G.R. No.

L-32181 March 5, 1986

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.LEONOR VALENCIA, as Natural mother and

guardian of her minor children, BERNARDO GO and JESSICA GO; and THE HON. AGAPITO
HONTANOSAS, Judge of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, Branch XI.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of respondent Judge Agapito Hontanosas of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch XI who ordered the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu to make the
necessary cancellation and/or correction in the entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in
the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu.

Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children, Bernardo Go and Jessica Go
filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of
entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu. The case
was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3043-R.

The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for correction of
entry in the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines in
relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, contemplates a summary proceeding and
correction of mere clerical errors, those harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of
a name that is merely mispelled, occupation of parents, etc., and not changes or corrections
involving civil status, nationality, or citizenship which are substantial and controversial.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order directing
the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in the Cebu Advocate, a newspaper
of general circulation in the city and province of Cebu, once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks, and notice thereof, duly served on the Solicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu
City and Go Eng.

Respondent Leonor Valencia, filed her reply to the opposition wherein she admitted that the
present petition seeks substantial changes involving the civil status and nationality or citizenship
of respondents, but alleged that substantial changes in the civil registry records involving the civil
status of parents, their nationality or citizenship may be allowed if- (1) the proper suit is filed, and
(2) evidence is submitted, either to support the allegations of the petition or to disprove the
same; that respondents have complied with these requirements by filing the present special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court and that they have caused reasonable notice to be given to the persons
named in the petition and have also caused the order for the hearings of their petition to be
published for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

Subsequently, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
since the petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go
from "Chinese" to "Filipino" and their status from "Legitimate" to Illegitimate", and changing also
the status of the mother from "married" to "single" the corrections sought are not merely clerical
but substantial, involving as they do the citizenship and status of the petitioning minors and the
status of their mother.

The lower court denied the motion to dismiss.

After trial on the merits during which the parties were given all the opportunity to present their
evidence and refute the evidence and arguments of the other side, the lower court rendered a
decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered granting the instant petition and ordering the Local
Civil Registrar of the City of Cebu to make the necessary cancellation and/or correction on the
following entries:

A. In the Record of Birth of BERNARDO GO, to register said Bernardo Go as 'FILIPINO' instead of
'CHINESE'; as 'ILLEGITIMATE instead of LEGITIMATE', and his father's (GO ENG) and mother's
(LEONOR VALENCIA) civil status as 'SINGLE instead of MARRIED';

B. In the Record of Birth of JESSICA GO to register said Jessica Go as 'FILIPINO' instead of

'CHINESE'; as 'ILLEGITIMATE' instead of 'LEGITIMATE' and father's (GO ENG) and mother's
(LEONOR VALENCIA) civil status as 'SINGLE instead of MARRIED': and

C. In both Records of Birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go to change the entry on Petitioner's
Citizenship from 'CHINESE to FILIPINO'.

Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, the Clerk of Court is hereby directed to
furnish a copy of this decision to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, who shall
forthwith enter the cancellation and/'or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica
Go in the Civil Registry as adverted to above.

From the foregoing decision, oppositor-appellant Republic of the Philippines appealed to us by way
of this petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioner Republic of the Philippines raises a lone error for the grant of this petition, stating
that:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION OF THE PETITIONER'S CITIZENSHIP
AND CIVIL STATUS AND THE CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL STATUS OF HER MINOR CHILDREN
BERNARDO GO AND JESSICA GO.

The petitioner premises its case on precedents from the 1954 case of Ty Kong Tin v. Republic (94
Phil. 321) to the 1981 case of Republic v. Caparosso (107 SCRA 67), that entries which can be
corrected under Article 412 of the New Civil Code as implemented by Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court refer to those mistakes that are clerical in nature or changes that are harmless and
innocuous (Wong v. Republic, 115 SCRA 496). In Republic v. Medina (119 SCRA 270) citing the
case of Chua Wee, et al, v. Republic (38 SCRA 409), there was this dicta:

From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until the promulgation of the
Revised Rules of Court on January 1, 1964, there was no law nor rule of court prescribing the
procedure to secure judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or
alterations in the civil register pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the
Revise Rules of Court now provides for such a procedure which should be limited solely to the
implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the matter of correcting entries in the civil
register. Rule 108, lie all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its rule- making authority under Sec. 13 of Art. VIII of the
Constitution, which directs that such rules of court 'shall not diminish or increase or modify
substantive rights.' If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or
corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to
comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy or
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become
unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive rights, which changes are not
authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil Code.

xxx xxx xxx

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is
indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a
proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a
wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the
principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the opposition of the Solicitor General dated February
20, 1970 while questioning the use of Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court admits that "the entries sought to be corrected should be threshed out in
an appropriate proceeding.

What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black's Law Dictionary defines "adversary
proceeding as follows:

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of
which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter
an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding." (Platt v. Magagnini, 187 p. 716,
718, 110 Was. 39).

The private respondent distinguishes between summary proceedings contemplated under Article
412 of the Civil Code and fullblown adversary proceedings which are conducted under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.

She states:

It will please be considered that the nature of the matters that may be changed or corrected are
of two kinds. It may either be mistakes that are clerical in nature or substantial ones. Under the
first category are those 'harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is
clearly misspelled, occupation of the parents, etc.,' (Ansaldo v. Republic, No. L-10276, Feb. 14,
1958, 54 O.G. 5886) or 'one' that is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding'. (Black v.
Republic, No. L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958, 104 Phil. 848).

To the second category falls those which affect the civil status or citizenship or nationality of a
party (Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, No. L-5609, Feb. 5, 1954, 94 Phil. 321: Tan Su v. Republic, No. L-
12140, April 29, 1959, 105 Phil. 578: Black v. Republic, No. L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958, 104 Phil.
848; Bantoco Coo v. Republic, No. L-14978, May 23,1961, 2 SCRA 42: Barillo v. Republic, No. L-
14823, Dec. 28, 1961, 3 SCRA 725).

