OTH 94431

~~

HSE

Health & Safety Executive

PIPELINE LEAK DETECTION STUDY

Prepared by Bechtel Limited for the Health and Safety Executive

•

*".-

Health and Safety Executive

OTH 94431

PIPELINE LEAK DETECTION STUDY

Authors

M Stafford and N Williams

Bechtel Limited POBox 739

245 Hammersmith Road London W68DP

HSEBOOKS

Health and Safety Executive - Offshore Technology Report

© Crown copyright 1996

Applications for reproduction should be made to HMSO First published 1996

ISBN 0-7176-1167-1

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise) without the prior written permission of the copyright owner.

This report is published by the Health and Safety Executive as part of a series of reports of work which has been supported by funds provided by the Executive. Neitherthe Executive, or the contractors concerned assume any liability for the report nor do they necessarily reflect the views or policy of the Executive.

Results, including detailed evaluation and, where relevant, recommendations stemming from their research projects arc published in the om series of reports.

Background information and data arising from theseresearch projects are published in the 011 series of reports.

SUMMARY

The aim of this report is to review current and emerging methods of detecting leaks in pipelines. in order to determine best practices in use today, and those with best promise.

Features of different commercial leak detection systems arc first examined, and the relative sensitivity of leak detection discussed both in terms of size of leak and how well leak detection works in practice. It is found that despite voluminous literature on the subject. general operational experience does not uniformly endorse anyone technology - indeed very few experiences are comparable across pipelines.

Different countries legislate for pipeline integrity monitoring in different ways: in the USA regulatory requirements for leak detection are most stringent. The relative responsibilities of operating company and suppliers are also examined.

In considering the emerging technologies, no new breakthrough leak detection techniques are apparent, other than those associated with the ever-growing performance/price indices for optic fibres, which favour integrity monitoring external to the pipeline. For methods based on internal pipeline measurements, several techniques compete. but improvements in low cost metering will in all cases lead to better leak performance.

The major conclusion is that automatic leak detection is heavily dependent on leak size, and that reasonable expectations of performance may fall short of operational or supplier claims. However, better understanding of the products can lead to improved statement of requirements, e.g. for acceptance testing. Pipelines can be designed with leak detection in mind, and hence with the ability to create (and contain) artificial leaks for periodic exercises of performance.

The technology is not yet mature: leak detection algorithms are not yet in the public domain. and the choice of leak detection methods is often subjective. However there remain certain factors and guidelines to take into account in selecting a leak detection system. These are assembled within the concluding section of the report, which has drawn its material from a wide variety of sources.

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CONTENTS

Page

SUMMARY •••.•••••.••••••••••.••••••••••.•••..•••.•••••.••••.•••••••..•••.•••••••••..••••••••••••••.•••••••.••••.•••.••••••••.••• iii

1. INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 Project Objective , I

1.2 Origins and Authorship 1

1.3 Scope of Work I

1.4 Format of Report I

2. CLASSIFICATION OF SYSTEMS 2

2.1 Introduction 2

2.2 Description of Leak Detection Methods 6

3. SENSITIVITY AND:RESPONSE 19

3.1 Introduction " 19

3.2 Factors Affecting Performance 19

3.3 Sensitivity Studies 20

3.4 Theoretical Limits to Leak Detectability [Ref. 1 4. 36J 22

3.5 Instrumentation for Real Time Pipeline Modelling [Ref.15J 24

3.6 Operational Experience 27

3.7 Key Items on Sensitivity 29

3.8 Performance Ratings 29

4. REGULATIONS. LEGISLATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES 34

4.1 Introduction 34

4.2 Regulatory References 34

4.3 Performance Responsibilities 35

5. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 39

5.1 General 39

5.2 Directions in Emerging Technology 39

6. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 43

6.1 Published Data , 43

6.2 Leak Statistics 43

6.3 Model-assisted Leak Detection 43

7. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES 46

7.1 Conclusions 46

7.2 Recommended Guidelines 48

APPENDIX A - LDS SPECIALISTS & CENTRES 49

APPENDIX B - REFERENCES 53

iii

iv

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 PROJECT OBJECTIVE

The ultimate objective of this report is the identification of perceived befit possible practices in the field of pipeline leak: detection systems (LDS) and of methods and techniques on which further R&D would be justified. The impetus for such identification is a concern essentially for rapid detection of leaks of a hazardous or environmentally damaging nature in both onshore and offshore pipelines.

1.2 ORIGINS AND AUTHORSHIP

The work by the authors, Bechtel Limited, was initiated by Offshore Safety Division of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and supervised by the Marine Technology Support Unit (MaTSU) of ABA Technology at Culham Laboratory.

1.3 SCOPE OF WORK

The authors were directed by HSE towards a scope of work incorporating the following general tasks:-

A survey of all the various leak detection techniques available for use offshore and onshore, including:-

in-use techniques

- development prospects

- emerging and new technology

The major sub-tasks of assessing all the above techniques in terms of:sensitivity

accuracy

reliability

- practicality

- continuous monitoring features

inherent limitations in various duties and environments

A rational assessment, based upon the data and opinions gathered, leading to the identification of perceived best possible practices including proposals for performance criteria which could be used 38 guidelines appropriate to present legislation.

1.4 FORMAT OF REPORT

This report is presented as an arm's length assessment of available, prominent technology from sources selected also only on obvious merit. With these considerations and in response to the scope of work established by HSE this document reports on the following topics:-

LDS Specialists and Centres

• Classification of Leak Detection Methods

• Instrumentation EII'Ol'S and Sensitivities

• Development Prospects

• Regulatory Considerations and Legislation

• Best Possible Practices

1

2. CLASSIFICATION OF SYSTEMS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In this section the overall approach to leak: detection is discussed and a number of leak: detection methods classified. The objective is to cover all practical methods employed today, to explain the essential difference between the methods, before discussing in the next section their relative performance and effectiveness.

Leak detection methods are broadly classified in terms of internal and external monitoring methods: internal methods involving intrusive measurements to monitor fluid state, and external methods applied to the environmental condition of a pipe.

The focus of attention is on continuous monitoring methods rather than intennittent monitoring in order to address concerns for full pipeline integrity.

Section 2.2 describes a number of continuous monitoring methods for which field performance data are available. Section 2.1 comments generally on the principal parameters involved in pipeline operation and current views on leak patterns with attendant physical characteristics.

2.1.1 Pipeline operation

Pipelines are designed and engineered for full load operations assuming steady state flow conditions. Operational parameters will range from MAOP (maximum allowable operating pressure) in exceptional circumstances to a degassed or depressurized state corresponding to a no-flow situation. Normal pipeline operations may involve day-to-day transients such as pump start/stop operations, the operation of control valving and changes in delivery rates. Internal leak: detection systems must therefore operate over a wide range of process conditions, some of which may appear to have the characteristics of leak patterns.

The basic problem is to distinguish between the normal operational transients and the occurrence of non-typical process conditions that would indicate a leak. Whereas steady state can be achieved for many pipeline operations, in general it is assumed that most pipelines undergo continual transient changes. In addition, hydraulic noise and instrument noise are characteristic of normal operation, forming a background base threshold to discrimination of any unusual event.

This study is concerned with single phase flow, primarily of oil, gas and ethylene.

2.1.2 Pipeline configurations

Leak detection methods are normally considered for both onshore and offshore trunk lines which have a single dispatch and terminal point. Radial networks or trunk configurations with cross-connections will contain a number of branches which cannot be metered as isolated elements without special provision.

The application of a leak monitoring system to a particular pipeline will depend on environmental issues, regulatory imperatives and operating company loss prevention and safety policy rather than pipe size and configuration.

2.1.3 Pipeline fluid characteristics

These refer to fluid parameters that affect internal detection methods.

Viscosity

Viscosity is dependent on temperature and determines the relationship between flow rate and frictional losses.

Liquids are more viscous than gases and frictional resistance to flow rate is generally dominated by viscosity and temperature considerations in liquid flow applications more so than in gas applications. Pipeline roughness would be a more relevant parameter in gas applications because of the different Reynolds numbers at which gas and liquids typically operate.

2

Compressibility

Gas compressibility measures the deviation of a real gas from ideal g88 behaviour in regard to inter-molecular forces, elasticity and volume occupancy. Compressibility determines the rate at which pressure disturbances can propagate in gas and liquids. Wave speeds in liquids are of the order 5 times those in gas.

2.1.4 Pipeline mechanical characteristics

The following mechanical parameters have a first order impact on the performance of internal leak. detection systems performance:

pipe internal roughness pipe diameter and length pipe diameter changes

pipe restrictions (e.g. valves)

ambient temperature variations. soil consistency. river crossings pipe bends and curvature,

2.1.6 Leak patterns and applicable detection techniques

To illustrate the relationship of leak size to flow. some typical figures are given in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1

Leak rate In tons/tu as function of hole size

Hole Size Pressure
liz" I" 2" 3" (Bam)
Ethylene 25 70 260 620 80
NGL 14 40 140 330 65
Crude Oil 18 48 180 430 25
Water 15 40 150 360 15
Gas 5 25 90 200 70 The characteristic of a leak is that the pressure profile in the pipeline becomes distorted. The flow rate ClUVe plotted against distance exhibits a step discontinuity whereas the pressure profile exhibits a cusp. The pressure and flow profiles shown in Figure 2.1 illustrate. in accentuated form, the development of a leak.

These pressure and flow variations can be sensed to indicate that a significant event has occurred. The efficiency of a leak detection system in recognizing a leak, locating it and estimating the size of a leak is dependent upon factors such 88:-

location of sensors accuracy of sensors size of leak

The development of the leak is shown in the pressure and flow profiles at successive time intervals (Figure 2.1). At any point along the pipeline, the pressure falls.

The onset of a leak in a pipe or containment vessel under pressure fa1ls into 2 broad categories:

3

Slow (e.g. Seepage)

This can occur over a period of time consistent with corrosion rates at weld points and pipeline fittings such as valves, strainers. The seepage rate would be expected to grow from pinhole size over a period of time without significant manifestation in pipe flow conditions. The fault line may eventually yield under plastic strain and create a sudden rupture. Acoustic noise also accompanies the seepage.

Sudden (e.g. pinhole to significant crack or rupture)

The traditional leak is characterized by sudden changes in pipeline flowing conditions at the leak site. The detection of the shock wave generated in the fluid medium at the moment of rupture and then propagated as a short lived transient at acoustic velocities can indicate that a leak has occurred. The size of the pressure wave depends on the magnitude ofthe leak. The negative pressure wave travelling away from the leak site is reflected at each end of the pipe.

Most leaks occur as a result of the operational transient reaching a weakened (eg, corroded) section of the pipe and fall into the "sudden" category.

2.1.6 LIst of leak detection methods

The methods of leak detection studied are as follows:

•

Mass Balance

Rate of change

Pressure Point Analysis Wave Alert SCADA-Based Systems

Dynamic Volume Balance (transient model) Pressure/Flow Deviations (transient model) Acoustic Emission Systems

• Chemical Based Systems

•

•

•

•

Discrete chemical sensors

Distributed chemical sensors Chemical-sensor-tube-basedsystems

• Temperature Profile

Fibre Optic Sensing Technologies. Neural Networks

Radioactive Tracing

• Intelligent Pigging

• Miscellaneous methods

Some of these methods are similar, for instance Pressure Point Analysis and Wave Alert methods are negative pressure wave techniques and differ essentiallyonly in the sensor techniques applied. Similarly, the temperature profile technique is currently a fibre optic technique where changes in temperature along the outside of a pipeline are sensed directly by the optic fibre cable. Other developments involving multi-sensors (e.g., gas detectors) distributed along the pipeline can be regarded as speculative on grounds of cost.

4

100,---------------------- --,

PRESSURE PROFILE

.c

-

~ Steady State Profile time = 0 _______

I ~r_----------------------~~::::::::::============i

I ~

u,

60

Steady State Profile time'" 0 time = 16 minutes

time = 1 hour

t1me=2 hours

Pipeline Length - Kilometres

FLOW PROFILE

ao·~-----------------------------;

-----

Steady State Profile time = 2 hours

ro+---~-~-~--~-~--~.-~-~--~-~---r-~

120

o

eo

240

160

200

Pipeline Length - Kilometres

Figure 2.1 Development of 8 leak over time

5

2.2 DESCRIPTION OF LEAK DETECTION METHODS

The following is a summary description of the methods listed in 2.1.7. above.

2.2.1 Mass balance [Ref. 1 , 3 and 32]

Mass balance (and volume balance) are in effect the same technique, relying on the principle of conservation of mass. For each pipe section the principle states that a fluid that enters the pipe section either remains in the pipe section or leaves the pipe section.

For a nonnal cylindrical pipeline the flow entering and leaving the pipe can be metered. The mass of fluid in the pipe section can be estimated from the pipe dimensions and measurement of state variables such as pressure and temperature,

A leak is identified when less fluid leaves the pipe than is expected from the measurements of input flow and estimates of the pipe contents.

The technique is relatively simple to understand and is probably the most widespread technique currently in use. The above description can be readily generalised to pipeline networks, 01' linear pipes with take-offs.

