Burmese Perspective

China, International Scene and the 2nd Panglong Conference

Kanbawza Win
Ancient Chinese History says that in the year 492 BC, Goujain, the king of Yue in
modern Zhejiang district, in a war was taken prisoner by king Fuchai, his northern neighbour. Goujain
was put to work in the royal stables where he bore his captivity with such dignity and loyalty that he
gradually won Fuchai;s respect, so much so that after few years time Fuchai let him return home as his
vassal.
He appeared to be a loyal vassal building a beautiful palace for Fuchai and send him the most
beautiful women of Yue and at the same time bribe his officials and brought enough grains to empty
Fuechai’s granary. But he never forgets his humiliation. He slept on brushwood and hangs a gall bladder
in his room, licking it daily to feed his appetite for revenge. He worked very hard for the prosperity of his
kingdom and soon he became prosperous, as the kingdom of Fuchai decline. He bided his time for several
years until he was very confident of his superiority and with more than 50,000 men marched to get his
revenge, and put Fuchai kingdom to the sword. He has become a symbol of perseverance and hard work
which every Chinese has to study as an exemplary. So anyone who lose heart and despair, the Chinese use
to point out King Goujain. The Chinese today sees him as a symbol of perseverance and dedication.
Students were told that if they want to succeed they must be like King Goujain, sleeping on brushwood
and tasting gall bladder, that great accomplishment will come with sacrifice and unyielding purpose. In
short, sleeping on brushwood and tasting gall bladder to the Chinese is somewhat similar to King Alfred
and his burning cakes to the English, or cutting of a cherry tree by George Washington, to the American.
China has been licking the gall bladder since the first opium war in 1842 (during the Quing
Dynasty) when Britain imposed the unequal treaty of Nanking and Hong Kong has to be ceded to the
British and opened its ports for opium trade. Following a series of Opium Wars it has bear the colonial
humiliation for nearly a century until Mao Hse Dong proclaimed the People`s Republic of China on 1st
Oct. 1949. Deng Xioping set about reforming the economy in 1978 and put more than one and half billion
people to work hard. Militarily and economically still too weak to challenge the sole super power, it talk
of peace all the time and concentrated on getting richer throughout the rest of the twentieth century.

Assertive China
As China grown in power and rebuilt its mighty armed forces, the West and Japan has run into
debts especially America with its disastrous wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan (in other words modern
Fuchai kingdom). They have no choice but to sell their technology to the Chinese who is now the richest
country in the world. Taking the parable of Goujain, many people finds it alarming about China’s rise to
superpower and foresee China verses the World since it has about one third of the population of the world
and its Diaspora population controlling the economy of their respective countries? Will the 21st century
Goujain fits with the world’s civilization, as a place where people desire nothing more than a chance to
succeed and enjoy the rewards of their hard labour or as the Chinese wealth and power grows
overshadowing every country including the United States- will China become a threat to the world? An
angry China set out to avenging the past wrongs and forcing others to bend to its will? One can gauge its
outcome and whether it will go along with the world’s civilization or not can be seen in the treatment of
its Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo and its better half Liu Xia similar to what the Burmese Junta
has treated to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Michael Aris. Moreover the setting up of a rival Nobel Prize
(Confucius Prize where according to the Burmese Cartoon by Hanlay, Than Shwe aspired to get one)
clearly indicates that the Chinese wants the world to tow its way. Hence, it seems the peace and prosperity
of the world depends very much on the path China takes and the whole world is getting ready to face it.
Admittedly before 2000, China and US fall out over Taiwan (now a day military experts analysed
that if there come to shooting over Taiwan the US would suffer a disastrous defeat) and the American
deliberately bomb of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the collision of an American EP3 spy plane
with a Chinese fighter, it seems that they are at loggerhead. But at that time the modern Goujain was not
sure and still licking the gall bladder and did not pursue the matter while the American shifted their
attention to Al Qaeda and terrorism.
This suited modern King Goujain that the best way to build a comprehensive national power was
through economic growth and China began to join the international organization which it once shunned
and became a responsible citizen of the world when it led the six party talks designed to curbed North
Korea and signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and stopped the proliferating the rouge Chinese
companies. Moreover it sent peace keeping troops more than any other permanent member of the UNSC
and NATO combined together.
