Loudette Calpo’s Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008)
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGESTS (Atty. Gwen De Vera)
All by LOUDETTE CALPO (A 2008)
1. MARBURY v. MADISON
Action: A petition for writ of mandamus for delivery of document
Facts:
On the December Term, 1801, petitioner, with Dennis Ramsay, Robert
Townsende Hooe and William Harper petitioned for a rule to compel respondent to
show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue. Petitioner is asking to be
furnished with the commission as Justice of the Peace (JOP) of Washington, D.C.
Witnesses Wagner (not all commissions signed, recorded; did not personally see
commissions), Daniel Brent (almost certain of Marbury and Hooe’s appointment,
signed and affixed with a seal but not recorded; Ramsay not included), Lincoln
(Secretary of State during Adams, term) that no commissions were sent out.
James Marshall (delivered commissions, returned some including Hooe’s
and Harper’s), and Hazen Kimball (Marbury and Hooe commissions signed)
attested to the existence of the commissions, duly signed and affixed with US seal.
Petitioners were denied requests for the commission, and thus appeal to the Court
for a writ of mandamus. On February 24, 1803, the Court rendered its decision.
Issues:
1. WON applicant has right to commissions demanded.
2. WON this right, if violated, has a remedy in law.
3. WON writ of mandamus is the remedy, and if so,
4. WON writ can be issued by the Court to respondent.
Held:
1. YES, the applicants have the right to the commissions demanded. When
the commission was signed by the President, and the seal affixed
verifying the verity of the signature, the commission is complete. The
office of the JOP is independent of the Office of the President; once
signed, commission is irrevocable. The transmission or acceptance of the
commission is a practice of convenience and not law, since the document
is delivered to one ALREADY appointed. The petitioner thus has a vested
right to the office of JOP.
2. The violated right has a remedy in law. The Secretary of State has both a
public ministerial duty to the US and an agency to the President. It is in
this former capacity that he is accountable to the people. His executive or
discretionary power ended with the signing of the President of the
commission.
3. Mandamus is the proper remedy. There is no other adequate specific
legal remedy. Since a detinue involves an object or its value. Mandamus
is the proper remedy since the office is not to be sold (no attendant value;
all or nothing).
4. No, A writ cannot be issued by the court to the respondent. Although
Congress gave the Court the right to issue a writ of mandamus to any
court appointed, for any person holding office, ART.3 SEC. 2 of US
Constitution clearly outlines the original and appellate jurisdictions of the
Court. While a writ may be issued to the respondent the basis of which is
not the office but the nature of the thing to be done, it cannot be issued by
the SC following the Constitution. The jurisdiction to issue writs to public
officers lies within the inferior courts. To do otherwise would be to give
the legislative supreme power over the law, and any act contrary to the
Constitution cannot be valid and given effect by the courts.
WHEREFORE, Court holds that the petitioner has a legal right to the office of JOP
for five years, and the refusal to deliver the commission is a violation of that right.
While mandamus is the proper remedy, jurisdiction to issue the writ lies with the
inferior courts.
2. ANGARA v. EC
Facts:
On September 17, 1935, petitioner was elected member of the national
assembly for the first district of Tayabas. The provincial board of canvassers
proclaimed him on November 15, 1935, NA passed Resolution no. 8 confirming all
members whose election has not been contested. On December 9, 1935,
respondent Ynsua filed a protest of petitioner’s election, with a prayer that he be
declared winner or election declared null and void. He filed on the last day set by
the electoral commission. On December 20, 1935 petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss protest before the Electoral Commission on the following grounds:
1. Res. No. 8 valid exercise of legislative powers
2. Resolution has the object of limiting protest period
3. Protest filed outside prescribed period
Ynsua argued that there exists no constitutional provision or statute
prohibiting protest of election of a NA member after confirmation. On January 23,
1936, the EC denied the protest of which are the following grounds:
1. Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction to EC as regards
electoral disputes under Sec 4 Art 6
2. This excludes the power to regulate proceedings of said
election contests—reserved to NA
3. EC can only regulate if Na has not availed of the power to do
so
4. Resolution no. 8 valid
5. SC has jurisdiction over question; involves Constitutionality
under Par 13 Sec 1, ordinance appended to constitution and
Sec 1 and 3 of PC
The Solicitor General replied:
1. EC on independent instrument of NA, and its fixing of the deadline is
a valid exercise of its powers

2. Res. No. 8 should and can not deprive EC of this jurisdiction
3. EC invested with quasi-judicial powers created by PC- it is not an
inferior tribunal
Respondent Ynsua argued:
1. No law prescribing protest period was in effect at the time EC set the
deadline
2. He filed within the set deadline
3. EC has no jurisdiction, not reviewable by a writ of prohibition
4. No law requires confirmation of NA members
5. EC renders independent, final, and unappealable decisions
6. EC not inferior tribunal but empowered by Sec 226 and 516 of Code
of Civil Procedure
7. The Tydings-Mcduffie Law as invoked by petitioner is not applicable
to case at bar.
Issue:
1. WON SC has jurisdiction over EC case at bar
2. WON EC acted in excess of its jurisdiction, given the resolution passed by
NA
Held:
1. The SC has jurisdiction. There is a need to determine the scope,
characteristics, and extent of the Consti grant to EC under Sec 4 Art
6.
2. No. The deliberation of the Constitutional Commissioners show that
the purpose in creating the EC was to transfer all power related to
judgment on electoral dispute from NA to independent tribunal.
Absent a Consti provision stating otherwise, all powers to promulgate
its judgment of election contests lies with EC. The argument of abuse
is not relevant as everything can be actually met. Confirmation of
elected officials is not necessary. The Constitution abrogated the
Jones Law and Sec 478 of Act 3387, which gave NA the power to fix
the time period within which protests can be filed.
Wherefore, petition is denied, with costs to petitioner.
Also, Abad-Santos concurring:
• The power of EC to judge electoral contests judicial in nature
• The power to regulate time to protest legislative in nature
3. TANADA v. CUENCO
Facts:
On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate on behalf of the Nacionalista Party elected
respondents Cuenco & Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal upon
the nomination of Senator Primicias, an NP member. The two seats, originally for
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minority party nominees, were filled with NP members to meet the Constitutional
mandate under Sec. 2 Art. 6, over the objections of lone Citizen Party Senator
Tañada. Consequently, the Chairman of the Tribunal appointed the rest of the
respondents as staff members of Cuenco & Delgado. Petitioner alleges that the
nomination by Sen. Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate,
violates Sec. 2, Art. 6 of PC, since 3 seats on the ET are reserved for minority
senators duly nominated by the minority party representatives. Furthermore, as
respondents are about to decide on Electoral Case No. 4 of Senate, the case at
bar is a violation not only of Tañada's right as CP member of ET, but respondent
Macapagal's right to an impartial body that will try his election protest. Petitioners
pray for a writ of preliminary injunction against respondents (cannot exercise
duties), to be made permanent after a judgment to oust respondents is passed.
Respondents contend that the Court is without jurisdiction to try the appointment of
ET members, since it is a constitutional right granted to Senate. Moreover, the
petition is without cause of action since Tañada exhausted his right to nominate 2
more senators; he is in estoppel. They contend that the present action is not the
proper remedy, but an appeal to public opinion.
Issues:
1. WON Court has jurisdiction over the matter
2. WON Constitutional right of CP can be exercised by NP, or the Committee
on Rules for the Senate
Held:
1. Yes. The Court has jurisdiction. The case at bar is not an action against
the Senate compelling them to allow petitioners to exercise duties as
members of ET. The ET is part of neither House, even if the Senate elects
its members. The issue is not the power of the Senate to elect or
nominate, but the validity of the manner by which power was exercised
(constitutionality). The Court is concerned with the existence and extent of
said discretionary powers.
2. No. Although respondents allege that the Constitutional mandate of 6
Senate members in the ET must be followed, this cannot be done without
violating the spirit & philosophy of Art. 6, Sec. 2, which is to provide
against partisan decisions. The respondents' practical interpretation of the
law (modifying law to fit the situation) cannot be accepted; although they
followed mandate on number, they disobeyed mandate on procedure. The
contention that petitioner Tañada waived his rights or is in estoppel is not
tenable. When interests of public policy & morals are at issue, the power
to waive is inexistent. Tañada never led Primicias to believe that his
nominations on behalf of the CP are valid.
WHEREFORE, The Senate cannot elect members of the ET not nominated by the
proper party, nor can the majority party elect more than 3 members of the ET.
Furthermore, the CRS has no standing to nominate, and the election of
respondents Cuenco & Delgado void ab initio. The appointment of the staff
members are valid as it is a selection of personnel - a matter under the discretion
of the Chairman.

Paras, dissenting: The procedure or manner of nomination cannot affect Consti
mandate that the Senate is entitled to 6 seats in the ET. The number of seats (9)
must be held fixed, since the Consti must have consistent application. There is no
rule against the minority party nominating a majority party member to the ET.
Furthermore, the Senate, and not the parties, elect on the ET members, brushing
aside partisan concerns.
Labrador, dissenting:
The petition itself is unconstitutional under Art. 6 Sec. 2 because:
1. 9-member ET mandate violated
2. right to elect of Senate held in abeyance by refusal of minority party to
nominate
3. process of nomination effectively superior to power to elect (party v.
Senate power)
4. SC arrogation of power in determining Con Con’s proviso of <9 ET
members under certain circumstances
The refusal of Tañada to nominate must be considered a waiver of privilege based
on constitutionality and reason, in order to reconcile two applications of Art. 6, Sec.
2.
4. MUTUC v. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is campaigning to be delegate to the Constitutional Convention
and was prohibited by respondent from using a taped jungle for campaign
purposes. Respondent justifies prohibition as being pursuant to RA 6132
(Constitutional Convention Act), which makes it unlawful for candidates to
purchase, produce, request, or distribute various forms of electoral propaganda.
On October 29, 1970, petitioner filed a civil action for prohibition with a prayer for
preliminary injunction. Though prayer was denied, the Court granted by minute
resolution a writ of prohibition on November 3, 1970, agreeing with petitioner that
prohibition is a violation of Sec. 4, Art. 3 of the Philippine Constitution (free
speech).
Issue: WON COMELEC has the authority to prohibit petitioner’s self-expression
Held, Ratio
NO, the Court believes that the COMELEC does not have a statutory
authority through RA 6132. Its interpretation of the statute infringes upon the right
to free speech. Statutes should always be consonant with the Constitution, which
is the highest law of the land. COMELEC’s prohibiton, in effect, amounted to
censorship.
WHEREFORE, petition granted. Injunction issued on COMELEC order.
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5. OSMEÑA v. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioners argue that RA 7056, in providing for desynchronized elections
violates the Constitution:
1. PC mandate that local & nat’l elections be held on the second Monday of
May, beginning 1992
2. par. 2, Sec. 3 of RA 7056, by providing that provincial, city & municipal
officials hold over beyond June 30, 1992 violates Sec. 2, Art. 18 of PC
3. Par. 2 Sec. 3 of RA 7056 shortens the term of certain officials to be
elected on the second Monday of November 1992 – a violation of Sec. 8,
Art. 10 of PC
4. Sec. 8 of RA 7056, by fixing campaign periods (Pres. & VP – 130,
Senators – 45 days before elections) violates Sec. 9 Art. 9 of PC
5. Problems stated as reasons for desynchronization are not valid.
Petitioners argue that as public officials and taxpayers, they have the duty
to uphold the PC.
Respondents argue that the questioned provision is a valid exercise of
legislative power, and that the amending process in the Consti does not apply to
transitory provisions. Furthermore, it is a political question, and the petitioners have
no standing.
Pending judgment, a temporary restraining order on RA 7056 was issued on
June 27, 1991.
Issues:
1. WON Court has jurisdiction over the matter
2. WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional
3. WON amending process applies to Transitory Provisions
Held:
1. The Issue is a justiciable controversy. The act in question is not
discretionary in nature. The question is the legality and not wisdom of RA
7056. Furthermore, the SC now has expanded jurisdiction over matters
involving political questions, so long as Constitutionality is an issue, as
evident in Sec. 1, Art. 8 of PC. Transcendental importance of cases to the
public can merit brushing aside of procedure – which is why procedural
flaws (standing, etc.) of petitioners can be brushed aside.
2. The Statute is unconstitutional. The Constitution specifically provides for
the synchronization of elections, as seen from the discussion of its
framers. The provisions of RA 7056 assailed by petitioners are violative of
the Constitution.
3. Transitory Provisions are Constitutional. The Transitory Provisions were
not created to be “applied as soon as practicable,” but on a specific date:
2nd Monday of May, 1992. The Solicitor General merely focused on the

