27 Impact of Climate Change On Nigerias Economy

Impact of Climate
Change on Nigeria’s
Economy
Final Report
February 2009
www.erm.com
Delivering sustainable solutions in a more competitive world

FINAL REPORT
Impact of Climate
Change on Nigeria’s
Economy
February 2009
REVISION RECORD
Revision Date Comments

00 11.09.08 Draft for internal review
01 12.09.08 Issued to DFID
02 08.12.08 Final draft for internal review
03 09.12.08 Final submission to DFID
04 24.02.09 Final Final submission to DFID
Prepared by: James Spurgeon, Catherine Wasilewski, Professor
Anthony Ikpi & Simon Foster
Reviewed by: Tim Geyer
This report has been prepared by Environmental Resources

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within the terms of the Contract with the client, incorporating our
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We disclaim any responsibility to the client and others in respect of

any matters outside the scope of the above.
This report is confidential to the client and we accept no responsibility

of whatsoever nature to third parties to whom this report, or any part
thereof, is made known. Any such party relies on the report at their
own risk.
For and on behalf of
Environmental Resources Management Ltd
Approved by: Tim Geyer
Signed:
Position: Partner
Date: 24th February 2009

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Nigeria is likely to be one of the most negatively impacted countries in the

world as a result of climate change. Its risks are particularly high due to its
low lying coastline that is highly populated with a heavy concentration of
GDP generating industry and infrastructure. In addition, the north of the
country forms part of the Sahel which is at risk of further desertification and
droughts. Flooding, water shortages, increased diseases and associated social
disruption could well give rise to a vicious cycle of economic degradation and
social conflict.
Based on IPCC climate change assumptions, latest research findings relating

to sea level rise, and results of a consultation exercise in Nigeria, a preliminary
Integrated Assessment Model adapted for this study predicts that climate
change could result in a loss in GDP of between 6% and 30% by 2050, worth
an estimated US$ 100 to 460 billion dollars. By 2020, if no adaptation is
implemented, between 2-11% of GDP could potentially be lost.
These numbers assume minimal adaptation. By undertaking appropriate

adaptation actions and strategies, much of these impacts can potentially be
mitigated.
The above impacts are based on possible sea level rise from 1990 levels to 0.3
m by 2020 and 1m by 2050, and rise in temperature of up to 3.2°C by 2050
under a high climate change scenario. The low estimate predictions are for
sea level rise of 0.1 m and 0.2 m by 2020 and 2050 respectively, and a
temperature increase of 0.4 to 1°C over the same time periods.
All the main sectors of Nigeria’s economy will be impacted by climate change,
but in particular agriculture. Infrastructure such as water, transport and
power are also extremely susceptible and will result in knock on effects to
other parts of the economy, especially wholesale and retail. It is possible that
some aspects of the economy may gain, such as the production and sales of
renewable energy, flood protection, medicine, building cooling equipment etc.
All regions will be impacted, particularly the southern coastal regions and the
far North of Nigeria. The more central regions will be less affected but were
grouped as part of the overall North region. The model predicts losses of 8-
30% for the North, 5-25% for the SE and SS, and 7-34% for the SW and Lagos.
Attaining the MDGs will also suffer as a result of climate change. In particular
Goal 1 on hunger and poverty and Goal 7 on environmental sustainability will
be affected in a major adverse way.
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 0082608/DIFID/NIGERIA CLIMATE CHANGE FEB 2009

I
Climate change impacts will be worse for the vulnerable such as the poor, old,
women, children and for those that depend on agriculture for their
livelihoods. This is because the vulnerable are less able to fend for themselves
and are less able to adapt to changing circumstances. In terms of the spatial
distribution of impacts, those in the far north and adjacent to the coastline are
far more at risk.
This study has identified a broad range of adaptation actions and strategies,
highlighting those that may be relatively cost-effective. Many relate to
strengthening the robustness and resilience to agriculture related impacts.
Other key adaptation requirements include conducting a national coast
defence strategy, protecting key infrastructure, and facilitating water
collection at a local and household level etc.
Extensive data gaps exist with respect to assessing impacts and adaptation
strategies. However, it is also difficult to obtain relevant information that
does exist. Key data gaps include: climatic data and trends, baseline natural
resource and socio-economic conditions, location and importance of assets,
data on extreme events such as drought, flooding and coastal flooding, socio-
economic data at a local and regional level etc.
Nigeria currently has institutions traditionally mandated to provide data

relating to climate change and associated impacts, such as the Nigerian
Meteorological agency (NIMET). However, such institutions appear to have
problems generating and disseminating relevant information.
There is some good academic capacity related to climate change expertise

within the country, in various institutions. However, coordination of
expertise and funding for research are lacking.
Most critically, Nigeria does not yet have a national climate change policy.
However, a national policy framework on climate change in Nigeria is being
developed, which will be put forward in April 2009 at the forthcoming
Nigerian National Climate Change Summit.
There is also a plan to mainstream the new climate change policy into the
National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy 2 (NEEDS 2)
programme, which is presently ongoing. Furthermore, Nigeria has recently
developed a draft National Adaptation Plan of Action, which may be available
by the end of this year.
Even with such policies and plans in place, there is a lack of a centralised
institution that can champion and coordinate climate change activities in the
country. Developing and implementing piecemeal solutions and projects will
not solve the country’s climate change problems. It is mandatory that Nigeria
move away from this model and embrace an integrated approach.

II
The recommended engagement strategy for HMG via DFID and the High
Commission, include the following seven actions:
1) Support a study to undertake a stock-take of existing and proposed

climate change data, studies and resources relevant to Nigeria.
2) Support the undertaking of a more detailed spatial analysis of key sectors

and geographical locations at risk from climate change, linked to a
feasibility study of adaptation options.
3) Facilitate raising the profile of climate change within Nigeria to the public
via the media, and amongst key interested parties through workshops.
4) Promote and support the creation of a national Climate Change

Commission (or similar).
5) Support an initiative to build capacity in climate change skills within the

Ministry for Environment and other Government Ministries.
6) HMG should work closely on climate change issues with key industries
and industry representatives.
7) Work with the Ministry of Environment and selected states, to develop

projects that might be eligible for carbon credits, or would otherwise
build up the adaptive capacity of Nigeria.

III
CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 BACKGROUND 1
1.2 STUDY OBJECTIVES 1
1.3 APPROACH 2
1.4 REPORT STRUCTURE 3
2 NIGERIAN ECONOMY 4
2.1 CURRENT GDP & GROWTH RATES 4

2.2 CURRENT POVERTY & DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES 5
2.3 CURRENT MDG STATUS 7
2.4 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS 9
3 NIGERIAN CLIMATE 10
3.1 CURRENT & HISTORIC NATIONAL CLIMATE 10

3.1.1 Historic changes in climate 10
3.1.2 Current climate 10
3.2 PREDICTED FUTURE CLIMATIC CHANGES 12
3.2.1 Changes in average temperature and precipitation 12
3.2.2 Changes in sea level rise 13
3.2.3 Other predicted changes 13
3.2.4 Final caveat 14
4 POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FROM CLIMATE CHANGE TO NIGERIA 15
4.1 INTRODUCTION 15
4.2 SPECIFIC SECTOR IMPLICATIONS 18
4.3 REGIONAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 21
5 ECONOMIC IMPACT MODEL RESULTS 23
5.1 INTRODUCTION 23
5.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE GDP 24
5.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR MDGS IN NIGERIA 26
5.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR VULNERABLE GROUPS 28
6 ADAPTATION 30
6.1 OPTIONS FOR ADAPTATION 30

6.2 OBSTACLES TO ADAPTATION 34
6.3 NATIONAL ADAPTATION PLAN 34
7 DATA & INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS 35

7.1 DATA REQUIREMENTS 35
7.2 INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS 37
8 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 41
8.1 CONCLUSIONS 41
8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND WHERE HMG CAN BEST ENGAGE 43
9 REFERENCES 46
ANNEX A SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION OUTPUT

ANNEX B CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIOS AND LATEST RESEARCH FINDINGS
ANNEX C SECTORAL AND REGIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS
ANNEX D COMMENTS ON A DISEASE PERSPECTIVE
ANNEX E KEY MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
ANNEX F NIGERIA’S PROPOSED CLIMATE CHANGE PROJECTS
LIST OF FIGURES, TABLES AND BOXES
Figure 2.1 Trends of sectoral contribution to Nigerian GDP in real terms (%)
2001-2004 5
Figure 2.2 Relative poverty incidence map of Nigeria by state, 2004 6
Figure 3.1 Vegetation map of Nigeria 11
Figure.4.1 Climate change and Africa 15
Figure 4.2 Map of regional impacts of climate change in Nigeria 21
Figure 5.1 Potential climate change impact on Nigeria’s GDP under a medium
growth scenario 25
Table 2.1 Trends in relative poverty levels, 1980-2004, Nigeria 6

Table 2.2 Occupational groups by gender in Nigeria, 2004 7
Table 2.3 Nigeria’s progress towards the MDG goals 8
Table 2.4 Projections of GDP growth in %, draft needs-2, Nigeria 9
Table 3.1 Projected increase in average temperature of Nigeria (∆ degrees celsius) 12
Table 3.2 Projected increase in precipitation in Nigeria (∆ mm) 12
Table 3.3 Projected increase in sea level rise (∆ metres) 13
Table 4.1 Summary of key impacts of climate change in Nigeria 17
Table 4.2 Key climate change impacts on GDP sectors 19
Table 4.3 Key regional climate change impacts by GDP sector 22
Table 5.1 Percentage loss of national GDP from climate change (medium gap
growth) in different years 24
Table 5.2 Percentage loss of sectoral GDP from climate change (medium GDP
growth) in 2050 25
Table 5.3 Range of percentage loss of GDP through cc by 2050 (assuming medium
GDP growth) 26
Table 5.4 Affects of climate change on MDG goals in Nigeria 26
Table 6.1 Adaptation options for agricultural management 30
Table 6.2 Adaptation options for agricultural sub-sectors 31
Table 6.3 Adaptation options for infrastructure 32
Table 6.4 Other sector-based adaptation options in Nigeria 32
Box 4.1 The worst case scenario, D. Okali 16

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AR Assessment Report
DFID Department for International Development
ERM Environmental Resources Management
FRN Federal Republic of Nigeria
GCM Global Climate Model
GCSI Global Change Strategies International
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HIV/AIDS Human immunodeficiency virus / Acquired immune deficiency
syndrome
HMG Her Majesty’s Government
IAM Integrated Assessment Model
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LSMS Living Standard Measurement Study
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MOE Ministry of Environment (of FRN)
NASRDA National Space Research and Development Agency
NCCC National Climate Change Commission
NEEDS National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
NEPA National Electric Power Authority
NEST Nigerian Environmental Study Action Team
NGO Non-governmental organization
NIMET Nigerian Meteorological agency
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PIRC UK’s Public Interest Research Centre
PMU Programme management Unit
SRES Special Report on Emissions Scenarios
SU Steering/Advisory group(s)
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
UK United Kingdom
UKCIP UK Climate Impact Programme
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
Nigeria hopes to be in the world’s top 20 biggest economies by 2020. In order

for Nigeria to reach this goal, the strengthening of non-oil growth is essential.
However, global climate change is one of the largest threats to Nigeria’s
development and economy. Particular threats are posed to Nigeria’s
competitiveness in agriculture from changes to rainfall patterns in the Sahel
resulting in increased desertification and flooding, and to economic activity in
Lagos, Nigeria’s commercial hub, which has recently been identified among
the 21 cities most likely to be affected by rising sea levels. Other threats
include effects on power generation and distribution due to the effects of river
levels on major dams, on transport infrastructure vital for trading, and
possibly on oil and gas production and investment.
Despite the recognition of the serious threats posed by climate change to the
Nigerian economy, the need to address this issue is not incorporated into
national policy or regulation. At present addressing climate change is the
responsibility of the Federal Ministry of the Environment, and focuses largely
on individual projects. Such an approach is unlikely to enable appropriate
and cost-effective adaptation to climate change for the country as a whole.
There is therefore a strong need for policy to address climate change at the
Federal and State levels, and to ensure that the private sector adequately
factors the risks posed by climate change into risk assessment, investment
planning and project execution.
Environmental Resources Management (ERM) has been commissioned by the

Department for International Development (DFID) to undertake an analysis of
the economic impact of climate change on sectoral and regional growth in
Nigeria in order to provide the information critical for raising the profile of
Climate Change in Nigeria and to contribute to the argument for the
mainstreaming of climate change within Nigeria’s development plans.
1.2 STUDY OBJECTIVES
The objective of this study is to provide ‘ballpark’ quantified estimates of the

impact of climate change on Nigeria’s future Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
growth and ability to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in
order to facilitate the integration of climate change concerns within Nigeria’s
development plans.

1
Specific outputs requested were as follows:
• An economic assessment of the impacts of climate change on Nigeria,

including GDP growth and attainment of the MDGs;
• An analysis of the economic impact for Lagos state, and for different
regions (either geo-political zones or climatic zones), and, where
appropriate, sectors, particularly those which employ a large number of
people;
• An analysis of the cost of adaptation to climate change for Nigeria and for
Lagos state and identification, if appropriate, of sectors where relatively
more can be done in a cost-effective way;
• An analysis of the distributional impact on different demographic groups;
• A statement on gaps in data and an outline of the institutional
arrangements that need to be put in place to provide this data;
• A statement on the capacity of Nigerian organisations and institutions to
take forward climate change impact analysis and the design and
implementation of adaptation measures, and a view on where capacity
could most usefully be built;
• A statement on where Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) can best engage
to address the economic impacts of climate change and support
adaptation.
1.3 APPROACH
ERM undertook some initial consultation to identify some key experts within
the Nigerian research community, civil society and donor organisations.
Further consultation was then undertaken with these experts through face to
face interviews in Nigeria and an email questionnaire to obtain expert opinion
and data to inform the study. The key findings and details of the experts
consulted are included in the stakeholder consultation write up in Annex A.
Additional consultation was also undertaken with Dr Victor Fodeke, head of
the Ministry of Environment’s Climate Change Unit, who responded on behalf
of the Ministry of Environment. His input is incorporated within this report.
In addition, ERM conducted a detailed review of relevant information on the

Nigerian economy and climate change issues with respect to Nigeria and
Africa (see references). Furthermore, a climate change impact model has been
developed using Microsoft Excel based on the TORCH model that ERM
created for assessing the economic impact of climate change to businesses.
The model, and study in general, splits the economy into three different
regions based on the six geo-political zones of Nigeria that also link to the
different agro-ecological zones. The three regions are:
i) North (North-West Zone (NW), North-East Zone (NE), North-Central

Zone (NC));
ii) South West (SW) (which includes Lagos); and
iii) South-East (SE) and South-South Zones (SS).

2
The model and study also focuses on the three largest sectors, together with a
combined ‘other’ category, as follows:
• agriculture (42% of the Nigerian economy in 2005) comprising crops,

livestock, forests and fisheries;
• mining and quarrying (25%) comprising oil and gas (99% of it);
• wholesale and retail trade (14%); and
• the remaining nine main sectors combined as ‘other’ (giving a combined
total of the remaining 19%).
Although the study is particularly focussed on GDP and MDGs, it is

important to highlight that GDP is increasingly being questioned as an
appropriate indicator, particularly from a ‘sustainable development’
perspective (Daly, 2008; Scott Cato and Kennett, 1999; and Stiglitz, 2006).
Indeed, cutting down forests, cleaning up pollution damage and repairing
extreme weather damage can all result in short term GDP growth.
1.4 REPORT STRUCTURE
The structure of the report is as follows:
Section 1: Provides the background, objectives and approach adopted for the
study.
Section 2: Sets the scene by giving an overview of the current and future
predicted Nigerian economy and MDGs.
Section 3: Details the current and future predicted climatic conditions in

Nigeria and West Africa.
Section 4: Highlights the potential impacts of the change in climate detailed in

Section 3, upon the main economic sectors and the three main regions in
Nigeria identified above.
Section 5: Details the results of the climate impact model on GDP at a sectoral
and regional level, also providing an overview of the national impacts on the
MDGs.
Section 6: Outlines potential alternative adaptation strategies and actions, and

indicates their relative cost-effectiveness.
Section 7: Discusses key data requirements and institutional capacity within

Nigeria in relation to climate change.
Section 8: Provides some conclusions and recommendations for action.

3
2 NIGERIAN ECONOMY
2.1 CURRENT GDP & GROWTH RATES
In contrast to the two previous decades, the Nigerian economy has expanded
at a rapid pace since 2000. According to UK-DFID estimates (Nigeria
Competitiveness and Growth, 2007), GDP per capita in current US dollars has
more than doubled between 2000 and 2005. Although part of this can be
explained by a rise in oil prices, real GDP rose by 39% in this period (IMF 2007
Country Economic Memorandum).
Moreover, non-oil GDP growth has accelerated significantly, reaching 7.4% in

2004 and 8.2% in 2005. First estimates (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008) for
2008 expect that real GDP growth will reach 6.8% thanks to strong non-oil
sector growth and increase in off-shore oil production. However, 2008 oil
production will remain below potential due to recent upsurge of violence in
the Niger Delta region. On the other hand, recent significant oil prices mean
that oil related GDP figures this year will grow substantially, although these
will be tempered by recent decline in oil prices. The overall global recession
may also slow down Nigeria’s growth over the coming few years.
Given the appalling conditions of the Nigerian economy in the 1990s, in 2004
the Government, launched The National Economic Empowerment and
Development Strategy (NEEDS, 2004-2007) (National Planning Commission,
2004) to reduce poverty, recover growth and foster development. According
to the IMF in 2007 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008), the performance of
NEEDS has been remarkable. For instance, the IMF reports that real GDP
annual growth rate averaged 6.6% in 2004-2006 as against the NEEDS target of
6.0%; oil sector annual growth rate averaged – 0.23% as against 0.0% targeted
for 2004 – 2006; and non-oil sector annual growth rate averaged 8.2% as
against the NEEDS target of 8.0%. However, much progress is still needed in
terms of poverty reduction, addressing inequalities, employment generation,
and provision of infrastructure and power (The Economist Intelligence Unit,
2008).
According to the IMF, Nigeria’s GDP (in current prices) for 2005 was US$ 112
billion (compared to US$ 46 billion in 2000). The relative contribution of
different sectors to GDP in Nigeria is shown in Figure 2.1 below. However, it
is worth pointing out the difficulty in obtaining accurate and consistent GDP
estimates for Nigeria, particularly over extended time periods.
4
Figure 2.1 Trends of Sectoral Contribution to Nigerian GDP in real terms (%) 2001-2004
Source: Poverty Profile for Nigeria, National Bureau of Statistics, 2005

Note: “Other” includes Solid mineral mining, Utilities, Hotels & Restaurants,
Transportation, Communications, Finance & Insurance, Business Services and Government Services. Since
2003, there has been decline in the contributions of these sectors to real GDP.
The oil and gas sector plays a large role in the Nigerian economy, accounting
for around 30% of the GDP between 2001 and 2004. Nigeria is a member of
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and possesses
the tenth largest proven reserves of oil in the world (36.2 billion barrels). It
ranks as the world’s eighth largest exporter of oil. However, on the other
hand, the agricultural sector has failed to keep pace with Nigeria’s rapid
population growth, so that the country, which once exported food, now relies
on imports to sustain itself (Library of Congress- Federal Research Division,
2008). The considerable fluctuations in price of oil will also strongly influence
the oil and gas related GDP over time.
2.2 CURRENT POVERTY & DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES
Poverty in Nigeria is multi-dimensional. Poor people are more likely to be

living in rural areas; to depend on natural resources for their livelihoods and
to be women, young or elderly. Most Nigerians still live in rural areas, yet
urban centres like Lagos grow quickly and welcome a growing number of
poor populations. Moreover, poverty rates in the northern regions are
substantially higher than in the south (World Bank Group and UK-DFID,
2005). The map shown in Figure 2.2 illustrates relative poverty by state and
clearly shows the northern states as having a higher incidence of poverty (ie in
red) than the southern ones (with the exception of Lagos).
5
Figure 2.2 Relative Poverty Incidence Map of Nigeria by State, 2004
KEY
20.0 to 42.9
43.0 to 63.4
63.6 to 95.1
Note: This map illustrates the distribution of “relative poverty”, which is based on a measure of
mean per capita household expenditure. Refer to the report p19 for the detailed methodology.
According to the National Bureau of Statistics of Nigeria, poverty levels

declined from 46.3% in 1985 to 42.7% in 1992, before rising sharply to 65.6% of
the population in 1996 (World Bank Group and UK-DFID, 2005). In terms of
numbers of individuals, the population of poor Nigerians increased four-fold
between 1980 and 1996, affecting 67.1 million people in 1996.
In 2004, the Nigerian Government decided to conduct a Living Standard

Measurement Study (LSMS)(1) to collect more reliable information and provide
basic welfare indicators for monitoring poverty alleviation programmes. The
survey found that relative poverty in Nigeria had decreased to 54.4% in 2004.
However, the population in poverty has maintained a steady increase between
1980 and 2004, as illustrated in Table 2.1. Note that it is thought that the
estimates prior to the 2004 figure are both not reliable and not comparable
with the 2004 figure (National Poverty Assessment, 2007). This tends to
explain the otherwise rather surprising fluctuations.
Table 2.1 Trends in Relative Poverty Levels, 1980-2004, Nigeria
Year Poverty Incidence Estimated Total Population Population in Poverty

1980 28.1% 65 m 18.26 m
1985 46.3% 75 m 34.73 m
1992 42.7% 91.5 m 39.07 m
1996 65.6% 102.3 m 67.11 m
2004 54.4% 126.3 m 68.70 m
(1) LSMS is a methodology developed and recommended by the World Bank
6
In spite of nearly 6% annual GDP growth rates between 2000 and 2005, and
significant progress (see section below) it is unlikely that Nigeria will manage
to reduce poverty level to about 28% and meet the MDG target (Nigeria
Competitiveness and Growth, UK DFID, 2007). This is mainly due to low
formal job creation rates, as well as to the fact that most of the workforce is
employed in low productivity activities in agriculture and in the informal
economy.
The repartition of the population by occupational groups is illustrated in Table

2.2.
Table 2.2 Occupational Groups by Gender in Nigeria, 2004
Occupational Group Male Female

Student/Retired/Unemployed/Inactive 32.52 46.16
Professional or Technical 5.84 2.79
Administration 0.25 0.07
Clerical 5.15 1.71
Sales and related activities 8.09 14.31
Services and related activities 3.48 11.39
Agriculture and forestry 36.06 20.09
Production and Transport 2.27 2.98
Manufacturing and Processing 2.05 0.04
Others 4.28 0.44
Total 100 100
2.3 CURRENT MDG STATUS
Nigeria’s current progress towards the MDG goals is summarised in Table 2.3,
which shows mixed progress. Significant progress has been made in
eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, achievement of universal primary
education, improving maternal health and developing a global partnership for
development. However, there are critical challenges in the health sector
where weak infrastructure, ineffective health services, low coverage of
immunization, and lack of access to skilled health care continue to hamper
progress(1). Progress reporting under the environmental sustainability goal is
hampered by a lack of data. However, there are a number of initiatives of
note taking place in Nigeria in this area, such as the agreement on Zero
Tolerance on Gas Flares by 2008 (IMF, 2007), which should improve health in
coastal areas.
(1) MDG Monitor, 2007. MDG factsheet: Nigeria. www.http://mdgmonitor.org/factsheets_00.cfm?c+NGA&cd+566
7
Table 2.3 Nigeria’s progress towards the MDG goals
MDG goal Progress Explanation(2)

icon(1)
1. Eradicate extreme Good progress towards goal. Poverty trend has continued
poverty and hunger to decline progressively from 70% in 1999 to 54% percent in
2005.
2. Achieve universal Steady progress towards goal. Net enrolment in primary
primary education education was 84.26 percent in 2005 compared to 81.1
percent in 2004.
3. Promote gender Mixed progress towards goal. The proportion of girls to
equality and boys in primary education (i.e. girls per 100 boys) has
empower of women improved from 79% in 2004 to 81% in 2005. However, the
proportion of women in non-agricultural wage
employment did not show any remarkable improvement in
2006.
4. Reduce child Little progress towards goal. Infant mortality rate (per 1000
mortality live births) deteriorated from 100 per 1000 births in 2003 to
110 per 1000 births in 2005.
5. Improve maternal Little progress towards goal. Mortality rate increase of 800
health per 100,000 live births reported in 2004 compared to 704 in
1999.
6. Combat Mixed progress towards goal. The prevalence of
HIV/AIDS, malaria HIV/AIDS fell from 5.8% in 2001 to 4.4% in 2005. Less
and other diseases progress reported for other diseases.
7. Ensure Progress towards goal not fully understood due to
environmental unavailability of data.
sustainability
8. Develop a global Good progress made in attaining goal. Per capita official
partnership for development assistance to Nigeria has increased from
development 2.3$US in 2004 to 4.0$US in 2005, but is still low.
Cancellation of Nigeria’s international debt has freed up an
additional $1 billion a year for poverty reduction.
Key to progress icons