Changes or corrections in the entries in the civil registry were governed, at first, by Act No. 3753
(Civil Registry Law) which placed these matters exclusively upon the sound judgment and
discretion of the civil registrars. With the effectivity of the New Civil Code on August 30, 1950,
these matters were governed by Article 412 thereof which prescribes judicial order before an
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected. This requirement was deemed necessary to
forestall the commission of fraud or other mischief in these matters.

But even then, it is not any correction that can be considered under Article 412 of he Civil Code.
The nature of the corrections sought has to be considered and if found to refer only to clerical
errors the same may be allowed under said article which was construed to contemplate only a
summary proceeding.

And so in the Ty Kong Tin case, this Honorable Court took occasion to draw a distinction between
what entries in the civil register could be corrected under Article 412 of the New Civil Code and
what could not. In the process, to our mind, this Honorable Court set down propositions which
hold true not only in that case but also in the subsequent cases for the latter merely reiterated the
Ty Kong Tin decision. These are:

First, that proceedings under Article 412 of the New Civil Code are summary:

Second, that corrections in the entires in the civil register may refer to either mere mistakes that
are clerical in nature or substantial ones which affects the civil status or -the nationality or
citizenship of the persons involved; and

Third, that if the change or correction sought refers to mere correction of mistakes that are
clerical in nature the same may be done, under Article 412 of the Civil Code; otherwise, if it refers
to a substantial change which affects the civil status or citizenship of a party. the matter should be
threshed out in a proper action.

To our humble estimation, these propositions do not altogether bar or preclude substantial
changes or corrections involving such details as the civil status or nationality of a party. As a
matter of fact, just three years after the Ty Kong Tin decision, this Honorable Court allowed a
party to correct mistakes involving such substantial matters as his birthplace and citizenship in the
birth certificates of his two sons. (Lim v. Republic, No. L-8932, May 31, 1957, 101 Phil. 1235)

Only that where the correction pertains to matters which are important and controversial certain
conditions sine que non have to be complied with. Thus it was held:

If it refers to a substantial change which affects the status or citizenship of a party, the matter
should be threshed out in a proper action ... .' (Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, supra)

. . . . for changes involving the civil status of the parents, their nationality or citizenship, those are
grave and important matters which may have a bearing and effect on the citizenship and
nationality not only of said parents, but of the offsprings, and to seek said changes, it is not only
the State, but also all parties concerned and affected should be made parties defendants or
respondents, and evidence should be submitted, either to support the allegations of the petition
or complaint, or also to disprove the same so that any order or decision in the case may be made
in the entry in a civil register that will affect or even determine conclusively the citizenship or
nationality of a person therein involved. (Ansaldo v. Republic, 54 O.G. 5886; Emphasis supplied;
Reiterated in the cases of: Tan Su v. Republic, supra; Bantoto Coo v. Republic, supra; Barillo v.
Republic, supra; San Luis de Castro v. Republic, L-17431, April 30, 1963; Ilu Lin v. Republic, L-
18213, Dec. 24, 1963; Reyes v. Republic, No. L-17642, Nov. 27, 1964; Calicdan Baybayan v.
Republic, L-20707, March 18, 1966; Tan v. Republic, L-19847, April 29, 1966).

If at all what is forbidden is, in the words of Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, 'only the entering of material
corrections or amendments in the record of birth by virtue of a judgment in a summary action
against the Civil Registrar. (Matias v. Republic, No. L-26982, May 8, 1969.

It will thus be gleaned from the foregoing that corrections involving such matters as the civil
status of the parents, their nationality or citizenship may be allowed provided the proper suit is
filed.

The court's role in hearing the petition to correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain
the truth about the facts recorded therein. Under our system of administering justice, truth is best
ascertained or approximated by trial conducted under the adversary system,

Excerpts from the Report on Professional Responsibility issued jointly by the Association of
American Law Schools and the American Bar Association explain why:
An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for combatting this natural human
tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known. The
arguments of counsel hold the case, as it were, in suspension between two opposing
interpretations of it. While the proper classification of the case is thus kept unresolved, there is
time to explore all of its peculiarities and nuances.

These are the contributions made by partisan advocacy during the public hearing of the cause.
When we take into account the preparation that must precede the hearing, the essential quality of
the advocate's contribution becomes even more apparent. Preceding the hearing inquiries must be
instituted to determine what facts can be proved or seem sufficiently established to warrant a
formal test of their truth during the hearing. There must also be a preliminary analysis of the
issues, so that the hearing may have form and direction. These preparatory measures are
indispensable whether or not the parties involved in the controversy are represented by
advocates.

Where that representation is present there is an obvious advantage in the fact that the area of
dispute may be greatly reduced by an exchange of written pleadings or by stipulations of counsel.
Without the participation of someone who can act responsibly for each of the parties, this
essential narrowing of the issues becomes impossible. But here again the true significance of
partisan advocacy lies deeper, touching once more the integrity of the adjudicative process itself.
It is only through the advocate's participation that the hearing may remain in fact what it purports
to be in theory; a public trial of the facts and issues. Each advocate comes to the hearing
prepared to present his proofs and arguments, knowing at the same time that his arguments may
fail to persuade and that his proofs may be rejected as inadequate. It is a part of his role to
absorb these possible disappointments. The deciding tribunal, on the other hand, comes to the
hearing uncommitted. It has not represented to the public that any fact can be proved, that any
argument is sound, or that any particular way of stating a litigant's case is the most effective
expression of its merits.

xxx xxx xxx

These, then, are the reasons for believing that partisan advocacy plays a vital and essential role in
one of the most fundamental procedures of a democratic society. But if we were to put all of these
detailed considerations to one side, we should still be confronted by the fact that, in whatever
form adjudication may appear, the experienced judge or arbitrator desires and actively seeks to
obtain an adversary presentation of the issues. Only when he has had the benefit of intelligent
and vigorous advocacy on both sides can he feel fully confident of his decision.

