Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 111812 May 31, 1995

DIONISIO M. RABOR, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City.
He entered the government service as a Utility worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55
years.
Sometime in May 1991, 1 Alma, D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of
Davao City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had
already reached the age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen
(13) years and one (1) month of government service. Rabor responded to this advice by
exhibiting a "Certificate of Membership" 2 issued by the Government Service Insurance
System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May 1988. At the bottom of this "Certificate of
Membership" is a typewritten statement of the following tenor: "Service extended to
comply 15 years service reqts." This statement is followed by a non-legible initial with
the following date "2/28/91."
Thereupon, the Davao City Government, through Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote to the Regional
Director of the Civil Service Commission, Region XI, Davao City ("CSRO-XI"), informing
the latter of the foregoing and requesting advice "as to what action [should] be taken on
this matter."
In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI advised Davao
City Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte as follows:
Please be informed that the extension of services of Mr. Rabor is contrary to
M.C. No. 65 of the Office of the President, the relevant portion of which is
hereunder quoted:
Officials and employees who have reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years shall not be retained the service,
except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the
retention shall not exceed six (6) months.
IN VIEW WHEREFORE, please be advised that the services of Mr. Dominador
[M.] Rabor as Utility Worker in that office, is already non-extend[i]ble. 3
Accordingly, on 8 August l991, Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of the 26 July 1991 letter
of Director Cawad to Rabor and advised him "to stop reporting for work effective August
16, 1991." 4
Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional Director, CSRO-XI, a letter dated 14 August
1991, asking for extension of his services in the City Government until he "shall have
completed the fifteen (15) years service [requirement] in the Government so that [he]
could also avail of the benefits of the retirement laws given to employees of the
Government." The extension he was asking for was about two (2) years. Asserting that
he was "still in good health and very able to perform the duties and functions of [his]
position as Utility Worker," Rabor sought "extension of [his] service as an exception to
Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President." 5 This request was denied
by Director Cawad on 15 August 1991.
Petitioner Rabor next wrote to the Office of the President on 29 January 1992 seeking
reconsideration of the decision of Director Cawad, CSRO-XI. The Office of the
President referred Mr. Rabor's letter to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission
on 5 March 1992.
In its Resolution No. 92-594, dated 28 April 1992, the Civil Service Commission
dismissed the appeal of Mr. Rabor and affirmed the action of Director Cawad embodied
in the latter's letter of 26 July 1991. This Resolution stated in part:
In his appeal, Rabor requested that he be allowed to continue rendering services
as Utility Worker in order to complete the fifteen (15) year service requirement
under P.D. 1146.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990 provides, in part:
1. Any request for extension of service of compulsory retirees to
complete the fifteen years service requirement for retirement
shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career
service who are regular members of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) and shall be granted for a period of
not exceeding one (1) year.
Considering that as early as October 18, 1988, Rabor was already due for
retirement, his request for further extension of service cannot be given due
course. 6 (Emphasis in the original)
On 28 October 1992, Mr. Rabor sought reconsideration of Resolution No. 92-594 of the
Civil Service Commission this time invoking the Decision of this Court in Cena v. Civil
Service Commission. 7 Petitioner also asked for reinstatement with back salaries and
benefits, having been separated from the government service effective 16 August 1991.
Rabor's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Commission.
Petitioner Rabor sent another letter dated 16 April 1993 to the Office of the Mayor,
Davao City, again requesting that he be allowed to continue rendering service to the
Davao City Government as Utility Worker in order to complete the fifteen (15) years
service requirement under P.D. No. 1146. This request was once more denied by Mayor
Duterte in a letter to petitioner dated 19 May 1993. In this letter, Mayor Duterte pointed
out that, under Cena grant of the extension of service was discretionary on the part of
the City Mayor, but that he could not grant the extension requested. Mayor Duterte's
letter, in relevant part, read:
The matter was referred to the City Legal Office and the Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission, in the advent of the decision of the Supreme Court in the
Cena vs. CSC, et al. (G.R. No. 97419 dated July 3, 1992), for legal opinion. Both
the City Legal Officer and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission are one
in these opinion that extending you an appointment in order that you may be able
to complete the fifteen-year service requirement is discretionary [on the part of]
the City Mayor.