Achieved
On track/very likely to be achieved
Possible to achieve if some changes are made
Off track
Insufficient information
The implications of climate change on reaching the MDGs in Nigeria are

addressed in Section 5.
(1) Status icons adapted from www.mdgmonitor.org

(2) Illustrative data adapted from: IMF, 2007. Nigeria Poverty reduction Strategy - Progress Report. IMF Country Report
No. 07/270.
8
2.4 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS
According to estimates by The Economist (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008),

annual economic growth in Nigeria should remain over 6% between 2009 and
2012, in spite of ongoing unrest in the Delta region.
The National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) expired

at the end of 2007 and is being replaced by the NEEDS-2 (2008-2011)
document, currently subject to consultation. The major growth drivers are
expected to remain agriculture and solid minerals. This is in accordance with
the President’s policy known as “Vision 2020” adopted in May 2007 which
aims at making Nigeria one of the 20 largest economies globally by 2020. Table
2.4 summarises the % GDP growth estimates recently estimated in the draft
NEEDS-2 report for both optimistic and conservative growth scenarios (IMF,
2007).
Table 2.4 Projections of GDP Growth in %, Draft NEEDS-2, Nigeria
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Scenario 1 (optimistic) – 1990 prices
GDP 8.84 9.13 9.35 9.53 9.62
Scenario 2 (conservative) – 1990 prices
GDP 5.02 4.81 4.91 5.92 5.83
Data based on NPC-CEAR ECON-MOD MAC-I Simulations (IMF, 2007).
The above estimates are used to inform the growth scenarios used in the
model for this study (see Section 5). An average annual growth of 6% is
assumed for the main model outputs.
9
3 NIGERIAN CLIMATE
3.1 CURRENT & HISTORIC NATIONAL CLIMATE
3.1.1 Historic changes in climate
Observational records have shown that Africa has been warming throughout
the 20th century at a rate of about 0.05°C per decade, amounting to an increase
of approximately 0.5°C. The warming has been more significant in the period
June-November each year. The most significant change to Africa’s climate has
been a long-term reduction in rainfall in the semi-arid regions of West Africa.
In the Nigerian Sahel region, there has been a 25% decrease in precipitation on
average in the last 30 years (Nkomo et al., 2006). However, the reduction in
precipitation has been more moderate in other parts of Africa.
In the past 30 years, both droughts and floods have increased in frequency
and severity on the continent. The regularity of drought periods has been a
notable aspect of Nigerian climate in recent years, especially in the drier
regions in the north. Well publicized droughts in the 1970s and 1980s
significantly affected West Africa in the 20th century and they severely affected
large areas of northern Nigeria and the Sahel region. These drought periods
are indications of the large variability in climate across tropical Africa, the
most serious effects of which are usually felt at the drier margins of
agricultural zones or in the regions occupied primarily by pastoral groups.
In recent years, Africa has seen more frequent flood and cyclone episodes. The
Nigerian delta has in particular seen a marked increase in flooding in the last
few decades (Nkomo et al., 2006). Dust storms (which are partly due to
changes in land use such as grazing and deforestation) in the some parts of the
Sahel have also increased, particularly between the 1950s and 1980s (Elasha et
al., 2006).
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment

Report explains that during 1961 to 2003, the average sea level rose by 1.8 ± 0.5
mm per year. While sea level rise varies between regions, Nigeria’s entire
coastline has been affected by this observed rise (IPCC, 2007a). Such a rise
will have already led to an increase in coastal erosion and exacerbated
flooding damages.
3.1.2 Current climate
Nigeria has a tropical climate with variable rainy and dry seasons, depending
on the location. In the southeast of Nigeria it is hot and wet most of the year,
but it is dry in the southwest and farther inland. In the north and west, a
savannah climate with marked wet and dry seasons prevails, while a steppe
climate with little precipitation is found in the far north.
10
Generally speaking the length of the rainy season decreases from south to
north. In the south the rainy season lasts from March to November, compared
to the far north, where it lasts from mid-May to September. In the south and
the southeast especially, precipitation is heavier with over 3,000 mm of rain a
year (compared with about 1,800 mm in the southwest). Rainfall decreases
progressively away from the coast and the far north receives no more than 500
mm a year.
In the south of the country, temperature and humidity remain relatively

constant throughout the year, while the seasons vary considerably in the
north. On the coast the mean monthly maximum temperatures are steady
throughout the year, remaining about 32 °C at Lagos and about 33 °C at Port
Harcourt; the mean monthly minimum temperatures are approximately 22 °C
for Lagos and 20 °C for Port Harcourt.
When considering Nigeria by climatic region, three regions emerge: the far
south, the far north, and the rest of the country. The far south is defined by its
tropical rainforest climate, where annual rainfall is 2,300 to 3,200mm a year.
The far north (i.e. Sahel region) is defined by its almost desert-like climate,
where rain is less than 800 mm per year. The rest of the country, everything in
between the far south and the far north, is savannah, and rainfall is between
800 mm and 2,300 mm per year. Figure 3.1shows the differences in vegetation
that are characterised by these three climatic envelopes, with the ‘woodland
and tall grass savanna’ representing the middle zone.
Figure 3.1 Vegetation map of Nigeria
11
3.2 PREDICTED FUTURE CLIMATIC CHANGES
3.2.1 Changes in average temperature and precipitation
Available data from the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, which is
also used in the IPCC assessments, has been used to provide a best estimate
scenario for temperature and precipitation changes in Nigeria. The best
estimates for 2010 – 2050 were calculated from an average of the three
different IPCC ‘Special Report on Emissions Scenarios’ (SRES) for the region
(see Annex B for the full set of SRES scenario data and underlying
assumptions). A low scenario has been calculated by using guidance from the
Stern Report (multiplying the best estimate by a factor – in this case of 0.57).
The high estimates are based on IPCC assessments for temperature and
rainfall, but on latest research findings for seal level rise. Table 3.1 and Table 3.2
summarise the predicted changes adopted for this study.
Table 3.1 Projected increase in average temperature of Nigeria (∆ degrees Celsius)
Scenario 2010 2020 2050

Low 0.4 0.5 1.0
Best estimate 0.7 0.8 1.8
High 0.9 1.3 3.2
Note: The high estimate is based on the latest IPCC Working Group 1 estimate of temperature
rise of 6.4oC in 2100 interpolated back. However, note that Stainforth et al (2007) suggest a
possible rise of up to 11oC by 2100..
Table 3.2 Projected increase in precipitation in Nigeria (∆ mm)
Scenario 2010 2020 2050

Low 3 4 8
Best estimate 5 6 14
High 7 9 19
It should be noted that although average precipitation is expected to increase

in Nigeria, different zones will have varying effects, with some areas
becoming increasingly desertified, while others will likely suffer increased
precipitation. The values shown here are thus country-wide averages. It
should also be noted that predictions are calculated based on observed
historical data and different models will produce varied results, as can be seen
in Annex 2.
Climate models suggest that Africa’s climate will generally become more
variable, but different authors have often stated conflicting views on the
future of Africa’s climate. For example, a more humid regime is predicted in
the Sahel by Brooks (2004), based on observations since the 1990s of an
amelioration of the regional climate with more rainfall. Other studies indicate
that these general trends may include hidden variations (Hulme et al., 2001).
12
3.2.2 Changes in sea level rise
A global rise in sea level is expected to significantly affect Nigeria’s coastline.

The current IPCC predictions are a rise in sea level of between 18 and 59 cm
by 2100 relative to 1980-1999, depending on the scenario (IPCC, 2007a). As
such, this study assumes there to be an increase of potentially 40cm by 2050
for the best estimate.
However, the IPCC’s fourth assessment forecast is now widely viewed to be

too conservative by the scientific community as it is based on multiple models
that all exclude ice sheet flow due to a (then) lack of published literature. In
the interim, several studies (e.g. Jevrejeva et al, 2006) using a range of different
methodologies have been published which suggest that sea levels will rise
much higher and faster than previously thought (between 80cm and 6m by
2100). The IPCC has been criticised for using the same model to predict future
sea level rise as was used to calculate past increases (inaccurately). The IPCC
models underestimated the sea level rise that we have already observed by
40% (Rahmstorf et al, 2007) therefore its accuracy in projecting future sea level
rise is questionable. A recent paper by Pfeffer et al (2008) in Science argues
that sea level is likely to rise by around 80 cm by 2100, but that a rise of 2m by
2100 cannot be ruled out. The recent report by the UK’s Public Interest
Research Centre (Hawkins et al, 2008) suggests that despite some predictions
of more than a few meters, a 2m rise would cause considerable global
economic havoc, especially as 22 of the world’s top 50 cities, hundreds of
million people and trillions of dollars of assets are at risk of inundation.
Table 3.3 Projected increase in sea level rise (∆ metres)
2020 2050 2100

Low 0.1 0.2 0.5
Best estimate 0.15 0.4 0.9
High 0.3 1 2.0
3.2.3 Other predicted changes
The general consensus in the scientific community is that extreme events will
continue to increase and become more severe across the continent. However,
the IPCC has stated that there is insufficient information on which to assess
possible changes in the spatial distribution and frequency of tropical cyclones
affecting Africa. However, it is thought that a further 1°C rise in surface sea
temperature in the Atlantic will create the conditions required to create
hurricanes off the coast of Nigeria.
A general increase in high-rainfall events is expected, coupled with the

expected increase in atmospheric water vapour. The probability of extremely
warm seasons is 100% for West Africa, with a 22% probability of extremely
wet seasons. The IPCC has further predicted that 1 in 5 seasons will be
extremely wet in the 21st century in West Africa (IPCC, 2007b).
13
In terms of more recent study predictions highlighting positive feedback
warming and stronger climate change, signals from observations have not
been focussed on Nigeria in particular. Thus a direct translation and
downscaling of the recent findings on temperatures and sea level rise to
Nigeria in terms of changes to precipitation, the frequency of extreme events
etc on a local level, is not possible.
For comparison, studies in Europe suggest that under global warming, the
number and intensity of extreme cyclones over the British Isles and the North
Sea are projected to increase, leading to increased wind speeds and storm-
related losses over western and central Europe (Pinto et al 2007). Without the
adoption of adaptation measures, storm-related losses are expected to increase
by up to 37% between 2060 and 2100 for the UK and Germany (Leckebusch et
al 2007).
3.2.4 Final caveat
ERM has used the findings of the IPCC as the basis for our projections for
the low and best case scenario, as it is the best available peer reviewed
evidence base. However, its conservative nature should be borne in mind at
all times. The high scenario is based on more recent scientific findings, but
again, that too is kept relatively conservative. This is still thus a risk that
potential impacts could be significantly worse.
Climate scientists have historically tended to be conservative when talking

about climate change for fear of being accused of being irresponsible or
alarmist. Scientists are increasingly stressing that when looking at the range of
possibilities for climate change, it is important not to ignore the upper end of
the range of uncertainty and the associated risks of disastrous impacts.
Recently however, the evidence is increasingly indicating that once climate

change exceeds certain “tipping points” or critical thresholds, the
consequences will enter a largely uncontrollable and irreversible domain – so
called dangerous / run-away / catastrophic or non-linear climate change.
Associated with which are trends such as the intensification of El Niño and
the risk that it could become a permanent feature, weakening of the Gulf
Stream, melting of the West Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets, disruption of
the Indian monsoon, widespread acidification of the oceans, and hurricanes of
increased intensity and geographical range (Schellnhuber, 2006).
Considerable scientific research released since the publication of the IPCC

Assessment Report 4 (AR4), suggests that the risks of amplified non-linear
climate change are considerably greater than stated in the AR4 and that the
severity and pace of climate change may be far graver than that stated by the
IPCC. A summary of some of the latest science produced since AR4, and the
key uncertainties regarding climate change projections is also presented in
Annex B.
14
4 POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FROM CLIMATE CHANGE TO NIGERIA
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The IPCC describe Africa as “one of the most vulnerable continents to climate
change and climate variability”, and within Africa, Nigeria is one of the
countries expected to be worst affected (Boko, M. et al., 2007, p3). Figure.4.1
below indicates the key areas at risk from climate change in Africa, revealing
that Nigeria faces potentially serious risks both on the south coast and in the
north of the country.
The remainder of this section identifies key reasons why Nigeria is vulnerable
to climate change, and key impacts likely to occur. It then provides two
summary tables that highlight how the three main economic sectors and the
three main regions of Nigeria are likely to be affected.
Figure.4.1 Climate Change and Africa
Source: Grid-Arendal, Columbia University: The Economist
According to Nigeria’s First National Communication under the United

Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (MOEFRN, 2003), 15% of
the country’s population is affected in some way by climatic variation and sea
level rise. The Ministry of Environment’s 2003 report also states that this is set
to rise to between 50% and 60% with further anticipated climate change and

15
sea level rise, and that between 25%-40% of the national capital stock could be
adversely affected.
Nigeria’s high vulnerability to climate change is due to a number of factors, as

highlighted below (based on Okali, 2004).
• Its geographical characteristics: Nigeria lies between 4ºN and 14ºN, and
between 3ºE and 15ºE and spans 6 major vegetation zones, reflecting the
highly variable climate throughout the country. Its sub-Saharan location is
one of the ‘hot spots’ of climate change likely to experience the most
severe impacts due to the delicate nature of the existing ecosystems.
• There is limited capacity to adapt due to low levels of awareness, financial

resources, and institutional and technological capability.
• Much of the economy is dependent on climate-sensitive resources. For

example, the agriculture, forestry and fishing sectors employ up to 70% of
the workforce (Library of Congress- Federal Research Division, 2008).
• A high population, general food insecurity issues and serious social

tensions (in some parts of the eastern states population density is over
1000ppl/km2 and rising).
• The heavy concentration of GDP generating industry in locations that are

highly vulnerable to climate change i.e. Lagos and the Niger Delta.
Box 4.1 The Worst Case Scenario, D. Okali
“Ultimately, failure to act effectively against climate change, because of indifference, inadequate
attention or a low level of adaptive capacity, exposes us to the risk of general systems collapse,
marked by economic losses, disruption of development and especially poverty elimination
programmes, displaced populations, ecological refugees, stresses on resources, heightened
resource-sharing conflicts and political destabilization.”
Source: David Okali, Nigerian Environmental Study Action Team (NEST)

16
Table 4.1 Summary of Key Impacts of Climate Change in Nigeria
Key Impacts Main Climate Change Selection of Possible Consequences

Related Factors
1- Sahelization - Increased - Decreased agricultural productivity in the north
unpredictability of of Nigeria
summer rains - Reduced food security
- Rapid contraction of - Reduced water availability for irrigation
Lake Chad due to - Desertification of 50% of the Guinea Savannah
drought, which has region (threatening 60% of the population of this
shrunk to almost 5% of region)
its size in 40 years - Increased social tensions
- Conflicts between farmers and pastoralists
‘climate refugees’ coming from the north seeking
water and pasture for their herds
2- Loss of coastal - Sea level rise - A 1 metre increase in relative sea level would
zone infrastructure, - Increased storm surge submerge 18,400 sq kms, which is much of the
settlements and heights south’s arable land and 6% of Nigeria’s 300,000 sq
agricultural land - More violent wave km of arable land.
action
- Saline inundation of
freshwater aquifers
3- Reduced - Sea level rise - Land loss
hydrocarbon - Increased severity - Food insecurity
extraction activities and frequency of - Increased social tensions
(Niger delta) and storms - Increased internal migrations
increased risk of oil - Fishing industry badly affected by oil spills
spills
4- Reduced food - Changes in the forest - Poor rural population depending on non-timber
security and fuel cover (following severe forest products (such as bush-meat) for food
wood supply dry spells) negatively affected
- Hampered energy supply for most rural
Nigerians depending on fuel wood for energy
5- Negative effects - Higher temperatures - Increased number of pests and breeding sites
on human health - Higher humidity - Increased exposure to vector-borne (e.g. malaria)
- Increased flooding and water-borne (e.g. cholera) diseases
- Reduced freshwater - Increased heat stress mortality
availability - Increase in malaria alone is expected to decrease
the annual GDP growth rate by 1.3%
- Worse sanitary and health facilities due to the
diversion of resources to combat climate-linked
natural disasters
- Increased risk of malnutrition (due to food
insecurity, shortages or famine)
6- Damaged - Extreme weather - Negative impacts on trade and communications

transport routes events (floods, heat - Buckling of rail tracks, melting of road surfaces
waves, etc)
7- Negative effects - Reduced rainfall - Reduced production of hydro-electricity
on electricity supply - Extreme weather - Damaged energy distribution network
and distribution events - Increased frequency of blackouts
- Economic activity across Nigeria negatively
affected
Source: Boko, M. et al. 2007. This represents the findings on Africa in the latest IPCC
assessment.

17
4.2 SPECIFIC SECTOR IMPLICATIONS
The table below summarises how seven key climate change impacts may
affect the three largest economic sectors, together with the remaining other
sectors. The shading indicates the relative significance of the impacts, which
includes both direct and indirect impacts. A more detailed description of the
impact can be found in Annex C. On balance, overall impacts are likely to be
negative, although minor positive impacts could arise in some sectors (e.g. in
renewable energy, flood prevention and cooling equipment for buildings).

18
Table 4.2 Key climate change impacts on GDP sectors
Sector Drought Sea level rise Flooding Extreme weather Temperature Change in Conflict / migration
abnormalities disease/pest
patterns
Agriculture, Direct: Will increase in occurrence Direct: Will cause up to 75% Direct: Will increase in Direct: Will increase in Direct: Will increase, Direct: Increases in Direct: Will increase
fisheries and and severity, having a huge impact, of agricultural land to be lost the humid, southern frequency and severity affecting planting and pests and disease as climate refugees
forestry especially in the dry North (50% in the southern region with a river basins and coastal causing crops to be growing seasons and will affect crop increase putting
affected by desertification). The 1m rise. Sea-level has already regions due to increases flattened or soil being threaten crops. Diurnal production, huge strain on
humid south may not be directly risen 0.25m threatening 15% in precipitation. This washed away. Will reduce temperature increases of livestock and the agriculture.
affected by precipitation but will be of agricultural land and will increase crop loss availability of surface water 0.6 degrees have already rural population
adversely affected by temperature 0.9million people. Will also from flooding in these resources for animals and been seen which affect the potentially causing
increase. Forestry, especially in the cause salinisation of many areas possible increase in salinity plant’s growth cycle and huge losses.
central and northern regions, will be southern areas. May increase at watering points increases extreme weather
affected by increasing forest fires fishing catches due to an will kill crops.
from drought. Large livestock increase in off-shore fishing,
holdings are predicted to lose 22% although species rich areas,
revenue but small holdings will see like reefs and mangroves, will
rises. Potential for irrigation will be be lost, potentially reducing
reduced. Low soil moisture fishing yields. Increased
content, and reduced soil fertility. salinity will also lead to agric
loss in short term.
Mining and Indirect: Mainly affects energy, Direct: Up to $13bn is at risk Direct: Increases in Direct: Increases in the Indirect: Will mainly Indirect: Will Indirect: Will
quarrying food supply and social sectors. of loss from sea level rise in precipitation in the frequency and severity of affect support systems, mainly affect mainly affect
the Niger delta region south combined with extreme weather events some operations and workers and social workers and social
(MOEFRN, 2003). Many irregular rainfall events around the coastal regions agricultural sectors. sectors. dynamics.
existing drilling operations in will trigger flooding will threaten major
the delta will be lost.
and adversely affect the infrastructure, off-shore
mining operations drilling and on shore
located in that region. mining, representing huge
potential losses to Nigeria’s
economy.
Wholesale Indirect: Will be greatly affected by Direct: Infrastructure is at Direct: With most of the Direct: Increases in extreme Indirect: Will mainly Indirect: Will have Indirect: Climate
and retail the direct affects that drought has direct risk from land major cities located on weather events will directly affect the supply of the much the same related
trade on crop production and other inundation and sea-level rise, or around rivers/deltas affect infrastructure products thus affecting affect as conflict/migration
agricultural products. especially in the Lagos and the impact of flooding is through damages. It will the wholesale and retail temperature will have severe
Niger delta region where up already being seen. As also cause increases in trade. abnormalities impacts upon the
to 35% of the land would be precipitation increases, damages to crops which wholesale and retail
lost with a 0.5m rise. damage will increase will affect trade. trade in Nigeria
(e.g. transport through major social
infrastructure). disruption.

19
Sector Drought Sea level rise Flooding Extreme weather Temperature Change in Conflict / migration
abnormalities disease/pest
patterns
Others (nine Direct/Indirect: The manufacturing Direct: All sectors will be Direct/ Indirect: As Direct: Extreme weather Direct/Indirect: The main Indirect: Increases Indirect: All sectors
sectors) sector will suffer losses from affected by sea level rise and with sea-level change damages to all sectors will affects will be caused by in the occurrence of will be affected by
reduced potential to produce goods land loss. The transport, except focussed around increase as the intensity disruption to sectors such disease affecting increases in conflict
requiring agricultural inputs. tourism (especially beach- rivers and the river and frequency of the events as the construction sector humans, animals and climate
Industries in the northern dry belt based tourism) and insurance basins as well as coastal increase. or tourism sector. and crops will have refugees.
will suffer increased costs for water- industries will be among the areas. Utilities will be Insurance industries will indirect effects on
reliant processes. The worst hit as they are directly affected as sewers and also be affected by most sectors and
other infrastructure are
utilities/energy sector will be affected. It will also affect the varying temperature might disrupt the
flooded. Land for
affected by decreases in the output boundaries of the ecosystems housing will be anomalies. Extreme heat manufacturing and
of hydroelectric plants and losses and the mix of the species that claimed, increasing may accelerate transport sectors.
from oil/gas. Water supply will be compose them. Most of the costs for building degradation of transport
constrained through reduced water resources along the erection. Insurance will infrastructure.
precipitation and run-off. The coast would become polluted also be greatly affected
tourism sector will also be affected by intrusion of salt water. by the increasing
from indirect losses such as Depreciation of coastal difficulty of predicting
ecological loss. properties would be the floods. Resorts and
profound. tourism will be badly
affected.
Overall The worst affected sector from Sea level rise will severely Flooding will increase The southern coastal Temperature The change in Climate refugees are
drought is by far agriculture. affect all sectors. The worst hit in the southern regions, regions that are at risk from abnormalities are disease and pests already migrating
Increases in drought have regions will be the coastal increasing the damage tropical storms will be the expected to increase will inevitable affect and this problem is
secondary impacts on all sectors. areas and the Niger delta to infrastructure and most at risk. A further one- causing disruption to the health sectors set to only get worse
High where a substantial amount of most sectors in that degree rise in sea surface most sectors and posing a most but will have a as climate change
investment is in place. region. temperature in the Atlantic severe threat to significant general takes effect. If
will create the conditions agriculture. threat when conflict breaks out
required to create typhoons combined with this could be
off the coasts of Nigeria. other factors, such devastating for all
Agriculture and mining as sea-level rise. sectors, both
will be the most affected regionally and
sectors. nationally.
Key: Red/dark shade = High impact; Orange/Light shade = Moderate impact; and No shade = Low impact

20
4.3 REGIONAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
The impacts of climate change in three main regions of Nigeria are

summarised in Table 5.2 overleaf. Again, it establishes key direct and indirect
impacts and the relative order of magnitude of impacts. The research
conducted by ERM into the regional impacts are also highlighted in Figure 4.2
and further elaborated in Annex C.
Figure 4.2 Map of Regional Impacts of Climate Change in Nigeria
Source: ERM Research for this study

21
Table 4.3 Key regional climate change impacts by GDP sector
Northern regions South East & South South West & Lagos
South
Agriculture Direct: Agricultural Direct: Will devastate Direct: Will inundate large
productivity decreases due farmland due to sea level areas of agricultural land
to soil moisture reduction rise and soil erosion. Food through sea-level rise. Will also
and desertification. Fishing security will affected by cause salinisation of many
yields in Lake Chad will reductions in the size and southern areas.
potentially reduce. biodiversity of the southern
Groundnut (peanut) rainforests.
production may disappear.
Forest will be affected by
increasing forest fires from
drought.
Mining Indirect: Mainly affects energy, Direct: Irregular rainfall Direct: Sea level rise and
food supply and social sectors. events will trigger flooding increases in the frequency and
and
quarrying and adversely affect mining severity of extreme weather
operations. Sea level rise will events around the coastal
also damage coastal regions will threaten major
operations and infrastructure, off-shore
infrastructure. drilling and on shore mining,
representing huge potential
losses to Nigeria’s economy.
Wholesale Direct: Will be greatly Direct: Infrastructure is at Indirect: Climate related
and retail affected by the direct affects direct risk from land conflict/migration will have
trade that drought has on crop inundation and sea-level severe impacts upon the
production and other rise. wholesale and retail trade. Sea
agricultural products. level rise will reshape
settlement and markets.
Others (ten Direct/Indirect: Will cause new Direct: Sea levels rise will Direct: As sea levels rise, Lagos
sectors) health risks, in particular cause major problems. Fuel will be uninhabitable. Will
cholera outbreaks. Will also wood supply will be destroy beach properties and
cause water resource scarcity affected by forest cover threaten low lying buildings
due to the decline of Lake reduction. The transport, and roads further inland. Most
Chad. The tourism sector tourism (especially beach- river deltas maritime wetlands
will also be affected from based tourism) and and most socio-cultural
indirect losses such as insurance industries will be features would also be
ecological loss. among the worst hit as they endangered.
Could cause desert are directly affected.
encroachment, drought, or
wild fires; directly through
diminished rainfall in the
north and central parts and
indirectly as people lose their
livelihoods and turn to
forests and other ecosystem
services to expand their
agricultural production.
Overall Drought is the main problem Sea level rise and flooding All sectors will be affected in
in this region, which can lead will severely affect all this vulnerable region due to
to severe ecosystem sectors, in particular in the large size population, poor
degradation. It suffers coastal areas and the Niger infrastructure and building
reduced agriculture outputs delta where a substantial quality, flood and sea-level rise
and severe water shortage. amount of investment is in risk.
Over 50% of the population place.
in this area is under threat
from climate change.
Key: Red/dark shade = High impact; Orange/Light shade = Moderate impact;
and No shade = Low impact

22
5 ECONOMIC IMPACT MODEL RESULTS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
As part of this study, ERM has modified an MS Excel™ based climate change
impact model it previously developed to assess climate change impacts on
business operations around the world. As such, we have used an Integrated
Assessment Model that combines scientific and socio-economic aspects, as
was used in the Stern Report (albeit we adopt a less complex approach).
Because the assessment was aiming to assess the overall impacts on the
Nigerian economy, a Computable General Equilibrium model has not been
used.
It is important to note that the model used is ‘preliminary’ only and can
readily be updated to generate more accurate outputs based on more complex
and comprehensive data and assumptions(1). Another advantage of this
approach is the transparent nature of the model, allowing any assumptions to
be readily modified.
The model is based upon up to date national economic data and forecasts,
along with the most recent peer reviewed scientific studies of the potential
impacts of climate change upon Nigeria, including IPCC’s 2007 4th assessment
report, as detailed in Section 3.
It is important to note that the high climate change impact scenario takes into
account the most recent findings on sea level rise, but still remains relatively
conservative (as explained in Section 3). It is thus possible that climate change
impacts in Nigeria could be more extreme than is assumed under the ‘high’
climate change scenario.
The model splits the economy into three different regions based on the six
geo-political zones of Nigeria that also link to the different agro-ecological
zones. The three regions are:
iv) North (North-West Zone (NW), North-East Zone (NE), North-Central

Zone (NC));
v) South West (SW) (which includes Lagos); and
vi) The South-East (SE) and South-South Zones (SS).
Three different impact timeframes were considered (2005-2010, to 2020 and to

2050).
(1) For example, the regions and sectors can be further broken down, and the assumptions as to the initial impacts and low
and high climate change impacts can be modified based on further research and assessment.

