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Mariano ANDAL, assisted by mom Maria Duenas as guardian ad litem, and
Maria DUENAS, plaintiffs vs. Eduvigis MACARAIG, defendant [May 30, 1951]
Appeal from CFI Camarines Sur judgment
Facts:
• Emiliano Andal & Maria Duenas are sps.
• Jan. 1941: Emiliano became sick of TB & his bro Felix went to live in their
house to help him work in his farm
• May 1942: Felix & Maria began having sexual intercourse & treated each other
as h & w
• On or about Sept. 10, 1942: Emiliano became so weak he couldn’t move or get
up fr bed
• Sept. 10, 1942: Maria eloped w/Felix & they lived w/Maria’s dad until mid 1943
• Jan. 1, 1943: Emiliano died w/o Maria who didn’t even attend the funeral
• June 17, 1943: Maria gave birth to baby boy Mariano.
• Mariano & Maria: filed suit for recovery of ownership & possession of parcel of
land in Talacop, Calabanga, Camarines Sur. Complaint alleges that the land in
ques was acquired by Emiliano fr mom Eduvigis (nice name! Hehe)thru a
donation propter nuptias. Emiliano enjoyed possession of land fr 1938-1942
when Eduvigis took advantage of abnormal situation, entered land in ques.
• CFI: declared Mariano as legitimate son of Emiliano & is entitled to inherit land
in ques. Likewise declared Mariano as owner of land & ordered Eduvigis to pay
cost of suit. Eduvigis appealed.
• If Mariano is legit, he’s entitled to inherit, otherwise, land should revert back to
Eduvigis as next of kin entitled to succeed Emiliano under the law. This would
be dependent on relationship bet Emiliano & Maria during period of conception
of child up to the date of his birth in connection w/death of alleged father.
Issues & Ratio:
1. WON Mariano can be considered as a legitimate child of Emiliano. – YES.
• CC Art. 108: Kids born after 180 days after celeb of marriage or w/in 300 days
after dissolution/separation of sps shall be presumed legitimate. May be
rebutted only by proof that it was PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE for husband to
have access to wife during first 120 day of 300 days preceding birth of child.
• Mariano was born on JUNE 17, 1943 & Eimiliano died on JAN. 1, 1943, Mariano
is presumed to be legit son of Emiliano & Maria since he was born w/in 300
days after dissolution of marriage.
2. WON there’s evidence to prove that it was physically impossible for
Emiliano to have access to Maria. – NO.
• Manresa on physical impossibility: absence during initial period of conception,
impotence, imprisonment unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place
(even if vs law).
• No proof that Emilano was absent bet Aug 21, 1942 – Sept. 10, 1942 (pre-
elopement) w/c is included in 120 days of 30 before birth of child. There’s proof
that they still lived under one roof. Even if Felix was already staying w/them &
he had an illicit relationship w/Maria, that still does not preclude cohabitation
bet them.
• Indeed Emiliano had TB & his condition was so serious that he could hardly
move & get up, his feet were swollen & his voice hoarse. But experience shows
that this does not prevent carnal intercourse. Some people even do it in the
most crucial stage because they’re more inclined to sexual intercourse. An
author on medicine even said that the reputation of TB towards sexual
propensity is probably dependent more upon confinement to bed than
consequences of disease.
• No evidence either that he was impotent or that he was imprisoned.
Presumption of legitimacy must remain since it has not been overcome.
• In conformity w/ Sec. 68, Par. C, Rule 123, Rules of Court: issue of wife
cohabiting w/husband who’s not impotent is presumed legitimate if not born
w/in 180 days after marriage or 300 days after dissolution. Emiliano was not
impotent, he had access to Maria & kid was born 300 days after dissolution.
Held: CFI affirmed. Mariano is the legitimate son of Emiliano & Maria.
JAO v. CA
152 SCRA 359 (1987)
Facts:
1968: Petitioner Janice Jao, then a minor, represented by her mother and
guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado filed a case for recognition and support with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) against Perico Jao.
Perico denied paternity so they agreed to a blood grouping test duly conducted by
the NBI upon the trial court’s order.
Result: Janice could not have been that possible offspring of Perico and
Arlene
The trial court found the test result legally conclusive
Janice filed MFR, and court ordered trial on merits where Janice was declared
Perico’s kid and thus entitled to monthly support.
