Association de Agricultores vs.Talisay Silay Milling Co.,
L-24626 June 28, 1974
88 SCRA 294; February 19, 1979; Barredo, J.
Facts: On 22 June 1952, Republic Act 809 was enacted for the
purpose of addressing the necessity to increase the share of planters
and laborers in the income derived from the sugar industry. Said act
was to regulate the relations among the persons engaged in the sugar
industry. Under Section 1 thereof, it was provided that “in the
absence of written milling agreements between the majority of
planters and the millers of sugarcane in any milling district in the
Philippines, the unrefined sugar produced in that district from the
milling by any sugar central of the sugar cane of any sugarcane
planter or planter-owner, as well as all by-products and derivative
thereof, shall be divided between them as follows: 60% for the
planter and 40% for the central in any district the maximum actual
production of which is not more than 400,000 piculs..” The
Association de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay Inc. and six sugarcane
planters filed a petition to the Secretary of Labor, praying that the
latter (1) declare the applicability to the Talisay-Silay Mill District of
the sharing participation prescribed by RA 809 for every crop year
starting from 1952-1953; (2) adjudicated in favor of the planters and
their laborers in the account entitled “In trust for Talisay-Silay
Milling Co. Inc., and Department of Labor”; (3) order the Central to
account for any unsold quedans or the proceeds thereof which have
been deposited with the PNB in the trust account; (4) order the
Central to account for and pay jointly and severally to the planters
and their laborers the proceeds of the sugar representing the increased
participation for the 1954-1955 crop year plus legal interest in facor
of the planters computed on the basis of the average market price
during the month within which the sugar was sold. On the other hand,
the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. Inc. alleged that (1) RA 809 was
invalid and unconstitutional; (2) that even if it was valid, the planters
had written milling contracts with the Central at the time the said act
went into effect, and (3) the planters who entered into said contracts
did so voluntarily and those voluntary contracts may not be altered or
modified without infringing the constitutional guarantee on freedom
of contracts and non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether RA 809 would violate the non-impairment clause of
the Constitution and infringe the Constitutional guarantee on freedom
of contracts if applied to the Talisay-Silay Mill District.
Held: [No] RA 809 is a social justice and police power measure for
the promotion of labor conditions in sugar plantations; hence,
whatever rational degree of constraint it exerts on freedom of contract
and existing contractual obligation as is constitutionally permissible.
The said act was concerned and enacted as a social legislation
designed primarily to ameliorate the condition of the laborers in the
sugar plantation. Having in view its primary objective, to promote the
interests of the labor, it can never be possible that the State would be
bereft of constitutional authority to enact legislations of its kind. The
imperious mandate of the social justice ideal consecrated in our
fundamental laws, asserts its majesty, calling upon the courts to
accord utmost consideration to the spirit animating the act assailed,
not just for the sake of enforcing the explicit social justice provisions
of the article on “Declaration of Principles and State Policies”, but
more fundamentally, to serve the sacred cause of human dignity,
which is actually what lies at the core of those constitutional precepts
as it is also the decisive element always in the determination of any
controversy between capital and labor. RA 809, which provides for
bigger shares to the planters in the big milling districts than those in
the small milling districts, does not violate the equal protection clause
considering that the more a central produces, the bigger could be its
margin of profit which can be correspondingly cut for the purpose of
enlarging the share of the planters.
Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento
G.R. No.
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(PALEA), PHILIPPINE AIR LINES SUPERVISORS
ASSOCIATION (PALSA) and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Air Lines sought the reversal of the
order of respondent Court reinstating one Fidel Gotangco dismissed
by his employer, petitioner Philippine Air Lines, for having been
found guilty of the breach of trust and violation of the rules and
regulations of the company. So it was decreed, considering what was
felt to be the severity of dismissal. Petitioner, however, is firm and
unyielding in its insistence that this was an appropriate ease for
terminating employment. Petitioner Philippine Air Lines, presented
an evidence, an exhibit referring to the confiscation of a piece of lead
material from his person at one of the gates of the PAL Airfield
compound and a signed statement by him, taken at an investigation,
wherein he admitted his apprehension by a company security guard
with a lead material he intended to take home for his personal use. On
the whole, the evidence of respondent is uncontroverted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the the order of reinstatement of Fidel
Gotangco by the court was proper despite the fact that he "is guilty
of breach of trust and violation of the rules and regulations of his
employer."
HELD: Yes, the order was proper.
The whole controversy is centered around the right of the Court of
Industrial Relations to order the readmission of a laborer who, it is
admitted, had been found derelict in the performance of his duties
towards his employer. We concede that the right of an employer to
freely select or discharge his employees, is subject to regulation by
the State basically in the exercise of its paramount police power.
(Com. Act Nos. 103 and 213). But much as we should expand
beyond economic orthodoxy, we hold that an employer cannot legally
be compelled to continue with the employment of a person who
admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards his
employer, and whose continuance in the service of the latter is
patently inimical to his interests.'" 6 Its tone of certitude is
unwarranted. The very excerpt cited speaks of the paramount police
power as a limitation on the right of an employer to freely select or
discharge his employees. Moreover, while there was an admission
that misfeasance or malfeasance could be a ground for dismissal, the
last sentence thereof reads: "The law, in protecting the rights of the
laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the
employer." 7 Where, therefore, it could be shown that the result would
be neither oppressive nor self-destructive, it cannot be asserted
dogmatically that an outright termination, of employment is justified.
n the light of all the circumstances disclosed, particularly that it was a
first offense after seventeen years of service, reached the conclusion,
neither arbitrary nor oppressive, that dismissal was too severe a
penalty, this Court should not view the matter differently.
From the facts as found by respondent Court accepted by petitioner,
the offense was "breach of trust and violation of the rules and
regulations of the company." A lead material of negligible size, in the
opinion of respondent Court, its measurement being eight inches by
ten inches, with thickness of one-half inch, not shown to be of any
use to the company, hardly of any pecuniary worth, It would be too
harsh an appraisal to view it as constituting theft.
National Service Corp. vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122
Facts: The National Service Corporation (NASECO) hired Eugenia
Credo as a lady guard on 18 July 1975. Later, she was
administratively charged by NASECO’s Manager of Finance
stemming from her non-compliance with the latter’s memorandum.
When she was called to explain her side, she showed resentment in a
scandalous manner and uttering remarks of disrespect in the presence
of her co-employees. Thereafter, Credo was placed on forced leave
status for 15 days and while on leave, NASECO’s Committee on
Personnel Affairs recommended Credo’s termination. On 25
November 1983, due to her failure to explain her side on the charges,
Credo was handed a notice of termination effective 1 December
1983. Credo then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on 6
December 1983 with the Ministry of Labor and Employment. Credo
contended that there was absence of just or authorized cause for the
dismissal and there was a lack of opportunity to be heard.
Issue: Whether Credo was legally dismissed according to the
Constitutional and Labor Code provisions on protection to labor.