Much as we desire to extend you an appointment but circumstances are that we
can no longer do so. As you are already nearing your 70th birthday may no
longer be able to perform the duties attached to your position. Moreover, the
position you had vacated was already filled up.
We therefore regret to inform you that we cannot act favorably on your request. 8
(Emphases supplied)
At this point, Mr. Rabor decided to come to this Court. He filed a Letter/Petition dated 6
July 1993 appealing from Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 and from Mayor Duterte's
letter of 10 May 1993.
The Court required petitioner Rabor to comply with the formal requirements for
instituting a special civil action of certiorari to review the assailed Resolution of the Civil
Service Commission. In turn, the Commission was required to comment on petitioner's
Letter/Petition. 9 The Court subsequently noted petitioner's Letter of 13 September 1993
relating to compliance with the mentioned formal requirements and directed the Clerk of
Court to advise petitioner to engage the services of counsel or to ask for legal
assistance from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). 10
The Civil Service Commission, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its
comment on 16 November 1993. The Court then resolved to give due course to the
Petition and required the parties to file memoranda. Both the Commission and Mr.
Rabor (the latter through PAO counsel) did so.
In this proceeding, petitioner Rabor contends that his claim falls squarely within the
ruling of this Court in Cena v. Civil Service Commission. 11
Upon the other hand, the Commission seeks to distinguish this case from Cena. The
Commission, through the Solicitor General, stressed that in Cena, this Court had ruled
that the employer agency, the Land Registration Authority of the Department of Justice,
was vested with discretion to grant to Cena the extension requested by him. The Land
Registration Authority had chosen not to exercise its discretion to grant or deny such
extension. In contrast, in the instant case, the Davao City Government did exercise its
discretion on the matter and decided to deny the extension sought by petitioner Rabor
for legitimate reasons.
While the Cena decision is barely three (3) years old, the Court considers that it must
reexamine the doctrine of Cena and the theoretical and policy underpinnings thereof. 12
We start by recalling the factual setting of Cena.
Gaudencio Cena was appointed Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon,
Metropolitan Manila, on 16 July 1987. He reached the compulsory retirement age of
sixty-five (65) years on 22 January 1991. By the latter date, his government service
would have reached a total of eleven (11) years, nine (9) months and six (6) days.
Before reaching his 65th birthday, Cena requested the Secretary of Justice, through the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority ("LRA") that he be allowed to extend his
service to complete the fifteen-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the
full benefit of an Old-Age Pension under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. If Cena's
request were granted, he would complete fifteen (15) years of government service on
15 April 1994, at the age of sixty-eight (68) years.
The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the Civil Service Commission on whether or
not Cena's request could be granted considering that Cena was covered by Civil
Service Memorandum No. 27, Series of 1990. On 17 October 1990, the Commission
allowed Cena a one (1) year extension of his service from 22 January 1991 to 22
January 1992 under its Memorandum Circular No. 27. Dissatisfied, Cena moved for
reconsideration, without success. He then came to this Court, claiming that he was
entitled to an extension of three (3) years, three (3) months and twenty-four (24) days to
complete the fifteen-year service requirement for retirement with full benefits under
Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146.
This Court granted Cena' s petition in its Decision of 3 July 1992. Speaking through Mr.
Justice Medialdea, the Court held that a government employee who has reached the
compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but at the same time has not yet
completed fifteen (15) years of government service required under Section 11 (b) of
P.D. No. 1146 to qualify for the Old-Age Pension Benefit, may be granted an extension
of his government service for such period of time as may be necessary to "fill up" or
comply with the fifteen (15)-year service requirement. The Court also held that the
authority to grant the extension was a discretionary one vested in the head of the
agency concerned. Thus the Court concluded:
Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. The Land Registration Authority (LRA)
and Department of Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena
to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government to complete the
fifteen-year service so that he may retire with full benefits under Section 11,
paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146. 13 (Emphases supplied)
The Court reached the above conclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain and
ordinary meaning" of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. Section 11 may be quoted in its
entirety:
Sec. 11 Conditions for Old-Age Pension. — (a) Old-Age Pension shall be paid to
a member who
(1) has at least fifteen (15) years of service;
(2) is at least sixty (60) years of age; and
(3) is separated from the service.
