DEBTOR'S FOURTH MOTION DEMANDING THAT

JUDGE THOMAS JAMES DISQUALIFY HIMSELF

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. §455 AND BANKRUPTCY RULE 5004
FOR PREDETERMINATION OF THE ACTION,
THE APPEARANCE OF PARTIALITY AND FOR HIS
DEEP-SEATED ANTAGONISM TOWARDS THE DEBTOR

NOW COMES the Debtor, EUGENE W. ALPERN ("EUGENE"), in pro per,

sui juris, and demands that Judge Thomas James disqualify himself for his appearance of
predetermination of the case, his appearance of partiality, and his deep-seated antagonism
towards EUGENE which prevents EUGENE from obtaining a fair hearing from Judge
James. In support of this motion, EUGENE submits the following:

JUDGE JAMES WAS DISQUALIFIED BY LAW

1. In Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147 (1994), the Court clarified what issues can
be brought before the Federal Judge to disqualify the Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§455(a). The Court held that valid causes for disqualification of a judge by a party to the
proceeding included (1) the judge had given the appearance that he had made a
predetermination (predisposition) of the case, or (2) the judge displayed such deep-seated
antagonism to the party that would render fair judgment impossible, or (3) both.

In addition, events occurring during the trial can be cause for disqualification, if
the events display an inability of the judge to render fair judgment, an exception to the
extrajudicial source factor (Liteky, at 1155, 1160), or that there is "an intent to ensure
that one side or the other shall prevail, there can be little doubt that he or she must
recuse." Liteky, at 1159. Judge James has not been able to render a fair judgment. Judge
James has no discretion to recuse himself.

The Supreme Court, in Liteky, affirmed the statutory requirements of 28

U.S.C. §455(a) for the disqualification of a judge.

In EUGENE's first Motion to Disqualify Judge James, filed December 16, 1993
and heard on December 20, 1993, EUGENE had charged, inter alia, that Judge James had
given the appearance of having predetermined the outcome of that hearing and of the
case. Although Judge James denied EUGENE's Motion to Disqualify Judge James, all
contact with Judge James, since December 16, 1993, has only confirmed EUGENE's
position as being truthful and factual. EUGENE had met the requirement on December
16, 1993 to disqualify Judge James. The charges of appearance of predetermination and
appearance of partiality as well as others, were repeated in subsequent Motions To
Disqualify Judge James. EUGENE continued to meet the requirements of Liteky, and
Judge James continued to give the appearance of having predetermined the outcome of
each hearing and of the case, and to give the appearance of partiality against EUGENE in
court, and to act without lawful authority.
 The Liteky court further clarified the conditions for disqualification of a judge
by a non-party to the proceeding. The Liteky court stated that under statute 28 U.S.C.
§455(a), "Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain
reasonable questions about the judges impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind
leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the
judge must be disqualified." [Emphasis added]. Id. at 1162.

On January 7, 1994, an objective, detached observer of Judge James' December

20, 1993 court hearing, filed an affidavit (1) stating, inter alia, that Judge James had given
the appearance of having predetermined the outcome of that hearing, and that he gave the
appearance of partiality against EUGENE and an appearance of partiality in favor of the
creditors. According to Liteky, the court had no discretion (2); Judge James had to
disqualify himself. The Seventh Circuit had previously ruled that disqualification is self-
executing, Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989); the judge has a duty to
disqualify himself. Whenever a judge has a duty, he has no discretion, Littleton v.
Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 412 (7th Cir. 1972), citing Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 9 Wheat (22 U.S.) 738, 866, 6 L.Ed 204 (1824); U.S. v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088,
1090 (9th Cir. 1991). He must disqualify himself. Whether or not a judge has disqualified
himself, the law has disqualified him. Under prevailing law, all orders issued on or since
December 20, 1993 are void, as they were issued by a disqualified judge. The failure of
Judge James to recuse himself gives no validity to any Order issued on or after December
20, 1993.