Perico appealed to CA, contesting trial court’s error to appreciate result of blood
test and CA reversed trial court decision, hence this appeal by Janice (for the love
story of Arlene and Perico and for the more detailed facts, refer to CA decision)
Issue: WON the result of blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive to prove
paternity
Held:
YES. In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to affirm
paternity was dealt with in Co Tao v. CA where the court held that the NBI expert’s
report stating that “from their blood groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a
possible father of the child” could not give any assurance that Co Tao was the father,
only the possibility.
There is now an almost universal agreement that blood grouping tests are
conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity (As shown in
Co Tao).
The fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product o the mother and the
alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents,
but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the bloods of
the mother and the alleged father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly
be that of the alleged father.
In jurisdictions like the U.S., the admissibility of blood tests results to prove non-
paternity has already been passed upon in several cases (Gilpin v. Gilpin, Cuneo v.
Cuneo and Clark v. Rysedorph). The important doctrine from such cases is that to
reject competent medical testimony would be tantamount to rejecting scientific fact
and to deny progress.
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Legislation expressly recognizing the use of blood tests is also in force in several
states.
Tolentino affirms this rule on blood tests as a proof of non-paternity.
Petitioner attempts to discredit the result of the blood grouping tests by impugning
that qualification of the NBI personnel who conducted the tests and the conduct of
the tests themselves.
However, the NBI forensic chemisy who conducted the tests is also a serologist,
and has extensive practice in this area for several years. The tests were conducted
6 times using 2 scientifically recognized blood grouping systems: MN test and ABO
system, under witness and supervision.
Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have been a proper
subject for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two years after the first blood
test, she, represented by her mom, declined to undergo the test to prove or
disprove their allegations, even as Perico was willing to undergo the test again.
Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals [September 12, 1980]
Petition for Review from the decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts:
 Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw. Sometime in Marcg 1967
she allegedly had intercourse with Antonio Macadangdang. Elizabeth
alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967.
 October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days after the illicit encounter) – she
gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in
baptismal rites held on December 24, 1967.
 April 25, 1972 – Elizabeth filed a complaint for recognition and support
against Rolando.
 February 27, 1973 – lower court dismissed the complaint.
 Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court. They ruled that
minor Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang. A
motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied.
Issues:
1. WON the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate child of the
spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw. YES
 The separation of Elizabeth and Crispin was not proven. The finding of the
court of appeals that Elizabeth and Crispin were separated was based
solely on the testimony of the wife which is self-serving. Her testimony is
insufficient without further evidence.
 Tolentino vs. De Jesus – Court held that the findings of facts by the Court
of Appeals in conclusive on the Supreme Court, unless: (complete list see
p. 80)
o Judgement is based on a misapprehension of facts
o The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court
o When the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is premised on
the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on
record.
 Art. 225 of the CC provides that : Children born after one hundred and
eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall
be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of
the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within
the first one hundred and twenty days of three hundred which preceded
the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a
way that access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
 Art. 256: The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress
 Art. 257: Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the
conception of the child, but there was no physical impossibility of access
between her and her husband as set forth in Article 255, the child is prima
facie presumed to be illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic
reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For the purposes of this
article, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case
 During the initial 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child,
there was no concrete or substantial proof that was presented to establish
physical impossibility of access between Elizabeth and Crispin.
 Elizabeth and Crispin continued to live in the same province, therefore
there is still the possibility of access to one another.
 The baby was born seven months after the first illicit intercourse and seven
months from the separation of the spouses.
 Under Art. 255 of the CC the child is conclusively presumed to be the
legitimate child of the spouses. (note the baby was not premature). This
presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was
physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days
of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child.
 The presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is
sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception.
 In order to overthrow the presumption it must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have enabled the
husband to be the father of the child. Sexual intercourse is to be
presumed when personal access is not disproved.
 Policy of law is to confer legitimacy upon children born in wedlock when
access of the husband at the time of the conception was not impossible
and there is the presumption that a child so born is the child of the
husband and legitimate even though the wife was guilty of infidelity during
the possible period of conception.
2. WON the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child
without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to
be heard. NO
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 Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.
 The right to repudiate or contest the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock
belongs only to the alleged father, who is the husband of the mother and
can be exercised only by him or his heirs, within a fixed time, and in
certain cases, and only in a direct suit brought for the purpose.
Chua Keng Giap vs. IAC (separate)
Cabatbat-Lim v Intermediate Appellate Court (1988)
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the then IAC.
FACTS:
This is a contest over the estate of the late Dra Esperanza Cabatbat. The petitioner
is Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be her only child and respondents are the
sisters of the doctor and the children of her deceased brothers.