procedural issues and the legislative power of Congress, but failed to
address the Constitutional questions. Moreover, the absence of a
provision prohibiting separate elections does not preclude
synchronization.
WHEREFORE, RA 7056 is unconstitutional & therefore null & void. The TRO is
made permanent.
6. RUBI vs. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
Action: For Habeas Corpus
Facts:
Plaintiff alleges that he and other Mangyans are being illegally detained
by provincial officials in a reservation in Tigbao, Mindoro. Plaintiff further alleges
that Doroteo Dabalos is being held in custody in Calapan by the provincial sheriff
for escaping from the reservation.
Sec. 2145 (power to delegate tribes to lands) delegating power to the
provincial governor, and Sec. 2759 of Act No. 2711 (detainment for violation) are
alleged to be in violation of the August 29, 1916 Act of Congress, Sec. 3 of which
guarantees equal protection under the laws.
Defendant contends that the exercise of police power was valid and
promulgated for the interest of the nation: the Mangyans need to be civilized
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711 are invalid by virtue of:
1. Illegal delegation of power from legislative to provincial officials
(legislative avoided full responsibility)
2. Discrimination based on religious belief
3. Denying plaintiff of right to equal protection of the laws
4. Illegal detention is tantamount to involuntary servitude
*Act 547 expressly for Mangyans
Held:
1. There is no illegal delegation of power. The legislative only conferred
discretionary authority to the provincial governor considering his familiarity
with the best places for relocation. Such delegation of power is necessary for
the execution of the law.
2. No discrimination based on religious belief. Legal practice and legislative
intent clearly show that the term “Non-Christian” does not discriminate on the
basis of religion, or even geographical location. The term is used to indicate
whether or not a particular community has been civilized.
3. No denial of right to equal protection. While the law is universal in its
application, liberty must be understood to mean liberty restrained by
reasonable regulations to assure public safety. Thus, given the Mangyan’s
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tendency to slow Philippine progress, their civilization is necessary to protect
the interests of their more fortunate brothers.
4. No slavery/involuntary servitude imposed. The Mangyan are not being asked
to work for anyone other than themselves. The prohibition against their
leaving is necessary to ensure the interests of others (practice of caingin,
etc.). There remains to the plaintiff the avenue of redress. Challenging the
validity of the law without showing specific instance of oppression will only
hamper the government from achieving its goals. This is consistent with the
government policy in the Philippines being effective in bringing about the
civilization of inhabitants.
WHEREFORE, Writ denied. Habeas corpus cannot issue if plaintiff is not
unlawfully restrained of liberty.
CARLSON, concurring: The power to provide for the issuance of Sec. 2145 and
2759 is akin to orders governing children and persons of unsound mind. It is for
their own good.
MOIR, dissenting: The Mangyans are legal citizens of the Philippines,
unlike American Indian tribes who have treatises with the government. The
reasons of caingin practice and their subsequent burden to the State is not
justification for incarceration. The arbitrary and unrestrained power to do harm (by
provincial governor) must be measure of law’s validity rather than the potential to
do harm.
7. ROXAS & CO.,INC v. CA
Facts:
Petitioner is the registered owner of HAACIENDAS PALICA, BANILAD,
and CAYLAWAY, all located in NASUGBU, BATANGAS. On June 15, 1999, RA
6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) took effect. Petitioner has tendered
a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway to DAR, and haciendas Palico &
Banilad were later put under compulsory acquisition. On May 4, 19993, petitioner
applied for the conversion of his lands from agricultural to non-agricultural, citing
the SANGGUNIAN NG BAYAN NG NASUGBU’s reclassification of the land;
petitioner was denied. On August 24,1993, petitioner filed a case before the
DARAB with a prayer to cancel the CLOAS issued in the name of several persons.
Petitioner contended that the land was no longer suitable for agricultural purposes.
DARAB remarked that the determination of the land’s suitability for agriculture
should be determined by DAR, and remanded the case to SDAR. The petition
citing a lack of due process in the acquisition of lands was denied by the CA on
April 28, 1994. Petitioner submitted the following assignment of errors:
1. CA’s determination of a premature cause of action. (did not exhaust
administrative remedies given patent illegality of DAR acts)
2. CA’s ruling that land is subject to CARL.
3. DAR acquisition of land void for lack of due process. (no notice and
identification of land)

4. Lack of compensation even after petitioner was stripped of
landholding.
Issues:
1. WON SC can take cognizance of petition.
2. WON acquisition on proceeding valid in accordance with law.
3. WON SC has power to rule on the reclassification of land.
Held:
1. Yes. Petitioner had recourse to SC because he had been denied a
speedy, adequate remedy by DARAB.
2. No. The acquisition of DAR of the land violated due process rights of
petitioner. He did not receive compensation, was not informed which
part of the land was to be taken, an uninformed of proceedings. Under
the law, compensation must be made in cash or LBP bonds; the
conversion of trust fund accounts to cash & bonds did not remove the
procedural lapse. Moreover, JAIME PIMENTEL is not sufficiently
integrated with the company to know what he should have done with the
correspondence. Neither was he authorized. The petitioner likewise
had no chance to exercise his right of retention given that DAR had not
clearly shown the part of the land it placed under compulsory acquisition.
3. No. The lack of due process does not give the court justification to
decide whether the lands in question are agricultural or non-agricultural.
Neither are the CLOAs nullified at the expense of the land owners who
have tilled it for the last few years. DAR must be given time to correct
its procedural lapses.
WHEREFORE, The petition is granted in part. Acquisition proceedings are
nullified because of lack of due process. The case is remanded to DAR for proper
acquisition proceedings and determination of application of conversion.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, dissenting:
The remanding of the case should not be done, given how DAR has
already sat on the petition for seven years. Fruits of wrongful acts must be
nullified & the CLOAs revoked. The DAR acceptance of Presidential Proclamation
1520 which identified Nasugbu as a tourist zone implies recognizance that the land
is non-agricultural. Vote to grant certiorari, declare lands non-agricultural and
outside the scope of RA 6657.
8. ICHONG, ET AL v. HERNANDEZ & SARMIENTO
Action: Petition for mandamus & injunction
Facts:
Petitioner alleges that RA1180, by limiting the participation of aliens in retail
trade, is unconstitutional because:
1. denies alien residents equal protection & due process
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2. subject of Act not expressed in Title
3. violates International & Treaty obligations of RP
4. provisions against hereditary succession & capital requirements
violate sec1 & sec5 Art 13 and sec8 of Art 14 of PC
Respondents argue that the Act was a valid exercise of Legislative Power,
that there was only one subject in the title, that there was no infringement of any
international treaty, and that in the case of hereditary succession, only the form
and not the value of property was impaired. Moreover, the institution of inheritance
is of statutory origin.
Issue: WON exclusion of aliens from retail trade is unreasonable under sec1 Art 3
of PC.
Held: No. It is a valid exercise of power. Police power is said to be the most
positive & active of all governmental processes, and as such is essential,
insistent & illimitable. The Constitution does not define the scope of police
power, but only imposes limits in the form of due process & equal
protection of the laws. Equal protection of the laws does not demand
absolute equality among residents so long as there is like treatment under
like circumstances. If it applies to all members of the same class, there is
no infringement so long as the distinction is reasonable. Moreover, courts
can only inquire into the legality & not the wisdom of the law.
Alien domination is a fact proven by official statistics and felt by all Filipinos
across industries. The alien group is a well organized and powerful group
dominating the economic sphere and perpetrating abuses. Alienage is a
reasonable distinction given that aliens are here for gain & profit. They
have no real contribution to national economy & wealth (don’t invest). The
abuses done are against Filipinos goes against petitioners argument that
retail trade is only a continuance of nationalistic protective policy laid down
as law in the primary objective of the Constitution.
Wherefore, Petition DENIED.
9. PEOPLE v. FERRER
Facts:
On May 5, 1970 a criminal complaint was filed against respondent FELICIANO
CO charging him as a ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, in
violation of RA 1700 (Anti-Subversion Law). On May 25, 1970 a criminal case
against NILO TAYAG and others was filed for subversion – respondent was a
member of the Kabataang Makabayan, a subversive group, and tried to invite
others to revolt against the government. On July 21, 1970, TAYAG moved to
quash, arguing that RA 1700 is:
1. a bill of attainder;
2. vague;
3. with more than one subject expressed in title;

4. a denial of equal protection of laws.
On September 15, 1970, the statute was declared void on the grounds that it
is a bill of attainder, vague, and overbroad.
Issues:
1. WON RA 1700 is a bill of attainder
2. WON RA 17700 is overbroad and vague (due process)
Held:
1. No, it is not a bill of attainder. The act does not specify which CPP
members are to be punished. The focus is not on individuals but on
conduct relating to subversive purposes. The guilt of CPP members must
first be established, as well as their cognizance as shown by overt acts.
Even if acts specified individuals, instead of activities, it shall not be a bill
of attainder – not unless specific individuals were named. The court has
consistently upheld the CPP’s activities as inimical to public safety and
welfare. A bill of attainder must also reach past conduct and applied
retroactively; Section 4 of RA 1700 expressly states that the act will be
applied prospectively to give members time to renounce their affiliations.
The legislature is with reasonable relation to public health, morals, and
safety – and the government is with right to protect itself against
subversion.
2. No, the statute is not overbroad and vague. The respondents’ assertion
that the term “overthrow” is overbroad is likewise untenable, since it could
be achieved by peaceful means. Respondents disregarded the terms
“knowingly, willingly, and by overt acts,” overthrow is understood to be by
violent means. Whatever interest in free speech/associations that is
infringed is not enough to outweigh considerations of national security
and preservation of democracy. The title of the bill need not be a
catalogue of its contents – it is valid if it is indicative in broad but clear
terms the nature, scope, and consequences of proposed law and
operation.
Guidelines Set Forth by the Supreme Court:
1. In the case of any subversive group
a. establish purposes to overthrow and establish totalitarian regime
under foreign domination;
b. accused joined organization;
c. knowledge, will and overt action.
2. in CPP case
a. pursuit of objectives decried by the government;
b. accused joined organization;
c. knowledge, will, and overt action.
WHEREFORE, Resolution set aside, cases remanded to court a quo for trial on
merits.
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Fernando, dissenting:
RA 1700 must be appraised in light of meaning prescribed to
increasing complexity of subversive movements in the country. A taint of
invalidity is seen even in the title of the Act, which state the specific name of
an organization and create presumption of guilt. The right to dissent is
constitutionally protected, even if it contains a subversive tinge. Dissent is not
disloyalty. A line is drawn when words amount to incitement to sedition or
rebellion. Other means could have been taken to stem the issue and spread of
the CPP.
10. US v. POMPEYA
Facts:
On June 1, 1914 a petition against appellee was filed by the Prosecuting
Atty of Iloilo. The complaint charged appellee with a violation of sec 40(m) of the
municipal code, which required able-bodied men of specific characteristics to
render patrol and/or police duty to the community, given a certain situation. He was
sentenced by the Justice of Peace to pay P2 and court costs, whereupon he
contended before the CFI that the said ordinance violated the liberty of citizens
under the Philippine Bill. On August 22, 1914 a decision in favor of the appellee
was rendered. Upon appeal, appellee contended that the facts of the case are not
sufficient for cause of action.
Issues:
1. WON sec 40(m) of the municipal code is constitutional (liberty assured by the
Organic Act of the Philippines)
2. WON complaint is enough to sustain a cause of action
Held:
1. Yes, Sec 40(m) of the Municipal Code requires all able-bodied men of
specific characteristics to render service, and all householders to furnish
relevant information in cases the community is infested by ladrones. This
statute recognizes the common law right of the state to exercise police
power. The powers of the country or posse comitatus, vests those with
authority to maintain good order the power to call upon all able-bodied
men to assist in maintaining the security of the community.
Generally speaking, the Philippine Legislature can adopt laws on
matters not expressly given to Congress, whereas the latter can only
legislate on matters expressly granted to them by the Constitution. Police
power is inherent on this power of the state and cannot be limited in the
interest of presuming public order and preventing conflict of rights. Police
power is so extensive that the courts have not been able to define it, such
that each case is decided on its merits. Thus Act 1309 is a legitimate
exercise of police power.