Viewed in this light, the role of the lawyer as a partisan advocate appears, not as a regrettable
necessity, but as an indispensable part of a larger ordering of affairs. The institution of advocacy
is not a concession to the frailties of human nature, but an expression of human insight in the
design of a social framework within which man's capacity for impartial judgment can attain its
fullest realization. (44 American Bar Association Journal (1160-1161, 1958)

Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the
opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the
suit or proceeding is appropriate.

The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:

SEC. 3. Parties — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall
be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.— Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an orde, fix the
time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC, 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register are-(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes
the duty of the court to-(l) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition,
and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose
the petition: (I) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.

If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or
cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that
when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or
claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is
actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings.

In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go
and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu was filed by respondent Leonor Valencia on
January 27, 1970, and pursuant to the order of the trial court dated February 4, 1970, the said
petition was published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in the, Cebu Advocate, a
newspaper of general circulation in the City of Cebu. Notice thereof was duly served on the
Solicitor General. the Local Civil Registrar and Go Eng. The order likewise set the case for hearing
and directed the local civil registrar and the other respondents or any person claiming any interest
under the entries whose corrections were sought, to file their opposition to the said petition. An
opposition to the petition was consequently filed by the Republic on February 26, 1970. Thereafter
a full blown trial followed with respondent Leonor Valencia testifying and presenting her
documentary evidence in support of her petition. The Republic on the other hand cross-examined
respondent Leonor Valencia.

We are of the opinion that the petition filed by the respondent in the lower court by way of a
special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register with the
requisite notice and publication and the recorded proceedings that actually took place thereafter
could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.

In Matias v. Republic (28 SCRA 31), we held that:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . In the case of petitioner herein, however, the proceedings were not summary, considering the
publication of the petition made by order of the court in order to give notice to any person that
might be interested, including direct service on the Solicitor General himself. Considering the
peculiar circumstances of this particular case, the fact that no doubt is cast on the truth of
petitioner's allegations, or upon her evidence in support thereof, the absence of any showing that
prejudice would be caused to any party interested (since petitioner's own father testified in her
favor), and the publicity given to the petition, we are of the opinion that the Ty Kong Tin doctrine
is not controlling this case. "

Only last year, we had occasion to clarify the Ty Kong Tin doctrine, further. In Republic v. Macli-
ing (135 SCRA 367, 370-371), this Court ruled:

The principal ground relied upon in this appeal is that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court upon which
private respondents anchor their Petition is applicable only to changes contemplated in Article 412
of the Civil Code, which are clerical or innocuous errors, or to corrections that are not
controversial and are supported by indubitable evidence. (Tiong v. Republic, 15 SCRA 262
[1965]).

It is true that the change from Esteban Sy to Sy Piao would necessarily affect the Identity of the
father. (Barillo v. Republic, 3 SCRA 725 [1961]) In that sense, it can be said to be substantial.
However, we find indubitable evidence to support the correction prayed for. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

In the case of Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, 94 Phil. 321 (1954), as well as subsequent cases
predicated thereon, we forbade only the entering of material corrections in the record of birth by
virtue of a judgment in a summary action. the proceedings below, although filed under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court, were not summary. The Petition was published by order of the lower Court
once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in accordance with
law. The Solicitor General was served with copy of the Petition as well as with notices of hearings.
He filed his Opposition to the Petition. The Local Civil Registrar of the City of Baguio was likewise
duly served with copy of the Petition. A Fiscal was always in attendance at the hearings in
representation of the Solicitor General. He participated actively in the proceedings, particularly, in
the cross-examination of witnesses. And, notwithstanding that all interested persons were cited to
appear to show cause why the petition should not be granted, no one appeared to oppose except
the State through the Solicitor General. But neither did the State present evidence in support of
its Opposition.

To follow the petitioner's argument that Rule 108 is not an appropriate proceeding without in any
way intimating what is the correct proceeding or if such a proceeding exists at all, would result in
manifest injustice.

Apart from Bernardo Go and Jessica Go, there are four (4) other sisters and one (1) other brother
born of the same father and mother. Not only are all five registered as Filipino citizens but they
have pursued careers which require Philippine citizenship as a mandatory pre-requisite. To
emphasize the strict policy of the government regarding professional examinations, it was the law
until recently that to take the board exams for pharmacist, the applicant should possess natural
born citizenship. (See. 18, Republic Act 5921 and Sec. 1, P.D. 1350)

The sisters and brother are:

1. Sally Go, born on April 29, 1934 was licensed as a Pharmacist after passing the government
board examinations in 1956.

2. Fanny Go, born on July 12, 1936 is a Registered Nurse who passed the government board
examinations in 1960.

3. Corazon Go, born on June 20, 1939, during the trial of this case in 1970 was a fourth year
medical student, qualified to take the government board examinations after successfully
completing the requirements for a career in medicine, and presumably is a licensed physician
now.
4. Antonio Go, born February 14, 1942 was an engineering student during the 1970 trial of the
case and qualified by citizenship to take government board examinations.

5. Remedios Go, born October 4, 1945 was a licensed Optometrist after passing the government
board examinations in 1967.

The above facts were developed and proved during trial. The petitioner failed to refute the
citizenship of the minors Bernardo and Jessica Go.

In this petition, it limits itself to a procedural reason to overcome substantive findings by arguing
that the proper procedure was not followed.

There are other facts on the record. Leonor Valencia is a registered voter and had always
exercised her right of suffrage from the time she reached voting age until the national elections
immediately preceding the filing of her petition. The five other sisters and brother are also
registered voters and likewise exercised the right of suffrage.

An uncle of the mother's side had held positions in the government having been elected twice as
councilor and twice as vice-mayor of Victorias, Negros Occidental. Respondent Leonor Valencia
has purchased and registered two (2) parcels of land as per Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
46104 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-37275. These allegations are well documented and
were never contradicted by the Republic. As correctly observed by the lower court.