Petitioner Violeta, her husband Lim Biak Chiao and the Calasiao Bijon Factory assail
IAC’s and TC’s decision finding her not to be the offspring of the Doctor and hence,
not a legal heir of the late Dra Cabatbat.
Respondents allege that Violeta is merely a ward (ampon) of the sps Esperanza and
Proceso who sheltered and supported her from childhood, w/o the benefit of formal
adoption proceedings. They present as evidence on the non-filiation of Violeta the
ff:
1. Absence of any record that Esperanza was admitted to the hospital where
Violeta was born on the day of her birth
2. Absence of birth cert of Violeta in the files of certs of live births in the hosp
from 1947-48
3. Cert of the Civil Registrar Gen saying that his office has no birth record of
Violeta
4. Cert from Violeta school that in her files, the sps were listed only as guardians
and not as parents
5. Testimony of one Amparo Reside who was at the hosp at the time of Violeta’s
birth and that she met a patient named Benita Lastimosa who gave birth to a
baby girl who grew up to be known as Violeta Cabatbat.
Petitioner denied the allegations and presented her birth record stating that she is
the legitimate child of the sps. and her marriage contract wherein Esperanza
appeared as her mother and a Deed of Abs Sale wherein she was assisted and
represented by her father Proceso.
ISSUES:
1. WON TC’s and CA’s finding that Violeta is not born of Esperanza Cabatbat is
conclusive on the Supreme Court
2. WON complaint is an action to impugn legitimacy and Art 263 CC can be
applied
HELD:
1. Yes, the factual findings of the courts are entitled to great respect. Moreover,
the absence of a record of birth of petitioner Violeta in the Office of the Civil
Registrar General puts a cloud on the genuineness of her birth record. The
records of the hospital show that only one woman by the name of Benita
Lastimosa gave birth to an illegitimate child on the date of Violeta’s birth.
2. No, because this is an action to claim inheritance of the respondents as legal
heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that Violeta is n
illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent’s child at all.
Being neither a legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a
child by legal fiction of Dra Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of
the deceased. Petition denied.
TAN v. TROCIO
191 SCRA 764 (1990)
Facts:
School owner and directress, Felicidad Bariñan Tan filed a complaint seeking
disbarment of Atty. Galileo Trocio for immorality and conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer.
She alleged that Trocio, who is the legal counsel of the school, overpowered her
inside the office and against her will, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her.
And as a result, she begot a son whom she named Jewel Tan.
She further alleged that he used to support Jewel but subsequently lost interest
and stopped.
She claimed she filed the complaint only after 8 years from the incident because of
Trocio threatened her with the deportation of her alien husband and due to the fact
that she was married with eight children.
Trocio files his answer stating that he was indeed counsel of the school as well as of
Tan and her family but denies he sexually assaulted her.
The lower Court and the Solicitor General completed the required pleadings and
thus forwarded the case to the SC
Issue: WON he had, in fact, sexually assaulted the Complainant, as a consequence
of which the latter begot a child by him (and is thus a ground for Trocio’s
disbarment for immoral conduct)
Held: Complaint for disbarment dismissed
The court found insufficient basis for the allegations
The alleged threat to deport her husband could not hold because she admitted
having lost contact with her husband when he learned of the respondent’s
transgression that very same evening. The fear had thus become inexistent
Even after the alleged incident, she continued having dealings with the respondent
—with Trocio acting as her personal and family’s legal counsel—as though nothing
happened.
Complainant’s contention that Respondent continued supporting the child for
several years for which reason she desisted from charging him criminally, has not
been substantiate. In fact, the fact that she kept her peace for so many years can
even be construed as condonation. It is likewise strange that an unwanted son, as
the child would normally have been, should, of all names, be called “Jewel.”
Witness, Elueteria’s (domestic help) testimony did not hold as how near she was to
the crime scene, considering it allegedly happened in school premises, has not been
shown.
Testimonies of Felicidad and witness Marilou (another domestic help) to show
unusual closeness between Trocio and Jewel, like playing with him and giving him
toys, are not convincing enough to prove paternity.
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Pictures of Jewel and Trocio showing allegedly their physical likeness to each other
is inconclusive evidence to prove paternity, and much less would it prove violation of
Complainant’s person
More importantly, Jewel Tan was born during the wedlock of Complainant and her
husband and the presumption should b in favor of legitimacy unless physical access
between the couple was impossible. From the evidence on hand, the presumption
has not been overcome by adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was
registered in his birth certificate as the legitimate child of the Felicidad and her
husband, Tan Le Pok.
