Economic Sanctions: Benefits and Costs

Author(s): Margaret Doxey

Source: The World Today, Vol. 36, No. 12 (Dec., 1980), pp. 484-489
Published by: Royal Institute of International Affairs
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Economic sanctions: benefits and costs
MARGARET DOXEY

whichmaymisstheirtrue
Economicsanctionsare bluntinstruments
targetand evenboomerang.

The lifting ofUnitedNationssanctions onRhodesiaattheendof1979following

theconstitutional settlement whichbroughtthatcountryto independence as
Zimbabwe1 has not broughtan end to interest in thesubjectof international
sanctions. SouthAfricais stilla possibletargetforharshermeasuresthanthe
armsembargo whichhasbeenmandatory forUN members since1977,andover
thepastyeartherehavebeenattempts to obtainUN authorization formeasures
againstIran,following theseizureofAmerican diplomats in Tehran,as wellas
resorttoretaliatory measures bytheUnitedStatesandothercountries to express
disapproval oftheSovietuseofforceinAfghanistan. Fullconsideration ofinter-
nationalsanctions raisesimportant questionsaboutstandards of international
behaviour as wellas thepracticality ofcollectivecoercionbya variety ofmeans.
Thisshortarticle focuses specificallyontheneedtoweighbenefits andcostsbefore
embarking on programmes of international economicsanctions.It drawson
experience gainedfromthestudyofLeagueofNationssanctions againstItalyin
themid-1 930s and on morerecentcases,particularly UN sanctionsagainst
Rhodesiain thewakeofUDI andOAS sanctions on Cuba whichwerein place
from1964to 1975.Lessonscanalsobelearnedfromothercoercive exercises even
iftheydo notqualify fortheappellation of'sanctions' ; and itis worth considering
brieflywhenthetermcan be correctly used,as thishassomesignificant implica-
tionsforthemaximization ofbenefit.
Onewouldfight a losingbattleinattempting torestrict thetermtopenalties for
a
illegalacts,imposedby legally constituted and
authority, perhaps itis a battle
whichshouldbe lost,particularly at theinternational level.Thereis no accepted,
functioning system of law and orderbetween states;wideideologicaland eco-
nomicchasmsyawnbetween them,andself-help is prevalent. Inevitably, thereis
recourse tomultilateral- andunilateral - coercion andretaliation usuallywithout
anyauthorization byan international body.Consensus on norms, or standards,
canbefoundonlyata generalized levelandtendstodissolve rapidly intodisagree-
mentoverdetailedinterpretation, particularlyoverclaimsthatstandards have
beenviolated.'Aggression' canbe presented as 'self-defence', intervention justi-
fiedas assistancetoa friendlygovernment.
1 For background, see MartynGregory,'Rhodesia: fromLusaka to LancasterHouse', The
WorldToday,January1980 and The 1980 Rhodesianelections - a first-handaccountand
analysis',ibid.,May 1980.
Dr Doxey is Professorof PoliticalStudies,TrentUniversity, Ontario;authorof Economic
Sanctionsand International
Enforcement, 2nd edition,1980,publishedby Macmillanforthe
Affairs.
Royal Instituteof International This articleis based on a recentlectureat Chatham
House.
484
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 485

But in speakingor writingabout negativesanctions,thereshould surelybe a

connexionbetweenthesanctionsand acts whichare judged improperor deviant
in termsof some acceptedstandard.If sanctionsare not authorizedby an inter-
nationalbody,theylack theadditionalstatus- legitimation - whichsuchauthor-
ization confers,and theycan be more readilychallengedby the targetand its
supportersas being themselves'illegal'. Regional sanctions are particularly
vulnerableto sucha charge.Of course,thelinebetweenauthorizedand unauthor-
ized sanctionscan become verythin.The Soviet veto in the SecurityCouncil of
sanctionsagainstIran made theresponseof the UnitedStatesand itsallies tech-
nically««authorized,butin thiscase thepriorviolationof international law was
hardlyin doubtand was confirmed bytheInternationalCourtofJustice.But now
thatsanctionsare in thenewsso much,thereis a tendencyin themedia and else-
whereto describevirtually anyact offoreignpolicywhichhas intentionalunplea-
santconsequencesforitstargetas a sanction,and thisseemsregrettable. Arab oil
embargoesagainstWesterncountriesin 1973-4werenotsanctionsand shouldnot
be so described;nor are themeasurestakenby theUnitedStatesand some of its
allies in the wake of Soviet interventionin Afghanistan.Unilateralresponses,
particularly, are oftenmore appropriatelydescribedas retaliatorymeasuresof
self-help.
In attempting toretainsomeauthoritativecontentfortheterm'sanction',which
wouldstrengthen themoralforceof sucha measure,one does, ofcourse,runinto
some difficulties. Acts whichmeritcollectivecensure,and perhapspunishment
(sanctioning),do notnecessarilyattractthem.And furtherproblemsariseoverthe
willingness or unwillingnessof thosewho findthepolicies of othersoffensive,
or
unacceptable,to takeactionto back up theircensure.This is truewhetherone is
thinkingof South Africa's apartheidsystemor the abuse of human rightsin
Uganda, Chile,Kampuchea or elsewhere.

