Eduardo, Hermogena and Vicente FELIPE, petitioners vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMO Not invalid because it’s imprecise considering CC terms re contracts. It can
ALDON (namely Gimena Almosara, Sofia & Salvador Aldon) and the
Honorable Court of Appeals, respondents
Petition for review of CA decision [Feb. 16, 1983]
Facts:
• 1936: Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara
• 1948 – 1950: they bought several pieces of land
• 1960 – 1962: said lands were divided into 3 lots, 1370, 1371 & 1415 of San
Jacinto Public Land Subdivision, San Jacinto, Masbate
• 1951: Gimena sold lots to sps Eduardo & Hermogena Felipe w/o Maximo’s
consent. Gimena & Hermogenes are close relatives.
• Maximo died.
• April 26, 1976: heirs of Maximo (private respondents) filed complaint in CFI
Masbate vs the Felipes alleging that they are the rightful owners of properties
sold to the sps. They claim that they orally mortgaged lands to sps & an offer to
redeem (given by priv respondents) mortgage had been refused by sps.
• Defendants claim: they acquired lots by purchase & it was subsequently
delivered to them.
• Trial Court: decided in favor of Felipes. They were declared as lawful owners.
Complaint was dismissed for lack of merit.
• CA: Reversed & set aside trial court decision. Felipes ordered to surrender lots
& muniments (?) of title to Aldons. They were also ordered to make acctg of
produce derived from lands including expenses incurred since 1951 & to
solidarily turn over to Aldons the net monetary value of profits after deducting
P1,800.00 (most probably this is the amount paid by Felipes when they
purchased the land or amount loaned to Aldons?)
• CA ratio:
1. if transfer was thru an oral contract of mortgage: redemption allowed
anytime upon repayment of P1,800.00
2. if it was done thru sale: redemption is improper
3. what really transpired: Deed of Purchase & Sale executed by Gimena in
favor of Hermogenes
4. sale not forged but invalid since deed was executed w/o needed consent of
Maximo, lots being conjugal (presumed as such because these were
purchased during marriage). This was properly raised in the pleading
considering the fact that complaint alleges that lands were purchased from
Gimena & husband Maximo.
• Felipes claim: since deed is not a forgery, it authenticity & due execution is
beyond question. This is a ques of fact that SC can’t consider. They’re only
concerned w/ques of law.
Issues & Ratio:
1. WON sale made by Gimena to the Felipes is valid. - NO
• Note the ff. elementary rules:
1. CC Art. 165: husband is administrator of CP
2. CC Art. 166: subj to certain exceptions, husband can’t alienate/encumber
any real prop of the CP w/o wife’s consent
3. CC Art. 172: wife can’t bind CP w/o husband’s consent except in cases
provided by law
• Thus, since wife sold lands belonging to CP w/o husband’s consent & such sale
is not covered by instances “except in cases provided by law”, sale is defective.
either be:
1. rescissible (art. 1380) – when all essential elements are untainted
(Gimena’s consent was tainted)
2. voidable (art. 1390)
3. unenforceable (art. 1403)
4. void/inexistent (art. 1409)
• Deed of sale is a voidable contract – where one of parties is incapable of giving
consent to the contract (art.1390 par. 1). Gimena was incapacitated to give
consent. Consent of both spouses is needed. Supported by CC Art. 173, w/c
provides that contracts entered by husband w/o wife’s consent when such is
required, are annullable at her instance during marriage & w/in 10yrs from
questioned transaction.
2. WON Gimena and her children can ask for annulment of contract
• GIMENA - It’s only subj to annulment of husband during marriage because he
was the victim who had interest in contract whereas Gimena was party
responsible for defect. Gimena is barred from doing this during and even after
the marriage.
• CHILDREN – While marriage was still subsisting, they could NOT seek for its
annulment since their rt to the lands was merely inchoate/expectant. But upon
death of dad, they acquired rt to question defective contract in so far as it
deprived them of their hereditary rts in dad’s share in lands. Dad’s share is ½ &
they’re entitled to 2/3 of such, remaining 1/3 belongs to mom.