People vs. Tumimpad [August 19, 1994]
Appeal from a decision of the RTC of Oroquieta City
Facts:
 Moreno L. Tumimpad and Constable Ruel C. Prieto are charged with the
crime of rape.
 Sandra Salcedo – 15 years old, had a mind of a five year old child
 Four security men were assigned to her father, two of whom are Ruel Prieto
and Moreno Tumimpad.
 August 7, 1989 – Sandra complained of constipation. She was brought to
a doctor and was given medication. Her condition did not improved
 August 8, 1989 – when she saw Tumimpad coming out from the kitchen
she told her mother “Mama, patayin mo ‘yan, bastos”
 Her brought Sandra to the hospital where she found out that Sandra was
pregnant.
 January 11, 1990 – Sandra gave birtb to a baby boy who was named
Jacob.
 Sandra was able to pick the pictures of Tumimpad and Prieto. During a
police line-up she pointed to the accused.
 During trial the accused moved that a blood test, both “Major Blood
Grouping Test” and Pheno Blood Typing” be conducted on the offended
party, her child Jacob and the two accused. The result of the test
conducted by the MMC showed that Jacob has a type ‘O” blood, Sandra
type “B”, Prieto type “A” and Tumimpad type “O”.
 Trial court convicted Tumimpad but acquitted Prieto. The acquittal of Prieto
was on reasonable doubt stating that he has a different type of blood with
the child Jacob.
Issue: WON it was impossible for Tumimpad to have committed the crime of rape
because most of the time he and his co-accused were together with Col. Salcedo.
NO
Ratio:
 It was proven that they were not always with Col. Salcedo. There were
instances that they would even play with Sandra. Based on this it is not
physically impossible for the accused to have access to Sandra.
 Tumimpad argued that his conviction was erroneously based on the
medical finding that he and the victim have the same blood type “O”
 In Jao vs. Court of Appeals it was held that Paternity – Science has
demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother, the child
and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man is
not the father of a particular child. But group blood testing cannot show
only a possibility that he os.
Benitez-Badua vs. CA
DE APARICIO v. PARAGUYA
Appeal from the judgment of CFI Bohol (1987)
FACTS:
Trinidad Montilde had a love affair w/ Rev Fr Felipe Lumain, a priest, and in the
process she conceived. When she was 4 mos pregnant, in order to conceal her
disgrace from the public, she decided to marry one Anastacio Mamburao. Fr Lumain
himself solemnized their marriage in March 1924. However, the couple never lived
together as H&W. Trinidad gave birth to daughter Consolacion Lumain in Sept, 192
days or 6 mos after the marriage.
In Oct 1936, Fr Lumain died but he left a last will & testament wherein he
acknowledged Consolacion as his daughter and instituted her as the sole and
universal heir of all his property rts & interests. This was duly probated in CFI and
on appela was affirmed by the CA.
After reaching age of majority, daughter Consolacion filed an action in CFI against
one Hipolito Paraguya for the recovery of certain parcels of land she claims to have
inherited from her father, the priest.
Hipolito Paraguya was declared owner of portions A, B, H, F and G and all its
improvements. The land in question is portion G. Hipolito assails also that
Consolacion is not a natural child of the late Fr Lumain.
TC ruling: Bearing in mind the date of the birth of the plaintiff, it is evident that her
mother Trinidad was still single at the time she was conceived. It is a legal
presumption that plaintiff is the daughter of the sps Anastacio and Trinidad.
However, this was disputable and Trinidad successfully overcame it.
Consolacion is therefore the natural child of Fr Lumain and she is entitled to claim
the disputed property, she having been instituted in the will as universal heir.
ISSUES and RATIO:
WON Consolacion is the natural child of Lumain and if so, WON she is entitled to the
possession of Portion G.
SC finds it unnecessary to determine the paternity of appellee Consolacion. As Fr
Lumain died w/o any compulsory heir, Consolacion is therefore his lawful heir as duly
instituted in his will.
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will all of his estate or any part of
it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
Portion G and its improvement declared to be owned by Consolacion. No award of
moral damages to be given to Hipolito for Consolacion was acting in her belief that
she was legal heir of the land. Judgment affirmed.
Constantino vs. Mendez (separate)
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MENDOZA V. MELLA
17 SCRA 788 (1966)
Facts:
lot No. 3390-B of the Sorsogon cadastre was owned originally by Paciano Pareja,
who donated it in 1939 to his son Gavino.