23
The sectors explored in the model were as follows (brackets showing 2005
percentage contribution to GDP):
• agriculture (42%) comprising crops, livestock, forests and fisheries;

• mining and quarrying (25%) comprising oil and gas (99% of it);
• wholesale and retail trade (14%); and
• the remaining nine main sectors combined as ‘other’ (combined total of
19%).
Agriculture and wholesale and retail sectors are the largest employers of
Nigerians, based on data from the Nigerian National Statistics Bureau.
Key assumptions used in the model are provided in Annex E. As explained in

that Annex, the key quantitative assumptions relating to significance of
impacts for each sector and region in particular draw upon Table 4.2. The
qualitative consultation responses detailed in Annex A also feed into the
assessment of impacts, however, the quantitative results from the consultation
are only indirectly considered in the model due to concerns over consistency
or responses.
5.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE GDP
The results of the model are provided in tabular form below. Of particular
interest (especially at this stage of the preliminary model development) is the
relative difference in sectoral and regional impacts. This highlights where the
bigger risks lie.
Table 5.1 highlights that by 2050; overall Nigerian GDP could be potentially
14-22% less with climate change if no adaptation is undertaken. Given the
potentially significant agricultural, health and sea-level rise impacts, such
figures are not surprising. Indeed, Nigeria is potentially one of the worst
impacted countries in the world from climate change.
Table 5.1 Percentage loss of National GDP from Climate Change (medium GDP
growth) in different years
Year
Climate change scenario 2010 2020 2050
Low CC 0.7% 2.2% 6.4%
High CC 3.9% 11.1% 29.5%
The predicted impact on overall GDP over time is shown in Figure 5.1. The
table above highlights that there could be a material impact on GDP by 2020,
which could hamper progress towards Vision 2020 goals.

24
Figure 5.1 Potential climate change impact on Nigeria’s GDP under a medium growth
scenario.
1,800
1,600
1,400
GDP US$ Bn
1,200
1,000 No Climate change
800 Low Climate change
600 High Climate change
400
200
0
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
Time
In terms of benchmarking these figures against other studies, in 2000,

Mendelsohn et al estimated a potential loss of GDP of 11% by 2060 based on a
2ºC rise for Nigeria. Stern (2006) indicated that poorer countries could lose in
excess of 10% of their GDP based on 5-6ºC warming by 2100. Currently, each
wet year in the Sahel causes a loss of around 1.25% of GDP and 3.5% for a dry
year (Ludwig and Kabat, 2007). Between 1997 and 2006, natural disasters
have caused damage valued up to 22% of an exposed country’s GDP,
although most impacts of 6% or more relate to island economies (Harmeling,
2008).
Table 5.2 reveals how the impacts may affect different sectors by 2050. It
shows that all sectors are at threat, but the worst affected is agriculture.
Table 5.2 Percentage loss of sectoral GDP from Climate Change (medium GDP growth)
in 2050
Sector Low CC scenario High CC scenario

Agriculture 8% 36%
Mining and quarrying 4% 21%
Wholesale & retail trade 5% 27%
Others (nine sectors) 5% 27%
Overall 6.4% 29.5%
Table 5.3 highlights how the sectors may be affected from a regional
perspective.

25
Table 5.3 Range of percentage loss of GDP through CC by 2050 (assuming medium GDP
growth)
Regions Sectors (% reduction in sectoral GDP)

Agric Mining Retail Other All
North 8 - 33 1-6 7 - 27 5 - 23 8 - 30
SE+SS 8 - 38 5 - 22 2 - 10 5 - 26 5 - 25
SW+Lagos 8 - 42 5 - 25 7 - 34 5 - 29 7 - 34
5.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR MDGS IN NIGERIA
Climate change will have a range of positive and negative impacts on progress
towards the MDGs around the world. In most regions of sub-Saharan Africa,
negative impacts are anticipated to far outweigh any positive impacts (IPCC,
2007b). The main ways in which climate change is anticipated to affect
Nigeria’s attainment of the MDGs is summarised in Table 5.4. Because
different MDGs will be affected negatively by climate change to different
extents, a third column has been added that rates the potential severity of the
impact as high, medium or low.
Table 5.4 Affects of climate change on MDG goals in Nigeria
MDG goal Affect of climate change on MDG goal* Degree of

impact
Goal 1: Eradicate • Increasing economic insecurity due to increase in
extreme poverty and weather extremes
hunger • Diminishing bio-diversity and access to natural
resources
• Diminished crop yields High
• Reduced fisheries due to coral bleaching and
increased calcification of coral
• Increasing soil salinity
Goal 2: Achieve • Lifestyle demands of increased time seeking food,

universal primary water and cash income reduces time for education
education • Increased environmental refugees and ill-health Low
impacts as barriers to attending classes
Goal 3: Promote gender • Impacts on women as are already 2/3 of the world's
equality and empower poor
women • Women's greater reliance on subsistence and natural Low
resources for income
Goal 4: Reduce child • Health impacts on children as are particularly

mortality vulnerable to flood-related, vector-borne and hunger
Medium
related diseases
Goal 5: Improve • Health impacts on mothers, particularly given

maternal health maternal vulnerability to malaria Medium
Goal 6: Combat • Malaria and other vector-borne diseases predicted to

HIV/AIDS, malaria and dramatically increase with extreme weather events,
other diseases increased flooding and temperature rises Medium
• Malaria zone extended

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MDG goal Affect of climate change on MDG goal* Degree of
impact
Goal 7: Ensure • Increased water shortages as a result of changes in
environmental rainfall patterns, greater periods of drought and salt
sustainability water incursion into fresh water reserves
• Sea-level rise for urban dwelling poor, for the
High
majority of the world's poor living in flood prone
areas
• Loss of arable land, particularly in coastal areas
Goal 8: Develop a • Dealing with the costs of weather related disasters

global partnership for could affect Gross Domestic Product, level of
Medium
development indebtedness, state of public finances, and
investment in development in poor countries
*Source of impacts: http://www.cana.net.au/socialimpacts/global/millennium-development-
goals.html
Key: Red/dark shade = High impact; Orange/Light shade = Moderate impact;

and No shade = Low impact
Table 5.4 shows that all MDG goals in Nigeria will be potentially affected by
climate change. The range of impacts listed is complex, and some are better
understood than others. For example, changes in crop yields under a range of
climate scenarios are relatively well known, whereas little research has been
conducted to date on the impacts of climate change and weather extremes on
women compared to men (IPCC, 2007).
In Table 5.4 the MDGs of ‘eradication of extreme poverty and hunger’ and
‘ensuring environmental sustainability’ are rated as high because the impacts
of climate change on these goals will be relatively direct. For example, climate
change is anticipated to have a direct negative affect on agricultural
production in Nigeria through an increase in weather extremes such as flood
and drought. This is of particular concern because a large sector of the
Nigerian population is engaged in, and dependent upon, agriculture and
forestry (36% of men and 20%of women) as their primary occupation (see
Table 2.2), and many such agricultural activities are subsistence in nature.
Similarly, the goal of ensuring environmental sustainability is important
because of the likely direct, negative impacts of climate change on water
scarcity and loss of land due to sea-level rise.
On the other hand, the MDGs rated ‘low’ in Table 5.4, whilst still important,
are less directly affected by climate change. For example, the MDG aimed at
empowering of women is affected by a complex range if economic and
political factors; changing social conditions due to climate change is just one.
In it current form, Table 5.4 assumes that climate change will impact in an even
manner across the country. In reality, however, this is unlikely to be the case
for two reasons. First, severe inequalities in wealth within Nigeria mean that
there is far greater chance of some regions meeting the MDGs than others. For
example, as described in Section 2.2, poverty rates in Nigeria’s northern
regions are substantially higher than in the south (i.e. 60-90 percent compared

27
to 20-40%resepctively). This means that, even in the absence of climate
change, there is far less chance of Nigeria meeting the MDGs in the north of
the country than in the south, particularly with regard to MDG 1 (eradication
of extreme poverty and hunger).
Secondly, climate change will have a number of regional-based impacts in

Nigeria, meaning that different MDG goals will be affected to different extents
across the country. For example, expansion of the Sahara and Sahel
southwards in the north of the country can be expected to have a major impact
on food security for the poorest sections of society (thus affecting MDG 1) in
this area compared to the more built-up regions of the south. Similarly,
changes to the disease regime in the southern areas of Nigeria (such as in and
around Port Harcourt and the Niger Delta) are expected to be more
pronounced compared to those in the north (thus affecting MDG 6, the combat
of HIV/AIDs, malaria and other diseases).
5.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR VULNERABLE GROUPS
Climate change can be expected to impact most severely on vulnerable

societal groups, given that they are the most at risk from the elements, most
reliant on natural resources for their living, and least able to adapt.
In Nigeria, vulnerable groups mainly include poor people, especially those

living in marginal environments and in areas of low agricultural productivity
where they often depend directly on species and ecosystem diversity to
support their livelihoods(1). As a result of this dependency, any impact that
climate change has on natural systems threatens the livelihoods, food intake
and health of poor people.
In Nigeria, as in numerous countries around the world, the poorest sections of

society are often disproportionately represented by women, young children
and the elderly, and these groups will accordingly be most vulnerable to
climate change (UNICEF, 2007). To illustrate, the women’s traditional role in
the household, such as collecting water, is likely to be made more difficult
through, for example, exacerbation of water shortages as a result of dryer
weather (as anticipated in the north east of Nigeria as a result of the ongoing
drying of Lake Chad). Similarly, an increase in the frequency and severity of
weather extremes in Nigeria, such as flood and heat wave (as anticipated to
occur, for example, in southern regions of the country), will
disproportionately affect young people who are most vulnerable due to their
small size and relative inability to care for themselves.
In addition, Figure 2.2 reveals that two key areas in Nigeria with high poverty
is the land in and around Lagos, and much of the region to the far North
around the Sahel. Potential sea level rise is likely to cause significant
problems to the poor in and around Lagos. Desertification and drought in the
(1) Source: http://www.developments.org.uk/articles/climate-change-threatens-africa2019s-poor/

28
North of Nigeria is likely to severally affect the poor that live there,
particularly those that depend on the land for their livelihoods.
Due to constraints of the study it has not been possible to assess the
distribution and vulnerabilities of different ethnic groups in any detail. This
would require a more accurate assessment of the location of regional impacts
and more detailed data on different ethnic groups throughout Nigeria.

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6 ADAPTATION
6.1 OPTIONS FOR ADAPTATION
There is a large amount of evidence demonstrating human adaptability to

climate around the world. For example, in Africa, the IPCC Fourth
Assessment Report (IPCC, 2007) contains numerous examples of complex
adaptations already observed in the continent in response to climate change
and other stresses. These examples highlight, for example, the roles of social
networks, diversification of livelihoods, and the contributions to adaptation
made by infrastructure and technology. Lessons learned from these past
experiences are highly valuable when considering future adaptation options.
In Nigeria, examples of options for agricultural management, agricultural

production (i.e. in specific sub-sectors) and infrastructure are presented in
Table 6.1, Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 respectively. Table 6.4 presents adaptation
options for a range of other sectors, including mining and quarrying, health
and real estate.
The adaptation options below represent a ‘preliminary’ list drawn from

various documents, in particular: NEST & GCSI (2008); Elasha et al. (2006) and
the Ministry of Environment of FRN (2003), as well as from the consultation
exercise. In the Tables, most emphasis has been placed on the agricultural
sector because of its relative cost-effectiveness of adaptation and its
importance to the more vulnerable sections of Nigeria society affected (see
Section 5.5). In addition, infrastructure is critical and thus likely to be
relatively cost effective too due to the fact that it supports the general
economy.
The tables highlight relative costs and benefits (categorised according to high
[H], medium [M] or low [L]). Those options where the relative benefits are
likely to exceed the relative costs are shown in bold. Given the constraints of
this study, these assessments are based on expert judgement and are only
intended to provide a preliminary indication of relative costs and benefits.
Table 6.1 Adaptation options for agricultural management
Adaptation option Relative Relative

cost benefit
Government policy
Providing greater support for agricultural research H H
Improving transportation of agricultural goods M H
Offering subsidies and other protective trade regulations devices H M
Reforming land tenure and land management policies M H
Establishing markets for products M M
Implementing medium- to long-term development strategies for H H
industries based on sustainable agricultural principles
Farm management

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cost benefit
Disseminating research findings to farmers L M
Creating more efficient food storage/processing systems M M
Improving pest management M H
Creating water tanks/reservoirs in dry areas M H
Reducing bush-burning M M
Developing a more reliable system of seasonal predictions M M
Engaging in labour migration M M
Changing farm location M L
Selling farm assets L L
Soil erosion
Initiating and stringently enforcing anti-erosion laws, including limiting M L
access to eroded and erosion-prone areas
Public education M M
Erecting contour bunds around farmlands L M
Prioritising soil and water conservation in government policy L M
Table 6.2 Adaptation options for agricultural sub-sectors

cost benefit
Crops
Using agro-forestry and organic farming techniques. For example, L M
organic manure instead of chemical fertilizers
Increasing crop area or crop intensity M M
Using disease-resistant, quick-maturing crop and plant species (e.g. L H
cassava sticks, fruits and nuts)
Developing better heat- and drought-resistant crops H H
Improving the production efficiencies in arid lands and marginal M H
areas of early maturing crops
Developing high-yield varieties H H
Properly preserving seeds and plant seedlings to ensure healthy M M
germination in the following farming season
Introducing mixed farming practices (e.g. utilizing forest products L H
as a buffer to crop failure in climatically marginal areas)
Livestock
Reducing herd and farm sizes L L
Diversifying animal stock – especially to smaller animals M H
Transitioning to sedentary herds L M
Culling animals L L
Fisheries
Maintaining water levels so that fish can spawn M M
Development of mariculture M H
Forests
Establishing wood-lots with fast-maturing plant species that yield L H
domestic fuel wood for nearby communities
Establishing seed banks to maintain biological diversity and M H
provide farmers with opportunities to diversify
Decentralising resources to local governance arrangements i.e. L M
adopting Community Based Natural Resource Management
Improving all-round management of tree plantations, including M M
prevention of soil erosion

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Table 6.3 Adaptation options for infrastructure

cost benefit
Electricity
Relocating power generation and transmission facilities that are H H
threatened by sea-level rise
Providing physical protection for highly sensitive energy production H H
facilities (e.g. oil rigs, oil refineries)
Developing and enhancing utilisation of renewable energy resources H H
such as solar energy
Water
Promoting water recycling and re-use M M
Promoting greater efficiency in water use (e.g. making irrigation more M M
efficient)
Modifying existing infrastructure (e.g. changing location or height of M H
water intakes; using closed conduits instead of open channels; using
artificial recharge to reduce evaporation; raising dam height; adding
more turbines; removing sediment from reservoirs for more storage)
Introducing new management techniques for existing infrastructure M H
(e.g. change in operating rules)
Increasing water supply capacity through construction of new H H
infrastructure (e.g. reservoirs, hydroplants, delivery systems for inter-
basin transfer, development of groundwater supplies)
Protecting watersheds and reservoir sites through establishment of L H
intensive vegetation cover to minimize evaporation
Better monitoring of ground-water resources M H
Improving rain-harvesting techniques and construction of rain L M
catchments back-up tanks
Transport
Using protective devices to shield sensitive equipment from excessive M M
dust and humidity
Installing drainage construction in and around ports H H
Installing storm surge barriers in and around airports H H
Better locating airports and motor parks (e.g. away from flood-prone M H
areas)
Designing highways and railway lines taking into account expected M M
changes in climate
Table 6.4 Other sector-based adaptation options in Nigeria

cost benefit
Mining and quarrying

Relocating to more favourable sites less exposed to weather extremes H H
Developing appropriate mining techniques and industries for transiting M M
climatic conditions
Designing new industrial activities with increased resilience and M H
flexibility with respect to climate change already built in
Health
Implementing a consistent attack on the disease vector population M H

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cost benefit
Strengthening the health care delivery system M M
Developing public awareness on health issues M H
Improving public sanitation and immunization coverage M H
Gathering data and archiving diseases associated with climate change M H
and their seasonal and inter-annual variations
Developing technological or engineering strategies such as genetic or H H
biological pest control
Real estate & buildings

Undertaking a coast protection strategy to determine where and what M H
form of coast protection schemes are required.
Designing buildings to be more resilient to weather extremes (e.g. heat M M
waves, storms)
Limiting property development in high-risk areas, such as flood M H
plains, hillsides and shore lines, through appropriate planning
Relocating infrastructure away from coasts prone to storm surges and H H
sea-level rise
Ecological
Diversifying and extending protected areas for the conservation of M M
ecosystems that are most vulnerable to climate change and sea level rise
Maintaining ecological structure and processes at all levels and M M
reducing existing pressure on natural ecosystems
Developing and implementing of programmes for restricted areas and M M
buffer zones, resource harvesting on a sustainable basis, ecological
restoration, sustainable management and agro ecosystems
Monitoring to evaluate species and ecosystems stability from climate M H
change perspective
The ‘low/medium cost’ but ‘high benefit’ options presented in the above
tables are potentially good value-for-money responses to the threat of climate
change in Nigeria. These have been listed below, where each option can be
implemented at a range of scales, from the individual farm up to the national
level:
• using disease-resistant, quick-maturing crop and plant species (e.g.

cassava sticks, fruits and nuts) (farm level);
• introducing mixed farming practices (e.g. utilizing forest products as a
buffer to crop failure in climatically marginal areas) (farm level);
• designing new industrial activities with increased resilience and
flexibility with respect to climate change already built in (site level);
• establishing wood-lots with fast-maturing plant species that yield
domestic fuel wood for nearby communities (district level);
• reforming land tenure and land management policies (national level)
• Improving pest management (district level);
• protecting watersheds and reservoir sites through establishment of
intensive vegetation cover to minimize evaporation (district level);
• establishing seed banks to maintain biological diversity and provide
farmers with opportunities to diversify (national level);
• better monitoring of ground-water resources (national level); and

33
• undertaking a coast protection strategy to determine where and what
form of coast protection schemes are required.
The costs of implementation of the above options range over a number of

orders of magnitude, from the $10,000s when implemented at the farm-level
to the $10,000,000s when implemented at the regional scale. For example, the
switch from traditional varieties to disease-resistant, quick maturing crop and
plant species on an individual farm will probably be in the order of $1,000s to
$10,000s, whereas a comprehensive national programme to improve the
monitoring of groundwater resources will most likely be in the order of
$100,000s to $1,000,000s.
Overall costs of adaptation are likely to be high. Niang-Diop (2005) estimates

that for countries potentially affected, countering the costs of sea level rise
could amount to 5-10% of GDP. Costs for Nigeria could be greater than this
given the oil infrastructure and low lying situation of Lagos.
6.2 OBSTACLES TO ADAPTATION
The main obstacles to adaptation in Nigeria are listed below (NEST and GCSI,
2004):
• Reluctance among some stakeholders to accept the reality of climate

change;
• Inability and reluctance to adopt new farming strategies;
• Lack of information (awareness) and knowledge (education) on the
phenomenon of climate change;
• Lack of government preparedness and insensitivity to climate change
• Lack of dedicated research institutions;
• Inadequate public policies that target adaptation for relevant stakeholders;
• Population growth;
• Widespread poverty which induces heavy and total dependence on the
immediate environment for a livelihood;
• Land scarcity, leading to adoption of unsustainable farming practices; and
• The existence of land tenure and land management systems that do not
favour food security.
6.3 NATIONAL ADAPTATION PLAN
According to Dr Fodeke of the Special Climate Change Unit, (pers. comms.,

2008), Nigeria currently has a draft National Adaptation Plan of Action, which
may be available by the end of 2008. This was put together in a national
review workshop in November through assistance of Heinrich-Boll
Foundation.

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7 DATA & INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS
This section outlines key data and institutional requirements needed to help
assess and deal with climate change impacts in Nigeria.
7.1 DATA REQUIREMENTS
As highlighted by the literature review and stakeholder consultation exercise,

at present, Nigeria has limited information and data on what the climatic
changes and associated impacts will be at a regional level within Nigeria. Key
data that need to be put in place in order to make effective policies directed at
tackling climate change impacts in Nigeria includes the following:
• Climate forecasting and climate scenarios data (transformation of Global

Climate Model (GCM) data into local climate scenarios based on regional
climate modelling).
• Information and good quality data for establishing baseline scenarios (e.g.
where assets are and their value, vulnerability etc) up to 50 year time slices
or longer.
• Data linking past climates with vulnerabilities in each sector (from

national to local community level, etc).
• Sectoral baseline and impact assessment data at a local and regional level.
• Understanding the interlinkages between biological, physical and social

capital and economic outputs.
• Local impacts (down to community level) and the social implications.
• Sectoral approaches for adaptation to biophysical impacts.
• Information on the least-cost approaches for adaptation.
• The range of social impacts associated with each impact scenario.
• Long-term data on sea level rise.
• Data on the rate of subsidence in coastal areas.
• Comprehensive analysis of droughts in the arid north, and data on the rate
of desert encroachment.
• Data for prediction of storm surges and oceanic fetches from remote forces
in the Atlantic.

35
• Regional climate models of various scenarios across different time slices.
• Data on sectoral vulnerability and impacts across various scenarios,

socioeconomic models of Nigeria’s future growth path, integrated
assessment models (as impacts or actions in one sector will affect other
sectors).
• Nigeria does not have even a good baseline dataset to assess the progress
that is being made towards the achievement of the MDGs across the
various sectors. For instance, it is difficult presently to assess the potential
impacts of climate change on the achievement of these MDGs.
• There is need for developing clear quantifiable vulnerability indicators

across biophysical, socio-economic and health areas; that are also
consistent and useful within a local context. At present, indicators are too
broad-brush and do not take local conditions into account.
• At present the historical record of the impacts of climatic events is of poor

quality due to the paucity of disaster statistics compiled in the aftermath of
events, and the generally low level of insurance coverage in the region.
The Ministry of Environment proposed a series of 14 projects back in 2003 to

help fill some key data gaps, and other climate change study needs. The eight
projects related to filling data gaps on climate change impacts and
assessments are listed below, using the original numbering system. Further
details of all 14 proposed studies can be found in Annex F. These projects
have yet to be undertaken due to lack of funds (Fodeke, pers. comms. 2008).
1) Satellite Remote Sensing Determination of Vegetation Loading and Land

use Change between 1995 and 2005 as Influenced by Human Activities
and Biomass Burning.
7) Baseline Data Analysis for Risk Assessment of Impacts of Flood and

Drought.
8) Modelling and Verification of Severe storms (cyclonic depressions) in the

Niger Delta, Nigeria.
9) GCM Climate Modelling of Temperature/ Precipitation and Crop Yield

relationship for Food Security.
10) Creation of Public Awareness on Climate Change.
11) Improving the Quality of Meteorological Data for Climate Change Impact
and Application Studies.
12) Climate Change Impacts and Vulnerability Assessment in the Sudan-Sahel

Region.
14) Climate Change and Assessment of pollution – related health hazards in

Livestock.