A decade after the new millennium 2011 is different. Very lately it has fallen out with Japan over
a fishing boat and the dispute flare over again over the Sinkaku Island which the Chinese calls Diaoyu
Island (prompting Japan to look again its defence policy). China deliberately refused to condemn North
Korea in the sinking of Cheonan killing 43 South Korean crewmen even though the international panel
condemned it. But when South Korea reacted with the joint military exercise it objected it. Again China
renewed its Spratly Islands dispute with ASEAN countries and at the Hanoi summit meeting, the Chinese
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi spat ―All of you should remember how much your prosperity depends on
us.‖
When the Indian Prime Minister visited Manmohan Singh visited the disputed territory in Tibet
there was a scorching attacked by the People’s Daily the Chinese government mouthpiece. Last year
when I was attending the climatic conference in Copenhagen I saw with my own eyes of a junior Chinese
official wagging his finger at Barrack Obama, the de facto leader of the free world. Worst of all is that
China is the only country in the world that eulogise the sham Burmese elections clearly indicating it
supported the Burmese Junta versus the people of Burma. Such things are small in themselves but it
indicates that modern king Goujain has come for revenge. In other words, the Chinese modern King
Goujain will soon makes its power felt to the rest of the world, now that the men on the Dragon throne are
quite confident to taking the West led by the US.

National Character of the Chinese can be measured in yuán (元) and jiǎo (角),
As China's dealings with Burma suggest, Beijing's new approach to pariah states is inherently
limited. For one thing, China's shifting diplomacy reflects not a fundamental change in its values but a
new perception of its national interests. Its main motivations remain energy security and economic
growth, and Chinese leaders still swear by Deng's 24-character strategy. Beijing paramount aim is
economic by simply devising more sophisticated means to secure them as if to appear some morality in
them. Thus, it should come as little surprise that China has avoided supporting tough penalties against
Tehran and Khartoum or that even though it has removed Sudan from its list of countries with preferential
trading status, few analysts in Beijing believe the move will substantially curb China's activities in that
country. Hu's decision to chill ties with Zimbabwe was an economic calculation: any further investment
there would yield little return while the economic crisis raged and Zimbabwe as defaulting on Chinese
loans.
When it comes to countries on China's periphery, such as North Korea, Burma, or the
Central Asian states, the prospects of regime change unleash deep anxieties in Beijing about being
encircled by new democracies -- and about the United States' ultimate strategic intentions in welcoming
democratization throughout the world. In addition, the shift is not underpinned by the consensus in
Beijing that would be necessary for a more comprehensive change in China's approach to pariah states.
Beijing's moves have been piecemeal, with its top leaders debating in detail the merits of their every
decision. China's old guard still opposes pressuring Sudan or imposing sanctions on Iran, for instance, in
the name of developing-world solidarity. The hard-liners want to support pariah regimes in order to
counterbalance U.S. power. Many Chinese arms and energy companies, and their powerful supporters in
government, frequently oppose a more responsible Chinese foreign policy or try to circumvent the costly
restrictions that come with it. And without an open civil society, a free press, or an independent judiciary
in China, it is exceedingly difficult to hold the Chinese government, the Chinese military or Chinese
companies accountable for their actions Burma. Like Burma, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Zimbabwe
continue to receive arms and ammunition and the dual-use and conventional weapons technologies from
economic and military actors in China. The fiery dragon will continue to set its own agenda, modern king
Goujain has make its presence felt and the world did not seems to realise it.

US and China
In February 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a comprehensive review of
U.S. policy towards Burma which stated that in addition to ongoing U.S. sanctions and support for the
democratic opposition, it would also primarily by the desire to contain Chinese influence in Burma and
the region. China is convinced that it is part of a larger effort to encircle China through security alliances
and a military presence in the South Pacific and Indian Oceans. Washington’s engagement policy has
various implications for Beijing as the possibility of warmer ties between the U.S. and Burma viewed as a
potential threat to Chinese security, in particular its south-western border and access to the Indian Ocean.