Gavino disappeared in 1943 and has not been heard of since. CA held that he died
that same year.
At the time of his disappearance, he was living with his common-law wife Catalina
Mendoza and their son Rodolfo (petitioners)
In 1948 Paciano sold the lot to Temistocles C. Mella, who notified petitioners in
1952 to vacate the same.
Notice to vacate went unheeded, whereupon Mella commenced this action in 1955
on the basis of the deed of sale by Paciano in his favor
Petitioners claim ownership for Rodolfo, first on the ground of succession from his
father Gavino, and secondly by adverse possession for more than 10 years.
Issues:
1. WON Rodolfo may be considered as an acknowledged natural child and
thus entitled to successional rights.
NO. CA had negatively resolved this issue on 2 grounds:
oOnly evidence on the matter is his birth certificate, which CA held is not proof
of acknowledgment; and
oThere is no showing that Rodolfo's parents could have married each other
when he was conceived.
The SC held that only the 1st ground need be resolved.
The birth certificate was disregarded by the CA since the system of civil registry
provided in the old Civil Code (Title XII) was never established in this country and
thus Art. 131 (The acknowledgement of a natural child must be made in the record
of birth, in a will, or in some other public document) insofar as it referred to
acknowledgment in the record of birth, never became effective.
It should be noted, however, that a Civil Registry Law was passed in 1930 (Act No.
3753) containing provisions for the registration of births, including those of
illegitimate parentage; and the record of birth under such law, if sufficient in
contents for the purpose, would meet the requisites for voluntary recognition even
under Art. 131.
Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question
here really is whether or not his birth certificate, which is merely a certified copy of
the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been
voluntarily recognized.
The SC held that no such reliance may be placed upon it. While it contains the
names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone
swore to its contents as required in Sec. 5 of Act No. 3753.
For all that might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who
furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any
event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary
recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same Article 131.
True enough, but in such a case there must be a clear statement in the document
that the parent recognizes the child as his or her own (Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55
Phil. 1); and in the birth certificate no such statement appears. The claim of
voluntary recognition is without basis.
2. WON they may claim ownership by adverse possession for more than
10 years
NO, in view of the factual findings by CA that their possession of the disputed
property was by tolerance on the part of Paciano and consequently was not adverse,
at least prior to the sale to Mella in 1948. Thereafter only 7years had elapsed when
complaint for recovery of possession was filed against them.
Held: judgment appealed from is affirmed
Lim vs. Court of Appeals [July 18, 1975]
Petition for Ceertiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts:
 1962 – Felisa Lim brought suit against Francisco Miguel Romualdez Uy
Chen Hong for the declaration of nullity of the affidavit Uy executed in
which he adjudicated to himself, as the only son and heir of Susana Lim.
(Property 120 square meters located in Tayabas)
 Uy and Lim claims that they inherited , to the exclusion of each other, the
property in question from Susana Lim.
 Lim claims that she is the natural daughter of Susana and she presented
her baptismal certificate which stated the her mother was Susana. She
also presented her marriage contract wherein Susana gave consent to the
marriage of Felisa.
 Uy claims that he is the only son and heir of Susana. He presented his
application form for alien registration which stated that his mother was
Susana, order of the BOI cancelling his alien registration because his
mother was a Filipina and his identification certificate which describes him
as the son of Susana.
 November 22, 1967 – court ruled that Felisa Lim as the daughter and only
heir of Susana Lim
 Uy filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial but the court denied it.
 Uy appealed to the court of appeals and it ruled that neither Felisa Lim nor
Uy is entitled to the inheritance because neither had either of them been
recognized by Susana Lim as her child by any means provided for by law;
and neither had either of them been declared in a judicial proceeding to be
the child of Susana Lim.
 They both assailed the decision of the court of appeals. Lim alleges that
Susana Lim’s consent to her marriage, given pursuant to Act 3613 and
recognition on the part of Susana Lim that she is her natural daughter.
She also contended that the records in the office of the Local Civil Registrar
pertaining to her marriage license, together with the supporting papers
which included the consent given by Susana Lim, were destroyed during
the liberation. She asserts that the marriage contract is a public
document.
 Guadalupe Uy contended that her husband purchased the property in
question with his own money prior to his mother’s death and took
conveyance and title thereof. His mother gave him a little money to
complete the purchase price.
