CARMEN PLANAS, petitioner, vs. JOSE GIL, Commissioner of Civil Service,
respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner , a member of the municipal board of the City of Manila, criticized the acts
of certain government officials in connection with the general election for
Assemblymen held on November 8, 1938 in one of the local dailies. The statement
as published in the issue of La Vanguardia of November 17, 1938, included the
following statements:
“… In Manila, the opposition should have won the November 8 elections, but lost
instead because of a disastrous division due to people who commercialized
their candidacies.
"The Constitution prohibits the reelection of the President precisely so that
the President may devote all his time to the administration of public affairs
for the welfare of the people, but the President was the first to play
politics. Publicly expressing his preference for candidates of his liking; and with the
President all other officials of the government also moved, taking part in electoral
campaigns.
"With the government machinery feverishly functioning to flatten the
opposition and prevent candidates supported by the people from going to
the National Assembly, and with frauds and violations of all rules of the civil
service to push to victory the candidates of the Nacionalista Party and the
administration, all constructive opposition in the country is useless ...
"… It is reasonable to believe that the President is from this moment paving
the way for his reelection. It is to be feared that the new National Assembly will
change this wise provision of our Constitution to permit the reelection of President
Manuel L. Quezon."
The day following the publication of the foregoing statement, the petitioner received
a letter, where she is informed that she needs to appear before the Commisioner of
Civil Service to prove her statements otherwise she may be suspended or removed
from office.
At the appointed time, the petitioner, accompanied by her counsel, appeared at the
office of the respondent and delivered to him a letter, Annex B, in which she voiced
objection to the authority of the respondent to conduct the investigation. The
respondent Commissioner did not desist from proceeding with the investigation, but
announced before adjourning the hearing of November 22nd that he would decide
the question raised as to his jurisdiction on November 26, 1938.
It was at this state of the investigation that the petitioner filed in this court her
original petition for prohibition of November 25, 1938, in which she at the same
time prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
respondent commisioner from continuing with the investigation.
Issues:
1. WON the courts have jurisdiction over this case
2. WON the president has the power to order the investigation
3. WON the investigation is in accordance with the law
Ratio/Holding: The petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.
1. Yes.
In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. The
Commissioner of Civil Service is the party respondent and the theory is advanced by
the Government that because an investigation undertaken by him is directed by
authority of the President of the Philippines, this court has no jurisdiction over the
present proceedings instituted by the petitioner, Carmen Planas. The argument is
farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer of the government is
acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be an important
averment, but is neither decisive nor conclusive upon this court. Like the
dignity of his high office, the relative immunity of the Chief Executive from
judicial interference is not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the
subordinate officials and employees of the Executive Department to the
extent that at the mere invocation of the authority that it purports the
jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the validity or legality of an
executive order is necessarily abated or suspended.
Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law
in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions."
(Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922]) This court, therefore, has
jurisdiction over the instant proceedings and will accordingly proceed to determine
the merits of the present controversy.
2. Yes.
It is not denied that the President did authorize the issuance of the order, but it is
contended "that the said investigation with a view to petitioner's suspension or
removal is against Article VII, sec. 11 (1) of the Constitution of the Philippines and
is not warranted by any statutory provision." (Par. XV [b], amended petition.) It,
therefore, becomes necessary to inquire into the constitutional and legal authority
of the President to order the investigation which has given rise to the present
controversy.
A perusal of our Constitution will show that extensive authority over the public
service is granted the President of the Philippines. Article VII of the
Constitution begins in its section 1 with the declaration that "The Executive
power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." All executive
authority is thus vested in him, and upon him devolves the constitutional
duty of seeing that the laws are "faithfully executed." (Art. VIII, sec. 11,
subsec. 1, last clause.) In the fulfillment of this duty which he cannot
evade, he is granted specific and express powers and functions. (Art. VII,
sec. 11.) In addition to these specific and express powers and functions, he
may also exercise those necessarily implied and included in them. (Myers vs.
United States [1926]) The National Assembly may not enact laws which either
expressly or impliedly diminish the authority conferred upon the President of the
Constitution. (Cf. Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921]) The Constitution provides that
the President "shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices" (Art. VII, sec. 11 [1], first clause) and shall "exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law" (Ibid,
second clause). This power of control and supervision is an important
constitutional grant. The President in the exercise of the executive power
under the Constitution may act through the heads of the executive
departments.
Independently of any statutory provision authorizing the President to conduct an
investigation of the nature involved in this proceeding, and in view of the nature and
character of the executive authority with which the President of the Philippines is
invested, the constitutional grant to him of power to exercise general
supervision over all local governments and to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed must be construed to authorize him to order an
investigation of the act or conduct, of the petitioner herein. Supervision is
not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without
limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and
conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is to
be conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be founded
upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and
investigation.
Viewed from the totality of powers conferred upon the Chief Executive by
our Constitution, we should be reluctant to yield to the proposition that the
President of the Philippines who is endowed with broad and extraordinary
powers by our Constitution, and who is expected to govern with a firm and
steady hand without vexatious or embarrassing interference and much less
dictation from any source, is yet devoid of the power to order the
investigation of the petitioner in this case. We should avoid that result.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Convention show that the grant of the
supervisory authority to Chief Executive in this regard was in the nature of a
compromise resulting from the conflict of views in that body, mainly between the
historical view which recognizes the right of local self-government (People ex rel. Le
Roy vs. Hurlbut [1871]) and the legal theory which sanctions the possession by the
state of absolute control over local governments (Booten vs. Pinson, [1915]). The
result was the recognition of the power of supervision and all its
implications and the rejection of what otherwise would be an imperium in,
imperio to the detriment of a strong national government.
Apart from the constitutional aspect, we find that section 64 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 provides as follows:
"In addition to his general supervisory authority, the Governor-General
(President) shall have such specific powers and duties as are expressly
conferred or imposed on him by law and also, in particular, the powers and
duties set forth in this chapter.
"Among such special powers and duties shall be:
* * * * * * * Ang-Angco v. Castillo
"(c) To order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires, an investigation of any action or the conduct of any person in the
Government service, and in connection therewith to designate the official,
committee, or person by whom such investigation shall be conducted."
This provision of the law, in existence before the taking effect of the
Constitution, still subsists. It is not inconsistent with the Constitution and
has not been abrogated or repealed by the National Assembly. (See sec. 2,
Art. XV, Constitution.)
3. Yes.
The interest of the public service requires that these charges be investigated, so
that, if found to be true, appropriate action may be taken against the parties alleged
to have been guilty of illegal acts, and if found untrue and made without justifiable
motives, the party making them may be proceeded against in accordance with
section 2440, in connection, with section, 2078, of the Revised Administrative
Code." Assuming that this is not one of the grounds provided by law for which the
petitioner may be investigated administratively (sec. 2078, Rev. Adm. Code), there
is weight in the argument that the investigation would still be in order if for no
other purpose than to cause a full and honest disclosure of all the facts so
that, if found proper and justified, appropriate action may be taken against
the parties alleged to have been guilty of the illegal acts charged. The
enforcement of the law and the maintenance of peace and order are primarily an
executive obligation. The declaration that the President should "take care
that the laws be faithfully executed" is more an imposition of an obligation
than a conferment of power. His oath requires him to "faithfully and
conscientiously fulfill" his duties as President, "preserve and defend" the
Constitution and "execute" the law. This duty of the Executive to see that
the laws be faithfully executed is not limited to the enforcement of
legislative acts or the express terms of the Constitution but also includes
the due enforcement of rights, duties, obligations, prerogatives and
immunities growing out of the Constitution itself and of the protection
implied by the nature of the government under the Constitution.
(Cunningham vs. Neagle)
We are vigilantly alive to the necessity of maintaining and protecting the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and of the press, no less than
the right of assembly and petition which, according to Stimson (The
American Constitution As It Protects Private Rights, 152), is its origin
rather than its derivation. In the present case, however, the petitioner is not
denied the right, nor is she being investigated because she had exercised that right.
She has a perfect right to criticize the Government, its administration, its policies
and officials, but she may not, on the plea of freedom of speech and of the press,
impute violations of law and the commission of frauds and thereafter fold her arms
and decline to face an investigation conducted to elicit the truth or falsity of the
charges formulated by her. Otherwise, the guarantee which, in the language of
Wendell Phillips, is "at once the instrument, and the guarantee, and the bright
consummate flower of all liberty" would degenerate into an unbridled license, and
render the Government powerless to act.
VILLENA VS. SECRETARY
Facts: Isidro Ang-Angco is the Collector of Customs. The Commissioner of
Customs filed an administrative complaint against him for releasing 1,188 units of
Pepsi-cola concentrate without authorization. President Ramon Magsaysay, on the
strength of this complaint, created an investigating committee to investigate Ang-
Angco. As a result, Ang-Angco was suspended from his office on December 1956.
On April 1, 1957, Collector Ang-Angco was reinstated by Finance Secretary
Hernandez, but the investigation decision was still pending. President Magsaysay
died and it was after three years, that Executive Secretary Natalio Castillo rendered
a decision on the pending administrative case. He found Ang-Angco guilty and
considered him resigned from the date of notice. Ang-Angco filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied. After exhausting all administrative remedies, he
filed this petition.
Issues: WON the President has the power to take direct action against petitioner in
spite of the provisions in the Civil Service Act of 1959
Held: No. The action taken by Respondent Executive Secretary, even with the
authority of the President, in taking direct action on the administrative case of
petitioner , without submitting the same to the Commissioner of Civil Service, is
contrary to law and should be set aside.