Held: [No] NASECO did not comply with the guidelines in effecting
Credo’s dismissal. Credo was not given ample opportunity to be
heard and to defend herself. Rule XIV, Book V of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code mandates that the employer
must furnish an employee sought to be dismissed two (2) written
notices of dismissal before a termination of employment can be
legally effected. These are the notice which apprises the employee of
the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and
the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer’s
decision to dismiss him. The said guidelines are in consonance with
the express provisions of law on protection to labor 18 (which
encompasses the right to security of tenure) and the broader dictates
of procedural due process necessarily mandate that notice of the
employer’s decision to dismiss an employee, with reasons therefor,
can only be issued after the employer has afforded the employee
concerned ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
PLDT vs. NLRC, 164 SCRA 671
Facts: Marilyn Abucay, a traffic operator of the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), was accused by two (2)
complainants of having demanded and received from the the total
amount of P3,800 in consideration of her promise to facilitate
approval of their applications for telephone installation. Investigated
and heard, she was found guilty as charged and accordingly separated
from the service. She went tot he Ministry of Labor and Employment
claiming she had been illegally removed. After the evidence and
arguments of the parties were considered, the company was sustained
and the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. The Labor
Arbiter’s decision, however, awarded financial assistance to Abucay
equivalent to one month of pay for every year of service. Both
Abucay and PLDT appealed to the National Labor Relations Borad,
which upheld the decision in toto. PLDT filed a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the petition,
affirming the decision of the Board except for the grant of separtation
pay in the form of financial assistance, which was disallowed.
Issue: Whether Abucay is entitled to financial assistance / separation
pay even if she was removed from employment for just case, on the
basis of equity and compassion and due to previous decisions of the
Supreme Court.
Held: The rule embodied in the Labor Code is that a person
dismissed for cause (as defined therein) is not entitled to separation
pay. The case of Firestone Tire vs. Lariosa, Soco vs. Mercantile
Corporation of Davao, Filipino Inc. vs. NLRC, and others, constitute
Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento
the exception, based upon considertations of equity. Equity has been
defined as justice outside law, being ethical rather than jural and
belonging to the sphere of morals than of law. Hence, it cannot
prevail against the expressed provision of the labor laws allowing
dismissal of employees for cause and without any provision for
separation pay. Still, where the exception has been applied, the
justification for the grant of separation pay and the amount or rate of
such award. has not been consistent. The Court, thus, made
distinctions. Where it comes to such valid but not iniquitous causes as
failure to comply with work standards, the grant of separation pay to
the dismissed employee may be both just and compassionate,
particularly if he has worked for some time with the company. Under
such circumstances, the award to the employee of separation pay
would be sustainable under the social justice policy even if the
separation is for cause. Separation pay shall be allowed as a measure
of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly
dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting
on his moral character. A contrary rule would have the effect of
rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense.
The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance
wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged.
B.F. GOODRICH PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. B.F. GOODRICH
(MARIKINA FACTORY) CONFIDENTIAL & SALARIED
EMPLOYEES UNION-NATU, B.F. GOODRICH (MAKATI
OFFICE) CONFIDENTIAL & SALARIED EMPLOYEES
UNION-NATU, and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
49 SCRA 532
FERNANDO; February 28, 1973
Facts:
The Goodrich Unions were seeking to be recognized as the
bargaining agent of BF Goodrich Phils’ employees so that there could
negotiations for a collective contract. BF Goodrich countered this by
filing for two petitions for certification election with the CIR. Strike
notices were sent to the company by the union demanding
recognition and soon after a strike was actually held. The company
then filed a case of illegal strike and unfair labor practice against the
unions.
ISSUE:
WON the determination of an unfair labor practice case, brought
against unions, must precede the holding of a certification election
HELD: No.
REASONING:
- If under the circumstances disclosed, management is allowed to
have its way, the result might be to dilute or fritter away the
strength of an organization bent on a more zealous defense of
labor's prerogatives.
- This is not to say that management is to be precluded from filing
an unfair labor practice case. It is merely to stress that such a
suit should not be allowed to lend itself as a means, whether
intended or not, to prevent a truly free expression of the will of
the labor group as to the organization that will represent it.
- There is no valid reason then for the postponement sought. This is
one instance that calls for the application of the maxim, lex
dilationes semper exhorret. (The law abhors delays.)
- The law clearly contemplates all the employees, not only some of
them, to take part in the certification election. (Some of the
employees could possibly lose such status, by virtue of a
pending unfair labor practice case, if such case is to be resolved
first before the election.)
- Another reason (re: no point in the postponement of said election)
is that even if the company wins in the pending case, it does not
mean that the employees involved automatically would lose
their jobs making them ineligible to participate in the cert.
election. (Ergo the respondent court decided in the negative.)
Besides, it was said in General Maritime Stevedores' Union v. South
Sea Shipping Line: the question of whether or not a certification
election shall be held "may well be left to the sound discretion of the
Court of Industrial Relations, considering the conditions involved in
the case…."
FEATI UNIVERSITY V BAUTISTA
18 SCRA 1191
ZALDIVAR; December 27, 1966
NATURE
Consolidated cases/petitions for certiorari, prohibition w/ writ of
preliminary injunction
FACTS:
-Jan 14, 1963: the President of the Faculty Club wrote to the
President of the University a letter informing the latter of the
organization of the Faculty Club as a labor union, duly registered
with the Bureau of Labor Relations
-Jan 22, 1963: another letter was sent, to which was attached a list of
demands consisting of 26 items, and asking the President of the
University to answer within ten days from date of receipt thereof.
-The University questioned the right of the Faculty Club to be the
exclusive representative of the majority of the employees and asked
proof that the Faculty Club had been designated or selected as
exclusive representative by the vote of the majority of said
employees.
-Feb 1, 1963: the Faculty Club filed with the Bureau of Labor
Relations a notice of strike alleging as reason therefore the refusal of
the University to bargain collectively with the representative of the
faculty members.
-Feb 18, 1963: the members of the Faculty Club went on strike and
established picket lines in the premises of the University, thereby
disrupting the schedule of classes.
-March 1, 1963: the Faculty Club filed Case No. 3666-ULP for unfair
labor practice against the University, but which was later dismissed
(on April 2, 1963 after Case 41-IPA was certified to the CIR).
-March 7, 1963: a petition for certification election, Case No. 1183-
MC, was filed by the Faculty Club in the CIR
ISSUES:
1. WON the definition of employer in RA875 covers an educational
institution like Feati University
2. WON the members of the Faculty Club are independent
contractors (If they are, then they are not employees within the
purview of the said Act.)
HELD:
1. YES. It is true that the SC has ruled that certain educational
institutions and other juridical entities are beyond the purview of
RA875 in the sense that the CIR has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of ULP charges against them, but the principal reason in
ruling in those cases is that those entities are not organized,
maintained and operated for profit and do not declare dividends to
stockholders.
-In the decisions in the cases of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the
University of San Agustin, the UST, and LaConsolacion College, this
Court was not unanimous in the view that the Industrial Peace Act
(Republic Act No. 875) is not applicable to charitable, or non-profit
Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento
organizations which include educational institutions not operated for
profit. There are members of this Court who hold the view that the
Industrial Peace Act would apply also to non-profit organizations or
entities, the only exception being the Government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, in so far as
governmental functions are concerned. However, in the Far Eastern
University case this Court is unanimous in supporting the view that
an educational institution that is operated for profit comes within the
scope of the Industrial Peace Act. We consider it a settled doctrine of
this Court, therefore, that the Industrial Peace Act is applicable to any
organization or entity whatever may be its purpose when it was
created.