Benefits
Turningspecifically - or payoffs
to the questionof benefits - fromsanctions,
one can perhapsidentify threekindsof achievement:Firstly,and presumablyat
best,thesanctionswould succeedin bringingto an end theoffending policyofthe
target.Theywouldputthingsright - back to wheretheywere,or forwardto where
theyoughtto be. For instance,Italywouldhave givenup itsinvasionofEthiopia;
thegovernment ofIan Smithwouldhave renouncedUDI and introducedgenuine
rule
majority ; the Americandiplomatswouldhave beenfreedin Iran. Leavingon
one side thevexedquestionas to whetherin everycase thoseimposingthesanc-
tionsall wantedexactlythe same outcome,one could say thatany of theseout-
comes would have meantthatsanctionshad succeeded,particularlyiftheresults
had come speedily - perhapsin a matterofweeks.One could also say,on thebasis
of experience,thatsuch successis unlikely.Secondly,and more probably,sanc-
tionswill make continuationof theoffending policymore costlyfor the target.
Theywillhurt,and becomea kindof international finewhichhas to be paid for
misbehaviour ; theymayperhapslimitor constrainfurther adventures.The costto
thetarget,discussedfurther below,is reckonedas a gain to thesanctioningstates.
486 THE WORLD TODAY December1980

Such objectiveshave beenexplicitlystatedin suchcases as Cuba and Iran.Thirdly,

therecan be benefits
notdirectlylinkedto impact.On theone hand,thesanctions
demonstrate publiclyofficialdisapprovalof whatis goingon ; on theotherhand,
theymake co-operationand collaborationwiththe targetrathermore difficult
owingto itsidentification
as a miscreant.
The followingare demonstrative, symbolicfunctions, relevantto a numberof
audiences:
(i) The government of thetargetgetsthemessage,and so do itscitizensto the
extentthattheyare aware of thepenaltiesand thereasonsforthem.Even
iftheoffending policyis notabandoned,further acts of thesame kindmay
be deterred.
(ii) Allieswho expector demandsome actiongoingbeyondverbalcensureare
reassuredabout supportand solidarity;friendlyoverturesto the target
becomelesslikely;continuinglinksbecomesubjectto question,
(iii) Groups in the sanctioningstateswho wantedaction are pleased; others
may not be enthusiastic,or even interested,but theremay be general
approvalforpositiveleadership,foran indicationthatsomethingis being
done to meetprovocativebehaviourbyotherstates.The sanctionsprovide
a fortifyingdietforthemedia and forpublicopinion,and may be helpful
for politicians.In a presidentialelectionyear in the United States,for
instance,thesymboliceffectof sanctionsmay not be unimportant,
(iv) To the worldat large,sanctionscan demonstratethata principleis being
upheld,perhapsat some cost to theupholders.This is moreconvincingif
the principleis clearlydefinedand consistently
upheld,irrespective of the
offender and the location of his misbehaviour,and if the principleis not
violatedby thesanctioningpowersthemselves in othercontexts.As noted
earlier,authorizedmeasureshave additionalstatusand additionalmoral
force.