The right of suffrage is one of the important rights of a citizen. This is also true with respect to the
acquisition of a real property. The evidence further shows that her children had been allowed to
take the Board Examinations given by the Government for Filipino citizens only.

It would be a denial of substantive justice if two children proved by the facts to be Philippine
citizens, and whose five sisters and brother born of the same mother and father enjoy all the
rights of citizens, are denied the same rights on the simple argument that the "correct procedure"
not specified or even intimated has not been followed.

We are, therefore, constrained to deny the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

The decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118387 October 11, 2001

LEE vs. CA

DE LEON, JR., J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals dated October 28, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP NO. 317862 . The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals upheld the Orders issued by respondents Judges Hon. Lorenzo B. Veneracion3 and Hon.
Jaime T. Hamoy4 taking cognizance of two (2) separate petitions filed by private respondents
before their respective salas for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth
of petitioners pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.

This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man but begotten of two (2)
different mothers. One set, the private respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and
his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly children of
Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan.

Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek
Sheng-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel
and Thomas K. Lee (hereinafter referred to as private respondents) filed two (2) separate
petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of Marcelo Lee,
Albina Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma
Lee (hereinafter referred to as petitioners). On December 2, 1992, the petition against all
petitioners, with the exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. 92-636925 and later assigned to Branch 47 presided over
by respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion. On February 3, 1993, a similar petition against
Emma Lee was filed before the RTC of Kalookan and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. C-16746 and
assigned to the sala of respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy of Branch 130.

Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent
records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of "Keh Shiok Cheng"
as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name "Tiu Chuan", who is allegedly the
petitioners' true birth mother.

The private respondents alleged in their petitions before the trial courts that they are the
legitimate children of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married in
China sometime in 1931. Except for Rita K. Lee who was born and raised in China, private
respondents herein were all born and raised in the Philippines.

Sometime in October, 1948, Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated the arrival in the Philippines from China of
a young girl named Tiu Chuan. She was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their new
housemaid but far from becoming their housemaid, Tiu Chuan immediately became Lee Tek
Sheng's mistress. As a result of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to petitioners.

Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each
of the petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth
of petitioners by making it appear that petitioners' mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.

Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave maternal care and guidance to the
petitioners. They all lived in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents were
residing in. All was well, therefore, before private respondents' discovery of the dishonesty and
fraud perpetrated by their father, Lee Tek Sheng.
The tides turned after Keh Shiok Cheng's demise on May 9, 1989. Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the
names of all his children, including those of petitioners', be included in the obituary notice of Keh
Shiok Cheng's death that was to be published in the newspapers. It was this seemingly irrational
act that piqued private respondents' curiosity, if not suspicion.7

Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to conduct an investigation into the matter. After investigation and verification of all
pertinent records, the NBI prepared a report that pointed out, among others, the false entries in
the records of birth of petitioners, specifically the following.

1. As per Birth Certificate MARCELO LEE (Annex F-1), their father, LEE TEK SHENG made it appear
that he is the 12th child of Mrs. KEH SHIOK CHENG, but upon investigation, it was found out that
her Hospital Records, the mother who gave birth to MARCELO LEE had given birth for the 1st
time, as per diagnosis of the attending physician, Dr. R. LIM, it was "GRAVIDA I, PARA I" which
means "first pregnancy, first live birth delivery" (refer to: MASTER PATIENT'S RECORDS SUMMARY
— Annex I). Also, the age of the mother when she gave birth to MARCELO LEE as per record was
only 17 years old, when in fact and in truth, KEH SHIOK CHENG's age was then already 38 years
old. The address used by their father in the Master Patient record was also the same as the Birth
Certificate of MARCELO LEE (2425 Rizal Avenue, Manila). The name of MARCELO LEE was
recorded under Hospital No. 221768, page 73.

2. As per Birth Certificate of ALBINA LEE (Annex F-2), it was made to appear that ALBINA LEE was
the third child which is without any rationality, because the 3rd child of KEH SHIOK CHENG is
MELODY LEE TEK SHENG (Annex E-2). Note also, that the age of the mother as per Hospital
Records jump (sic) from 17 to 22 years old, but the only age gap of MARCELO LEE and ALBINA
LEE is only 2 years.

3. As per Birth Certificate of MARIANO LEE (Annex F-3), it was made to appear that MARIANO LEE
was the 5th child, but the truth is, KEH SHIOK CHENG's 5th child is LUCIA LEE TEK SHENG (Annex
E-4). As per Hospital Record, the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was only 23 years old, while the
actual age of KEH SHIOK CHENG, was then already 40 years old.

4. As per Birth Certificate of PABLO LEE (Annex F-4), it was made to appear that PABLO LEE was
the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG which is impossible to be true, considering the fact that KEH
SHIOK CHENG have stopped conceiving after her 11th child. Also as per Hospital Record, the age
of the mother was omitted in the records. If PABLO LEE is the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, it
would only mean that she have (sic) given birth to her first born child at the age of 8 to 9 years,
which is impossible to be true.

Based on the birth record of MARIANO LEE in 1953, the recorded age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was
23 years old. Two years after PABLO LEE was born in 1955, the difference is only 2 years, so it is
impossible for PABLO LEE to be the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, as it will only mean that she
have (sic) given birth at that impossible age.

5. As per Birth Certificate of HELEN LEE (Annex F-5), it was made to appear that she is the 6th
child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, but as per Birth Certificate of JULIAN LEE (Annex E-5), he is the true
6th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG. Per Hospital Record, KEH SHIOK CHENG is only 28 years old,
while KEH SHIOK CHENG'S true age at that time was 45 years old.

6. EMMA LEE has no record in the hospital because, as per complainant's allegation, she was born
at their house, and was later admitted at Chinese General Hospital.

7. As per Birth Certificate of CATALINO LEE (Annex F-7), it was made to appear that he is the
14th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, and that the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG a.k.a. Mrs. LEE TEK
SHENG, jumped from 28 years old at the birth of HELEN LEE on 23 August 1957 to 38 years old at
the birth of CATALINO LEE on 22 April 1959.

