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The Abyei Referendum

Overview
Unfortunately, the Abyei Referendum was not held from January 9 th through the 15th as set forth by the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement’s Abyei Protocol. At present, it seems increasingly likely that a
political agreement will be negotiated between north and south Sudan in place of the referendum.

We are disappointed that the residents of Abyei have been denied the opportunity to participate in an
on-time referendum to determine their status as part of either north or south Sudan as promised by the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

However, the organization would support a politically negotiated resolution to the Abyei question
provided that the people of the region (including the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya) are engaged as a critical
part of the decision-making process.

We remain concerned about the safety of civilians if a peaceful solution is not determined in the near
future, and we urge the United States and the international community to effectively utilize all the tools
at their disposal to ensure an effective resolution to the question of Abyei is found.

Brief Background on Tensions in the Abyei Region


The Ngok Dinka and Misseriya have historically lived together peacefully with the Misseriya seasonally
traveling through Abyei to reach grazing land for their cattle on the Kiir River (Bahr el Arab). In the
second civil war between the north and south, the Misseriya fought on the side of Khartoum and
perceive the north has now abandoned them and their interests. Tension between the two groups has
increased since Misseriya militias were paid by the National Congress Party (NCP) to force the Ngok
Dinka from their land which intensified after the discovery of oil. Despite repeated promises by
Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) to the contrary, the Misseriya fear that if Abyei becomes part of
the south they will lose their migratory rights. In 2008, SAF and allied militias deliberately attacked Ngok
Dinka civilians in Abyei displacing over 60,000 civilians and destroying half of Abyei town.

Possible Politically Negotiated Solutions


Partition of Abyei between the North and South
This potential solution would involve splitting the region in two, likely somewhere in relation to the town
of Diffra. It should be noted that at this time a de facto partition exists along similar lines to this
proposed long-term solution. Any partition near Diffra would be approximately 15 kilometers south of
the boundary proposed by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Although not ideal, it seems that this would be something that the NCP could agree to implement.
However, for the Government of Southern Sudan—that has already given up so much territory over the
years of Abyei negotiations—this option seems to be out-of-the-question.

Awarding of Abyei to the South with Political Inclusion for the Misseriya
Both sides are pushing against this option, although it would seem to be more palatable to the
Government of Southern Sudan. For the NCP, this option would be perceived as a political defeat as

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they would effectively be conceding more territory to the South without a substantial return. For the
South, political inclusion of the Misseriya would bring about fears of continued meddling by the NCP and
would mark another concession on top of those that the South has already made. Additionally, there
are tensions around the idea of political inclusion for the Misseriya given the history of fighting between
them and the Ngok Dinka.

Compelling Interests of the Parties


National Congress Party
The NCP came to power in a coup, declaring that they were going to save all of Sudan. The loss of more
territory in making concessions over Abyei forces Bashir to face tough questions from his own party and
the rest of Sudan on whether he has failed in his promise. For those supportive of a unified Sudan the
loss of Abyei marks a political defeat. For those that are disenfranchised, freedom for the South and
Abyei could further support their own desires for independence. The prospect that other marginalized
areas might push for independence is one of the NCP’s greatest fears moving forward.

Government of Southern Sudan


The Government of Southern Sudan has made compromises on multiple occasions that have resulted in
the shrinking of the Abyei territory. Most recently—despite both the South and NCP agreeing to uphold
the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the Abyei boundary—only the South lived up to
their word. They did so even though they were not entirely satisfied with the results of the arbitration.

Overarching Concerns
No matter the mechanism for solving the question of Abyei, effectively engaging the people of the
region is crucial to a successful and peaceful outcome. It cannot be overstressed that all those who
would be impacted by a decision related to the status of Abyei must be consulted as part of the process.

Misseriya
No matter the outcome, protecting the rights of the Misseriya to travel through the region will be
necessary and efforts to help mitigate concerns related to the protection of these rights are imperative.
Given outstanding issues around the Misseriya being prohibited from travelling through the region with
weapons, negotiations on this matter will be necessary.

Ngok Dinka
The Ngok Dinka of Abyei have long awaited their opportunity to participate in the Abyei Referendum in
order to determine their future. Even if a negotiated settlement results in the awarding of Abyei to the
South—as the majority of the Dinka would want—outstanding issues could threaten to increase
tensions and have potentially disastrous consequences. In the event that a negotiated solution falls
short of awarding the Abyei region (as defined by the internationally arbitrated border) to the South, the
consultation of the Dinka will be critical to ensure a sustainable peace given the likelihood that such a
solution would be perceived negatively.

Additional Note on Oil Production


While the Abyei region has been closely linked with oil production in Sudan, the area under
consideration only includes the Diffra oil field, which produces an estimated 3,000 barrels of oil per day;
This is relatively small field and reduces the dimension that oil plays in the ongoing debate over the area
of Abyei, at least as defined by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. As there are other concerns about
migratory routes, watercourses, and identity of Abyei’s residents, it is important that any potential
solution to the Abyei question expand its focus beyond oil reserves.
Map of the Entire Abyei Area

Map Highlighting the Abyei Boundary as Designated through International Arbitration

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