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and
and a member of Amalgamated Transit Union Local No. 1164 (the "Union").
required to work on the upcoming Labor Day holiday (CBA § 18, ¶ 1),
who had drawn up the Labor Day work assignments. Mr. Lambert spent
job assignments are offered on a seniority basis; to the extent not enough people
volunteer, openings are filled on the basis of reverse seniority. Mr. Lambert
explained also how employees with less seniority than Grievant might not be
required to work Labor Day; for example, if Monday were their regular day off.
extra board (CBA § 15) for Labor Day, which he felt afforded him the best
chance of finishing work early. Grievant worked Friday, August 30, 1991, his
assignment for the day. He spoke with Maynard Tindell, the morning
dispatcher, who informed Grievant that he had been assigned a 9:55 a.m. run. A
few hours later, Grievant called back and told Mr. Tindell, "Just mark me off
sick today" (CBA § 12, ¶ 18). Grievant did not report for work on Labor Day,
and did not call in before 4:00 p.m. as required (CBA § 12, ¶ 19).
Grievant reported to work the following day, September 3, 1991, for his
regular run, only to learn that it had been reassigned because he had not called in
before 4:00 p.m. the previous day. Grievant then went to his doctor, who made
9/3/91 He may return to work 9/3-4, by D.B. He had a stomach virus and
was out 9/2.
that he had not received either holiday pay or sick pay for September 2nd or 3rd,
1991. He filed a grievance on September 19, 1991 (EX 2), which was denied on
September 25, 1991 (EX 3). This arbitration ensued, pursuant to § 5 of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement for the term July 1, 1991 through June 30,
1994 ("CBA" or EX 1).
Grievant insists (EX 2) that he complied with CBA § 12, ¶ 18, which
states:
Grievant claims that the Company violated CBA § 24, ¶ 2,1 which states:
Sick Leave shall be effective on the second (2nd) scheduled work day,
first (1st) day if confined to a hospital, or scheduled for approved
outpatient surgery in lieu of hospitalization, and shall be paid after the
first (8) hours of lost time. A doctor's certificate must be furnished as
proof of illness. Employees must see a doctor within three (3) days of
their illness.
(a) Do not work their last scheduled work day preceding the observed
1
In Exhibit 2, the Grievance Report, Grievant refers to "Sec. 25 Par 2", but there is no such provision in the CBA;
the Company makes the same mistake in its response (EX 3). I assume that the correct reference is § 24, ¶ 2,
which is set forth in the text of the opinion. See Lambert testimony.
holiday AND their first scheduled work day following the observed
holiday and the holiday, if scheduled to work, unless they have been
excused for illness or injury.
Discussion
Grievant seeks holiday pay (CBA § 18) for 9/2/91 and sick pay (CBA §
24) for 9/3/91. It is undisputed that Grievant worked 8/30/91, the last scheduled
work day preceding the Labor Day holiday; that he was scheduled to work
Labor Day, 9/2/91; that he called in sick 9/2/91 and did not work; that he failed
to call in by 4:00 p.m. Labor Day, in accordance with CBA § 12, ¶ 19; and that
he did not work 9/3/91, because his run had been assigned to another operator.
Under the plain language of CBA § 18, ¶ 8(a), Grievant is entitled to holiday
pay only if he was sick on both 9/2/91, the holiday itself, and 9/3/91, the first
There is insufficient evidence that Grievant was sick and unable to work
9/2/91. Grievant's medical chart (EX 4) confirms the fact that his illness
occurred on 9/2/91. Regardless of when the chart actually may have been
prepared, it is clear that it refers to the state of his health on 9/3/91, the date on
which he was examined by the doctor ("this morning", "today"). The thrust of
Grievant's complaint to the doctor was that Grievant had been ill on 9/2/91
("yesterday").
supervisors and, indeed, with Grievant's own assessment of his health on 9/3/91.
Company supervisors. He seemed surprised and annoyed that they did not
expect him to be there. He made no mention of any plans to see a doctor. Seeing
indicates that Grievant was ready, willing, and able to work on 9/3/91. He was
not permitted to do so only because he had not called in, as required by the
CBA.
the Company was justified in not permitting him to work on 9/3/91. This being
the case, it is unnecessary to decide whether Grievant was in fact ill on Labor
Day itself. Regardless of the state of his health on Labor Day, he is not entitled
to sick pay, because entitlement would not begin until the second day of illness
(CBA § 24, ¶ 2). Even if Grievant were sick Labor Day, he nevertheless
violated CBA § 12, ¶ 19 by failing to call in and so properly was not permitted
to work 9/3/91 and equally properly was denied holiday pay, pursuant to CBA §
18, ¶ 8(a). If Grievant was not ill on Labor Day, nothing further need be said.
Award
At the hearing, the parties stipulated that this is not a disciplinary action
by the Company but rather a denial of benefits under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (cf. CBA, § 24, ¶ 6). In this situation, the Union concedes having the
burden of proof. I conclude that the Union has failed to carry its burden.
the Company's action was unreasonable on the basis of the evidence before it,2
result is the same. There is simply insufficient evidence that Grievant was so ill
as to be unable to work on Tuesday, September 3, 1991. For this and all the
2
"[I]n George Kraft Co., 71 LA 222 (Spritzer, 1978), the arbitrator ruled that in determining whether an
employee violated a contract rule by refusing to perform required overtime work, the employer does not bear the
burden of proving just cause after it has demonstrated that a legitimate company rule containing a discharge
penalty was violated, subject, however, to the union's right to demonstrate that the rules were improperly applied
or, given special circumstances, that the penalty was unreasonable." Hill & Sinicropi, Evidence in Arbitration
(BNA 1987), at 43.
3
Hill & Sinicropi, Evidence in Arbitration (BNA 1987), at 39-40.