-TEST: Does the University operate as an educational institution for
profit? Does it declare dividends for its stockholders? If it does not, it
must be declared beyond the purview of Republic Act No. 875; but if
it does, Republic Act No. 875 must apply to it. In this case, Feati
University itself admits that it has declared dividends. CIR also found
that the University is not for strictly educational purposes and that "It
realizes profits and parts of such earning is distributed as dividends to
private stockholders or individuals. Under this circumstance, and in
consonance with the rulings in the decisions of this Court, above
cited, it is obvious that Republic Act No. 875 is applicable to herein
petitioner Feati University.
-RA 875, Sec 2(c): The term employer includes any person acting in
the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not
include any labor organization (otherwise than when acting as an
employer) or any one acting in the capacity or agent of such labor
organization.
-It will be noted that in defining the term "employer" the Act uses the
word "includes" and not the word "means". In using the word
"includes" and not "means", Congress did not intend to give a
complete definition of "employer", but rather that such definition
should be complementary to what is commonly understood as
employer. Congress intended the term to be understood in a broad
meaning because, firstly, the statutory definition includes not only "a
principal employer but also a person acting in the interest of the
employer"; and, secondly, the Act itself specifically enumerated
those who are not included in the term "employer", namely: (1) a
labor organization (otherwise than when acting as an employer), (2)
anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor
organization [Sec. 2(c)], and (3) the Government and any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof insofar as the right to strike for
the purpose of securing changes or modifications in the terms and
conditions of employment is concerned (Section 11). Among these
statutory exemptions, educational institutions are not included; hence,
they can be included in the term "employer". This Court, however,
has ruled that those educational institutions that are not operated for
profit are not within the purview of Republic Act No. 875.
-RA 875 does not give a comprehensive but only a complementary
definition of the term "employer". The term encompasses those that
are in ordinary parlance "employers." What is commonly meant by
"employer"? The term "employer" has been given several
acceptations. The lexical definition is "one who employs; one who
uses; one who engages or keeps in service;" and "to employ" is "to
provide work and pay for; to engage one's service; to hire." [see full
case for other definitions of the word employer as provided for by the
Workmen's Compensation Act, the Minimum Wage Law, the Social
Security Act, etc]
-Jurisprudence: An employer is one who employs the services of
others; one for whom employees work and who pays their wages or
salaries (Black Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 618).
-Under none of these definitions may the University be excluded. The
University engaged the services of the professors, provided them
work, and paid them compensation or salary for their services. Even
if the University may be considered as a lessee of services under a
contract between it and the members of its Faculty, still it is included
in the term "employer". "Running through the word `employ' is the
thought that there has been an agreement on the part of one person to
perform a certain service in return for compensation to be paid by an
employer.
2. NO.
-RA 875, Section 2 (d): The term "employee" shall include any
employee and shall not be limited to the “employee” of a particular
employer unless the act explicitly states otherwise and shall include
any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair
labor practice and who has not obtained any other substantially
equivalent and regular employment.
-This definition, by the use of the term “include” is again
complementary. This Court has defined the term "employer" as "one
who employs the services of others; one for whom employees work
and who pays their wages or salaries. Correlatively, an employee
must be one who is engaged in the service of another; who performs
services for another; who works for salary or wages.
-It is admitted by the University that the striking professors and/or
instructors are under contract to teach particular courses and that they
are paid for their services. They are, therefore, employees of the
University.
-The contention of the University that the professors and/or
instructors are independent contractors, because the University does
not exercise control over their work, is likewise untenable. This Court
takes judicial notice that a university controls the work of the
members of its faculty; that a university prescribes the courses or
subjects that professors teach, and when and where to teach; that the
professors' work is characterized by regularity and continuity for a
fixed duration; that professors are compensated for their services by
wages and salaries, rather than by profits; that the professors and/or
instructors cannot substitute others to do their work without the
consent of the university; and that the professors can be laid off if
their work is found not satisfactory. All these indicate that the
university has control over their work; and professors are, therefore,
employees and not independent contractors.
-Moreover, even if university professors are considered independent
contractors, still they would be covered by RA 875. This law
modelled after the Wagner Act, or the National Labor Relations Act,
of the United States, did not exclude "independent contractors" from
the orbit of "employees". It was in the subsequent legislation the
Labor Management Relation Act (Taft-Harley Act) that "independent
contractors" together with agricultural laborers, individuals in
domestic service of the home, supervisors, and others were excluded.
Petition for certiorari & prohibition with preliminary injunction
dismissed. Writs prayed for therein denied. Writ of preliminary
injunction dissolved. Costs against Feati University.
Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento
Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines vs. Court of
Industrial Relations (1977)
Facts:
The ALPAP is the legitimate labor organization tasked to
be the representative of pilots with negotiating collective bargaining
agreements with their respective airline employers. A labor dispute
between the ALPAP and PAL ensued which led to the mass
resignation and retirement of the former’s members who were
employed by the latter. Capt. Felix Gaston was elected as ALPAP’s
President by a majority vote of 180 out of 270 members. On the other
hand, a day after Gaston’s election, Capt. Ben Hur Gomez was
elected by member pilots who did not resign nor resign from PAL as
their President. Gomez was only elected by 45 members. Gomez
prays that he be allowed to represent ALPAP because the pilots who
resigned/retired ceased to be employees of PAL. Thus, his group is
entitled to name, office and funds of the association.
Issue:
W/N members of a legitimate labor organization are limited
to employees of a particular employer?
Held:
No. This Court cannot likewise subscribe to the restrictive
interpretation made by the court below of the term "labor
organization," which Section 2(e) of R.A. 875 defines as any union or
association of employees which exist, in whole or in part, for the
purpose of the collective bargaining or dealing with employers
concerning terms and conditions of employment." The absence of the
condition which the court below would attach to the statutory concept
of a labor organization, as being limited to the employees of
particular employer, is quite evident from the law. The emphasis of
Industrial Peace Act is clearly on the purposes for which a union or
association of employees established rather than that membership
therein should be limited only to the employees of a particular
employer. Trite to say, under Section 2(h) of R.A 875
"representative" is define as including "a legitimate labor
organization or any officer or agent of such organization, whether or
not employed by the employer or employee whom he represents." It
cannot be overemphasized likewise that labor dispute can exist
"regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employer and employee. (Section 2(j), R.a. 875). A labor union,
however, may authorize a segment thereof to bargain collectively
with the employer and in the exercise of such authority to have
custody of the union’s funds, office and name. Having given Gomez
the authority to enter and conclude bargaining contracts with PAL, it
would be unreasonable to disallow Gomeza certain use of the office,
funds and name of ALPAP when such use is necessary or would be
required to enable ALPAP to exercise in a proper manner, its
delegated authority to bargain collectively with PAL.
Note: The SC also considered that the election of Gomez was illegal.