2. No. While Act 1309 applies only to special individuals under special
circumstances, the complaint must show that the appellee falls within the
scope of that class. The complaint did not show appellee was part of the
class, or that special circumstance existed
Wherefore, Judgment affirmed and petition dismissed.
Pertinent Provisions of Sec 40(m) of Act 1309
• empowers municipal government, if province is overrun by ladrones and
outlaws to:
1. require able-bodied males between 18-50(55) to assist for not more
than 5 days per month in the apprehension of outlaws; patrol duty for
not more than once a wee.
2. Exact a fine or issue penalty for failure to comply ( not more than
P100; not more than 3 months) or both at the discretion of the courts
3. Docs not extend to US officers/employees
4. officers/employees of common carriers (sea and land), priests,
ministers, physicians, druggists, physicians engaged in business, and
lawyers when in court
Purpose of Act 1309
1. amendment of Municipal Code for organization of municipal governor
2. amendment to create sec 40 (m)
3. enunciation of municipal council powers
4. empowerment on additional areas to the council
11. AGUSTIN v. EDU
Action: Action for prohibition
Facts:
Petitioner assails Letter of Instruction No. 229 which provides for the
mandatory use of early warning devices for all motor vehicles. Petitioner owns a
Volkswagen Beetle equipped with blinking lights that could well serve as an early
warning device. He alleges that the statute:
1. violates the provision against delegation of police power
2. immoral – will only enrich the manufacturer of the devices at the car
owner’s expense
3. prevents car owners from finding alternatives
Petitioner prays for a declaration of nullity and a restraining order in the
meantime.
On the other hand, respondents’ answers are based on case law and
other authoritative decisions of the tribunal issues.
Issues:
1. WON LOI 229 is constitutional (due process)
2. WON LOI 229 is an invalid delegation of legislative power, as far as
implementation is concerned
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Held:
1. Yes. Respondents assert that LOI 229 is backed by factual data &
statistics, whereas petitioner’s conjectural assertions are without merit.
The statute is a valid exercise of police power in so far as it promotes
public safety, and petitioner failed to present factual evidence to rebut the
presumed validity of the statute. Early warning devices have a clear
emergency meaning, whereas blinking lights are equivocal and would
increase accidents. The petitioner’s contention that the devices’
manufacturers may be abusive does not invalidate the law. Petitioner’s
objection is based on a negative view of the statute’s wisdom-something
the court can’t decide on.
2. No. The authority delegated in the implementation is not legislative in
nature. Respondent Edu was merely enforcing the law forms part of
Philippine law. PD 207 ratified the Vienna Convention’s recommendation
of enacting road safety signs and devices. Respondents are merely
enforcing this law. Moreover, the equal protection under the laws
contention was not elaborated upon.
Wherefore: Petition is dismissed. Judgment immediately executory.
Teehankee, dissenting:
The rules and regulations outlined by the LTO Commission does not
reflect the real intent of LOI229.
1. Effectivity and utility of statute not yet demonstrated.
2. public necessity for LOI not yet shown
3. big financial burden on motorists
4. no real effort shown to illustrate less burdensome alternative to early
warning device
5. imperative need to impose blanket requirement on all vehicles
-people still drive dilapidated vehicle
-need for sustained education campaign to instill safe driving
The exercise of police power affecting the life , liberty, and property of any person
is till subject to judicial inquiry.
12. US v. GOMEZ JESUS
Facts:
On July 17, 1913 a complaint was filed before the COFI MANILA charging
defendant with practicing medicine without a license 1. Contrary to SEC. 8 ACT 310
of the PC. Defendant contends that:
1. Complaint was not in the form required by law
2. Facts stated do not constitute a crime
3. Complaint’s allegations are justifications to legally exempt the accused.
1
Defendant found guilty of violating the OPIUM LAW

The demurrer was overruled and COFI found the defendant guilty of charges
filed against him.
Defendant presented the following errors on appeal:
1. The provisions of SEC 8 ACT 310is contradictory to the PHILIPPINE BILL
2. Powers vested in BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINER to revoke licenses of
physicians convicted of unprofessional conduct should not be valid (basis
of defendant’s license’s revoke)
3. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINER’s decision should not be taken as final
pending the appeal to the BOARD OF HEALTH (later withdrawn by
defendant)
4. Objection to defense evidence that the practice is worth more than P600
was sustained
5. Lower court took HOTEL QUIRUGILO as a cloak to aid defendant’s
contravention of the law
6. Sentence of fine and subsidiary imprisonment invalid
Defendant further alleged that SEC 8 of ACT 310 is void because of:
1. It violates PAR 1 SEC 5 of ACT OF CONGRESS (no deprivation of life,
liberty, property without due process)
2. Power to revoke licenses only with COFI & SC
3. Power of BOME to revoke licenses repealed by SEC 88 of the
PHILIPPINE BILL.
Issues:
1. WON state can require certain standards of morality/scholarship in the
practice of certain professions
2. WON the state has the right to revoke licenses
3. WON State can punish those who practice medicine without a license
Held:
1. Yes. The state has the general power to enact laws in relation to persons
and property to promote public health, morals, safety and welfare. Thus,
police power cannot be deprived from the state – to deprive it from the
state would be to destroy the purpose of the state. The deprivation of
rights of certain people cannot curtail police power. Private interests must
be subservient to the general interest of the community. Police power is
so extensive and pervasive that the courts do not give it exact definition.
There is no arbitrary deprivation of rights if the exercise is nor permitted
by virtue of the detriment to society.
2. Yes. Reliance is placed on the medical license issued by competent
authority by people who invoke the aid of physicians. State police power
to regulate/monitor/revoke licenses extends to all areas affecting public
interest and welfare
Loudette Calpo’s Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008)
8
3. Yes. The law is not necessarily invalid if it provides a remedy to those
affected simply because it does not provide for appeal to the courts. Due
process of law is not judicial process. Once revoked the right to appeal
the issuance of one’s license is only a statutory right not an inherent right.
WHEREFORE, Judgment affirmed
13. MORFE v. MUTUC
Facts:
Petitioner alleges that RA 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT PRACTEICES ACT) by
requiring periodic ruling of the SAL of public officers is an unlawful exercise of
police power and is unconstitutional because:
1. It violates the right to privacy
2. Violates ban against unreasonable search and seizure and the prohibition
against self-incrimination.
The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioner and granted the petition for
injunction. Appellant contends that RA 3019 is a valid exercise of public power
to safeguard public morals. Appellee contends the statute’s presumption of
guilt is an affront to dignify tax law & tax census law already require
documents relevant to RA 3019’s purposes.
Issues:
1. WON case exhibits evidence to rebut presumption of constitutional
validity
2. WON statute violates the right to privacy, self incrimination &
unreasonable search & seizure (valid exercise of police power?)
Held:
1. The evidence is not enough to rebut the presumption of its
constitutionality. There is no factual basis for the allegation, and the
validity of the statute must be upheld. It has been said that when freedom
is impelled by law, freedom must be respected, but if property is curtailed,
the legislator’s judgment must be respected.
2. There is no violation of any right to privacy, self-incrimination and
unreasonable search and seizure. 3019 (Sec 7) was drafted in order to
address the rampant corruption in politics. Restriction of liberty is done
for the greater good, and is allowable so long as due process is observed.
Public servants are protected in so far as they cannot be removed from
office without just cause. RA 3019 is thus not arbitrary exercise of police
power. There is no unconstitutional intrusion to the public servant’s
privacy nor an unreasonable search & seizure. The statute is with
reference to a determinate provision and a procedure that must be
followed. Invoking the violation of the self-incrimination clause will have
to wait until charges have been filed. Arguing that the statute is an affiant
to dignity is likewise untenable. The court can only decide in the legality
& not the wisdom of the statutes.

WHEREFORE, Judgment is affirmed.
14. ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC
v. CITY MAYOR
Facts:
On July 5, 1963 petitioner filed for a writ of prohibition against respondent,
challenging the Municipal Board of Manila from enacting Ordinance No. 4760.
Petitioner alleged that said ordinance was unconstitutional, unreasonable,
oppressive, arbitrary, denies rights to privacy and self-incrimination, and void since
the respondent was without authority to regulate motels (not expressly granted by
law or the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The petition was granted by
the lower court and the statute declared null and void.
Respondent, in appealing to the Supreme Court, contended that:
1. petitioner was without cause of action;
2. ordinance had a reasonable relation to a public purpose (curb immorality);
3. ordinance a valid exercise of police power;
4. only guests/customers can argue for abridgement of right to privacy and
self-incrimination;
5. preliminary injunction issued is contrary to law, and the petition should be
dismissed.
Issues:
1. WON case at bar has shown that the ordinance is unconstitutional;
2. WON ordinance violates due process rights;
3. WON ordinance is vague or uncertain.
Held:
1. The case at bar has not shown that the ordinance is unconstitutional. The
presumption of a statute’s constitutionality is presumed and the burden to
prove otherwise rests with the petitioner. The absence of evidence does
not impair the statute’s validity. Police power, being the most essential,
insistent and least limitable of powers aims to safeguard public morals,
and must be respected until clearly shown to violate constitutional rights.
2. The ordinance did not violate due process. There is no controlling and
precise definition of due process. It is the standard to which governmental
action must conform in order that life, liberty or property deprivation is
valid. The test of an ordinance is its responsiveness to reason and the
dictates of justice. Much wider discretion is afforded to the state in terms
of licensing non-useful corporations, and the state generally does not
interfere with such discretion. The fact that some may lose their jobs does
not curtail police power, which is exercised in the interest of the
community. Liberty is not absolute and is regulated by law. When the
liberty curtailed by statutes affects property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wide.
Loudette Calpo’s Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008)
9
3. The ordinance is not vague. The petition seems to indicate that the
problem with the statute is that it is too detailed rather than vague. It
concerns (such as whether it is the owner or operator who determines
profits) such as those raised by the petitioner are not enough to invalidate
the ordinance. As Justice Holmes said, there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean.
WHEREFORE: Judgment is reversed; order prohibiting statute enforcement is
set aside.
15. BUCK v. BELL
Facts:
Plaintiff is a feeble minded woman, daughter of a feeble-minded woman
committed to the same institution. She is likewise the mother of a feeble minded,
illegitimate child. The petition is to review the decision of SCA Virginia upholding
the order of salpingectomy issued by the Circuit Court of Amherst City.
Plaintiff alleges that such order, under the act of assembly; is
unconstitutional as it violates plaintiff’s right to bodily integrity, and is repugnant to
the due process provision of the 14th Amendment. In Mann vs. Illinois the Court
ruled that the inhibition against deprivation extends to all limbs and faculties
through which life is enjoyed, and of what God has given everyone with life. While
the statute provides for a hearing before the operation, and may be in a court of
law in case of appeal, it does not meet the constitutional requirement of due
process of law (form of procedure cannot convert process to due process if
constitutional rights are denied).
The test of due process of law must show that proceedings are legal &
preserves liberty of citizens. Furthermore, the statute denies institutionalized
individuals equal protection of the law as the classification is not enough to justify
the statute. Such classification must be on reasonable grounds considering the
legislative purpose; it cannot be arbitrary. The statute’s objective of preventing the
reproduction of mentally defective people would give the state legislature, as they
are the ones who determine the standards for mental capacity. Tyranny of medical
professionals & its system of judicature would be established.
For its part the defense contends that the statute does not constitute cruel
& unusual punishment, which necessarily involves torture. In State vs. Felin it was
held that the asexualization process is not a cruel punishment. The statute is a
valid exercise of police power, as provided for in Sec 159 of the Virginia
Constitution (police power never to be abridged). The state’s confinement of the
feeble minded precludes their procreation, and is a deprivation of liberty that was
never questioned. Compulsory vaccinations are similar ways to protect the
individual & society.
Issues:
1. WON Virginia statute is a constitutional deprivation of liberty
2. WON classification is reasonable
3. WON plaintiff has been denied due process of law

Held:
1. Yes, the Virginia statute is constitutional. The Virginia statute has for its
purpose the protection of individual & and societal health by the
sterilization of mental defectives, who may be safely discharged by virtue
of sterilization. The plaintiff contends that the statute is patently
unjustifiable. Yet public welfare can call upon some citizens to sacrifice
their lives – it is reasonable to call upon those who already burden the
state to make lesser sacrifices. It is better for the world to execute
degenerates for crime now, and prevent imbeciles from starving. It is a
reasonable desire to prevent the manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind. The principle sustaining compulsory vaccination is broad enough to
cover salpingectomy. Given the policy, the law has done all that is needed
by striving to bring all similarly situated within the scope of the policy.
2. Yes, the classification is reasonable. The statue is based on a reasonable
classification. In Virginia, marriage with feeble minded is prohibited, and
consummation is heavily penalized. In Peterson vs. Widule, the Court
upheld the necessity of requiring males applying for marriage to present a
physician’s certificate attesting in their freedom from disease.
3. No. The statute’s strict guidelines on the procedure to be followed in the
case at bar illustrates the protection the state affords to the feeble
minded. The power of the state superintendent must be preceded by strict
compliance to procedure. In the case at bar, every step taken was in
keeping with the procedural requirements.
WHEREFORE, judgment affirmed.
16. RUTTER v. ESTEBAN
Facts:
On Aug. 20, 1941 appellant sold to appellee two parcels of land in Manila
for P9,600 ( P4,800 up front, P2,400 on August 7, 1942 and 1943, at 7% interest).
A mortgage to secure the first payment was taken in the name of the plaintiff,
whereupon a deed of sale in favor of defendant was executed. On August 2, 1949,
plaintiff filed a petition before the COFI to recover the unpaid balance and accrued
interest, as well as attorney’s fees. There was also a prayer for the sale of the
properties pursuant to law should the plaintiff fail to collect.
Defendant contended that he is protected by:
1. Moratorium clause in RA 342
2. He is a war sufferer with a claim with the Philippine War Damage
Commission for losses
3. The liability was incurred as a pre-war obligation
4. Sec 2 of RA 342 suspend the payment of obligations until after 8 years
from the settlement of claims
Loudette Calpo’s Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008)
10
Defendant argues said period ha not expired, the COFI ruled that the
obligations were not yet demandable pursuant to the Moratorium Law. A motion for
reconsideration assailing the constitutionality of the moratorium was likewise
dismissed.
Issues:
1. WON Sec 2 of RA 342 is unconstitutional (impairs the obligations of
contract; prohibited under Sec 1 Art 3)
2. WON RA 342 is a valid exercise of police power
Held:
1. No, it is constitutional. A moratorium in essence an application of sovereign
power, adopted during the times of national emergency. It is considered
constitutional as long as the determination of the suspension of remedies is
definite and reasonable. The policy of protecting contractual obligations
presupposes the maintenance of a government with adequate authority to
secure the peace and order of society, without which contracts are
unenforceable in the first place. The statute is constitutional insofar as it
protects national economic interests. The assumption is that all contracts are
subject to the implied reservation of the state’s protective power.
2. Yes, it is a valid exercise of police power. RA 342 is a valid exercise of police
power given the emergency situation and need for action.
Police power is limited by:
1. impairment (only remedy, never the substantive right) – determinate and
reasonable suspension
2. justified by emergency situation, temporary and reasonable conditions
The statute protects war sufferers from debtors, and gives them the opportunity to
rehabilitate themselves. However, creditors in effect will have to wait for 12 years
before they can collect under RA 342, which is an unreasonable amount of time
given the local situation of progress due to American aid and local spirit. Thus
while RA 342 has a reasonable relation to public welfare, the rime of the
moratorium is impossible.
Wherefore, Act 342 unreasonable and oppressive, declared null and void. EO 25
and 32 are likewise lifted, given it has no limitations and can only be lifted once
declared null and void. Decision reversed.
Notes:
Sec 2 RA 342
All debts and monetary obligations incurred before December 8, 1941 are due and
demandable after 8 years after settlement of war damages claims before the
Philippine War Damage Commission.
Sec 3 RA 342