Sensors

The sensors required for this technique can be categorised as flow, pressure and temperature. Flow meters are required at all inlets and outlets for the pipeline. Custody metering, i.e., the metering of flow necessary as the fluid passes from one operator's domain to another, thus serves a double purpose. Pressure and temperature sensors are required. Ideally these sensors should be distributed along the length of the pipe. In addition, density must be known accurately in order to calculate the line pack.

Performance

The sensitivity of the mass balance technique depends on the accuracy of the estimate of pipe contents. The accuracy can be increased by considering the flow into and out of the pipe section over a long enough time period. when the mass that has flowed in and out of the pipeline will be very large compared to the mass resident in the pipe. Over a long enough time period detection is limited only by the accuracy of the flow instrumentation.

Generally, the method can detect small leaks (over a long time) assuming steady state line conditions. A wide range of flow variations can be accommodated without masking the leak detection process and pipeline transients are normally filtered out by long term averaging. The main drawback with all mass balance schemes, however, is their inability to locate a leak. Once a leak is indicated other methods would be needed to pinpoint it.

2.2.2 Rate of change methods [Ref.3]

In this system a mechanical or electronic instrument sensitive to pressure rates of change 01' sudden changes in flow rate is placed at the end of a pipe. The system is designed to detect the sudden change in pressure andlol' flow rate that would arise in rupture situations.

Where pressure rate of change monitors are used then this method is essentially a Pressure Point Analysis system without the statistical software package 01' a single point Wavealert system (both described later). The main drawback in all pressure rate of change systems is the loss of signal definition due to background events and noise. (The Wavealert system provides a partial solution to this problem.)

Rate of change of flow schemes are more discriminative because of the inertial effects of fluids which tend to dampen out fluctuations. A sudden change in flow rate due to a leak occurrence will propagate as a wave at acoustic velocity and quickly settle down to a new steady state position.

Rate of change systems can estimate leak size but cannot locate a leak. (insufficient signal intelligence from one monitor only).

The effectiveness of these systems depends on line length and, crucially, where the leak occurs (maximum response and sensitivity when the leak is at the downstream end of the pipe close to the monitor). A rate of change system needs to be tuned to the host pipeline

6

so that suitable thresholds can be set for sensitivity. The major problem in this method is the false alann rate.

2.2.3 Pressure point analysis (PPA)

The pressure point-analysis leak detection method [Ref. 4] is based upon the statistical properties of a series of pressure or velocity pipeline measurements at one point being different before and after a leak occurs. The PPA method detects leaks by monitoring pipeline pressure at a single point along the line and comparing it against a running statistical trend constructed from previous pressure measurements. The combination of selective filtering and software thresholds determines if the behaviour of successive measurements contains evidence of a leak.

Normally, a number of transient model runs are needed to tune a PPA system for leaks of various magnitudes and character in a target pipeline.

Physical Processes

Following the negative pressure wave, there is a general loss of pressure in the pipeline. Additional to these short term and long term effects, there will be operational transients.

Performance

The mechanism depends on tuning of the pressure signal so as to produce statistical meIUIUJ"es of the pressure history at a particular point. Several such filters are applied - the discriminating thresholds are applied to the output of one or more of these filters,

There is a potential problem in dealing with normal transient operations, as opposed to quasi- steady state pipeline operations. The claims for PPA in the literature are extensive.

2.2.4 Wave alert system (Ref.9]

This system is designed to detect the negative pressure wave produced by a rupture in the pipe. The pressure wave travels away from the leak in both directions at acoustic velocity. Wave speed and the distance between detector stations sets the response time of the system, A leak is located by the relative arrival time of the wave at each detector station which are linked via land-lines, telephone wires or other telemetry systems. The system calculates the location of the leak by using the known velocity of sound in the pipeline fluid, which is continuously measured by the system itself. The size of leak can be estimated from the amplitude of the received pressure wave together with the known attenuation characteristics of the pipeline.

The feature that distinguishes the Wavealert system from other pressure-monitoring devices is the capability to make the system "directional". The detector stations at either end of the pipeline are only sensitive to negative pressure waves which originate in the length of pipeline between the stations. This is called the "protected" length of pipeline. Negative pressure waves which result from normal operational changes, such as pump startup and shutdown, valve operations, flow changes, relief valves, etc., arrive at the detector station from outside the "protected" length of pipeline, i.e, in the "reverse" direction. and are ignored.

The Wavealert system uses dynamic pressure transducers which are not sensitive to slow changes in static pressure. A leak must occur rapidly (typically over a few seconds) to be detected. The sensor will detect a leak only at the time at which it occurs and will not, for example, detect an existing steady-state leak. The system is only sensitive to pressure rate of change.

Since the transient pressure-wave amplitude decays exponential1y with distance, the detection sensitivity is a function of distance and pipeline pressure. For long pipelines over land, detector stations can be placed at intervals along the pipeline (e.g. at valve stations) to achieve the required sensitivity along the whole length.

A simplified diagram of a typical Wavealert installation is shown in Fig. 2.3. In a 'directional' system two dynamic pressure transducers are spaced a distance apart on the

_ pipeline, with the signal from the 'N transducer delayed electrically by a time exactly equal to the flight time of pressure waves travelling between the 'A' and 'B' transducers. The 'B'

7

transducer signal and the delayed signal from the 'A' transducer are subtracted from one another which means that a pressure transient arriving from outside the protected length of pipeline results in identical signals at the input of the subtracter which completely cancels any such transients. The system is still sensitive to any "leak" produced pressure transient, which will arrive at the 'B' transducer fi.mt and produce an immediate output from the subtracter which produces a "leak" alarm if this output is above a preset threshold value.

Theoretically, this system should achieve better sensitivity than simple pressure-monitoring techniques since the directional nature of the detection method allows a lower threshold value to be used, without incurring the penalty of an increased false-alarm rate. In actual installations, the improvement factor achieved due to the cancellation technique can be as high as 100:1. The system can be applied to both gas and liquid pipelines and is applicable to all products, provided that two-phase flow does not occur in the pipeline which could cause slugs of liquid and prevent the passage of pressure waves down the pipeline by virtue of reflections from the gasJJiquid interfaces. The system provides a fast response following the leak occurrence, which is determined by the flight-time along the length of the pipeline, and the system is capable of indicating leak size and location to the pipeline operator immediately, to enable him to take appropriate action.

2.2.5 SCADA-based systems

The supervisory controls and data acquisition (SCADA) systems monitor the pipeline at every block valve site and collect pipeline data over the entire pipeline length, including metering stations at the end.

The data give the operator an instantaneous (or real-time) view on pipeline conditions. The data collected can also be utilized for leak detection, usually within a dedicated computer connected to the SCADA computer.

This technique attempts to mathematically model the one-dimensional hydraulic behaviour of the pipeline. Mathematically, this is an initial-boundaty value problem which is completely defined by boundary conditions taken from sampled measurements of pipeline pressure, flow and temperature. Given pressure and flow at the pipeline inlet the equations will solve for outlet pressure and flow. Leaks are determined as discrepancies between predicted and measured values.

The hydraulic equations are based on the conservation laws of mass, momentum and energy plus an equation of state relating fluid density to pressure and temperature.

The conservation laws are described by non-steady partial differential equations in which the hydraulic parameters of pressure, temperature and flow are functions of time and distance along the pipe. These equations are solved by a variety of computational techniques. The alternative methods currently in use in commercial software packages include:

• Finite Difference

• Finite Element

• Method of Characteristics

• Frequency Response/Spatial Discretisation

2.2.6.1 Pressure deviations [Ref. 14 and 27J

This system is based on a comparison between modelled and measured pressures at the downstream end of a pipeline segment, When the model is tuned there should be no difference between modelled and measured pressures. When a leak develops, the flow upstream of the leak is increased causing a larger pressure drop. Downstream of the leak. the flow remains the same as that seen by the model leaving the pressure gradient unchanged. The result is a deviation between the modelled and measured pressure at the downstream end of the pipeline. When this deviation exceeds a threshold value, a leak is declared.

Pressure deviations are difficult to interpret since the magnitude of the discrepancies are dependent on leak size, length of the pipeline segment being monitored, flow conditions in the pipeline and the leak location (leaks that occur closet to the upstream end produce smaller signals).

Because of these factors, a single deviation alarm is usually not allowed to declare a leak. The alarm is generated only when a deviation event occurs in conjunction with some other deviation alarm.

8

Pressure Difference Meter

Check Valve: Bypass for Positive Pressure Surges

A B

~--l I- ~-_..l--.I\

Throttle

Fluid Buffer

Pipeline

The pressure in chamber A equals the pipeline pressure at the meter location.

Figure 2.3

Negative pressure wave sensor

9

2.2.6.2

Flow devlBtlons [Ref.6, 33J

Measured pipeline pressures are used to force the hydraulic equations to match the pipeline pml8UI'6 profile at the measured points.

A leak will cause a flow deviation at the upstream end of the pipe. As the leak develops, the upstream measured flow will diverge (in the positive direction) from the modelled flow. When the transient caused by the leak has fully propagated to the upstream end, the difference will be the leak size. Once again. when the difference between measured and modelled flows exceeds a threshold, a leak is declared.

2.2.5.3

"Voting" schemes

A leak should cause several deviation alarms. In a simple pipe segment, a leak should cause a pressure alarm downstream and a flow alarm upstream. Depending on where the leak occurs and how long the leak has had to develop, a leak deviation mayor may not be alarmed. Schemes are devised whereby each leak declaration "votes" to declare a leak alarm to the user.

An alarm is declared whenever enough votes are collected. Voting schemes may be simple or complex and are used to eliminate false alarms,

2.2.5.4

Leak location

Solutions of the hydraulic equations vary in the way boundary values are applied and in the numerical procedures adopted to integrate the differential equations of flow. By and large these are public domain techniques available in classical literature.

All Real Time models use SCADA measurements to update pipeline inventory and deviations in the mass balance equation are still used as a primary or secondary source of leak: indication. As with conventional mass balance procedures (see 2.2.1 above) these calculations provide no information to locate a leak.

Proprietary differences between Real Time model vendors arise in the area of leak location and three basic algorithms tend to predominate.

• Least squares fit of pressure profile once a leak is indicated either by an identifiable pattern of flow discrepancies or deviations above mass balance thresholds then a leak location search is started in an offline model. A leak is imposed in the offline model and the resulting pressure profile is checked against SCADA measurements. A least squares best fit approach is used to select the most likely leak location.

• Gradient intersection [Ref.IS]

When a leak is indicated a pseudo-steady state profile is calculated in the forward direction using pipe inlet conditions and in the reverse direction using pipe outlet conditions. A leak is located at the intersection of the hydraulic gradient lines. This method in particular relies on the expectation that a leak disturbance settles out eventually to a new steady state position. (See Figure 2.2).

• Flow discrepancy distribution [Ref.33]

SCADA pressure measurements along the length of the pipe hold the Real Time model in "lock-step" [Ref.5J with the pipe pressure profile, A leak will generate flow deviations between model pipe section sharing a pressure boundary and the resultant distribution of flow discrepancies indicates the position of the leak. Leak size estimates can be derived from the magnitude of flow discrepancies.

Sensors

Real Time models require the same measurements as the mass balance method:

• Flow at all inlets and outlets

State variables (pressures and temperature) at all inlets and outlets.

Pipeline measurements that are not used to solve the hydraulic equations form a redundant set which can be used to identifY and reject faulty instrument readings. Furthermore many of the models use "state estimators" in a attempt to increase instrument signal to noise ratios.

10

Hydraulic gradient calculated from inlet measurements

Hydraulic gradient calculated from outlet measurements

Location of leak

Piping Inlet

Distance

Piping Outlet

Figure 2.2

Use of hydraulic gradient In locating leak

11

Per10rmance

Leak detection sensitivity can be several times better than the comparable figures for the mass balance method but leak location is unlikely to be much better than + 5% of pipeline length. "Transient" flow models have traditionally struggled in two-phase flow applications where one phase can change to another under operational conditions.

2.2.6 Acoustic emission [Ref.3]

Physical Process

Turbulent velocity fluctuations are a cause of sound excitation. If the fluid escaping through a hole in a pipe wall creates different turbulent characteristics from the ambient conditions the corresponding sound generated can be used as a means of leak detection and location.

The intensity of emitted sound is proportional to the eighth power of the turbulent flow velocity and increases strongly with increasing pressure. The relationship between the emitted sound and pressure is not simple and several different empirical relationships have been reported in the literature.

For nearly all subsea oil and gas pipelines the operational flow regimes are highly turbulent. For leaks from pressurised subsea gas pipelines it can be safely assumed the leak will act asa sound source. However for static heavy oil lines it is possible that the leak will not act as a sound source.

The presence of a leak is manifested by an increased noise level. There are many potential reasons for an increased noise level and considerable further discrimination would be required before a leak could be declared. For this reason acoustic emission cannot be regarded as universally appropriate to all pipeline applications. However, acoustic emission can provide good supporting evidence for confirming leaks proposed by other techniques. Furthermore acoustic emission can provide high accuracy location capability.

Sensors

Numerous onshore leak detection applications have used acoustic emission. However there are only a few applications of the technology to hydrocarbon gas pipeline operations and no submarine applications have been identified.