Additional declarations by other court observers, who were non-parties to the

proceedings, have been filed (3) attesting to Judge James appearance of partiality against
EUGENE. These declarations evidence not only Judge James appearance of
predetermination and appearance of partiality against EUGENE, but his continuing
predetermination (predisposition) of the outcome of the case and his continuing
appearance of partiality against EUGENE.

Judge Thomas James impartiality is being, and has been, questioned by both
EUGENE and by non-party court observers who have attended hearings.

"It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he
believes that he has received justice. A judge, like Caesar's wife, should be above
suspicion." Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972). EUGENE does not believe
that he has received justice, as he was before a judge who was not impartial.

It has been held that a judge's self-appraisal that he or she is able to preside
impartially over the case is irrelevant. Clay v. Doherty, 608 F.Supp 295 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
The Sciuto court, among others, has stated that the right to a tribunal free from bias,
prejudice, or the appearance of partiality is based on the Due Process Clause, and not on
any statute. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1996). Recusal is not
intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge but rather to promote public
confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process, Liljeberg v. Health Services
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988); United States v. Balistrieri,
779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985); it is directed against the appearance of partiality. United
States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985).

The critical question before this Court is not the assessment of Judge James as
to his predisposition, his remarks, his biases, his prejudices, his claim of impartiality, but
what is the perception of objective, non-party persons to his predisposition, his remarks,
his biases, his prejudices, his claim of impartiality. In this respect, Judge James has
displayed an extreme appearance of partiality, and his predisposition, against EUGENE.

Judge James had entered into a long-term and continuing policy of preventing
EUGENE from obtaining a fair hearing before the Court

EUGENE AS A NON-REPRESENTED LITIGANT (4)

2. As a non-represented litigant, this Court had a responsibility to guarantee

EUGENE that he would be instructed/advised on what to do/expect and that he would
have proper access to the court (proper access has been defined to be an "adequate,
complete, effective, fair, full, meaningful, and timely access to the court"). EUGENE has
repeatedly reminded this Court of court rulings on this subject, but this Court has ignored
the court rulings and proceeded to deny, deprive, and overlook EUGENE's Rights. As
recently as January 5, 1996, the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion is which it stated that it
had reviewed the transcripts in a case involving another non-represented litigant, to be
certain that the judge had given instruction/advice to the litigant. In the Matter of
CLDC Management Corporation; Appeal of: Irene M. Geschke and Clarence O.
Geschke, sl. op., No. 94-3586, __ F.3d ___ (7th Cir., 1996).

Neither the Seventh Circuit, nor any other court, would not find even one
instance of where Judge James complied with the court's rulings on non-represented
litigants, should it decide to review the transcripts of each and every hearing before this
Court. It would instead find multiple instances where Judge James violated EUGENE's
legal and Constitutional Rights.

The failure of Judge James to comply fully with his responsibility towards
EUGENE, a non-represented party, is a violation of EUGENE's due process Rights.
United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1996). Not only would the failure of
Judge James to comply fully with his responsibility towards EUGENE, pursuant to case
law, be a violation of the First Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of
America, it would also give to a non-party of the proceeding an appearance of bias, an
appearance of prejudice, and an appearance of partiality by Judge James. The failure of
Judge James to comply fully with his responsibility towards EUGENE would disqualify
him from taking any action in this proceeding.

It has been held that where a judge violates a party's legal and/or constitutional
rights, the judge loses jurisdiction. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019
(1938); Article VI of the Constitution for the United States of America
 Judge James has violated, and continues to violate, EUGENE's legal, due
process, and Constitutional Rights; such violations have ousted Judge James from any
lawful authority in this matter.

VOID ORDERS/JUDGMENTS

3. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that void orders and/or void judgments are
void even before reversal.Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41
S.Ct. 116 (1920). Should a Court in 1998 hold that an Order issued in 1996 was void, it
was also void in 1996, when it was originally issued.

Void orders/judgments are legal nullities, and there-fore can be challenged at

any time; there is no statute of limitations which restricts a person from challenging the
lawful authority of any judge who issued the void order, an Order that by law does not
exist.