It begins in Japan, stretches through nations in the South China Sea to India, and ends in Afghanistan
American policy of continued sanctions on Burma have thrived Chinese business and companies
have now become a threat. China understands the Burmese military Junta’s desire to engage in dialogue
with the U.S. as part of an effort to rid itself of sanctions, receive more development assistance, attract
more foreign investment and build its international legitimacy. It also a means to strengthen its bargaining
position vis-à-vis China and other countries.
While Beijing is aware that the U.S. engagement policy has not achieved its stated objectives so
far, it worries about changes after the elections which could give momentum to the relationship. Given
Western criticism of the elections, Chinese analysts predict that both the Obama administration and the
military regime are likely to wait ―for the dust to settle‖ after the controversial polls before making further
moves. The U.S. administration’s engagement policy – which Beijing sees as a potential challenge to its
influence in the country also contribute to China’s perception that the Junta may be gaining leverage in
the relationship. While increasing its economic presence in the country, Beijing is also stepping up
diplomatic engagement through high-level visits.
Beijing feels that India is ready to take advantage of any chill in Sino-Burma relations to position
its corporations for further investment. Senior General Than Shwe’s state visit to New Delhi from 25-29
July 2010, highlighted deepening bilateral ties, irritated Beijing. Even though weak governance and
widespread corruption in Burma present challenges to Chinese companies, they have not discouraged
investment. Chinese officials and business people see this chaotic economic reality as an opportunity
rather than as a deterrent. Many in the Chinese business community feel that while the lack of market
regulation can pose problems, it also can be a boon that allows them to exploit labour and natural
resources. Bribery is seen as a necessary cost of business. Hence Chinese investment and trade in Burma
is growing dramatically. Beijing could not be fooled by the Burmese Generals saying that they hate the
Chinese, because she holds all the triumph cards.
The Chinese are constructing the Naypyidaw International Airport. Over 2000 kilometres
Kunming- Rangoon railway to be extended to Tavoy’s deep sea port. Renovating the
Stillwell road (Myitkyina to Kunming) and of course the largest joint projects is a pipeline that
will carry natural gas to Kunming from Burmese offshore fields in the Bay of Bengal. And
soon China will construct a railway line along this route, linking Kunming and the Arakan
State deep-sea port of Akyab which all are just billion dollars projects to prove that Burma
was the economic colony of China and there is the possibility that soon Burma will be one of
the autonomous regions of Burma like Tibet.
Rethinking of Our Policy?
In such an international scenario, the Burmese ethno democratic forces led by Daw Aung San Su
Kyi will have to be very wary, wise, far sighted and patient to get away from the path of the fiery dragon
breathing out the flames from its nostrils. Burma’s geographical location of 2185 kilometres common
border with China has a history of vassal of China since the battle of ―Nga Saung Gyan‖ when the
Burmese king Narathihapatae pronounced [nəɹa hapətḛ) was overthrown by the Chinese in 1278. Now
that the Junta Chief Than Shwe has virtually made Burma a dependent of China just to sustain himself in
power even though he tried to forgets that king Hsinbyushin has conquered the Chinese in 1756-69 at the
cost of 70,000 Chinese soldiers and four commanders w&kyfjrefrmppfyJG 中緬戰爭 or 清緬戰爭.
Burma is both a strategically important client and an embarrassment for China. But Beijing has
far more vested interests in Burma, a neighbour, close ally, and home to two plus million Chinese
nationals. In addition to worrying about long-standing problems such as the drug trade, cross-border
crime, and the potential spill over of ethnic insurgencies from Burma, Beijing is hoping to use Burma's
ports and new transport links to India to develop China's poor and landlocked South-western provinces. In
an effort to facilitate the shipment of oil supplies from Africa and the Middle East while bypassing the
energy-supply route that runs through the Strait of Malacca chokepoint, China is constructing a gas and
oil pipeline from western Burma to Yunnan and Sichuan.
Nonetheless, China's patience with the Burmese Junta has been wearing thin recently. For several
years, Beijing encouraged it to undertake Chinese-style economic and political reforms in order to help
the regime consolidate its rule, ensure stability, and regain international acceptability. It supported former
Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, whom it considered a Deng-style reformist -- only to see him ousted in 2004.