Lopez Sugar Corp. vs. Sec. of Labor (1995)
Facts:
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR
INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES-TUCP (NACUSIP-TUCP) filed
a petition for direct certification or for certification election to
determine the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative
of the supervisory employees of herein petitioner, Lopez Sugar
Corporation ("LSC"), at its sugar central in Fabrica, Sagay, Negros
Occidental. It avers in this petition that it was a legitimate national
labor organization; that LSC was employing 55 supervisory
employees, the majority of whom were members of the union; that no
other labor organization was claiming membership over the
supervisory employees; that there was no existing collective
bargaining agreement covering said employees; and that there was no
legal impediment either to a direct certification of NACUSIP-TUCP
or to the holding of a certification election. It submitted a charter
certificate.
LSC contended, among other things, that the petition was bereft of
any legal or factual basis; that the petition was nothing more than a
useless scrap of paper designed to harass the company; and that its
employees above the rank-and-file category were in truth unaware of
the petition.
The Commercial and Agro-Industrial Labor Organization
("CAILO"), a registered labor organization also claiming to count
substantial membership among the LSC supervisory employees,
moved to intervene. The motion was granted. One Carlos S. Gevero,
asserting a right to represent the "supervisors of LSC," filed a motion
to dismiss the petition for lack of interest on the part of the
supervisory employees.
The Med-Arbiter granted the petition for direct certification because
of the non-appearance of NACUSIP-TUCP and CAILO on two
hearing dates. He ruled that under Article 257 of the Labor Code, as
amended, the Med-Arbiter was left with no option but to order the
conduct of a certification election immediately upon the filing of the
petition. The Sec. of Labor denied the appeal of LSC ruling that the
holding by the Med-Arbiter of a certification election is mandatory
under Article 257 of the Labor Code. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
W/N the dismissal of the appeal was proper.
Held:
No. Indeed, the law did not reduce the Med-Arbiter to an
automaton which can instantly be set to impulse by the mere filing of
a petition for certification election. He is still tasked to satisfy himself
that all the conditions of the law are met, and among the legal
requirements is that the petitioning union must be a legitimate labor
organization in good standing.
The petition for certification election, in the case at bench, was filed
by the NACUSIP-TUCP, a national labor organization duly
registered with the DOLE render Registration Certificate No. FED-
402-6390-IP. The legitimate status of NACUSIP-TUCP might be
conceded; being merely, however, an agent for the local organization
(the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter),
the federation's bona fide status alone would not suffice. The local
chapter, as its principal, should also be a legitimate labor organization
in good standing. Since the "procedure governing the reporting of
independently registered unions" refers to the certification and
attestation requirements contained in Article 235, paragraph 2, it
follows that the constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of
accounts submitted by the local and chapter must likewise comply
with these requirements. The same rationale for requiring the
submission of duly subscribed documents upon union registration
exists in the case of union affiliation. The only document extant on
record to establish the legitimacy of the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez
Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter is a charter certificate and nothing
else. The instant petition, at least for now, must thus be GRANTED.
Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento
San Miguel Corp. Employees Union vs. Bersamira
Facts:
SMC entered into contracts with Lipercon and D’rite which are
independent contractors. It was expressed in their contract that there
was to be no employer-employee relationship between the contractors
and/or its workers, on the one hand, and SMC on the other.
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-
PTWGO(authorize labor union) advised Sanmig that some Lipercon
and D'Rite workers had signed up for union membership and sought
the regularization of their employment with SMC. Failing to obtain a
favourable response from Sanmig, the union filed a notice of strike.
Despite Conciliatory meetings, pickets were staged by Lipercon and
D'Rite workers in various SMC plants and offices. SMC filed a
complaint for damages and injunction to enjoin the union from
representing the Lipercon and D’rite workers, calling or holding of a
strike etc .The union filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction because it was a labor dispute. The trial
court found the complaint sufficient in form and substance and issued
an injunction to put a stop to the acts complained of. The trial court
reasoned that there was no employer-employee relationship that
exists between the parties which cancelled out a labor dispute.
Issue:
W/N a labor dispute can exist even without an employer-
employee relationship?
Held:
Yes. A "labor dispute" as defined in Article 212 (1) of the
Labor Code includes "any controversy or matter concerning terms
and conditions of employment or the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging
the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee."
While it is SanMig's submission that no employer-employee
relationship exists between itself, on the one hand, and the
contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite on the other, a labor
dispute can nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relationship of employer and employee"
(Article 212 [1], Labor Code, supra) provided the controversy
concerns, among others, the terms and conditions of employment or a
"change" or "arrangement" thereof (ibid). Put differently, and as
defined by law, the existence of a labor dispute is not negative by the
fact that the plaintiffs and defendants do not stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee.
That a labor dispute, as defined by the law, does exist herein is
evident. At bottom, what the Union seeks is to regularize the status of
the employees contracted by Lipercon and D'Rite in effect, that they
be absorbed into the working unit of SanMig. This matter definitely
dwells on the working relationship between said employees vis-a-vis
SanMig. Terms, tenure and conditions of their employment and the
arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringing the matter
within the purview of a labor dispute.
NESTLE PHILS., INC. V NLRC (NUÑEZ)
195 SCRA 340
GRIÑO-AQUINO; March 18, 1991
FACTS
- The private respondents, who were employed by Nestlé either as
sales representatives or medical representatives, availed of the
petitioner's car loan policy. Under that policy, the company advances
the purchase price of a car to be paid back by the employee through
monthly deductions from his salary, the company retaining the
ownership of the motor vehicle until it shall have been fully paid for.
- After having participated in an illegal strike, the private respondents
were dismissed from service. Nestlé directed the private respondents
to either settle the remaining balance of the cost of their respective
cars, or return them to the company for proper disposition.
- Private respondents failed and refused to avail of either option, so
the company filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati a civil suit to
recover possession of the cars. The private respondents sought a
temporary restraining order in the NLRC to stop the company from
cancelling their car loans and collecting their monthly amortizations.
The NLRC, en banc, granted their petition for injunction.
- The company filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied
for tardiness. Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that the
NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it issued a labor injunction without legal basis and
in the absence of any labor dispute related to the same.
ISSUE
WON there is a labor dispute between the petitioner and the private
respondents
HELD
NO
Ratio Paragraph (1) of Article 212 of the Labor Code defines a labor
dispute as follows:
Gold City Integrated Port Services vs. NLRC
245 SCRA 627
Facts: Early in the morning of April 30, 1985, employees of Gold
City Integrated Port Services Inc, stopped working and gathered in a
mass action to express their grievances regarding wages, thirteenth
month pay and hazard pay. On the same morning, the strikers filed
individual notices of strike with the then Ministry of Labor and
Employment. With the failure of conciliation conferences between
the company (Gold City Integrated port Services, Inc., INPORT, for
short) and the strikers, the former (INPORT) filed a complaint before
the Labor Arbiter for Illegal Strike with prayer for a restraining
order/preliminary injunction. The NLRC issued a temporary
restraining order which prompted the strikers to return to work.
The strike staged by the said workers was found by the Labor Arbiter
to be illegal for not complying with the requirements in Article 246
of the Labor Code. The NLRC affirmed with the modification the
Arbiter’s decision. It held that the concerted action by the workers
was more of a “protest action” than a strike. However, the
Commission still affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision which
declared the strike illegal.
Issue:Whether or not the mass action of the employees is the result of
labor dispute between the parties involved.