Issues:
1. WON Felisa Lim is entitled to the inheritance. NO
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 Felisa Lim alleges that she was recognized by Susana Lim during 1943
which means that it was during the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1889.
Sec. 131 of CC of 1889 requires that the recognition of a natural child be
made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document.
 Public documents are those authenticated by a notary or by a competent
public official, with formalities required by law. The two classes of public
documents are:
o Executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by
notaries (MARRIAGE CONTRACTS WOULD FALL UNDER THIS
CATEGORY)
o Those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office
 Marriage contract presented by Felisa does not satisfy the requirements of
solemnity prescribed by article 131 of the CC of 1889. There was no
intervention of a notary.
 The marriage contract is a mere declaration by the contracting parties, in
the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses
of legal age, that they take each other as husband and wife, signed by
signature or mark by the said contracting parties and the said witnesses,
and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage.
2. WON Uy is entitled to the inheritance. NO
 The title is in the name of Susana Lim, and oral testimony cannot
overcome the fact that the sale was made to Susana Lim and title issued in
her favour
 Implied trust arises where a person purchases land with his own money
and takes conveyance thereof in the name of another. The property is held
on a resulting trust in favour of the one furnishing the consideration for the
transfer unless a different intention or understanding appears.
 Uy raised the theory of implied trust in favour of her husband for the first
time in her motion for reconsideration filed with the appellate court and
evidence regarding the purchase by her husband is altogether
unconvincing.
Mariategui vs. CA (separate)
Adriano vs. De Jesus
November 5, 1912
PETITIONER: Florentino Adriano, appointed administrator of the estate of deceased
Magdalena Carreon
OPPONENTS: Lorenza Sombillo de Jesus, alleged legitimate daughter of deceased and
Hipolito de Jesus, her husband
FACTS:
 Florentino Adriano initiated a proceedings in the CFI of Bulacan in the matter of
the probate will of deceased Magdalena Carreon on November 5, 1985
 The will was admitted and Adriano was appointed administrator
 Spouses Lorenza and Hipolito opposed, alleging that, as the only surviving
legitimate daughter of the deceased, Lorenza is entitled to 2/3 of the estate left
by Magdalena
 A hearing was conducted to determine W/N Lorenza was in fact a legitimate
daughter and, consequently, an heiress of the deceased by force of law
 The judge ruled against Lorenza, saying that she was no able to prove her
allegations and, therefore, not entitled to the estate of the deceased.
 De Jesus spouses appealed
OPPONENTS’ ALLEGATION:
 That she was the legitimate daughter, born in lawful wedlock, of Tranquilino
Sombillo y Ignacio and Magdalena Carreon as proven by:
1. uninterrupted enjoyment of status as a legitimate child; and
2. her baptismal certificate, which states her parents as Tranquilino Sombillo
and Magdalena Carreon
 And, as such, she is a forced heiress of the deceased
ISSUE: W/N Lorenza Sombillo de Jesus is the legitimate daughter of Magdalena
Carreo and, consequently, entitled to 2/3 of the estate left by the
deceased.
HELD: No. Lorenza was not able to sufficiently establish her filiation and, thus,
cannot be considered a forced heiress of the deceased.
LEGAL BASES:
A. Civil Code
ART. 115. The filiation of legitimate children is proven by the record of the birth,
entered in the civil registry, or by an authentic instrument, or a final
judgment in the cases referred to in articles 110 to 113 of the preceding
chapter.
ART. 116. In the absence of the documents mentioned in the preceding article,
filiation shall be proven by the uninterrupted enjoyment of the status of
a legitimate child.
ART. 117. In the absence of the record of birth, authentic document, final sentence,
or enjoyment of status legitimate child, filiation may be proven by any
means, provided there is a foundation of proof in writing coming from
both parents, either jointly or severally.
B. Doctrine:
A baptismal certificate attests the facts of its origin, execution, and the date of
the same to wit, the administration of the sacrament on the day specified, but not
to the veracity of the statements made therein respecting the kinsfolk of
the person baptized. Though the filiation of legitimate children be proven, as
established by article 115 of the Civil Code, by the record of birth entered in the
civil registry, which is analogous to the certificates of baptism issued prior to the
creation of that civil service, such record is presumptive evidence only, and is
susceptible of proof to the contrary, and when, by virtue of that proof, the
presumption is overcome, the said article of the Code is not violated.