36
The Ministry of Environment also highlighted the need to consider the
outcome of the UNFCCC report on Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities
and Adaptation in Developing Countries (2007), which also stresses the need
for: adequate operational national systematic observing network and access to
the data available from other global and regional networks; for countries to be
able to understand their local climate better and thus be able to improve the
understanding of the dynamics of the climate system and its natural
variability; and provide input for climate models and plan adaptation options.
Systematic observations of the climate system are usually carried out by

national meteorological centres and other specialised centres. The report
concludes that observations and data availability still need to be improved in
all regions, systematic observation networks in Nigeria and Africa are
inadequate because there is a lack of stations and lack of maintenance, and if
data exist, there are difficulties in obtaining it. Equally as important, as
mentioned above, is the need for accurate socio-economic data from across
sectors, with a focus on the poor.
7.2 INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS
In terms of institutional arrangements necessary, according to the Ministry of

Environment, Nigeria currently has institutions that are traditionally
mandated to provide data relating to climate change and associated impacts.
For example, the Nigerian Meteorological agency (NIMET) is charged with
systematic observations and analyses for forecasting purposes around the
country.
In addition, other agencies and institutes have field experiment stations for
their specific needs that are relevant to collating and analysing information
about climate change. This includes, the National Electric Power Authority
(NEPA), the National Institute for Freshwater Fisheries Research, The
National Water Resources Institute - Kaduna, The National Space Research
and Development Agency (NASRDA), National Centre for Remote Sensing,
Jos and the National Centre for Arid Zone Studies, Maiduguri.
What is needed now, however, is to establish exactly what they are meant to
be doing in this area, and why they are all not fulfilling that task at present,
and to seek to address the reasons identified. The country also needs to
strengthen the research centres that are presently working in the area of
climate change, such as the University Linkage Centre for Climate Change
(FMEnv), so as to be able to add value to the sort of data that NIMET will be
producing and make the data useful to the development community.
The Ministry of Environment believes that Nigeria needs to establish and

strengthen national climate committees and programmes throughout the
country. Such programmes would promote activities related to gathering the
data identified above, climate monitoring and observation networks,
education and training, capacity building, climate research and the
development of models, technology transfer and adaptation of technology,

37
development and implementation of impact assessments, improved climate
information services and public awareness of applications of climate
information.
In addition, the Ministry suggests that the government has to improve the
capability of the meteorological satellite receiving facilities at the Airports in
Lagos, Kano, Maiduguri, Enugu and Calabar, and to establish many more
such facilities.
The consultation process also highlighted the need to establish Programme

management Unit(s) (PMU) and Steering/Advisory groups(s) (SU). The use
of indigenous knowledge in the research to reduce uncertainty was also
stressed. The impacts of climate change on poverty alleviation, food security
and rural development should also be a research priority within the Nigerian
context.
Climate change course curricular is encouraged in Nigerian universities and

other educational institutions. A database of African researchers who have
considerable experience on climate change in general and adaptation in
particular should be compiled and such researchers, where available should
be used as mentors to other young African researchers. It is also
recommended that a healthy funding stream should be diverted to this area to
ensure that long term research projects are able to be sustained. Other
consultees recommended developing and strengthening networks of trained
scientists and associating them with on-going and new projects on climate
change and adaptation research.
Suggested research activities include:
i) Desk research and consultation to fully collate and synthesize all existing
and previously conducted research and data on climate change in the
region (Nigeria and West Africa), potential impacts, assets at risk and
vulnerability etc. to climate change. This should build on the results of
this study and the work undertaken by the Ministry of Environment and
NEST.
ii) From the desk survey, identify important results, lessons learnt and
research gaps. Further research should be planned and conducted to fill
those gaps.
iii) Large scale multi-region research should be encouraged and funded.
iv) Developing a more comprehensive and accurate Integrated Assessment

Model (IAM) for Nigeria (and Africa) is particularly important, to help
focus on the sectors and locations most in need of support and
adaptation.

38
Beyond the academic community, Nigeria also needs to strengthen the
capacity of key senior policy makers to ensure that they understand and
support these institutional arrangements.
More critically, Nigeria does not yet have a national climate change policy.
However, according to Dr Fodeke of the Special Climate Change Unit at the
Ministry of Environment, a National Policy Framework on climate change in
Nigeria is being developed. It is planned that this be put forward in April,
2009 at the forthcoming Nigerian National Climate Change Summit.
It is recommended that climate change impacts and adaptation principles are

embedded in existing planning systems (i.e. all relevant local, regional and
national plans and strategies). According to Dr Fodeke of the Special Climate
Change Unit, the plan is to mainstream the climate change policy into the
programme, which is presently ongoing.
In addition, the importance of using the latest scientific evidence to inform

and design policies should be reiterated. To have the maximum impact, a
wide range of stakeholders should be included in cross-sectoral policy
planning, and the media needs to be made more aware of the issues.
An organisation should be created or selected, (such as a ‘Climate Change

Commission’) that can champion and coordinate climate change activities in
the country. Developing and implementing piecemeal solutions and projects
will not solve the country’s climate change problems. It is critical that Nigeria
moves away from this model and embraces an integrated approach.
The current direction should be to establish a National Climate Change

Commission (NCCC) to coordinate and provide new data for climate change
assessment and management. This will be the best institutional arrangement
foreseeable. The NCCC will link research institutions with other stakeholder
institutions, and develop the scenarios for vulnerabilities and adaptation, as
well as the likely policy framework for addressing the problem. The NCCC
should be linked to the National Planning Commission of Nigeria which
would use the key results in planning. The structure of the NCCC should
evolve through professional input which can soon become available.
Presently, there is some good academic capacity within the country, in

various institutions. However, coordination of expertise and funding for
research are lacking. Therefore, there should be networking of key
institutions together with the national focal point, providing the policy and
management lead, while the research institutions are provided the needed
support to bring together informed positions of the state of climate system,
the scenarios for vulnerability, and adaptation. Other institutions could then
play their different roles in-between, including the media and the NGOs for
outreach and public information.

39
It is important for Nigeria to build strong knowledge networks that will
promote understanding of how adaptation can be effectively integrated into
development processes. The UK Climate Impact Programme (UKCIP) should
be referenced as good practice in this arena and offers an exemplar of how to
develop effective communication frameworks between and within the
communities of scientists, resource managers, business, the general public,
and the policy and government sectors.
The encouragement of collaborative research between Nigerian, African and

international (e.g. British researchers) is to be encouraged. Scientists can
“learn by doing” and encourage cross learning from different cultural
perspectives.
In order to ensure effective planning of the suggested National Climate

Change Commission, the following activities should be carefully
implemented:
• Identify resource persons in the various institutions.
• Coordinate the effort in funded project implementation to ensure

networking.
• Require a reporting function for funded activities/tasks in a well

articulated program.
• Provide or source for essential equipment and transportation facilities

where necessary.
• Ensure periodic exposure of project personnel to National/Global trends

in research by attendance at conferences/seminars/workshops within and
outside Nigeria.
• Carry out assessments to identify policy determinants of adaptive

capacity.
• Develop monitoring and evaluation criteria for adaptation projects and

test across various sectors and regions through case studies.
• Factor climate change into new development investments and ensure the
effective development and implementation of National Communications,
NAPAs, and promote cross-sectoral policy dialogue.

40
8 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1 CONCLUSIONS
Nigeria is likely to be one of the most negatively impacted countries in the

world as a result of climate change. Its risks are particularly high as a result
of its low lying coastline that is highly populated with a heavy concentration
of GDP generating industry and infrastructure. In addition, the North of the
country forms part of the Sahel which is at risk of further desertification and
droughts. Flooding, water shortages, increased diseases and associated social
disruption could well give rise to a vicious cycle of economic degradation and
social conflict.
Based on IPCC climate change assumptions and the latest research findings
relating to sea level rise, the preliminary model adapted for this study
predicts that climate change could result in a loss in GDP of between 6% and
30% by 2050, worth an estimated US$ 100 to 460 billion dollars. These
numbers assume minimal adaptation. By undertaking appropriate adaptation
actions and strategies, much of these impacts can potentially be mitigated.
The above impacts are based on possible sea level rise from 1990 levels to 0.3
m by 2020 and 1m by 2050, and rise in temperature of up to 3.2oC by 2050
under a high climate change scenario. The low estimate predictions are for
sea level rise of 0.1 m and 0.2 m by 2020 and 2050 respectively, and a
temperature increase of 0.4 to 1oC over the same time periods.
All the main sectors of Nigeria’s economy will be impacted by climate change,
but in particular agriculture. Infrastructure such as water, transport and
power are also extremely susceptible and will result in knock on effects to
other parts of the economy, especially wholesale and retail. It is possible that
some aspects of the economy may gain, such as the production and sales of
renewable energy, flood protection, medicine, building cooling equipment etc.
All regions will be impacted, particularly the southern coastal regions and the
far North of Nigeria. The more central regions will be less affected but were
grouped as part of the overall North region. The model predicts losses of 8-
30% for the North, 5-25% for the SE and SS, and 7-34% for the SW and Lagos.
Attaining the MDGs will also suffer as a result of climate change. In

particular Goal 1 on hunger and poverty and Goal 7 on environmental
sustainability will be affected in a major adverse way. Goals 4 (reduce child
mortality), Goal 5 (Improve maternal health), Goal 6 (Combat HIV/AIDS,
malaria and other diseases) and Goal 8 (Develop a global partnership for
development) are all likely to be moderately adversely affected.
Climate change impacts will be worse for the vulnerable such as the poor, old,
women, children and for those that depend on agriculture for their

41
livelihoods. This is because the vulnerable are less able to fend for themselves
and are less able to adapt to changing circumstances. In terms of the spatial
distribution of impacts, those in the far north and adjacent to the coastline are
far more at risk.
Assessing Nigeria’s physical vulnerability to the impacts of climate change is

hindered by the paucity of data concerning historic incidences of climatic
disruption, insurance losses and natural disasters in the country. Impact
projections for the region also suffer from a lack of local detail, covering as
they do large geographic areas. This lack of data means that it is difficult to
estimate the impacts of climate change on Nigeria in the detailed manner
needed to develop robust adaptation strategies.
Adaptation principles need to be embedded in existing planning systems and

reiterate the importance of using the latest scientific evidence to inform and
design policies.
This study has identified broad range of adaptation actions and strategies,
highlighting those that may be relatively cost-effective. Many relate to
strengthening the robustness and resilience to agriculture related impacts.
Other key adaptation requirements include conducting a national coast
defence strategy, protecting key infrastructure, and facilitating water
collection at a local and household level etc.
There is currently little political will to do anything serious about climate

change and adaptation. This issue is compounded by the media’s general lack
of interest and understanding of the issue as well.
There are extensive data gaps with respect to assessing impacts and
adaptation strategies. However, it is also difficult to obtain relevant
information that does exist. Key data gaps include: climatic data and trends,
baseline natural resource and socio-economic conditions, location and
importance of assets, data on extreme events such as drought, flooding and
coastal flooding, socio-economic data at a local and regional level etc.
Nigeria currently has institutions that are traditionally mandated to provide

data relating to climate change and associated impacts, such as the Nigerian
Meteorological agency (NIMET), as well as numerous other institutions.
However, such institutions appear to have problems generating and
disseminating relevant information.
There is some good academic capacity related to climate change expertise

within the country, in various institutions. However, coordination of expertise
and funding for research are lacking.
Nigerian politics has barely begun addressing climate change due to the
perception that more urgent worries exist and the fact that long term strategic
thinking is not fully embedded within national politics.

42
Most critically, Nigeria does not yet have a national climate change policy.
However, a national policy framework on climate change in Nigeria is being
developed, which will be put forward in April 2009 at the forthcoming
Nigerian National Climate Change Summit.
There is also a plan to mainstream the new climate change policy into the
programme, which is presently ongoing.
Furthermore, Nigeria has recently developed a draft National Adaptation

Plan of Action, which may be available by the end of this year.
Even with such policies and plans in place, there is a lack of a centralised
institution, (such as a Climate Change Commission) that can champion and
coordinate climate change activities in the country. Developing and
implementing piecemeal solutions and projects will not solve the country’s
climate change problems. It is mandatory that Nigeria move away from this
model and embrace an integrated approach. Perhaps the Ministry of
Environment’s Special Climate Change Unit can play or help coordinate this
role.
8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND WHERE HMG CAN BEST ENGAGE
The key to achieving greater resilience for Nigeria in the face of climate
change lies in changing the mindsets and political will of decision makers.
Key organisations are likely to include the Ministry of Power and Energy, and
the Ministry of Finance. The oil companies are also extremely influential in
Nigeria.
Only by achieving this will enable the severity of the issue to be fully
comprehended and integrated into development plans. The UK’s leadership
in establishing institutional solutions to address climate change, particularly
the UKCIP (UK Climate Impact Programme), puts it in a good position to
engage with Nigeria’s decision makers to achieve this transformation. What is
clear from the consultation is that reports and written communications are not
the most effective route to take to achieve this engagement. Face to face time
with decision makers is essential, in workshops, stressing win-win solutions
and opportunities (e.g. for coastal defences and renewable energy
development).
It is also apparent that a considerable number of ongoing data collection and

studies related to climate change are underway in Nigeria. Considerable
benefit could be gained by coordinating and linking these up.

43
The recommended engagement strategy for HMG via DFID and the High
Commission, include the following seven actions:
1) Support a study to undertake a stock-take of existing and proposed

climate change data, studies and resources relevant to Nigeria. This should
include identifying key ongoing climate change projects, and key individuals
within government, institutions, academia and the private sector with an
interest in climate change who have the authority to influence outcomes. The
challenge associated with engaging and gaining co-operation from the
relevant individuals and organisations, and documenting such a considerable
dataset should not be underestimated. Lack of progress on achieving this
comprehensively should not be allowed to prevent subsequent actions from
going ahead.
2) Support the undertaking of a more detailed spatial analysis of key sectors

and geographical locations at risk from climate change, linked to a
feasibility study of adaptation options. This should draw upon the
outcomes of this initial study, and the proposed stock take, and link the
outcomes to key political planning approaches in Nigeria (eg the Country
Economic Memorandum, NEEDS2/SEEDS, Vision 2020 etc. The analysis
should be a far more spatially detailed assessment, in particular focussing on
sea level rise risks and desertification/drought vulnerable areas in the north.
The latter should be achieved through use of remote sensing and GIS
mapping tools to identify key assets, infrastructure and settlements at risk and
links to poverty mapping and other socio-economic data.
3) Facilitate raising the profile of climate change within Nigeria to the

public via the media, and amongst key interested parties through
workshops. This can be achieved through supporting (as appropriate) a
media campaign in the country’s prominent newspapers, radio stations and
television, to raise the issue of climate change and what it means specifically
for Nigeria, in the public consciousness. In addition, holding focussed
workshops with relevant committees within the House of Representatives and
the Senate (i.e. committees related to the environment, infrastructure
development, the Niger Delta, oil / gas industries, power generation and
distribution) – as these committees are influential. Workshops should focus on
the science of climate change, what it means for Nigeria, and how best Nigeria
should respond to the challenges posed.
4) Promote and support the creation of a national Climate Change

Commission (or similar). Some central organisation that can coordinate the
data collation and outputs from the various institutions and academic
organisations involved in climate change.
5) Support an initiative to build capacity in climate change skills within the

Ministry for Environment and other Government Ministries. The Ministry
of Environment would benefit from additional capacity and influence to lobby

44
other Ministries, whilst other such Ministries would benefit from have more
informed staff with respect to the implications of climate change.
6) HMG should work closely on climate change issues with key industries
and industry representatives. This should include working with the oil and
gas industry (e.g. Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron, BG Group etc) in Nigeria to
develop a consistent, robust cross-industry approach to climate change in
Nigeria. Both in-house actions as well as activities to influence the Nigerian
government are needed. The severity of the impacts of a potential 1 - 2m raise
in sea-levels for an industry whose infrastructure is located in coastal regions
lower than 1m above current sea levels, should be self-apparent and
emphasised. It should also include working with the Chambers of Commerce
and other industry bodies (especially in Lagos, where 60% of all industry is
located), to raise climate change as an issue for business, and to develop an
action plan amongst key private sector players e.g. cement industry,
breweries etc.
7) Work with the Ministry of Environment and selected states, to develop

projects that might be eligible for carbon credits, or would otherwise build
up the adaptive capacity of Nigeria. Such projects may include for example,
afforestation initiatives, re-establishing coastal mangroves, and potentially
managing forests that may otherwise be degraded (i.e. eligible for REDD –
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation). The Government of
Cross River State, Ogun State and Ondo State have already had meetings with
a private company that wishes to invest in standing tropical forests in these
states with a view to obtaining carbon credits / CDM funds.

45
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50
Annex A
Summary of Consultation
Output
A1 SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION OUTPUT
Prof Anthony Ikpi

a.ikpi@comcast.net
Dept of Agricultural Economics
University of Ibadan
Ibadan, Nigeria
(+234-805)5066828
1. Introduction
This portion of the Nigeria Climate Change Impact Study reports the fieldwork in Nigeria
and addresses those issues embodied in the terms of reference covering the fieldwork. It
consists of four other sections besides the Introduction. Section 2 contains the terms of
reference; while Section 3 describes the methodology adopted for the data collection in the
field. Section 4 presents a summary of some of the results/findings derived from filled-in
respondent questionnaires relating to assessing impacts. Other responses, in particular the
data and institutional arrangements that need to be put in place to effectuate policies that are
to be directed towards tackling climate change in Nigeria are incorporated in the main
report.
2. Terms of Reference
i) To provide relevant information and references on climate change impacts in Nigeria;
ii) To interview selected respondents that represent a cross section of Nigeria’s climate
change experts from research, government, business, donor agencies and other
sections of stakeholders for data, and complete some model assumptions and
questionnaire proformas; and
iii) To provide a brief write-up on gaps in data and institutional arrangements that need
to be put in place
3. Methodology
The method applied in collecting data from the field for this study combined direct face-to-
face interviewing with emailing and telephoning of selected knowledgeable professionals
within and outside Nigeria in the area of climate change in Nigeria. A three-page
questionnaire containing eight simple questions was sent/given to a total of 21 respondents
to fill after appropriate introduction and explanation of the purpose of the study.
The 21 respondents included Nigerian civil service officials, politicians, private sector/NGO
practitioners, and employees of diplomatic missions/donor agencies in the country.
Altogether, 15 questionnaires were completed by respondents: eight by email and seven in
hand-filled hard copies. The full list is detailed below, with their complete contact
coordinates. Respondents with an asterisk (*) against their names, completed and sent/gave
back their questionnaires; while the remaining non-asterisked seven did not complete theirs.
Subsequent to this consultation exercise, ERM contacted Dr Victor Fodeke of the Special
Climate Change Unit at the Ministry of Environment to obtain the Ministry of Environment’s
opinions. The outcome of this is included in the main report.

A1
4. Summary of Findings from the Field Responses on Impacts
The key findings from the field concern the guesstimated impact of climate change on the
different sectors of the Nigerian economy. Using scores given by the 14 respondents, the
average scores for the sectors are summarized in Table 1. The Table shows that, out of a
maximum impact index of 5.00, the four sectors that will be most critically impacted are:
Crops (4.50), Livestock (4.07), Forestry (3.50), Utilities (3.50). Telecommunications (1.36), and
Financial Services (1.36) are least affected.
The reasons for the range of scores for each sector by the respondents are numerous and
varied, and they are summarized below.
Table 1.1 Respondent's Estimated Impact Scores of Climate Change on Various Sectors
of the Nigerian Economy
Sector No. of Range of Scores indicating Average Score

Responses magnitude of adverse impacts
(0-5)
Crops 14 3 to 5 4.50
Livestock 14 2 to 5 4.07
Fisheries 14 1 to 5 3.07
Forestry 14 1 to 5 3.50
Oil/gas 14 0 to 5 2.71
Wholesale and Retail Trade 14 0 to 4 2.07
Manufacturing 14 1 to 4 2.36
Utilities(water/electricity) 14 1 to 5 3.50
Construction 14 0 to 4 2.00
Transport 14 1 to 5 2.86
Telecommunications 14 0 to 3 1.36
Hotels/Ecotourism 14 1 to 4 2.71
Financial services 14 -5* to 4 1.36
Real estate & business services 14 -5* to 4 2.00
General Environment 14 2 to 5 2.50
* Two scores of plus five were suggested, whereby respondents believed a positive impact would be gained.
For the Crop Sector:

• Rain-fed agriculture is highly vulnerable to the vagaries of climate/weather, heat-wave
and drought inclusive;
• Climate change will adversely affect the ecosystem, length and volume of rainfall and
alter the balance of available micro-nutrients available to crops among other reasons.
High temperature and drought consequence of climate changes destroys crops;
• Biological component are sensitive and good indicators of change in ecological systems.
Since green plants and crops are also primary producers and food sources, they are keys
to the survival of all other living things that depend on them. Hence, these sources have
the potential to experience most severe impact;
• Reduced rainfall will lead to crop failure in the northern region, while flooding in the
coastal regions will lead to loss of crops, low soil moisture content, and reduced soil
fertility;
• Climate change will directly affect crops through high temperatures, decreasing water
use efficiency, soil desiccation, floods and droughts;
• It would get drier in most of the northern States that have surplus land for agriculture,
while the southern coastal States would also loose agricultural lands in the face of sea
A2
level rise, induced flooding, and possibly increased rainfall caused by climate change. If,
however, the North gets wetter, a net positive effect on crops would be expected. In this
case, the impact may not be extensive taking other issues into consideration, like land
degradation arising from population growth that may likely reach 500 million by 2050.
For the livestock sector:

• Under-developed animal husbandry or one dependent on pasture/open land grazing,
watering holes and nomadic is highly vulnerable;
• Livestock animals/birds which depend mainly on plants for food will expectedly suffer
greatly under climate change, plus flooding which arises from climate change will kill
livestock;
• Livestock are biological materials sensitive to changes in ecosystems. Domesticated
animals are also sources of food and income to humans. Any negative impacts on this
sector will affect man and livelihood;
• Extreme heat affecting livestock and unavailability of water leading to increase in
diseases affecting livestock;
• Large livestock would be affected through droughts more than small ruminants;
• In the drier North, there will be a net decline in feed productivity. Extreme loss of forest
cover is expected from the interplay between population growth, urbanization and
climate change. Even in the wetter climate scenario, it is unlikely that forests would
recover from the current rates of deforestation and biodiversity loss;
• Grazing patterns might be affected as land becomes lost at low lying coasts.
For the Fishery Sector:

• Capture fisheries and fishing will be vulnerable due to fisheries species fluctuations etc,
and loss of wetlands will severely impact the fisheries;
• Increased salinity, shrinking rivers and lakes will result from climate change;
• Fisheries resources are more prone to environmental changes as they live in and depend
on water for survival. Studies have shown that factors that contribute to climate change
such as global warming are initially felt in natural water bodies and estuaries. For
instance, undue increase in ocean temperatures can cause sea levels to rise hence fishes
may be displaced. Thus, fishes are disturbed when their immediate environment and
home are perturbed;
• Water shortage due to climate change leads to a reduction in fish stock or a decline in fish
catches;
• Warm temperatures in the coast could affect fisheries production. Drying up of rivers
could also affect artesinal fishing;
• Moderate sea level rise (SLR) would moderately boost increase in river basin (especially
the Niger Basin) volumes. It is not known how other issues, such as increased water
pollution and increased human population leading to higher demands, would play on
fisheries; on the other hand, no easy positive impacts can be discerned as enhanced SLR
would even further increase the adverse impacts;
• Distributions of El Ninios will affect storms, storminess patterns, and the aquatic habitat;
For the Forestry Sector:

• Agro-forestry is climate dependent and vulnerable to drought and desertification;

A3
• Most direct and swift negative effect on forestry comes from logging and development
activities. It is this felling of trees however that contributes to climate change. Fire across
tinder-dry parts of any Nigerian forest could force some thousands of individuals to flee
their homes;
• Forests are rich sources of biodiversity (genetic, species and ecosystem). Moreover, they
serve as habitats to a host of fauna resources. Any adverse impact on this sector will
affect biological materials significantly. Wildlife resources live in perfect harmony with
their flora counterpart. In addition, flora resources serve as food, shelter and sustenance
for wildlife and vice versa in some ecosystems. When flora are affected, the fauna
resources are directly or indirectly affected as well;
• Climate change could cause serious desert encroachment, drought, or wild fires;
• Directly through diminished rainfall in the north and central parts of Nigeria and
indirectly as people lose their livelihoods and turn to forests to expand their agricultural
production and for other ecosystem services;
• Deforestation is huge in Nigeria, and if continued at the present pace will likely heighten
the negative effects of climate change on Nigeria’s forests;
For the Oil & Gas Sector:

• Contributes more to climate change, by facilitating ozone layer depletion, rather than
being clearly affected by it directly;
• Being mostly non-biological resources and sectors, these are not as adversely affected as
biological components. On the other hand, the burning of fossil fuel (especially oil and
gas from petroleum thereby spewing large amounts of pollutant gases and elements into
the atmosphere, water, and land), has caused untold havoc in our environment in the
past 30 years and this has contributed greatly to climate change in Nigeria;
• A sea level rise (SLR) of 1meter in the worst case could submerge all of Nigeria’s oil
infrastructure in the Delta region;
• Nigeria depends nearly exclusively on exports of oil and gas resources for foreign
exchange. With the combined response of most developed countries to the current energy
crises which combine energy efficiency improvements with alternative sources based on
renewables, the price and demand for oil may decline on the world market in the
medium term (20 years) to long term (over 50 years) time slice. There are no indications
of any preparedness plan by Nigeria to join in the search for low-carbon or carbon-free
renewable energy technologies to off-set the potential loss of revenue. There is also no
clear idea of what would be the likely products of international trade aside from oil.
Nigeria could easily transform from an energy-exporting country to one that now
imports both energy technologies and new fuels from the developed countries. The
challenge for searching for alternatives to oil as product of international trade could make
the nation re-think investments in science and technology as basis for future
development;
• Oil and gas might be affected minutely as a result of changes in sea level, etc.
For Wholesale and Retail Trade:

• Wholesale and retail trade in plant-based products like modern and traditional
medicines, trade in foodstuffs, etc will be adversely affected;
• Trade in agricultural produce could decline through a fall in production; decline in
production could lead to high commodity prices out of the reach of many people.
Climate change could impact also through the destruction of transportation
infrastructure through floods and SLR;

A4
• Distribution and diversity might be somewhat affected, and other sectors might
inadvertently affect it as well, but a balancing effect will be expected as adaptation
occurs.