If Sec 2 is nullified, provision of EO 25 as amended by EO 32 shall take no effect.
The nullification of the Act revives the former moratorium by the President.
17. UNITED STATES v. TORIBIO
Facts:
Evidence shows that appellant slaughtered a carabao for human
consumption without a permit from the municipal treasurer pursuant to sec. 30 and
33 of Act 1147, regarding the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.
Appellant contends that since there are no municipal slaughter house in Carmen,
Bohol, the provision of Act 1147 do not apply, since the wording of the statute limits
the prohibition and slaughtering in a municipal slaughterhouse. The defendant’s
previous application for a permit to slaughter was denied because the animal was
not found to be unfit for agricultural or draft purposes. He further alleges that
penalizing those who slaughter animals without a permit is unconstitutional by
violating sec 5 of the Phillippine Bill (due process). The prohibition unjustly limits
defendant’s enjoyment of his property.
Issues:
1. WON provision of ACT 1147 apply despite an absence of a municipal
slaughterhouse.
2. WON Act 1147 is unconstitutional for violating due process rights of
defendant.
Held:
1. Yes, provisions apply. Sec 30 and 33 of Act 1147 must be taken in the
context of the legislator’s intent. Given that the purpose of the bill is to
protect large cattle theft and facilitate the return of the cows/cattle to
owners, the interpretation of the Act must be consistent with the intent.
The court holds that in general, the Act prohibits the slaughter of large
cattle anywhere, and in particular, the slaughter of large cattle in
municipal slaughterhouses (both without permits). When a statute’s
language is susceptible to 2 or more constructions, interpretation should
be according to the intent of the legislator.
2. No. It is not clear whether the defendant assailed the statue for being (1)
unlawful taking of property by right of eminent domain (without
compensation) or (2) an undue and unauthorized exercise of police
power.
All property acquired and held under the condition that it is not used to
injure the equal rights of others, or impair public rights. While the statute detracts
from the enjoyment of property by owners, it does not constitute a “taking” of
property. Act 1147 is not an exercise of the right to eminent domain, but a
reasonable limitation of the law of rights of property in keeping with the police
power for public welfare. The state can interfere whenever public interests so
demand. A large discretion is vested in the legislative to determine public interests
Loudette Calpo’s Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008)
11
and the measures necessary for their protection. The justifications of police power
exercise are (1) the interests of the public (versus a specific class) require
interference and (2) must be through reasonable means, and not oppressive. The
determination of proper exercise of police power is subject to the court’s
supervision.
Wherefore, Judgment affirmed.
Notes:
The statute was drafted after a virus attacked the carabao population.
Lands were not tilled and need to import rice arise. Cattle rustling increased. Thus,
exercise of police power is justified. There is a necessity and a right of self-
protection.
Act 1147, sec 30: Requirement of approval from the municipal treasurer whenever
large cattle are slaughtered.
Sec 31: Permit to slaughter does not extend to animals still fit for agricultural or
draft purposes.
Sec 33: Slaughter must be in municipal slaughterhouses for food or human
consumption.
18. JM TUASON & CO. vs. LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION
Action: An Appeal from CFI.
Facts:
Feb 18, 1970- Court rendered judgment reversing the lower court’s decision that
RA 2616 is unconstitutional.
March 30, 1970 – motion for reconsideration was filed by appellee invoking his
rights to due process & equal protection of laws
May 27, 1970 – detailed opposition to the reconsideration was filed by SG Felix
Antonio
June 15, 1970 - a rejoinder of petition was filed. Petitioner contends that the
expropriation of Tatalon Estate in Quezon City is unconstitutional (by
virtue of its denial of due process for landowners) pursuant to RA 2616
sec 4. *the statute prohibits suit for ejectment proceedings & continuance
of proceedings after expropriation proceedings have been initiated.
Issues:
1. WON sec4 RA2616 is unconstitutional by virtue of its denial of due
process & equal protection
2. WON procedural mistakes invalidate the statute
Held:
1. No, the statute is constitutional. The statute is held to be constitutional
given the opportunity and protection it affords to land owners in
recognizing their right to evict subject to expropriation proceedings and
just compensation. RA 3453 amended sec4 of RA 2616 in order to

address this precise problem (sec4 of RA 3453 previously held to be
unconstitutional.)
The amendment was drafted in light of Cuatico vs. Court of
Appeals where the landowner’s right to due process was impaired by
tenants’ invocation of as-yet-to-be instituted expropriation proceedings.
2. The procedural mistakes do not invalidate the statute. Inaccuracies
committed by Congress in determining who owns the land does not
invalidate the statute. Dominical rights cannot be conferred on those
obviously not entitled to them. Appellee’s fears are without legal basis.
The government will only compensate rightful owners.
Wherefore, Judgment AFFIRMED.
19. US vs. CAUSBY
Facts:
Respondents are owners of 2.8-acre farm outside of Greensboro, North
Carolina. Said property was close to the municipal airport leased by the
government. The Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) designated the safe path to
glide to one of the airport runways over the property of appellees. They contend
that the noise and glare from airplaines landing and taking off constituted a taking
of property under the FIFTH AMENDMENT. The Court of Claims found the facts
of the case to constitute a taking of property and rewarded appellees with $2,000
as value of the easement.
Issues:
1. WON appellee’s property was taken as provided for the Fifth Amendment
2. WON awarding of damages is reasonable
3. WON Court of Claims is with jurisdiction
Held, Ratio:
1. Yes, US Congress enacted the Air Commerce Act of 1926 (as amended
by Civil Aeronautics Act of 1930), which outlines that the US had complete
and exclusive national sovereignty in air space. The Act deemed
navigable air space as that above the minimum safe altitude of flight
prescribed by the CAA. While appellant contend that the flight is well
within the minimum safe altitude (take-off and landing), and that there was
no physical invasion or taking of property, the Court ruled that rendering
lands unusable for purposes of a chicken farm entitles petitioners to
compensation under the Fifth Amendment, despite the Court’s
unfavorable view of the application of the common law doctrine. The
measure of value is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The path of
glide as defined by the appellant is not within the meaning of minimum
safe altitude of flight in the statute. Land owners are entitled to at least as
much space above ground as he can occupy in connection with his use of
the land. The damages sustained were a product of a direct invasion of
respondent’s domain. It is the character of invasion, and not the amount
Loudette Calpo’s Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008)
12
of damage resulting, that determines WON property was taken.
Furthermore, the definition of “property” under the Fifth Amendment
contains a meaning supplied by local law – as in the case of North
Carolina Law.
2. No, the value of the land was not completely destroyed; it can still be
used for other purposes. Thus, appellees are only entitled to a lower
value given the limited utility of the land. However, there is no precise
description of the nature of the easement taken, whether temporary or
permanent. These deficiencies in evidentiary findings are not rectified by
a statement of opinion. The finding of facts on every material matter is a
statutory requirement. The Court of Claims’ finding of permanence is
more conjectural than factual; more is needed to determine US liability.
Thus, the amount stated as damages is not proper.
3. Yes, the Court of Claims has clear jurisdiction over the matter. The
question of WON there has been a taking property is a claim within the
constitutionally-granted jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.
WHEREFORE, the judgment is reversed. Case remanded to the Court of Claims
for evidentiary hearing.
Justice Black, dissenting:
The Court’s opinion seems to be that it is the noise and glare of planes,
rather than the flying of the planes themselves, which constitutes taking. The
appellee’s claims are at best an action in tort (nuisance, statute violation,
negligence). The Government cannot be sued in the Court of Claims unless over
matters of implied or express contracts. There is no contract involved in the case at
bar.
The concept of “taking” has been given a sweeping meaning. The old
concept of land ownership must be made compatible with the new field of air
regulation. The damages should not be elevated to the level of the Constitution, as
it would be an obstacle to a better-adapted, vital system of national progress.
20. US v. CALTEX
Facts:
At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, oil companies had
terminal facilities in Pandacan. The US army restricted the distribution of products
for civilian use requisitioning most of the supplies for the war effort. On December
26, 1941, the order for the demolition of all unused products and terminals was
issued to prevent the approaching enemy from using the supplies.
On December 31, 1941, demolition was completed just as the enemy
entered Manila. Following liberation, appellees are demanding compensation for
the property the US Army used and destroyed. While the US Government paid for
the petroleum stocks, transportation equipment used and destroyed, they refused
to compensate appellees for the Pandacan terminals. The appellees concede that
the US army had the right to destroy such installations, but argue that they are
entitled to compensation just the same. Appellees cite Mitchell v. Harmony and US
v. Russel as legal basis for their claim.

Issue: Whether or not appellees are entitled to compensation for properties
demolished for public welfare.
Held: No they are not. The appellee’s use of Harmony and Russel is untenable.
In neither case was the US Army bound by the sole purpose of destroying strategic
property to prevent the use by the enemy. On the other hand, US v. Pacific R.
Company governs the case at bar. It was held that the losses and injury to private
property are borne by the sufferer alone as a consequence of war. The order of
demolition by the Commander General is justified by war necessities. The safety
of the state takes precedence over personal loss. Common law likewise holds
that the sovereign is immune from liability when he destroys public property in the
interest of society.
Wherefore, Judgment reversed.
Justice Douglas, dissenting: The Army may have authority to destroy, but
the 5th amendment requires compensation for taking of property. Whenever
government appropriates private property for public use, the public purse should
bear the loss.
21. HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA v. REYES
Facts:
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of PD 564 (Revised Charter of
PTA) and proclamation No. 2052 (declaring certain Cebu towns and municipalities
as tourist zones). They contend that expropriation cannot continue because:
1. To do so would be uconstitutional (no specific constitutional provisions for
tourism expropriation, and that expropriation under PP 1533 does not
offer unjust compensation)
2. Land in question is part of the Land Reform Program (jurisdiction under
Court of Agrarian Relations, and tourism concerns cannot be superior to
land reform concerns)
3. Expropriation proceedings / Writ of possession issued premature
(necessity of taking unestablished)
4. Forcible ejectment of tenants criminal under PD 583 (prohibits orders
contrary to the Land Reform Act)
Issues:
1. WON expropriation for tourism purposes is unconstitutional.
2. WON land meant for land reform can be expropriated for tourism
purposes.
3. WON the taking was premature
4. WON ejectment of tenants is unconstitutional
Held:
1. Expropriation for tourism purposes is constitutional. The taking of the
land for tourism purposes is supported by the constitution. Sec 2 Art
4 provides for taking with just compensation. Sec 6 Art 14 empowers
congress to expropriation of private lands with just compensation.
Loudette Calpo’s Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008)
13
The petitioner’s view or the state’s right of eminent domain is
restrictive and based on a misconception of fundamentals. “Tourism”
is a specific term that may not be found in the constitution, which is
phrased in general terms of objectives that are archived by varying
programs. The provisions for agrarian reform do not preclude the
exercise of eminent domain for tourism / development projects.
2. Yes, but the issue is moot. Petitioners claim that the certificate of land
transfer and Emancipation Patents issued to them as proof that the
land has been expropriated under PD 2 (Agrarian Reform Law), and
thus can no longer be expropriated for tourism purposes. Yet the
petitioners failed to show that the land is indeed a land reform area to
which they are entitled. The area to be expropriated is hilly and
unproductive, and few of the petitioners have the necessary
document anyway. Thus, there is no real need to determine the
superiority of one public interest over another. Even contracts have
never impaired state right to expropriate.
3. No, the taking was not premature. PD 42 as amended by PD 1533
empowers the government to take immediate possession of land
provided 10% of the property value has been deposited with the
proper agencies. This is supported by Art 8 Sec Par 2 of PC, which
gives Presidential Decrees the character of law. Given the fidelity of
the PTA in following procedure, the writs of possession issued are not
premature.
4. The ejectment of the tenants is constitutional. Petitioners claim that
PD 583 prohibits the implementation of orders contrary to the Land
Reform Law. However, the law refers to tenant farmers forcing
emancipation rights, and does not apply to the expropriation of the
state. The land in question is not even a tenanted area.
Wherefore, Petition dismissed for lack of merit
Makasiar, dissenting:
The rights to land under the Land Reform Law is greater than the states
right to develop land for tourism. But since petitioners are not tenants of the land,
petition must be dismissed.
22. PHILIPPINE REALTORS v. SANTOS
Facts:
Petitioner is with judgment against defendant in an ejectment suit dated
August 14, 1959, the land in question being in Sampaloc, Manila and of 20,500
square meters. Writs of ejectment and demolition were issued despite appeals of
defendants. On August 5, 1963 the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) filed for the
expropriation of the land for subdivision and sale to its tenants. Respondent argues
that the condemnation is in keeping with Sec. 2 of RA 1400, since the land was