1. Under sec. 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil
Service who has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative
cases of all officers and employees in the classified service. The decision may be
appealed to the Civil Service Board (Sec. 18 RA 2260), and not the President as was
allowed before under Commonwealth Act 598. The said act was expressly repealed
by the Civil Service Act of 1959, therefore the petitioner was deprived of the
procedure laid down in the law and has lost his right to due process.
2. However, under sec. 16(i), the power to remove, separate and suspend officers
and employees is qualified by the saving clause “Except as otherwise provided by
law”. Is there any other law that allows the President to remove officers and
employees in the classified civil service?
No. The only other law that gives the President the right to remove officials is Sec.
64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code. The president has the power to remove
officials from office “conformably to law”. This means that the President does not
have blanket authority to remove any officer, but is still subject to laws that may be
enacted by the legislature.
3. Respondents cite President’s power to control all officials and employees in the
executive department to override the provisions in the Civil Service Act. (Sec. 10(1)
Art. VII, Constitution)
The power of the President to “control” all officers and employees in the Executive
Department only means that he has the power to “alter, or modify, or nullify, or set
aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, and to
substitute the President’s judgment over his.” This merely applies to the acts of the
employee or official, and not to the agent of the act. President only has power to set
aside action of the official, not remove him from office.
4. The purpose of the Civil Service System is to give stability of tenure to those who
belong in the classified service. In Sec. 4 Art. XII of the Constitution, it states that
“No officer of employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except,
for cause as provided by law”. This section must be harmonized with Sec.10(1) Art.
VII, which gives the President the power to control all officials and employees of the
Executive Department. The Court held that the President may remove, investigate
or suspend employees, if they are presidential appointees, or they do not belong to
the classified service. This is because with the power to appoint comes the power to
remove.
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION vs. COMELEC
Facts:
Pres. Marcos’ term was supposed to end on June 30, 1987. However, he
submitted a letter of conditional resignation claiming that he would vacate his
position effective only when election’s held & after winner’s proclaimed &
qualified as Pres by taking his oath of office 10 days after his proclamation. He
claims that he is calling for the new elections to seek a new mandate to assess
his policies & programs as demanded by the opposition. He further stressed
that his term will be shortened but in the name of public accountability he
believes that the final settlement of these issues can only be done thru a
presidential election.
B.P. Blg. 883: enacted by the Batasang Pambansa calling for special national
elections on Feb. 7, 1986 for Pres & VP.
Different sectors were against the special elections. Among the contentions are:
1. Such is unconstitutional because there was no vacancy in the presidency
thus there’s no need to call for a special election. This is pursuant to Art.
VII, Sec. 9 of the Consti 1 w/c requires an actual vacancy before an special
election can be called and in such cases, the Speaker of the House will be
the Acting Pres until a new one has been elected.
2. Unconstitutional because it allows the Pres to continue holding office after
calling of the special election. Cutting his term short is valid but he should
actually vacate the office.
After some time, many of the petitions were w/drawn expressly or abandoned
impliedly. Political parties have chosen to participate in the elections by fielding
their own candidates. M.P. Arturo Tolentino who was one of those opposed to
the elections (claiming that Marcos must first resign from office in order for the
constitutional mandate to go into effect & the Speaker to assume post of Acting
Pres.) set aside his objections & went on to become Marcos’ running mate. The
opposition united & chose its standard bearers: Cory Aquino for Pres & Doy
Laurel for VP. They have decided to take the Pres at his own terms & conditions
rather than file any more petition or suit to oppose such.
Current petition involves parties who still oppose the special national elections
assailing its constitutionality.
Held: The Supreme Court voted 7 to dismiss petitions & deny prayer for issuance of
injunction restraining respondents from holding election and 5 declared BP 883
unconstitutional & voted to grant the injunction. Since there are less than the
required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional, petitions are considered
dismissed & writs prayed for denied. Justices filed separate opinions since only a
resolution was issued.
1
Sec. 9. In cases of permanently disability, death, removal fr. Office/resignation of the Pres., the
VP shall become Pres to serve the unexpired term. The BP shall by law provide for the case of
permanent disability, death, removal from office or resignation of both the Pres & VP, declaring
what officer shall then become Pres or the manner in w/c one shall be selected. In case a
vacancy in the Office of the Pres occurs before the 1987 Pres’l election, the Speaker of the BP
shall act as Pres until a Pres and a VP or either of them shall have been elected & shall have
qualified. Their term of office shall commence at noon of the 10 th day following proclamation &
shall end at noon on the 30th day of June of the 6th year thereafter.
Teehankee, concurring
Issue has veered from a justiciable to a political one & can only be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity in a fair, clean & honest election.
Labor Minister Blas Ople: people’s minds have been set to expect the holding of
the elections. Court should not stand in the way. Court has to take judicial
notice that the elections are on and canceling it might aggravate crisis & Pres
may find it difficult to govern effectively. This issue threatens national survival.
Senator Pelaez: This is a giant step in the people’s struggle for the restoration
of freedom & democracy shattered by declaration of martial law. The opposition
has become united & the 2-party has been restored. We can’t throw away the
substantial gains by postponing the elections. The issue has been decided by
the political will of the people. The Pres admitted that he needs a new mandate
& that he has lost his capacity to govern. People must be given a chance to
decide to keep Marcos or to elect a new Pres.
Bulletin Today Columnist: People have been titillated by the prospect of change.
Considering current political situation w/ the economic crisis & communist-led
insurgency, any delay will only exacerbate the pol situation (Cayetano). SC
should not contribute to the possible destabilization of the gov’t.
Former CJ Fernando & Former Sen. Padilla: Court should defer exercise of
people’s pub right to vote & to express their judgment.
This may be RP democracy’s last chance. Different sectors support the idea.
Plana, concurring
Consti does not prohibit Pres from tendering a resignation that is not immediately
effective thus, resignation in futuro is allowed. BP can’t wait for actual vacancy
before it can enact the necessary legislation. Also, there’s a strong presumption that
law’s constitutional. To doubt is to sustain. Presumption’s strengthened by fact that
it’s a product of the executive & legislative departments.
Escolin, concurring
Petitioners failed to prove that BP 883 contravenes any applicable constitutional
provision. Issue is political in character. Pres sought the passage of the legislation &
BP authorized the elections. Response of the people has been overwhelming & they
have decided that only an election during this crucial time can deliver the country
from subversive forces as well as economic problems plaguing the country.
Relova, concurring
Requisites of a complete & operative resignation from public office: 1)intention
to relinquish; 2) act of relinquishment; 3)implied/express intention to
surrender, renounce & relinquish office; 4) acceptance by competent & lawful
authority. (Gamboa vs. CA)
Acceptance is necessary and the BP by enacting BP 883, accepted Marcos’
resignation. Legislative act suffices because of the plenary pow vested in the BP
considering that Consti framers were not prepared for such scenario (CJ
Fernando). What is not prohibited by the Consti can be provided for by the BP.
(Sol Gen) The calling of an election is essentially legislative in nature (Ututalum
vs COMELEC).
Parties have fielded their candidates. Time, effort & money have been spent.
People are expecting the elections & thus they can’t be deprived of their rt to
suffrage. Legislative & executive bodies have spoken.
Gutierrez, dissenting
Government acts ought to conform to the Consti. A special election is only
necessary when a vacancy is created by death, permanent disability, removal
from office or resignation. Vacancy must be real & actual and a resignation
must be real & irrevocable. Currently, there is no vacancy and so, no valid
appointment/reelection may be effected. Consti provision should be construed
in its ordinary meaning.
Special elections can’t be premised on the accountability provisions of Art. XIII
of the Consti. Snap elections to make executive accountable to the people are
for parliamentary systems. Not applicable here since we have a presidential
system. Although 1973 Consti envisioned a parliamentary set-up where the
National Assembly may w/draw its confidence from the PM by electing a
successor by majority vote of all its members, the Consti was amended even
before the parliamentary gov’t was formed.
De la Fuente, dissenting
Unconstitutional for it contravenes Art. VII, Sec. 9 of the Consti. It ignores the
process set out by the Consti in selecting a successor in case of vacancy.
Resignation must result in a permanent vacancy & not prospective or inchoate
or contingent.
Disagrees w/those who believe the statute is unconstitutional but still allows its
implementation taking into account the supervening events & people’s
overwhelming desire to hold election.
Consti & election laws allow Pres/elective official to submit himself to reelection
to same office w/o vacating it during regular elections & not on a special
election.
If Pres wants to ask for the people’s vote of confidence, most appropriate
vehicle would be thru a referendum where a negative vote would bring about a
vacancy.
Alampay, dissenting
Court should detach itself from all the supervening events that are taking place
especially since it goes against the Consti. Consti should be respected & followed.
BP 883 doesn’t meet specific condition that there should first be an actual & existing
vacancy before a special election can be held.
Patajo, dissenting
Batasan can only call for an election before the expiration of Pres’ term in 1987
upon the occurrence of contingencies provided for in Sec. 9, Art. VII. By
enacting BP 883, BP shortened Pres’ term w/o going thru process of amending
the Consti since it is acting in its legislative pow & not as a constituent body.
There is no vacancy considering that the Pres will continue to hold office until a
winning candidate assumes office. IF a vacancy did exist, it should be the
Speaker who will act as Pres. The provision contemplates an actual vacancy &
not one in futuro.