As the Burmese regime hardened further, China's confidence in the junta's capacity or willingness to
reform faded. Beijing called on the regime to "listen to the call of its own people and speed up the process
of dialogues and reforms."
Even as China was pushing the Junta to accommodate the demands of the country's ethnic
nationalities groups, it started managing those relationships itself, for example, by convening in Kunming
the leaders of various armed Burmese ethnic groups and pressing them to consider disarming. Chinese
officials also intensified their efforts to reach out to the democratic opposition by hosting its
representatives for meetings in China and sponsored talks between the U.S. government and the Burmese
government in Beijing.
One important way to persuade China to cooperate will be to assuage its fears about the
consequences of change in pariah states like Burma and Iran. The political upheaval or other major crises
in Burma, North Korea, and Sudan would be disastrous to China hence Daw Aung San Suu Kyi should
seek out dialogue with Beijing, both to reassure Beijing about the implications of political transitions and
to enlist its help in facilitating them. Meetings with Burmese opposition groups have played an important
role in helping to moderate the Chinese government's position with respect. Of course, such moves will
require firm support from Hu and the rest of China's top brass. Of all the parties involved in making the
Chinese policy towards Burma, the Chinese Foreign Ministry is generally more supportive of China's
evolving dictatorship diplomacy, even though when Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was released all the
diplomatic circles came to congratulate her except the Chinese ambassador in Rangoon. This is partly
because it cannot its position over the Ministry of Commerce or the military in cooperation with the
Yunnan province.
China has moved from outright obstructionism and a defensive insistence on solidarity with the
developing world to an attempt to balance its material needs with its acknowledged responsibilities as a
major power. Hence our policies towards China should not be construing as an obstacle but rather as a
critical partner giving preference to economics than morality. The writing on the wall is that even though
many Western governments have imposed sanctions on Burma's military regime for its atrocious human-
rights record, a new competition is unfolding in this crossroads nation: regional powers are scrambling for
access to Burma's plentiful natural gas, timber and minerals. For Burma's top brass — who have at their
disposal a 400,000-strong military corps and a record of institutionalized rape, torture and forced labour
— democratic reform would mean not only ceding political supremacy but also surrendering the
opportunity to siphon wealth from ever growing state coffers. Unlike South Africa's apartheid
government when Nelson Mandela was released from prison, Burma's dictatorship is not in its death
throes. If anything, because of burgeoning foreign investment in Burma, especially over the past five
years, the Junta is even more entrenched than a decade ago.

Current Situation and the 2nd Panglong Conference

At the outset of the twenty-first century, the overriding goal of the Burmese Junta is regime
survival. Close and cordial relations with China are a key element of the strategy. The Junta maintains its
grip on power through sheer brute force, and the new generation of military leaders continues to adhere to
the country’s current foreign and domestic policies. As such, the Junta will continue to look to China for
diplomatic protection, economic sustenance and military hardware. China’s action at the UNSC
underscores its continued position as Burma’s most valuable ally. Since the early 1990s, Burma has
viewed China’s veto-power at the UN as its ultimate insurance policy against an East Timor-style
international intervention. Contrary to what many observers believe, however, Burma is neither Beijing’s
puppet nor a pawn in China’s grand strategy in Asia. The Junta is xenophobic, and Rangoon’s foreign
policy actions since the mid-1990s strongly suggest that the ruling military junta has sought to reduce its
dependence on China by reaching out to other countries. Since 2000, this policy—implemented with
varying degrees of success—has only accelerated, with India becoming the primary beneficiary. China is
likely to retain its privileged position in the hierarchy of Burma’s foreign relations in the immediate
future. Nevertheless, in line with its desire to exercise some diplomatic latitude, it seeks to bolster
relations with other regional countries as well. India will figure prominently and there is the possibility of
a major nationalist backlash against China as a result of the Sinicization of upper Burma and the growing
resentment caused by income disparities between impoverished Burmese and Chinese immigrants.