Held: A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning
terms or condition or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of
employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employers and employees. Private respondents
and their co-workers stopped working and held the mass action on
April 30, 1985 to press for their wages and other benefits. What
transpired then was clearly a strike, for the cessation of work by
concerted action resulted from labor dispute.

"(1) 'Labor dispute' includes any controversy or matters concerning

terms or conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employer and employee."

Nestlé’s demand for payment of the private respondents'

amortizations on their car loans, or, in the alternative, the return of
the cars to the company, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves
debtor-creditor relations, rather than employee-employer relations.

Reasoning Whether or not the private respondents remain as

employees of the petitioner, there is no escape from their obligation
to pay their outstanding accountabilities to the petitioner; and if they
cannot afford it, to return the cars assigned to them. The options
given to the private respondents are civil in nature arising from
contractual obligations. There is no labor aspect involved in the
enforcement of those obligations. The NLRC gravely abused its
discretion and exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing the writ of
injunction to stop the company from enforcing the civil obligation of
the private respondents under the car loan agreements and from
protecting its interest in the cars which, by the terms of those
agreements, belong to it (the company) until their purchase price
shall have been fully paid by the employee. The terms of the car loan
agreements are not in issue in the labor case. The rights and
obligations of the parties under those contracts may be enforced by a
separate civil action in the regular courts, not in the NLRC.

Petition is granted.

Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento
RCPI vs. PCEEWF
65 SCRA 82;July 15, 1975
Barredo
Facts:
-In a labor dispute involving RCPI and RCPI employees' union where
union members were dismissed following a strike due to their
defiance of a return to work order issued by the Industrial Court, this
Court declared the dismissal illegal and ordered immediate
reinstatement of the illegally dismissed employees.
-RCPIEU filed a petition for a modified judgment to include an
award of backwages to the employees concerned in addition to
reinstatement.
-RCPI opposed upon the ground that the issue of payment of
backwages was neither raised in nor passed upon by the Industrial
Court and not even touched in the previous pleadings of the
respondents. Additionally, the matter is being looked into by National
Relations Board, hence it is not necessary for this Court to take it up.
Issue :
WON the Court may modify its judgment to include an award of
backwages
Held:
-The Industrial Court had no discretion in the matter for there was no
issue of fault it had to decide. If it overlooked the award, that was
plain error which is within the Court's prerogative to correct motu
propio, as it is done in appeals by writ of error (sec. 7 rule 51).
-Such award is in order, for it is a logical and inescapable
consequence of the order of reinstatement that one is actually
incomplete without the other.
-Not ruling on this point now to leave it for action by the National
Labor Relations Board and thereby give rise to another possible
appeal in this Court is to unnecessarily lengthen the process for the
respondents to get what is rightfully due them, contrary to the
Constitutional duty to give protection to labor.
Motion of respondent RCPIEU for modification of judgment granted.
Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento
G.R. No. L-48347 October 3, 1978
SCOUT RAMON V. ALBANO MEMORIAL COLLEGE,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. CARMELO C. NORIEL, and FEDERATION OF FREE
WORKERS (Scout Ramon V. Albano Memorial College
Chapter), respondents.
FERNANDO, Acting C.J.:
Facts: Prviate respondent union (FFW: Scout Ramon V. Albano
Memorial College Chapter) filed for certification election among the
college’s workers to decide on whether or not to form a union,
collecting 67 signatures out of a workforce of 200. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss based on respondent’s failure to meet the 30%
consent requirement of total employees, which was 75 as the
employer claimed there were actually 250 employees. In response
FFW submitted an additional 22 signatures to meet this requirement.
Petitioner filed its opposition to the respondent, arguing
that the 30% requirement must be met at the time of filing which the
Med-Arbiter took cognizance of and dismissed respondent’s petition.
They in turn appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations (public
respondent) which granted their motion for certification election 20
days from the receipt of his decision. Petitioner then moved for
reconsideration and later appeal with the Secretary of Labor to no
avail. Hence the present petition.
Issue: Notwithstanding the failure of private respondent to produce
signatures of 30% of the total employees of the college may the
Bureau of Labor Relations still order the holding of a certification
election?
Held: Petition lacks merit. Existing doctrine based on preceding
jurisprudence, particularly the Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions decision, recognized the authority of the BLR, at its
discretion, to conduct certification elections when petitioned despite
the failure of the petitioning party to meet the 30% requirement.
Hence petitioner’s argument stands infirm especially considering that
the respondent later made up the deficiency by submitting additional
signatures.
Furthermore the court emphasized the importance of the certification
election in the collective bargaining process that, “It is a fundamental
postulate that the will of the majority given expression in an honest
election with freedom on the part of the voters to make their choice,
is controlling. No better device can assure the institution of industrial
democracy with the two parties to a business enterprise, management
and labor, establishing a regime of self-rule. That is to accord respect
to the policy of the Labor Code, indisputably partial to the holding of
a certification election so as to arrive in a manner definitive and
certain concerning the choice of the labor organization to represent
the workers in a collective bargaining unit.”
Concurrently the court also noted the dubious nature of the
petitioner’s motion for dismissal considering that it was filed by one
of the adversarial parties in the collective bargaining process adding,
“Sound policy dictates that as much as possible, management is to
maintain a strictly hands-off policy. For if it does not, it may lend
itself to the legitimate suspicion that it is partial to one of the
contending unions. That is repugnant to the concept of collective
bargaining. That is against the letter and spirit of welfare legislation
intended to protect labor and to promote social justice. The judiciary
then should be the last to look with tolerance at such efforts of an
employer to take part in the process leading to the free and
untrammeled choice of the exclusive bargaining representative of the
workers.”
G.R. No. L-54334 January 22, 1986
KIOK LOY, doing business under the name and style SWEDEN
ICE CREAM PLANT, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) and
PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA (KILUSAN),
respondents.
CUEVAS, J.:
Facts: The present petition is for certiorari to annul public
respondent’s (NLRC) previous ruling in favor of private respondent
(KILUSAN) which found the petitioner (Sweden Ice Cream Plant)
guilty of unfair labor practice for its unjustified refusal to bargain in
violation of Article 249 paragraph G of the Labor Code and further
declared that the draft proposal of the respondent union for a
collective bargaining agreement was to govern between employees
and management.
Prior to this petition, respondent union, after having been duly
certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the petitioner’s
employees furnished the company with draft proposals for a
collective bargaining agreement and solicited counter proposals on
the matter. However petitioner refused to engage the respondents in
any dialogue to a protracted period of time hence the CBA could not
be enacted. Left with no recourse, respondent union served a notice
to strike, entering into the 30-day statutory cooling off period after
which they submitted to compulsory arbitration by the NLRC. Again
petitioner company was unresponsive during negotiations, contriving
several excuses to delay or derail the proceedings when finally the
labor arbiter, after the failure of the company representative to
appear, declared that the company had waived its right to present
further evidence and then promulgated the presently assailed
decision.
Issue: Whether the petitioner’s right to procedural due process had
been violated? Was the petitioner company guilty of unfair labor
practice?
