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an-stability
Abyei Solution Key to South Sudan Stability
Disputed area of southern Sudan remains a potential flashpoint– but not because of
its oil resources.
By Blake Evans - Pritchard - International Justice - ICC
ACR Issue 285,
13 Jan 11
With South Sudan heading rapidly towards independence, now is the time to start
talking seriously about Abyei, because until something is done about this contes
ted region peace cannot be guaranteed.
Abyei, a fairly small strip of land in the centre of the country, has been an in
tegral part of the north-south civil war, partially because of its strategic pos
ition but also because of the vast reserves of oil that have been extracted from
under its surface.
In recent years, though, Abyei’s oil-production has significantly declined, and po
rtraying it as a vital oil-producing region is no longer accurate.
This is a crucial point. In the past, the question of oil wealth has dominated d
iscussions to find a lasting solution to Abyei. Now, any future settlement must
address the grievances of the individual tribes, which so far has not been adequ
ately done.
In 2003, when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, CPA, was signed, Abyei accounte
d for a quarter of the country’s total oil production (69,303 barrels per day), ac
cording to figures published by the International Crisis Group, ICG, although th
e opacity of the oil industry in Sudan means that data is not always reliable.
Six years on, Abyei almost certainly accounts for a much smaller amount of the c
ountry’s overall oil wealth.
This is partly because production in Abyei has declined – oil experts say that ext
raction peaked a few years ago – but also because other oil fields have since open
ed up across the south.
Moreover, in 2009, a landmark ruling from the Permanent Court of Arbitration, PC
A, redrew Abyei’s borders so that the two largest oil fields – Heglig and Bamboo – fel
l within territory belonging to the north.
The only major oil field that still remains within Abyei is Diffra, which, accor
ding to figures from ICG, produces just 4,000 barrels of oil per day. This is le
ss than one per cent of the nearly 500,000 barrels that Sudan as a whole produce
s each day. Even taken with other oil-producing facilities in the region, the to
tal value of Abyei’s oil worth is less than 5 per cent of the country’s total.
But, despite the dwindling importance of Abyei as an oil-producing region, both
Khartoum and Juba remain determined to hold on to this small strip of land.
The reason is that both sides are under pressure from tribal communities that fe
el they will be marginalised if the region joins part of the country to which th
ey do not belong.
Abeyi is dominated by two main ethnic groups: the Ngok Dinka in the south and th
e Misseriya Arabs in the north. Neither Khartoum nor Juba wishes to alienate the
se relatively large tribes, and so they both maintain an interest in the region.
The Misseriya, predominantly Muslim, cattle-herders, whose survival depends upon
being able to lead their herds down to the grazing pastures of the south during
the summer months. Misseriya fear that should Abyei end up with the south, they
will lose access to these lands.
Meanwhile, the Ngok Dinka, who are Christians and Animists, are worried that if
they join the north, Khartoum will cause them problems. President Omar al-Bashir
has already said that if the south secedes, he intends to impose Islamic sharia
law on anyone living in the north.
At the moment, the CPA, which expires later this year, exempts non-northerners f
rom sharia.
A solution to the Abyei question will not be easy. This is all the more reason f
or stepping up efforts to find one.
There are signs that northern and southern leaders are now prepared to take the
problem seriously.
Following a recent spate of killings in the region, both Khartoum and Juba sent
high-level delegations to talk to tribal leaders in Abyei and assess how further
clashes could be avoided.
What is needed for the region is a solution that brings the two tribes together,
offering them a way to peacefully coexist and share resources as they did in th
e past.
One solution was floated by Khartoum just before Christmas: that Abyei belongs t
o both north and south, with government jobs distributed equally between the Ngo
k Dinka and the Misseriya. Any oil wealth would be shared equally between Kharto
um and Juba, with a portion going to local communities.
This is certainly an enticing compromise, and, if it could be made to work, woul
d help overcome the senseless bickering between the north and the south over Aby
ei. It would also deter either side from using tribal rivalries to stoke tension
s, as they have done in the past.
But such a solution also requires strong political will from both sides, somethi
ng that has been lacking in previous north-south agreements.
So far, the referendum in South Sudan has been a success – efficiently run and wit
h little sign of the trouble that some commentators had been predicting.
But any jubilation that comes from bringing Sudan’s uneasy unity peacefully to an
end will be tempered by the fear that, in the centre of the country, there is st
ill a spark smouldering.
Blake Evans-Pritchard is IWPR’s Africa Editor.
The views expressed in this article are not necessarily the views of IWPR.