formerly part of Hacienda Tuazon and, thus, in keeping with Sec. 4, Art. 13 of the
Philippine Constitution (PC).
Issue: WON land is expropriable under Sec. 4, Art. 13 of PC
Held, Ratio:
NO, the condemnation proposed by respondents is inadmissible as
illustrated in RP vs. Manotok Realty. While the government has the right to
expropriate lands/estates relative to small urban lands (5 hectares or so), it does
not mean that land can be expropriated once more years after it has been
partitioned. Land cannot be expropriated on the argument that it was once landed
estate. Landed estates are determined by area or extension, not the number of
tenants.
WHEREFORE, petition for certiorari is granted, COFI order of August 6, 1963 set
aside and therein petition dismissed.
23. GUIDO v. RURAL PROGRESS
Facts:
Petitioners filed for a Writ of Prohibition to prevent the expropriation of her land in
Maypajo, Rizal. Petitioner contends that:
1. Respondent is without authority to negotiate for a bank loan used as
partial payment for her property.
2. Land in question is in part commercial, making it exempt from Act
359 (expropriation of private lands)
3. Expropriation will impair the obligation of contracts
4. Value set by lower court is erroneous
Issue: Whether or not the land is expropriable under sec 4 of Art13 of PC.
Held: No, the land is not. Various laws support the legitimacy of expropriation of
private lands (Commonwealth Act 539, sec1 provides for expropriation/
purchase of private lands & expropriation for subdivision of small lots,
sec2 provides for the designation of authority to any agency to carry out
expropriation, and sec4 art13 PC empowers CONGRESS to expropriate
private lands). Whether or not private lands can be expropriated
regardless of location, area or nature is reflected in the purpose for the
Constitutional provision, which is to break up large estates for the benefit
of small landowners. The constitution does not seek to undermine
property rights, and sec 4 art 13 allows only for expropriation for public
benefit of a few families does not constitute public benefit. There is no line
to determine when public use can be used as basis for expropriation;
decisions must be made on a case-to-case basis. Deciding in favor of the
respondents may only give rise for more oppressive cases of
expropriation.
Wherefore, Petition GRANTED
Loudette Calpo’s Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008)
14
Torres, concurring – Art 13 sec4 was not intended to be applicable in all
cases. Not judging on the merits of individual cases may give rise to
socialism.
24. REPUBLIC v. JUAN
Facts:
On September 28, 1964 the lower court to expropriate appellants land to
be used as La Union Regional argricultural school, with compensation set at
P190,000 given pre-expropriation correspondence with appellants. On april 15,
1963, the government had taken immediate possession of the land after depositing
P90,000 with the provincial treasurer of La Union, defendants had petitioned to lift
the writ of possession, arguing that:
1. value of land higher than the value set by the provincial appraisal
committee in resolution 13, series of 1962
2. expropriation must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
3. provisional value should be at P300,000
4. writ of possession set aside until jurisdiction is determined or provisional
value deposited
The defendant, after the trial court had found in favor of apellee and ordered
deposit of P100,000. appealed for the reconsideration of value and dismissal of
expropriation, they present the following errors:
1. manner of expropriation objectionable (no valid negotiation prior to taking
in violation of EO 132 series of 1937)
2. value of property determined contrary to legal requirements (value far less
than that determined by provincial agriculturists)
Issues:
1. WON defendant was denied due process
2. WON value of compensation was just
Held:
1. No, the defendant was not denied due process. Negotiations were
evident even before expropriation proceedings began, given
correspondence with defendants. The appellee is excercising its right of
eminent domain, and EO 132 being an administrative requirement, does
not impair the exercise of the plaintiffs right. Defendants withdrawal of the
money precludes any objection to the expropriation proceedings.
2. Yes, the value of the compensation was just. The valuation of the lots
must be fair not only to owners but to taxpayers as well. The value must
reflect only that which owner has been deprived of. The defendants last
valuation of P500,000 is binding and admissible sec. 22 rule 130 of
RROC, given that there was no indication of a factual error. The price to
be considered is the value of the property at the beginning of the
expropriation, and nor inclusive of the improvements the government has
made since occupation. Given that the defendants invested only P90,000,

to require taxpayers to pay P616,000 is unjust. Sec. 2 rule 67 RROC
provides that when the landowner himself fixes the price it becomes
binding. The discrepancy between peso values in 1963 and 1979 is not
enough reason to increase the land value drastically, since the
government will pay interests anyway.
Wherefore, Judgment modified, plaintiff must pay P200,000 with 6% interest.
Teehankee, concurring: Defendants; valuation binding, given that there is no
factual error.
Antonio, dissenting: defendant only referred to a P300,000 provisional value
valuation not bindng if unjust valuation affected by land residential potential
Provincial Agriculturist appraisal objective and authoritative, just and realistic
devaluation of peso justifies doubling of price of land.
25. COMISSIONER v. BOTELHO SHIPPING CORP.
Facts:
Appellants (Gov’t) seek to reverse the judgment of the court of Tax Appeals
holding respondents exempt from compensating taxes on vessels M/S Maria
Rosello and M/S General Lim. The reparation committee of the Philippines had
sold the ships to respondents on Aug 30, 1960 and Sept. 19, 1960 under RA 1789.
Respondents were denied due process for the vessels’ registration until the
compensating tax was paid. While their case was pending before the lower court,
RA 3079 amended RA 1789 insofar as the following provisions are relevant:
1. buyers of reparation goods no longer required to pay compensation tax
2. Sec 20 of RA 3079 provided for the renovation of previous contracts to
avail of the amendatory act’s benefits on the condition that the end users
voluntarily assumes all new obligations. Respondents applied for and
were granted renovation, whereupon they filed a petition for review before
the Tax Court, which ruled in their favor.
Appellants contend that the court erred in finding for respondents because:
1. no clear intent of retroactivity is seen in RA 3079
2. Congress could not have intended retroactivity as it would be prejudicial
to the government
3. benefits alluded to in Sec 20 of Ra 3079 does not include tax exemptions
Issue: Whether or not retroactivity was intended by Congress in RA 3079
Held: Yes. The appellants contentions are untenable. Tax exemptions, by nature,
are prejudicial to the government as it is a waiver of a right to collect what would be
due to the gov’t. The tax exemption, which is given for a public benefit greater than
monetary loss, is clear and explicit in RA 3079. The statute is with a valuable
consideration for the retroactivity: the voluntary assumption of all new obligations
under the act. Sec 14 of the law on reparations exempt not particular persons but
members of a particular class. There is no constitutional prohibition against
Loudette Calpo’s Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008)
15
granting tax exemptions to specific people anyway so long as a denial of equal
protection does not arise through unreasonable discrimination. Moreover, RA 3079
does not explicitly declare the exemption of parties to contracts prior the
amendment because those parties still have to apply for renovation of their
contracts. Sec 20 of RA 3079 does not seek to discriminate but to abolish
discrimination (Phil Ace Lines Inc. vs Commission on Internal Revenue)
Wherefore, Judgment affirmed.
26. LUTZ v. ARANETA
Facts:
Appellant contests the legality of the taxes imposed by Commonwealth Act No. 567
(Sugar Adjustment Act) alleging that the tax is unconstitutional as it is only for the
benefit of the sugar industry and not the public. Appellant seeks to recover P14,
666.40 in taxes.
Issue: Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 567 is unconstitutional on the
grounds that no benefit directly accrue to the public.
Held: No, the appellant’s assumption that CA No. 567 is a pure exercise of taxing
power is untenable. Sec 6 of CA No. 567 indicates that the tax is for a regulatory
purpose and to rehabilitate and stabilize the threatened sugar industry. The
protection and advancement of sugar industry affects the public welfare greatly as
the industry is the biggest contributor to GDP. The authority of the legislature to
enact laws for the promotion of the industry is subject only to the test of
reasonableness. As such, taxation can be made the implement of the State’s
police power. It is inherent in the power to tax that the state be free to select the
subjects of taxation. The inequalities that may arise from the choice of who to tax
or to exempt are not unconstitutional. Even if other industries may be in like
danger, the protection of the sugar industry is not wrong.
Wherefore, Judgment affirmed.
Notes on CA No. 567 (introduction):
1. Sec 1- state of emergency due to the Tydings-McDuffie Act, and the
imposition of export taxes and corresponding loss of preferential position
in US markets. There is a need to stabilize the industry.
2. Sec 2- an increase in the tax of sugar manufacturers on a graduated
basis.
3. Sec 3- owners/controllers of sugar land ceded to sugar manufacturers to
pay taxes equal to the difference between rent and 12% of the land tax.
4. Sec 6- all tax collections for the Sugar Adjustment & Stabilization fund is
to be used for achieving the objectives set by law.
CA 567 Objectives
1. to place sugar industry in a competitive position despite increasing
competition

2. readjust industry benefits for all involved to encourage continued
profitable engagement
3. limit sugar production to more economically suitable areas
4. afford improved living wage to laborers subject to certain conditions,
purposes, and through particular means
27. REPUBLIC v. BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING CO
Facts:
Appellants are sister companies under one controlling management. The
lower court found them liable for special assessments under Sec. 15 of RA 632
(Charter of Philippine Sugar Institute or Philsugin). Appellants contend that they
are exempt/ not liable for said tax given Philsugin’s unlawful acquisition and
disastrous management of Insular Sugar Refinery. They allege that:
1. RA 632 does not authorize the purchase of sugar mills.
2. There is only an obligation to pay the special tax as long as
benefits accrue to the taxpayers, since RA 632 is not an act for
revenue generation.
The lower court decided in favor of the plaintiff because:
1. Sec 3 of RA 632 authorizes Philsugin to acquire sugar refineries.
2. Claim of fund misappropriation and lack of benefits to appellants
untenable; Philsugin board is composed of members
recommended by National Federation of Sugar Cane Planters
and Philippine Sugar Association, of which appellants are
members.
3. All financial transactions by Philsugin audited by a variety of
agencies.
4. Wrongness of petition: anyone can then refuse to pay taxes if he
suspects fund misappropriation.
To which the appellants rejoined:
1. Safeguards do not ensure legality of actions
2. Philsugin without authority to acquire sugar refineries given the
difference between central experiment stations and sugar
refineries (Collector vs. Ledesma, Commonwealth Act No. 470)
3. Refusal to pay under RA 632 is a refusal to pay a special tax.
Refusal to pay ordinary tax would impede government functions.
4. Norwood vs. Baer indicates the imposition of special benefits
without accruing benefits as a denial of due process.
Issues:
1. WON Philsugin is authorized to acquire sugar refineries under RA 632
2. WON special assessments are justified by benefits accruing to
taxpayers.
Held:
1. YES. The acquisition of a sugar refinery is authorized by Sec 2 (A) of
RA 632, which provides for the conduction of research work for the
improvement of the sugar industry in all its phases. Even if the operation
Loudette Calpo’s Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008)
16
of the facility resulted in a loss, the experience is still a gain to the entire
industry. Sec 2 (A) of RA 632 and its objectives can only be achieved
through the actual operation of a refinery.
2. No. There is no need for benefits to accrue to the taxpayer in the
collection of special assessments. Lutz vs. Araneta illustrated that the
protection of the sugar industry is a matter of public concern. Legislature
is with power to do what is necessary for the industry’s protection and
promotion, subject to the test of reasonableness. The exercise of special
taxation is thus an exercise of sovereign power no private citizen can
lawfully resist, because of another sovereign power, which is police
power.
Wherefore, judgment affirmed.
NOTES ON RA 632
Sec 2. Objectives of Philsugin:
a. Conduct research for the sugar industry in all its phases
(agricultural/industrial) to reduce cost and improve efficiency
b. improve methods of sugar cane raising and sugar manufacture
c. ensure stable permanent and sufficient production of sugar for local
and international consumption
d. maintain balance between production and consumption, and stabilize
prices with a reasonable profit
e. improve sugar merchandising in markets to ensure economic security
f. improve living and economic situation of sugar laborers by correcting
inequalities.
Sec 15. Ways to achieve objectives
Capitalization – annual sugar production tax of 10 centavos per picul of sugar fro 5
years from 1951-1952 for funds for Act implementation; borne by sugarcane
planters/centrals in proportion of milling share.
Sec 16. Special Fund
Levy for the Sugar Research and Stabilization Fund for Philsugin
Sec 3. Powers of Philsugin
a. acquire/establish/operate central experiment stations to research on
sugar cane culture and manufacture, related subjects
b. purchase equipment for experiment
c. expand local and foreign market
d. buy/own/manage materials for production of sugar-related subjects
e. enter into or make contracts to attain purposes
f. grant loans to laborers
g. do all such things to attain objectives
h. execute all corporation powers under the corporation law.