(b) unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be
compulsory for an employee at sixty-five-(65) years of age with at least fifteen
(15) years of service; Provided, that if he has less than fifteen (15) years of
service, he shall he allowed to continue in the service to completed the fifteen
(15) years. (Emphases supplied)
The Court went on to rely upon the canon of liberal construction which has often been
invoked in respect of retirement statutes:
Being remedial in character, a statute granting a pension or establishing [a]
retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in favor of
persons intended to be benefitted thereby. The liberal approach aims to achieve
the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security and well-
being of government employees may be enhanced. 14 (Citations omitted)
While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms, there were (and still
are) two (2) administrative issuances which prescribe limitations on the extension of
service that may be granted to an employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of
age.
The first administrative issuance is Civil Service Commission Circular No. 27, Series of
1990, which should be quoted in its entirety:
TO : ALL HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS AND AGENCIES OF THE
NATIONAL/LOCAL GOVERNMENTS INCLUDING GOVERNMENT- OWNED
AND/OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS.
SUBJECT : Extension of Service of Compulsory Retiree to Complete the Fifteen
Years Service Requirement for Retirement Purposes.
Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 90-454 dated May 21, 1990, the Civil Service
Commission hereby adopts and promulgates the following policies and
guidelines in the extension of services of compulsory retirees to complete the
fifteen years service requirement for retirement purposes:
1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory
retirees to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for
retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the
career service who are regular members of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be granted for a
period not exceeding one (1) year.
2. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retiree
to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for
retirement who entered the government service at 57 years of
 age or over upon prior grant of authority to appoint him or her,
shall no longer be granted.
3. Any request for the extension of service to complete the fifteen
(15) years service requirement of retirement shall be filled not
later than three (3) years prior to the date of compulsory
retirement.
4. Any request for the extension of service of a compulsory
retiree who meets the minimum number of years of service for
retirement purposes may be granted for six (6) months only with
no further extension.
This Memorandum Circular shall take effect immediately. (Emphases supplied)
The second administrative issuance — Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of
the President, dated 14 June 1988 — provides:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, this Office has been. receiving requests for reinstatement and/or
retention in the service of employees who have reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years, despite the strict conditions provided for in
Memorandum Circular No. 163, dated March 5, 1968, as amended.
WHEREAS, the President has recently adopted a policy to adhere more strictly
to the law providing for compulsory retirement age of 65 years and, in extremely
meritorious cases, to limit the service beyond the age of 65 years to six (6)
months only.
WHEREFORE, the pertinent provision of Memorandum Circular No. 163 or on
the retention in the service of officials or employees who have reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years shall not be retained in the service,
except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the
retention shall not exceed six (6) months.
All heads of departments, bureaus, offices and instrumentalities of the
government including government-owned or controlled corporations, are hereby
enjoined to require their respective offices to strictly comply with this circular.
This Circular shall take effect immediately.
By authority of the President
(Sgd.)
CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.
Executive Secretary
Manila, June 14, 1988. 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Medialdea, J. resolved the challenges posed by the above two (2) administrative
regulations by, firstly, considering as invalid Civil Service Memorandum No. 27 and,
secondly, by interpreting the Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65 as
inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena.
We turn first to the Civil Service Commission's Memorandum Circular No. 27.
Medialdea, J. wrote:
 The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature
of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle that
administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for
the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions (People v. Maceren,
G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v. Members of the
Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v.
General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v.
Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). . . . . The rule on limiting to
one the year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the
compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but has less than fifteen (15)
years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, S. 1990,
cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no relationship or connection
with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was
an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect.
The Civil Service Commission has no power to supply perceived omissions in
P.D. 1146. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that Cena, in striking down Civil Service Commission Memorandum No.
