Policy Brief January 2011

The Transition from Emergency

Relief to Development
Problem Recommendations & Actions
USAID’s Office of When a country comes out of the emergency phase of a man-made or natural disaster,
U.S. Foreign Disaster post-emergency transition and recovery efforts lay a critical foundation for stability and long-
Assistance is the lead term development. Transition planning should begin at the outset of an emergency response
agency in providing and be fully integrated with long-term development planning. Such efforts become particu-
immediate, life-saving larly important when emergencies reach a “protracted” phase—when the acute emergency
services to populations recedes and a crisis-affected population begins to stabilize (even while a conflict is ongoing).
suffering the effects of • Create a new “transition” contingency account to enable rapid funding of recovery and
natural or manmade transitional development assistance in post-disaster and post-conflict settings.
disasters. Its parent • Appropriate $300 million for the transition account that USAID can use to bridge the
agency, USAID, leads on “relief to development” gap in countries transitioning out of natural disasters and conflict.
the implementation of • Ensure that U.S. transition activities include strong emphases on conflict mitigation and
long-term development disaster risk reduction.
programs. The hand-
off between these
two functions is weak
at best, with a lack
of coordination and
effective oversight in
the transition. This limits
the effectiveness of
U.S. efforts and putting
vulnerable populations
at risk.

www.InterAction.org
1400 16th Street, NW
Suite 210
Washington, DC 20036
202-667-8227
Results
The creation and funding of a transition fund will allow USAID to build upon
the successes of humanitarian programs during the transition to development
assistance; and its flexibility will allow for shifts in programming mechanisms to
facilitate that work.
Background
As some of the key crises that the humanitarian community
has been dealing with (such as Afghanistan, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Sri Lanka and Sudan) are starting to
transition from emergency response to recovery and devel-
opment, it has become clear that USAID does not have an
effective mechanism to facilitate the shift from one type of
assistance to another. The U.S. is known as a generous
and compassionate donor nation, but the mechanisms
by which the U.S. Government is able to respond to rapid
onset emergencies and transition from emergencies into
recovery and development assistance do not allow for the
quick and flexible response that is necessary in these situ-
ations. Transitional contexts in fragile states now constitute
a large policy priority for the U.S.; yet the structure of U.S.
assistance still reflects an outmoded dichotomy between
“relief” and “development” in which effective coordination
and handover between these poles is often discussed but
rarely executed. The “transition gap” in countries recover-
ing from natural disasters is just as acute.
Within USAID, it is unclear where the responsibility
lies to ensure a coherent transition, and there is rarely a
“handshake” between USAID’s Bureau for Democracy and
Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) and the regional bureaus
responsible for more traditional development assistance
when programs are being transitioned from one type of
assistance to another. The Office of Transition Initiatives
(OTI) has the transitional mandate in theory, but in prac-
tice has focused on a limited scope of interventions, leav-
ing major gaps in transitional assistance. Other relatively
new mechanisms can potentially help narrow the transition
gap. The new Complex Crises Fund (CCF) is still evolving
and may present an avenue for transitional funding in post-
conflict situations. It remains to be seen how USAID will
put this new funding authority to use in the long-term. The
Obama Administration has included a Community Devel-
opment Fund in its Feed the Future Initiative to support
longer-term safety net programs that help narrow the gap
between humanitarian and development assistance. This
fund would provide a cash alternative to fund programs
currently supported via Title II monetization.
OFDA tends to be drawn into de facto transitional devel-
opment assistance, but lacks a clear mandate and appro-
priate tools to do so. Its short funding cycles impede
medium- to long-term strategic planning, complicate
efforts to build program ownership and capacity among
the affected populations, and prolong the use of expensive
relief-oriented program strategies.
There are many examples of humanitarian assistance
programs ending without development assistance pick-
ing up support for basic social services. This has caused
already vulnerable populations to lose access to key basic
services such as health and education, which then contrib-
utes to continuing instability. Of particular concern in com-
munities coming out of conflict is the impact that sexual
violence has had on women and their families. Address-
ing the physical and psychological needs of women who
have survived sexual violence is extremely important to the
recovery process for communities coming out of conflict;
and this particular issue, along with the reintegration of
child soldiers, is often lost in this “relief to development”
gap.
Another challenge is the chronic under-funding of disas-
ter risk reduction activities, which support communities
to assess their vulnerability to threats such as drought or
floods and work to reduce their future exposure to those
threats.1
To address the transition gap and allow for a more flex-
ible response to transition situations (which can fluctuate
between emergency and recovery as peace processes
are being worked out), USAID should be provided with a
transition fund of $300 million, which the USAID Admin-
istrator can access specifically to support the transition
process. The funds accessed should be programmed by
the regional bureaus and in-country USAID missions, with a
clear plan developed in coordination with DCHA that would
prevent gaps in basic social services. In order to enable
satisfactory congressional oversight, the transition account
could be structured as an ERMA-style2 drawdown account.
1 See the Disaster Risk Reduction policy brief for more details.
2 The Department of State’s Emergency Refugee and Migration Assis-
tance (ERMA) account funds unforeseen displacement emergencies.