28. KILOSBAYAN v. GUINGONA
Facts:
Petitioners filed a case for the prohibition / injunction with a prayer for a
TRO & preliminary injunction against the implementation of the Contract of Lease
between PCSO & PGMC in connection to an online lotto system. Petitioners are
suing in their capacity as members of Congress and as taxpayers. On
DECEMBER 17, 1993 the Contract of Lease was executed and approved by the
president on DECEMBER 20, 1993. Petitioner claims that the respondents & the
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT gravely abused their discretion tantamount to a lack
of authority by entering into the contract, because:
1. Section 1 of RA 1169 (PCSO Charter) prohibits the PCSO from
conducting lotteries in cooperation with any entity
2. RA 3846 & jurisprudence require Congresional franchise before a telecom
system (public utility) can be established
3. Article 12 of Section 11 of the Constitution prohibits companies with less
than 60% Filipino Ownership from operating a public system
4. PGMG is not authorized by its charter or by RA 7042 (Foreign Investment
Act) to install an online Lotto system
a. The contract shows that PGMC is the actual operatior while it is
a 75% foreign-owned company. RA 7042 puts all forms of
gambling on the negative list
Respondents answered the allegations by contending:
1. PGMC is only an independent contractor. There is no shared franchise
2. PCSO will not a operate a public system as a telecom system is an
indispensable requirement of an online lottery system. Petitioner
interpretation of Section 1 of RA 1169 too narrow.
3. There are no violations of laws
4. The issue of morality is a political one and should not be resolved in a
legal forum
5. Petitioners are without legal standing, as illustrated in Valmonte vs. PCSO
a. The PCSO is a corporate entity and can enter into all kinds of
contracts to achieve objectives. Arguing that PCSO will operate
a public utility, it is still exempted under Section of Act 3846,
where legislative franchisees are not necessary for radio stations
Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioners have standing
2. Whether or not the contract is legal under Section 1 of RA 1169
Held:
1. Yes, petitioners have standing. Standing is only a procedural technicality
that can be set aside depending on the importance of an issue. As
taxpayers and citizens to be affected by the reach of the lotto system,
petitioners have standing.
2. No, the contract is illegal. The Court rules in the negative arguing that
“whatever is not unequivocally granted is withheld.” PCSO cannot share
Loudette Calpo’s Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008)
17
the franchise in any way. The contract’s nature can be understood to form
the intent of the parties as evident in the provisions of the contract. Article
1371 of the CC provides that the intent of contracting parties are
determined in part through their acts. The only contribution PCSO will be
giving is the authority to operate. All risks are to be taken by the lessor;
operation will be taken by the PCSO only after 8 years. Further proof are:
a. Payment of investment acts in the even of contract suspension /
breach
b. Rent not fixed at 4.9% and can be reduced given that all risks
are borne by the lessor
c. Prohibition against PGMC involvement in competitor games;
strange if gaming is PGMC; business
d. Public stock requirement of 25% in 2 years, which is
unreasonable for a lease contract. It indicates that PGMC is the
operator and the condition an attempt to increase public benefit
through public involvement.
e. Escrow deposit may be used as performance bond.
f. PGMC operation evident in personnel management, procedural
and coordinating rules set by the lessor.
g. PCSO authority to terminate contact upon PGMC insolvency
The contract indicates that PCSO is the actual lessor of the authority to
operate given the indivisible community between them.
Wherefore, Petition granted. Contract invalid and TRO made permanent
Cruz, Concurring:
The respondent was not able to prove the allegations that the contract
was intentionally crafted to appear to be a lease. PCSO cannot operate without the
collaboration of PGMC. The rental fee underscores the PGMC interest in the
success of the venture, since their income depends on the degree of success. The
transaction is immoral insofar as the activity is fixed by the foreigners on us with
government approval.
Feliciano concurring:
Locus standi reflects an important constitutional principle: the separation
of powers. The rules is that those assailing statute must show the adverse effect of
its implementation has on them. But it is not a rigid rule. It is not enough that the
court invoke public mistrust or national concern in brushing aside the requirement,
as it would mean standing is dependent on a majority and is far from being
intellectually satisfying. While no principle has been set for determining standing,
the guidelines are:
1. character of funds involved (is it public in nature?  in this case, the
funds are from the general populace); taxpayer with right to see taxes
used properly.
2. clear disregard of a law prohibiting certain actions of a public agency –
the judicial conclusion on case merits interact with the notion of locus
standi

3. lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest. In this case, no
other government agency filed suit.
4. wide impact or implementation; in this case, nationwide.
Padilla, concurring:
Gambling is immoral. Petitioner must show a clear, personal or legal right
violated by the assailed law, but the requirement must be relaxed in the face of
paramount national interest. The PCSO-PGMC contract is clearly a joint venture as
each party contributes its share in the enterprise or project – PCSO contributes the
market.
Melo, dissenting:
The petition must be dismissed for lack of standing. Petitioners are
without a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy; to invoke public
interest is too broad and indeterminate. Their capacity as taxpayers does not give
them standing; a taxpayer suit can arise only w\hen public funds derived from
taxation are improperly disbursed. PCSO is not a revenue-collecting fund and as
such no public funds are involved. The funds in question are corporate in nature
and will not fo into the National Treasury. If the petition is entertained, it may give
rise to nuisance suits.
Puno, dissenting:
The requirement of standing to sue inheres from the definition of judicial
power. It is not merely a technical rule. Section 1, Article 8 of Consti outlines the
requirements to be satisfied / complied with before coming to court:
a) actual case / controversy
b) question of constitutionality raised by the proper party with actual or
potential injury
c) question raised ASAP
d) judicial decision on question raised necessarily to determine the case.
Even a relaxation of the requirement of standing does not mean all cases
should be heard. Petitioner has no standing because:
a) not part of the contract
b) petitioners are not personally injured; they won’t even play
c) no ordinary tax is involved or tax money used, given that PGMC assumes
all risk
d) an action on behalf of other parties must exhibit personal injury and a
need to prevent the erosion of a third party right
The invocation of constitutional rights and the allegation of vioalation are
untenable. Section 1 Article 13(enhance right to dignity and equality
through property regulation) is a mere policy direction for the legislative,
reminding them to prioritize certain concerns. Section 11, Aticle 12 (60%
Filipino ownership) violations cannot be determined by the Court as
PGMC has not been proven to be foreign-owned or controlled. The
rulings in DE GUIA VS. COMELEC the Court treated standing as a
procedural rule when in fact it is a constitutional requirement under Sec 1,
Loudette Calpo’s Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008)
18
Art. 8. In FLAST VS. COHEN standing was shown to focus on the party
and not the issue. Standing cannot be granted simply because others
cannot come to court. The taxpayer suit is without legal basis as the
PCSO is a quasi-public corporation where taxpayer derivative suits
cannot be recognized. The majority struck down the contract on the basis
of a statute, but invoked National Importance for overlooking standing.
There are no Constitutionally-based arguments. Power unused would be
better than power misused. Petition denied.
Vitug, Separate Opinion:
Tax Payer suits are recognized only insofar as public funds from taxation
are misused. Locus standi is not merely a procedural rule but the essence of
jurisdiction. The petition strikes at factual issues and requires evidence. The
petitioner’s claim that lottery being a game of chance is a crime against morals in
the REVISED PENAL CODE is misplaced. The Court has not power to ignore legal
mandates. RA 1169 Section 1 authorizes PCSO to conduct lotteries. Petition
dismissed.
Kapunan, dissenting:
There is a need to comply with standards before petition can be
recognized. The judiciary has power to decide on cases only when litigants with
real interests at stake file complaints in accordance with law. The funds in
questions are generated from sources other than taxation / public funds. The Court
must respect the other branches of government; national interest is not enough
reason to encroach on their powers. The judicial power is to check, not to supplant
those powers of elected representatives. There is no constitutional issue involved;
the question of the contract’s validity should have been brough before the lower
courts. Petition denied.
29. PHILCONSA v. ENRIQUEZ
30. AVELINO v. CUENCO
31. UNTAL v. CHIEF OF STAFF
Action: Resolution on motion for reconsideration
Facts:
Petitioner is a first class private of the 212 th Military Police Company of
AFP, stationed in Manicani, Guiuan, Samar, which was stationed for the sole
purpose of guarding surplus supplies in the area.
On November 4, 1947, petitioner killed Sgt. Francisco Estrada with a rifle
and charged with a violation of 93rd Article of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408).
Petitioner pleaded not guilty, contending that the offense occurred in time of peace,
and thus the General Court Martial is without jurisdiction. The defense alleges that
WW II was terminated by the Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945 in Tokyo

Bay, reinstating the judicial branch. Thus, petitioner is not triable not only under the
original 94th Article of War, but also under the amended one, as well as the 93 rd
Article of War.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is triable under Articles of War.
Held: Yes, he is. Petitioner is triable under the Articles of War given that the treaty
of peace had not been signed and officially announced US Jurisprudence indicate
that a state of war ceases only upon the declaration or signing of a treaty of peace.
Raquiza v. Bradford illustrates how detainment of POWs is constitutional even after
hostilities have ended, if peace has not been declared in the official legal sense.
Petitioner is not triable under the original 94th Article of War, as the crime was
committed outside of a military reservation. Neither can he be tried under the new
law, as amended by RA 242, as it was passed on June 12, 1948 – after the crime
was committed. Thus, petitioner is found to have violated the 93rd Article of War.
WHEREFORE, Petition is denied.
NOTES ON ARTICLES OF WAR
Original 94th Article of War – Any person subject to military rule committing a
penal offense on Philippine Army Reservation during a time of war is punishable by
Court Martial.
94th Article of War, amended by RA 242 – Offender punishable by Court Martial
outside military reservation, if offended party is subject to military law.
Article 93 – Any subject under military law committing murder punishable by
death/life imprisonment by Court martial directive, if committed in time of war (lifted
from US 92nd Article of War)
FERIA, dissenting on ratio:
The petitioner is triable under the 94th Article of War as amended, even if
outside reservation. The amendment was after the offense, but before the
prosecution and trial began.
RP is no longer at war since the US withdrawal on July 4, 1946 gave us
sovereignty. Before then, we could not enter into war or a treaty of peace as we
were not independent. The country has never been at war with the Axis powers.
38. ALMARIO v. ALBA (by Diane Sayo)
Facts:
• Batas Pambansa Blg. 643 – provides for a plebiscite on 27 January 1984
to either approve or reject the amendments to the Constitution proposed
by BP Resolutions Nos. 104, 105, 1120, 112, and 113. There are four
separate questions answerable by YES or NO.
Loudette Calpo’s Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008)
19
• Question No. 3 – vote for approval of amendments proposed by BP No.
105, which provides that grant shall be an additional mode for the
acquisition of lands, as part of Sec 11 Art XIV of consti.
• Question No. 4 – vote for the approval of amendments proposed by BP
No. 113, which provides that a paragraph will be included in Section 12
Article XIV of the Consti. The additional paragraph shall provide that the
state will undertake an urban land reform and social housing program
wherein reasonable opportunities to acquire land and decent housing will
be made available, consistent with Section 2 Art IV of consti.
Petitioners deem that there has been no fair and proper submission to the
people prior the plebiscite. The petitioners are asking for more time for the people
to study the meaning and implications of Res. No. 105 and 113.
Issue: WON there are enough grounds for cause for postponement of the
plebiscite.
Held: NO. The petitioners failed to show sufficient cause for postponement of the
plebiscite.
No one should deny to the voters their right to decide whether or not they
agree to such amendments. The issue here whether the voter are aware of the
wisdom, the desirability, and the danger of an abuse that may come about with
Res. 105 and 113. Though the “grant” as a form of acquiring land may either mean
just the same as “homestead” or “free patents” or just plain giving away of land, the
petitioners failed to show the voter’s lack of discretion. Also, the Filipino people
have long been aware of urban land reform and social housing, anyway.  The
wisdom of the proposed amendment, that is, the meaning that it holds, is beyond
the power of the court to adjudicate.
The Comelec, along with civic organizations including the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, has been giving effort in information dissemination, such that the
petitioner’s request for 67 days (for Res. 105) and 42 days (for Res. 113) before
ratification is too much, given that the 1935 consti was ratified only after 36 days
upon approval of Act No. 4200.
Wherefore, Petition DISMISSED.
Fernando, CJ, concurs: No question need arise under the standard of proper
submission, referring to CJ Conceptions’ decision in Gonzales vs. Comelec
Separate Opinions:
Planas, J, concurs: The amendments proposed by questions No. 3 and 4 are
already inherent in the consti!!! What is the point then of the amendments?
The plebiscite is just a waste of effort, time, and money!!! But given that the
plebiscites will still push through, there is no need for two separate plebiscites.
Teehankee, J., dissents: Questions 3 and 4 do present a problem. They are
unnecessary and redundant to the consti, since these are already
encompassed in the “social justice and equity” responsibility of the