3. WON petitioners have acquired land by acquisitive prescription. - NO
They bought lands in bad faith proven by ff instances:
a. Vicente, son of sps Felipe, attempted to have Gimena sign a ready-made
document purporting to sell disputed lands to Felipes in Dec. 1970. They knew
land didn’t belong to them.
b. Said document was for purpose of obtaining Gimena’s consent to construction
irrigation pump on lands. If they were the owners, why did they have to get her
consent?
c. Improvements were only being made in 1970 when sale was in 1951.
d. Declaration of prop made only in 1974.
e. No attempt to obtain Maximo’s signature despite fact that Gimena &
Hermogena were close relatives.
Given that they did possess the lands, possession in bad faith is covered by
extraordinary prescription w/c lapses in 30 yrs. Sale was in 1951 & case filed in
1976, 30 yrs has not yet lapsed.
4. WON rt of action of Sofia & Salvador Aldon is barred by statute of
limitations - NO
Their rt of action accrued from death of dad in 1959 & they are given 30 yrs to
institute it (CC Art. 1141). Action filed in 1976, thus still w/in allowed time.
Held: CA modified. Sofia & Salvador awarded their shares of lands. Felipes as
possessors in bad faith ordered to make an acctg of fruits corresponding to
children’s shares from 1959 & solidarily pay value to them.
Tintigan v. Tintigan
Guiang vs. Court of Appeals [June 26, 1998]
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA

Facts:
 Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz were married on December 24, 1968. They
have 3 children Junie, Harriet and Jodie or Joji.
 February 14, 1983 – they bought a piece of land from Manuel Callejo with Gilda
Corpuz as the vendee. The consideration was payable in instalment and with
the right of cancellation in favour of the vendor should the vendee fail to pay
for 3 successive instalments
 April 22, 1988 – the spouses sold ½ of their Lot 9 Block 8 to the defendant
spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang.
 June 1989 – Gilda Corpuz went to Manila (with the consent of the husband) to
look for employment in the Middle East but she became a victim of an
unscrupulous illegal recruiter.
 January 1990 – Harriet (daughter) informed her mother that her father
intended to sell the remaining ½ portion of the land including their house to the
Guiangs. Gilda Corpuz objected to the sale. Harriet did not inform her father
but instead she gave the letter of her mother to the Guiangs.
 Judie Corpuz pushed through with the sale of the remaining ½ portion and a
deed of transfer of rights was executed.
 March 1 (or15), 1990 – to cure whatever defect in defendant Judie Corpuz’s
title over the lot transferred, Luzviminda Guiang executed another agreement
over lot 9 block 8 with Manuela Callejo (widow of the original owner) {Manuel
and Manuela}
 March 11, 1990 – Gilda Corpuz returned home and together with her children
they stayed at their home. At this time her husband is already living with
another woman already.
 The Guiangs charged Gilda in the barangay for trespassing. March 16, 1990
the parties signed a document known as amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz
asked for the annulment of the settlement.
 Court of Appeals ruled that the sale was void because it was done without the
consent of the wife. The amicable settlement did not ratify the sale because
Art. 1409 expressly bars the ratification of the contracts of those prohibited or
declared void by law.
Issues:
1. WON the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed
2. WON the CA erred in not declaring as voidable contract under Art. 1390 of the
Civil Code the impugned Deed of Transfer of Rights which was validly ratified
thru the execution of the amicable settlement by the contending parties.
Ratio
1. No, it is a void Contract
 Petitioners contend that it is a valid contract and that Deed of Transfer of Rights
was validly executed and that the absence of the consent of Mrs. Corpuz merely
made the Deed voidable and under Art. 1390 provides that it is susceptible of
ratification.
 Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there
may have been no damage to the contracting parties (2) Those where the
consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
This article refers to contracts visited by vices of consent (consent was vitiated
through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud) The consent
of Mrs. Corpuz was totally inexistent or absent.
 Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy,
which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors. (165a)
 Disposition or encumbrance is void. The court compared the civil code with the
family code. Under Art. 166 of the civil code the husband cannot generally
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the
wife’s consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made without the consent
of the wife. Art 173 provided that the wife is 10 years during the marriage to
annul the alienation or encumbrance. This provision was not carried to the
Family Code and as such any alienation or encumbrance made by the husband
after August 3, 1988 without the consent of the wife would be considered as
null and void.
 Fraud and intimidation was only present during the execution of the amicable
settlement and not during the Deed of Transfer of Right.
 When is a contract null and void? Absence of any of the elements:
i. Cause
ii. Object
iii. Consent
2. No
 The Deed of Transfer of Right cannot be ratified because an amicable
settlement cannot validate an invalid act.
 Art. 1422 provides that: A contract which is the direct result of a previous
illegal contract, is also void and inexistent.
Imelda Relucio, pet v Angelina Lopez, res
Relucio seeks to have the CoA decision set aside, which denied a petition for
certiorari assailing the RTC’s order (that then denied her motion to dismiss the case
against her inclusion as party defendant).
Angelina Lopez is legally married to Alberto Lopez. In 1968, Alberto abandoned her
and their four legitimate children. He also abrogated unto himself full and exclusive
control and administration of their CP. He spent and used the CP for his sole gain
and benefit to the total exclusion of Angelina and their four children.
Since 1976, he also maintained an illicit relationship and cohabitated with Imelda
Relucio. Since then, they amassed quite a fortune consisting mainly of
stockholdings in Lopez-owned or controlled corporations, residential…jewelry, etc.
These properties are in the names of (in CoA case, the defendant) Alberto and
Imelda or jointly, or their dummies. They have been acquired mostly byactual
contribution and industry of Alberto. He also, with intention to escape his obligations
as a father and husband, placed some properties in the name of Relucio and even
stashed away some. He has also alienated various properties that belong to the CP,
spending the proceeds thereof for his benefit, Imelda’s and their two illegitimate
children.
WON Angelina’s petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the CP against
her H established a cause of action against petitioner
NO. A cause of action is an act or omission of one party (the defendant) in
violation of the
legal right of the other. There are three elements:
1. right in favor of plaintiff
2. obligation on part of defendant to respect that right
3. act or omission on part of defendant in violation of that right
Complaint of Angelina is that of an aggrieved wife against her husband. It
doesn’t seek relief from Imelda. References to her iare merely incidental to
set forth facts and circumstances that prove cause of action against
Alberto. All of Angelina’s causes of action were against her husband:
1. as to judicial appointment as administratrix of the CP or ACP arising
from her marriage to Alberto…Imelda is a stranger to such cause of
action since A128 of FC refers only to sps with regards to compliance
with marital obligations, petitions for judicial separation or property or
for appointment as administratrix
2. as to accounting, which is an incident of marriage
3. as to forfeiture of Alberto’s share in co-owned property acquired during
illicit relationship with Imelda…the issue is whether there is basis in
law for forfeiture of Alberto’s share
4. as to seeking support, which can’t be sought from stranger
5. as to moral damages
WON Imelda’s inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for
complete adjudication of the controversy
NO. she isn’t a real party-in-interest; there can be a final determination of
action even without her inclusion. A judgement in favor of Angelina would
be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto. Moreover, complete
relief will be granted to Angelina even without the inclusion of Imelda. See
page 584.
HMPH! Dapat concubinage kasi kinaso niya.
Thelma Jader-Manalo v. sps Norma & Edilberto Camaisa (2002)
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA
FACTS:
→ April 1992: Petitioner Thelma Jader-Manalo came across respondent sps’ ad in
Bulletin Today selling their 10-door apartment in Mkt and another property in
Taytay, Rizal.