Held: The court sustains the assailed ruling of the NLRC that found
the petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice for its refusal to respond
to respondent union’s entreaties to negotiate a collective bargaining
agreement which had already been set in motion under the following
preconditions “(1) possession of the status of majority representation
of the employees' representative in accordance with any of the means
of selection or designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2) proof
of majority representation; and (3) a demand to bargain under Article
251of the New Labor Code.”
In the case at bar, “It has been indubitably established that (1)
respondent Union was a duly certified bargaining agent; (2) it made a
definite request to bargain, accompanied with a copy of the proposed
Collective Bargaining Agreement, to the Company not only once but
twice which were left unanswered and unacted upon; and (3) the
Company made no counter proposal whatsoever all of which
conclusively indicate lack of a sincere desire to negotiate.”
Furthermore throughout the entire arbitration process, by its frequent
requests for postponement, petitioner company has displayed
behavior that is in derogation of the policy enshrined in the Labor
Code which is aimed at expediting economic disputes thus the Labor
Arbiter cannot be faulted as violating procedural due process for
denying petitioner’s last motion for postponement.
Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento
G.R. No. 93983 June 29, 1992
DAVAO INTEGRATED PORT AND STEVEDORING
SERVICES CORPORATION, Petitioner, chanrobles virtual law
library
vs.
ALFREDO C. OLVIDA IN HIS CAPACITY AS VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATOR, AND THE ASSOCIATION OF TRADE
UNIONS (ATU-TUCP)., Respondents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:p
FACTS
The DAVAO INTEGRATED PORT AND
STEVEDORING SERVICES CORPORATION filed a petition
for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order impugns the Decision dated May 19, 1990 of the Voluntary
Arbitrator, Alfredo C. Olvida. The controversy centers on the
interpretation of two provisions of the five-year Collective
Bargaining Agreement (effective April 15, 1989 up to April 14,
1994) between the petitioner, Davao Integrated Port and Stevedoring
Services Corporation (or "DIPSSC"), and the respondent, Association
of Trade Unions [ATU-TUCP] (the Union, for short). Those
provisions are:
1. ARTICLE VIII - SICK, VACATION AND EMERGENCY LEAVES.
Sec. 4 - Emergency Leaves. The Company agrees to grant a
maximum or six (6) days Emergency Leave with pay per calendar
year to all regular field workers, covered by this agreement who have
rendered at least six months of service (including overtime) per
calendar year, are members of the Regular Labor Pool, upon prior
approval by the company. Said Emergency Leave is not cumulative
(sic) nor commutable." (pp. 46-47, Rollo; Emphasis supplied.)
ARTICLE XVII - SPECIAL PROVISIONS.
Sec. 4 - Union Education and Training Fund. The Company agrees to
contribute twelve thousand (P12,000.00) pesos per year to the Union
Education and Training Fund. (p. 48, Rollo.)
According to petitioner Assistant General Manager Benjamin Marzo,
insisted that the above provisions are to be interpreted as:
1. Under Article VIII, Section 4 (Emergency Leave) - that before the
intermittent field workers who are members of the Regular Labor
Pool can avail of the six (6) days Emergency Leave provided in this
provision, the workers must have rendered at least six months of
service per calendar year regardless of their employment status (i.e.,
regular or probationary). Thus, all regular (non-intermittent) field
workers, who belong to the Regular Labor Pool must have rendered
at least six months of service per calendar year to be entitled to the
six days Emergency Leave Pay. Petitioner pointed out that the phrase
"per calendar year" is used twice in Section 4, the first of which
modifies the word "pay" and the second modifies the phrase "who or
rendered at least six months of service." (pp. 130-131.) The
entitlement and enjoyment of the emergency leave must be strictly
availed in the calendar year on which the six months service was
rendered. law library
2. Under Article XVII, Section 4 (Union Education and Training
Fund) - petitioner required that the Union should first prepare and
submit a seminar program before it can avail of the Education and
Training Fund of P12,000.00 per annum.
After due hearing, respondent arbitrator rendered a decision on
interpretations of Article VIII, Section 4 and Article XVII, Section 4,
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement different to the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the respondent arbitrator is correct on its
interpretation of the provision in the said CBA.
HELD:
The Supreme Court agrees to the petitioner contention. The Court
finds the petitioner's interpretation of Section 4, Article VIII
(emergency leave) more logical than the Arbitrator's and the Union's.
The provision of the CBA is clear: (1) the employee must be a
member of the Regular Labor Pool; (2) he is entitled to only six (6)
days emergency leave with pay per calendar year; and (3) he must
have rendered service for at least six (6) months during the year when
he took his emergency leave. The emergency leave may be staggered
or it may last for any number of days as emergencies arise but the
employee is entitled only to six (6) days of emergency leave "with
pay" per year. Since the emergency leave is allowed to enable the
employee to attend to an emergency in his family or household, it
may be taken at any time during the calendar year but he must render
at least six months service for that year to be entitled to collect his
wages for the six (6) days of his emergency leave. Since emergencies
are unexpected and unscheduled happenings, it would be absurd to
require the employee to render six (6) months service before being
entitled to take a six-day emergency leave with pay for it would mean
that no emergency leave can be taken by an employee during the first
six months of a calendar year. law library
With regard to the provision on Union Education and Training Fund
in Section 4, Article XVII of the CBA, the petitioner's requirement
that the Union submit a seminar program for each calendar year
before it may claim the company's P12,000 yearly donation to the
fund, is not warranted by the terms of the CBA. The Arbitrator did
not abuse his discretion in ruling that the respondent company should
comply with its obligation to contribute to the Union Education and
Training Fund the amount of Twelve Thousand (P12,000.00) pesos
per year by paying said amount to the Union at the beginning of each
and every year, or contributing P1,000.00 at the end of each and
every month during the lifetime or the CBA, at the option of the
company. As correctly observed by the Arbitrator, the employer's
demand for the submission of a seminar program "is foreign to the
language of the contract" with the union.ch
G.R. No. L-49046 January 26, 1988
SATURNO A. VICTORIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, DEPUTY MINISTER, and FAR
EAST BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC., respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
Facts: Complainant Saturno Victoria is the president of the Far East
Broadcasting Company Employees Union. After registering their
association with the then Department of Labor, they demanded
recognition of said association by the company but the latter refused
on the ground that being a non-profit, non-stock, non-commercial and
religious corporation, it is not covered by Republic Act 875,
otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act, the labor law enforced
at that time. On September 8, 1972, the said union declared a strike
against respondent company. On September 11, 1972, respondent
filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Civil Case No. 750-
V, for the issuance of an injunction and a prayer that the strike be
declared illegal.
On October 24, 1972, complainant together with the other strikers
filed with the ad hoc National Labor Relations Commission Case
Nos. 0021 and 0285 for reinstatement. The Arbitrator rendered a
decision in said case on December 28, 1972, wherein he ordered
Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento
respondent to reinstate complainants without prejudice to whatever
decision the Court of First Instance may promulgate on Civil Case
No. 750-V and to the requirements the existing order may need of
people working with the mass media of communications."
Since said decision was affirmed by the NLRC, the Secretary of
Labor, and the Office of the President of the Philippines,
complainants were reinstated pursuant thereto.