Leak noise is generally wideband ranged from around IMHz down to below 1kHz. The noise often propagates with less attenuation in the pipewall than in the pipeline contents. Accordingly sensors would normally be mounted on the pipewall, Typical sensors operate in the range lOMHz to 400kHz.

Per10rmance

Although the technique offers very good performance with respect to the minimum leak detectable there are a number of practical factors limiting its application to such operations.

Performance of critical acoustic emission leak detection appfications is of the order 10-6 m3s-1 for liquid and 10-5 m3s-1 gas. This performance can be achieved with relatively small distances between sensors and the leak site. In practice the maximum span between sensors is limited to several hundred metres.

The pipeline coatings required for suitable corrosion protection can increase noise attenuation with respect to a comparable onshore pipeline. If the acoustic emission technique is to be used then attenuating effects of the particular coating should be investigated.

Unlike the negative wave phenomenon described earlier acoustic emission perseveres as long as the fluid flow through the site is turbulent, Accordingly if acoustic emission sensors are not switched on at the time when the leak occurs it is still possible to subsequently identify the leak site.

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2.2.7 Chemical based methods

Chemical leak detection methods described here are limited to mpid response techniques designed for continuous monitoring in which sensors are deployed along the entire length of the pipeline.

2.2.7.1

Discrete chemica/sensors [Ref.2]

A discrete-chemical sensor-based leak detection system consists of an array of chemical detectors spaced along the pipeline 80 that any product leaking from the pipeline will be sensed at one or more of the detectors. Power and communication lines are needed to tie each detector to a central monitoring location. Critical parameters that affect sensitivity and response time are detector spacing and reactivity to the pipeline product. For hydrocarbon products sensitivities of the order 100 ppm would be required.

For subsea pipeline applications, sensors are needed that cover distances of 10 to over 100 km, and therefore signal transmission methods that employ common communication lines must be employed. The present generation of chemical sensors are not sufficiently developed for use on long subsea pipelines. There is presently a significant amount of work being done on chemical detectors for detecting pollutants in water so developments in the near future may provide longer sensor lengths and signal transmission methods that utilize common communication lines.

2.2.7.2

Distributed chemical sensors

Distributed chemical-sensor-based leak detection systems are sensitive to chemicals along the entire sensor length. The advantages of distributed sensors include common sensing and signal transmission lines, complete coverage of the pipeline, simplified installation compared with mounting and wiring discrete sensors, and the ability to locate the leak position. Two different distributed chemical-sensor-based leak detection systems are described below. The first sensor type detects changes in special fibre optic cables caused by the presence of chemicals in the water. The second leak detection system uses special tubing laid along the pipeline to detect the presence of a leak.

2.2.7.3

Distributed fibre optic chemical sensors

Distributed fibre optic sensors responding to temperature changes (see Section 2.2.6) are presently commercially available and can be deployed over fairly long distances (20 km). Primarily they have been designed to allow microbend losses to be used to measure the temperature along a fibre. This sensing technique requires small bimetallic elements to be applied to the fibre 80 microbends are induced in the fibre when the temperature of the fibre changes. These micro bends create light losses from the fibre core that can be detected as attenuated light transmission.

The same type of extrinsic technique can be envisaged in which microbends can be induced in a fibre wrapped in materials that swell on contact with oil and certain chemicals.

The system is similar in concept to that in which the electrical properties of wires wrapped in special materials are affected by the presence of chemicals. Such a system is an electrical conductor covered with a special expanded Teflon that absorbs hydrocarbons but is waterproof. When exposed to hydrocarbons the change in capacitance is detected by time domain reflectometry (see Section 2.2.7). In addition to detecting the leak, the location of the leak along the cable (up to 4000 ft lengths reported) is also accurately determined.

2.2.7.4

Chemical-sensor-tube-based leak detect/on systems [Ref.8]

A chemical leak detection system that has been used for onshore pipelines for a number of years is based on detecting the presence of the leaking chemical with a semi-permeable sensor tube placed near the pipeline. The tube has a wall material that allows diffusion of hydrocarbon vapours into the air inside the tube. The tube is periodically pumped out and the air in the tube passes through a sensor that detects the presence of the hydrocarbon vapours in the air stream. These are commonly termed LASP systems (Leak Alarm System for Pollutants). The system can determine the size of the leak by the height of the peak recorded by the detector. The location of the leak can be determined by the peak arrival time at the detector compared with the arrival time of the test gas injected at the far end of the sensor tube when the sampling event is started. (See Fig 2.4).

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Gas

concentration

Pump start

Small leak peak

Test gas peak

Run~ me 2 ,elll!.d to dlm""e 2

Rurrtim.' ,elatodto <1.141'1<>9'

Total pump ~me T .... III nglh oI •• neo, lube

Gas Detector

Pump I

Weak gas concentra1ion

Test and Marker gas

LASPTube

High gas concentration

Dryer

,\tll ,\tll

DIffusion though the sensor tube

Small Leak

Large Leak

Figure 2.4

LASP detector diagram

14

This method can be used for multiphase flow lines since it can detect the presence of either vapour or liquid products. Once the sensor tube is installed near the pipeline the tube does not require any routine maintenance.

The detector-tube-based system has been installed on several different pipelines [Ref.7] to provide leak. detection in sensitive environments. One system is installed on a 4km ethylene pipeline that crosses a sensitive environmental area. A test on the leak. detection sensitivity showed the system was capable of detecting 2 grams of ethylene placed in the ground near the pipeline to simulate a small leak. Another LASP system is installed in a half mile long tunnel with a variety ofhydrocatbons pipes to monitor any pools of liquid product that might collect on the bottom of the tunnel

LASP systems vary from 300 ft to 10 miles in length and the products sensed by the detectors include; ethylene, benzene, jet fuel, pentane, fuel oil, H2S, ethylene oxide, gasoline, diesel and LPG. The sensor-tube-based leak. detection method has not yet been demonstrated for subsea pipelines.

System Leak Response Time

The minimum leak. response time is determined by the frequency that the air in the tube is pumped through the detector. The sampling interval depends on the desired level of leak. detection sensitivity and on the diffusion rate of the product through the tube wall. Typically the system is pumped every 12 hours. For longer sensor tube lengths, the pumping time required to clear the entire sensor tube can be several hours. This leak. detection method is clearly designed for low level leak detection and not rapid response to major leaks. A second sensor tube can be installed and continuously pumped to obtain a faster response for larger leaks.

Detection Sensitivity

The minimum detectable leak. level depends upon the installation, pipeline product, and the sampling detector sensitivity. Teledyne Geotech [Ref.6] claim that leaks less than 0.04 gallhr of gasoline can be detected.

2.2.8 Temperature profile [Ref.3]

Physical Processes

In this method the physical effect being monitored is the temperature profile of the environment along the outside of the pipeline. In many situations a pipeline leak will create a temperature disturbance in the environment surrounding the pipe. For leaks in pressurised gas pipelines the escaping gas will generate a cold zone in the environment surrounding the pipe due to Joule Thomson expansion.

For pipelines carrying heavy crude oils the oil is often transmitted at temperatures significantly above ambient in order to maintain a reasonable oil viscosity. A pipeline leak would therefore create a local warming of the environment surrounding the pipeline.

Sensors

The temperature profile technique requires distributed temperature sensors. Two major technologies compete in the area of temperature sensing [Ref.2]:

Multi sensor electrical cable.

• Optical Time Domain Reflectometry (OTDR) using fibre optic cable.

Early trials of the temperature profile technique were undertaken for an onshore gas pipeline in Germany. The trials used a very sophisticated multicore electrical cable with up to 1,024 discrete temperature sensors per kilometre. The trials produced good technical results but the cost of the cable was considered too high for operational use.

Independently in the UK a manufacturer of fibre optic sensors has developed a temperature sensing system incorporating a genuinely distributed temperature sensor. In this case the sensor is the fibre optic cable itself. This has a number of advantages:

• Safety in hazardous environments (no electrical current used in the monitored areas).

15

•

Immunity to electro magnetic interference.

Ease of placement of all sensors in otherwise inaccessible areas.

The sensing element can also be used as a high bandwidth communication medium.

•

•

Principle of OTDR Temperature Sensing [Ref.2]

In a typical OTDR distributed temperature system, a pulse of light is launched into the sensing fibre through a directional coupler. The light is scattered as the pulse passes down the fibre. A proportion of the scattered light is guided back toward the BOlIl'Ce. The returned signal is directed to a suitable receiver by the directional coupler. If the fibre is uniform and at uniform temperature the intensity of returned light exhibits an exponential decay with time. Variations in composition, density and temperature of the fibre cause deviations from a "perfect" exponential. Signal processing electronics convert the received signa! into a temperature profile,

Performance

At present the technology is limited to spans of20km or less. Typically the distributed sensor would be laid "piggy back" on the pipeline to be monitored. For enhanced reliability and for large diameter pipes up to 4 sensing cables could be attached to the pipeline and serviced by the same signal processing electronics. Table 2 shows the characteristics of such systems in terms of location of and time to detect a leak.

Table 2.2

Typical fibre optic temperature sensor

Measurement Temperature
Range Resolution Time Resolution
(metres) (metres) (seconds) (K)
500 1 5 ±1
1000 1 5 ±1
4000 1 10 ±1
10000 1 60 ±2.5
20000 10 60 ±2.5 2.2.9 Fibre optic sensing technologies [Ref.2]

The optical characteristics of fibres alter with temperature changes, mechanical stress and surface coating/absorption of chemicals.

Four types of optical fibre sensor system installation methods are common. These are:

Discrete Sensor Systems Clustered Sensor System

Discrete Distributed Sensor Systems Continuous Distributed Sensor System

A discrete sensor system uses a single fibre optic sensor at a single location. The system uses properties of the fibre (insulator, high band width, etc.) for sensing. Single sensors appear to have no application for pipeline leak: detection.

The Clustered. Sensor System approach uses multiple individual sensors tied to a single node. The node polls the sensor and sends fault commands to a central processor via a data transfer cable. Multiple nodes can be tied together in series via the data transfer line. The primary advantage of this approach is that the nodes can be tied end-to-end to attain a system which is as long as necessary.

16

Optical fibre sensors can be placed at inteIVals along an optical fibre. When the fibre itself is used both as the sensing and communication element along its entire length, it is a continuous distributed sensor system. This system utilizes a special fibre that is sensitized to change when exposed to temperature changes or microstmins. It should be noted that the transport fibre for this system is also the sensor and does not involve the problem of determining adequate sensor spacing. This type of sensor system is normally used with an Optical Time Domain Refleetometry (O'IDR) to determine leak location.

Three methods are useful for interrogating the sensors. These are:

- Total Attenuation Sensing

Optical Time Domain Reflectomeby Optical Time Domain Transmission

The attenuation or loss of the sensor can be determined by injecting light into the sensor and measuring light loss. Information concerning the locations of the loss. due to strain or breaks, is limited to the position of the sensor. For example. a sensor can be an optical fibre secured to the wall of a pipeline. If light is injected at one end of the fibre and received at the other. excess strain in the wall causing a break. in the fibre would be detected. However. no information concerning the position of the break. is obtained.

Other methods use the propagation velocity of the light moving through the cable to determine the position of the sensed event. The OIDR approach uses short light pulses to interrogate a group of sensors that are connected in series.

Light pulses are launched into the splitter. At each point where the refractive index of the fibre changes. a reflection occurs. The magnitude of the reflection is based on the change of refractive index at the sensor locations. OTDR systems have been in use in the communications field for years and are used by every major fibre optic user for diagnostics. The users for these systems include long haul telephone companies. which use the systems for locating breaks in fibres.

The Optical Time Domain Transmission system (OTDT) operates on changes in optical properties similar to OTDR. Pulses are launched into the fibre and exit at the receiver end of the fibre. The pulse shape changes baaed on the inverse of the refractive index at the sensor locations. This is the inverse of the operation that occurs for OTDR systems. The primary advantage of OTDT is that the light only has to travel a maximum of one system length compared to two system lengths required for OTDR. The O'IDT system uses hardware similar to that of an OIDR, and therefore shares the cost and training/support hardware problems of the OTDR approach.

Following a literature search ([Ref.2] South West Research Institute) a number of papers involving fibre optic technology applied to pipeline leak detection have been assessed.

The net conclusion is that the micro bending sensor appears to be most cost effective. but that this technology as a whole is not mature. It may be mentioned that the distance over which the different methods apply is limited (eg. 50km).

2.2.10 Neural networks [Ref.131

This is a technology which has been successfully applied to condition monitoring of gas turbine engines and batch transportation problems.

The basic procedure involves rationalizing the measured data of a process to produce a data map that correlates with ideetifiable patterns of behaviour. This is in contrast to the real-time model approach which uses a mathematical description to predict a response to a boundary value change.

SD-Scicon are major exponents in neural network applications and software development. the most recent application being on a 3-phase offshore pipeline to interpret field events using pressure transducers and gamma densitometers. This is an emerging technology yet to be applied to pipeline leak detection.

2.2.11 Radlotracer techniques

Radiotracing is used intermittently when a leak is suspected or to confirm the integrity of a pipe or vessel after maintenance and repair. One radiotracing technique or a combination of such techniques would normally be selected for a particular application depending on circumstances.