27, took a very narrow view on the question of what subordinate rule-making by an
administrative agency is permissible and valid. That restrictive view must be contrasted
with this Court's earlier ruling in People v. Exconde, 17 where Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
said
It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that
corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate authority and
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the
reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is
that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but conform to standards that the law prescribes. 18 (Emphasis supplied)
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 19 the Court, in sustaining the validity of a MECS Order which
established passing a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT) as a prerequisite for eligibility for admission into medical schools in the
Philippines, said:
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making
authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are
necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice
Fernando in Edu v. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]) —
The standards may be either expressed or implied. If the former,
the non-delegation objection is easily met. The Standard though
does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In
the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public
safety. What is sought to be attained in Calalang v. William is
"safe transit upon the roads."
 We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of
the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education"
and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that
these considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the
non-delegation principle. 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis partly in the original and
partly supplied)
In Edu v. Ericta, 21 then Mr. Justice Fernando stressed the abstract and very general
nature of the standards which our Court has in prior case law upheld as sufficient for
purposes of compliance with the requirements for validity of subordinate or
administrative rule-making:
This Court has considered as sufficient standards, "public welfare," (Municipality
of Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547 [1917]); "necessary in the
interest of law and order," (Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660 [1919]); "public
interest," (People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 [1939]); and "justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case," (International Hardwood v. Pangil Federation of
Labor, 17 Phil. 602 [1940]). 22 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of detail in the
statute to be implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the
governing or enabling statute is quite detailed and specific to begin with, there would be
very little need (or occasion) for implementing administrative regulations. It is, however,
precisely the inability of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed
situations in respect of any relatively complex subject matter, that makes subordinate,
delegated rule-making by administrative agencies so important and unavoidable. All that
may be reasonably; demanded is a showing that the delegated legislation consisting of
administrative regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by the
governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is appropriately applied in respect of
Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and to this test we now turn.
We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be examined is the
present Civil Service law — found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, of Executive Order No.
292 dated 25 July 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 — and
not alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise known as the "Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977." For the matter of extension of service of retirees who have
reached sixty-five (65) years of age is an area that is covered by both statutes and not
alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146. This is crystal clear from examination of many
provisions of the present civil service law.
Section 12 of the present Civil Service law set out in the 1987 Administrative Code
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Sec. 12 Powers and Functions. — The [Civil Service] Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
 (2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect
the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws;
(3) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt
plans and programs to promote economical, efficient and effective personnel
administration in the government;
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Formulate, administer and evaluate programs relative to the development
and retention of a qualified and competent work force in the public service;
xxx xxx xxx
(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in
the Civil Service including extension of service beyond retirement age;
xxx xxx xxx
(17) Administer the retirement program for government officials and employees,
and accredit government services and evaluate qualifications for retirement;
xxx xxx xxx
(19) Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnel agency and
such other functions as may be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
It was on the bases of the above quoted provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code that
the Civil Service Commission promulgated its Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doing
so, the Commission was acting as "the central personnel agency of the government
empowered to promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for efficient, responsive
and effective personnel administration in the government." 23 It was also discharging its
function of "administering the retirement program for government officials and
employees" and of "evaluat[ing] qualifications for retirement."
In addition, the Civil Service Commission is charged by the 1987 Administrative Code
with providing leadership and assistance "in the development and retention of qualified
and efficient work force in the Civil Service" (Section 16 [10]) and with the "enforcement
of the constitutional and statutory provisions, relative to retirement and the regulation for
the effective implementation of the retirement of government officials and employees"
(Section 16 [14]).
We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of service
after an employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable
relationship or is not germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service
Law. The physiological and psychological processes associated with ageing in human
beings are in fact related to the efficiency and quality of the service that may be
expected from individual persons. The policy considerations which guided the Civil
Service Commission in limiting the maximum extension of service allowable for
compulsory retirees, were summarized by Griño-Aquino, J. in her dissenting opinion in
Cena:
Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that
extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would:
 (1) give a premium to late-comers in the government service and in effect
discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age; (2) delay the
promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the
chances for employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have
already passed the various government examination but must wait for jobs to be
vacated by "extendees" who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but
are enjoying extension of their government service to complete 15 years so they
may qualify for old-age pension. 24 (Emphasis supplied).