Shortening of term of office can’t be justified by Pres agreeing to vacate his
office. He can only shorten his term of office by UNCONDITIONALLY resigning
therefrom before its expiration in order that vacancy is created & Speaker shall
act as Pres. His letter did not create the vacancy envisioned by Art. VII, Sec. 9.
Although pow to call election is a legislative pow, it can’t be exercised when it
would amend an express provision of the Consti more specifically Art. VII, Sec.
 5 fixing term of the Pres to 6 yrs. Pow to define the term is not legislative but
constituent. BP 883 has in effect, amended the Consti.
Accountability of pub officers can’t be invoked. Impeachment is the recourse for
holding pub officials accountable & not special elections.
Constitutions don’t’ change w/varying tides of pub opinion & desire. They can’t
be construed as if they were public enemies standing in the way of progress
(Bay City vs. State Treasurer).
Unconstitutionality of the Snap Poll (article by Fernando & Pelaez?)
Consti mandates precise procedure for presidential succession. Had it wanted
the BP to legislate such, it should have expressly said so. But because it
provided us w/a very detailed process, the Batasan must keep out. Batasan can
supplement where it’s authorized to do so but it can’t touch what’s already
prescribed by Consti.
Consti demands an actual & permanent vacancy, not a paper vacancy. BP has
no authority to contrive another cause like a post-dated resignation to effect a
succession.
Consti specifically provides that on the 3rd after the occurrence of a vacancy at
10 am, Batasan shall convene w/o need of a call & w/in 7 days enact a law
calling a special election to elect a Pres & VP not earlier that 45 nor later than
60 days from time of such call. This is a very specific provision contrary to
traditional notions of consti-making w/c provides that consti must be general
allowing legislature to provide details. In cases where Consti itself supplies the
details, legislature must not meddle w/it.
NO doubt that Consti’s intent means that special presidential election during
Marcos’ term must take place & must be carried out strictly in accordance
w/circumstances & procedures specifically laid out by Consti.
BP 883 defies Consti in following instances:
1. Called for a snap election when there’s no actual vacancy. Resignation
letter did not create a vacancy.
2. Instead of installing Speaker from the moment of vacancy, law allowed
Marcos to usurp speaker’s role & continue as Pres.
3. Consti provision w/c provides that Batasan must meet on the 3 rd day after
vacancy. Law does not provide for such.
Suggested remedies:
1. referendum: in accordance w/ Marcos’ claim that he wants to show that
people were still w/him. Affirmative vote would show that people still had
confidence in Pres whereas a negative vote would create the vacancy
required by Consti.
2. Amend the consti to allow holding of special election in the manner BP 883
provides.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
194 SCRA 317 (1991)
Facts:
 July 23, 1987: then Sec. of Justice Ordoñez, construing Sec. 13, Art. VII in
relation to Sec. 7(2), Art. IX-B, rendered an opinion declaring that Cabinet
members, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries may hold other public
office, including membership in the boards of government corporations:
(a) when directly provided for in the Consti as in the case of the Sec. of Justice
who is made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under
Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII; or
(b) if allowed by law; or
(c) if allowed by the primary functions of their respective positions
 On the basis of this Opinion, Pres. Aquino promulgated E.O. No. 284.
 Petitioners (CLU and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. and Crispin
Reyes) seek:
o Declaration of unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 284 on the grounds that it
violates Sec. 13, Art. VII, Consti as the executive order, in effect, allows
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to
hold other gov’t offices or positions in addition to their primary positions,
albeit subject to the limitations that they shall hold not more than 2 positions
& that at least 1/3 of the members of the boards of gov’t-owned or controlled
corps should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary
and thus adds exceptions to Sec. 13 other than those provided in the
Constitution; and
o that public respondents cease and desist from holding, in addition to their
primary positions, dual or multiple positions other than those authorized by
the Constitution and from receiving any kind of emolument appurtenant to
their questioned positions, and compelling public respondents to return,
reimburse or refund any and all amounts or benefits that they may have
received from such positions
 Petitioners argue: Only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in Gov’t are those provided in the Constitution, namely:
(1) Vice-President may be appointed as a Cabinet Member under Sec. 3(2), Art.
VII; and
(2) Sec of Justice is ex-officio mem of Judicial & Bar Council by virtue of Sec.
8(1), Art. VIII.
 Further, the exception to the prohibition in Sec. 7(2), Art. I-XB applies to officers
and employees of the Civil Service in general & that said exceptions do not
apply and cannot be extended to Sec. 13, Art. VII which applies specifically to
the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistants.
 Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution" in Sec.13, Art.VII refers to the
exceptions provided under Sec.7(2), Art. I-XB insofar as the appointive officials
mentioned therein are concerned.
Issue: WON prohibition in Sec. 13, Art. VII insofar as Cabinet members,
their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions
made for appointive officials in general under Sec. 7(2), Art. I-XB
 NO. Sec. 7(2), Art. I-XB: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their
subsidiaries."
 The foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying
the provision under consideration. Because the practice of designating Cabinet
members and their assistants as members of governing bodies or boards, which
was prevalent during the martial law era, led to abuses, the 1987 Constitution
 intended to provide for a remedy or a correction of the evils that flowed from
holding multiple governmental offices & employment
 It was the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding
other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned as
shown by the fact that although Sec. 7, Art. I-XB already contains a prohibition
against holding multiple offices subsuming both elective and appointive public
officials, the Con-Com still formulated another provision (Sec. 13, Art. VII) with
a prohibition specifically for the Pres, VP, Cabinet mems, their deputies and
assistants, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.
 Furthermore, the prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is
all-embracing and covers both public and private office or employment as shown
by the facts the other provisions of the Constitution (Sec. 13, Art. VI; Sec. 5(4),
Art. XVI; Sec. 7(2), Art. IX-B) on the disqualifications of certain public officials
or employees from holding other offices or employment pertains to an office or
employment in the government and government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries while the disqualification in Sec. 13, Art. VII is
absolute was not qualified by the phrase "in the Government."
 Commissioner Foz: "We actually have to be stricter with the President and the
members of the Cabinet because they exercise more powers and, therefore,
more cheeks and restraints on them are called for because there is more
possibility of abuse in their case."
 From the foregoing, it would seem that Sec. 7, Art. I-XB is meant to lay down
the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and
employees, while Sec. 13, Art. VII is meant to be the exception applicable
only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants.
 THEREFORE: to interpret the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution" the way the respondents did would render nugatory and
meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution
to impose a stricter prohibition on those particular public officials with respect to
holding other offices or employment in the government during their tenure.
 MOREOVER, respondents' reading of the provisions in question would render
certain parts of the Constitution inoperative, such as Sec. 3, Art. VII authorizing
the VP to become a Cabinet member, and to act as President w/o relinquishing
the Vice-Presidency where the President shall not nave been chosen or fails to
qualify.
 The prohibition in Sec. 13 must not, however, be construed as applying to posts
occupied by the Executive officials specified therein w/o additional compensation
in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of said officials' office because these posts do no comprise "any other
office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly
an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. The ex-officio
position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it
follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position as these services are already
paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.
Therefore, the prohibition in Sec. 13 need not apply.
 Ex-officio: from office or by virtue of office; an authority derived from official
character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but
rather annexed to the official position; act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that
conferred by the office.
 During the floor deliberations, Commissioner Ople asked about Commissioner
Monsod’s proposal to add to Sec. 7 the exception "unless required by the
functions of his position" with express reference to certain high-ranking
appointive public officials like members of the Cabinet. Monsod pointed out that
there are instances when although not required by current law, membership of
certain high-ranking executive officials in other offices and corporations is
necessary by reason of said officials' primary functions.
 While this exchange may be used as authority for saying that additional
functions and duties flowing from the primary functions of the official may be
imposed upon him without offending the constitutional prohibition under
consideration, it cannot, however, be taken as authority for saying that this
exception is by virtue of Sec. 7(2) of Art. I-XB. What was being discussed then
were general principles which would serve as constitutional guidelines in the
absence of specific constitutional provisions on the matter. What was primarily
at issue and approved on that occasion was the adoption of the qualified and
delimited phrase "primary functions" as the basis of an exception to the general
rule covering all appointive public officials. That this exception would apply also
to the President and his official family is by reason of the legal principles
governing additional functions and duties of public officials rather than by virtue
of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B.
 In light of the construction given to Sec. 13, Art. VII in relation to Sec. 7(2),
Art. IX-B, E.O. No. 284 is unconstitutional as it actually allows them to hold
multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate
of Sec. 13, Art. VII, Constitution, prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. However, ex-officio posts held by
the executive official concerned without additional compensation as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of his office do not fall under the
definition of "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition.
 Being head of an executive department is no mean job. It is more than a full-
time job, requiring full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and expertise.
Held: Petitions GRANTED, E.O. No. 284 declared null and void and set aside.
MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS (Sept. 15, 1989)
Petitioners: Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., Irene Araneta,
Imee Manotoc, Tomas Manotoc, Gregorio Araneta, Pacifico Marcos, Nicanor Yñiguez
& PHILCONSA
Respondents: Hon. Raul Manglapus (DFA Sec.), Catalino Macaraig (Exec. Sec.),
Sedfrey Ordoñez (DOJ Sec.), Miriam Defensor-Santiago (Immigration
Commissioner), Fidel Ramos (DND Sec.), Renato de Villa (Chief of Staff)
Substantive Facts:
Feb. 1986 – Marcos was deposed from presidency by means of the People
Power. He was forced into exile in Hawaii.