In a Decision dated April 23, 1975, in Civil Case No. 750-V,
promulgated by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, the strike
staged by herein complainant and the other strikers was declared
illegal. Based on said Decision, respondent dismissed complainant
from his employment. Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint
for illegal dismissal.
Issue: Whether or not a clearance from the Secretary of Labor is still
necessary before the petitioner herein could be dismissed.
Held: Technically speaking, no clearance was obtained by private
respondent from the then Secretary of Labor, the last step towards
full compliance with the requirements of law on the matter of
dismissal of employees. However, the rationale behind the clearance
requirement was fully met. The Secretary of Labor was apprised of
private respondent's intention to terminate the services of petitioner.
This in effect is an application for clearance to dismiss petitioner
from employment.
The strike staged by the union in 1972 was a futile move. The law
then enforced, Republic Act 875 specifically excluded respondent
company from its coverage. Even if the parties had gone to court to
compel recognition, no positive relief could have been obtained since
the same was not sanctioned by law. Because of this, there was no
necessity on the part of private respondent to show specific acts of
petitioner during the strike to justify his dismissal.
This is a matter of responsibility and of answerability. Petitioner as a
union leader, must see to it that the policies and activities of the union
in the conduct of labor relations are within the precepts of law and
any deviation from the legal boundaries shall be imputable to the
leader. He bears the responsibility of guiding the union along the path
of law and to cause the union to demand what is not legally
demandable, would foment anarchy which is a prelude to chaos.
Petitioner should have known and it was his duty to impart this
imputed knowledge to the members of the union that employees and
laborers in non- profit organizations are not covered by the provisions
of the Industrial Peace Act and the Court of Industrial Relations [in
the case at bar, the Court of First Instance] has no jurisdiction to
entertain petitions of labor unions or organizations of said non-profit
organizations for certification as the exclusive bargaining
representatives of said employees and laborers.
As a strike is an economic weapon at war with the policy of the
Constitution and the law at that time, a resort thereto by laborers shall
be deemed to be a choice of remedy peculiarly their own and outside
of the statute, and as such, the strikers must accept all the risks
attendant upon their choice. If they succeed and the employer
succumbs, the law will not stand in their way in the enjoyment of the
lawful fruits of their victory. But if they fail, they cannot thereafter
invoke the protection of the law for the consequences of their conduct
unless the right they wished vindicated is one which the law will, by
all means, protect and enforce.
Petition is dismissed.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (PAL), petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR
ARBITER ISABEL P. ORTIGUERRA and PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA),
respondents
225 SCRA 301
FACTS: On March 15, 1985, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL)
completely revised its 1966 Code of Discipline. The Code was
circulated among the employees and was immediately implemented,
and some employees were forthwith subjected to the disciplinary
measures embodied therein.
Thus, on August 20, 1985, the Philippine Airlines Employees
Association (PALEA) filed a complaint before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) for unfair labor practice with the
following remarks: "ULP with arbitrary implementation of PAL's
Code of Discipline without notice and prior discussion with Union by
Management". It prayed that implementation of the Code be held in
abeyance; that PAL should discuss the substance of the Code with
PALEA; that employees dismissed under the Code be reinstated and
their cases subjected to further hearing; and that PAL be declared
guilty of unfair labor practice and be ordered to pay damages. PAL
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting its prerogative as an
employer to prescibe rules and regulations regarding employess'
conduct in carrying out their duties and functions, and alleging that
by implementing the Code, it had not violated the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) or any provision of the Labor Code.
PAL asserts that when it revised its Code on March 15, 1985, there
was no law which mandated the sharing of responsibility therefor
between employer and employee.
ISSUE: Whether or not the formulation of a Code of Discipline
among employees is a shared responsibility of the employer and the
employees.
HELD: Indeed, it was only on March 2, 1989, with the approval of
Republic Act No. 6715, amending Article 211 of the Labor Code,
that the law explicitly considered it a State policy "(t)o ensure the
participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes
affecting the rights, duties and welfare." However, even in the
absence of said clear provision of law, the exercise of management
prerogatives was never considered boundless. Thus, in Cruz vs.
Medina (177 SCRA 565 [1989]) it was held that management's
prerogatives must be without abuse of discretion.
The exercise of managerial prerogatives is not unlimited. The
implementation of the provisions (PAL‘s 1966 Code of Discipline)
may result in the deprivation of an employee's means of livelihood
which, as correctly pointed out by the NLRC, is a property right
(Callanta, vs Carnation Philippines, Inc., 145 SCRA 268 [1986]). In
view of these aspects of the case which border on infringement of
constitutional rights, we must uphold the constitutional requirements
for the protection of labor and the promotion of social justice, for
these factors, according to Justice Isagani Cruz, tilt "the scales of
justice when there is doubt, in favor of the worker" (Employees
Association of the Philippine American Life Insurance Company vs.
NLRC, 199 SCRA 628 [1991] 635).
Verily, a line must be drawn between management prerogatives
regarding business operations per se and those which affect the rights
of the employees. In treating the latter, management should see to it
that its employees are at least properly informed of its decisions or
modes action. Indeed, industrial peace cannot be achieved if the
employees are denied their just participation in the discussion of
matters affecting their rights. Thus, even before Article 211 of the
labor Code (P.D. 442) was amended by Republic Act No. 6715, it
was already declared a policy of the State, "(d) To promote the
enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations . . .
Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento
as employees." This was, of course, amplified by Republic Act No
6715 when it decreed the "participation of workers in decision and
policy making processes affecting their rights, duties and welfare."
PAL's position that it cannot be saddled with the "obligation" of
sharing management prerogatives as during the formulation of the
Code, Republic Act No. 6715 had not yet been enacted (Petitioner's
Memorandum, p. 44; Rollo, p. 212), cannot thus be sustained. While
such "obligation" was not yet founded in law when the Code was
formulated, the attainment of a harmonious labor-management
relationship and the then already existing state policy of enlightening
workers concerning their rights as employees demand no less than the
observance of transparency in managerial moves affecting
employees' rights.
CALTEX FILIPINO MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS
ASSOCIATION petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CALTEX
(PHILIPPINES), INC., W.E. MENEFEE and B.F. EDWARDS,
respondents.
44 SCRA 350
FACTS: The Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors' Association
is a labor organization of Filipino managers supervisors in Caltex
(Philippines), Inc., respondent Company in this proceeding. On
February 8, 1965 the Association sent a set of proposals to the
Company wherein one of the demands was the recognition of the
Association as the duly authorized bargaining agency for managers
and supervisors in the Company. To this the Company countered
stating that a distinction exists between representatives of
management and individuals employed as supervisors and that it is
Company's belief that managerial employees are not qualified for
membership in a labor organization; hence, it is digested that the
Association institute a certification proceeding so as to remove any
question with regard to position titles that should be included in the
bargaining unit. The Association felt disinclined to follow the
suggestion of the Company and so on February 22, 1965 the
Company initiated a certification proceeding docketed as Case 1484-
MC. On March 8, 1965 the Association filed notice to strike. On the
basis of the strike notice filed on March 8, 1965 and in view of acts
committed by the Company which the Association considered as
constituting unfair labor practice, the Association struck on April 22,
1965.
The Company, filed Case No. 1484-MC(1) praying among others, to
declare the strike of Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors
Association “illegal”..