Burma’s sham elections last year present a new challenge to China. Beijing was caught off-guard
by the Junta`s offensive into Kokang in August 2009 that sent more than 30,000 refugees into Yunnan
province and become international media headlines. Since then it has used pressure and mediation to push
Naypyidaw and the ethnic groups that live close to China’s border to the negotiating table. Beijing feels
its interests are being challenged by a changing bilateral balance of power due to the Obama
administration’s engagement policy and China’s increasing energy stakes in the country. It also process
that Burma`s ethnic nationalities are a liability rather than strategic leverage. The Junta’s unsuccessful
attempt to convert the main ceasefire groups into border guard forces under central military command
raised worries Beijing feared that thousands of the refugees flooding into China. While most ethnic
groups appreciate Beijing’s role in pressuring the Burmese regime the ethnic nationalities believe that
China’s support is provisional and driven by its own economic and security interests.
One should remember that Beijing and local Yunnan governments have differing perceptions of
and approaches to border management and the ethnic groups. Beijing prioritises border stability and is
willing to sacrifice certain local commercial interests, while Yunnan values border trade and profits from
its special relationships with ethnic groups. Chinese companies’ resource extraction activities are
fostering strong popular resentment because of their lack of transparency and unequal benefit distribution,
as well as environmental damage and forced displacement of communities.
When early in 2010 UWSA chairman Bao Youxiang, knowing the treachery of the Burmese
Generals refused to meet the Junta`s representatives Beijing intervened and the meeting took place under
the watchful eyes of the Chinese. In addition, at least thirteen rounds of negotiations took place between
the KIO and the regime but unable to break through. Beijing seems to be in favour of ―genuine union‖ in
which the ethnic groups would have autonomy, possibly like the Chinese Special Administrative Regions
(SARs).
China observes a ―Four No’s‖ policy towards border groups: no political recognition; no military
support; no organisational exchanges; no economic aid. Some members of the ethnic groups justify their
drug and other illegal businesses by citing Chinese abandonment. The ethnic believe Chinese involvement
might help prevent the government from reneging on any deal reached, and that China would be the ―best
custodian of a peace process between the ethnic groups and the army.
The Chinese also knew that most Burmese are inclined towards the West. If the situation in
Burma is more stable then Burma won’t need China as much. Burma could then turn to other countries
for help. But for the moment China is the only external actor that has real leverage with the military
regime Beijing’s top concern in Burma is preventing conflict on its border, which could affect China’s
domestic stability and regional economic development. While China sees problems with the long-term
standoff between the Junta and many of the country’s ethnic groups, its preferred approach to solve the
situation is gradual policy adjustment by a strong central government on the basis of internal stability, not
liberal democracy or federalism and certainly not regime change.
It has subsequently invested considerable diplomatic resources to facilitate negotiations between
the military government and the ethnic groups. The Kokang conflict also deepened differences between
Beijing and local Yunnan governments. The capital now seeks to manage relations with the border ethnic
groups more directly, by dispatching its own officials. Continued illegal cross border trade by Yunnan
companies and government officials also heightens tensions with Beijing. China’s growing demand for
energy supplies is making Burma increasingly important as a conduit for Tran’s shipment of oil and a
source of natural gas. Chinese companies are also expanding rapidly into Burma’s hydropower sector.
These investments, along with many projects are increasing resentment of China in Burma, due to
unequal distribution of benefits, environmental damage and harmful impacts on local communities and
traditional ways of life. If China does not act to limit the negative impact of its companies in Burma, it
risks increasing tensions in ethnic group areas and possible violent backlash, all of which would
undermine its economic and security interests.
The 2nd Panglong Conference is very crucial for the long term peace of Burma because only real
democracy and genuine federalism can propel Burma into the family of civilized nations now as modern
king Goujain is set to rule the world, the ethno-democratic forces of Burma should solicit the support of
the Chinese no matter what they may be. The vision of the founding of modern Burma Bogyoke Aung
San’s will have to be carried on by his loving daughter Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and she needs, young
intelligentsia and capable persons to help guide the country to achieve its goal or otherwise the cruel
Generals would wreck the country and be a Chinese colony but in name..