government as provided by the consti. Also, there has been no ample time for
the dissemination of information on the implications of Q # 3; this is proven by
the fact that even the judiciary is doubting its significance and consider it as
unnecessary.
Abad Santos, J. separate opinion: populace is not yet fully prepared to decide on
Q 3 and 4. it is best that the plebiscite for these questions be held on a
separate date.
Melencio-Herrera, J. separate opinion: the number of days to which a proposed
consti amendment is to be submitted in a plebiscite is within the power of the
Batasan, and will depend on the date of publication of the Batas Pambansa on
the Official Gazette.
Relova, J. separate opinion: The people, especially those from the provinces, are
not yet fully informed of the implications of Q 3 and 4!!! In fact, the proposed
amendments have been translated only in Tagalog and Cebuano! The voter
needs ample basis for an intelligent appraisal on the matter. (note: the
decision was given only two days before the plebiscite!)
39. MABANAG v. LOPEZ VITO (by Chesa Baltazar)
Petition for Prohibition with preliminary injunction (March 5, 1947)
Facts: Petitioners pray to prevent the enforcement of a joint resolution (through
R.A. No.73) proposing an amendment to the Constitution to be appended as an
ordinance thereto (note: this is the controversial Parity Rights Amendment).
Among them are 8 Senators who have been suspended and 17 representatives
who have not been allowed to sit in the House shortly after the opening of the 1 st
session on account of alleged election irregularities. They thus did not take part in
the passage of the questioned resolution, nor were they included in the
computation of the ¾ vote requirement for the passage of a resolution proposing
amendments. Petitioners also include presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the
Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
Issue:
WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this case.
Held:
No, the Supreme Court ruled that it did not.
1. This is a political question, and is thus outside of the province of the
judiciary. The term “political question” is not susceptible of exact
definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in harmony as
to the scope of its restrictions.
In Coleman v. Miller, it was said that since ratification of an amendment is
a political question, a proposal which leads to it must also be a political
question. There is no logic attaching political character to ratification and
withholding that character from proposal. Said case was a petition for
Loudette Calpo’s Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008)
20
mandamus by members of the Senate to compel the Sec of State to erase
an indorsement on the resolution ratifying the Child Labor Amendment to
the effect that it has been adopted and to indorse thereon the words “as
not passed.” The issue was the power of the Lt Governor to cast his vote
in the event of a tie in the Senate, and the “loss of vitality” of the proposed
amendment due to the failure of ratification within a reasonable time of 3
years.
The Kansas SC held that it had jurisdiction in so far as
petitioners’ standing went, but dismissed the petition on its merits. It
concluded that the substantive issue was a political question and was not
subject to review of the court. The justices themselves were at odds and
were “equally divided” into 3 groups, and the case was treated as
“interesting” and “amusing” by an article in the Yale Law Journal in so far
as it was labeled, “Sawing a Justice in Half.”
Nonetheless, this SC bases its decision on the concurring
opinions of four justices in the Coleman case.
2. The enrolled bill rule should be followed, as it conforms to the policy of the
lawmaking body (sec 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended
by Act 2210), and as it is required by the respect due to a coequal and
independent department of the government and is also one of
convenience in so far as courts need not look beyond the legislative
journals and instead, just rely on prima facie evidence.
In our jurisdiction, there are two methods of proving legislative
proceedings: by the journals, or by a duly authenticated copy. Both are
conclusive proof of the provisions of Acts and due enactment thereof. The
SC found no irregularity in the journals in the passage of RA 73.
Decision: Petition dismissed. It is unnecessary to decide on the issue regarding
computation.
Bengzon, concurring:
On the principle of separation of powers: It is a time-honored rule that
courts may not go behind legislative journals to contradict the veracity of enrolled
bills and resolutions. Journal entries are binding on the judiciary and they may
question neither their veracity nor the computation of votes for approval because
this matter is entirely left to the discretion of the legislature:
Hilado, concurring and dissenting:
Suspension of members of the Congress is their business and thus is a
political question which may not be interfered with by the Court. Suspension should
thus be taken for granted, preventing any justification or reason for even including
the suspended members in the determination of the ¾ vote. Furthermore, there is
also no way of determining how they would have voted.

Perfecto, dissenting (his right brain took over ):
On the issue of computation:
Respondents maintain that on the date of the passage of the joint
resolution, there were only 21 senators and 90 representatives. However, the
stipulation of facts belies this and in fact shows that there were 24 senators and 90
reps. Based on this, the votes obtained to approve the resolution fall short of the ¾
requirement.
On the issue of political questions:
This “doctrine” should not be accepted at its face value as it is not even a
doctrine but a general proposition despite the majority’s claim that it is “well-
established.” Doctrines should be expressed in simple and self-evident terms. A
doctrine such as this in which one of the nuclear terms is the subject of endless
debate is a misnomer and a paradox. He thus refuses to accept it.
On the Coleman case:
This invoked authority has no relevance at all to the matters of
controversy in the present case. In the Coleman case, no controversy of violation
of specific Constitutional provisions was raised.
The major premise of the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black was that
the Constitution granted Congress exclusive control over submission of
amendment. While this may be applicable to the US, no such unlimited power is
granted to our own Congress. Submission is expressly provided by law.
On the enrolled bill theory:
This theory is absurd and should not be accepted. Though it prevails in
England, we are “not Simians trained in the art of imitation” so as to be incapable
of thinking independently. The invoked section 313 is now obsolete, and has been
repealed by its non-inclusion in the Rules of Court.
On the respect due to a coequal branch and convenience:
We should not sacrifice truth and justice for the sake of social courtesy
and convenience.
On the Constitutional numerical rules:
The Constitutional Conventional put them there for a purpose (affecting
matters of momentos importance) and we abide by the wise teachings of
experience. The ¾ rule must not be left to the caprice of arbitrary majorities,
otherwise it would be the deathknell of constitutionalism in our country.
On the Jalandoni case: lessons learned:
The SC has the duty of giving redress in clear cases of violation of the
fundamental law, and must not bury their heads in the sand as ostriches tend to
do.
It is also necessary in the effective administration of justice that some of
the existing wrong attitudes (particularly those used as premises for the majority
opinion in this case) should be discarded and replaced with more progressive ones
in consonance with truth and reason.
Loudette Calpo’s Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008)
21
40. OCCENA v. COMELEC (by Chesa Baltazar)
Action: Petition for Prohibition (April 2, 1981)
Facts:
Petitioners, suing as taxpayers, assail the validity of Resolution Nos. 28, 104 and
106 (1981) of the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP) on the premise that the 1973
is not the fundamental law (so basically, all their arguments attack certain
provisions of that Consti). SC here has to dismiss their petition precisely because
 they are bound to defend that Constitution which they have held to be valid in
the Javellana case.
Issues:
1. WON the force and applicability of the 1973 Consti may be denied.
Held:
No, it may not. It is too late to assail it. In Javellana, CS, by a majority vote (6-4),
pronounced the validity of the 1973 Constitution. The function of judicial review
has both a positive and negative effect: it can sustain the validity as well as nullify
the acts of coordinate branches. The SC already sustained the 1973 Consti’s
validity, thus resolving all doubts against it.
2. WON assailed resolutions are invalid based on:
a. The questioned existence of the power of the IBP to propose
amendments.
Held:
No, The 1976 amendments gave it the same functions, responsibilities, rights,
and privileges as the Interim National Assembly and regular National Assembly,
one such power being the power to propose amendments upon special call by the
Prime Minister by majority vote. Thus, IBP could and did propose the amendments
embodied in the assailed resolutions.
b. The proposed amendments are so extensive in character that
they actually revise, and not merely amend, and thus go beyond
the limits of the authority conferred on the IBP.
Held:
No. The Constitutional Convention has the discretion to either propose
amendments only or entirely overhaul the Consti and then submit it to the people
for ratification. “Amendment” includes “revision” or total overhaul.
c. The fact that only a majority vote and not the ¾ vote is required
to convene as the agency proposing amendments.
NO.
Ratio: The Consti specifically requires only a majority vote. Besides,
“extraordinary” majority was in fact obtained when the IBP exercised its constituent
power to propose amendments.

d. The length of the time necessary for submission.
NO.
Ratio: The Consti indicates the way the matter should be resolved. Article XVI,
Section 2 states only that the plebiscite should be held not later than 3 months
after approval of the amendment/revision (there is no minimum requirement). The
people have been adequately informed.
Decision: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
Teehankee, dissenting:
1. Consistently with his dissenting opinion in Sanidad on the invalidity of the
1976 amendments for not having been proposed/adopted in accordance
wit mandatory provisions, which require that they must come from the
Interim National Assembly and not from the executive power as vested in
the President (PM) from whom such constituent power has been withheld.
2. Proposed amendments at bar having been adopted by the IBP as the fruit
of the invalid 1976 amendments must also suffer from the same inherent
infirmity.
3. Length of time for submission was inadequate. What the Consti directs is
that the government shouled exert all effort to enlighten the people so that
there will be fair submission, and intelligent consent/ rejection.
“A good Consti should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and
popular caprice/passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must
yield to the thought of the people, not to the whim of the people…” (Judge
Cooley).
41. GONZALES v. COMELEC (by Diane Sayo)
Facts:
• Republic Act No. 4913 – provides that the amendments on the
Constitution proposed by Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for
approval by the people, at the general elections on 14 November 1967.
• Resolution for Both Houses (RBH) No. 1 – proposing that Section 5
Article VI of the Constitution be amended so as the membership of the
House of Representatives be increased from 120 to a maximum of 180.
• RBH 2 – calling a convention to proposed amendments to Constitution
• RBH 3 – proposing that Section 16 Article VI of the Constitution be
amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of
Representatives to become delegates of the constitutional convention
without forfeiting their slots in the Congress.
Petitioner Gonzales prays for judgment to restrain (1) Comelec from
enforcing RA 4913 or to hold any plebiscite, (2) Director of Printing from printing
the ballots, and (3) auditor general from disbursing any funds related to RA 4913.
He deems the Act as unconstitutional and void.
Loudette Calpo’s Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008)
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Petitioner Philconsa asks for a review by certiorari of the resolution of
Comelec dismissing their prior petition, similar to that of L-28196.
Issue: WON RA 4913 is unconstitutional.
Held: NO. It is not unconstitutional. Several reasons are enumerated:
1. The votes cast in Congress in favor of the proposed amendment
satisfy the three-fourths vote requirement as stated in the Consti. The
issue raised in the case is not a political question, hence the court
decided upon such in the same way as in Tanada vs. Cuenco and
Avelino vs. Cuenco.
2. Though it is the people who has the inherent power to amend the
fundamental law, the Congress acts as a constituent assembly in
proposing amendments or calling a convention for such purpose;
Congress does not have the final say. (In light of the spirit of the law,
the “or” here may mean “and”.)
3. Legality of the congress: Sec 5 Art VI of the consti provides that
Congress may make an approportionment of the their representation
within three years. This should not be read as three years after the
ratification of the 1935 consti but applied in every subsequent
election. In fact, there has not been any valid approportionment since
1935! This does not repeal the Election Law regarding the election of
members of Congress (failure to make an approportionment within
three years after the census of 1960). The then members of
Congress are not just de facto officers.
4. Power of Congress, as provided for in the consti, to approve
resolutions, should not be denied!!! Their reasons for approving
resolutions is an issue political in nature, and not subject to review by
the court. And besides, the determination of the conditions under
which amendments shall be submitted to the people is a matter that
falls under the legislative sphere.
5. Date of the elections: there is nothing in the provision indicated that
the plebiscite will be held as a “special election” and not as part of a
“general election”. (note: all three previous plebiscites to amend the
consti are held as special elections. This is the first time that it will be
part of a general election.)
6. Public knowledge of proposed amendments: copies of the
amendments are posted in public places and polling stations, and
even at the back of the ballots.
Wherefore, Petitions DISMISSED.
Separate Concurring Opinions:
Makalintal, J.:
(1) The means of informing people is enough. 
(2) (2) RA 4913 constitutional. To declare unconstitutionality, there should
proven an irreconcilable conflict between it and the consti.