A5
For the Manufacturing Sector:
• Most of the capacity are located in urban low-lying coastal areas vulnerable to accelerated
sea level rise and consequent disruption by increased flooding/inundations and marine
erosion;
• Agro-allied manufacturing will be affected; but manufacture of metals and solid
minerals-based products may not be so affected;
• Agricultural and agro-processed produce will be badly affected, and this will lower the
return on investment in the agriculture sector;
• This can be through limited water availability and also destruction of economic
infrastructure along the coastal region by floods;
• Increased demands for industrial efficiency could, if not well managed, lead to increased
production costs, which translates to higher living costs for consumers. On the other
hand, attainment of cleaner production at competitive costs could lead to improved
capacity to export although due to low technology base, the likelihood of this happening
is rather low;
• Materials to be manufactured might change as a result of change in trade due to change
in environment but then another balancing effect might be expected.
For the Utilities (water/electricity) Sector:

• Surface and groundwater are likely to suffer from salinization and sedimentation, while
low water levels will decrease electricity generation in dams and reservoirs;
• Shrinking rivers will affect hydro-electricity generation and reduce the water table and
quantity of drinkable water available from unpredictable rainfall. Water available for
other uses will also decrease;
• Utilities such as water supplies may be altered if changes are effected in this sector;
• Reduction in seawater level will lead to a drop in the electricity wattage, shortage of
water, and reduced water quality;
• Water supply will be constrained through reduced precipitation and run-off. Water
quality will also be affected through salt water intrusion particularly along the coasts.
Already we are seeing how changes in levels in Lake Kainji are affecting electricity
supply and climate change will further reduce run-off in the Niger River. In the worst
case scenario where countries upstream decide to dam the river, then the impact will be
exacerbated;
• Being located at the equator and within the tropics means that any increase in mean air
temperatures would translate into higher demands for electricity for space cooling as
well as increased demand for water for residential and agricultural uses. If such
additional electricity generation would arise from fossil fuel, it would exacerbate climate
change. If it is to come from renewable sources, additional costs would be involved.
There appears to be no win-win situation;
• Water will suffer a higher impact than electricity as it is expected that less freshwater will
be available as a result of submersion of some coasts by the sea, and as Nigeria already
suffers a huge scarcity of potable water, it will be quite adverse on the nation.
• Hydroelectricity generation will be reduced due to low water levels;
• Power and energy is derived from some climatic components/factors such and water,
wind and sun. Indeed, changes in these translates into alterations in sources of power
and energy. Proper and well-directed utilization of these may help in curbing negative
effects of climate change in our environment. This sector is highly essential to man’s
survival and progress;

A6
• Hydroelectric generation is affected due to drop in seawater level;
• Ability to develop clean energy at competitive costs would lead to improved capacity,
supporting energy export, and the development of auxiliary technologies to support
infrastructure development. Due to low technology base, the likelihood of this happening
is rather low;
• If oil and gas are not expected to be affected much, then the power and energy industry
might also not suffer much.
For the Construction sector:

• Construction and development activities are hinged on climatic conditions. The type and
mode of construction depends on the climate of the region. Changes in climate therefore
have significant effect on this sector of human economy. It is noteworthy too that the
reverse is also the case. Much construction and huge development activities affect many
facets of the environment, which in turn affect the climate. Many have asserted that these
anthropogenic activities (which involves deforestation and removal of large quantities of
vegetation and soil covers; pollution of air; and contamination surface and ground water)
are one of the primary causes of climate change;
• Unavailability of water and decreased human capacity to do work;
• Water availability and drop in GDP will all affect construction;
• Flooding of coastal areas used for resettlement schemes;
• There might be increased monitoring on urban planning, etc but it is not likely that the
construction sector might suffer at all.
For the Transport Sector:

• Accelerated rise in sea level would cripple ports, coastal roads, air fields, rail lines, etc
thereby reducing economic activities in the country;
• Changes in climatic conditions affect transportation, travel and travel time and schedule;
• Ocean/sea navigation is impaired due to reduced seawater level;
• Road and economic infrastructure, particularly along the coasts will be washed away.
Most of the infrastructure from Port Harcourt to Lagos will be at risk;
• The efficiency of the transport sector is very low, resulting from nearly sole-dependence
on road transportation. Response to climate change by other developed countries could
change the transportation technology towards cleaner fuels and more integrated
transport planning. Without a good long-term plan in place, the country may suddenly
find its transportation system unable and not ready to tap into these new technologies.
This could imply a sudden need for structural changes in the transportation system, with
high implications to consumers, leading to enormous economic and social impacts. On
the other hand, Ability to evolve a plan for new transportation system and transport
technologies would add to national capacity for technology development and innovation
management. Due to the low technology base, the likelihood of this happening is rather
low;
• Transportation might be affected a bit as a result of changing means to adapt to new
environments e.g. looking for more ways to navigate wet land, but it will not suffer
much.

A7
For the Telecommunication Sector:
• Probably will enjoy a boom!;
• The principles applied in telecommunications are hinged on climatic factors.
Communication may likely to be impossible if the climate is not right, and
communication is critical to a growing and healthy economy. Hence changes in climate
will affect this sector of the economy in the long term;
• Destruction of infrastructure during flooding in the coastal region;
• Destruction of masts through storms. A further 1 degree rise in sea surface temperature
in the Atlantic will create the conditions required to create typhoons off the coasts of
Nigeria;
For the Hotel/Ecotourism Sector:

• Resorts will be badly affected by frequent flooding/inundation and destruction of flora
and fauna, including risk of frequent malaria etc;
• Tourism suffers when weather-related disasters occur;
• Long term changes in climatic conditions also affect landscapes and the way places looks.
This may lower the value of these components and thus reduce livelihood and income for
man;
• Extreme heat leading to loss of life, increase in diseases affecting animals crops, and
humans;
• Many of Nigeria’s good hotels are in Lagos, within proximity to the coasts and can be
impacted by SLR and coastal erosion;
• Tourism could reduce based on the need for tourists from cold countries to come to the
tropics;
• Ecotourism will suffer as a result of the change of habitats of animals and so such places
of interest as game reserves and life parks might suffer a great deal as animals abandon
them.
For the Financial Services Sector:

• When this sector is adversely affected, many things could be affected, as this sector helps
to provide necessary funds/resources for amelioration/mitigation;
• Nigeria’s financial services are sustained by oil and agric and if these two sectors are
affected, then the effect will spiral into the financial services sector;
• Lagos and the Niger Delta areas currently harbor a significant fraction of the national
development infrastructure, and the oil and gas facilities. In any scenario of sea level rise
(whether low, moderate or high) threats to infrastructure from potential
flooding/submergence are high. This is already noticeable in the Lagos coasts. Insurance
costs for existing and future investments, as well as assets management could lead to
higher costs, leading to significant economic and social impacts;
• They are subject to changes everyday and such a change might mean more expenses in
the community but will not change financial services too much.
For the Real Estate & Business Services Sector:

• Depreciation of coastal properties would be profound due to increased scourge of
flooding, marine erosion and subsidence of low-lying coastal areas;
• Flooding from climate change destroys homes. Fire across tinder-dry parts of Southern
California forced some 500,000 to flee their homes n 2007;
A8
• Real estate and business services are affected through diminished estate development
when the climate is not right;
• Land for housing is claimed by water–flooding, thereby Increasing cost on foundation for
building erection;
• They might suffer as a result of restructuring and urban planning;
• Design and construction will refocus for environmental impact and energy use.
For the General Environment Sector:

• Coastal settlements will be dislocated, internally displaced persons and/or refugees from
arid areas will increase in number;
• Rising temperature foster the spread of diseases by allowing mosquitoes and disease-
carrying organism like fungi to spread;
• Human health and safety is regarded as one of the most important biological resources.
When negative changes occur in our climate, leading to disease outbreak, they hit human
health severely. This reduces man-hours and work efficiency and increases death rate.
Changes and alteration in one affects the other in like manner. This huge sector makes up
the basic component of our environment wherein man is able to survive. Negative impact
on these may prove to be detrimental and threat to plants, animals and man;
• Global warming and its associated effects – desert encroachment, flooding, drought, etc
could occur;
• We will see severe ecosystem degradation, from droughts up north to flooding in the
south with attendant consequences;
• Air pollution, waste management, and other environmental management issues are to be
increased resulting from both local emissions and long-term transport. These require
more efficient management systems, with costs likely to increase. On the other hand,
ability to mainstream climate change adaptation into planning could reduce some of the
costs, and provide improved technology planning and management capacity. The
likelihood of this happening cannot be rated high;
• The total effect on the environment might be drastic to areas in low lying coasts but more
stable environments might not suffer too much.
Experts contacted/interviewed on Climate-Change-in-Nigeria

(a) In Calabar, South-south Agroecological Zone:
1. Dr. Imo Jackson Ekpoh*,
Environmentalist & Geographer
Department of Geography
University of Calabar
Calabar, Cross River State (CRS)
2. Prof. Sam O. Abang*

Agricultural Environmentalist
Department of Agricultural Economics
University of Calabar

A9
3. Dr. Chris Odu Agbor*
Environmentalist & Permanent Secretary
CRS Forestry Commission
69 Target Road
(b) In Lagos, South-west Agroecological Zone

4. Mr. Adeniyi Arimoro*
Environmental Ecologist & MD/CEO
Afruit Enterprises
12 Festival Road,
Victoria Island, Lagos
5. Dr. E. A. Ajao*
Environmental Ecologist & Deputy Director
Nigerian Institute for Oceanography & Marine Research
Wilmot Point Road, Bar Beach
PMB 12729
6. Mr. Nubi Olubunmi Ayoola*

Environmentalist
Nigerian Institute for Oceanography & Marine Research
Wilmot Point Road, Bar Beach
PMB 12729
(c) In Ibadan and Ile-Ife, South-west Agro-ecological Zone

7. Prof. David U. U. Okali
Retired Professor of Forestry Environment & Chairman
The Nigerian Environmental Study Action Team (NEST)
No. 1, Oluokun Street (Off Awolowo Avenue)
Bodija, Ibadan
8. Dr. N. Kai
GIS Expert
International Institute for Tropical Agriculture
Oyo Road, Ibadan
9. Dr. Imoh B. Obioh*

Coordinator
Atmospheric Research and Information Analysis Laboratory (ARIAL)
Centre for Energy Research and Development (CERD)
Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria

A10
(d) In Abuja, Federal Capital Territory (FCT)
10. Prof. Collins Olisa-Emeka Gardner
Environmentalist & Executive Chairman/CEO
Presidential Implementation Committee on Clean Development Mechanism
Room 1.49, Wing B (1st Floor)
Federal Secretariat Complex, Phase 1
Shehu Shagari Way, Abuja
11. Dr. Ewah Out Eleri

Executive Director
International Center for Energy, Environment & Development (ICEED)
Chatti Plaza, 6 Sapele Street
P. O. Box 5421
Garki II, Abuja
12. Dr. Ishaku Huzi Mshelia

Director
Clean Energy & Environment Initiative
HUZI & ASSOCIATES Legal Practitioners
No. 8 Lobito Crescent
Wuse II, Abuja
13. Ms Kate Airey*

Head of Political Section
British High Commission
Shehu Shagari Way (North)
Maitama, Abuja
14. Dr. Graham M. Gass*

Social Policy Adviser
DFID
Abuja
15. Mr. Dada Iweka
Geological Engineer
Western Goldfields Limited
12 Abeokuta Street
Garki, Area 8
Abuja
16. Mr. Guy Okechukwu

Environmentalist & Estate Developer
Guy & Co Properties Limited
33 Ekukinam Street
Utako District, Abuja
17. Mr. Paul O. Iweka

Construction Engineer
Isajon Engineering & Construction Company
33 Ekukinam Street
Utako District, Abuja
A11
18. Dr. B. A. Ajakaiye
Director-General/CEO
National Oil Spill Detection & Response Agency (NOSDRA)
5thFloor, NAIC Building
Plot 590 Zone AO
PMB 145, Central Area
Garki, Abuja
19. Mr. Femi Ajibabi*

Environmentalist
Budget Office, National Assembly
Abuja
(e) In Enugu
20. Chidi Onuoha*
Research Fellow
African Institute for Applied Economics
Enugu
Nigeria
(f) In other places outside Nigeria

21. Prof. Anthony Nyong*
Director
IDRC
Nairobi, Kenya
22. Ms. Nura Oyekan*

MSc. Student Intern/Environmentalist
Imperial College
London
(Presently interning on Climate Change issues with Mr. Arimoro, Afruit Enterprises)

A12
Annex B
Climate Change Scenarios

and Latest Research
Findings
B1 CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIOS
B1.1 PREDICTED FUTURE CLIMATIC CHANGES
Table B1.1 and Table B1.2 show the predicted changes in temperature (degrees
Celcius) and precipitation (mm) respectively, for four different IPCC models
from the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research. These models,
CGCM2, CSIRO2, HadCM3 and PCM are also known as IPCC model numbers
7, 10, 30 and 23, respectively. The data are shown for the years 2010, 2020 and
2050 for three different scenarios – A1F1, A2 and B1, which correspond
approximately to a high, medium and low climate change scenario,
respectively. However, each scenario has various characteristics that should
not be boiled down to ‘high, medium and low’ categories. The average results
from the four models are shown.
Table B1.1 Predicted changes in average temperature of Nigeria (∆ degrees Celsius)
Model Scenario 2010 2020 2050

CGCM2 A1F1 1.00 1.22 2.56
A2 0.62 0.84 2.08
B1 0.62 0.82 1.41
CSIRO2 A1F1 0.67 0.83 1.70
A2 0.58 0.77 1.85
B1 0.80 1.05 1.83
HadCM3 A1F1 0.94 1.14 2.41
A2 0.60 0.82 2.04
B1 0.71 0.94 1.63
PCM A1F1 0.55 0.66 1.40
A2 0.35 0.47 1.17
B1 0.42 0.56 0.94
Average A1F1 0.79 0.96 2.02
A2 0.54 0.73 1.79
B1 0.64 0.84 1.45
Table B1.2 Predicted changes in precipitation in Nigeria (∆ mm)
Model Scenario 2010 2020 2050

CGCM2 A1F1 -9.23 -11.28 -23.76
A2 -5.83 -7.89 -19.49
B1 -3.60 -4.77 -8.26
CSIRO2 A1F1 -16.30 -19.98 -41.15
A2 -14.80 -19.80 -47.55
B1 -14.74 -19.32 -33.49
HadCM3 A1F1 25.83 31.41 66.46
A2 20.75 28.12 69.90
B1 20.79 27.54 47.72
PCM A1F1 24.15 29.01 61.33
A2 15.31 20.70 51.42
B1 17.63 23.23 39.49
Average A1F1 6.11 7.29 15.72
A2 3.86 5.28 13.57
B1 5.02 6.67 11.37

B1
B1.2 SCENARIO ASSUMPTIONS
B1.2.1 A1F1
The A1 storyline and scenario family describes a future world of very rapid
economic growth, global population that peaks in mid-century and declines
thereafter, and the rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies.
Major underlying themes are convergence among regions, capacity building
and increased cultural and social interactions, with a substantial reduction in
regional differences in per capita income. The A1 scenario family develops
into three groups that describe alternative directions of technological change
in the energy system. The A1F1 group is distinguished by its technological
emphasis: fossil-intensive.
B1.2.2 A2
The A2 storyline and scenario family describes a very heterogeneous world.

The underlying theme is self-reliance and preservation of local identities.
Fertility patterns across regions converge very slowly, which results in
continuously increasing population. Economic development is primarily
regionally oriented and per capita economic growth and technological change
more fragmented and slower than other storylines.
B1.2.3 B1
The B1 storyline and scenario family describes a convergent world with the
same global population, that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter, as
in the A1 storyline, but with rapid change in economic structures toward a
service and information economy, with reductions in material intensity and
the introduction of clean and resource-efficient technologies. The emphasis is
on global solutions to economic, social and environmental sustainability,
including improved equity, but without additional climate initiatives.

B2
B2 LATEST CLIMATE CHANGE FINDINGS
Climate change science is a relatively ‘young’ research field and the academic
literature is rapidly changing. There are considerable scientific uncertainties
associated with lack of information and disagreement about what is known or
even knowable. For many years, interest in climate change centred on whether
or not global warming was really happening. In scientific circles, all but a
minority of skeptics now agree that the climate is changing and most climate
experts have moved on from this debate and begun serious consideration of
the severity, likely impacts and the prospects for mitigating and adapting to
climate change. However despite this apparent consensus there continue to be
a broad range of views as to what the likely impacts of climate change will be.
One recent emergent view that is increasingly making the headlines is the
concept of ‘dangerous climate change’ i.e. a view held by an increasing
number of climate scientists who argue that climate change will be
compounded by positive feedback mechanisms that accelerate warming, and
risk pushing global systems toward dangerous thresholds or ‘tipping points’
beyond which we lose any prospect of management. The evidence for
‘dangerous’ climate change will be presented in this annex.
The difference in academic opinions is compounded by the wide range of

uncertainties present in climate change science. For example, the following
uncertainties mean that it is not possible to predict the exact impacts of climate
change on the state of Nigeria:
• Future greenhouse gas emissions from human activities,
• Availability of fossil fuels,
• Future population trends,
• Future consumption trends,
• How to accurately express the exact role of water vapour and the
water cycle in global climate models,
• Sensitivity of natural greenhouse gas emissions sinks to warming
temperatures and the likelihood of positive feedback,
• Temporal atmospheric inertia – i.e. how long do past greenhouse gas
emissions ‘stay’ in the atmosphere and impact on the climate?
• Climatic sensitivity to greenhouse gas emissions.
Further information on these uncertainties and the latest scientific

developments in these areas will also be presented in this annex.
B2.1.1 The IPCC
To help decision-makers deal with the rapidly changing body of evidence for
climate change, the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
has produced regular comprehensive summaries of peer reviewed science on
the topic – the IPCC Assessment Reports. The latest – the Fourth Assessment
Report (AR4) was released in 2007. It is important to stress that the AR4 is not

B3
new science; rather it is a collation of existing peer reviewed science, with the
IPCC in essence being a reviewing and a collating body. The AR4 set out an
overwhelming body of scientific evidence which put the reality of human-
induced climate change beyond any real doubt. However despite being
viewed by many governments as undisputed authority of climate change
science, considerable uncertainties and knowledge gaps exist in the academic
literature of climate change, despite and in some cases as a result of the AR4
and the IPCC Assessment Report process itself.
B2.1.2 Limitations of the IPCC Review Process
The IPCC has garnered criticism that its Assessment Reports are too
conservative in their projections of climate change. This is partly unavoidable
due to several key features of the IPCC Review Process most notably; the long
timescales involved, the fact that governments not scientists have the final
‘cut’ in the editing process, and by the very nature of the Assessment Reports
as consensus documents. Certainly, in making its projections, the IPCC faces
pressure from numerous stakeholders, many of which may from short-term
commercial and national interests wish to dilute its findings. The IPCC’s final
reports have to reach consensus and unanimous approval from the scientific
community, and then from each of the 113 signatory governments to the
UNFCCC. Representatives of each signatory government review each
summary document line-by-line, with the result that government staff, often
without scientific backgrounds have the final ‘edit’ on the science presented in
the reporti at times against the advice of the scientific panel.
Because of the protracted nature of the IPCC’s review process for the
Assessment Reports the IPCC’s schedule for producing reports requires a
deadline for submissions up to two years prior to the report’s final release.
This means that any new evidence that has been published in the intervening
period is not able to be included, regardless of its significance. In an area of
science where our scientific understanding is rapidly changing, this has been
raised as a serious shortcoming in a body which is widely regarded as the
ultimate authority on the science.
So AR4, for example was limited to assessing science published up until the
end of 2006 at the latest (with the bulk of the science assessed adhering to a cut
off date of 2005), despite being published in November 2007 and criticsii have
argued that it is already out of date and omits recent observations and factors
contributing to global warming, such as the release of greenhouse gases from
thawing tundra, and because it provides no upper bound on its projections of
sea level rise.
Some critics have contended that the IPCC reports tend to underestimate
dangers, understate risks, and report only the ‘lowest common denominator’
findings. Professor James Hansen of NASA’s Goddard Institute of Space
Studies, perhaps the most eminent climate change scientist in the world today,
links this conservatism to a phenomenon that he describes as ‘scientific
reticence’ which he believes

B4
“Hinders communication with the public about dangers of global warming…
Scientific reticence may be a consequence of the scientific method. Success in science
depends on objective skepticism. Caution, if not reticence, has its merits. However, in
a case such as ice sheet instability and sea level rise, there is a danger in excessive
caution. We may rue reticence, if it serves to lock in future disasters… I believe there
is a pressure on scientists to be conservative. Papers are accepted for publication more
readily if they do not push too far and are larded with caveats. Caveats are essential to
science, being born in skepticism, which is essential to the process of investigation and
verification. But there is a question of degree. A tendency for ‘gradualism’ as new
evidence comes to light may be ill-suited for communication, when an issue with a
short time fuse is concerned.iii”
B2.2 SCIENTIFIC ADVANCES SINCE THE AR4
Involving over 3,800 scientists from over 150 countries and six years of work,
the IPCC AR4 was a substantial body of work which reviewed and analysed
peer reviewed scientific studies published up to the end of 2006, and in a very
few cases, to early 2007iv. Since the publication of the AR4, scientific research
on climate change suggests that global warming is accelerating, considerably
beyond that projected by the IPCC in AR4. New numerical modelling studies
have also provided more detailed indications of the impacts to come,
including in areas where there were significant data gaps in the AR4. Indeed
important aspects of climate change seem to have been underestimated or
downplayed due to the politics of the IPCC editing process, and the impacts of
climate change appear to be being felt sooner and with more severity than
predicted.
Areas where significant science has been published since the AR4 submission
deadline closed include: sea level rise, Arctic sea ice dynamics, ocean
acidification and dangerous climate change as a result of feedback warming.
The latest evidence suggests that feedback warming is already beginning to
occur and will potentially amplify the warming trend initially triggered by
anthropogenic emissions and, as a result, we may face climatic disruption
considerably beyond the grave situation predicted by climate change scientists
and the IPCC AR4 today.
Rajendra Pachauri, the IPCC chair, admitted at the launch of the AR4
synthesis report that since the IPCC began work on it, scientists have recorded
"much stronger trends in climate change"v which were unable to be included
in the final document. The table below highlights some of the most important
recent research including significant impacts, and their proposed thresholds
(i.e. a certain increase in average global temperatures, or global CO2 levels)
which was not available in time for inclusion in the IPCC’s AR4:

B5
Table 2.1 Latest Research Omitted from the IPCC AR4
Climate Change Hazard Estimated Thresholds

Shutdown of the thermohaline circulation (the Gulf Stream) Various: 3°C, in 100
years, 700ppm CO2
Disintegration of the West Antarctic ice sheet (causing sea level rise of 2-4°C, 450 – 550 ppm
5 metres) CO2
Disintegration of the Greenland ice sheet (causing sea level rise of 7 1°C
metres)
Widespread bleaching of coral reefs >1°C
Broad ecosystem impacts with limited adaptive capacity (including 1-2°C
loss of the Fynbos in South Africa, and the Atlantic Forest ecosystem in
Brazil)
Large increase of people at risk of water shortage in vulnerable regions 450 - 650 CO2
Source: adapted from Oppenheimer and Petsonk, 2005vi
B2.3 UNCERTAINTIES
Some of the most significant knowledge gaps / areas of uncertainty affecting

the academic literature of climate change science, and the latest science to
have emerged since the production of the Fourth Assessment Report are
discussed in more detail below.
B2.3.1 Positive Feedbacks, Non Linear Change and the Risk of ‘Dangerous’ Climate
Change:
Climate change is often thought of, and indeed in the AR4 is typified as - a
gradual, linear process that involves a smooth relationship between increasing
levels of greenhouse gases and rising temperatures — with the inherent
assumption that, if we are slowly increasing GHGs we will produce a
predictable linear warming. But the climatic system just is not as simple as
this.
In the Earth’s history, periods of relatively stable climate have often been
interrupted by sharp transitions to a contrasting state: for instance, past
glaciation periods typically ended suddenly. Prehistory suggests that it would
be wrong to characterise our climate as one where change is gradual; rather
the paleoclimatic record details numerous instances of dramatic changes that
tipped regional climates from one state to another setting off chains of events
that echoed around the globe. Scientists are increasingly coming to
understand that our climate is one of chaotic, non-linear transitions, where a
small increase in the level of greenhouse gases, or in the energy imbalance of
the climate system, beyond certain critical thresholds can flip the whole
climatic system from one state to another quickly and unpredictably. Rates of
warming since the mid-19th century are higher than those of the last ice age
by more than a factor of ten, increasing to a factor of twenty from the mid-
1970s. The atmosphere is now heating up more quickly than modern humans
have ever experienced suggesting that any ‘flip’ to another climatic state may
also occur more quickly.