Costs
Turningnow to theotherside of thebalance-sheet,costsare obviouslyinescap-
able, and indeedintentionalto a degree.But theyare sustainedbythoseimposing
them,and bythirdstates,as wellas bythetarget.
As faras target-associated
costsare concerned,some impactand hardshipare
to be expected.Economic sanctionscan reduce or eliminatetrade in particular
commodities,or across theboard; theycan limitor blockcapital flows,tourism,
communications,aid, the transferof technology - all of whichcan have unwel-
come,cumulativeand possibleseriouseffects fortheeconomyofthetargetand the
livesofsomeor all ofitspeople.
But experiencehas shownhow readilyeconomicsanctionscan be evaded and
theireffectsminimizedor circumvented.The reasons are well known. Those
imposingthemmaynot- or perhapscannot- implement themfully,whileothers
remainoutsidethe group. In the Rhodesian case, forinstance,Switzerlandas a
neutralstatemaintained'normal'trade,Botswanaand Malawi weretoo weakand
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 487

vulnerabletoriskfullinvolvement, whileSouthAfrica- and Portugaluntil1974-

weresympathetic to and supportiveoftheillegalSmithregime.
Moreover,thetargetitselfwilltake defensivemeasures:by doing without;by
developingalternatives;by fighting back withcountermeasures. It can improve
stockpilescarce commodities;encouragediversification
self-sufficiency; of pro-
duction; encouragesmugglingand the re-routingof trade throughmiddlemen,
cloakingall transactionsin secrecy.Its government can also mobilizepatriotism
internallyand develop new friendsand linkages externally.Italy, Cuba and
Rhodesia all providedexamplesof thesestrategies.In particular,thereis now
plentyofinformation on theRhodesiancase to showhow UN sanctionswereshot
fullof holes. One onlyhas to read theBinghamReport2to realize thefutility of
the oil sanction- and of the Britishblockade of Beira. And the UN Sanctions
CommitteeReportsyearafteryearshowedclearlythetipsof verylargeicebergs:
allegationsofsanctionsevasionwerehardto proveand therewas belatedand less
than enthusiasticfollow-upby governmentswhose bureaucratsdoubtlesshad
moreimportantthingsto do. The US violationof thechromeboycottunderthe
Byrdamendmentfrom1971to 1977was publicknowledge.
Withouta physicalblockade,or perhapsfullparticipationin sanctionsbythose
whofullycontrola strategicresource,it seemsthattradeboycottsand embargoes
do notworkto changepolicy.Indeed,thereis thedangerthattheymayhardenthe
attitudeof thetarget,notsoftenit.This maybe truein Iran; it seemsalso to have
been true of Italy, Cuba, and white attitudesin Rhodesia. And the shiftsin
emphasis,or 'tilts'away fromIsrael towardstheArabs discerniblein some coun-
triesafterthe 1973-4 oil embargoes,whichmightsupportargumentsthatecono-
mic coercion works,did not involvebasic changes in national policy,such as
wouldbe entailedbygivingup apartheid.
A second set of costs is borne by thesanctioningstatesthemselves.Economic
relationshipsare two-way,and the sanctioninggroup will suffercorresponding
losses.Exportmarketsmaybe forfeited; vitalimportsand intereston investments
cut off.Establishedand mutuallybeneficiallinks can be permanently severed;
countermeasures imposedwhichbringadditionalhardship.Governments are well
aware of some of thesecosts: one can citeWesternreluctanceto severprofitable
connexionswithSouthAfrica;concernin WestGermanyforthecontinuationof
naturalgas importsfromthe Soviet Union; farmers'demandsfor government
helpin theUnitedStatesto makeup forlostgrainsales to theSovietUnion.
The thirdsetof costscomes withthespillovereffects of economicsanctionsto
thirdcountries,whichhave geographicalor otherimportantlinkswiththetarget.
Zambia and Mozambique wereprimeexamplesin the Rhodesian case and both
wereill-equippedto bear additionaleconomicburdens.8It may be incumbenton
moreprosperouscountriesto help- whichmeansfurther costsforthem,directly
2 T. H. Bingham and S. M. Gray, Report on theSupply ofPetroleum ...to Rhodesia (London:
Foreignand Commonwealth Office,1978).The bestdetailedaccountof RhodesianSanctions
is HarryR. Strack,Sanctions:the Case of Rhodesia(Syracuse,N.Y.: SyracuseUniversity
Press,1978).
8 Cf. TheFrontLine States: theBurdenoftheLiberationStruggle(London: Commonwealth
Secretariat,1978?).
488 THE WORLD TODAY December1980

or throughcontributionsto internationalagencies- and the help does not

necessarilyfullyoffsetthesacrifice/costto thethirdstates.
Finally,therecan be generallyharmful'chain' or diffused on thewhole
effects
internationaleconomicsystem, especiallyifthetargetis in somewayan important
componentof it: as buyer,supplieror investor.Therewillbe disruptionof trade
and investment;blockingof channelsof exchange;emphasison self-sufficiency;
loss of certainty;loss of confidence.The last is particularlyundesirablein the
ratherfragileconditionof theinternational economywhichbecame apparentin
the 1970s. It has been alleged that the US action in freezingIranian assets in
American banks underminedthe confidenceof other depositorsin Western
centralbanksand financialinstitutions.
Predictionof theintensity of any or all of thesecostsmaybe difficult,
butit is
unrealisticnot to take account of them- evenifthecause stillappears to justify
theirbeingincurred.