17

Techniques apply to chemical plant applications, concrete coated pipes buried to a depth of 3 feet, and subsea umbilicals up to about 20 kilometres long. The sensitivity that can 00 achieved with radiotracer tests is of the order 0.1 % of total flowrate using external radiation detector techniques and 0.001 % of total flow using sample analysis techniques. A comparative summary of sensitivities fur a number of relevant radiotracer techniques is presented in table 3.F (Section 3.0 Sensitivities and Response).

Radiotracer leak detection methods fall into three basic categories:

• Measurement of flow rate

• Measurement of residence time

• Direct tracer methods.

The flowrate measurement technique is appropriate for buried pipeline applications when the leak rate is a significant portion of the total flowrate. A pulse of active radio tracer material is injected into the pipeline and the velocity of the tracer is measured either with radiation detectors at the ground surface or in strategically placed boreholes. The velocity of the liquid changes sharply as it passes a leak. Leak location is effected by successive trials noting the relative change in velocity in adjacent pipe sections.

Direct tracer leak detection methods involve filling a pipe with a radioactive tracer and allowing it to soak under static pressure conditions (the pipe is blocked both ends). The line is then flushed and radiation detectors are used to detect the tracer in the subsoil, A gas tracer can be employed in liquid lines and usually shortens the soak time (gas percolates to the surface more quickly than a liquid tracer).

For long pipelines where external detection cannot be suitably employed then internal detection methods such as instrumented pigs are used.

2.2.12 Intelligent pigging

Small leaks produce ultrasonic signals which can be detected by a pig propelled forward by oil flow over several seconds, allowing several hundred samples. Background noise is appreciably smaller than the leak-induced ultrasonic signal.

In order to accurately locate the leak from the on-board recorded signals, acoustic markers are employed. Very small leaks can be detected by this method - the disadvantage being the requirement for frequent pigging.

18

3. SENSITIVITY AND RESPONSE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The sensitivity of a Leak Detection system is defined in terms of a minimum detectable leak rate. The time taken to detect a leak is the response time of the system; in continuously monitored systems this is normally inversely related to leak rate.

A threshold of uncertainty is also defined which characterizes the sensitivity available to a leak detection system as a result of the measurement tolerances of instrumentation and the noise of transient events not associated with leaks. Leaks that fall below thresholds are undetectable.

A possible leak is indicated therefore by deviations above a threshold. with the reservation that such an over-threshold signal requires confirmation of several repeated measurements in order to minimise false alarms.

The location of the leak and the magnitude of the leak are also the output of a leak detection system, which therefore, in summary, has a level of performance established by:-

the detection of a minimum size leak the time to detect a leak (response time)

• the calculated size of the leak

the accnracy of measuring the leak rate

(Ina general sense, the term 'sensitivity' can also be used in the context of performance when pipeline or other parameters including operating regime, are altered. It is usual to carry out a sensitivity study which establishes performance for a number of operating conditions for the particular pipeline.)

3.2 FACTORS AFFECTING PERFORMANCE

3.2.1 Performance criteria

The performance of a leak detection system can be stated in terms of contractual requirements, as follows:

- minimum detectable leak rate

- time to detect minimum leak rate

accuracy of leak location estimates accuracy of leak rate estimates.

3.2.2 Specific factors

Operational:

- Fluid, gas or liquid

- Transients or dispatch and terminal points

- Load changes (turndown)

- Line pack level

- Temperature changes

- Viscosity changes

Controller set point changes Slack line flow

- Vapourlliquid phase changes

- Multi-product batches

19

Measurement:

Instrument accuracy, repeatability and hysteresis Instrument drift

Temperature effects on transducer accuracy

Data Transmission:

Resolution of AID converters Noise filtering

Pollingmte

Model software:

Number and location of SCADA points Uncertainty in fluid property calculations Uncertainty in ground thermal properties Noise discrimination techniques.

3.3 SENSITIVITY STUDIES

3.3.1 Objectives

A sensitivity study for leak detection systems is normally the basis of an acceptance testing procedure within the terms of a supply contract. For model-assisted systems this is often a reimbursable study carried out by pipeline leak detection vendors in advance of vendor selection. The objective is to establish for both vendor and client the operating limits of a leak detection system to ensure an acceptable balance between performance guarantees and regulatory requirements.

The advantage of a study based on a specified pipeline configuration is that it provides an opportunity to test incrementals in the exact configuration of the pipeline and thereby reach an agreement with respect to cost/performance.

The success of a model-based leak detection system is fundamentally dependent upon the ability of the hydraulic model to track the real-time hydraulic operation of the pipeline, which in turn is dependent on factors such 88:-

•

the completeness and accuracy of the operating company's drawings of the pipeline and equipment (since the model data-sets will be constructed from these drawings).

knowledge of the fluid properties.

the accuracy and repeatability of the field measurements.

the degree of dead-band filtering of data performed by the SCADA system. the manner of operation of the pipeline.

•

•

•

3.3.2

Scope of a sensitivity study

Some form of pipeline simulation is necessary to evaluate the applicability of a detection method, but in retrofit cases on-line operators may be permitted to either record pipeline behaviour or to carry out experiments that assist the characterisation of the pipeline.

However the concept of access to a dynamic pipeline (real or model) is fundamental to a sensitivity study.

A study typically addresses the pipeline and fluid property configuration and a number of operating scenarios. Variations in performance of leak detection can be then checked against changes in fluid data and a range of such performance measures evaluated.

Such a study can assist the location of measurement points, and the number of instruments required and requirements for accuracy. It also gives some early and specific ideas as to the performance to be expected. It is to be noted that to date 110 bench-marking by third party vendors is employed in such studies. It should also be noted that although perturbation analysis may be performed on the pipeline equations and then integrated to check output variations in pressure, flow, etc., such chemical analytic techniques are not generally

20

employed. If it is possible to express the pressure perturbation at the outlet of a pipe consequent on a change in a parameter, then the deviation can be quantified between this pressure and a measured pressure.

Instead of applying mathematical seasitivity analysis a range of possible parameter or operating regimes are set out and the study is directed to running the leak detection system (including the pipeline modelling) around these variations. Because of the large number there is a problem in handling the many trial results without losing track of the objectives. Very often the scope of the simulation study is left largely to the vendor to define, within broad guidelines of the variations under investigation. It should be noted that it would be impossible to set out each of the items in section 3.2.2 as a potential parameter perturbation, since the number of combinations of results will be too large.

A typical content of a sensitivity study is given in Table 3.1. These are more representative of model-based leak detection than any hardware/electronic or chemical based system, and should be formulated about a range of expected operations for the particular pipeline.

Table 3.1

Contents of sensItIvIty study

1. INTRODUCTION - General

- Basis for the Study

- Reference Material

2. SUMMARY

- Main Findings

- Conclusions

3. LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM ENVIRONMENT (including Ranges of Van at ion) - Pipeline

- Operational nata

- Instrumentation

- Product Property Data

- Data Communication

4. LEAK DEfECTION METHODOLOGY - Pipeline Model(s)

- Leak Detection Method(s)

- Leak Location Method{s)

5. ASSESSMENT - Capability

- Reference Case (Base Case or Cases)

Sensitivity to leak size Sensitivity to leak location

APPENDICES

- Simulation Runs

- System Layout and Pipeline Data

In practice the sensitivity of a leak detection system depends largely on the filtering techniques used to validate leak alarms. Leak indicators for transient leak detection respond to deviations between measured and model predicted values and will register noise from pipeline operational events as well as leaks.

A low level of discrimination can saturate a system with false alarms and thereby reduce reliability whilst retaining sensitivity. A compromise which involves raising threshold settings to mask transient, non-leak: events will prevent system response to leaks below threshold level although the basic sensitivity of the system is retained.

21

In general, the performance of model assisted techniques can be rated by the level of uncertainty in line pack calculations. At the low end of the sensitivity scale is the line pack model based on average densities which are drawn from a straight line relationship between end pressure measurements. At the high end of the scale is the transient model system which is calibrated to the pipeline. This system can make valid predictions of pipeline flowing conditions between measurement points using the Napier-stokes fluid flow equations. The effect is to decrease line pack uncertainty by a factor of 1-100 on conventional volume balance techniques (depending on the number of SCADA measurements) and thereby raise the level of sensitivity.

Published performance data reveal some overlap between techniques which can obscure cost/functionality benefits. By and large the overlap exists in liquid pipeline applications in which inertial pressure changes are large (compared to gas) and falI within the range of acoustic wave technologies, PPA systems and model systems that can rely on constant fluid density for volume balance techniques.

3.4 THEORETICAL LIMITS TO LEAK DETECTABILITY [REF.14, 36] A leak becomes detectable when the volumetric leak rate exceeds the sum. of uncertainties in flow measurement and line fill,

If:
Qo =
K =
Qs =
Qt =
QI = reference flowrate

percentage uncertainty in flowrate measurement

bound for uncertainty in line fill change due to system measurements bound for uncertainty in line fill change due to transients

leak rate

then the first sentence of this section implies:

QI > 2KQo + Qs + Qt

As the inspection/calculation time increases, the uncertainties in line fill (of either type) decrease, and detectability becomes a function of flow rate measurement.

The theoretical limits are given in Fig 3.1 and illustrate that, for the mass balance method, a 10 % leak can be determined only if the metering accuracy is better than 10% and that other uncertainties such as line fill are effectively zero.

The normalisation of pipeline equations to yield standard hyperbolic equations defined over a fixed range (say 0-1) permit the calculation of a normalised (characteristic) wave speed along the pipeline in either direction [Ref.14]. This permits any system based on transient analysis wave detection to be looked at in terms of the wave velocity and attenuation. This does not however allow for real noise, the magnitude of transients nor the extent of false alarm filtering carried out in practice. An approximate theoreticallim.it curve for transients is given in Fig. 3.2.

When it comes to transient modelling, which relies on the voting of discrepancies noted between the real current pipeline (post-leak) and pre-leak behaviour, then the theoretical minimum of Fig.3.2 does not apply. An integrated line fill calculation is replaced by an instant disparity between real and previously identical pipeline behaviour [Ref.5] heralding a leak.

One such study aimed at distinguishing between sensitivity for Ieaks at the centre of the pipeline, and at the end of the pipeline is reproduced below. This will yield the theoretical limits to the actual leak detection. In this particular case noise was excluded.

Pipeline Configuration Line Flow = 4.3 ftlsec

Tin = lOOQF

Pin = 2236.48 psig

Pout = 1789.96 psig

Pipe Diam. = 28.94" ID PipeLength = 217.5 miles Line Pack Rate = 25 psilbr

22

LEAK SENSITIVITY - RESPONSE CURVES FOR MASS BALANCE METHOD

1.0

0.2

\
\
\\
with uncertainties
\ \--- I--
\ \
\ " ---- -- uncertainties reduced by hal
~ <,
"- ~ -.........._
1---
--- 0.9

0.8

0.7 e

o 0.6

o 0.5 CD

....

(j) 0.4 .:.::

m

...J 0.3

0.1

0.0 o

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Response time, minutes

Figure 3.1

Effect of measurement uncertainty (from Llou)

1.0

o.

\\
\\
\'
\ ~ no line fill correction (max dOt lOre')
~\- ---- -
i~' ..........
~ -- --
........
~ ~ ---
1
transient model {min dOt I Qref} - ~
0 - I i 0.9

0.8

0.7

e o 0.6

-

00.5 ~ W 0.4

m

...J 0.3

0.2

o. o

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Response time, minutes

Figure 3.2

Effect of line flU uncertainty

23

Leak Detection Thresholds

(% of design flow, total barrels of crude lost)

Base Leak Leak Size

Velocity Location "TO = 3 Min. To=30 Min.
4.3 ftlsec centre 3.9% 26B+ 1.5% 97B
(half load) inlet 2.4% 16B 1.1% 75B
2.15 ft/sec centre 6.9% 46B 1.5% 10lB
(full load) inlet 3.7% 24B 1.0% 64B
*TO = Time to detect leak
+B = Barrels The significant results from this study are the differences in times to detect leaks at the centre of the pipeline as opposed to leaks at the inlet of the pipe.

3.5 INSTRUMENTATION FOR REAL TIME PIPELINE MODELLING [REF.15]

3.5.1 Introduction

High quality reporting of pipeline flow parameters is required when using software for real-time pipeline modelling. This section describes the pipeline instrumentation recommended for use and also discusses the associated accuracy, repeatability and sensitivity of instrumentation and the resulting data applied to the model through the SCADA system. The data sampling (SCADA) system is also discussed.

The instrumentation of a pipeline which is to be modelled is a subject of direct importance to the modeller since the performance of the entire data system determines the performance of the model and its applications. Modelling and instrumentation activities should be coordinated and applied consistently to ensure adequate model performance.

A pipeline flow model consists of a set of differential equations which yield solutions describing the time and distance variations of fluid pressure, temperature, density and velocity in the pipeline. These equations are referred to as the equations for Continuity, Momentum, Energy and State.

