Professional Documents
Culture Documents
7-28-1996
Teodoro M. Kalaw
in his autobiography, Aide-de-Camp to Freedom
Tomas Cabili, delegate from Lanao, did not sign the 1935
Constitution because he did not vote in favor of it -the only delegate to
vote “No,” in fact. During the Convention he had worked for Mindanao
to have the right to vote for its own representatives, which up to then
had been appointed by the Governor-General of the Philippines.
According to Delegate Jose Aruego, who later wrote the definitive
account of the Convention, Cabili was convinced that “the province of
Lanao -except Sulu and Cotobato- should have been permitted by
constitutional provision to have its... representatives elected by the
direct vote of the people” (a curious statement; did this mean Cabili was
only primarily concerned with Lanao and did not think that Sulu and
Cotobato were worthy of electing their own Assemblymen?). Aruego
pointed out that,
“In the southern provinces, the most important question of all was
the future of Mindanao... which for ages past had been under the Moros.
They had never been subdued by the Spanish and were never disarmed
by them...
“The American Army officers used alternately to fight the Moros
and then to ‘baby’ them. The Moros are very artful and seldom agreed
to any proposition made to them on the part of the Government except
with feigned reluctance, and only in a manner calculated to put the
executive under an obligation. I felt that this method on their part was
only bluff, and I now addressed them on various occasions with straight-
from-the shoulder declarations. This new method of handling them
seemed to work excellently... we are glad to see them at length
gradually settling into modern ways.”
While all of this was going on, of course, Filipinos could only fret
over what they felt might turn out into a separate accommodation with
the Moros. Teodoro M. Kalaw, for example, filed a bill in the Philippine
Assembly in 1910 which “disapproved the dismemberment of Philippine
territory until such a time as the American Congress could define the
real political status of the Philippines” -at a time when there had already
been four major Muslim uprisings.
“3. The lack of true representation on the part of the Moros in the
Philippine Legislature, their judges, prosecutors and Constabulary being
at the present time Filipinos, in contrast to conditions existing prior to
1913;
Hence the conviction of the leaders in the 1930s that the Muslims
had to be dealt with firmly, if the interests of the nation they were
building were to prevail. This was, at best, a confrontational attitude:
“us” against “them.” The Muslims (or rather their leaders, this was the
time, after all, when political affairs was still firmly in the hands of
leaders who were only responsible to a limited electorate) were viewed
as half-savage children who needed firm disciplining and tutelage
-concepts which used to irritate Filipino leaders when they had begun to
agitate for autonomy.
So it was very clearly spelled out from the very start -colonization
, the genesis of what would come to be called “Manila imperialism.” The
international aspect of the “Mindanao question” would be confirmed
soon enough when a controversy arose over the growing number of
Japanese settlers in Mindanao in the late 1930s. Eventually the National
Assembly would pass the Immigration Act of 1940 (still in force), to the
outrage of the Japanese who complained that it was aimed specifically
against them. The Philippine government, the Japanese foreign ministry
suspected, even welcomed Jewish refugees from Germany (who were
urged to settle in Mindanao) to counterbalance the growing presence of
Japanese companies in Mindanao’s economy.
The end result can all the more be seen as internal colonialism.
Flooding Mindanao with Christian settlers -the way Americans flooded
the Midwest in the US- became one of the most effective ways of
ensuring that the island would stay in the hands of the Republic. By the
1950s, Muslim leaders like Domicao Alonto had become familiar fixtures
in national politics, but still the leader from Mindanao who would rise
the highest prior to the Marcos years was Emmanuel Pelaez, a Christian.
The gradual extension of voting and other rights to the Muslims was
accompanied by the gradual rise of Muslim politicians who played the
game, Manila-style, or at least in the fashion adopted by provincial
Christian warlords who had private armies; the supreme example of this
new breed of Muslim leader was -is- Muhamed Ali Dimaporo.
It may yet turn out that in one fell stroke the current (Ramos)
Administration has achieved something that was half-heartedly
attempted before: the co-optation of Muslim leaders by making them
“one of the boys” politically, with access to patronage and pork barrel
funds. This time, the government has gone all-out and decided to give
everyone a share of the loot, in the hope that this attempt to share the
wealth will make everyone, Christian and Muslim alike, happy.