8. As per Birth Certificate of EUSEBIO LEE, the alleged last son of KEH SHIOK CHENG, the age of
the mother is 48 years old. However, as per Hospital Record, the age of Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG,
then was only 39 years old. Considering the fact, that at the time of MARCELO's birth on 11 May
1950. KEH SHIOK CHENG's age is 38 years old and at the time of EUSEBIO's birth, she is already
48 years old, it is already impossible that she could have given birth to 8 children in a span of only
10 years at her age. As per diagnosis, the alleged mother registered on EUSEBIO's birth indicate
that she had undergone CEASARIAN SECTION, which Dr. RITA K. LEE said is not true.

In view of the foregoing facts, the NBI concluded that:

10. In conclusion, as per Chinese General Hospital Patients Records, it is very obvious that the
mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most
probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG, is in
a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of
making his 8 children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his
2nd family and secure their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been
necessary had not the father and his 2nd family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the
legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG.8

It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions for cancellation and/or
correction of entries in petitioners' records of birth with the lower courts.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions — SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 and SP. PROC.
NO. C-1674 — on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate
objective is to assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is essentially
an action to impugn legitimacy was filed prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has already
prescribed.9

On February 12, 1993, respondent Judge Veneracion denied the motion to dismiss SP. PROC. NO.
92-63692 for failure of the herein petitioners (defendants in the lower court) to appear at the
hearing of the said motion.10 Then on February 17, 1993, Judge Veneracion issued an Order, the
pertinent portion of which, reads as follows:

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is hereby given due course.
Let this petition be set for hearing on March 29, 1993 at 8:30 in the morning before this Court
located at the 5th Floor of the City Hall of Manila.

Notice is hereby given that anyone who has any objection to the petition should file on or before
the date of hearing his opposition thereto with a statement of the grounds therefor.

Let a copy of this Order be published, at the expense of the petitioners, once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

Let copies of the verified petition with its annexes and of this Order be served upon the Office of
the Solicitor General, and the respondents, and be posted on the Bulletin Board of this Court, also
at the expense of the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.11

On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an Order dated April 15, 1993 taking
cognizance of SP. PROC. No. C-1674, to wit:

It appearing from the documentary evidence presented and marked by the petitioners that the
Order of the Court setting the case for hearing was published in "Media Update" once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks, that is on February 20, 27, and March 6, 1993 as evidenced by the
Affidavit of Publication and the clippings attached to the affidavit, and by the copies of the "Media
Update" published on the aforementioned dates; further, copy of the order setting the case for
hearing together with copy of the petition had been served upon the Solicitor General, City
Prosecutor of Kalookan City, Civil Registrar of Kalookan City and the private respondents, the
Court holds that the petitioners have complied with the jurisdictional requirements for the Court to
take cognizance of this case.

xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED.12

Petitioners' attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the above-mentioned orders of Judge

Veneracion and Judge Hamoy failed, hence their recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Petitioners averred that respondents judges had acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders
allowing the petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners' records of
birth to prosper in the lower courts.

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners raised the following arguments: (1)
Rule 108 is inappropriate for impugning the legitimacy and filiation of children; (2) Respondents
judges are sanctioning a collateral attack against the filiation and legitimacy of children; (3)
Respondents judges are allowing private respondents to impugn the legitimacy and filiation of
their siblings despite the fact that their undisputed common father is still alive; (4) Respondents
judges are entertaining petitions which are already time-barred; and (5) The petitions below are
part of a forum-shopping spree.13

Finding no merit in petitioners' arguments, the Court of Appeals dismissed their petition in a
Decision dated October 28, 1994.14 Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the said decision was
also denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated December 19, 1994.15

Hence, this petition.

1. Petitioners contend that resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is improper since
private respondents seek to have the entry for the name of petitioners' mother changed from
"Keh Shiok Cheng" to "Tiu Chuan" who is a completely different person. What private respondents
therefore seek is not merely a correction in name but a declaration that petitioners were not born
of Lee Tek Sheng's legitimate wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, but of his mistress, Tiu Chuan, in effect a
"bastardization of petitioners."16 Petitioners thus label private respondents' suits before the lower
courts as a collateral attack against their legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.

Debunking petitioners' above contention, the Court of Appeals observed:

xxx xxx xxx

As correctly pointed out by the private respondents in their comment . . . , the proceedings are
simply aimed at establishing a particular fact, status and/or right. Stated differently, the thrust of
said proceedings was to establish the factual truth regarding the occurrence of certain events
which created or affected the status of persons and/or otherwise deprived said persons of rights.17
xxx xxx xxx

It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. 18 The
petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of
birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for
Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth
records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually
actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate
children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's children. There is
nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.19

Further sanctioning private respondents' resort to Rule 108, the Court of Appeals adverted to our
ruling in the leading case of Republic vs. Valencia20 where we affirmed the decision of Branch XI of
the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City ordering the correction in the nationality and
civil status of petitioner's minor children as stated in their records of birth from "Chinese" to
"Filipino", and "legitimate" to "illegitimate", respectively. Although recognizing that the changes or
corrections sought to be effected are not mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature,
this Court, sitting en banc, held therein that even substantial errors in a civil register may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.21 In the said case, we also laid down the rule
that a proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil register under Rule 108
ceases to be summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary
proceeding when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are complied with. Thus we
held:

"Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the
opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the
suit or proceeding is 'appropriate.'

The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:

'SECTION 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding.'

'SECTION 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order,
fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be
given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published
once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.'

'SECTION 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition
thereto.'

"Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register are — (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it
becomes the duty of the court to — (1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of
the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise
entitled to oppose the petition: — (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming
any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.

"If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or
cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that
when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or
claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is
actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings."22 (Emphasis
supplied.)

To the mind of the Court of Appeals, the proceedings taken in both petitions for cancellation
and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners in the lower courts are
appropriate adversary proceedings.