B6
Climate scientists are increasingly concerned that continued warming may
instigate a number of positive feedback mechanisms, whereby natural tipping
points are exceeded and self reinforcing, run-away warming is initiatedvii.
Most climate models look at the direct effect of carbon emissions on global
temperatures. What they do not include is the effect any warming might have
on promoting further warming—what are called positive feedback loops.
Scientists have long suspected that such sharp transitions might be related to
tipping points where positive feedback mechanisms lead to self-propelling
changeviii.
The demonstration of tipping points has implications for our thinking about
current climate change. The well known projections by the IPCC are based on
the assumption of linear change. The latest science contradicts this and implies
that we should also consider the possibility that the climate will cross a
tipping point after which changes will be amplified. In recent years a broad
consensus emerged amongst climate scientists that a rise above 2°C (and
perhaps even less) of warming above pre-industrial global average
temperature levels is ‘dangerous’ because it is likely to lead the planet’s
climate to cross a number of these critical thresholds and stimulate further
feedback warming as a result, i.e. the warming we cause will encourage the
world's natural systems (i.e. permafrost, oceans, soils, and forests) to start
releasing the GHGs they store – leading to so-called dangerous or run-away
climate change. If feedback mechanisms kick in on a large scale human society
would be unable to stop the planet from undergoing a rapid rise in
temperatures of 11°C over a period perhaps as short as a few decades - this
would be an unprecedented rise and one not seen since the end of Permian
period some 250 million years ago – a time also known as the great extinction.
Humans would then be powerless to prevent the collapse of numerous
ecosystems (including the Amazon, global fisheries, and coral reefs), huge loss
of human life from famine and drought, mass extinctions and sea level rises of
up to 25 metres over the coming centuries. Examples of such feedback
mechanisms, which could all trigger further warming, are illustrated in the
following table:
Table 2.2 Climate Change Positive Feedback Mechanisms
Feedback Mechanism Status c.2008 Source

Release of methane from previously frozen deposits Already occurring in International
i.e. permafrost, methane hydrates. Northern Siberia and Siberian Shelf
North America Study 2008 ix
The die-back of tropical forests and the release of Already occurring in the Lancaster
their embodied carbon through forest fires. Amazon. University,
University of
East Anglia,
2008 x
Change to the albedo balance of the polar regions, as Already occurring in the Scientific
sea ice is reduced, and allowing oceans to absorb Arctic and Antarctic American,
more warmth. 2004 xi
Higher CO2 levels in the atmosphere reduce the Already occurring Science 2007xii
ocean’s ability to store CO2 by increasing the acidity (particularly in the
of the ocean and harming plankton and crustaceans. Southern Ocean).

B7
Recent observations suggest that feedback warming is already beginning to
occur at temperatures far below the 2°C previously believed to lead to
dangerous climate change. All of these feedbacks are occurring some 20-100
yearsxiii before they were predicted to by the IPCC, suggesting that we may be
approaching the tipping point of catastrophic climate change sooner, and at a
lower atmospheric concentration of GHGs than was previously thought.
Indeed the latest science suggests that even a small perturbation can cause
large climate change. Today, the Arctic sea-ice, the West Antarctic ice sheet,
the Amazon rainforest and the Greenland ice sheet could provide such
feedbacks. Little additional forcing is needed to trigger these feedbacks,
because of the warming that is already in the pipeline from past emissions and
the time lags in the atmospheric system.
One such a shift is now occurring at the North Pole, where it appears that a
tipping point, or critical threshold, has been passed, and an area of summer
sea-ice once as large as Australia is disintegrating a century ‘ahead of
schedule’. Two new summaries of the sciencexiv published since last year’s
Intergovernmental Panel report, produced independently of each other, and
the United Nations’ own Environment Programme’s latest yearbookxv suggest
that - almost a century ahead of schedule - the critical climate processes that
may lead to dangerous climate change have begun. In the AR4 the IPCC
warned that the Arctic’s “late-summer sea ice is projected to disappear almost
completely towards the end of the 21st century … in some models.xvi” But, as
the new report by the Public Interest Research Centre (PIRC) shows, climate
scientists are now predicting the end of late-summer sea ice within three to
seven years. It appears that the less than 1°C of global warming that the world
has experienced to date may have already triggered the first tipping point of
the Earth’s climate system – the disappearance of summer Arctic sea ice1.
This process has implications far beyond the Arctic and the iconic survival of
the polar bear but rather, has implications for wider society and the global
economy and could potentially open the gates to rapid and abrupt climate
change, rather than the gradual changes that have been forecast so far. As the
ice disappears from the Arctic, areas that were once white snow and sea ice
are transformed into dark earth and ocean which absorb more heat from
sunlight (much of which would previously have reflected off white ice and
snow – due to the albedo affect) and warming is accelerated as a result.
The most dangerous feedback loop involves methane release. Methane is

another greenhouse gas, and one that is 21-times more potent than CO2.
Billions of tons of methane lie frozen in the permafrost of the Arctic tundra.
Evidence published since the AR4 shows that the extra warming caused by
disappearing sea ice penetrates 1500km inland, covering almost the entire
region of continuous permafrostxvii. Arctic permafrost contains twice as much
carbon as the entire global atmosphere (ibid). This vast source of greenhouse
gases remains safe for as long as the ground stays frozen. But this issue is
compounded by the fact that the Arctic regions are warming three times faster
than the rest of the planet, and are already 2°C warmer than they were in the

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1980s. Consequently, large areas of the Siberian tundra are now beginning to
thaw. In 2005 it was discovered that a million square kilometers—an area the
size of France and Germany combined—in western Siberia had already turned
from permanently frozen peat bog into shallow lakes. Methane ‘geysers’ are
now appearing in some locations with such force that they keep the water
open in Arctic lakes, through the winter13. Worryingly, since mid-2006 the first
significant spike in global atmospheric concentrations of methane in over a
decadexviii has been observed, although whether this is linked to melting
permafrost is not yet proven.
Further south, if the changing climate were to produce four or five

consecutive years of drought in the Amazon, it might become sufficiently dry
for wildfires to destroy much of the rainforest and for the carbon stored in the
biomass to pour into the atmosphere. The frequency and severity of
Amazonian droughts have been increasing in recent years, partly as a result of
climate change induced warming of the tropical Atlantic (which reached
record levels in 2005 and produced record levels of forest fires in the
Amazonxix), and also partly linked to changes in interdecadal variations and
the ENSO cycle. This change in the regional climate pattern would further
reduce rainfall, and the drying and dead forest would release very large
amounts of GHGs. These impacts, like many others, would cause further
threshold events. If this kind of momentum builds sufficiently, and enough
tipping points are crossed, it seems likely that we will pass a point of no
return. Whether climate as a whole is now approaching a tipping point is
difficult to judge because human influence is simply too fast to generate data
records long enough for accurate detectionxx.
B2.3.2 Uncertainties Regarding Sea Level Rise (SLR)

Sea levels could rise by substantially more than the levels predicted by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), according to the latest
scientific research published since the IPCC’s AR4 was released last year. The
IPCC’s forecast of an average rise in global sea levels of 28-43cm (and up to
59cm under the highest emissions scenario) by 2100 is now widely viewed to
greatly underestimate the risk posed by SLR, by many in the scientific
community as it is based on multiple models that only consider SLR due to
thermal expansion of seawater, and from mountain glacier melt and notably
exclude any SLR resulting from melting in the Antarctic and Greenland. The
IPCC’s depiction of SLR as a gradual linear event has been questioned by
more recent science and by actual observed rises. Sea level rose at an average
rate of about 1.8 mm/year during the years 1961-2003, but the rise in sea level
during 1993-2003 was at an increasing average rate of some 3.1 mm/year. The
IPCC was unable to explain this acceleration in sea level rise, and unable to
include the contribution to sea level rise from accelerated melting of the
Greenland and Antarctic polar ice sheets in the AR4 (which are likely to
contribute the vast majority of SLR over this century), because the processes
involved were not understood at the time it went to press. In the interim
several studies using a range of different methodologies, have been published
which suggest that sea levels will rise much higher and faster than the figures
stated by the IPCC in AR4. According to NASA:

B9
“The critical factor in predicting how fast sea levels rise, is how fast the major ice
sheets respond to the warming of the ocean… Ice sheet disintegration could happen
very rapidly, as rising sea level itself tends to lift marine ice shelves and detach them
from land ice. As ice shelves break up, this accelerates movement of land ice to the
ocean. The process could be further accelerated by increased absorption of sunlight by
ice sheets darkened by pollution or meltwaterxxi. These reinforcing effects mean that
the rate of change would be moderate until real collapse begins, after which changes
could be extremely rapid. Recent observations of the Arctic ice cap lead some scientists
to argue that a tipping point has already been passed after which ice loss can only
acceleratexxii.”
In 2007, German researcher Stefan Rahmstorf and his team published an

influential paper in Sciencexxiii, showing that the observed sea level rise has
been close to double the mean predicted by IPCC models over the past
decade, and that the IPCC’s assumption that SLR is a linear process, is
erroneous and that rises of up to 1.4m (and possibly even higher) by 2100 are
possible. This raises concerns that the climate system, in particular sea level,
may be responding more quickly to climate change than the current
generation of models indicates.
Another notable studyxxiv published too late to be included in the AR4 which
involved the construction of a computer model linking temperatures to sea
level rise for the last two millennia projects that by 2100, sea levels will rise by
between 0.8m and 1.5m, with a rapid rise associated with melting of ice sheets.
Anders Levermann, of Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, is one
of the many scientists (and himself an IPCC contributing author) who, while
supportive of the IPCC's overall findings, have criticised the panel for using
the same model to predict future sea level rise as was used to inaccurately
calculate past increases. The models in the IPCC report underestimated the
sea level rise that we have already observed by 40% therefore their accuracy in
projecting future sea level rise is questionable.
B2.3.3 Atmospheric Sensitivity to GHG and Saturation Thresholds
Another key uncertainty with regard to climate change science is the

sensitivity of the planet to increased GHG concentrations in the atmosphere
and the rate with which the climate could change and specifically the
correlation between atmospheric concentrations of GHGs and climate change
temperature rises.
Recent consensus views argue that the most serious consequences of climate
change might be avoided if global average temperatures rise by no more than
2 °C above pre-industrial levels (1.4 °C above present levels). Until recently it
had been assumed that this would occur if GHG concentrations rose above
550 ppm carbon dioxide equivalent by volume. This concentration was used,
for example, in informing government policy in certain countries including
the European Union. However a recent conference on avoiding dangerous
climate change concluded that stabilizing emissions at the level of 550 ppm, is
likely to lead to the 2 °C safe limit being exceeded, based on the projections of
more recent climate models. Stabilizing GHG concentrations at 450 ppm
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would only result in a 50% likelihood of limiting global warming to 2 °C, and
that it would be necessary to achieve stabilization below 400 ppm to give a
relatively high certainty of not exceeding 2 °C.
In the past five years and particularly in the last two years, improved climate
change measurement techniques, and observation of the speed of glaciers
melting in the Arctic and Antarctic, research has yielded compelling evidence
that the world’s climate is warming at an unpredicted pace, it may well be
that this is because the capacity of the Earth’s natural carbon sinks to absorb
emissions may be reaching saturation point. The annual mean growth rate for
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide in 2007 was 2.14ppm – the
fourth year in the past six to see an annual rise greater than 2ppm. From 1970
to 2000, the concentration rose by about 1.5ppm each year, but since 2000 the
annual rise has leapt to an average 2.1ppmxxv. Scientists say the shift could
indicate that the Earth is losing its natural ability to soak up billions of tons of
carbon each year. Climate models assume that about half our future emissions
will be re-absorbed by forests and oceans, but the new figures confirm this
may be too optimistic. If more of our carbon pollution stays in the atmosphere,
it means emissions will have to be cut by more than currently projected to
prevent dangerous levels of global warming, and if emissions are not cut
appropriately, that the impacts of climate change will be considerably worse
than that predicted by the IPCC in the AR4 – i.e. dangerous. To ensure that
climate change does not warm average global temperatures above 2°C,
current mainstream thinking is that we will need to stabilize GHG
concentrations in the atmosphere between 400-550 ppm. However the latest
observations which suggest natural sinks are reaching saturation is leading an
increasing number of researchers to conclude that the only way to avoid
dangerous climate change is to limit concentrations to <350xxvippm thus,
considering that current concentrations already stand at 387ppmxxvii, it can be
seen that dangerous climate change is a real possibility
B2.3.4 Data gaps relating to climate modelling:
Despite an ever improving understanding of the science of climate change,

our understanding of many of the components of the highly complex climate
system and their role in climate change are still evolving, and as a result it has
not yet been possible to incorporate their influence into Global Climate
Models (GCMs). Some of the aspects of the climate system yet to be fully
understood and quantified in GCMs include the roles played by clouds, the
oceans, longer term climatic trends such as ENSO and the Pacific Decadal
Oscillation, land-use changes, the cryosphere (i.e. all snow, ice and frozen
ground on and beneath the Earth and ocean surface) and the interactions
between some natural feedback mechanisms and physical processes.
Worryingly, the effects of melting permafrost and other positive feedback
mechanisms are not incorporated into any global climate models.
B2.3.5 Knowledge Gaps in Historic Climate Records:
Long term observations and accurate recording of historic climatic conditions

does not exist for many regions of the planet, particularly in the developing
B11
world. Thus it is not possible to use historical frequencies of climatic events to
project a future trend line, or to detect changes from the long term average.
Similarly it is not possible to use historical insurance loss data to look at past
frequencies of extreme weather events, as assets in many parts of the world
were underinsured or uninsured until the 1980s and underwriting data is not
available: again, this is largely an issue for developing world countries.
B2.3.6 Future Emissions
Perhaps the most significant uncertainty is that future climate change will be
shaped by emissions of greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) which we have yet
to emit - the evolution of which is highly uncertain (thus the success of current
and future mitigation strategies will impact on the level of adaptation needed
in the future). To reflect this uncertainty the IPCC developed different
emission scenarios to express different emissions trajectories associated with
different potential ‘futures’ expressing a range of climate change mitigation
policies, rates of population growth, economic growth strategies – and the
likely climate change impacts associated with each emissions scenario. The
different emissions scenarios and the projected temperature rises associated
with them circa 2100, is illustrated in the graph below, taken from the IPCC
AR4:
Figure 2.1 Projected Temperature Rises Associated with the Different SRES Scenarios
IPCC, 2007
There are also uncertainties related to some of the assumptions implicit within
the SRES emissions scenarios. Recent growth in anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions has increased faster than projected in even the most fossil fuel
intensive of the IPCC’s emissions scenarios (A1F1) – i.e. that is to say that ‘our
business as usual’ activities – even with the Kyoto protocol, are already
emitting more greenhouse gas emissions than the IPCC previously projected
for its ‘high’ emissions scenario. Furthermore two-thirds of the
‘decarbonization’ of energy supply believed to be required to stabilize
greenhouse gases is already built into the IPCC reference scenarios which
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implicitly assume that the bulk of the challenge of reducing future emissions
will occur due to spontaneous technological changexxviii - in the absence of
climate policies, something that recent observations would suggest may be
over optimistic. Indeed the IPCC’s assumptions for increasing decarbonization
in the near term (2000-2010) are already inconsistent with the actual recent
evolution of the global economy, as in recent years global energy intensity and
carbon intensity have both increased, contrary to IPCC projections.
Increasing energy use and rates of GHGs mean only one thing: it will get
hotter, quicker. The IPCC’s conservative estimate is a rise of 4°C by 2100 for
the most pessimistic ‘business as usual’ scenario – A1F1, yet our emissions are
currently rising faster than this scenario envisages, and one recent study
predicts a 0.3°C increase for the period from 2004–2014 alone.
B2.3.7 Fossil Fuel Reserves
The SRES scenarios make no assumptions about future fossil fuel supplies, but
assume that the supply of conventional fossil fuels will be able to keep up
with demand which contradicts expert opinion from the energy modelling
sector. Bodies such as the International Energy Agency (IEA), the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and
Energy Watch believe that it is increasingly likely that geological constraints
on oil global conventional oil production (peak oil) will occur before 2015
(assuming the continuation of economic growth, a recession will reduce oil
consumption and delay the date of peak), if this has not already occurred,
meaning that global production will go into decline. Whilst this may limit
future emissions from burning conventional oil, should synthetic fuels, first
generation biofuels or non-conventional oil supplies (tar sands, oil shales) be
used to fill the gap in the supply of conventional oil it is likely that emissions
could be significantly higher than those predicted by the IPCC’s emissions
scenarios.
B2.3.8 Atmospheric Inertia
The currently observed impacts of climate change represent the reaction of the
climate system to the greenhouse gas emissions of the past two centuries.
“Even if all greenhouse gas emissions could be stopped today, the immense
inertia in the Earth’s climate systems means that changes to our climate for the
rest of the century are unavoidablexxix ”.Because of this inertia the impacts of
today’s significantly higher GHG emissions will not become noticeable until
the coming decades and consequently the climate of the Earth will
presumably continue to heat up for many centuries to come. Average global
temperatures have already risen 0.7°C since 1900. Climate models predict that
we are committed to another 0.6°C temperature rise and changing weather
patterns for the next 40 years, from emissions that we have already emitted.
International efforts to reduce global emissions are not so far making the
drastic reductions required, so we may be heading for further and potentially
more profound changes to our climate.

B13
B2.3.9 Natural Variability
Climate is the term used to describe the average weather conditions and their
variability over a long period of time (at least 30 years). Within the historic
record there will be years when summers are hotter, winters are wetter than
the predicted climate change trends, this does not mean that climate change is
not happening, or that impact projections are wrong, or that efforts to reduce
emissions have worked, rather it underlies the natural variability of the
climate. Significant uncertainties are posed in relation to the interplay between
long term climatic variables i.e. ENSO, interdecadal processes such as the
Pacific Interdecadal Oscillation and climate change. More research is needed
in these areas before their contribution and any interrelationships with climate
change can be understood - let alone quantified in GCM modelling and
climate change projections.
B2.4 CONCLUSION
All climate change projections have four sources of uncertaintyxxx associated

with them:
1. Natural variability: the climate is influenced by natural factors as well

as anthropogenic GHGs i.e. seasonal cycles, the ENSO (El Niño
Southern Oscillation), it is also influenced by more complex climatic
system feedback mechanisms (i.e. albedo, methane hydrates), and
random external factors such as volcanic eruptions and sunspot
activity;
2. Limitations of our knowledge, modelling methodologies and

computing: our knowledge of how GHGs effect the Earth’s natural
systems such as the atmosphere, biosphere etc is imperfect, and
therefore our ability to represent these systems in a model contains
large uncertainties and assumptions;
3. Future emissions scenarios: are not predictions but separate storylines

on how the world may develop, the IPCC is keen that no probabilities
are assigned to any of its SRES scenarios even though some appear
now to be more likely than others considering recent history and
development paths;
4. Scaling: it is a very complex process to represent local conditions that

determine weather into the GCMs, and similarly extracting local
conditions from some models can also lead to uncertainties.
Science cannot and will not be able to prove any statement with 100%
confidence, to expect it to is to misunderstand the scientific method. Science’s
role is to provide the best available theory to explain and understand
observations. Therefore, any adaptation strategies that are produced in
response to climate change should be flexible enough to be effective in the face
of variability, in the face of the reasonable worst case scenario, and also in the
face of new evidence as it arises. It will not be feasible or cost-effective to wait
B14
for 100% consensus to emerge on any aspect in the academic record of climate
change, as this may have the effect of pushing decision making opportunities
beyond the point in time where there is sufficient time to adapt to climate
change in an anticipatory manner, and may result in the construction of
considerable maladaptation in infrastructure constructed in the intervening
period. As highlighted in the Stern Reviewxxxi, an early proactive approach
against climate change will be less expensive and more effective than a
reactionary, retrospective or emergency response.
The implication of the latest climate change evidence published since the IPCC
AR4 is that our mitigation and adaptation responses to climate change may
need to be even more rapid and ambitious and that reliance upon some of the
older science published in the AR4 could potentially lead to maladaptation
and development which constrains society’s ability to cope with climate
change in the future.
i Summary from Der Spiegel 4th June 2007: “The release of the report was delayed for
hours as heated discussions continued as countries like China, Russia and the US
continued to lobby for the removal of parts of the report. US delegates opposed a
passage warning of the prospects of "severe economic damage" to parts of North
America. But the main tension in Brussels between some authors of the report and
some political representatives was not over the scientific findings, but over a 21-page
summary that would be shown to policymakers. Earlier this week, the summary said
scientists had "very high confidence" that natural systems around the world "are being
affected by regional climate changes, particularly temperature increases." "Very high
confidence," in the language used by the report, translates to a 90 percent certainty.
Delegates from China and Saudi Arabia lobbied for "high confidence" instead, or 80
percent certainty -- and after a dramatic hours-long protest by three scientists on
Thursday night, the milder language went in. "The authors lost," said one of the
scientists. "A lot of authors are not going to engage in the IPCC (International Panel on
Climate Change) process anymore. I have had it with them," he told the Associated
Press on condition of anonymity. Though Washington and Beijing ultimately
succeeded in changing very little of the text, the political tug o' war drew sharp
criticism in Germany. "We are happy that we were able to prevent this kind of
scientific vandalism in the end," Environment Minister Sigmar Gabriel told Reuters
TV. "The people have a right to find out about the consequences that threaten them if
we are unable to stop climate change." Still, the final version is the clearest and most
comprehensive scientific statement to date on the impact of global warming. "Certain
passages were lost for time or for lack of agreement," Parry said, "But I don't think in
any respect that the message was lost."
http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,476074,00.html
ii Joseph Romm, Fox News, February 1st 2007, available from
http://climateprogress.org/2007/02/01/climate-progress-on-fox-news/
iii Hansen, James, E., 2007, Scientific reticence and sea level rise, Environmental Research
Letters, 2 (2007) 024002 (6pp) doi:10.1088/1748-9326/2/2/024002, May 24th 2007.

iv Tin, Tina; (2008). Climate Change; Faster, Stronger, Sooner – A European Update of
Climate Change Science. WWF, Brussels.

http://assets.panda.org/downloads/wwf_science_paper_october_2008.pdf
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v Rajendra Pachauri, quoted in The International Herald and Tribune, November 18th
2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/18/europe/climate.php

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vi Oppenheimer, Michael, and Annie Petsonk, 2005 presentation to Avoiding Dangerous
Climate Change Scientific Symposium on Stabilisation of Greenhouse Gases, February 1st to
3rd, 2005 Met Office, Exeter, United Kingdom
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/research/dangerous-
cc/index.htm
vii Greater London Authority, The London Climate Change Adaptation Strategy, 2008, pp1
http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor/publications/2008/docs/climate-change-adapt-
strat.pdf pp9
viii Vasilis Dakos, Marten Scheffer, Egbert H. van Nes, Victor Brovkin, Vladimir
Petoukhov, and Hermann Held, 2008, Slowing down as an early warning signal for abrupt
climate change. PNAS early online publication, September 2008
ix Semiletov, Igor, Örjan Gustafsson et al, 2008, International Siberian Shelf Study 2008,
ISSS-08 http://www.polar.se/expeditioner/swedarctic2008/pdf/ISSS_web.pdf
x Barlow, J. and Peres, C.A., 2008, Fire-mediated dieback and compositional cascade in an
Amazonian forest, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B.

doi:10.1098/rstb.2007.0013
xi Hansen, James, 2004, Defusing the Global Warming Time Bomb. Scientific American,
290, No 3, March 2004: pp68-77,

xii Le Quéré, C., C. Rödenbeck, E.T. Buitenhuis, T. J. Conway, R. Langenfelds, A.
Gomez, C. Labuschagne, M. Ramonet, T. Nakazawa, N. Metzl, and N. Gillett, M.