Pipeline models produce detailed information at any point in the pipeline. and can be used to describe the physical behaviour of the fluid in a pipeline where measurements do not exist. In real time pipeline modelling, real measurements provide input to pipeline equations from which additional "measurements" can be inferred.

Since the model uses equations for pressure, temperature, density and flow (four equations, four unknowns), an end point value of each of these variables must be used as a boundary condition.

The normal pipeline practice is to make these measurements at all end points. There are various combinations of measured values which will be satisfactory as impressed boundary conditions. One combination of impressed boundary conditions would be:

PuTuFu upstream boundaries

F d downstream boundaries

Alternatively, it would be acceptable to have

PuTuFu upstream boundaries

P d downstream boundaries

Other combinations are possible. It should be noted that often more boundary conditions are available than are strictly needed, i.e., the pipeline is over-determined. This can be made use of, for instance, in formulating two independent models, each of which can present warnings of a leak.

While some of the set of upstream and downstream measurements are needed as impressed boundary conditions, the remaining values are available for model tuning (parameter Identification), leak detection, or other applications.

24

3.6.2 Instrumentation performance

Minimum instrumentation requirements for leak detection are typically:

• Flowmeters at all inlets and outlets,

Pressure transducers at all inlets, outlets, and junctions.

• Temperature transducers at all inlets, outlets and junctions.

The d6WJ ity and composition of the flowing product can usually be assumed without introducing excessive errors. An assumed density and composition is normally acceptable when the product is dry natural gas, or is an off-line measured, crude oil or crude oil product (gasoline, fuel oil, etc).

Further instruments for additional pressure or temperature measurements at intervals along the pipeline can improve leak detection performance although there is likely to be a level of redundancy for large leak incidents. Additionally, a densitometer or chromatograph is needed when either density or composition is otherwise ambiguous.

The quality of a measurement is characterized by:-

• Accuracy

• Repeatability

• Dead band and sampling error

Data treatment errors

The above refer to the cumulative errors associated with the instrument, instrument electronics. data point acquisition and transmission, encoding filtering and smoothing, and engineering value conversion in the database.

Table 3.2 provides a compilation of typical instrument characteristics for some transmitter and meter elements. This material was obtained from vendors, in-house and operational sources.

3.5.2.1

Accuracy

The value to be measured will have a true value, which is its intrinsic value. An instrument transducing this value will be useful over a limited range of these values, referred to as the range, or span, of the instrument.

The instrument usually has a linear response over this range, but if not, then any non-linearity is taken into account in the calibration of the measurement.

Drift. offset and noise affect instrument accuracy, although noise is normally filtered out by signal conditioning or processing.

3.6.2.2

Repeatability

To establish repeatability a fixed variable is repeatedly measured. With the exception of hysteresis each measurement is independent. Repeated sampling of a fixed quantity by the same measurement process produces a set a data points which usually follows a normal distribution. The mean of this distribution approaches the true value with the deviation of the mean from the true value being related to the accuracy of the measurement. The spread of the distribution is a measure of the repeatability of the measurement.

3.5.2.3

Dead Band and sampling error

The dead band in an instrument is the minimum change which must occur in the signal in order for the measuring system to be able to detect and report a corresponding change to the database. This dead band may have several causes:

a) Electronic limitations in encoding which cause the change to be less than a quantitization. A change in resolution from 10 to 12 bits yields .2% and .05% respectively.

b) Physical limitations of the instrument to respond to a change due to friction, inertia, etc.

c) Sluggishnesa in the measuring system, or data filtering, which results in diminished sensitivity due to delayed time of response.

25

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26 Sampling impacts the high frequency information, acting 88 a low pass filter, Imprecise sampling times may also add to the uncertainty in timing between measurements which are related via an algorithm.

Time tagging in normal pipeline modelling must be accurate to within one sampling interval of (typically) + 15 seconds. Where samples are scanned, such tinting has to be taken into account.

3.5.2.4

DBts treatment errors

These include linearization and exception reporting.

• Linearization

Many flow measurements require linearization in terms of "square root treatment". This is typically provided within the RTU software.

For Engineering Units range 0 to M the conversion equation Y = SQRT OC"'M)

applies, where X is the non-linearized reading.

If the actual measurement contains an error, expressed as X + E, then the absolute error introduced by the conversion equation becomes (only +E considered):

SQRT «X+E)"'M) - SQRT (X"'M) «X+E) x M - SQRTX x M

It can be shown that at 10w values of X the level of uncertainty is amplified by the presence of an error E.

The conclusion is that flow meters do not operate accurately at the low end of their range, and a leak. detection system can suffer significant degradation in turndown situation.

• Exception Limit Reporting

In order to reduce the loading of RTU to Master Station communications, the variations of analogue signals, e.g., flow, temperature and pressure, are sometimes reported on an "exception limit" basis.

A typical analogue signal constantly varies, and a one second scan rate could produce 30 messages for transmission during a single poll cycle. With many analogue signals being scanned by RTUs on a typical installation the communication links and the Master Stations may become overloaded.

Any small variations are therefore filtered using the report-by-exception technique. The magnitude of the exception deviation limits (often + 2%) are directly reflected as measurement noise

3.6 OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

It is difficult to obtain operational experience across a number of pipelines and operators, in a normalised way.

Since there are only a few leak. detection vendors (approximately 4 in the case of model-based leak detection) one would expect that their large histories of operational application would be helpful. In fact this is not the case; the vendor references are largely sole references and operator-supported claims do not give a consistent picture.

In this study data from a number of sources, including internal reports from operating companies, published papers and digests, are summarised for comparison in Table 3.3.

Care should be taken in drawing direct comparisons since operating conditions vary widely. For instance one offshore and onshore gas production system regularly produces transients of + 12% of the total flow, over a period of 15 minutes. Other pipelines are operated mainly under steady-state conditions.

Another problem in comparing results is that of relating hole size to leak. flowrate (for the given pipeline pressure conditions). As an example of such relationships, Table 2.1 (Section 2.1.6) provides a look-up table at fixed conditions only: ideally a family of such look-up tables should be available.

27

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28 3.7 KEY ITEMS ON SENSITIVITY

This sub-section provides a checklist of items to be taken into account when considering a vendor.

Key items include the following:

Regulation requirements

- Insurance implications Performance guarantees Choice of vendor

Configuration of pipeline - Residence time

- Routing

- Block valve sites

- Transport fluid

Operational characteristics - Turndown

- Pumps and control valves

Method of Leak Detection - Technology

Software

- Track record

Acceptance testing Time to detect a leak Time to locate a leak

Accuracy of leak location estimates Accuracy of leak size estimates Instrument accuracy

Location of measurement points Retrofit/greenfield

Implementation and operator training Performance testing In field.

3.8 PERFORMANCE RATINGS

3.8.1 Comparative survey

Leak detection methods can be rated loosely in terms of sensitivity and response by technological grouping. Figure 3.3 below summarizes the current position.

Other methods such as visual inspection, reliance on 3rd party response (e.g. farmers in agricultural areas) and monitoring changes in the environment (e.g, monitoring water courses) will also apply in many pipeline applications but do not fall within a technological grouping. The effectiveness of these methods will depend on the application. Visual inspection, for example, would be limited to onshore pipes canying a product that has a visible effect on the environment and sensitivity would depend on the frequency of inspection trips.

There is also a perception that operator expertise in monitoring the behaviour of a pipeline over a number of years can add to the performance of a leak detection system. This can apply, for example. in SCADA-based systems where an online visual display of the pipeline pressure profile may well indicate to a trained eye the growth of an abnormal situation which is not immediately apparent to the logical formality of computer analysis.

29

METHOD

SCADA-BASE0

Negative Pressure Wave

Mass Balance

Pressure Point Analysis

Transient Models

Wave Alert (Directional)

FIBRE OPTICS

(Temperature Profile)

ACOUSTIC

Hydrophones

Ultrasonic Pig

CHEMICAL

LASP

m3/hr litreslhr

• Fluid transportation limit

30

~
I

L



, ,
........ j
0,1

0,1 1 10

10 100 1000

100

Leak Size

Figure 3.3

Leak size capability by leak detection method

By and large there will be an element of human unpredictability in the effectiveness of 'other' leak detection methods which cannot be rated against the reliability of hardware systems designed for routine and repetitive tasks.

SCADA-based model systems cover all large leaks down to about 10M3/hr. These systems are continuously active and their performance depends primarily on the quality of operational data supplied to the computer model from dedicated flow meters at both ends of the pipe and pressure and temperature measurements in between. The location of a leak with respect to measurement points also has a first order impact on performance.

Below 10M3/br, acoustic monitoring and negative pressure wave techniques will apply. The performance of these systems depend on the operational characteristics of the pipeline and the level of discrimination that can be applied to background noise. Negative pressure wave and acoustic disturbances attenuate quite mpidly to background noise levels and the overall effectiveness of these systems will depend on the number of monitoring points installed and their relative spacing. In practice. the performance of these systems is significantly affected by second order effects such as pipe flexibility. pressure levels and transportation velocities.

Fluid properties such as viscosity do not have a significant effect on detectability thresholds. The most sensitive methods are fibre optics and chemical. Potentially. fibre optics bas a high leak detection response time but is limited to short line sections of about 20 miles using time-domain reflectometry techniques with microstmin and temperature sensors. Their application to subsea pipelines is limited. Chemical sampling techniques are limited to much shorter lines and are not continuously operated systems so that response time is not related to sensitivity.

For long pipelines of the order 100-200 miles and more, a SCADA -based system is the only technology available with sufficient potential for adequate leak. detection. There is also a large measure of overlap with other categories of pipeline integrity monitoring such as damage detection and corrosion monitoring.

SCADA-based transient models are used to comprehensively simulate the pipeline flow process 80 that the effects of a leak can be separated from normal pipeline transients, The chief complaint with these systems is their susceptibility to false aIanning when unforseen pipeline transients arise. Potentially, the limiting sensitivity of these systems is the level of uncertainty in instrument accuracy, In practice, sensitivity thresholds are set above instrument accuracy and the response to a potential leak condition is delayed to perform discrimination checks.

3.8.2 Strengths and weaknesses of model techniques

Line balance techniques are based on the principle of mass conservation and employ accurate flow measurements at both ends of a pipeline to reconcile the volume flowing into and out of the pipeline. An imbalance indicates a leak. The sensitivity of line balance techniques depend entirely on the operational characteristics of the particular pipeline in which, for example, it may be possible to assume constant line pack (steady state flow conditions) or predictable density changes for product lines. Sensitivity is effectively limited to leaks of the order 1-5 % of design flow rate by flow measurement accuracy, operational transients which affect line pack, and the transportation lag between input and output measurements.

Electronic flow computers can limit flow meter inaccuracy to just the repeatability of the transducer element (typically 0.02% for turbine meters on a stable product) 80 that the deciding factor in line-balance sensitivity is line pack variation. Line-balance techniques smooth the effects of operational transients, compositional changes, and fluctuations in pressure, temperature and flow over a long enough period of time to distinguish leak. effects from background noise. This reduces the effective response of the system to typically 2 hours at best for short line applications and up to 24 hours for longer lines. This technique can estimate the size of a leak. but cannot locate iL

The whole direction of subsequent developments in this area is based on reducing - the uncertainties in line pack calculations. Some essential strengths and weaknesses in techniques commonly applied (volume balance, pressure point analysis, and real time models) are highlighted below.

31

3.8.2.1

Volume balance method: [Ref.33]

This method calculates a volume balance between flow in and flow out and line pack accumulation. Line pack is calculated using average fluid densities based on a straight line relationship with the pressure profile measured at pipe inlet and outlet.

Weaknesses ate:

Sensitivity to false alarms arising from the assumption of steady state conditions in the pipe.

Inability to locate leaks.

Not applicable to gas lines since line pack changes are large or for batch fluids where average density depends on the position of the batch interface moving in the pipeline.

Transient operations are not accounted for.

Strengths are:

•

•

•

• Volume increments can be updated over Iarge time steps which tends to filter out high frequency transients. This improves the overall sensitivity of the system (potentially to instrument accuracy level) at a cost in response time (typically 12 -24 hours).

3.8.2.2 Pressure pOint analysis /Ref.21]

This method senses the change in pressure level and the pressure rate of change at a point in the pipeline. A statistical package is used to test the significance of a change between new and old measurements.

The application of this method relies on the assumption that pipeline pressure will fall as the result of a leak. To reduce false alarms the system relies on inhibiting the leak detection computation when known transients are present in the pipeline. The transients must have a predictable signature and be notified to the leak detection system. Leak computations resume when the pipeline returns to a steady state operation.

Weaknesses ate:

A fall in pipeline pressure is not unique to a leak: situation. There is a high probability of generating a false alarm when unforseen transients occur.

• There is no indication of leak: location or size beyond the proximity of the sensing point.

Strengths are:

• This is a simple application with a low level of instrumentation and low installation costs.

A combined PPA and volume balance system would be complementary.

3.8.2.3

Tmnslent models [Ref.20, 22, 32}

This method attempts to increase leak detection sensitivity by simulating and reproducing operational pipeline transients so that leak effects can be separated out.

This method requires a complete description of the pipeline (mechanical characteristics plus process flow conditions and instrumentation) and the facsimile mathematical model is tuned to match actual pipeline conditions at flow meter points.