After 3 years, Marcos, now dying, prays that he and his family be allowed to
return to the country.
Aquino – barred Marcoses from returning due to possible threats & following
supervening events:
1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders
2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
 3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a
Lebanese arms dealer
*proof that they can stir trouble from afar & fanaticism & blind loyalty of
followers
4. Honasan’s failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao (setting up own gov’t w/aim to
overthrow current gov’t thru arms or propaganda
7. devastated economy due to
a. accumulated foreign debt
b. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Procedural Facts (Petitioners):
1. Filed a petition for mandamus & prohibition to order respondents to issue them
travel documents & prevent implementation of President’s decision to bar
Marcoses from returning.
2. They question:
a. President’s power to bar return of Marcoses. They ask if such is a political
question.
b. President’s claim that such decisions may be made in the interest of national
security, public safety and health. Questions: a)clear & present danger b)
was due process observed c) were petitioners notified d) was there proper
hearing of the case e) were petitioners notified of the decision. They ask if
such is a political question & if such fact has been established.
c. President’s capacity to bar return of Marcoses. They claim that she acts
outside/in excess of her jurisdiction.
3. Petitioners claim that:
a. Such act deprives them of their rt. To life, liberty, property w/o due process
& equal protection of the laws.
b. Such act deprives them of their right to travel w/c according to law (Consti
Bill of Rights, Sec. 6) may only be impaired by a court order
c. Even international laws provide for their right to return: a) rt to leave any
country including one’s own country & return to his country (Universal
Declaration of Human Rights Art. 13) and b) rt to liberty, mov’t & freedom to
choose residence, free to leave any country including is own not subj to
restrictions except if necessary to protect nat’l security, pub
order/health/morals and no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of rt to enter
own country (International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights)
Procedural Facts (Respondents):
1. This is a political question w/c includes the State’s rt. To security & safety, a
question which only the President can determine.
2. Consider the supervening events w/c can endanger national security & public
safety .
3. Art II, Consti: State has the duty to maintain peace & order & protect rts of
everyone & promote gen. welfare so everyone can enjoy democracy.
4. International precedents: Trujillo of Dominican Rep., Somoza Jr. of Nicaragua,
etc. are among deposed dictators banned from returning to their countries
Issues:
1. WON the right to travel is similar to the right to return to one’s country.
2. WON it is w/in the President’s power to ban deposed dictators from returning to
the country.
3. WON the President in banning the deposed dictator from returning is acting with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Reasoning:
1. NO.
a. International laws cited distinguish right to freedom of mov’t & residence
from rt. To leave any country including his own & to return to his country.
b. Right to return to one’s country is not vested in the constitution but it’s
only incorporated by virtue of the constitution’s adoption of international
laws as part of the laws of the land (Art II, Sec. 2)
2. YES.
a. Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers.
b. Though the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not
defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in
the Consti w/c include the power to protect the general welfare of the
people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare &
advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Consti). Residual powers
dictate that the President can do anything w/c is not forbidden in the
Consti (Roosevelt), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President
(Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace
during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the
State.
c. Any power not vested on the judicial and legislative bodies belong to the
executive. (Springer vs. Gov’t of the Philippine Islands)
d. Consider the fact that who is president affects & shapes the presidency.
e. It’s a folly to limit governmental powers to what is in the Constitution.
(Holmes Dissent)
f. The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible
depending on the circumstances.
g. Congress has recognized the President’s power by coming up with a
resolution to urge Aquino to allow Marcoses to return.
h. The Constitution is a social contract between the sovereign who surrenders
its powers to the chosen rulers for the common good.
3. NO.
a. Factual bases – supervening events based on interviews w/AFP Chief of
Staff & National Security Adviser.
b. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of
the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.
Holding: President did not act arbitrarily or w/gadalej in barring Marcoses from
returning to the country. Their return, considering present time & circumstances,
would pose as a serious threat to national interest & welfare. Petition dismissed.
Fernan, Concurring
1. The president’s power is not fixed. Limits would depend on the imperatives of
events and not on abstract theories of law. We are undergoing a critical time
and the current problem can only be answerable by the President.
2. Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear & present danger.
Thus, it’s the executive’s responsibility & obligation to prevent a grave & serious
threat to its safety from arising.
3. We can’t sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political & economic gains to
give in to Marcos’ wish to die in the country. Compassion must give way to the
other state interests.
Gutierrez, Dissenting
1. The issue here is one of rights & not of powers. Bill of rights must be applied
equally to everyone including rulers & people. The right to travel & abode may
only be impaired by a COURT ORDER and not an Executive Order such as what
the President has done. And it can only be impaired in the interest of national
 security, public safety & public health or as may be provided by law. No proof of
such. We can’t interpret the Constitution for one person only.
2. No proof of grave threat/danger. The military has been able to quell previous
attacks.
3. It is not a political question. For such to exist, the Consti must provide that the
power is vested exclusively in the President or Congress, prohibiting the courts
to examine exercise of the power. Respondents failed to point out a Consti
provision granting the President power to decide such questions. Closest
provision would be commander-in-chief clause but there’s no rebellion or need
to suspend writ of habeas corpus. Hardcore loyalists are few in number.
4. GADALEJ is determined by evidence. However, when president presents
evidence, court is in no position to disprove them and it seems as if the
executive dept participates in the decision-making process or executive itself
judges the suit (Morales vs. Enrile). Another option would be to avail of judicial
notice. Supervening events however are unrelated to the Marcoses.
Disturbances are caused not by Marcos followers but by NPA. President has
failed to pronounce that Marcos’ return would create a clear & present danger
to the security & public safety. Reasons cited (nat’l welfare & interest, preserve
gains of recovery & stability) are too generic & sweeping. Even military has
expressed its capacity to quell opposing groups & that it’s on top of the
situation.
5. It is Marcos’ constitutional right to be allowed to return home w/c is similar to
rts to go abroad or move around the country. Rt to return home is the most
impt among these rts.
6. If the President’s fears would happen once Marcos is allowed to return,
President can act by arresting & trying him in court but no sense denying him
his right to return.
7. Allow Marcos to return out of tradition & custom and in the interest of national
unity & reconciliation.
Cruz, Dissenting
1. As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ right to return, live & die in his own
country. It is a right guaranteed by the Consti to all individuals, whether patriot,
homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.
2. Military representatives failed to show that Marcos’ return would pose a threat
to national security. Fears were mere conjectures.
3. Residual powers – but the executive’s powers were outlined to limit her powers
& not expand.
Paras, Dissenting
1. AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to impair Marcos’ right
to return to the Philippines. .
2. Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that one dies, he/she
should be buried w/in 10 days.
Padilla, Dissenting
1. Untenable that without a legislation, right to travel is absolute & state is
powerless to restrict it. It’s w/in police power of the state to restrict this right if
national security, public safety/health demands that such be restricted. It can’t
be absolute & unlimited all the time. It can’t be arbitrary & irrational.
2. No proof that Marcos’ return would endanger national security or public safety.
Fears are speculative & military admits that it’s under control. Filipinos would
know how to handle Marcos’ return.
Sarmiento, Dissenting
1. Consti and international law do not distinguish between rights…only one right is
involved, right to travel w/in one’s country or another & right to return.
2. Residual powers of the president must yield to the primacy of the bill of rights
especially if it has not been proven why the president’s exercise of her residual
powers should override the mandate of the fundamental law. Only 2 exceptions
are created in impairing one’s right to travel: by statute or judicial mandate. If
presidential initiative was an option, it should have been included in the Consti.
As a matter of fact, present Consti has divested the Executive of that implied
power to impair rights…it should always be w/in the limits of the law.
3. President’s determination that Marcos’ return would threaten national security
should be agreed upon by the court. Such threat must be clear & present.
MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS II (October 27, 1989)
Substantive Facts:
Sept. 28, 1989 – Marcos died in Honolulu
Aquino statement – remains of Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to the
country in the interest of safety of those who will react conflictingly to the death
of Marcos and for tranquility of state & order of society. This will hold until
government, whether present or succeeding, decides otherwise.
Petitioners Procedural Facts:
1. pray that necessary travel documents be issued to them
2. pray that respondents be enjoined from implementing Aquino’s decision to bar
return of Marcos’ remain
3. MFR filed Oct. 2, 1989 w/following arguments:
a. barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to
return to their country of birth & all other rights guaranteed by the Consti
to all Filipinos
b. President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country, if she has,
she acted arbitrarily
c. No basis for barring their return
Respondents Procedural Facts:
1. MFR is moot & academic as to deceased Marcos
2. Formal rights they’re invoking, right to return = right to destabilize the country,
hide their efforts to destabilize
Issue: WON Marcos’ should be allowed to return to the country - NO
Reasoning:
1. Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration.
2. Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed.
Threats are still there. Imelda even made a comment about Marcos being the
legal president.
3. President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power.
Enumerations are merely for specifying principal articles implied in the
definition; leaving the rest to flow from general grant that power, interpreted in
conformity w/other parts of the Consti (Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress
can exercise power from sources not enumerates so long as not forbidden by
consti’l text (Myers vs. US). This does not amount to dictatorship. Amendment
No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of legislation whereas 1987 Consti
granted Aquino w/implied powers.