Heimann, 2007, Saturation of the Southern ocean CO2 sink due to recent climate change,
Science, 316, DOI:10.1126/science.1136188, 1735-1738.
xiii Brahic, Catherine, 2007, Southern Ocean already losing ability to absorb CO2, New
Scientist Online, 17th May 2007

http://environment.newscientist.com/article/dn11876-southern-ocean-already-
losing-ability-to-absorb-cosub2sub.html
xiv Hawkins, Richard, et al (2008). Climate Safety. Public Interest Research Centre,
London, www.pirc.info Retrieved on 25/11/08.

xv United Nations Environment Project, (2007). Melting Ice - a Hot Topic? Press
Release on 4 June 2007.

http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=512&Arti
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xvi Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group I (2007). Technical
Summary. IPCC, Cambridge, p73.

http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-ts.pdf
xvii Lawrence, David M., et al., (2008). Accelerated Arctic land warming and permafrost
degradation during rapid sea ice loss. Geophysical Research Letters, Vol. 35, 11506.
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xviii
Cunnold, P. Steele, P. Krummel, R. Weiss, S. O’Doherty, P. Salameh, H. Wang,

C. Harth, J. Mühle, and L. Porter (2008). Renewed growth of atmospheric methane,
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xx Vasilis Dakos, Marten Scheffer, Egbert H. van Nes, Victor Brovkin, Vladimir
Petoukhov, and Hermann Held, 2008, Slowing down as an early warning signal for abrupt
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xxi Hansen, James, 2004, Defusing the Global Warming Time Bomb. Scientific American,
290, No 3, March 2004: pp68-77, pp74

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xxii Tracy, Alexandra., Trumbull, Kate., and Loh, Christine, The Impacts of Climate
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Compared to Projections. Science DOI: 10.1126/science.1136843. February 1, 2007.
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xxv NOAA, Mauna Loa Observatory carbon dioxide dataset. Dr. Pieter Tans,
NOAA/ESRL (www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/)
xxvi J. Hansen, M. Sato, P. Kharecha, D. Beerling, R. Berner, V. Masson-Delmotte, M.
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xxx Greater London Authority, The London Climate Change Adaptation Strategy, 2008, pp1
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xxxi Nicholas Stern et al, 2007, The Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change,
HM Treasury, UK, http://www.hm-

treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_climate_change.htm

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Annex C
Sectoral and Regional

Climate Change Impacts
C1 SPECIFIC SECTOR IMPLICATIONS
Many sectors of the Nigerian economy are directly vulnerable to the impacts
of climate change such as construction, insurance, communications,
transportation, offshore oil and gas exploitation, and thermal and hydro
power generation and transmission (Nokomo, J.C., 2006). Other vulnerable
sectors are those dependent on climate-sensitive resources like agriculture,
fishing, forestry, renewable energy and eco-tourism (Adejuwon, J., 2006).
Industries that aren't affected directly by climate change will be affected
indirectly, with impacts depending on many factors like geographic location.
C1.1.1 Agriculture and Fishing
Climate change has the potential to affect African agriculture in a range of

ways leading to an overall reduction of between 2 and 7% of GDP by 2100 in
the Sahara and 2 to 4% in Western Africa (Mendelsohn 2000 in Boko, M. et al.,
2007). First, as described in Section 4.2.2., desertification and the decline of
Lake Chad as a major source of irrigation water is likely to decrease food
production in the northern Sahel region, which today accounts for 26.6% of
Nigeria’s land area (Boko, M. et al., 2007). Agriculture in southern Nigeria
will also be affected by climate change. Indeed, Southern Nigeria’s low
elevation means that it is prone to salt-water intrusion as sea levels rise. Even
upland water is already showing evidence of increased salinization (Ministry
of Environment of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2003), which will
ultimately make agriculture no longer viable and will force populations to
relocate.
Crops
Crops occupy nearly 94% of the agricultural sector in Nigeria and some areas
are already experiencing a loss in length of growing days by 20%. Growth
rates of maize, guinea corn, millet and rice are depressed by rises in
temperature. Warming trends also make the storage of root crops and
vegetables more difficult for those without access to refrigeration. Agriculture
in Nigeria will be adversely impacted by increased variability in the timing
and amount of rainfall. Water deficits may also depress crop and livestock
production and hence, food supply, necessitating imports (Scoones, I. et al.,
2005). During the worst of the drought in the 1970's and 1980's, harvest failure
was significant which had significant repercussions for animal husbandry (see
the next section) (Nkomo, J.C. et al., 2006). Food security is dependant on the
age-long ability of farmers to predict when to plant their crops. Increasing
unpredictability in the onset of rains in the last 30 years (NEST, 2008b) have
led to crops planted with the arrival of early rains being damaged by an
unexpected dry spell. This combined with the late arrival of rains results in
harvest failures, forcing farmers to plant afresh with seeds taken from their
reserves or else borrow money. It is also possible that groundnut (peanut)
production will disappear in the north of Nigeria due to drought, as has been
seen in Niger and Senegal where groundnuts were a major foreign exchange
C1
earner. Furthermore, extreme weather events like storms, heavy winds and
floods may devastate farmlands and lead to crop failure. Pests and crop
diseases are also migrating in response to climate variations. The changing
distribution of pests may also hamper food storage.
Livestock
The current warming trend hinders livestock production by reducing animal

weight gain and dairy yield as livestock are subjected to long treks to find
water and grass. During the worst of the drought in the 1970’s and 1980’s,
close to one million livestock were lost, affecting meat and dairy supply
throughout the country (Nkomo, J.C. et al., 2006). Large livestock species
(cattle) are likely to be more vulnerable than small ruminants i.e. goats.
Additionally, extreme storm surges may endanger livestock in the coastal
region. In Nigeria, nomadic pastoralism is felt to be most vulnerable due to
the insecurities of reliance on open land grazing and natural watering holes
and the relative poverty of those currently practising this livelihood. The
range of the tsetse fly has already extended its range northward and will pose
a threat to livestock in the drier north.
Fisheries
Coastal regions will be hit as climate change upsets ocean currents and
fisheries (Okali, D., 2004). Major changes to fish spawning patterns have
already been observed. In the coastal zone, the loss of mangroves as sea level
rises will have serious repercussions for fishing as mangroves act as a
sanctuary for young fish to mature (NEST, 2008c). Increases in the severity of
storms, will threaten fishing vessels and crew. The viability of inland fisheries
is threatened by increased salinity, and shrinking rivers and lakes.
Forests
Climate change will potentially increase the incidence of pests and diseases
that decimate forest trees. This in turn can lead to species extinction in the
various ecosystems of Nigeria, as it has already been the case for the Iroko and
oil bean in the southeast; various mahogany species in southwest; the baobab
and the locust bean in the northwest and gum arabic in the northeast (NEST,
2008b). Serious deforestation is expected from the interplay between
population growth, urbanisation and climate change. Even in wetter climate
scenarios, it is unlikely that tropical forests will recover from the current rates
of deforestation and biodiversity loss. In the drier scenarios, forest fires and
desert encroachment would pose significant risk to local populations.
C1.1.2 Mining and Quarrying
Heavy winds, waves and precipitation, and shoreline erosion - from fierce
storms – will make fossil fuel extraction more difficult and threaten sea-going
vessels and crew, entailing production and transportation delays and
temporary suspensions due to poor weather (NEST, 2008a; Okali, D., 2004).
Oil and gas extraction infrastructures could even be lost as was seen in the

C2
Gulf of Mexico in 2005 in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This is an
increasing risk as Nigeria has many US$ billions invested in oil mining in the
Niger delta alone and seeks to move more of its production to offshore fields
to avoid local unrest in that region. Increases in the severity of storms in the
region combined with sea level rise, may lead to increasing wave damage to
offshore buried oil pipelines, with the worst-case scenario being rupture and
spillage.
Oil spills already seriously affect fishing and upset the balance of marine
ecosystems in Nigeria. Industrial pollution is damaging large areas of the
Nigerian coast, further decreasing food security as valuable fisheries are
destroyed. This will worsen food insecurity, exacerbate already existing social
tensions in the Niger delta and create a greater risk of malnutrition. Sea level
rise of 1 metre would submerge the entire oil infrastructure in the Delta region
which would have a devastating knock on impact to the whole economy due
to Nigeria’s overreliance on hydrocarbons for foreign exchange and
government revenues.
C1.1.3 Wholesale and Retail Trade
Firstly, industries dependent on climate-sensitive natural resources will suffer

with a lack of yield translating into fewer products to sell and reductions in
consumer spend. Consumer behaviour is also linked to the climate, and as it
changes, seasonal products risk a mismatch between supply and demand. In
addition, trade will be threatened by the fact that electricity supply
interruptions will probably increase and that whole regions of the country
(particularly the Delta) risk massive relocations of population and
impoverishment. However, the most significant risk for the wholesale and
retail trade sector is probably related to the impacts of climate change on
Nigeria’s transportation infrastructure. As a result, many industries will not
get their goods to market, out of the country for export, or get access to raw
materials in a timely fashion.
C1.1.4 Other sectors
Finance & Insurance
Financial services, which comprise private and public institutions that offer
insurance, banking and asset management services, will be severely affected
by climate change related impacts. In particular, the property insurance
industry is likely to be the most affected since it is already vulnerable to
extreme weather events. Moreover, climate induced events are likely to place
undue stress on insurance markets. As it is, weather-related losses stress
insurance companies to the point of bankruptcy by raising consumer prices,
causing insurance coverage withdrawals for settlement claims and increasing
the demand for publicly-funded compensation and relief. More uncertainty in
the frequency, intensity and regional distribution of weather-related losses
will increase the vulnerability of the insurance sector (NEST, 2008a). Nigeria’s
financial services industry is very heavily reliant on the oil and gas, and

C3
agriculture sectors, negative impacts on these industries, will impact on
financial services organisations.
Manufacturing
Variations in the availability and production costs of crops, domestic animals,

fish, wood, water and mineral resources due to climate change and sea level
rise will directly affect industries processing these products (Ministry of
Environment of FRN, 2003). Harvest failure, for example, would affect the
fruit juice manufacturing and food-processing industries, while increased
floods and storms will disrupt transportation of goods within the country
(NEST, 2008a). Most of Nigeria’s manufacturing capacity is located in urban
low lying coastal regions of the south, many of which could be obliged to
relocate as the sea level rises. Those located in the northern dry belt will be
exposed to extreme weather events that can destroy industrial infrastructure,
as well as to the effects of warmer climate on water supplies that make process
cooling and environmental processes more difficult and unduly expensive
(NEST, 2008a). Eventually, a reduction of flow in rivers due to climate change
may put increased pressure on wastewater treatment processes, leading to
increased water recycling and a decline in industrial water use (Ministry of
Environment of FRN, 2003).
Energy Sector
Climate change could have significant impacts on the energy sector in Nigeria,
affecting production, transmission and distribution but also consumption
patterns. First, expected reduced rainfall, increased droughts and rising
temperatures, particularly in the northern part of the country, would
adversely affect the supply of hydroelectric power, upon which most
Nigerians rely. Indeed, according to UNIDO estimates, hydropower
generation currently accounts for about 40% of the total installed generation
capacity in Nigeria (UNIDO Regional Centre for Small Hydro Power, 2005).
Climate change could also have significant impacts on solar and wind energy;
the two significant sources of energy that still remain untapped in Nigeria
(Ministry of Environment of FRN, 2003), which could result in a positive
impact on GDP growth.
Furthermore, all types of energy facilities, including electric transmission

lines, thermal power plants, wind and oil and gas production facilities, located
along the coast could be subject to damage related to sea level rise (Ministry of
Environment of FRN, 2003). Extreme weather events such as windstorms,
severe and excessive rainstorms, floods and tornadoes could damage virtually
all energy production facilities in the country and increase the failure rate of
electric utility transmission systems (NEST, 2008a). Temperature fluctuations
could affect the operations of switches, transformers and other equipment. In
warmer weather, power transmission lines tend to expand and sag, and
become susceptible to more damage from strong winds. If climate change
results in population shifts, some existing production facilities may be
impacted by changes to the grid, causing a reduction in production or closure,
resulting in turn in financial losses and increased costs to remaining customers
C4
(Ministry of Environment of FRN, 2003). Finally, hampered energy
production in Nigeria would have impacts on other countries, since for
example Nigeria supplies Niger with electricity to stop them from building a
dam upstream of the Niger (Nkomo, J.C. et al., 2006); if Nigeria is unable to
supply these consumers, then it is feasible that her upstream neighbours may
decide to dam the river themselves. Meanwhile, it is expected that energy
demand would increase significantly as increased temperatures would result
in increased demand for air conditioning, refrigeration and other household
uses (Ministry of Environment of FRN, 2003).
Water Supply
There are currently three main categories of sources for water supply in
Nigeria: direct rainfall harvesting, surface (rivers and lakes including human-
made reservoirs, e.g. Kainji lake behind Kainji dam on river Niger) and
underground water. Rainfall harvesting is used mainly in rural areas and
covers more than 50% of water consumption in these localities. The estimated
national annual water demand in 1996 was 6,502 million litres per day (mld)
which far outstripped the supply of 2,957 mld (Ministry of Environment of
FRN, 2003). Water supply demand projections for Nigeria show that the
situation is expected to get worse by 2030, as shown in Table C1.1.
Table C1.1 Water Supply and Demand Projections in Nigeria till 2030
Population (million) Water Supply (mld) Water Demand (mld)

Year Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total
1996 50.7 39.6 90.5 2593.5 363 2956.7 4905.6 1596 6501.6
2000 62.8 44.7 107.5 3212.2 407.7 3619.9 6074.1 1792.5 7866.6
2005 82.1 51.6 133.7 4199.4 470.6 4670 7947.3 2069.2 10016.5
2010 107.3 59.5 166.8 5488.4 542.6 6031.1 10386.6 2386 12772.6
2015 140.3 68.5 208.6 7166.1 624.7 7730.8 13561.7 2746.9 16308.6
2020 183.5 78.9 262.4 9386 719.6 10105 17762.8 3163.9 20926.7
2025 240 90.9 330.9 12776 829 13605 23232 3645.1 26877.1
2030 313.6 104.9 418.5 16040.6 956.7 16997 30356.5 4206.5 34563
Source: Nigerian Ministry of Environment, 2003
Climate change, particularly if it is reflected in reduced rainfall in many parts

of Nigeria, would further compound the inability of the country to meet
people’s demand for water. The country may be tempted to increase its
dependence on underground water sources, but decreased rainfall would lead
to lower water tables and this could further worsen the water stress. In
addition, higher temperatures will increase the rate of evaporation from land
and water surfaces and evapotranspiration from plants, and will result in
greater salinization and sedimentation of watercourses. The Sudan-Sahel
region is very sensitive to small changes in temperatures and rainfall, meaning
that the impacts on water resources may be greater there because temperature
changes will affect the amount of runoff that becomes groundwater - the main
source of water supply in many parts of the region (Ministry of Environment
of FRN, 2003). Trends for Africa in the last decade already show a 17%
decrease in rain runoff (TAR, 2001), to which water reservoir storage is
markedly sensitive (Okali, D., 2004). In addition, most of the water resources
C5
along the coast would become polluted by intrusion of salt water, and water
resources management would need to place greater emphasis on
desalinization. For industries, reduction of flow in rivers may also put
increased pressure on wastewater treatment processes, leading to increased
water recycling and a decline in industrial water use (Ministry of Environment
of FRN, 2003).
Transportation & Communications
Climate change would affect transportation in various ways. First, sea level
rise may require costly changes to ports, coastal roads and railways as the
current means of communications along the coast may be covered by
intruding sea water or washed away by erosion. Most of the transportation
infrastructure from Lagos to Port Harcourt is at risk. Drainage for instance
would be needed at the international airports of Lagos and Port Harcourt and
other coastal airports. Changes in lake and river levels would affect inland
navigation. More frequent storms would hamper shipping and other forms of
transport. Increased rainfall will damage roads, entailing increased
maintenance costs and more traffic accidents.
Prolonged heat waves will cause serious problems to roads by softening

asphalt and buckling concrete, warping railroad rails, forcing airport closures
due to lack of “lift” in extremely hot air conditions, and increasing mechanical
failures in automobiles and trucks. Adverse weather conditions may cause
flight delays, cancellations and re-routing; with attendant financial losses to an
industry already suffering from high fuel costs. Increasing floods and storms
are also likely to hamper trucks and trains transporting merchandise. Any
change in prevailing winds and increased dust haze would affect the safety
and efficiency of take-off of flights (Ministry of Environment of FRN, 2003).
Communications infrastructure is at risk from rising sea levels and the
increased likelihood of storm damage to transmitters. Additionally
telecommunications, dependant as the sector is, on electricity, is likely to be
negatively impacted as Nigeria suffers from increased energy insecurity.
Real Estate & Business Services
In the real estate and business services sectors, the most serious impacts from
climate change come from depreciation of coastal asset values, increased
likelihood of damage to buildings from extreme weather events (particularly
at risk are uninsured assets) and risks to the national electricity supply, on
which these sectors are heavily dependent. Changes in construction styles,
and mechanical services requirements (cooling etc), may result from changes
in the climate. However a decrease in national GDP as a result of other
climate change impacts, will likely constrain construction and renovation
activities significantly.
Tourism
Tourism numbers in Nigeria have remained static for 15 years according to

2006 Nigeria Tourism Master Plan. The World Travel and Tourism Council

C6
forecasts that the tourism share of GDP will fall from 5.5% of GD in 2008 to
3.4% of GDP in 2018. However, tourism will certainly be adversely affected
by climate change. It is based on wildlife, nature reserves, coastal resorts and
abundant water supply for recreation. Changes to wildlife distribution and
declining biodiversity are likely to negatively impact ecotourism. Changes to
the malaria regime, as a result of increased flood events and warmer
temperatures, are also likely to reduce visitor numbers. Tourism also suffers
in the aftermath of weather related disasters. In Nigeria, many tourist
attractions are located along the coast.
Thus, any significant sea level rise would impact on these tourist attractions
that range from modern hotels through traditional relics to recreational
grounds like beaches and wildlife sanctuaries. Many beaches (e.g. the Victoria
Island beach) in Nigeria will be lost, most river deltas and maritime wetlands
would also be endangered, as well as most socio-cultural features (e.g., the
first Christian Church in Nigeria, located in Badagry, near Lagos). Tourist
attracting traditional festivals, such as the Argungu festival on river Argungu
in Kebbi State, would decline to the extent that climate change induces
shrinkage of such rivers. Climate change overseas will also impact Nigeria’s
tourism industry, as with Europe warming, visitor numbers seeking respite
from cold climates can be expected to reduce. Overall, tourism contribution to
GDP could be seriously threatened by climate change-related impacts
(Ministry of Environment of FRN, 2003).

C7
C2 REGIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS
C2.1.1 The North & Central Regions
The Sahel
The north and centre of Nigeria fall within the Sahel region. More than two-
thirds of Nigeria is already prone to desertification and this will be
exacerbated by climate change. The 30-year-long drought in the Sahel,
described as "the biggest climatic anomaly observed to date" (Lebel, T., 2005),
is the root of conflicts across the Sahel (e.g. Darfur) and is triggering major
social changes across the region. The Sahel is facing a “lethal mix” of threats
including climate change, rising food prices and the trafficking of arms and
drugs according to Jan Egeland, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser
on conflict (Egeland, J., 2008). The Sahel zone’s vulnerability to conflict is
heightened by unregulated border crossings between Nigeria and its dry
neighbour to the north, Niger. Pastoralists from Niger, whose welfare
depends on their livestock, let their animals encroach on Nigerian farmland,
further decreasing food security for Nigeria.
The Sahel is expected to experience higher temperatures and extreme peaks

and troughs in rainfall, resulting in reduced agricultural outputs and
disruptive migration as people move around the region searching for water,
fertile land and jobs (Boko, M. et al., 2007). Changes to the Sahel are already
being witnessed and over 50% of the population in this area is under threat
from climate change. There have been an increasing number of extreme
events across the Sahel, with periods of extreme drought interspersed with
dramatic downpours. According to experts, the timing of rainfall is as vital as
the quantity (Boko, M. et al., 2007). Wind and strong rains damage the
region’s soils, leading to erosion and flash flooding. One predicted impact of
climate change is a reduction in soil moisture, which will have serious impacts
on agricultural output (Boko, M. et al., 2007). The longer dry periods between
rain storms are also affecting water quality and creating new health risks, in
particular cholera outbreaks. There are also links between desertification and
meningitis, which is endemic across the Sahel and is spreading south.
Lake Chad and environs
Related to the increasing sahelization of the north of Nigeria, is the decline of

Lake Chad, located at the junction of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. It
was once the sixth largest lake in the world and the second largest wetland in
Africa. Persistent droughts and continuous extraction have shrunk it to about
a tenth of its former size (UNEP) and its contraction has been increasing in
rate in recent years. According to a recent study, the lake is now only 1/20th
of the size it was 35 years ago (Coe, M.T. and Foley, J.A., 2001). The lakebed is
shallow; even before the drought the lake was no more than 5-8 m deep. Lake
Chad used to support diverse wildlife which historically provided a
substantial proportion of local diets. Many different communities, including

C8
fishermen, farmers and herdsmen are dependant upon the lake. This food
source is increasingly under threat from climate change, further compounding
food insecurity in the region. Lake Chad's primary source of water comes
from the monsoon rains that typically fall in June, July and August. Over the
last three decades, these rains have become increasingly unreliable.
Meanwhile, the use of water for irrigation has increased in response to the
drier climate. It is estimated that rural water demand will be increasing from
nearly 10,000mld in 2005 to 21,000mld by 2020, increasing the pressure put on
the strained water sources. Therefore, climate refugees are being created, as
climate change makes land no longer viable for farming without irrigation,
and simultaneously reduces the water available for irrigation (Okali, D., 2004).
C2.1.2 Southern Nigeria
For the purposes of this study ERM has subdivided southern Nigeria into two
distinct regions: ‘Lagos and the southwest’, and ‘the southeast and far south’
but it is worth stressing that many of the climate change issues facing these
two regions will be the same. Shared impacts will be considered together in
this section, before issues specific to the sub-regions are discussed separately.
Nigeria's 800 km coastline is low lying and prone to erosion and flooding.
Whilst the coastal zone only covers about 3% of Nigeria's entire land surface
most of the economic activities that form the backbone of the national
economy are located in the coastal zone. A large percentage of Nigeria’s
population (more than 6 million) lives in coastal cities. Its shores and swamps,
particularly in the Niger Delta contain valuable fishing grounds and
hydrocarbon deposits. Coastal erosion, flooding, pollution (air, water, and
land), deforestation, saltwater intrusion and subsidence are already degrading
the region, and these issues look set to be worsened by climate change.
Hydrological modelling (Onofeghara, 1990) shows that a 0.2 m rise in sea-
level will inundate 3,400km2 of Nigerian coast-land; a 1.0 m rise will cover
18,400 km2 and submerge the Delta’s entire oil and gas infrastructure. The
whole of the Niger Delta is under 6,000 km2 and contains the oil and gas
producing region, and important cities, ports, and other infrastructure. The
Ministry of Environment estimate that Nigeria will lose close to $20 billion as
a result of the sea-level rise of 0.5m and US$ 43 billion from a 1m sea level rise
assuming development and economic growth of 5% over 30 years (MOEFRN,
2003). Cities including Lagos, Warri, Port Harcourt, Eket, and Calabar could
become uninhabitable; whole communities will be forced to relocate,
generating a serious refugee problem and dire socioeconomic consequences as
violence, theft and disease are likely to become more prevalent. As sea levels
rise, beach properties will be destroyed; low lying buildings and roads further
inland will be threatened. This eventuality is already happening at Bar Beach,
Lagos (NEST, 2008c). It is estimated that about 40% of the mangroves in
Nigeria had been lost by 1980 (WRI, 1990). Mangrove ecosystems offer
valuable protection to inland areas from storms and erosion, their loss will
worsen the consequences of climate change (NEST, 2008c).

C9
Lagos and the Southwest
Lagos, Nigeria's largest city and one of the largest in sub-Saharan Africa is
located on the high rainfall West African coast. The business district is centred
on Victoria Island although the conurbation has rapidly extended to the once
swampy, mainland. The city is situated just above sea level and is susceptible
to flooding. Much of the city comprises of slums characterized by poor
housing and overcrowding. Abuja was developed to replace Lagos as
Nigeria’s capital city, because of Lagos’ chronic slums, environmental
pollution and traffic congestion. However, Lagos remains Nigeria's most
prosperous city and much of the nation's wealth and economic activity are still
concentrated there. The sheer density and size of the population in Lagos
combined with poor infrastructure and building quality, poverty and flood
risk means that Lagos is very vulnerable to climate change.
Southeast and the South (Niger Delta)
The integrity of coastal engineering infrastructures and industrial facilities in

this key oil producing region are already being undermined by wave scouring
and run-up and are vulnerable to possible closure of operations and resulting
job losses (NEST, 2008c). Impacts on hydrocarbon extraction itself are
discussed further below. Sheet erosion – which results in the complete
removal of arable land – is the biggest threat to agriculture in the sandy soil
regions of inland south-eastern Nigeria (NEST, 2008b). Farmland in this
region has already been devastated by heavy rainfall-induced soil erosion,
which is likely to accelerate as a result of climate change. Food security in the
southern interior will also be affected by reductions in the size and
biodiversity of the southern rainforests because many Nigerians, particularly
the poor rural majority, depend on forest products for food. The severe dry
spells that are likely to reduce Nigeria's forest cover will also pose problems
for fuel wood supply.

C10
Annex D
Comments on a Disease
Perspective
D1 COMMENTS ON A DISEASE PERSPECTIVE
Climate plays a significant role in the distribution of infectious diseases.

According to the IPCC report on Human Health – Climate Change 2007
“projected trends in climate change related exposures of importance to human health
will continue to change the range of some infectious disease vectors (high confidence)”
(Boko, M. et al., 2007). Climate Change could influence the seasonal patterns
as well as temporal distribution of diseases such as malaria, dengue and
cholera due to changes in temperatures and expected alterations in rainfall
patterns (Kuhn, K. et al., 2005; Thomas, C.D. et al., 2004).
According to the World Health Organization, Malaria is the most important

vector-borne disease in the world (WHO/UNICEF, 2005). The disease is
endemic in Nigeria. It presents a major health problem for Nigeria; stable
transmission occurs throughout much of the country. The distribution of
Malaria as well as the abundance of the disease could be shifted in the future.
These shifts in the distribution and abundance of malaria will depend on the
location and the climate associated with the area (Tanser F.C. et al., 2003;
Thomas, C.D. et al., 2004).
Dengue is the most common mosquito-borne viral disease of humans; Dengue

is transmitted by Aedes aegypti (Boko, M., I. Niang et al., 2007). A risk of
dengue transmission (World Health Organisation, 2008) exists for the region.
Outbreaks of dengue have been linked in the past directly or indirectly to high
rainfall, increased temperature and humidity (Gubler D.J. et al., 2001).
However scientific reports are not consistent in reflecting the complex effect
that climate has on the transmission (Boko, M., I. Niang et al., 2007). Changes
in temperature as well as changes in rainfall are expected to change the
geographical distribution of the disease vector and therefore alter the spread
of the disease (Chan, M., 2008).
Cholera is a bacterial infection that causes both local outbreaks and worldwide
pandemics. Regional epidemics occur seasonally and are associated with
periods of excessive rainfall, warm temperatures and increases in plankton
populations (Kuhn, K. et al., 2005). In the past, cases of cholera have been
reported for Nigeria (World Health Organisation, 2008). Although the disease
(according to the World Health Organization) no longer poses a threat to
countries with minimum standards of hygiene, climate change could cause
conditions where access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation cannot
be guaranteed which may cause cholera outbreaks or the threat of a cholera
epidemic.
The seasonal pattern and temporal distribution of above listed diseases is

strongly influenced by the climate. Impact of climate change such as
alterations in temperature and rainfall will have serious impact on diseases
(Boko, M., I. Niang et al., 2007; Campbell-Lendrum D. et al., 2007). A Public
Health system needs to be in place; access to primary health care need to be

D1
accessible in order to reduce the vulnerability and increase the adaptive
capacity (Boko, M., I. Niang et al., 2007). Effective surveillance, reporting
procedures as well as implementation and monitor adaptation options are
essential requirements (Campbell-Lendrum D. et al., 2007). Current national
health programmes may need to be revised in order to include climate-
sensitive disease issues.