We agree. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:

In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth was filed by
private respondents and pursuant to the order of the RTC-Manila, dated February 17, 1993, a
copy of the order setting the case for hearing was ordered published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. In the RTC-Kalookan,
there was an actual publication of the order setting the case for hearing in "Media Update" once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks. In both cases notices of the orders were ordered served
upon the Solicitor General, the Civil Registrars of Manila and Kalookan and upon the petitioners
herein. Both orders set the case for hearing and directed the Civil Registrars and the other
respondents in the case below to file their oppositions to the said petitions. A motion to dismiss
was consequently filed by herein petitioners Marcelo, Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino and Eusebio,
all surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young in the RTC-Manila, and an opposition was filed by Emma
Lee in the RTC-Kalookan.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed by the private respondents in the courts
below by way of a special proceeding cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil registers
with the requisite parties, notices and publications could very well be regarded as that proper suit
or appropriate action.23 (Emphasis supplied.)

The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings adversarial does not give trial courts
the license to go beyond the ambit of Rule 108 which is limited to those corrections contemplated
by Article 412 of the New Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature.24
The petitioners point to the case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,25 which is of a later date than
Republic vs. Valencia,26 where this Court reverted to the doctrine laid down in earlier cases,27
starting with Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic,28 prohibiting the extension of the application of Rule 108
beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections. Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et
al. vs. Civil Registrar,29 allowing substantial changes under Rule 108 would render the said rule
unconstitutional as the same would have the effect of increasing or modifying substantive rights.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the cited case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,30 the
reason we declared null and void the portion of the lower court's order directing the change of
Labayo-Rowe's civil status and the filiation of one of her children as appearing in the latter's
record of birth, is not because Rule 108 was inappropriate to effect such changes, but because
Labayo-Rowe's petition before the lower court failed to implead all indispensable parties to the
case.

We explained in this wise:

"x x x An appropriate proceeding is required wherein all the indispensable parties should be made
parties to the case as required under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.

"In the case before Us, since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic of the Philippines as the only respondent,
the proceedings taken, which is summary in nature, is short of what is required in cases where
substantial alterations are sought. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other
indispensable parties should have been made respondents. They include not only the declared
father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their
hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected by
the change should be notified or represented x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

"The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her
status would be changed from 'legitimate' to 'illegitimate'. Moreover, she would be exposed to
humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will
bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of
general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the
proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated
by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules 'shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights.' If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of
errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend
substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation,
or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said
rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify
substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code."31 (italics
supplied).

Far from petitioners' theory, this Court's ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic32 does not exclude
recourse to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to effect substantial changes or corrections in
entries of the civil register. The only requisite is that the proceedings under Rule 108 be an
appropriate adversary proceeding as contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding. Thus:

"If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register] is
merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding,
the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake.
However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed
after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved.
Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and
should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy,
and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and
evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary
admitted x x x."33 (Emphasis supplied.)

It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and
the remedy granted upon mere application or motion. But this is not always the case, as when the
statute expressly provides.34 Hence, a special proceeding is not always summary. One only has to
take a look at the procedure outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated therein is not a
summary proceeding per se. Rule 108 requires publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e.,
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec.4). The Rule also requires inclusion as parties of
all persons who claim any interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction (Sec.
3). The civil registrar and any person in interest are also required to file their opposition, if any,
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such
notice (Sec. 5). Last, but not the least, although the court may make orders expediting the
proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the same (Sec. 7).

Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia,35 that Rule 108, when
all the procedural requirements thereunder are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding
to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.

It must be conceded, however, that even after Republic vs. Valencia36 there continues to be a
seesawing of opinion on the issue of whether or not substantial corrections in entries of the civil
register may be effected by means of Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code.
The more recent cases of Leonor vs. Court of Appeals37 and Republic vs. Labrador38 do seem to
signal a reversion to the Ty Kong Tin ruling which delimited the scope of application of Article 412
to clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register.

In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108 cannot be used to modify, alter or increase
substantive rights, such as those involving the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child. We ruled thus:

"This issue has been resolved in Leonor vs. Court of Appeals. In that case, Respondent Mauricio
Leonor filed a petition before the trial court seeking the cancellation of the registration of his
marriage to Petitioner Virginia Leonor. He alleged, among others, the nullity of their legal vows
arising from the "non-observance of the legal requirements for a valid marriage." In debunking
the trial court's ruling granting such petition, the Court held as follows:

'On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation of any entry regarding
"marriages" in the civil registry for any reason by the mere filing of a verified petition for the
purpose. However, it is not as simple as it looks. Doctrinally, the only errors that can be canceled
or corrected under this Rule are typographical or clerical errors, not material or substantial ones
like the validity or nullity of a marriage. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding; error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or
writing (Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or some harmless and innocuous change
such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of
the parent (Ansalada vs. Republic, L-10226, Feb. 14, 1958).'

'Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her
children from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial
x x x .'

'Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under
Article 412 of the Civil Code cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginia's civil status
from married to single and of their three children from legitimate to illegitimate x x x '

"Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry will change the status of a
person from "legitimate to "illegitimate," as in Sarah Zita's case, the same cannot be granted in
summary proceedings."39

It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to the confusion sown by pronouncements seemingly
in conflict with each other, and perhaps, in the process, stem the continuing influx of cases raising
the same substantial issue.