4. It is w/in Aquino’s power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people.
She bound to comply w/ that duty and there is no proof that she acted
arbitrarily or w/gadalej.
Holding: Motion denied for lack of merit.
Cruz, Dissenting
No extraordinary reaction from so-called loyalists. There was only a display of
passing interest, if not outright indifference. Feeble threat has died with him. His
death has reduced him to a non-person as State has admitted, no reason to be
scared of him. He’s just a cadaver waiting to be interred in his country. We have
bigger problems.
Paras, Dissenting
1. dead still has rights – libel vs. deceased, etc. His widow & family have rights
too.
2. threats are still unproven & unpersuasive. Chaos might arise if we bar him from
returning.
3. Return might mean reconciliation.
4. World will applaud our act of mercy.
Padilla, Dissenting
1. We have denied him his right to return & die in his country, let’s not deny him
his rt to be buried here. We can’t apply Consti selectively, it should apply to all
Filipinos whether dictator, pauper, learned, ignorant, religious, etc. All Filipinos
have the constitutional right to be buried in his country. Government can lay
down conditions if it pleases but it should recognize rt. We can’t abandon our
ageless & finest tradition of respect & deference to the dead.
2. Respondents have yet to present hard evidence to prove alleged threats. All
they can give are general conclusions. Live Marcos did not pose serious threat,
why should a dead one be any worse? There might be a graver threat if we
deprive him of his rt to be buried here.
Sarmiento, Dissenting
1. Still no proof of residual powers of the president whether implied / expressly
granted. See first dissent re presidential initiative etc.
2. Bill of Rights limits legislative & presidential intrusion on individual liberties.
3. Threats are conjectures, speculations & imaginations. No hard evidence.
Military said they are on top of the situation & even President has expressed
stability of the nation.
Ople vs. Torres
July 23, 1998
Nature: Petition to invalidate Administrative Order #308
Petitioner: Senator Blas Ople
Respondents: Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, and the heads of other gov’t
agencies charged with the implementation of AO 308
Facts:
- Pres. FVR issued AO 308, “Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System” (NCIRS), which provides, inter alia:
1. That participation in the identification system is required for persons
seeking basic services from the government, for the purpose of:
a. convenience
b. reduction of fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations
2. That an Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) will draw-up the
implementation guidelines of the System
3. That IACC and the SSS shall establish the standards for the use of
“Biometrics Technology”
4. That funding shall come from the budgets of the concerned agencies
- The AO was published in four newspapers of general circulation
- After which, Senator Blas Ople filed a petition assailing its validity
Contentions:
- Petitioner assails the validity of AO 308 on two grounds:
1. That the President has usurped the legislative power of Congress because:
a. Establishment of the NCIRS requires a legislative act; and
b. Appropriation of public funds is an exclusive right of Congress
2. That the NCIRS constitutes a violation of citizens’ right to privacy, which is
“the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men” (J. Brandeis)
- Respondents, in return, allege that:
1. The case is not justiciable (no legal standing and premature)
2. That the issuance of the AO is within the Executive and Administrative
Powers of the President (a. merely implements Administrative Code of 1987;
and b. not a law)
3. Funds may be source from the budgets of the concerned agency; and
4. AO 308 sufficiently protects the individual’s right to privacy
Issues:
I. W/N the requisites of judicial review are satisfied. YES
II. W/N AO 308 violates the right to privacy. YES
III. W/N the President usurped the legislative power of Congress in issuing AO 308.
YES
Reasoning:
I. All the requisites for judicial review are satisfied:
a. Locus Standi:
- As Senator, has sufficient standing to raise the issue of usurpation of
legislative power
- As Taxpayer and Member of the GSIS, can raise the issue of
misalignment of public and GSIS funds.
b. Ripeness
- The petitioner assails AO 308 as invalid per se and infirmed on its face
- Promulgation of rules of implementation cannot cure its defect
- Respondents themselves have began implementation without waiting for
the rules
- All signs from respondents show their unswerving will to implement the
AO
- Insistence to tighten the rule on standing would result in throttling an
important constitutional principle and a fundamental right
II. AO 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and, hence, beyond the
power of the President to issue
- Definition of terms:
1. LEGISLATIVE POWER – the authority under the Constitution to make, alter
and repeal laws
 − Any power deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has
lodged it elsewhere
− Embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or
common interest
2. EXECUTIVE POWER – the power to enforce and administer laws
− the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing
their due observance
3. THE PRESIDENT – represents the government as a whole
− sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of
his department
− has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive
department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its
officials
− Corollary to this is the duty to supervise the enforcement of laws for
the maintenance of general peace and public order (Administrative
power)
4. ADMINISTRATIVE POWER – concerns applying policies and enforcing orders
as determined by proper governmental organs
− Enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative
efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents
5. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS – defined by Section 3, Chapter 2, Title I, Book
III of the Administrative Code of 1987
− Acts of the President that:
1. relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of
government
2. in harmony with the law
3. must be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying
out the legislative policy
A. Respondents try to argue that AO 308 merely implements the intent of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (AC1987).
- COURT REJECTED THIS ARGUMENT
- AC1987 is a general law
- It cannot be simplistically said that AO 308 mere implements AC1987
because it:
1. establishes for the first time the NCIRS;
2. requires delicate adjustment of various contending state policies (e.g.
primacy of national interest, extent of privacy interest against dossier-
gathering of the government, choice of policies, etc.);
3. redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-à-vis
the State; and
4. it redefines the line that separates the administrative power of the
President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress
∴ THESE DEAL WITH A SUBJECT THAT SHOULD BE COVERED BY LAW
B. Respondents also try to argue that AO 308 is not a law because it confers no
rights, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office.
- ALSO REJECTED because no citizen can refuse to get identification
- Otherwise, they cannot transact business with government
- They will have difficulty exercising their rights and enjoying their privileges
- Fisher: Regulations should not be substituted for the general policy-
making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law… The authority to
prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to
make laws.
III. AO 308 violates the constitutionally enshrined right to privacy, which is
essentially the “right to be left alone”
- Griswold vs. Connecticut: There is a right to privacy which can be found within
the penumbras of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights… Various
guarantees create zones of privacy
- In Morfe vs. Mutuc we adopted the Griswold ruling into our jurisdiction
- In fact, the right to privacy is enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution
(see Article III, Sections 3(1), 1, 2, 6, 8, 17)
- They are also recognized by our laws (i.e. Civil Code, RPC, special laws)
- Since the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that AO
308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn.
- It is debatable whether the reasons of convenience and reduction of fraud are
compelling enough
- Worse, it is inarguable that the broadness, vagueness and overbreadth of
AO308 will put our people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger
− “Biometrics” is the science of the application of statistical methods to
biological facts; a mathematical analysis of biological data
− The most common form is fingerprinting, which is the scanning of the
fingertips and the storage of such data to identify individuals
− Today, however, biometrics is not merely limited to the use of fingerprints
− AO308 does not state:
a. What specific biological characteristics will be gathered
b. What particular biometrics technology will be employed
c. Whether data is limited to use for identification purposes only
d. How data will be handled
e. Who shall control and access the data
∴AO308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy
because, as technology advances, the level of reasonable expected privacy
decreases
CALDERON VS. CARALE (April 22, 1992)
Petition for prohibition to review the constitutionality & legality of the appointment
of respondents
FACTS:
Sec.16, Art.VII: The President shall nominate &, w/ the consent of the Com on
Appointments (CA), appoint the heads of the exec depts., ambassadors, other public
ministers & consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain & other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Consti. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, & those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of depts., agencies,
commissions, or boards.
• Sarmiento III v. Mison: (On power of CA to confirm appointments) The
position of the BOC Commissioner (a bureau head) is not one of those w/n
the 1st grp of appointments where the consent of the CA is required. While
the 1935 Consti includes ‘heads of bureaus’ among those officers whose
appointments need the consent of the CA, the 1987 Consti deliberately
excluded the position of ‘heads of bureaus’ from appointments that need
the consent of CA. The intent was to exclude pres’l appointments from
confirmation by CA, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in
the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII.
• Bautista v. Salonga: The position of Chairman of the Com on Human Rights
is not among those mentioned in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of
1987 Consti, appointments to w/c are to be made w/ the confirmation of
the CA. The Pres appoints the CHR Chairman & members pursuant to the
2nd sentence in Sec. 16, Art VII, that is, w/o confirmation of CA bec they
are among the officers of govt whom the Pres ‘may be authorized by law
to appoint.’ And Sec 2(c) of EO 163 authorizes the Pres to appoint the
Chairman & members of CHR.
• Quintos Deles, et al. v. The Commission on Const’l Commissions: Since the
seats reserved for sectoral reps in par.2, Sec. 5, Art VI may be filled by
appointment by the Pres by express provision of Sec. 7, Art XVIII of the
Consti, it is indubitable that sectoral reps are among the ‘other officers
whose appointments are vested in the Pres in this Consti’ referred to in the
1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII whose appointments are subject to CA
confirmation.
• DOCTRINES FROM THE 3 CASES:
1) Confirmation by CA is required only for presidential appointees
mentioned in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII, including those
officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Consti in the
Pres.
2) Confirmation is not required when the Pres appoints other govt officers
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those
officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. Also, in Mison,
when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for
appointment thereto, or provides in an unconst’l manner for such
appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose
appointments are not other wise provided by law.
• March 1989, RA 6715, amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was approved.