REASONING:
1. Uninterrupted enjoyment of status of a legitimate child is proven by:
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a. Use of father’s surname;
b. The treatment she received from her father and mother and from her
parents' family; and also
c. Her parents' having constantly attended to her support and education.
 As found by the trial court, she was not successful in proving these, in fact, in
the marriage certificates of Lorenza’s children, it is shown that she uses the
surname “Carreon” and not “Sombillo”
 Preponderance of evidence shows she was not the legitimate daughter of
Sombillo and Magdalena, but the daughter of Torribia Carreon, an unmarried
woman and sister of Magdalena, and an unknown father
2. Baptismal and other such canonical certificates are:
- conclusive proof only of:
i. the baptism administered,
ii. in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church,
iii. by the priest who baptized the child
- But not of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the
said certificate that concern the relationship of the person baptized, which
must be prove by some kinds of proofs recognized by law.
- Presumptive evidence susceptible to proofs to the contrary such as:
a. statements found in the certified copies of the marriage certificates of
her children, Matias and Guillerma, where it is stated that:
i. Lorenza uses the surname “Carreon” and not “Sumbillo,” and
ii. that she is the natural child of Torribia Carreon and an unknown
father (if there were mistakes in the marriage certificates of her
children, she could have sought to correct them during the lifetime
of Magdalena Carreon)
b. The will of the deceased:
i. which expressly states that she has no living descendants since,
at the time of its writing, her husband and all of their 11 children
were already dead
ii. did not even make mention of Lorenza, while it mentioned the her
son-in-law by her deceased daughter
- Testimony of Lucio Pahati, who testified that he had seen Toribia Carreon in
a pregnant state and afterwards give birth to a child who was subsequently
called Lorenza, and swore that its mother was Torribia and not Magdalena
Acebedo vs Arguero [March 11, 2003]
Facts:
 June 1, 1994 - Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server
of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Brooke’s Point, Palawan for immorality
 He alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo and respondent unlawfully
and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife at Bancudo Pulot,
Brooke’s Point, Palawan as a result of which a girl, Desiree May Irader
Arquero, was born to the two on May 21, 1989
 Attached was the birth certificate of the girl indicating her parents to be
Arquero and Dedjoe. He also presented a copy of the marriage contract
 Eddie P. Arquero vehemently denied the charge of immorality, claiming that
it is “just a mere harassment and a product of complainant’s hatred and
extreme jealousy to his wife.” He presented a sworn statement wherein
Edwin Acebedo (complainant) acknowledged paternity of a child born out of
wedlock, which documents, respondent claims, support his contention that
the complaint filed against him is but a malicious scheme concocted by
complainant to harass him. He also said that the complainant was
cohabiting with another woman.
 February 12, 2001 – judge Fernandez recommended that the complaint be
dismissed for failure to adduce adequate evidence to show that respondent
is guilty of the charge
 December 12, 2001 - Memorandum by the Office of the Court
Administrator disagreeing with the recommendation of the Investigating
Judge that the case should be dismissed, recommends that respondent be
held guilty of immorality and that he be suspended from office for a period
of one (1) year without pay.
Issue: WON Arguero can be suspended due to immorality. YES
Ratio:
 The entry of respondent’s name as father in the baptismal certificate of
Desiree May I. Arquero cannot be used to prove her filiation and, therefore,
cannot be availed of to imply that respondent maintained illicit relations
with Dedje Irader Acebedo.
 A baptismal certificate merely attests to the fact which gave rise to its
issue, and the date thereof, to wit, the fact of the administration of the
sacrament on the date stated, but not the truth of the statements therein
as to the parentage of the child baptized.
 Arguero admitted that he had an illicit relationship with the wife of the
complainant
 Arguero justified his pursuing a relationship with complainant’s wife with
the spouses having priorly entered into a settlement with respect to their
marriage which was embodied in a “Kasunduan”.
 This justification fails because Arguero, being an employee of the judiciary,
knows that the Kasunduan has no force and effect because Article 1 of the
FC provides: marriage is “an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation.” It is an institution of public order or policy, governed by rules
established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the stipulation of
the parties.
 Republic Act 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, enunciates the State’s policy
of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the
public service
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 Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no
position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness
from an individual than in the judiciary.
 Arguero’s act of having illicit relations with the complainant’s wife is a
disgraceful and immoral conduct.
 Under Rule IV, Section 52A (15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, an immoral conduct is classified
as a grave offense which calls for a penalty of suspension for six (6)
months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal
is imposed for the second offense. Since it is his first offense, his
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day is in order.