→ Interested in both properties, petitioner negotiated for its purchase through the
sps’ real estate broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno.
→ After a visual inspection of the lots, petitioner met w/ both the sps and made a
definite offer to buy the properties.
→ After negotiation, Edilberto (only) and petitioner agreed upon the purchase
price of PhP1.5M for Taytay property & PhP2.1M for Mkt property. Agreement
was handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto. Purchase was on
installment basis and downpayment through checks was made by petitioner.
→ Ff day, Norma, the sps and the real estate broker met to incorporate notations
and revise contracts to sell
→ At yet another mtg, petitioner was surprised to learn that sps were backing out
of the agreement because they needed “spot cash” for the purchase price.
Norma Camaisa refused to sign contract to sell.
ISSUES:
1) WON sale of real properties of the sps have already been perfected
2) WON H may validly dispose of a conjugal property w/o the W’s written consent
3) WON Court may intervene to authorize transaction
HELD: Petition of buyer denied.
RATIO:
1& 2) No, acdg to Art 124 FC, the law requires that the disposition of a conjugal
property by the H as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent
of the W. Otherwise, the disposition is void. Even though W Norma was aware of
and participated in the negotiations for the sale, mere awareness of a transaction is
not consent and her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity.
3) No, because acdg to the same law, court authorization is only resorted to in
cases where the sp who does not give consent is incapacitated. Petitioner failed to
allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to
the contracts. In the absence of such, court authorization cannot be sought.
Princesita, Federico and Willie SANTERO, petitioners vs. CFI OF CAVITE,
Anselma Diaz, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, Miguel all surnamed Santero &
Reynaldo Evaristo, in his capacity as administrator of the Intestate Estate
of Pablo Santero, respondents
Petition for certiorari to review CFI Cavite judgment [Sept. 14, 1987]
Facts:
• Pablo Santero – only legitimate son of Pascual Santero (died 1970) & Simona
Pamuti vda de Santero (died 1976). He died in 1973.
• Petitioners are children of late Pablo & Felixberta Pacursa.
• Priv respondents (Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina & Miguel) are 4 of 7 children of
Pablo & Anselma Diaz.
• Pablo married neither Felixberta nor Anselma.
• Priv respondents filed a Motion for Allowance before CFI. CFI decided in their
favor granting such motion.
1. Priv respondents claim that allowance is support for educational expenses,
clothing & medical necessities. Anselma Diaz, guardian-movant of children,
claimed that similar motion was granted last year.
2. Petitioners/oppositors: Wards are no longer schooling & they have reached
age of majority. Also, they claim that administrator doesn’t have sufficient
funds to cover said allowance because current funds are held in trust for
benefit of whoever will be adjudged as owners of Kawit prop fr w/c
administrator derives income of Pablo’s intestate estate.
3. Anselma: some of her children are not in school precisely because they
don’t have funds to finance such. They’ll e enrolled as soon as they get the
allowance. She cited:
 a. CC Art. 290: Support is for substance, dwelling, clothing & medical
attendance accdg to social position of family. It also includes education
until person entitled to support completes education/training even
beyond age of majority.
b. Sec. 3, Rule 83, Rules of Court: Widow & minor or incapacitated
children of deceased are entitled to allowances upon settlement of
estate as may be determined by court.
CFI further ruled that Pablo’s estate is quite big & allowances would be
insignificant & can be easily replaced fr gen funds. Children are granted P2k
allowance each for tuition, clothing materials & subsistence.
• March 25, 1985: another Motion for Allowance was filed by priv respondents for
inclusion of Juanita, Estelita, & Pedrito Santero (remaining 3 children of Pablo &
Anselma) in grant of allowance. CFI granted such. Anselma explained that 3,
even if they’re of age already, are still entitled to receive allowance as advance
payment of their shares in inheritance of Pablo under Art. 188 of New CC1.