The basis for the pronouncement that extending the scope of Rule 108 to substantial corrections is
unconstitutional is embodied in the early case of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic40 that first delineated
the extent or scope of the matters that may be changed or corrected pursuant to Article 412 of
the New Civil Code. The Supreme Court ruled in this case that:

"x x x After a mature deliberation, the opinion was reached that what was contemplated therein
are mere corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature and not those that may affect the civil
status or the nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. If the purpose of the petition is
merely a clerical error then the court may issue an order in order that the error or mistake may be
corrected. If it refers to a substantial change, which affects the status or citizenship of a party, the
matter should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issue involved.
Such action can be found at random in our substantive and remedial laws the implementation of
which will naturally depend upon the factors and circumstances that might arise affecting the
interested parties. This opinion is predicated upon the theory that the procedure contemplated in
article 412 is summary in nature which cannot cover cases involving controversial issues."41

This doctrine was taken a step further in the case of Chua Wee, et al. vs. Republic42 where the
Court said that:

"From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until the promulgation of the
Revised Rules of Court on January 1, 1964, there was no law nor rule of court prescribing the
procedure to secure judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or
alterations in the civil register pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court now provides for such a procedure which should be limited solely to the
implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the matter of correcting entries in the civil
register. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13 of Art. VIII of the
Constitution, which directs that such rules of court 'shall not diminish or increase or modify
substantive rights.' If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or
corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to
comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become
unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive rights, which changes are not
authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil Code."43 (Italics supplied).

We venture to say now that the above pronouncements proceed from a wrong premise, that is,
the interpretation that Article 412 pertains only to clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous
nature, effectively excluding from its domain, and the scope of its implementing rule, substantial
changes that may affect nationality, status, filiation and the like. Why the limited scope of Article
412? Unfortunately, Ty Kong Tin does not satisfactorily answer this question except to opine that
the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature and cannot, therefore, cover
cases involving controversial issues. Subsequent cases have merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin
doctrine without, however, shedding light on the matter.

The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412 contemplates a summary procedure.

First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows:

"No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order."

It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say that the corrections
or changes must be effected by judicial order. As such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the
procedure contemplated for obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature.

Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms "corrected" and "changed".
In its ordinary sense, to correct means to make or set right"; "to remove the faults or errors
from"44 while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or
with something that serves as a substitute".45 The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of
entry to be changed or corrected nor does it distinguish on the basis of the effect that the
correction or change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the civil register
may be changed or corrected under Article 412. What are the entries in the civil register? We
need not go further than Articles 407 and 408 of the same title to find the answer.

"Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded
in the civil register."

"Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name."

It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding provisions include not only
status but also nationality. Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin pronouncement that Article 412 does not
contemplate matters that may affect civil status, nationality or citizenship is erroneous. This
interpretation has the effect of isolating Article 412 from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I
of the New Civil Code, in clear contravention of the rule of statutory construction that a statute
must always be construed as a whole such that the particular meaning to be attached to any word
or phrase is ascertained from the context and the nature of the subject treated.46

Thirdly, Republic Act No. 904847 which was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially
amended Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

"SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. — No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations."

The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are
now to be corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the
correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the
scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil
register. This is precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of its genre had said,
perhaps another indication that it was not sound doctrine after all.

It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress' response to the confusion
wrought by the failure to delineate as to what exactly is that so-called summary procedure for
changes or corrections of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from that appropriate
adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a substantial kind. For we must admit that
though we have constantly referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to
categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies that
summary procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding. Be that as it may,
the case at bar cannot be decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has prospective
application. Hence, the necessity for the preceding treatise.

II. The petitioners contend that the private respondents have no cause of action to bring the cases
below as Article 171 of the Family Code allows the heirs of the father to bring an action to impugn
the legitimacy of his children only after his death.48

Article 171 provides:

"The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the
preceding article only in the following cases:

"(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing this action;

"(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or

"(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband."

Petitioner's contention is without merit.

In the recent case of Babiera vs. Catotal,49 we upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals that
affirmed the judgment of the RTC of Lanao del Norte declaring the birth certificate of one Teofista
Guinto as null and void ab initio, and ordering the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City to cancel the
same from the Registry of Live Births. We ruled therein that private respondent Presentacion
Catotal, child of spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, had the requisite standing to
initiate an action to cancel the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera, another alleged child of the same
spouses because she is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.50

We likewise held therein that:

"x x x Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of the
provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's
child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the
mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In
other words, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of
Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all x x x. ''51

Similarly, we ruled in Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals52 that:

"Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to
the case at bench cannot be sustained. x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

"A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in
the instant case, where a child is alleged not be the child of nature or biological child of a certain
couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own
a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of
said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child;
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that
in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or
ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue
influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period
within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of
said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to
the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are
contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that
petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:

'Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not
well taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this
case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private
respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not
claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is
not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural
child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.
"'53

III. Petitioners claim that private respondents' cause of action had already prescribed as more
than five (5) years had lapsed between the registration of the latest birth among the petitioners in
1960 and the filing of the actions in December of 1992 and February of 1993.54

We disagree. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as no law or rule
specifically prescribes a fixed time for filing the special proceeding under Rule 108 in relation to
Article 412 of the New Civil Code, it is the following provision of the New Civil Code that applies:

"Art. 1149. other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be
brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues."

The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of three (3)
elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and c) an
act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. It is only when
the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen.55

It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action. The last element of their cause
of action, that is, the act of their father in falsifying the entries in petitioners' birth records,
occurred more than thirty (30) years ago. Strictly speaking, it was upon this occurrence that
private respondents' right of action or right to sue accrued. However, we must take into account
the fact that it was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents discovered that they in fact
had a cause of action against petitioners who continue to use said falsified birth records.

Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive private respondents of their right
to establish the truth about a fact, in this case, petitioners' true mother, and their real status,
simply because they had discovered the dishonesty perpetrated upon them by their common
father at a much later date. This is especially true in the case of private respondents who, as their
father's legitimate children, did not have any reason to suspect that he would commit such
deception against them and deprive them of their sole right to inherit from their mother's (Keh
Shiok Cheng's) estate. It was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents' suspicions were
aroused and confirmed. From that time until 1992 and 1993, less than five (5) years had lapsed.