There are two main product supplies in this area: Deviation analysis and compensated volume balance.

Deviation model [Ref.S and 22]

Flow. pressure and temperature measurements ate applied to model non-steady flow equations as boundary values. The model calculates the real-time hydraulic values and is compared against measurements not used as boundary values. The model is applied piece wise to pipe sections between adjacent _ pressure measurement points. Flow deviations calculated at the junction of adjacent pipe section models indicate a leak.

Weaknesses are:

32

Relies on tuning and is therefore susceptible to instrument errors and fluid property deviations.

- This method requires a high level of instrumentation (including temperature). Strengths are:

Operates in transient conditions. Large leaks can be detected in minutes and small leaks in hours.

The model can be used for pig tracking, batch tracking and for look-ahead scenarios in addition to leak detection.

• Compensated volume balance model [Ref.33]

This approach calculates a volume balance between inlet and outlet flows and from changes in line pack rate. Pressure and temperature measurements are required along the length of the pipeline for line pack calculations. This method relies on spotting a "kink" in the pipeline pressure profile.

Weaknesses are:

Susceptible to false alarming when leak thresholds are set too low.

Strengths are:

Accuracy is not sensitive to tuning/calibration with the pipeline. The model can be out of time with the pipe and still predict the same line pack rate.

Fast leak detection response in the presence of transients (minutes for large leaks).

3.8.2 Summary

Reasonable targets to be achieved for leak detection are of the order;

Leak Size Time to Detect Leak (mins)

Gas 10% 120

Liquid 2% 20

Ethylene

4%

60

These figures can be disputed by operators or vendors. However, it is noteworthy that hardly any gas pipeline leak detection exists in the USA or UK, and the minimum leak that can be detected will be determined by other methods e.g. odour or gas presence. For gas therefore, leak detection is questionable.

Both for liquid (crude oil) and ethylene leak detection performance may be better than the figures above, particularly where the instrumentation maintenance is specifically tailored to leak detection requirements.

The above results are largely independent of line length. given constant valve separation. Leak location times to ±1 mile accuracy will in general take much longer (e.g. greater than 5 times) than leak detection times.

33

4. REGULATIONS, LEGISLATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The regulations of Countries are evolving to match the legislation. The US is particularly attentive to pipelines as a transportation method akin to road and rail transportation, while France, Denmark, etc, have no specific regulatory requirements to enforce or encourage integrity monitoring. A survey of appropriate legal and regulatory references follows. In addition it is useful to consider the practical responsibilities of typical leak detection vendors.

4.2 REGULATORY REFERENCES

4.2.1 United states of america

The major references that apply to pipeline integrity monitoring are:

Oil Production Act (OPA) Pipeline Safety Act (PSA)

- Department of Transport (D01) Office of Pipeline Safety

The DOT is charged with producing regulations to interpret the intent of the PSA (1992). This slates that the US companies must have specific responses in place for all facilities that may cause pollution to water, oil, air, densely populated areas, etc. The OPA (Nov. 1992) has given the industry two years to study the problem and a furtber two years to implement the regulations.

Other agencies involved in the regulatory process are the EPA and the National Safety Board (the latter being particularly limited to accident investigations). Individual States have their own legislation, and it is understood that certain Slates require leak detection performance figures to 1 %.

4.2.2 Norway

Regulations and guidelines concerning pipeline protection and leak detection are laid down by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD). The regulations state that the pipelines shall be equipped with a reliable leak detection system but do not however provide any details or recommendations for leak: detection systems or accuracy of measurement.

It is necessary to comply with the regulations concerning safety, etc., relating to the Act relating to petroleum activities stipulated by Royal Decree of June 28, 1985 pursuant to para. 57 of the Act of March 22,1985, No.1!,

4.2.3 Germany

Currently there is no legislation for a particular leak: detection method to be applied or any accuracy of measurement. However, the pipelines shall be equipped with leak detection systems. TIN is gathering experience and working on formal regulations and requirements. The operators/owners specify the leak: which is to be detected by the leak detection system.

Pipelines are tested in accordance with:

"DVGV - Worksheet 0-469, Druckverfahren fur Ieitungen und Anlagen der Gasversorgung" (Test carried out with water and air).

These teats are conducted also after commissioning of the pipelines (during pipeline shutdowns).

4.2.4 Spain

According to Compania Logistica di Hidrocarburos (Cl1I). the largest Spanish owner of pipeline systems, there are no mandatory regulations for pipeline integrity in Spain. Enagas

34

and CUI generally follow the German TUV norms. In all pipeline projects, the prevention of leaks has to be addressed in an environmental impact statement, both during design and separately for the construction phase of the project.

4.2.6 France

There is no regulation concerning leak detection.

Pipelines come under the Ministry of Industry (Division de Service Speciale de Depots Hydrocarbures) and the related legislation, namely the Reglement de Seeurit 2i de Pipelines Hydrocarbures, does not make obligations on pipeline monitoring. The Environmental Agency is not part of the Ministry. However companies such as Treppil which run the pipelines for Total do employ mass balance and intelligent pigs for detecting leaks, but the driving force is economic, not legislative.

4.2.6 Canada

A recommended practice for the State of Alberta represents the major legislative Canadian reference, since good engineering design in this country must take account of this practice. The requirements are formulated in terms of mass and balance and related instrument accuracy and apply to liquid petroleum products only.

4.2.7 Italy

There are no Italian pipeline regulations for leak detection. The Ministero del Ambiente (Environment) in Rome is the major related body. Any major construction project requires an environmental impact statement.

Private user organisations such as Comitato Italiano Gas (CIG) do not have any leak detection regulations; the practice is to adopt UK standards. Where they exist various Presidential Decrees relating to accidents at work may also connect with pipeline integrity requirements.

4.3 PERFORMANCE RESPONSIBILITIES

4.3.1 General

In certain countries the operation of the pipeline including SCADA-board operations is handed over to a third party who then become responsible for integrity monitoring,

However in many cases the responsibilities are dispersed or covered in back-to-buck contracts.

The performance (both expected or achieved) ofleak detection systems is very much defined by the vendors, and not guaranteed to the degree met in metering. unit process operations. pumping systems (i.e, it is a magic art).

Some questions that might be raised are:

• What can be expected from a LOS contract?

What can the pipeline operator do to make LDS effective?

What can be expected from the vendor as regards testing on site and in the factory? In terms of problems encountered, where do responsibilities lie?

The answers to the questions above must address the evolving state of leak detection, and how performance conditions (contractual) and procedures for actual measurement of performance and performance testing may be drawn up to reflect the changing situation.

The combined operation of instrumentation, SCADA and LDS equipment may not be the responsibility of anyone supplier. While failure of any hardware or software element may be covered by an individual warranty, degraded performance of the entire chain effectively means illS failure.

A table of responsibilities might be as follows:

35

Table 4.1 Responsibilities

01 = Vendor, OP= Operating Company)

INSTR SCADA LOS
Calibration (lnstr.) V.OP - -
Drift (Instn) V.OP - -
Documentation 0 V. V V
Equipment V V V
Calculations - - V
Instr; placed off Scan - OP -
Deviation of Instr, from normal V.OP - -
Recording/archiving OP OP V
Detection of leak OP - V
Tuning - - V/OP The responsibility for upholding performance conditions in the field (unexpected leaks) is within the Operator / Instr I SCADA I LDS organisation. (project engineering responsibilities have been left out.)

In this situation the role of testing becomes significant. Testing exists to:

• assist the vendors (in any sub-contractor relation)

• give the eventual client confidence that the system will function and save him problems

• confirm performance and validate payment milestones

• support eventual arbitration or court material, following imperfect leak detection.

Third party testing (using other LO systems) is not II. problem if written into specifications - the LDS vendor signs to meet II. test. Cross-checking via another LOS product is unwelcome but not a basis for arguments, if made mandatory at an early contractual stage.

Testing also should include examination of theory behind the method (e.g., equations used) but not the algorithms, software details, etc. Testing should include dynamic simulation of artificial leaks in a mode easily able to meet client ad-hoc queries.

It should be axiomatic that configuration data for the pipeline is accepted in updated versions, and that it may be necessary to repeat sensitivity studies (or parts of them) for new data.

At the same time performance conditions should allow for:

• leak size as a percentage of maximum flow, percentage of stated flow, hole size.

• automatic tuning, rejection of imperfect data.

• statement of model matching criteria.

• accuracy of property calculations, steady state calculations.

• location, time to detect.

36

4.3.2 Proposed Requirements (Future)

Operator Procedures to:

• keep instrumentation calibrated and reading recorded

• provide regular test leaks

• provide feedback on both regular and unexpected leak. tests (see 6.2 also)

• LDS performance to be defined in a standard way for a fluid.

SCADAll...OS

• responsibility for LOS performance to be single point

• regular updating of configuration data

• factory tests against external desk data (source either practical recorded event or simulated)

LOS

Must provide:

sensitivity studies noise performance

• draft performance

• time to detect, leak size, leak condition performance figures are on the same basis, and expressed with a confidence factor against time

• details of basic equations and basic method employed for leak detection and location.

4.3.3 Technological Aspects (Future)

The major advance forseen is that of low cost metering which may be achieved by using a number of technologies including lasers.

Modelling is well understood and while computer power could permit more exact models the one-dimensional pipeline equations appear to hold within the limits of instrument accuracy.

While basic pipeline modelling equations stay the same however, the use of statistics, particularly as regards instrumentation, is at a low level It is foreseeable that Kalman filtering or similar, to take out dynamics and then give relative weights to pipeline measurements will produced enhanced performance,

Kalman filters offer the possibility for optimum weighting of signals, both in the presence of drift and noise. It is also possible to combine parameter and state estimation, based on the original pipeline equations and fitted to the real measurements. In the case of leak detection, where the system is non-linear, an approximation of linearity must be made, which should be practicable. However much more important is to distinguish between good instruments and faulty inatruments (which should be rejected) rather than apportioned weighting across all measurements. There is no reason why Kalman filtering cannot be adopted to match measured noise values, prior to a "there is a leak" vote, and it is surprising that the technology has not smoothly been incorporated in the standard leak. detection products.

The knowledge of practical transients to be expected should influence the slavish adherence to exact representation of sonic velocities and hence settling time. Leak detection shall be forecastable in the presence of nonnal transients, without any settling or inhibition periods.

37

4.3.4 Safety Aspects

Fault tree or event trees analysis should take account of not only SCADA and process components, but these components in the presence of a IDS.

Given detection of a leak, appropriate shut-in actions should be defined for operator initiation, and warning to resources (area groups) who will take over enviromnental and repair actions. Their timings to respond depend on the LDS response time and the pipeline operation response.

Safety investigation will require access to archived SCADA and LDS data (ref. OSHA 'Incident investigation) to be completed within 24 hours.

Bench-mark comparisons should be available both on representative pipelines, and between standard tests for pipeline models. These should yield minimum achievable warning times.

Contractual responsibilities with regard to IDS and associated systems have to be clearly laid down in advance.

38

5. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

5.1 GENERAL

There are no new developments in leak detection that direct attention in an urgent sense - rather it is trends in capability and cost for sensors, digital multiplexing and signal processing that indicate the future.

One trend that is evident is the growth in processing power available.

Table 1
Date Processor Cost ($)
1975 Minicomputer 10k
1985 PC lk
1995 Neuron Node 10 Equivalent development curves hold for laser and fibre optic technology. Because processing requirements present no limitation, technology at any level (service, data acquisition, data processing) is only limited to the understanding and production of any algorithms. With regard to sensors there is a disappointing lack of new sensors technology (after strain gauge development and ultrasonic devices). Temperature sensors in the semi-conductor industry tmditionally measure to 0.5°C in 15()(PC and the ability to measure temperature is largely dependent on reliability. For offshore studies it is known that smart instruments far exceeding conventional instrumentation data in accuracy and repeatability (One such recent study indicates 100 years MTBF for offshore smart field instruments. Since smart instruments are only double the price of conventional instruments, the use of such instruments in Leak Detection would seem to be beneficial).

Clear air laser measurement, gas distributed sensing, and remote sensing are all technologies in growth. The are largely associated with environmental monitoring, but can offer theoretically especial forms of monitoring production release.

5.2 DIRECTIONS IN EMERGING TECHNOLOGY

Technological measure that could be adopted include the following:

Fibre optic

Investigate chemical ingress intocladding and hence a distributed determination of chemical (petrochemical) release from a pipeline into a fibre optic hiway. This hiway can be a) externally located with the pipe. b) located along the pipe but at some distance above the surface of a buried pipe.

• Investigate fibre optics with view of detecting changes in thermal gradient along pipe.

Evaluate future cost of fibre optic laying (in conjunction with pipe) and associated multiplexing for digital data transmission via manufacturers.

• No one baa yet meaningfully exploited fibre optics as a means of transporting energy (eg 10 or 100 mwatts).

Estimation techniques from classical estimation of state and parameters theory (as per advanced control) should be looked at as enhancements to the validated process of signals pieced up from instrumentation. In particular, Estimation Technologies which not only provide weighting of instruments along the pipeline (eg meters are more important/reliable than orifice type flow metering), but also for nullifying those instruments whose contribution is not representative of pipeline conditions.