• Petitioners opposed motion. CFI ordered estate administrator to get back
allowance of 3 additional children based on petitioners’ Urgent Motion to Direct
Administrator to Withhold Disbursement of Allowance to Movants.
• Among petitioners’ contentions: children have attained majority, 2 are gainfully
employed, 1 married thus no longer covered under Sec. 3, Rule 83, Rules of
Court. They also claim that wards are no longer under guardianship &
respondents misrepresented part re school materials & fees. Issue of
insufficient funds was also raised.
Issues & Ratio:
1. WON priv respondents are entitled to the allowance. - YES
• Pursuant to CC Arts. 188 & 290 and not Rules of Court, Rule 83, Sec. 3. CC is a
substantive law that can’t be impaired by a procedural rule like the Rules of
Court.
• CC Art. 188 makes no distinction w/regards minor or incapacitated children
unlike Rules of Court. Thus, fact that some children have already reached
majority or married is immaterial.
• Allowance will be considered as advances fr their shares in inheritance from
dad.
• Note that spouse contemplated in Art. 188 is only the legitimate spouse & not
common-law spouses who are mom of children here. (Anselma not entitled to
support)
2. WON priv respondents are entitled to allowance from intestate estates
of Pablo’s parents - NO
They’re only entitled to estate of their dad, Pablo. New CC Art. 992 states that
illegitimate child has no rt to inherit ab intestato fr legit children & relatives of
dad/mom & vice-versa. Settled in Diaz vs. Felisa Pamuti-Jardin.
3. WON motion was granted by CFI w/o hearing - NO
Notice of Hearing was issued & there’s even proof that petitioners’ lawyers received
such. Lawyer even filed an opposition. Besides, allowances have been granted for 8
yrs now.
Held: Petition dismissed. CFI decision affirmed.
1
Art. 188, New CC – Support shall be given to surviving spouse & children from common mass of prop
upon liquidation of inventoried prop & until what belongs to him is delivered; but from this shall be
deducted amt received for support w/c exceeds fruits/rents pertaining to them.
Garcia vs. Manzano
Partosa-Jo vs Court of Appeals [December 18, 1992]
Petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts:
 Jose Jo cohabitated with three women and he fathered 15 children. The
Petitioner in thus case claims to be the legal wife (Prima) and they a daughter
named Monina Jo.
 Prima claims that when she left Dumaguete City it was their agreement that
she was temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her
pregnancy and for Jose to visit and support her.
 1980 – Prima filed an action for judicial separation of conjugal property and this
was consolidated with her earlier petition for support.
 In the disposition of the trial court it was held that Prima was legally married to
Jose Jo and therefore entitled to support as the lawfully wedded wife and Jose
Jo was ordered to give a monthly support of 500. There was no definite
disposition as to the judicial separation of conjugal property.
 The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the Trial Court but the complaint
for the judicial separation of conjugal properties was dismissed for lack of cause
of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Art.
178 of the CC.
 The penultimate paragraph of the decision provides: It is, therefore, hereby
ordered that all properties in question are considered properties of Jose Jo, the
defendant in this case, subject to separation of property under Art. 178, third
paragraph of the CC, which is subject of separate proceedings as enunciated
herein.
Issue: WON the conjugal properties of Prima and Jose can be judicial separation of
their conjugal properties is allowed under Art. 175, 178 and 191 of the CC.
Held: yes
Ratio:
 The dispositive portion of the decision was incomplete insofar as it carried no
ruling on the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property although it
was extensively discussed in the body of the decision.
 The penultimate paragraph of the decision of the trial court ruling should have
been embodied in the dispositive portion.
 The ruling of the CA that an agreement to live separately without just cause
was void under Art. 221 of the CC and could not sustain any claim of
abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. The only remedy available was that of
legal separation.
 Petitioner contends that it was never their agreement to live separate
permanently.