• Sec. 13, RA 6715: “The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners
shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by CA….”
• Pursuant to RA 6715, Pres Aquino appointed the Chairman &
Commissioners of the NLRC. Drilon then issued AO No. 161, designating
the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners.
• The present petition questions the constitutionality & legality of the
permanent appointments mentioned above w/o submitting the same to CA
for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA
6715.
• PETITIONER: insists on a mandatory compliance w/ RA 6715. Mison &
Bautista are not decisive in this case for in the case at bar, the Pres issued
permanent appointments w/o submitting them to CA for confirmation
despite passage of a law (RA 6715) w/c requires the confirmation by the
CA of such appointments.
• SOLGEN (RESPONDENTS): RA 6715 transgresses Sec. 16, Art. VII by
expanding the confirmation powers of CA w/o const’l basis. Mison
&Bautista laid the issue to rest.
• SOLGEN: “Three points as regards subsec. 3 of Sec. 10 of Art VII of the
1935 Consti & in the orig text of Sec. 16, Art. VII of 1987 Consti as
proposed in Resolution No. 517: 1) in both, the appointments of heads of
bureaus were required to be confirmed by CA; 2) in both, the
appointments of other officers “whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law to appoint” are expressly made subject to confirmation
by CA. However, in the final version of Resolution No. 517, as embodied in
Sec. 16, Art. VII of 1987 Consti, the appointment of heads of bureaus &
other officers whose appointments are not provided for by law & those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint – are excluded from the list
of those officers whose appointments are to be confirmed by CA; 3) Under
1935 Consti, the word “nominate” qualifies the entire Subsec.3 of Sec. 10
of Art VII thereof.
• SOLGEN: If confirmation is required, the 3 stage process of nomination,
confirmation & appointment operates. This is only true of the 1st grp
enumerated in Sec. 16, Art. VII but the word nominate does not appear in
the 2nd & 3rd sentences. Therefore, the president’s appointment pursuant to
the 2nd & 3rd sentences need no confirmation.
ISSUE:
1) WON Congress may, by law, require confirmation by CA of appointments
extended by the President to government officers additional to those
expressly mentioned in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII whose
appointments require confirmation by the CA.
RATIO:
• Mison: There are 4 groups of officers whom the Pres shall appoint
1) Heads of exec depts., ambassadors, other public ministers &
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, & other officers whose appointment are vested in
him in this Consti.
2) All other officers of the Govt whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law
3) Those whom the Pres may be authorized by law to appoint
 4) Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by
law vest in the Pres alone.
• In the course of the debates on the text of Sec 16, Art VII, there were 2
major changes proposed & approved by Const’l Commission: 1) exclusion
of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of
confirmation by CA; 2) exclusion of appointments made under the 2nd
sentence of the section from the same requirement.
• The 2nd sentence refers to all other officers of the govt whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law & those whom the Pres may be
authorized by law to appoint.
• The NLRC Chairman & Commissioners fall w/n the 2nd sentence of Sec 16,
Art VII, more specifically, under the “third grp” in Mison (I.e. those whom
the Pres may be authorized by law to appoint). Thus, they are not among
those mentioned in 1st sentence whose appointments require confirmation
by CA.
• To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by CA of the
appointments of respondents Chairman & Members of NLRC, it is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL because:
1) It amends by legislation, the 1st sentence of Sec 16, Art VII by adding
thereto appointments requiring confirmation by CA
2) It amends by legislation the 2nd sentence of Sec 16, Art VII by
imposing the confirmation of the CA on appointments w/c are
otherwise entrusted only w/ the Pres.
• Legislation cannot expand a const’l provision after the SC has interpreted
it.
• Sec 16, Art VII was deliberately intended by the framers to be a departure
from the system embodied in the 1935 Consti where the CA exercised the
power of confirmation over almost all pres’l appointments, leading to many
cases of abuse of such power of confirmation.
• Subsec. 3, Sec. 10, Art. VII, 1935 Consti: “The Pres shall nominate &
w/ the consent of the CA, shall appoint the heads of the exec depts. &
bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy & Air
Forces from the rank of captain or commander, & all other officers of the
Govt whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, & those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
• The solution to Congress’ displeasure/disapproval to the deliberate
limitation on the CA’s power of confirmation is a future const’l change w/c
may consider either a return to the 1935 const’l provisions or the adoption
of a hybrid system bet’n 1935 & 1987 Consti.
HELD; Petition DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715
insofar as it requires the confirmation of CA of appointments of the Chairman &
Members of the NLRC is UNCONSTITUTIONAL & of no legal force & effect.
Manalo vs. Sistoza [August 11, 1999]
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition
Facts:
 Manalo questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent
appointments issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino to the
respondent senior officers of the Philippine National Police who were
promoted to the ranks of Chief Superintendent and Director without their
appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and
Republic Act 6975 otherwise known as the Local Government Act of 1990.
 Secretary Enriquez III of the Budget and Management is also impleaded
because he approved and effected the disbursements for the salaries and
other emoluments of the police officers.
 December 13, 1990 – RA 6975 was signed by President Aquino. This law
created the Department of Interior and Local Government
 Section 26 of RA 6975 provided that the Chief of the PNP shall be
appointed by the President from among the senior officers down to the
rank of the chief superintendent, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments: Provided, That the Chief of the PNP shall
serve a term of office not to exceed four (4) years.
 Section 31 of RA 6975 provided how the appointment of PNP officers and
members will be effected:
o (c) Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director General - Appointed
by the President upon recommendation of the Chief of the PNP,
with the proper endorsement by the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission and subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments;
o (d) Director General - Appointed by the President from among the
senior officers down to the rank of chief superintendent in the
service, subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; Provided, That the Chief of the PNP shall serve a
tour of duty not to exceed four (4) years; Provided, further, That,
in times of war or other national emergency declared by Congres,
the President may extend such tour of duty.
 March 10, 1992 – The president promoted 15 respondent police officers by
appointing them to positions in the PNP with the rank of Chief
Superintendent and Director.
 The appointments were made in a permanent capacity. Their names were
not submitted to the Commission of Appointment for Confirmation.
 October 21, 1992 – petitioner filed the case as a taxpayer suit, to assail the
legality of subject appointments and disbursements made.
 The contentions of the petitioners are:
o Republic Act 6975 is a valid law that duly requires confirmation of
the appointments of officers from the rank of senior
superintendent and higher by the Commission on Appointments
o The Philippine National Police is akin to the Armed Forces where
the Constitution specifically requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments
Issue: WON the appointment of the PNP are valid even without the confirmation of
the Commission of Appointments. YES
Ratio:

 The petitioners theorizes that every statute passed by Congress is
presumed to have been carefully studied and considered before its
enactment and that the court should avoid, as much as possible, deciding
constitutional questions. The court agreed with the petitioner but they also
stated that the court also has the duty to strike down laws that are
unconstitutional.
 The power to make appointments is vested in the Chief Executive. (Article
VII section 16)
 In Sarmiento III vs. Mison: it was held that Section 16 of Article VII of the
1987 Constitution requiring confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of certain appointments issued by the President
contemplates a system of checks and balances between the executive and
legislative branches of government.
 The framers of the 1987 Constitution deemed it imperative to subject
certain high positions in the government to the power of confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments and to allow other positions within the
exclusive appointing power of the President.
 Four groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the president
1. heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank
of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution;
2. all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
3. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
4. officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by
law vest in the President alone.
 Only appointments that fall under the first group requires the confirmation
of the commission of appointments
 Tarrosa vs. Singson: Congress cannot by law expand the power of
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation
of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first
sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
 Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution provides for the
characteristics of the armed forces while Section 6 provides for the police
force
 PNP is separate and distinct from the AFP. RA 6975 distinguishes the police
force from the armed forces. In this law it is provided that no element of
the police force shall be military nor shall any position thereof be occupied
by active members of the AFP.
 Police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the
ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National
Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the
herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category of
presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
DOMINADOR R. AYTONA, petitioner, vs. ANDRES V. CASTILLO, ET AL.,
respondents. (January 19, 1962)
Facts:
On December 29, 1961, President Carlos P. Garcia appointed Dominador R. Aytona
as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. On the same day, the latter took the
corresponding oath.
On December 30, 1961, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on
December 31, 1961, he issued Administrative Order No. 2 recalling, withdrawing,
and canceling all ad interim appointment made by President Garcia after December
13, 1961, (date when he, Macapagal, had been proclaimed elected by the
Congress). On January 1, 1962, President Macapagal appointed Andres V. Castillo as
ad interim Governor of the Central Bank, and the latter qualified immediately.
In revoking the appointments, President Macapagal is said to have acted for these
and other reasons:
(1) The outgoing President should have refrained from filling vacancies to
give the new President opportunity to consider names in the light of his
new policies,
(2) These scandalously hurried appointments in mass do not fall within the
intent and spirit of the constitutional provision authorizing the issuance of
ad interim appointments
(3) The appointments were irregular, immoral and unjust, because they
were issued upon the condition that the appointee would immediately
qualify obviously to prevent a revocation by the incoming President, with
the result deserving officials who preferred to be named by the new
President declined and were by-passed
(4) The abnormal conditions surrounding the appointment and
qualifications evinced a desire on the part of the outgoing President to
subvert the policies of the incoming administration.