The Association's charge for unfair labor practices against the
Company and its officials on September 10, 1965, in Case No. 4344-
ULP against Caltex (Philippines), Inc., W. E. Menefee and B.F.
Edwards. According to the latter, the Company and some of its
officials, including B.F. Edwards, inquired into the organization of
the Association and he manifested his antagonism to it and its
President; that another Company official, W.E. Menefee issued a
statement of policy designed to discourage employees and
supervisors from joining labor organizations; that the Company
refused to bargain although the Association commands majority
representation; that due to the steps taken by the Company to destroy
the Association or discourage its members from continuing their
union membership, the Association was forced to file a strike notice;
that on April 22, 1965 it declared a strike; and that during the strike
the Company and its officers continued their efforts to weaken the
Association as well as its picket lines. The Company in its answer
filed with respondent court denied the charges of unfair labor
practice.
ISSUE: (a) Whether or not the CIR has jurisdiction over Case No.
1484-MC(1); (b) Whether or not the strike staged by the Association
on April 22, 1965 is illegal and, incident thereto, whether respondent
court correctly terminated the employee status of Jose Mapa,
Dominador Mangalino and Herminigildo Mandanas and reprimanded
and admonished the other officers of the Association; and (c)
Whether or not respondent court correctly absolved the respondents
in Case No. 4344-ULP from the unfair labor practice charge.
HELD:Respondent's court's jurisdiction over Case No. 1484-MC(1)
has to be tested by the allegations, reading of said pleading shows
that the same is for injunctive relief under Section 9(d) of Republic
Act No. 875 (Magna Carta of Labor); for contempt, obviously
pursuant to See, 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 in conjunction
with Sec. 3 (b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and for forfeiture of
the employee status of the strikers by virtue of their participation in
what the Company considered as an "illegal strike."
It is well known that the scheme in Republic Act No. 875 for
achieving industrial peace rests essentially on a free and private
agreement between the employer and his employees as to the terms
and conditions under which the employer is to give work and the
employees are to furnish labor, unhampered as far as possible by
judicial or administrative intervention. On this premise the
lawmaking body has virtually prohibited the issuance of injunctive
relief involving or growing out of labor disputes.
The prohibition to issue labor injunctions is designed to give labor a
comparable bargaining power with capital and must be liberally
construed to that end (U.S. vs. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers, 79 F. Supp. 485, Certiorari denied, 69 S. Ct. 137, 335
U.S. 867, cause remanded on other grounds, 174 F. 2nd 160, 85 U.S.
App. D.C., certiorari denied 70 S. Ct. 140, 338 U.S. 872, 94 L. Ed.
535). It is said that the prohibition creates substantive and not purely
procedural law. (Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation vs. National
Labor Relations Board, 49 F. Supp. 886). Within the purview of our
ruling, speaking through Justice Labrador, in Social Security
Employees Association (PAFLU), et al. vs. The Hon. Edilberto
Soriano, et al. (G.R. No. L-20100, July 16, 1964, 11 SCRA 518,
520), there can be no injunction issued against any strike except in
only one instance, that is, when a labor dispute arises in an industry
indispensable to the national interest and such dispute is certified by
the President of the Philippines to the Court of Industrial Relations in
compliance with Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 875. As a corollary to
this, an injunction in an uncertified case must be based on the strict
requirement See. 9 (d) of Republic Act No. 875; the purpose of such
injunction is not to enjoin the strike itself, but only unlawful
activities. To the extent, then, that the Company sought injunctive
relief under Sec. 9(d) of Republic Act No.875, respondent court had
jurisdiction over the Company's "Urgent Petition" dated April 26,
1965.
We now come to the issue as to whether the strike staged by the
Association on April 22, 1965 is illegal. To begin with, we view the
return-to-work agreement of May 30, 1965 as in the nature of a
partial compromise between the parties and, more important, a labor
contract; consequently, in the latter aspect the same "must yield to the
common good" (Art. 1700, Civil Code of the Philippines) and "(I)n
case of doubt ... shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent
living for the laborer" (Art. 1702, ibid). To our mind when the
Company unqualifiedly bound itself in the return-to-work agreement
that all employees will be taken back "with the same employee status
prior to April 22, 1965," the Company thereby made manifest its
intention and conformity not to proceed with Case No. 1484-MC, (c)
relating the illegality of the strike incident. For while it is true that
there is a reservation in the return-to-work agreement as follows:
Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento
6. The parties agree that all Court cases now pending shall continue,
including CIR Case No. 1484-MC.
we think the same is to be construed bearing in mind the conduct and
intention of the parties. The failure to mention Case No. 1484-MC(1)
while specifically mentioning Case No. 1484-MC, in our opinion,
bars the Company from proceeding with the former especially in the
light of the additional specific stipulation that the strikers would be
taken back with the same employee status prior to the strike on April
22, 1965. The records disclose further that, according to Atty.
Domingo E. de Lara when he testified on October 9, 1965, and this is
not seriously disputed by private respondents, the purpose of
Paragraph 10 of the return-to-work agreement was, to quote in part
from this witness, "to secure the tenure of employees after the return-
to-work agreement considering that as I understand there were
demotions and suspensions of one or two employees during the strike
and, moreover, there was this incident Case No. 1484-MC(1)" (see
Brief for the Petition pp. 41-42). To borrow the language of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in Citizens Labor Union Pandacan Chapter vs.
Standard Vacuum Oil Company (G.R. No. L-7478, May 6, 1955), in
so far as the illegality of the strike is concerned in this proceeding
and in the light of the records.
... the matter had become moot. The parties had both abandoned
their original positions and come to a virtual compromise and
agreed to resume unconditionally their former relations. To
proceed with the declaration of illegality would not only breach this
understanding, freely arrived at, but to unnecessarily revive
animosities to the prejudice of industrial peace.
In addition, it is clear that the strike of the Association was declared
not just for the purpose of gaining recognition but also for bargaining
in bad faith on the part of the Company and by reason of unfair labor
practices committed by its officials. Significantly, in the voluntary
return-to-work agreement entered into between the Company and the
Association, thereby ending the strike, the Company agreed to
recognize for membership in the Association the position titles
mentioned in Annex "B" of said agreement.
The guilty conduct of the Company before, during after the strike of
April 22, 1965 cannot escape the Court's attention. It will suffice to
mention typical instances by way of illustration. Long prior to the
strike, the Company had interferred with the Cebu Supervisors'
Union by enticing Mapa into leaving the Union under the guise of
promotion in Manila; shortly before the strike, B.R. Edwards,
Manager-Operations, had inquired into the formation and
organization of the petitioner Association in this case. During the
strike, in addition to the culpable acts of the Company already
narrated above, due significance must be given to the inclusion
initially of J.J. Mapa and A. Buenaventura, the Association's
President and Vice-President respectively, in 1965, in two coercion
cases filed at that time and their subsequent elimination from the
charges the initiative of the Company after the settlement of strike;
the cutting off of telephone facilities extended Association members
in the refinery; and the use of a member of the Association to spy for
the company. The discriminatory acts practiced by the Company
against active unionists after the strike furnish further evidence that
Company committed unfair labor practices as charged.