Policy Brief January 2011

The U.S. Military’s Expanding

Role in Foreign Assistance
Problem Recommendations & Actions
The U.S. Armed Forces In development work, differences in mandate and training make the military a poor substi-
provide important tute for civilian experts from the U.S. Government, the United Nations and NGOs. Congress
lift capacity and help and the Administration should ensure civilian agencies have the mandates, funding and per-
ensure security during sonnel they need to lead U.S. diplomatic, humanitarian and development efforts. It makes
large-scale humanitarian little sense for the military to take on development work in order to compensate for resource
crises. How its gaps in U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The currently expanding assis-
growing involvement tance programs of the Department of Defense should be thoroughly evaluated to ensure that
in humanitarian security objectives are being met. U.S. Armed Forces should, as a rule, be used in disaster
and development relief as a last resort, in situations requiring large lift capacity, under civilian humanitarian
assistance evolves leadership. When foreign policy objectives require a strong U.S. engagement, the projection
is a serious concern of “soft power” through professionals at the U.S. Department of State or USAID is often the
to nongovernmental most effective option. The military’s development and humanitarian efforts response should
organizations (NGOs). be limited in geographic and programmatic scope, and should always be in support of U.S.
Expanded military civilian agencies.
involvement in relief and • Rebuild civilian personnel and resources at the Department of State and particularly
development as part development and humanitarian professionals at USAID by providing substantial support
of counter-insurgency to State and USAID operational capacity in the international affairs budget.
efforts dangerously • Rewrite and reauthorize the Foreign Assistance Act to promote and protect humani-
blur the line between tarian and development priorities, including reinvigorating related civilian expertise and
the military and NGOs resources.
acting in accord with • Conduct a full review of Department of Defense programs and regional combatant com-
humanitarian principles. mand activities relating to foreign assistance. Determine the appropriateness and effec-
The military’s pursuit tiveness of its security, humanitarian and development aid programs and the extent to
of political and security which they are redundant or need to be more focused on particular areas of expertise of
objectives can endanger the U.S. Armed Forces such as training of other militaries.
humanitarian workers’
lives and compromise
both missions.
Results
These steps will foster a means of U.S. humanitarian response that is in keep-
ing with internationally agreed principles and standards, while addressing the
imbalance among the three pillars of national security: defense, diplomacy and
development. In combination, these actions will also improve U.S. Government
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capacity to alleviate suffering and address poverty through effective humanitar-
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ian response and development assistance. The recommendations will eliminate
Suite 210 duplicative Department of Defense programs, thus freeing up military resources
Washington, DC 20036 for tasks critical to its core mission.
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Background
Since 1998, the Department of Defense (DoD) share of
U.S. official development assistance (ODA) has increased
from 3.5 percent to 22 percent. During that time, the DoD
has dramatically expanded its relief, development and
reconstruction assistance through programs such as Sec-
tion 1207/1210, the Commanders’ Emergency Response
Program (CERP) and the Combatant Commanders’ Initia-
tive Fund, and also through the activities of the regional
combatant commands and the Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs). Humanitarian nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) adhere to a strict set of principles and stan-
dards of behavior. These are based on the Code of Con-
duct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement and Nongovernmental Organizations in Disaster
Relief. This code of conduct binds signatories to the follow-
ing key principles:
• The Humanitarian Imperative: Every human being has
the right to humanitarian assistance when affected by a
natural or man-made disaster;
• Independence: NGO staff must not knowingly allow
themselves to be used by governments or other groups
for non-humanitarian purposes; and
• Impartiality: Assistance is provided according to need,
without regard to race, religion, nationality or political
affiliation.
Military forces have frequently been involved in natural
disaster response where their logistical resources, air and
marine transport capabilities and engineering services can
fill an important need. Such efforts are most effective when
coordinated with civilian leadership and expertise, which
can be found in USAID, the UN and NGOs. The military
may also have no choice but to get involved in relief activi-
ties in areas too insecure for civilian agencies and staff to
access. In general, however, when the military represents
a party to a conflict, its involvement in relief and develop-
ment activities can be problematic. The U.S. military’s pri-
mary focus is security. Its relief and development activities
emphasize winning the “hearts and minds” of a population.
Moreover, the military generally lacks specialized humani-
tarian and development expertise and does not have the
ability to reach out to and partner with affected communi-
ties that comes with employing local staff as NGOs do.
Quick-impact projects and other force protection activi-
ties motivated by security objectives may undermine sus-
tainable development projects and relationships built by
NGO workers. Well-intended projects may have negative
consequences and are often unsustainable due to the
military’s short-term goals and quick turnover rate on the
ground. Relief activities by the military can also compro-
mise the security of NGO staff in or near conflict areas by
blurring the lines between humanitarian and military per-
sonnel.
NGOs take a different approach to relief and develop-
ment than does the military. NGOs generally make a long-
term commitment to a situation, acquire a deep under-
standing of local societies, employ largely local staff and
design projects with community participation and cultural
sensitivity to ensure sustainability. As a result, instead of
using weapons or armed guards for their security, NGOs
rely on an “acceptance” model that rests upon perceived
impartiality and the trust of the communities in which they
work. In conflict situations, NGO staff generally keep their
distance from the military unless they deem cooperation
necessary to address the needs of vulnerable populations.
This is not an expression of hostility to the military, but
instead a necessary and vital measure for their security—
security that depends on community belief in their neutral-
ity and independence from political and military actors.
U.S.-based NGOs are advancing a dialogue with the U.S.
military to reinforce appropriate roles.
The military should not consider NGOs as “force extend-
ers” or assume their willingness to collaborate, and should
leave humanitarian and development activities to civilian
agencies and NGOs as much as possible. NGOs recognize
that communication with military actors is mutually benefi-
cial when conducted in a neutral space, and guidelines exist
to help improve NGO-military relations when they operate
in a common area. Although the InterAction-Department of
Defense Guidelines apply in hostile and potentially hostile
environments, they are useful in any environment where the
military and NGOs are present.
The military should focus on its mandate and strengths
including combat operations, security sector reform, mari-
time security and military-to-military training in civilian pro-
tection and HIV/AIDS. However, when the military does
engage in humanitarian and development activities, its
involvement should be approved, led and coordinated by
civilian agencies. The military should develop clearly speci-
fied security and developmental objectives before imple-
menting any assistance project and should regularly moni-
tor progress towards achieving these goals.
Diminishing security is a major factor that shapes the
evolving U.S military-NGO dynamic. Sadly, humanitarian
workers are at times directly targeted in today’s world. In
2008, 260 humanitarian aid workers were killed, kidnapped
or seriously injured in violent attacks. Relations between
the military and NGOs should adhere to the Guidelines
(attached) and military uniforms should be worn at all times,
without exception.