• Development of sensitivity equations for the traditional pipeline equations in a linearised form to yield sensitivity of pressure or flow at any position along the pipeline as a function of parameter change (eg friction factor, fluid properties etc)

39

Remote sensing

It would be useful to track developments in remote sensing as driven by environmental Iobbies since these involve intensive European effort in image enhancement from satellite and other remote data collection devices, While it is not believed that such technologies can indicate leaks in a pipeline within (say) hoUI'8, this technology ought to be tracked.

Gas detection

Clear air turbulence laser detection and gas pressure detectors for area leak detection are sensors worthy of evaluating further. The current range is limited (tens of meters), but the cost projections may indicate a trend to multiple devices along a pipeline as a feasible option.

Pipeline modelling

No improvement is foreseen here, the equations and the physics are well understood The precise forms of thresholding, the confidence levels of leak warning, and combinations of leak warning should be developed but vendors at present treat this as solely client preference for presentation. It is thought tbat the whole area of probability and bounds ought to be cleared up.

Since pipeline models are approximate there may well be advantage in investigating not just increasingly complex models but simpler models on the grounds that:- a) these may be just as useful, b) such simplified models may be useful as prefiltering "prompts" to the more -complex models. The concept of locating leak detection algorithms within the RTU or, in

the future. within the sensor software should be investigated

Neutral networks and systems expert

Both these technologies have attracted a good deal of interest. Bxpert systems (eg Gensym 02) have been accepted in terms of operator assistance and can easily be applied to pattern pipelines of pressure (and their changes). Neural networks are marketed by software houses and researched by non-operational support staff in oil/gas companies. The results are, so far, inconclusive. so that this technology ought to be awaited rather than positively approached.

Of particular current interest is work associated with multi-phase flow metering for offshore pipeline applications [Ref.13]. This is fundamentally different to the first principles model approach which relies on best fit correlations (see below).

Statistical testing

A new interest in the use of Linear Dynamic models and Bayes estimation (conditional probability) has raised expectations for LDS sensitivities down to 1 % of flow rate.

This is a significant advance on current PPA technology which relies on assumptions of constant statistical means within a time frame.

Bayes estimation is an emerging technology based on a time-aeries approach that potentially can filter out operational noise (pump startl stops) and reduce the high risk offalae alarming endemic to most of these systems.

Colour

Low cost equivalents to spectrum analysis are appearing, which offer to specify in an absolute sense colour measurement. This may permit the monitoring of escaping volumes.

Flowmetering

Current research into the following technologies offer potential enhancement to current systems (source: British Technology Group):

Optical vortex flowmeter Multicomponent flowmeter

Dual bluff-body vortex flowmeter

40

Static Charge flowmeter (for two phase flow) Bypass flowmeter

Tomography for two-component flows

In addition self calibrating flow meter technology is a current field of interest.

For two-phase flow in general (eg that experienced at wellheads) much research has been initiated on the modelling side (ref. University of TUlsa. Statoil). However practical correlations are not generally encouraged among operator production staff, so that such investigations are strictly limited and viewed as academic.

However it is felt that proration of wells joined to common separators can only be achieved by some form of correlation of pressure drop across an orifice (e.g, a choke) together with sampled flow measurements.

Scada

It is possible to redesign differential pressure instruments to give 20 kHZ responses. Normally, pressure variations are filtered out.

Orifice flow metering, despite considerable knowledge of accuracies is not used heavily in leak detection. They are limited to pipelines below 36" diameter and generally have poor turndown characteristics. At block valves pressure and temperatures measurements are used alone.

If in the future. laser flow measurement devices fall to 10 $ or so, general flow meter accuracies along the pipeline may be possible.

In leak detection retrofit applications the clamp on version of the Ultrasonic flowmeter is of particular relevance to acoustic leak detection systems.

Such a noise correlator system recently used on an urban water distribution network in Italy covering 341 kilometres of cast iron pipe sections in which 163 leaks were detected over a period of 6 months. These varied from pin-hole size to full rupture [Ref.4I].

Scada RTU developments

Most remote Telemetry Units (RTU's) have a measure of on-board processing ability for signal conditioning, range computation and signal conversion. There is a perception that part of the leak detection calculation procedure normally performed by real time models can be performed at RTU level. The objective would be to relieve central processor loads and avoid data transmission losses. A suitable algorithmic approach has yet to be developed in which the equations of flow for a long pipeline can be suitably partitioned and networked.

Future directions for HSE

The route which HSE may wish to follow is as below:

1. To develop an experiment via HR or HRA with view to cross bench-marking products.

2. In conjunction with pipeline operators, initiate a three year programme on selecting one (or preferably several) illS products, with comprehensive approach to recording results.

3. Produce tightened up LDS requirements for transmission to operators, for comments.

4. Liaise strongly with!P, UKOA, AP and particularly the latter. This should involve a visit to both API and University of Idaho, plus pipeline operators in the USA.

5. Develop pipeline model and sensitivity functions to allow the HSE:To try any leaks at any position To check sensitivity of model

To formulate sensitivity studies of LDS vendors This facility at HSE offices shall be applicable to any pipeline, and will enable the HSE to exercise safety scenarios e.g, a leak near to a population, such as the Forties pipeline.

41

6. Instigate a limited group of LnS specialists (non vendor based) who represent pipeline knowledge, numerical analysis, signal analysis as potential sources of advice to the HSE.

7. Periodically (at two year intervals) review new sensor technology.

8. A specific in-depth, assessment of one or two majors be attempted (of which Arameo is possibly the most important) to ascertain real, across-tho-board experience of Leak Detection Systems.

9. To support an investigation into the practical developments and limits of low cost, high accuracy metering.

42

6. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

6.1 PUBLISHED DATA

Performance data quoted in this study have been taken from approximately 30 Technical publication. In addition, use is made of a number of sensitivity studies undertaken by leak detection vendors on proprietary pipelines.

Although there is insufficient field data to form a normalised and consistent basis for comparing leak detection methods the data that are available does indicate an order of magnitude performance rating. The general lack of data for gas transmission systems in particular presents a problem. Study results are therefore largely typical of liquid systems such as Crude Oil or Ethylene.

It is felt that additional data sources may help to reflne results but will not add greatly to the conclusions that are drawn. This is supported mainly by the fact that the sensitivity of internal leak detection systems is strongly affected by fluid compressibility and those techniques based on line fill balance or expansion wave monitoring indicate an equally degraded performance in gas applications.

Vendor performance data quoted in this study are taken from published results of successful field trials. Care has been taken to avoid any reliance on vendor claims that could be regarded as optimistic. By and large the performance of all leak detection systems is dependent on instrument accuracy, the extent of the instrumentation, the length of the pipeline and the physical process being monitored. There are of course vendor variations within each methodology but no attempt is made to rate these in any preferential way. Most groups have leading exponents that are well known.

The general view is that leak detection is a growing industry, that market opportunities for new products or developments in existing technology are mainly vendor driven and that progress is not necessarily applied uniformly across the market place.

Published data indicate the main division in leak technologies is between:

Peak transient detection (NPW and acoustic) Model-based detection

Other methods (optic fibre, sniffer, radioactive tracing)

6.2 LEAK STATISTICS

There appears to be no worldwide register of pipeline leaks, although there are records of spillage volumes and incidents associated with gas pipelines and the DOT registers all leak occurences over the last five years (including cause) in the USA. Gas accidents (assumed to be proportional to leakages) have been traditionally higher per pipeline mile than liquid incidents.

Within the British Gas network the bulk of gas line incidents resulting in leakages are due to external corrosion, particularly in small bore pipes (less than 13" 0.0) and to mechanical damage inflicted by construction, drainage and other operations endemic to onshore pipelines. Whereas gas incidents are far more frequent they have less impact on the environment than a liquid spillage and are less costly. The consequential damage to property caused by one liquid pipeline accident for example is recorded at $40 million ([Ref.40] DOT Research & Special Programs Administration Summary of Liquid Pipeline Accidents. 1977).

Reported estimates indicate that O'()OO6% of total U.S.A. pipeline throughput by volume is lost through leaks each year. There are no comparative figures for the U.K. or Europe.

6.3 MODEL-ASSISTED LEAK DETECTION

There is a large commitment still to simple volume balance and rate of change methods ([Ref.35] API software-based pipeline leak detection survey, 1991). These have always been low cost software options suitable for stable pipeline operations but vulnerable in applications where tine pack can change significantly. There is evidence to suggest, for

43

example, that false alarms caused by operational transients are commonly dealt with by switching off the volume balance algorithm and resetting it when operations stabilize. The leak detection system is unavailable fur an unspecified amount of time in these circumstances,

There are no compliance rules at present that require a minimum IDS availability taking into account the range of operational transients expected in a pipeline. Future consideration could be given to a structured approach to LDS availability in which a high performance system would be retro--fitted to replace a less reliable system as the pipeline ages.

Future preferences for compensated volume balance methods (API survey [Ref.35]) show a growing awareness of the deficiency in simple volume balance methods to account for line pack changes. This may be associated with the growth of NGL lines, ethylene lines and Natural Gas lines in which line pack can be quite volatile and in which a stable flow pattern would be the exception rather than the rule.

There is an apparent acceptance among transient model vendors that the heavily instrumented dynamic model approach can provide a more comprehensive solution base than conventional volume balance systems or, for example, PPA systems.

With regard to PPA the background view is that this technology will not perform when there are unforeseen operational transients and that statistically based filter techniques used by PPA are vulnerable to false alarming. On the other hand, the method is less vulnerable to the total pipeline instrumentation, being localised to a selected point or points.

The API survey reveals that there is a growing interest in Real Time Transient models and it is felt that this is driven less by cost constraint and more by pipeline integrity issues. The application of these models is by no means widely accepted and they compete with other methods on cost and performance in a large number of cases. Volume balance methods still predominate as the most popular leak detection package (see Table 6.1 below).

Table 6.1 Order of preference

Past Future
1. Volume balance Vohune balance with line
pack correction
2. Rate of change methods Rate of change methods
3. Volume balance with line Volume balance
pack correction
4. Other Other Notes :

1. • Other , software methods include PPA, Real Time models with flow and pressure deviations analysis.

2. Volume balance is taken to be the same as Mass balance.

3. Volume balance with line pack correction is commonly referred to as 'Compensated Volume balance'.

The original interests in leak detection shown by Logica, ESD-Scicon, University of Munich, GasUnie appear to have faded and the Novocorp product (ex Covcon) is less prominent. Only three model based vendors ( SSI, Stoner-Drem, and LicConsult) demonstrate stability and commitment; while there are potential recruits to their ranks (e.g. HAL) the field is strictly limited.

Other technologies such as Wavealert and Acouatic emission have limited application. Portable acoustic systems are frequently used where pinpoint accuracy is needed (e.g, buried pipes in a water distribution system) and are often used in conjunction with other detection

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systems (e.g, IWI88 balance). There has been no recent investment in the Wavealert system and it is generally regarded as not state-of-the-art (this is supported by Spectra- Tek's (UK) virtual abandonment of the product), although Ruhrgas and other organisations are very supportive of the Wavealert technology, especially for shorter pipelines.

The pressure point analysis (PPA) method is a form of Wavealert with more sophiaicated filtering/voting.

Although widely sold it is difficult to rank this product as superior to model based systems, especially during transient operations.

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7. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES

7.1 CONCLUSIONS

• Taking into account all the evidence. including latest innovations, the prime methods of leak detection are:

physical observation

mathematical modelling

Of these mathematical modelling appears to offer future advantages, but it cannot yet be said that the technology is mature.

• The performance of leak detection systems, as reported in papers, by survey, or by discussions with operators, and vendors is difficult to validate. Users and vendors may exaggerate the best features of performance and the real operational experience of false alarms versus successes in integrity monitoring is difficult to elicit.

• Much of the literature cannot be compared or normalised. For instance leak performance is given for pipelines where no flow. density or pressure data are available, and leaks are classified variably as either hole size, or percentages of flow. Short, small pipelines in particular are different from long pipelines. The leak detection method chosen shall be based on the pipeline to be measured.

• The legislation in general implies for the future an increasing sophistication of model based leak detection methods, based on greater computer power, better techniques such as training, the use of estimation and better presentation to the operator.

• The role of responsibility for performance of leak detection systems requires to be clarified - the interaction between operator, leak detection vendor and other systems elements of the pipeline (including instrumentation) make the concept: of responsibility for a working system too diffuse. If the system works the correct functioning and the response to its notifications must be verifiable and recordable.

• Technological areas where improvements can clearly be made are in:

utilisation of intelligence at block valves and stations (leak detection to be carried out within the SCADA RTU)

weighting of instrumentation at every point to take account of drift, failure, offset and other inaccuracies

correct matching of pipeline sections to the leak detection model sections (such techniques may cany a risk of false alarms due to increased sensitivity).

• The remaining systems which appear to offer the most promise are radioactive tracing and pressure point analysis (PPA) neither of which utilises pipeline models. There are no significant new techniques in view although neural networks and sampling (LASP) must be considered. The applicability of non-model based systems under transient operations (apart from the leak) is questionable.