On January 2, 1962, both appointed exercised the powers of their office, although
Castillo informed Aytona of his title thereto; and some unpleasantness developed in
the premises of the Central Bank. However, the next day and thereafter, Aytona was
definitely prevented from holding office in the Central Bank.
Aytona claims he was validly appointed, had qualified for the post, and therefore,
the subsequent appointment and qualification of Castillo was void, because the
position was then occupied by him. Castillo replies that the appointment of Aytona
had been revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 of Macapagal.
Thus, Aytona instituted this proceeding which is practically, a quo warranto,
challenging Castillo's right to exercise the powers of Governor of the Central Bank.
Issue:
WON petition should be granted in favor of Aytona.
Ratio/Holding: No. Petition Dismissed.
The record shows that President Garcia sent to the Commission on Appointments —
which was not then in session – three communication letters with a total of about
three hundred fifty (350) "midnight" or "last minute" appointments.

It is Malacañan's practice to submit ad interim appointments only when the
Commission on Appointments is in session. This time, Malacañan submitted its
appointments on the same day they were issued; and the Commission was not then
in session; obviously because it foresaw the possibility that the incoming President
would refuse to submit later the appointees of his predecessor.
Because of the haste and irregularities, some judges of first instance qualified for
districts wherein no vacancies existed, because the incumbents had not qualified for
other districts to which they had been supposedly transferred or promoted.
Referring specifically to judges who had not qualified, the course of conduct adopted
by Former Chief Justice Moran is cited. Being ambassador in Spain and desiring to
return to this Court even as associate justice, Moran was tendered an ad interim
appointment thereto by President Quirino, after the latter had lost the election to
President Magsaysay, and before leaving the Presidency. Said Ambassador declined
to qualify being of the opinion that the matter should be left to the incoming newly-
elected President.
It is common sense to believe that after the proclamation of the election of
President Macapagal, President Garcia was no more than a "care-taker"
administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of
authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he ought
to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor.
It was not for President Garcia to use powers as incumbent President to continue
the political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives
to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in important positions, if
few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and
careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's
qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350
appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a
few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some
reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse. Presidential prerogatives, the
steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions
irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new
administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.
Normally, when the President makes appointments the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, he has benefit of their advice. When he makes ad interim
appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to
insure approval of his selection either previous consultation with the members of the
Commission or by thereafter explaining to them the reason such selection. Where,
however, as in this case, the Commission on Appointments that will
consider the appointees is different from that existing at the time of the
appointment2 and where the names are to be submitted by successor, who
may not wholly approve of the selections, the President should be doubly
careful in extending such appointments. Now, it is hard to believe that in
signing 350 appointments in one night, President Garcia exercised such
"double care" which was required and expected of him; and therefore,
there seems to be force to the contention that these appointments fall
beyond the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision granting to the
Executive authority to issue ad interim appointments.
None of precedents in favor of petitioner refer to mass ad interim
appointments (three-hundred and fifty), issued in the last hours of an
outgoing Chief Executive, in a setting similar to that outlined herein. On the
other hand, the authorities admit of exceptional circumstances justifying
revocation3 and if any circumstances justify revocation, those described
herein should fit the exception.
The appointees, it might be argued, wittingly or unwittingly cooperated with the
stratagem to beat the deadline, whatever the resultant consequences to the dignity
and efficiency of the public service. Needless to say, there are instances
wherein not only strict legality, but also fairness, justice and righteousness
should be taken into account.
Note: The issue of WON the new President had power to issue the order of
cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by the past President, even after
the appointees had already qualified was mentioned in this case but not really
addressed. In Quimsing v Tanjanglangit, the SC stated that “In the various cases
decided by this Court after the Aytona vs. Castillo case the matter of the validity of
appointments made after December 13, 1961 by former President Garcia was
considered not in the light of the said Administrative Order No. 2 (which was never
upheld by this Court), but on the basis of the nature, character and merit of the
individual appointments and the particular circumstances surrounding the same.”
QUIMSING VS. TAJANGLANGIT
EUFEMIO P. TESORO vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
FACTS (MORAN, J):
On October 10, 1934, petitioner Eufemio P. Tesoro was convicted in CFI of Manila of
the crime of falsification of a public document and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from 2-3 yrs, 6 mos and 21 days, to pay a fine PhP100 or undergo
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. This penalty was to expire on
October 28, 1937. On November 14, 1935, then Governor-General Frank Murphy
granted the petitioner a parole, which the latter accepted, subject to the ff
conditions:
1. That he will live in the City of Manila and will not change his residence
without first obtaining the consent of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence;
2. That he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an
orderly manner;
3. That he will report, during the period of his parole, to the Executive
Secretary of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, during the first year, once a
month, and thereafter, once every three months.
Should any of the conditions stated be violated, the sentence imposed shall
again be in full force and effect.
On December 3, 1937, petitioner was again charged in the justice of the peace
court of San Juan, Rizal, with a different crime, adultery, alleged to have been
committed with one Concordia Dairo, wife of petitioner's brother-in-law, Jose Nagar.
Sometime in Feb, 1938, the same Jose Nagar lodged a complaint with Board of
Indeterminate Sentence, and upon the same facts, charged the petitioner with
violation of the conditions of his parole. On Feb 4, 1938, petitioner addressed a
letter to the board denying the charges. On the same date, parole officer Figalang,
assigned to investigate the case, submitted his report to the board. The acting
chairman of the board then addressed a communication to the President of the
Philippines, recommending the arrest and reincarceration of the petitioner.
On Feb 19, 1938, the Pres issued an order finding Tesoro to have violated the
condition in his parole about not committing any other crime and to conduct himself
in an orderly manner. It was found that upon the death of the sister of Jose Nagar,
he w/ his wife lived w/ Tesoro in order to mitigate the grief of the bereaved family
and to help in the keeping of the house and caring of the children in San Juan, Rizal.
But Tesoro took advantage of the frequent absences of Jose Nagar from the house,
and he succeeded in having illicit relations with Narag’s wife and even went to the
extent of taking her away. He now lives with her in adultery.
By virtue Sec 64 of the Administrative Code, Tesoro was arrested and committed to
the custody of the Director of Prisons, Manila, who was authorized to confine him
person for the service of the unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which
he was originally committed to prison. Petitioner sued for a writ of habeas corpus
against the Director of Prisons, and upon denial by TC, took the present appeal.
ISSUES & RATIO:
Sec 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, by virtue of which the petitioner was granted
parole, gives the Governor-General the following powers and duties:
To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial,
conditional or unconditional; to suspend sentences without pardon, remit
fines, and order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject
to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and re-
incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply
with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of
sentence.
Par 6, Sec 11, Art VII, of the Constitution, provides as follows:
The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses,
except in cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such
restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose. He shall have
the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly.
Appellant contends that section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, w/c confers upon
the Chief Executive the power to grant and revoke paroles, has been impliedly
repealed by Par 6, Sec 11, Art VII, of the Constitution, as the consti’l provision
omitted to specify such power in connection with the powers granted therein to the
Pres. This is untenable. The power to pardon given to the Pres by the Constitution,
"upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem
proper to impose," includes the power to grant and revoke paroles. If the omission
of the power of parole in the Constitution is to be construed as its denial to the Pres,
the effect would be to discharge unconditionally parolees, who, before the adoption
of the Constitution, have been released conditionally by the Chief Executive. That
such effect was never intended by the Constitutional Convention is obviously beyond
question.
Appellant also contends that the Board of Indeterminate Sentence has no legal
authority to investigate the conduct of the petitioner, and recommend the revocation
of his parole. By the terms of his parole, petitioner agreed to report the executive
secretary of the board once a month during the 1st yr of his parole, and, thereafter,
once every three months. By his consent to this condition, petitioner has placed
himself under the supervision of the board. The duty to report on the part of the
petitioner implies a corresponding power on the part of the board to inquire into his
conduct, and a fortiori to make recommendations to the President by whose
authority it was acting. Besides, the power to revoke paroles necessarily carries with
it the power to investigate and to inquire into the conduct of the parolees, if such
power of revocation is to be rational and intelligent. In the exercise of this incidental
power of inquiry and investigation, the Pres is not precluded by law or by the
Constitution from making use of any agency of the government, or even of
any individual, to secure the necessary assistance. When, therefore, the
President chose to entrust his power of inquiry upon the Board of Indeterminate
Sentence, a government agency created precisely for the concern of persons
released on parole, he acted both upon legal authority and good judgment.
Appellant further contends that judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has
committed a crime is necessary before he can be properly adjudged as having
violated his conditional parole. Under condition No 2 of his parole, petitioner agreed
that he "will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly
manner." It was, therefore, the mere commission, not his conviction by court, of
any other crime, that was necessary in order that the petitioner may be deemed
to have violated his parole. And under section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, the
Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such
person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions,
of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence."
It is also Tesoro’s contention that, upon the expiration of his maximum term of
imprisonment, his conditional parole also expires. In other words, he holds the view
that the period during which he was out on parole should be counted as service of
his original sentence. When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed
in the same state in which he was at the time the pardon was granted. He may be
rearrested and recommitted to prisons. Although there is no statutory provision
squarely governing the case with respect to the duration of the petitioner's
confinement after his recommitment, the terms of the parole shall govern. From
the express terms of the parole that "should any of the conditions stated be
violated, the sentence imposed shall again be in full force and effect," it is evident
that the petitioner herein should serve the unexpired portion of the penalty
originally imposed upon him by the court.