REPUBLIC v. VICENCIO
300 SCRA 138 (1998)
Facts:
Cynthia Vicencio is the daughter of Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega
Leabres.
When Cynthia was a year old, Pablo Vicencio left their conjugal abode after a
marital spat & since then never reappeared nor sent support to his family.
Ernesto Yu came to the aid of Fe and her children
Fe was successful in her petitions for dissolution of their conjugal partnership, for
change of name (to drop the surname of her husband) and for the declaration of
Pablo as an absentee
Fe and Ernesto Yu eventually married
Cynthia now files present petition for change of surname, from Vicencio to Yu
Issue: WON Cynthia may be allowed to change her surname to that of her step-
father's surname.
Held: NO. decision of the CA reversed
Cynthia asserts that her case falls under one of the justifiable grounds cited in Rep.
v. Hernandez. She says that confusion has arisen as to her parentage because ever
since childhood, Ernesto Yu has acted as her father, assuming duties of rearing,
caring and supporting her.
SolGen however argues that there is no proper & reasonable cause to warrant
private respondent's change of surname. Such change might even cause confusion
and give rise to legal complications due to the fact that private respondent's step-
father has 2 children with her mother. In the event of her step-father's death, it is
possible that private respondent may even claim inheritance rights as a "legitimate"
daughter. In his memorandum, he opines that "Ernesto Yu has no intention of
making Cynthia as an heir because despite the suggestion made before the petition
for change of name was heard by the trial court that the change of family name to
Yu could very easily be achieved by adoption, he has not opted for such a remedy.”
Court sided with the SolGen’s contention, arguing that Cynthia is the legitimate
offspring of Fe and Pablo and a legitimate child generally bears the surname of his
or her father.
It must be stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which has the duty to consider
carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless
weighty reasons are shown.
Confusion indeed might arise with regard to Cynthia’s parentage due to her
surname. But even, more confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if a
change were allowed.
Previous decisions allowing children to bear the surname of their respective step-
fathers even without the benefit of adoption were not similar to the present case.
Based on the precedents cites, the worry of the court is if a child born out of a
lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the
mother, should the first husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there
may result a confusion as to his real paternity. In the long run the change may
redound to the prejudice of the child in the community. Legal restraints bind the
court to rule as such.
Further, there is no assurance the end result would not be even more detrimental
to her person, for instead of bringing a stop to questions, the very change of name,
if granted, could trigger much deeper inquiries regarding her parentage.
DE ASIS v. CA
Special civil action in SC. Certiorari. (1999)
FACTS:
On Oct 14, 1988, respondent Vircel Andres, in her capacity as mother and legal
guardian of minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and
support against Manual de Asis alleging that the latter is the father of subject minor
Glen and that he refused to provide for the maintenance of Glen after repeated
demands.
Manuel denied his paternity and therefore, he cannot be required to provide support
for him.
In July 1989, Vircel, through a manifestation, as well as Manuel both agreed to move
for the dismissal of the case.
However, in Sept ’95, Vircel again filed a similar complaint as the legal guardian of
Glen against Manuel. This time, she asked for a monthly support of not less than
PhP2K for the previous mos since June 1, 1987 and another monthly allowance of
PhP5K paid before the 5th of every month.
On Oct 8 ’93, petitioner Manuel moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res
judicata, that it is barred by the prior judgment dismissing the previous case. He
further asserts that through the previous manifestation of Vircel, w/c binds the
complainant, admitted the lack of filiation needed and therefore obligation to give
support ceases.
TC ruled that res judicata is inapplicable in an action for support for the reason that
renunciation or waiver of future support is prohibited by law.
ISSUE: WON CA acted w/ GADALEJ1 in upholding the denial the motion to dismiss and
holding that an action for support cannot be barred by res judicata
HELD: NO, for the right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted
to a third person as per Art 301 CC. Also, future support cannot be the subject of a
compromise as in Art 2035.
1
GADALEJ – Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
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The rt to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his
existence, he is not entitled to renounce/ transfer the rt for this would mean
sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The rt to life cannot be renounced;
hence, support, w/c is the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced.

Therefore, the agreement entered into by the petitioner and respondent’s mother for
the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support, w/c is in the nature of a
compromise, cannot be countenanced.

Moreover, paternity and filiation (or lack of it) must be judicially established and it is
for the court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or
agreement of the parties. If such an admission is made, it at most is evidentiary and
does not conclusively establish the lack of filiation.

CA decision affirmed. Petition dismissed.