(3) (3) Ratification need not be in a special election or plebiscite.
Bengzon, J.:
(1) The manner or procedure of proposing amendments (ie. the 3-4ths vote
of the Congress) should not be questioned! In fact, the three-fourths vote
for RA 4913 is not even required since the Act merely provides the
manner and date the amendments will be voted upon, and not the
contents of the amendments themselves!
(2) Again, special election is not required!
(3) Due process clause: The means of informing the people on the
amendments (publications, posted on public areas and on polling areas)
are not infringements of due process. Fair and reasonable opportunity to
be informed is given.
Fernando, J.: Certain aspects of the amending process may be considered
political but then the judicial inquiry in this case is still the best means to
assure compliance of constitutional requirements.
Dissenting Opinions:
Sanchez, J.: “Submission” is not the same as “ratification”: The changes that the
two amendments will bring about will certainly affect the people as a
whole. The word “submitted” can only mean that the government should
strain every effort in to inform every citizen of both the provisions to be
amended and the proposed amendments (not just the latter, as planned).
People should be enlightened; there must be fair submission.
(a) The procedure for dissemination of information is defective:
not everyone has access to the Official Gazette, not everyone goes to
public places such as municipal hall, much less for the reason of reading
such amendments, etc.
(b) date of plebiscite: has always been separate from general
elections
Reyes, JBL, J.: The intention of the framers of the consti is that the people will
give importance and undivided attention for amendments. That is why these are
submitted and approved in special elections exclusively devoted to the issue.
ANNOTATION by Atty. Domingo Lucenario
Political Question refers to those questions which under the consti are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to the delegated
authority to the legislative and executive. Political questions involve political rights,
that is, the right to participate in the establishment or management of the
government. On the other hand, justiceable questions are those that affect civil,
personal, or property rights accorded to all.
The judiciary cannot revise or even question the acts of the executive and
the legislative branches that are within the power granted to them by the
constitution. The judiciary is merely empowered to determine limitations which the
law places upon official actions. Hence in determining the jurisdiction of the courts
in such cases is the issue involved, and not the law or provision to be applied.
Several particular questions are held to be political (total of 14!!!). Among
the examples given are:
Loudette Calpo’s Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008)
23
1. inquiry regarding the wisdom, justice, or advisability of particular law
– this is a question for the legislature, who makes these laws, to
determine. Refer to Angara vs. Electoral Commission
2. issues affecting exercise of executive power to appoint and withdraw
appointments. – the Commission on Appointments serves as the
check-and-balance.
3. Whether lawless violence, invasion, etc., and war exists – refer to
Untal vs. Chief of Staff (the articles of war case)
Several particular questions held to be justiceable (there are 6). Among
the examples given are:
1. validity of proceedings in Senate Electoral Tribunal (SEL) – refer to
Tanada vs. Cuenco; the constitution sets limitations on the choice of
members of SEL.
2. determination of number of votes essential to constitute a quorum –
refer to Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito and Avelino vs. Cuenco.
45. PLANAS v. COMELEC (by Diane Sayo)
Facts:
• Proclamation No. 1081 – Issued on Sept. 21, 1972.
– Placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.
• Presidential Decree No. 73 – Issued on November 30, 1972.
– Submitting the proposed constitution to the people for ratification or
rejection, appropriating funds therefore, and setting the plebiscite on
January 15, 1973.
• PD 86 – Organizing Citizens Assemblies to be consulted on certain public
questions
• General Order No. 20 – issued by the president on January 7, 1973.
– Directing the postponement of the scheduled plebiscite on January 15,
1973, until further notice, and temporarily suspending the effects of Proc.
No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed
constitution
• Proclamation No. 1102 – issued on January 15, 1973.
– Announcing the ratification by the Filipino people of the constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
The instant petitions were filed after the issuance of PD 73 seeking to
nullify it, on the grounds that the powers exercised therein are lodged exclusively in
Congress, and that there was no proper submission of the proposed constitution to
the people for lack of time and lack of freedom of speech, press and assembly.
The petitions enjoin the Comelec from fulfilling its duties regarding the plebiscite
referred in PD 73.
The president already issued an order temporarily suspending the effects
of Proc. No. 81 on December 17, 1972, and announced the postponement of
plebiscite on December 23, though these were only formalized through GO 20.

Issues:
1. WON the Court has the authority to pass upon the validity of PD 73. If
yes, WON PD 73 is valid.
2. WON the 1971 Constitutional Convention has the authority to pass the
proposed constitution through Citizen Assemblies.
3. WON Proc. No. 1102 is valid.
Held:
1. (a) Yes. The issue on the validity of PD 73 is justiciable in nature. Sectoin
2 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution as well as precedent cases provides
the authority of the Court to review cases involving statutes.
(b) The issue was deemed moot and academic precisely because the
plebiscite in question will not be held at any definite time yet
2. YES. The convention is free to postulate any amendment it may deem fit
to proposes because the Convention exercised sovereign powers
delegated to them by the people, insofar as formulating and determining
proposals is concerned. As for the approval of the proposed amendments
or of a new constitution, the proposal is submitted to the people who shall
approve or otherwise, through votes cast on elections, as provided in Sec
1 Art XV of 1935 Constitution.
3. This issue was not raised properly in the Court, hence the Court should
not pass upon such question.
Wherefore, Petitions DISMISSED.
Separate Opinions:
(Each justice was required to share their own views from which the final decision,
based on the votes cast on the points in issue, was derived. A recapitulation of the
opinions, arranged by issue/points raised, is in the latter part of the syllabi. This
one is arranged per justice )
Makalintal and Castro, JJ., concurs:
The issues on the validity of PD 1102, that is WON the president has the power to
call a plebiscite, is moot and academic because the plebiscite in question did not
take place, anyway. Its postponement of some indefinite date rendered the
petitions immature. The contention that the 1972 Draft was unfit for proper
submission is also moot because the ratification has already taken place. Petitions
DISMISSED.
Zaldivar, J. dissenting opinion:
The issues are not moot and academic because there remains substantial
rights and issues that are controverted which are not yet settled. The Court should
not indulge too much on technicalities! Even though Zaldivar views PD 1102 as
merely a proclamation, he contends that the Court must not ignore it.
Loudette Calpo’s Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008)
24
PD 1102 did not comply with Sec 1 Article XV of the 1935 Constitution
which provides that Congress in joint session may propose amendments for or call
a convention to amend, the constitution. This amendment is done through casting
of votes. The voting held in barangays did not contemplate on this provision.
Hence PD violates the constitution.
Even though the result of the “plebiscite” was a “will of the people”, the
Court may not allow the will of the majority to prevail because the requirements of
the law were not complied with. (example: the case of the disqualified mayor
winner)
Petitions GRANTED.
Teehankee, J. separate opinion.:
It is premature for the Court to decide on the validity of PD 1102 because
it had not been properly raised in the Courts, and that the plebiscite did not
happen, anyway.
Barredo, J concurring and dissenting opinion.:
I vote to dismiss the petitions even if these are justiciable, because the
grounds thereof are either untenable or have become premature, at least while the
plebiscite had not been rescheduled, or if it will take place at all.
The Convention’s task is not limited to proposing specific amendments; it
is free to make any proposals, whether or not consonant with 1935 constitution.
Also, it is judicially improper to pass upon an issue the factual setting of which may
still be altered, hence a decision on PD 1102 is premature.
Article XV of 1935 constitution was not complied with! The establishment
of citizens’ assemblies as a mode of plebiscite is not within the provision of Art XV;
is must be observed that the Comelec should have been in charge of the
plebiscite, as in any election. But still, the people have spoken; they have decided
on their future with this new constitution. The Court does not have the right to go
against the people’s will!!! Otherwise it is tantamount to defying the very sovereign
people by whom and for whom the constitution has been ordained. 
On the contention that citizens less that 21 years of age (15 and above)
participated in the Citizens’ Assembly, should not be questioned. The constitution
provides that those 21 and older has the right to suffrage but that does not deny
the legislature to include others it believes should enjoy those rights as well.
Antonio, J., concurs:
Implicit in the power of the Constitutional Convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution in its authority to order an election at which such
amendments are to be submitted. Also, martial rule per se does not warrant the
presumption that the result of the plebiscite is not genuine and free expressions of
the people; thinking so would demean the integrity of the Filipino people. 
Esguerra, J. concurs in the result:
I vote to deny the petitions. Reasons:
1. The cases are moot and academic because of the postponement.

2. There is nothing to restrain or prohibit as the acts sought to be stopped have
been fully accomplished. He does not attempt to assail with the validity of PD 1102
because that was not formally filed in the Court.
46. UNIDO v. COMELEC (by Chesa Baltazar)
Facts:
On March 5, 1981, the Comelec issued 3 resolutions (Nos. 1467, 1468, 1469)
providing for rules and regulations governing the upcoming 1981 plebiscite, as
regards equal opportunity on public discussions and debates, equal time on the
use of broadcast media, and equal space on the use of printed media for political
parties and groups campaigning for both the “Yes” and “No” votes.
On March 10, 1981, petitioner United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), a political
organization campaigning for the “No” votes, sent a letter to the Comelec
demanding that it also be given the same privileges accorded to President Marcos,
in light of his scheduled “Pulong-pulong sa Pangulo” radio-TV program wherein
Marcos led the campaign for the “Yes” votes, carried live by 26 TV and 248 radio
stations for a 2-hour period on March 12, 1981. Petitioners stated that their own
public meeting be given the same amount of coverage. Comelec denied their
demands, saying in so many words that it was in his capacity as the President/PM
that Marcos held the pulong, especially since it was under his leadership that the
amendments were proposed. He is the one responsible for the program of
government, thus, he should be able to inform and enlighten the people of the
rationale behind his initiatives without the same privilege being given to the
opposition. Comelec also said that the pulong is not a political vehicle but an
“innovative system of participatory democracy,” and that they cannot direct the
media to grant the free use of their facilities, although petitioners may avail of them
with their own resources if they so choose.
Unido then sumbmitted a motion for reconsideration stating the ff. reasons for the
granting of their demand:
1. The subject matter of the pulong was in fact a campaign for the “yes”
votes.
2. The radio and TV facilities were used by Marcos in his capacity as
political leader of the KBL, not as president/PM.
3. When the proposed amendments were passed by the Batasan under his
leadership, his function as President/PM was complete.
4. Nature of the pulong is not determined by its name but the subject matter.
5. Marcos campaigning for the “Yes” votes did not enter into appropriate
contracts with stations, but was given free use.
6. Comelec has the constitutional right and power to have its resolutions
respected and obeyed by all, otherwise, they will only be in form without
any substance.
Motion was also denied; hence, this appeal.
Issue: WON Unido is entitled to the same amount of mileage accorded to Marcos
in light of the Comelec Resolutions supposedly regulating fair elections.
Loudette Calpo’s Constitutional Law 1 Digests (A 2008)
25
Held: NO. In the interest of the importance of properly enlightening the people
regarding proposed amendments, it would seem plausible that petitions be
granted. However, the Court recognized certain norms that they cannot disregard,
such as their incapacity to mandate the Comelec (an independent Constitutional
body) to act in a certain way. It is also beyond their power to take any action with
regard to the media entities, as petitioners have not shown that they have
previously requested any media station to grant them coverage, and have been
denied.
As regards the capacity of Marcos, it is undeniable and natural that the head of the
state be accorded privileges not equally available to his opponents. No
Office/government entity is obliged to give the opposition the same facilities by
which its contrary views may be aired. While these opponents are free to avail of
their own resources to accomplish their purpose, “it is not for the administration to
hand them on a silver platter the weapon they need.” It was also in his capacity as
President/PM that Marcos appeared at the pulong, not to promote the interests of
his party, but to “improve the quality of government.”
Wherefore, Petition dismissed.
Fernando, concurring:
A President, by virtue of the position he holds, is necessarily in a more
advantageous position. Respondent Comelec did not abuse its discretion in
denying the request of the petitioners, and can in fact take pride in the fact that “it
has not been recreant to the trust imposed on it” by virtue of the provisions
ensuring free, orderly and honest elections.
Teehankee, dissenting:
Petition should be given due course, as Comelec is fully authorized to
issue all reasonable measures to the media, even those that are government-
owned, to grant petitioners as much time and space as it is feasible, although
understandable less than that accorded to the President. This is especially
important in light of the fact that only two days remain before the plebiscite, and up
to now, even lawyers have a difficult time grasping the practical applications of the
proposed amendments.