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant. Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real,
Imperial, Laurel and Diaz, JJ., concur.
Wilfredo TORRES, petitioner vs. Neptali GONZALES, Chairman Board of
Pardons & Parole, and the Director, Bureau of Prisons, respondents
Original Petition for Habeas Corpus [July 23, 1987]
Facts:
♥ Before 1979: Torres was convicted of 2 counts of estafa & sentenced to 11 y 10
m & 22 d to 38 y 9 m 1 d imprisonment. Affirmed by CA & max sentence would
expire Nov. 2, 2000.
♥ He was granted a conditional pardon by the Pres on condition that he won’t
violate any of the penal laws of the Phil & if he violates the condition, he will be
proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. He accepted the conditional
pardon & was released.
♥ May 21, 1986: Board of Pardons & Parole (BPP) recommended to the Pres
cancellation of the conditional pardon based on the ff evidence:
1. He was charged w/20 counts of estafa on March 22, 82 – June 24, 82.
2. He was convicted of sedition on June 26, 1985, case is now pending appeal
before the IAC.
3. NBI sent a letter to the BPP on Jan. 14, 1986 showing a long list of charges
brought against Torres in the last 20 yrs. Including estafa, swindling, grave
threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms, ammunition &
explosives, malicious mischief, violation of BP 22, violation of BP 772
(interfering w/police functions). Some were dismissed & NBI did not
purport to be a status report of the charges.
♥ Sept. 8, 1986: Pres cancelled conditional pardon. An Order of Arrest &
Recommitment was issued & Torres was accordingly arrested & confined in
Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
♥ Petitioner contends that he did not violate the conditional pardon since he has
not been convicted by final judgment of all the charges against him. He also
argues that he was not given the opportunity to be heard before he was
arrested & recommitted thus depriving him of his right to due process.
Issues: WON conviction of a crime by final judgment is necessary before the
petitioner can be validly rearrested & recommitted for violation of the terms of his
conditional pardon to serve the balance of his original sentence.
Held: NO. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
♥ Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons: similar case wherein he was granted parole but
was charged w/adultery later on but the case was dismissed. He was still
charged of violating the conditions & was arrested & recommitted. Like Torres,
he claimed that a judicial pronouncement that he committed a crime was
necessary before he can be adjudged as having violated his conditional parole.
Court ruled that determining WON the conditions of the parole had been
breached rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Gov Gen & such is not
subj to the review of the courts. It was granted by the Pres & he agreed to the
terms of the grant of parole thus he cannot invoke the aid of the courts no
matter how erroneous the findings for his recommitment may be. Sec. 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) empowered the Gov Gen to grant
reprieves/pardons to convicted prisoners & to authorize their
arrest/recommitment if they fail to comply w/the condition/s of the
pardon/parole/suspension of sentence.
♥ Sales vs. Director of Prisons: similar case. The court here ruled that RPC Art.
159 did not repeal RAC Sec. 64 (i), they can stand together & proceeding under
one provision did not preclude action under the other. Act No. 4109
(Indeterminate Sentence Law) preserved the authority vested on the Pres by
Sec. 64. It likewise held that Sec. 64 was not repugnant to the constitutional
grant of due process since the petitioner was already a convict & had been
seized in a constitutional way. He has confronted his accusers & witnesses
against him and he has been convicted & sentenced to that specific
punishment. He was not constitutionally entitled to another judicial
determination of WON he had breached the condition of is parole by committing
a subsequent offense. In accepting the conditional parole, he has agreed that a
conclusion by the gov gen that he violated the conditions of his parole & order
for his arrest is conclusive upon him.
♥ Espuelas vs Provincial Warden of Bohol: court held that due process is not
necessarily judicial. The petitioner already had his day in court & afforded the
opportunity to defend himself during trial for the crime with w/c he was
conditionally pardoned. No other dept has the authority to determine WON the
conditions of the pardon have been violated except the gov gen. Court
reaffirmed validity of Sec. 64.
♥ Thus, grant of pardon & determination of its terms & conditions are executive
acts not subj to judicial scrutiny. In determining WON the conditions have been
breached, two options are available:
1. Executive: RAC Sec. 64 (i). No judicial pronouncement of guilt/conviction
by final judgment of a subsequent crime is necessary. This is not
unconstitutional since the accused has already been accorded judicial due
process in his trial & conviction for offense for w/c he was conditionally
pardoned.
2. Judicial: trial & conviction of violation of conditional pardon under RPC Art.
159 w/c provides the penalty of prision correccional, minimum, upon a
convict who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Exec shall
violate any of the conditions of such pardon.
♥ President chose option #1. It’s an exercise of his executive prerogative & is not
subj to judicial scrutiny.
BARRIOQUINTO v. FERNANDEZ
82 Phil. 642 (1949)
Facts:
 Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with the
crime of murder. Barrioquinto had not yet been arrested. The case proceeded
against Jimenez and he was sentenced Jimenez to life imprisonment.
 Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, Jimenez availed of
Proclamation No. 8 which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be
charged with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to
the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and
committed during the period from Dec. 8, 1941, to the date when particular
area of the Philippines where the offense was actually committed was liberated
from enemy control and occupation.
 He submitted his case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission presided by the
respondents herein, and the other petitioner Barrioquinto, who had then been
already apprehended, did the same.
 After a preliminary hearing had started, the Amnesty Commission had their
cases returned to the CFI Zamboanga, without deciding whether or not they are
entitled to the benefits of he said Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that
neither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have admitted having committed the offense,
because Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and killed
the victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty. Respondents are of the
idea that the "invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of
confession and avoidance."
Issue: WON Petitioners are precluded from availing the benefits of Amnesty as they
have not admitted to the commission of the crime
 NO. Respondents fail to differentiate between amnesty and pardon. pleads not guilty or that he has not committed the act with which he is charged,
does not necessarily prove that he is not guilty thereof. Notwithstanding his
PARDON AMNESTY denial, the evidence for the prosecution or complainant may show the contrary,
Pardon is granted by the Chief Amnesty by Proclamation of as it is generally the case in criminal proceedings, and what should in such a
Executive and as such it is a the Chief Executive with the case be determined is whether or not the offense committed is of political
private act which must be concurrence of Congress, character. The plea of not having committed the offense made by an accused
pleaded and proved by the and it is a public act of which simply means that he can not be convicted of the offense charged because he is
person pardoned, because the the courts should take not guilty thereof, and, even if the evidence would show that he is, because he
courts take no notice thereof judicial notice has committed it in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
Pardon is granted to one after Amnesty is granted to persons a ding in the war efforts of the enemy, and not for purely political
conviction classes of persons or motives.
communities who may be  According to A.O. No. 11 of October 2, 1946 creating the Amnesty Commissions,
guilty of political offenses, cases pending in the CFIs of the province in which the accused claims the
generally before or after the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation, and cases already decided by said courts but
institution of the criminal not yet elevated on appeal to the appellate courts, shall be passed upon and
prosecution and sometimes decided by the respective Amnesty Commission, and cases pending appeal shall
after conviction be passed upon by the Seventh Amnesty Commission. To hold that a Amnesty
Pardon looks forward and relieves Amnesty looks backward and Commission should not proceed to the investigation and act and decide whether
the offender from the abolishes and puts into the offense with which an accused was charged comes within the Amnesty
consequences of an offense of oblivion the offense itself, it Proclamation if he does not admit or confess having committed it would be to
which he has been convicted, so overlooks and obliterates defeat the purpose for which the Amnesty Proclamation was issued and the
that is, it abolished or forgives the offense with which he is Amnesty Commission were established.
the punishment, and for that charged that the person  If a defendant had to confess having committed the offense before he can
reason it does ""nor work the released by amnesty stands invoke the benefit of amnesty, and given that such admission or confession may
restoration of the rights to hold before the law precisely as be used as evidence against him in the courts of justices in case the Amnesty
public office, or the right of though he had committed no Commission finds that the offense does not come within the terms of the
suffrage, unless such rights be offense. (section 10[6], Amnesty Proclamation, nobody or few would take the risk of submitting their
expressly restored by the terms Article VII, Philippine case to said Commission.
of the pardon," and it "in no case constitution  Besides, Barrioquinto’s allegation that the offended party or victim was killed by
exempts the culprit from the Hipolito , does not necessarily bar the respondents from finding, after the
payment of the civil indemnity summary hearing of the witnesses for the complaints and the accused, directed
imposed upon him by the in the said Amnesty Proclamation and AO No. 11, that the petitioners are
sentence" art. 36, RPC) responsible for the killing of the victim because they were members of the same
group of guerrilleros who killed the victim in furtherance of the resistance to the
 HELD: In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
of 1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua
non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is Held: respondents ordered to immediately proceed to hear and decide the
charged and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence application for amnesty of Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless the courts have in the
either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed meantime already decided the question WON they are entitled Amnesty
comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Proclamation benefits.
 A person who is regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation which has the force of a
law, not only as innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had never
committed any punishable offense because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or
hero, can not be punishment as a criminal. Just as the courts of justice can not
convict a person who, according to the evidence, has committed an act not
punishable by law, although he confesses being guilty thereof, so also and a
fortiori they can not convict a person considered by law not a criminal, but as a
patriot and hero, for having rendered invaluable services to the nation in
committing such an act.
 There is no necessity for an accused to admit his responsibility for the
commission of a criminal act before a court of Amnesty Commission may
investigate and extend or not to him the benefits of amnesty. The fact that he