D2
Annex E
Key Model Assumptions

E1 KEY MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
The starting point is an annual GDP for 2005 of US$ 112 billion based on
current prices (IMF, 2007). Data from the Nigerian National Statistics Bureau
was used to break total GDP down to a sector level based on percentages of
local currency. The proportion of each sector’s output for the three regions is
shown below, and is based on the team’s professional judgement (1).
E1.1 PROPORTION OF SECTOR OUTPUT PER REGION
North SE+SS SW+Lagos Total

% % % %
Agriculture 50% 25% 25% 100%
Mining and quarrying 5% 80% 15% 100%
Wholesale & retail trade 10% 30% 60% 100%
Others (nine sectors) 20% 30% 50% 100%
An underlying average annual compounded GDP growth rate of 6% was

assumed (best estimate growth), with a high and low of +/- 25%, based on
information in Section 3. However, the model outcomes below are generally
based on the medium growth scenario.
The low climate change scenario is simply 33% of the best estimate climate
change impact. The High climate change scenario varies for the three regions
as shown in Annex E (ranging from 150% for the North, to 175% for the SSS
and SE and 200% for SW and Lagos). Larger impacts were used for the latter
based on potential sea level rise implications.
E1.2 PROPORTION OF MEDIUM ESTIMATE IMPACTS USED AS HIGH AND LOW CLIMATE
CHANGE SCENARIOS
North % of SE + SS% of SW +
Med impacts Med impacts Lagos% of
Med
impacts
High Climate Change impacts 150% 175% 200%

Medium Climate Change Impacts 100% 100% 100%
Low Climate Change impacts 33% 33% 33%
(1) Contact was made with the Ministry of Finance, but it appears that a regional breakdown of GDP is currently being
undertaken, so no such data could be made available

E1
Agricultural impacts in the North was taken as the initial starting point with
an assumed reduction in GDP growth rate of -1.5% (of 6% assumed medium
growth) over a 5 year period from 2005 – 2010. This is loosely based on data
from Ludwig and Kabat (2007) that shows a decrease of 1.5% on overall GDP
growth for a single dry year assuming a 10% decrease in rainfall in the Sahel,
and just over 1% decrease in rainfall for Coastal West Africa.
Over time, a factor of 1.5 is used each decade until 2050. So, each decade an
additional loss of growth of 2.25% is assumed. So, in 2020, agricultural
growth for the North is assumed to be 3.75% less than the growth in the no
climate change scenario which assumes 6% annual compounded growth, and
by 2050 the reduction is 10.5%.
The 2005-2010 reduction in growth rate for all other sectors and regions is a
function of the -1.5% multiplied by a factor which takes into account the
relative impacts (H/M/L) in the summary impact tables in Section 4 for both
the sectoral and regional impacts respectively. A score 10 was used for the
High impacts, 5 for the Medium impacts and 1 for Low impacts. The
combined scores for the seven sectoral impacts are added and multiplied by
the regional impacts to give a regional impact score for each sector.
E1.3 RELATIVE SCORES FROM ADDING SECTORAL IMPACTSAND MULTIPLYING BY

REGIONAL IMPACTS
North SE+SS SW+Lagos

Agriculture 630 630 630
Mining and quarrying 99 330 330
Wholesale & retail trade 490 147 490
Others (nine sectors) 400 400 400
These relative scores are then used to adjust the base impact of -1.5% for
agriculture in the North. For example, as shown below, agriculture in the
other two regions also scored 630 points, so they too have a starting impact of
-1.5%, whilst the wholesale and retail trade in the North has a score of 490,
thereby resulting in a factor of 1 x (490/630) = 0.8, and an impact of -1.2%.
E1.4 PROPORTION OF MEDIUM ESTIMATE IMPACTS USED AS HIGH AND LOW CLIMATE
CHANGE SCENARIOS
North SE+SS SW+Lagos

Agriculture 1.0 1.0 1.0
Mining and quarrying 0.2 0.5 0.5
Wholesale & retail trade 0.8 0.2 0.8
Others (nine sectors) 0.6 0.6 0.6

E2
Annex F
Nigeria’s proposed climate

change projects
F1 NIGERIA’S PROPOSED CLIMATE CHANGE PROJECTS (2003)
The following 14 projects are those recommended in the Ministry of

Environment’s First National Communication (2003). The text has been
slightly abbreviated. The current status of each project is not known.
1) Satellite Remote Sensing Determination of Vegetation Loading and Land

use Change between 1995 and 2005 as Influenced by Human Activities and
Biomass Burning.
It is generally known that Nigeria’s forest estate has decreased from about
60million hectares (mha) to approximately 9.6 mha during the 20th century.
However not much data exist on annual evolution of landuse types in the
different geographical zones of Nigeria, the biomass stocks in them, including
above and below ground biomass, annual biomass growth rates, biomass
harvests and biomass burning in different parts of the country
Objectives:
Satellite remote sensing remains the most viable tool to improve the current
poor data in the land use change and agriculture sectors. The main aim of the
project is to use the satellite remote sensing tool to provide new data and
update existing ones so that the uncertainties in future GHG inventories could
be reduced.
Project Duration: 3 years (2004 to 2006).
2) Audit of Downstream Energy Sector Technologies, Fuel Consumption

and Projected Demand Side Analysis for the Downstream Sector
Substantial gaps exist in the database of both the emission inventories and
mitigation analyses. For instance, in the downstream energy sector, data are
obtained from NNPC Annual Reports, FOS Annual Abstracts of Statistics,
among others reports. These reports are lacking in respect sectoral energy
consumption, which is necessary for emission inventories.
Objectives:
The objective of this project is to undertake field surveys to provide data for
energy consumption in the downstream energy sector. The surveys will
involve development and administration of questionnaires as well as actual
field estimate (vehicle counts, survey of vehicle fuel consumption, survey of
fuel consumption in public sector and institutions, among others). This
information will be used to develop demand-side energy consumption data.
The study will cover all major downstream energy sectors: road, rail, internal
navigation, domestic and military aviation, industrial heat generation,
industrial and, private electricity generation, public and business sector
energy consumption, etc.
Project Duration: 2 Years: 2004 to 2005

F1
3) Development of National Emissions Data Systems (NEDS)
There is currently no formal institution mandated with the task of developing

and reporting of GHG emissions and mitigation options for Nigeria. The
development of and implementation of a National Emissions Data Systems
(NEDS) is part of the framework to ensure the availability of an institutional
framework for data collection and archiving to support emissions inventories
and mitigation assessment options.
Objectives:
The objective of this project is to develop and implement an institutional
framework which would support the sustainable evolution and
implementation of NEDS under the Federal Ministry of Environment. A
suitable R&D institution with capability in GHG inventories and mitigation
options is to be identified and tasked with the following:
(a) Development of linkages with major database networks within the country
for purposes of providing inputs to emission inventories and mitigation
assessment routinely.
(b) Periodic review of GHG emissions and mitigation options for all IPCC
recognized sectors.
(c) Development and implementation of an institutional framework to support
the operation of NEDS could operate with mandate to provide data needed
for research and national planning.
(d) Development and implementation of a emissions data systems, which
would be available either on the internet or LAN, to link various users of
GHG inventory and available mitigation options.
(e) Nation-wide capacity development on various aspects of emissions
inventories: emission measurements, process modeling, database
development, inventory spreadsheets development, etc.
Project Duration: 2 Years (2004 to 2005) to support establishment and

preliminary implementation of NEDS.
4) Technology Characterization Inventory to Support the Development of

Technology Baselines and Options GHG Emission Reduction in Nigeria
Technology plays and will continue to play a major role in development. The
current efforts at providing mitigation to GHG emissions in various sectors
require substantial knowledge of the technology base from which these
sectors are currently operation. Such a technology characterization inventory
(TCI) has never been carried out in Nigeria, even though mitigation options
assessment are being carried out.
Objectives:
The objective of this project is to undertake a TCI for all relevant sectors and
for small, medium and large scale sectors.
Project Duration: 2 Years (2004 to 2005)

F2
5) Audit of Source Strengths for Solvents and Other Chemicals Use in
Nigeria
The solvents are other chemicals use is one of the sectors recognized by IPCC
as contributing to GHG emissions. For Nigeria, there is hardly any data on
solvents use. These include data on various paints applications, use of various
organic and inorganic chemicals are volatile, especially the consumption of
dry cleaning chemicals. Extensive field data collection is needed to support
these.
Objectives:
The objective of this project is to develop a programme for field surveys of the
various subcomponents of solvents and other products use in Nigeria and to
be able to quantify their contribution to GHG emissions.
Project Duration: 1 Year (2004 or 2005)
6) The Assessment of CH4 Emissions from Leak Facilities in the Upstream

Oil and Gas Sector and Options for Reduction
The oil and gas industry has in the last 30 years served as the main support for
the Nigerian economy. This has been because, crude oil export during the
period contributed more than 90% of the country’s gross export earnings.
Despite the enormous positive impact on the economy, national and world
attention has become recently focused on the high degree of perceived
environmental degradation of the Niger Delta. Such assessment has
principally been driven by sharp practices such as gas flaring, oil spillage,
land use change induced by oil and gas exploitation activities, and other
agents of global change.
In 1990, the gross national emissions of CH4, NMVOC and CO2 from fugitive
processes in the energy sector were summarised to be 55.81 Tg CO2 (mainly
from gas flaring), 964 Gg CH4 and 210 Gg NMVOC. Oil and gas systems are
responsible for more than 99% of the fugitive CH4 emissions. The current
estimates of CH4 and NMVOC from oil and gas pipeline fugitive sources are
expected to have high level of uncertainties which arise from the high
uncertainties in the estimates of the population and emission factors of leak
inducing modules.
Objectives:
In this regard, the main objectives of this study are as follows:
(a) The determination of the components leading to fugitive emissions in the
oil and gas sector in Nigeria, and the contribution of each generic components
to the overall methane emission in the sector.
(b) The assessment of the maintenance requirement needed to reduce future
methane emissions to minimal levels.
(c) The assessment of the adequacy of trained technical and managerial
manpower capable of managing the maintenance of these systems in order
that leak emissions are minimised.
(d) Based on the fore-going, the determination of leakage emissions associated
with oil and gas production and utilisation in Nigeria.
The project is expected to provide data needed for accurate estimates of

fugitive emissions from pipelines and other modules in the oil and gas sector.

F3
7) Baseline Data Analysis for Risk Assessment of Impacts of Flood and
Drought given climate change scenario in Nigeria.
Flood and drought are considered the greatest challenge facing Nigeria as a
result of climate change in the 21st Century. Although studies on flood and
Drought in Nigeria have confirmed their increasing intensity within the past
three decades, Risk assessments have been speculative, falling short of IPCC
required methodologies due to lack of baseline data on losses of life,
properties and production base (agricultural land recourses and animal
habitats).
Objectives:
The studies proposed will aim at:
(a) Providing specific Baseline Data for Risk Assessment on Flood and
Drought in Nigeria.
(b) Delineating States (parts thereof), or geographical / Ecological zones prone
to Flood and Drought with emphasis on flood /Drought types.
(c) Quantifying the Risk levels of the different flood or Drought prone zones in
order to assess the type (s) of intervention (local or international) required for
adaptation.
Expected outcomes include (i) Data Bank for GIS Products on Risk
Assessment and Early Warning System on Flood, Erosion, (ii) Vulnerability
Assessment of Specific disorders including Groups (and levels) of People at
Risk, Capital values at Risk and Subsistence Values at Risk, (iii) Protection /
Adaptation cost on Socio-Economic and Ecological values at loss / Risk, (iv)
Cultural / Agricultural / Land Resources at loss / Risk for Adaptation
measures.
Expected Project Duration: 15 months.
8) Modeling and Verification of Severe storms (cyclonic depressions) in the

Niger Delta, Nigeria.
The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) has mandate to carry out
development projects identified to be a fallout from environmental
degradation in the oil producing areas of Nigeria. This is to be carried out in
close collaboration with multi-nationals. But it is important that activities
include, in addition to man-induced disasters such as oil spillage, gas flaring
resulting in general biodiversity degradation, natural disasters such as climate
change effects: Sea Level Rise (SLR) and severe storms that will develop due
to higher Sea Surface Temperatures (SST). The NDDC can only take the latter
disasters ‘on-board’ at planning stage if it is in possession of scientifically
sound ‘proof’ of imminent development of such severe weather events, that
the present study aims at quantifying.
Objectives and outcomes:

With a lead time of no more than 2-5 years before the Tcritical of 27-28ºC is
reached for these Tornado-type storms to start wrecking havoc in the Delta
area, it is expedient to carry out this study so that advisories can be issued to
Governments and their Agencies and adaptation measures put in place (a
priori) of storm occurrence. Measures are in place ahead of seasonal severe
storms. Specifically, the study shall aim at the following:
F4
(a) Design empirical and numerical models occurrence of tornado – type
storms in the Niger Delta based on Tcritical Scenarios using SST values.
(b) Predict (a head in time) the possible incidence of such tornado - type
storms.
(c) Provide advisories on the outcome of (a) and (b) above.
(d) Suggest adaptation measures to curb or reduce losses including socio-
economic values at loss / Risk (people, Capital value, Wetland / Land
Resources, Biodiversity etc.
(e) Empirical and numerical model results to determine level of susceptibility
of the Niger Delta to storm surges of tornado origin.
(f) Estimation of socio-economic disorders (people/capital; value/national
resources at/risk) and adaptation measures to be recommended.
Expected Project Duration: About 12months
9) GCM Climate Modeling of Temperature/ Precipitation and Crop Yield

relationship for Food Security.
Studies on Crop failure that may be climate, induced is on-going on the

possibility of large scale food shortage, especially cereals and other grains in
drought prone areas like Nigeria. GCM Models used on experimental (pilot)
scale using data for two locations (Kano and Port Harcourt) are inconclusive
with doubled Co2 adopted in GISS, UKMO and GFDL models.
Objectives
a) Simulate Temperature and Precipitation regimes under doubled CO2
(Extreme Warming above 1990 base-line level).
b) Apply GCM models [GISS, UKMO, GFDL) tested in other tropical
environments for simulation of crop- climate relationship under normal (1961
– 90) and climate change scenarios to predict crop yield especially cereals and
tubers.
c) Provide long – term Food Early Warning for the 21st Century (in decadal
stages).
The immediate outputs of the project will include:

(i) Predictions of Crop yield under normal and doubled CO2 scenarios for
formulation of FOOD SECURITY Policies through Early Warning.
(ii) Identification of crops that are most vulnerable in terms of poor yield and
low quality under extreme climate conditions.
(iii)Determination of the most appropriate GCM models for operational use in
Nigeria ‘quick-look’.
(iv) Software, easy- to – use for algorithms simple applications in field
operations where there is no direct access to mainframe systems.
Expected Project Duration: 12 months.
10) Creation of Public Awareness on Climate Change.
Climate Change as a result of human activities will have a devastating effect

on land and life in Nigeria. With the variations being experienced in climatic
conditions, there have been signs of adverse impacts of these changes.
Temperatures are already rising with negative effects on health, agricultural
production, water resources and other socio-economic sectors.
F5
It is therefore necessary to create awareness on (a) the need to reduce the
emissions of GHGs, which are responsible for climate change and (b) the need
to implement adaptation measures for reducing the adverse consequences of
the impacts of climate change.
Objectives
The general objective of the awareness is to sensitize the general public to
integrate measures in their programmes to reduce the emission of the GHGs
and, where necessary, to co-operate on adaptation measures for the impacts of
climate change. Specific objectives include
(a) Making the public aware of the dangers of uncontrolled emission of GHGs
(b) Assisting the public to identify the sources of emission of GHGs
(c) Developing teaching and learning materials in the field of climate change
for educational institutions
(d) Promoting informal education stakeholders.
11) Improving the Quality of Meteorological Data for Climate Change

Impact and Application Studies
Data collection and archiving are faced with a lot of problems most of which
the country has been unable to solve due to lack of, or inadequate, facilities
including instrumentation, technological development, trained personnel and
infrastructures. There is paucity of data on the commonly measured
meteorological elements (e.g. rainfall, temperature, etc) and there are minimal
data on such parameters such as radiation, humidity and wind. Since the mid-
1990s, satellites have been used to monitor meteorological systems, but the
data collected have not been stored because of lack of storage facilities.
Objectives
The main objective of the project is to improve the availability and quality of
meteorological data in Nigeria. Specific objectives include
(a) Increasing the number stations used for collecting the data to meet the
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) standards.
(b) Increase the quantity and quality weather measuring instruments.
(c) Adopting modern state –of - earth technologies for data collection and
management.
(d) Improving the quality of personnel in NIMET and some other institutions
that collect meteorological data.
Expected outputs are (i) equipments acquired and installed, (ii) improved
number of skilled personnel, (iii) enhanced quality and quantity of
meteorological records, (iv) Improved meteorological database management
systems (DBMS).
Project Duration: 24 months. (Some details of this include)
12) Climate Change Impacts and Vulnerability Assessment in the Sudan-

Sahel Region
All countries in the Sudan-Sahel regions have been adversely affected by

climatic variability and changes as well as climatic events. Especially during
the past three or four decades, the Sudan-Sahel region have been a centre of
worry and disturbing concern especially because of the impacts of droughts
F6
and desertification. It has also been a region where greater focus and attention
have been given on the need to find solutions to the problems of
environmental crisis caused by climatic variability and climatic events,
(especially droughts and desertification, soil erosion and other such
consequences of climatic variations and variability).
Objectives
The main objectives of the project is to study the impacts of climate change on
physical and socio-economic sectors of the Sudan – Sahel region, (with
particular reference to agriculture and water resources) and put forward
adaptation strategies for reducing the probable impacts of climate change.
Specific objectives of the study include
(a) To assess the potential impacts of climate change on agricultural
production.
(b) To assess the potential impacts of climate change on surface and
groundwater resources.
(c) To assess the impacts of climate change on water quality and how it can
affect the water supply-demand systems.
(d) To evaluate the impacts of climate change on domestic, industrial,
agricultural and other avenues of water demands.
(e) To evaluate water supply-demand systems and project the water balance
(surplus or deficits) in the region based on implications of climate change on
population and various socio-economic factors.
Project Duration: 24 Months
Expected outputs are (i) estimates of quantity and quantity of surface and
groundwater resources in the Sudan – Sahel region of Nigeria (the estimates
will also be carried out for the various states in the region), (ii) vulnerability
analysis of the climate change impacts on the study region but specifically on
agriculture and water resources sectors, (iii) projection of water resources
supply and demand as well as water balance characteristics based on water
supply and demand in the region, (iv) specific adaptation strategies for
implementation in the region.
13) Improving Efficiency of Transport System in Nigeria
The Transport System in Nigeria presents a major problem for environmental

and socioeconomic development in the country. In particular, about 98% of
the passenger travel in the country is by road, the other modes of transport
forming only about 2 per cent. Unfortunately, the road transport system is
very inefficient with the bulk of the transport consisting of small vehicles and
private cars. In the urban centres, the situation is worsened by the
centralization of commercial activities in the heart of the cities, especially the
Central Business District (CBD).
This situation causes heavy traffic congestion usually leading to “near
impossible” movement in such cities as Lagos, Port Harcourt, Kano and
Abuja. This has led to the urgent need to improve the efficiency of the
transport system especially in the urban centres.
Objectives:
The main aim of the project is to improve the quality of the environment
through the reduction of the number of the road transport vehicles in

F7
particular corridors, and decongest city centres of commercial activities.
Specific objectives include:
(a) To study the purpose of journeys and relate this to the density of road
transport.
(b) To study the level of gas emissions of the various classes of vehicles.
(c) To examine the possibilities of reduction or change in the travel modes to
modes that are more environmentally friendly (including (i) those modes with
reduced exhaust emissions and (ii) those that would reduce transport
congestion in the cities).
(d) To assist in the formulation of policies towards the improvement of mass
public transport system.
(e) To examine the possibility of the use of other modes of transport for both
inter and intra city travels.
(f) To examine the possibility and ways of reducing the use of small private
vehicles and their replacement by efficient traffic management measures
Project Duration: 15 months.
Expected outputs are (i) the reduction in the level of exhaust emissions, (ii)
Use of alternative modes of transport such as rail for mass transit and freight,
(iii) efficient transport system, (iv) evolution of various traffic management
measures to encourage public transport use as against the use of small road
transport vehicles, (v) reduction in the use of fuel which in turn will lead to
reduction in emission of GHG, (vi) improvement in transport efficiency,
which will transmit to efficient running of the economy, reduced costs and
improvement in the economy through the distributive sector.
14) Climate Change and Assessment of pollution – related health hazards in

Livestock
Although changes in climate affect existing systems adversely, some systems

for which adaptation is possible may benefit greatly from these changes.
Climate change is also assessed in terms of economic development, which
may make some countries more Vulnerable to climate change, for example,
countries like Nigeria, which do not manage their natural resources properly
and have high population growth rates, may be more vulnerable to potential
changes in relation to environmental degradation, the basic cause of dust
population.
The dust in Nigeria may be ‘carcinogenic’ due to the presence of residues of

chemical additives (in soils) to enhance or increase crop yield. Thus, livestock
may be liable to epidemics which could be fatal under present trends of
climate change when the Harmattan Season is synonymous with extremely
cold nights and very hot dusty afternoon.
These events indicate that, if advanced economies after doing all possible
could not avert these catastrophes, it is expedient that in weaker, evolving
economies like Nigeria assessment of impact of climate change in the poultry
sub-sector of agriculture which tends to hold high promise in the country is
expedient in order to provide benchmark data against which aberrations due
to climate change can be ‘measured’.
Objectives:

F8
(a) Establish Benchmarks for Risk assessment of Livestock (Poultry) against
which Poultry losses during the 2000 / 2001 in the southwestern parts of
Nigeria (prone to Harmattan Season epidemics) based on Pre – 1994 losses.
(b) Identify ‘local’ and ‘Agric’ hybrids for stratification of possible specific
worst affected by epidemics in each state and estimate Economics values at
loss and capital value at loss and capital value at Risk.
(c) Design protection / Adaptation measures to minimize or eliminate losses
in future.
Expected outcome is a vulnerability assessment in relation to economic values

at loss and risk including determination of time trends in relation to cyclic
recurrence patterns of epidemics which will not only be applicable in poultry
development but can also be adapted for other livestock.
Expected Project Duration: Nine (9) Months.

F9
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27 Impact of Climate Change On Nigerias Economy

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27 Impact of Climate Change On Nigerias Economy

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Impact of Climate

Delivering sustainable solutions in a more competitive world

Revision Date Comments

This report has been prepared by Environmental Resources

We disclaim any responsibility to the client and others in respect of

This report is confidential to the client and we accept no responsibility

Approved by: Tim Geyer

Date: 24th February 2009

Nigeria is likely to be one of the most negatively impacted countries in the

Based on IPCC climate change assumptions, latest research findings relating

These numbers assume minimal adaptation. By undertaking appropriate

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 0082608/DIFID/NIGERIA CLIMATE CHANGE FEB 2009

Nigeria currently has institutions traditionally mandated to provide data

There is some good academic capacity related to climate change expertise

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 0082608/DIFID/NIGERIA CLIMATE CHANGE FEB 2009

1) Support a study to undertake a stock-take of existing and proposed

2) Support the undertaking of a more detailed spatial analysis of key sectors

4) Promote and support the creation of a national Climate Change

5) Support an initiative to build capacity in climate change skills within the

7) Work with the Ministry of Environment and selected states, to develop

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 0082608/DIFID/NIGERIA CLIMATE CHANGE FEB 2009

2.1 CURRENT GDP & GROWTH RATES 4

3.1 CURRENT & HISTORIC NATIONAL CLIMATE 10

4 POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FROM CLIMATE CHANGE TO NIGERIA 15

5 ECONOMIC IMPACT MODEL RESULTS 23

6.1 OPTIONS FOR ADAPTATION 30

7 DATA & INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS 35

8 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 41

ANNEX A SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION OUTPUT

Table 2.1 Trends in relative poverty levels, 1980-2004, Nigeria 6

Box 4.1 The worst case scenario, D. Okali 16

Nigeria hopes to be in the world’s top 20 biggest economies by 2020. In order

Environmental Resources Management (ERM) has been commissioned by the

1.2 STUDY OBJECTIVES

The objective of this study is to provide ‘ballpark’ quantified estimates of the

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 0082608/DIFID/NIGERIA CLIMATE CHANGE FEB 2009

• An economic assessment of the impacts of climate change on Nigeria,

In addition, ERM conducted a detailed review of relevant information on the

i) North (North-West Zone (NW), North-East Zone (NE), North-Central

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 0082608/DIFID/NIGERIA CLIMATE CHANGE FEB 2009

• agriculture (42% of the Nigerian economy in 2005) comprising crops,

Although the study is particularly focussed on GDP and MDGs, it is

1.4 REPORT STRUCTURE

The structure of the report is as follows:

Section 3: Details the current and future predicted climatic conditions in

Section 4: Highlights the potential impacts of the change in climate detailed in

Section 6: Outlines potential alternative adaptation strategies and actions, and

Section 7: Discusses key data requirements and institutional capacity within

Section 8: Provides some conclusions and recommendations for action.

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 0082608/DIFID/NIGERIA CLIMATE CHANGE FEB 2009

2.1 CURRENT GDP & GROWTH RATES

Moreover, non-oil GDP growth has accelerated significantly, reaching 7.4% in

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 0082608/DIFID/NIGERIA CLIMATE CHANGE FEB 2009

Source: Poverty Profile for Nigeria, National Bureau of Statistics, 2005

2.2 CURRENT POVERTY & DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES

Poverty in Nigeria is multi-dimensional. Poor people are more likely to be

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 0082608/DIFID/NIGERIA CLIMATE CHANGE FEB 2009

According to the National Bureau of Statistics of Nigeria, poverty levels

In 2004, the Nigerian Government decided to conduct a Living Standard

Table 2.1 Trends in Relative Poverty Levels, 1980-2004, Nigeria

Year Poverty Incidence Estimated Total Population Population in Poverty

(1) LSMS is a methodology developed and recommended by the World Bank