Since the void order/judgment is a nullity, they can be challenged and

expunged in any court in the nation, even in New York City or in El Paso, Illinois, in any
State or Federal Court. There is no requirement to challenge the void order within the
venue in which it was issued, since by law the void order does not exist. The natural
extension of an old Common Law principle that "a demurrer searches the record",
requires a review of the entire record.

Further, void orders/judgments can be repeatedly challenged, as re judicata

does not apply to them.

And interesting, to EUGENE's understanding, it is the only type of order that

can be vacated by a Court lower than the Court that issued the void order/judgment. Since
the void order/judgment has no legal existence, even the lowest Court has authority to
vacate it.

Since a void order/judgment has no legal existence, no person(s) have any

lawful authority to enforce them. In the current situation, should any person(s) enter upon
EUGENE's property without EUGENE's prior voluntary-given lawful written
authorization, the person(s) have engaged in criminal trespass. If the person(s) enter the
property in 1996 based on an order that is declared to be void in 1998, that person(s) has
engaged in criminal trespass of the property in 1996. Furthermore, immunity does not
apply to any person(s) involved in criminal conduct.

The purported Orders of Judge James, disqualified inter alia by his appearance
of partiality, are void. No judge has any authority to attempt to enforce them, and no
person(s) is engaging in any lawful purpose by attempting to enforce the void Order(s),
such as, but not limited to, entering upon EUGENE's property without EUGENE's
voluntary-given written permission, first obtained beforehand. Neither Judge James nor
the purported Chapter 7 Trustee, Lawrence Fisher, is acting within the law.
 A person is not restricted by the eight(8)/ten(10)-day requirement in
Bankruptcy Court, or by the thirty(30) day requirement of the District Court to challenge
any purported order of this court, since the purported Orders are a nullity and have no
legal force or effect. There is no time limit to challenge a void order, for there is no
statute of limitations to vacate a void order. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire
Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct. 997 (1943); Rule 60(b)(4), Rules of Civil Procedure; Skelly
Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App. 79, 87, 86 N.E.2d 875, 879 (1st
Dist. 1949). "Furthermore, a claim of fraud upon the court may be raised by a non-party."
Southerland v. Irons, 628 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1980), see Root Refining Co. v. Universal
Oil Products Co., 169 F.2d 514, 522-523 (3rd Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 912, 69
S.Ct. 481 (1949), and it may be raised at any time.

The Full Faith and Credit clause does not apply to void orders; but the Full
Faith and Credit clause does apply to an Order vacating a void order.

EUGENE has not given any person involved in any proceeding against
EUGENE any voluntary-given written permission to enter his property. Should any
person enter EUGENE's property without EUGENE's voluntary-given written
permission, that person would be in criminal trespass of EUGENE's property. (5)

CONCLUSION

Under prevailing law, when an affidavit has been filed by a non-party to a

proceeding charging Judge James with the appearance of partiality, Judge James has no
discretion on disqualifying himself from this action. Under law, he is disqualified. The
affidavit of January 7, 1994 charged Judge James with predetermination and the
appearance of partiality at the December 20, 1993 hearing. As Judge James was
disqualified by law as of December 20, 1993 or before, all of his Orders issued on or
since December 20, 1993 are void.

THEREFORE, EUGENE prays that Judge James

A. vacates all orders issued by Judge James on or since December 20, 1993.

B. vacates all orders issued by Judge James issued since Judge James gave the
first appearance of partiality.

C. recuses himself for his appearance of predetermination (predisposition) of

this case, for his appearance of partiality, for his appearance of bias, for his appearance of
prejudice, and/or for his deep-seated antagonism to EUGENE that has rendered fair
judgment impossible, as evidenced by EUGENE and the various observers who have
filed affidavits and declarations to sustain EUGENE's charges, pursuant to the above
cited case law.

Respectfully submitted,
________________________
Eugene W. Alpern, in pro per,
sui juris