 1942 – Prima returned to Dumaguete City but she was not accepted by her
husband.
 Art. 178 of the CC provides that: The separation in fact between the husband
and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership,
except that: (3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for
at least one year, she may petition the court for a receivership, or
 administration by her of the conjugal partnership property, or separation of
property.
 This provision was superseded by Art. 128 of the Family Code which states
that: If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with
his or her obligation to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court
for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the
sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such
precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to
marital, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the
conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the
conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same
period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie
presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling
 In the FC the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation:
o Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause
o Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family
without just cause, even if said spouse does not leave the other spouse.
 Abandonment – departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to
return, followed by a prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the
meantime providing in the least for one’s family although able to do so.
 Physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by Jose to give
support sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial
separation of their conjugal property.
 The FC allows sjudicial separation of property when the spouses have been
separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
Estrella dla Crz, plaintiff-appellee v Severino dla Crz, defendant-appellant
Estrella and Sev are married w/ six children. They acquired seven parcels of land at
Bacolod Cadastre and three parcels at Silay Cadastre. These are all registered in
their names. They are also engaged in various business ventures.
Petitioner’s claims:
In 1949, W already suspected that H was sleeping around. It was only confirmed by
a note she found in his shirt in 1951. She had confronted him about it and he
promised her to forsake his mistress. Well, he didn’t. Since 1955, he hasn’t slept in
conjugal dwelling. He has been luiving in Mnla but has returned to Bacolod
occasionally. After 1955 until the time of thr trial, he had never visited the conjugal
abode and denied W communication with himself. He lived with Nenita Hernandez,
his concubine in Mnla.
She prays for separation of property, monthly support and payment of attorney’s
fees but doesn’t ask for legal separation. Hahaahah
RTC ordered separatn and divisn of C assets (valued at 500, 000), directing the H to
pay to W 20, 000 as attorney’s fees, with legal interest form date of original
complaint (July 22, 1958) until fully paid plus costs.
WON separation of H from W constitute abandonment in law that would justify
the separation of CPP
NO.
Abandonment contemplated by the law must be of physical estrangement,
moral and FINANCIAL desertion. Reading from how word abandonment was
used in A178 as well as Gay v State, for a desertion of one sps to
constutute abandonment, there must be absolute cessation of marital
relations and duties and rights with intention of perpetual separation. To
abandon is to forsake entirely. Emphasis is on its finality, hence it means
giving up absolutely and with intent never again to resume or claim one’s
rights or interests.
Not only has the H been supporting the education of their children, he has
been sending her financial allowance of at least P500 (actually, they get
1200-1500 from him, as testified to by H’s general manager) so she could
play mahjong.
Since separation in fact between H and W do not affect the CP except if the
H abandoned his wife without just cause, (A178, CC)..claims of the W of
concubinage on part of H must be regarded as efforts at bolstering her
claim of abandonment which shall justify, under the law, a judicial
separation of C assets. There is no strong corroborated evidence that
demonstrates the existence of illicit relations between Nenita and
defendant.
He also hasn’t been mismanaging funds. Au contraire, he has increased the
value of their assets by over a million pesos.
2WON H’s failure and/or refusal to inform W of the satate of their business is an
abuse of his powers of admin’n of the CP as to warrant a division of
matrimonial assets
NO. for abuse to exist, there must be an act willfully performed and with
utter disregard by one sps that would be prejudicial to W.
COURT says they’re not condoning the husband’s separation from his W. What
they’re saying is that there is an insufficiency or absence of cause of action.
Remedies of A167 and 178 are aimed at protecting the CP. And they must exercise
restraint since they’re trying to preserve union of sps: a judgement ordering a
separation of assets where there’s no real abandonment may eradicate the
possibility of reconciliation.
Alimony increased from 2000 to 3000. Attorney’s fees must also be born by
defendant since he left the conjugal abode and has given casue for plaintiff to seek
redress in courts.