Petitioners would have us reckon the five-year prescriptive period from the date of the registration
of the last birth among the petitioners-siblings in 1960, and not from the date private respondents
had discovered the false entries in petitioners' birth records in 1989. Petitioners base their position
on the fact that birth records are public documents, hence, the period of prescription for the right
of action available to the private respondents started to run from the time of the registration of
their birth certificates in the Civil Registry.
We cannot agree with petitioners' thinking on that point.

It is true that the books making up the Civil Register and all documents relating thereto are public
documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.56 Petitioners liken
their birth records to land titles, public documents that serve as notice to the whole world.
Unfortunately for the petitioners, this analogy does not hold water. Unlike a title to a parcel of
land, a person's parentage cannot be acquired by prescription. One is either born of a particular
mother or not. It is that simple.

IV. Finally, petitioners accuse private respondents of forum shopping. They enumerate the other
actions filed by private respondents against them prior to the filing of their Rule 108 petitions in
the lower courts, as follows:

(1) A criminal complaint for falsification of entries in the birth certificates filed against their father
as principal and against defendants as alleged accessories;

(2) A petition for the cancellation of the naturalization certificate of their father, Lee Tek Sheng;
and

(3) A petition for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng's estate.57

According to the petitioners, all the three (3) actions above-mentioned, as well as the Rule 108
petitions, subject of the case before us, raise the common issue of whether petitioners are the
natural children of Keh Shiok Cheng or Tiu Chuan. They contend that in all these cases, the judge
or hearing officer would have to resolve this issue in order to determine whether or not to grant
the relief prayed for.58

Forum shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity of parties,
rights or causes of action and reliefs sought.59 Even a cursory examination of the pleadings filed
by private respondents in their various cases against petitioners would reveal that at the very
least there is no identity of rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for. The present case has
its roots in two (2) petitions filed under Rule 108, the purpose of which is to correct and/or cancel
certain entries in petitioners' birth records. Suffice it to state, the cause of action in these Rule
108 petitions and the relief sought therefrom are very different from those in the criminal
complaint against petitioners and their father which has for its cause of action, the commission of
a crime as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, and which seeks the punishment
of the accused; or the action for the cancellation of Lee Tek Sheng naturalization certificate which
has for its cause of action the commission by Lee Tek Sheng of an immoral act, and his ultimate
deportation for its object; or for that matter, the action for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng's estate
which has for its cause of action the private respondents' right under the New Civil Code to inherit
from their mother's estate.

We therefore concur in the finding of the Court of Appeals that there is no forum shopping to
speak of in the concept that this is described and contemplated in Circular No. 28-91 of the
Supreme Court. HCISED

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated October 28, 1994 is AFFIRMED.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and
seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in
Cagandahan's birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff
Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male."

The facts are as follows.

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries
in Birth Certificate[2] before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female
in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics
and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where
persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she
was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an
ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that
her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or
menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind
and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be
corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed
from Jennifer to Jeff.

The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks
and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his
appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of
the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr.
Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondent's condition is known as CAH. He
explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones,
her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs - female and male. He
testified that this condition is very rare, that respondent's uterus is not fully developed because of
lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that
respondent's condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent
has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be
advantageous to her.

The RTC granted respondent's petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs
prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for
the granting of his petition. It was medically proven that petitioner's body produces male
hormones, and first his body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen
to be male. He is a normal person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make
the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the
prescribed fees:

a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and

b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.

It is likewise ordered that petitioner's school records, voter's registry, baptismal certificate, and
other pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.

SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
abovementioned ruling.

The issues raised by petitioner are:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
I.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN
COMPLIED WITH; AND,

II.

CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN
THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT'S MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL
ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE."[4]
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the
birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of
her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court.

The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
respondent's petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar.[5] The OSG
further contends respondent's petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is
a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior
to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. [6] The
OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and
respondent's claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.[7]

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna
was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the
Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16,
2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings,[8] respondent is
actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true
sex/gender,[9] change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108, [10] and respondent substantially
complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.[11]

Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME

SECTION 1. Venue. - A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the
Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court].

SEC. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the
person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:

(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for
at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;

(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;

(c) The name asked for.

SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by
an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and
shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three
(3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the
court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an
election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice.

SEC. 4. Hearing. - Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The
Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of
the Republic.

SEC. 5. Judgment. - Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such
order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court
shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge
that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.

SEC. 6. Service of judgment. - Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be
furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated,
who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.

Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. - Upon good and valid grounds, the following
entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths;
(d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of
natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)
changes of name.

SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall
be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix
the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. - The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders
expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the
rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

SEC. 7. Order. - After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting
the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be
served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court because respondent's petition did not implead the local civil registrar.
Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil
registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil
registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can be had.
[12]
Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall
be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules.[13] The corresponding
petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may have
or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby. [14] Respondent, however,
invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules
liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with
Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.

The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No.
9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial
order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in
entries in the civil register.[18]

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure
is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.[19]

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.[20]

Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate" appearance
of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much
androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a
(1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing
more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as
the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear
male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in
10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.

CAH is one of many conditions [21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century,
medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as
either male or female.[22] The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia,
intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes,
genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor
female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female
sexes."

Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex
individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role. [23] Since the
rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous
external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female
genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder"
which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime
medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or
female.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested
that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a `no-man's land' for those individuals who
are neither truly `male' nor truly `female'."[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled
by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change
in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and
scientific development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the

subject's birth certificate entry is in order.

Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically
female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX)
chromosomes. However, respondent's body system naturally produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic
features of a male.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent,
having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here
thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It
is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest
or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of
a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not
to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent's development to reveal more
fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a
matter so innately private as one's sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or
not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or
remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take
medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender
of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the
primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and
maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent" [27] and in the absence
of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who
are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the
respondent's position and his personal judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent's
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help
make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is
not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced
and the consequences that will follow.[28] The trial court's grant of respondent's change of name
from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the
consequence that respondent's change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find
merit in respondent's change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in
his birth certificate from female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republic's petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr., and Brion, JJ., concur.