General remarks
In conclusion,it maybe usefulto make one or two generalcommentsand also
raise a fewmildlycontroversialquestions.Sanctionsmustbe judged as regards
probabilityand efficacyon a case-by-casebasis. There is no generalpatternof
enforcement - nor is therelikelyto be. But one can generalizeand say thatthe
largerthegroupsupportingsanctionsand theclearertheconsensuson theviola-
tion of a norm,themoreeffective thesanctionswillbe in symbolicand probably
in practicalterms.However,thehigherthelevelofanticipatedcostto thesanction-
inggroup,thelesslikelyitis thatsanctionswillbe imposed.If theyare imposed-
because thebenefits appear to outweighthecosts- it is unlikelythattheywillbe
vigorouslyimplemented.
Wheresanctionsare imposedreluctantly (and belatedly)evenifcondemnation
was widespread,theremay be some loss of credibility in theirstatus.If theyare
'phased in', as in theItalian and Rhodesiancases, theycan have an 'inoculation'
effect.If thereis no authorizationby an internationalbody,and if pressurehas
been exercisedby one stateto bringothersintoline withitssanctionspolicy,the
symboliceffect is certainlydiluted.This is trueofanyeffort at censure.The partial
boycottof the Moscow Olympicsis an obvious case in point.It is probablyalso
counter-productive and certainlygivespropagandaadvantagesto thetarget.
One may conclude that economic sanctionsshould not be seen as a useful,
peacefulweaponofpressurewhichcan be readilyemployedat low cost.Economic
impoverishment of any state is undesirableunless thereare very compelling
reasonsforit; theworldis alreadybesetwitheconomicdifficulties. Development,
notretardation, is a primegoal and long-term harmfuleconomiceffects cannotbe
readilyexpungedwhensanctionsend.4Economic sanctionsare not susceptibleto
'finetuning': theyare bluntinstruments whichmaymisstheirtruetargetand can
also havea boomerangeffect.
Giventhecounter-productive aspectsofeconomicsanctionsoutlinedabove,the
4 See D. G. Clarke, Zimbabwe's economicpositionand aspects of sanctionsremoval',
JournalofCommonwealth Politics,Vol. 18, 1 March 1980,pp. 28-54.
and Comparative
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 489

questionariseswhether suchmeasures shouldbeavoidedbyinternational bodies.

Obviously,economic pressurewillcontinue to be used by individualstatesand by
groupsofstatesforcoercivepurposesbutwhatabouttheUnitedNations,the
Commonwealth, theOrganization ofAmerican States?Shouldsuchbodiesrestrict
themselvesto condemnation and to otherkindsof sanction?For example,the
exclusionof offenders frommembership or participation in theirwork;the
severanceofcultural links;sportsboycotts ? Suchmeasures aregenerallyeasierto
imposethaneconomicsanctions, havehighvisibility anddenystatesthebenefits
of participationin significantaspectsofinternational life.The linkagebetween
offenceandpenalty mayalso be clearertocitizens ofthetarget (although officiai
censorshipcan bluror distortthismessage).The questionis perhapswhether
internationaleconomic sanctions carryenoughpoliticalimpactto justify their
- a politicalimpactwhichmore than offsets
imposition theireconomically
damaging effectswhichexperience hasshowncannotbeconfined tothetarget and
seemunlikely to correctan unwelcome situation?If theyfail,is therealso a
furthercost?Is thatfailure itself
conducive to furtherdisrespect fortherights of
statesand a gradualundermining of thesadlylimited roleof obligation in the
worldtoday? Is a patternofcensure forcomparable actsthefirstobjective?
Thesearenotquestionswhichcan be easilyanswered, buttheyare questions
whichneeddetailedandcareful consideration beforepolicydecisions aremade.

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