• Leak: testing facilities (preferably into contained vessels) should be a part of the implementation of a pipeline system. Regular testing bench marks should also be included in the leak detection vendor deliverables, so as to give some performance measure of the detection system against a real leak,

• The best practical accuracy in the judgement of Bechtel of the leak detection systems attainable in terms of warning that a leak has occurred is considered to be:

+ 4 % crude oil

+ 12% gas

+ 8% ethylene

Here the percentages are expressed in terms of design flow and detection time of 20-30 minutes assumed. Vendors may well provides better figuees from these conservative performances,

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•

There is in existence no comparative bench marking of competing leak detection products. It is recommended that particular investigations be made into the experience of large operators who have simultaneous experience of several competing systems.

The freedom given to licensees is helped by the very broad guidelines of the existing legislation ('there shall be a form of pipeline integrity monitoring.')

There is a requirement for a standard in terms of either hole size, percentage of actual flow or percentage of maximum flow in order that leak performance can be standardised. Risk of leak consequence shall be taken into account along with leak: size.

The normalisation techniques developed under the sponsorship of the API (1993) suggest that minimum sensitivities may be independently specified to hold for a range of pipelines.

The costs of software based leak detection are abnonnally high in terms of signal processing and in comparison with hardware. This is largely due to the R&D nature of the application software and its configuration. The tuning of leak: detection systems usually remains the province of the supplier. Since these tuning skills are proprietary, the operator may remain supplier dependent, even after delivery of the system.

Operational information is not generally available in a fonn to permit the creation of a classified data base of leaks, apart from the DOE (USA) reports.

Third party validation is not used to any extent - in design or testing. In particular no standard pipeline dynamic readings or model outputs are available that might be applied in testing a leak detection system.

The technology is so diffuse, in terms of requirements, application and performance as to require firm attention from safety authorities. At the moment, although clearly related to environment and personnel security, the connection of leak detection with formal engineering design is minimal.

Sensitivity calculations could be a mandatory requirement for any model based leak detection system, with vendor commitment to the applicability of such calculations to the pipeline in question bearing in mind all operating conditions.

Despite difficulties in applying third party testing, independent checks on sensitivity may be useful. Additionally, factory testing may benefit from third party comparisons carried out either on or off-line.

Pipeline Operating companies be required to take on a degree of responsibility for the leak detection performance, independent of contractual arrangements with the leak detection vendor. In particular, they shall state the risk figures on which their integrity monitoring approach is based.

Pipeline Operating companies should ideally be obliged to regularly test leak detection software performance and calibrations in a varied manner to check out the expected performances for leak: detectability, size estimates and location estimates and hence bear the mobility for the operation of the leak detection.

Performance specifications and actual field performance characteristics should apply to both steady state and transient operations (where the pipeline system undergoes appreciable transients in the normal course of operation). The particular case of the "shut-in" state is also of importance, although monitoring sensors are usually outside the shut-in section.

Training for pipeline operating staff should be available to ensure an acceptable response to leak indications of varying size, and based on the pipeline hydraulics.

Flow metering at the inlet and outlet points of new pipelines should be considered. It is in this area of low cost metering, which would provide accurate measurement at both ends of the pipeline, where major improvements are to be made.

In the sense that national and community legislation is founded on reasonable practice, the regulations for pipeline integrity worldwide could be usefully investigated further (especially regarding individual USA States). The commonality of the more stringent requirements is expected to reflect the modern regulatory trends world-wide.

HSE might consider the acquisition or development of a model to permit reasonably approximate simulation of pipeline dynamics and imposed leaks, in order to be able to run different scenarios to evaluate the effects of a leak.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

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7.2

•

The attempts by workers (notably the University of Idaho) to normalise transient effects, pipeline dimensions ought to be further investigated to see how and if leak detection responses for differing pipelines can be put on a similar footing.

The API should similarly be approached. as representing possibly the most forward authority in setting up leak detection standards, to explore common ground.

Laboratory experimental pipeline support for evaluating leak detection systems is thought to be of limited value without substantial pipeline interaction and funding. Such experimental facilities may however be of use in signal processing methods for instrumentation.

It is our judgement that ideally all operators in the future should be obliged to carry out and document regular leak detection tests, and also to present performance in a standard manner. This means that, for instance, leak size would be quoted in m3/h or tonnes/hr or barrelsfhr as well as in terms of percentage of mass flow rate at design, actual and maximum conditions. All pipeline and property calculations relating to the pipeline shall be lodged with the test results. The requirements for such testing and therefore documentation could (for example) be set up by a body such as the HSE.

OSHA 1910.119 be reviewed to assess what overseas (US) regulations imply in terms of documentation, additional to those required for the UK Safety Case for offshore installations.

Leak detection responses, as in general response to emergencies, ought to form part of the pipeline operating philosophy at an early stage of engineering.

•

•

•

•

•

RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES

As a 'road-map' to potential users of leak detection systems, the first questions to be asked (and steps to be considered) in sequence are:

1. What are the expected operational features of the pipeline?

2. What are the regulatory requirements (safety, environment, etc.) ?

3. What risks apply in the case of leaks and what is the role of leak detection in

minimizing the consequences of an unexpected leak ?

4. What are the physical properties of pipeline and transported fluid?

5. Where is metering located (hopefully ~t the ends of the pipeline) ?

6. What is the accuracy, location of instrumentation along the pipeline?

7. Which is the most appropriate (cost efficient) leak: detection system for the pipeline?

8. What will then be the responsibilities of the operator I user ?

A successful pipeline monitoring system should meet then the following criteria:

1. System installation and maintenance should be relatively easy to perform.

2. The system should have acceptable coverage of the entire pipeline system that is being monitored. There should be no 'dead zones' that are not monitored.

3. The system should allow good localization definition of a failure. The resolution of the system should be sufficient to direct repair crews to the failure site.

4. The system should be essentially an 'alann'-type system that activates only when a failure has occurred, Monitoring and support crew should be small.

5. Installation and operational costs should be acceptable to undersea pipeline users.

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APPENDIX A

LDS SPECIALISTS & CENTRES

1.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The authors were influenced in their search for information by the need to be concerned firstly with systems available DOW to the pipeline operators. It was envisaged at an early stage that such information would reside largely with the pipeline operators, the pipeline engineers and the proprietary system designers and suppliers. The authors believe that this was indeed the case.

The secondary search for emerging systems and technologies of promise was expected to lead more into the field of technology research at academic/technological centres and to be supported for the most advanced "new-wave" systems by comment from the proprietary system designers and suppliers.

1.2 PROMINENT SPECIALISTS

The following lists name those companies or organisations which, in the opinion of the authors, may be regarded as prominently involved in illS and able to respond with effective contributions to an understanding of the subject. They are grouped by type of organisation and shown with their UK centre for LDS information. Where applicable, the country of origin is shown.

1.2.1 Pipeline Opsrlltors

British Gas

• British Petroleum Shell

Phillips Petroleum

• Esso

• Mobil Oil

• Statoil

• GasUnie

1.2.2 Pipeline Engineers

• Bechtel

• Brown & Root

• Binnie & Partners

ESBI Atkins International Howard Humphreys & Partners

• British Pipeline Agency

• John Brown Engineers & Constructors

• Costain Oil, Gas & Process

• European Marine Contractors

• Pipeline Construction Group

• Press Construction

• J.P .. Kenny

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1.2.3

•

Proprietary System Designers and Suppliers ABA Technology

Drem Incorporated (Stoner-Drem) BDS Scicon

Hydraulic Analysis Ltd Trident Consultants

J.P. Kenny (also in 1.2.2) UCConsult

Novocorp International (Sandwell) Modisette InclReal Time Systems Spectra- Tek

Scientific Software - Intercomp Stoner Associates

Tracerco

BFA Technologies

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

In addition, many operator and training simulation vendors are producing high definition products which can rapidly provide the affects of a leak through validated real-time models. However the leak detection voting algorithms do not form part of these products.

Section 1.3 of this Appendix describes in brief detail the scope of LDS services available from the proprietary system designers and suppliers listed above.

1.3 PROPRIETARY SYSTEM DESIGNERS AND SUPPLIERS:

SCOPE OF SERVICES

The scope of proprietary services on offer from the companies listed above in Section 1.2.3 are briefly described with reference for each company to:

general company background

specific LDS abilities.

a) ABA Technology

The petroleum services section of this Harwell based technology has produced transient pipeline models, notably for two-phase flow. Although pipe rupture and leaks have been studied and validated, there is no emphasis on leak detection algorithms as such.

b) Drem Incorporated (now Stoner-Deem)

Houston based company specialising in the simulation of the dynamic behaviour of pipeline systems. Computer models built for gas and liquid pipelines over approximately 22 years. Implementation of off-line programs as well as real time systems. Developed state-of-the-art numerical simulation techniques, in particular a pipe network model to simulate pressure and flow transients for gas or liquid systems, incorporating LOS evaluation.

c) EDS-Scicon

Formerly significant but currently believed to have reduced their interest and technical capability in this area, although neural networks offered in the pipeline integrity monitoring application.

d) Hydraulic Analysis Ltd

This organisation has developed a new leak detection product which has been validated, and is about to be marketed. Currently applicable to gas pipelines and liquid pipelines, the commercial product will truget leak detection applications requiring high accuracy.

e) Trident Consultants

Trident are a U.K. based company specializing in LDS studies, Dynamic Simulation of pipeline and process systems and Safety and Risk analysis since 1982. Licensed Stoner-Drew software for IDS Studies.

"Leakimder": An on-line real time computer program using data available in a SCADA database to detect the existence and location of leaks in a pipeline.

"Leaktester": A tool to quantify leak detection sensitivity and leak detection threshold.

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"UQPVT": A program simulating steady state and transient flow of crude and/or refined petroleum products in pipelines where the fluid parameters (PV &1) are influential.

n) Tracerco:

An ICI subsidiary with a background of more than 30 years experience offering services based on radioisotope technology applied to flow measurement and related problems on continuously operating processes.

0) EFA Technologies Inc.

A Sacramento (CA) based provider of PPA, a low cost statistical analyser of pressure transients, widely used. Formidable claims for performance, e.g. in 80% of applications can detect 114 inch holes, but achievements not based on model calculations. Product is essentially similar to Wavealert, plus more discrimination.

There are other sources of leak detection systems, such as the University of Munich, or organisations who have taken over a product and enhanced the software (e.g., Gas Unie),

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APPENDIX B REFERENCES

1. Whaley RS, Nicholas RE, Vanheer JD

Tutorial on Software Based Leak Detection PSIG Oct 1992

2. South West Research Institute

"New Methods for rapid leak detection in offshore pipelines"

3. Turner N.C. "Hardware and Software Techniques for pipeline integrity and leak detection monitoring." Offshore Europe Aberdeen Sept 1991

4. Farmer EJ "A new approach 10 pipeline leak detection" Pipeline Industry June 1989

5. Rachford, H.H., Dupont, T

"A transient remote integrity monitor for pipelines using standard SCADA measurements"

Seminar paper, INTERPIPE conference, Houston, Texas, 6th February 1980

6. Teledyne Geotech, "LASP Leak: Alarm System for Pullutants", TX Marketing Information

7. Sperl, J.L .• 'System pinpoints leaks on Point Arguello Offshore Line" OOJ, Sept 9 1991

8. Issei, W., 'New alarm system permits early detection of smalileak:s' Pipeline Industry, Dec 1993

9. Butler, N.C. "Pipeline Leak Detection Techniques", Pipes & Pipelines International,

April 1982

10. CRC Bethany Int. Inc., "Transient Pressure Wave Monitor Systems", Wave Bulletin, Dec. 1979

11. Hemp, J. "Theory of eddy currents in Electro Magnetic flowmeters" Journal of Physics, 1991

12. Baker, R.C., "Response of bulk flowmeters to multipbase flows", Proc. I.Mech.E. 1991

13. Sheppard, C.P., Russel, D. "The Application of Artificial neutral networks to non-intrusive multi-phase metering" (SD-Scicon UK Ltd & CALtec Ltd). Control Engineering practice Journal, March 1993.

14. Liou, J.C.P., Brockway, C.G.,

"Pipeline variable uncertainties and their effects on Leak Detectability", Proc. of the API Pipeline Cybernetics Symposium, 1992, Houston

15. Van Reet, J.D. and Skogman, K.D. 'The Effect of Measurement Uncertainty on Rea!

Time Pipeline Modelling Applications' .

16. Scientific Software Inc.

"Instnunentation for Real-Time Pipeline Modelling".

17. Fumess,R.A. and Van Reet, J.D.

"Pipeline Leak Detection Techniques". September 1986.

18. Braathen, N.F. and Devik, O.

"Leak Detection and Avoidance in Offshore Pipeline Systems". Det Norske Veritas, Norway.

19. Van Der Hoeven, T.

"Gas Network State Estimation with the Equal Error Fraction Method". IMACS World Congress, Oslo, August 1985.

20. Giles, Chris.

"Integrated Control Systems for Product Pipelines".

The Institute of Petroleum, Petroleum Review. November 1989.

21. Ellul,I.R.

"Advances in Pipeline Leak Detection"

The Institute of Petroleum, Petroleum Review. November 1989.

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