Cena laid heavy stress on the interest of retirees or would be retirees, something that is,
in itself, quite appropriate. At the same time, however, we are bound to note that there
should be countervailing stress on the interests of the employer agency and of other
government employees as a whole. The results flowing from the striking down of the
limitation established in Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 may well be "absurd
and inequitable," as suggested by Mme. Justice Griño-Aquino in her dissenting opinion.
An employee who has rendered only three (3) years of government service at age sixty-
five (65) can have his service extended for twelve (12) years and finally retire at the age
of seventy-seven (77). This reduces the significance of the general principle of
compulsory retirement at age sixty-five (65) very close to the vanishing point.
The very real difficulties posed by the Cena doctrine for rational personnel
administration and management in the Civil Service, are aggravated when Cena is
considered together with the case of Toledo v. Civil Service Commission. 25 Toledo
involved the provisions of Rule III, Section 22, of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel
Action and Policies (CSRPAP) which prohibited the appointment of persons fifty-seven
(57) years old or above in government service without prior approval of the Civil Service
Commission. Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1983 provided that a
person fifty-seven (57) years of age may be appointed to the Civil Service provided that
the exigencies of the government service so required and provided that the appointee
possesses special qualifications not possessed by other officers or employees in the
Civil Service and that the vacancy cannot be filled by promotion of qualified officers or
employees of the Civil Service. Petitioner Toledo was appointed Manager of the
Education and Information Division of the Commission on Elections when he was
almost fifty-nine (59) years old. No authority for such appointment had been obtained
either from the President of the Philippines or from the Civil Service Commission and
the Commission found that the other conditions laid down in Section 22 of Rule III,
CSRPAP, did not exist. The Court nevertheless struck down Section 22, Rule III on the
same exceedingly restrictive view of permissible administrative legislation that Cena
relied on. 26
When one combines the doctrine of Toledo with the ruling in Cena, very strange results
follow. Under these combined doctrines, a person sixty-four (64) years of age may be
appointed to the government service and one (1) year later may demand extension of
his service for the next fourteen (14) years; he would retire at age seventy-nine (79).
The net effect is thus that the general statutory policy of compulsory retirement at sixty-
five (65) years is heavily eroded and effectively becomes unenforceable. That general
statutory policy may be seen to embody the notion that there should be a certain
minimum turn-over in the government service and that opportunities for government
service should be distributed as broadly as possible, specially to younger people,
considering that the bulk of our population is below thirty (30) years of age. That same
general policy also reflects the life expectancy of our people which is still significantly
lower than the life expectancy of, e.g., people in Northern and Western Europe, North
America and Japan.
Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this
extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more
specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b)
of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be read together with Memorandum Circular No.
27. We reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the head of the government agency
concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of the
service of an official or employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age without
completing fifteen (15) years of government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to
be exercised conformably with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No.
27, Series of 1990.
We do not believe it necessary to deal specifically with Memorandum Circular No. 65 of
the Office of the President dated 14 June 1988. It will be noted from the text quoted
supra (pp. 11-12) that the text itself of Memorandum Circular No. 65 (and for that
matter, that of Memorandum Circular No. 163, also of the Office of the President, dated
5 March 1968) 27 does not purport to apply only to officers or employees who have
reached the age of sixty-five (65) years and who have at least fifteen (l5) years of
government service. We noted earlier that Cena interpreted Memorandum Circular No.
65 as referring only to officers and employees who have both reached the compulsory
retirement age of sixty-five (65) and completed the fifteen (15) years of government
service. Cena so interpreted this Memorandum Circular precisely because Cena had
reached the conclusion that employees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age,
but who have less than fifteen (15) years of government service, may be allowed such
extension of service as may be needed to complete fifteen (15) years of service. In
other words, Cena read Memorandum Circular No. 65 in such a way as to comfort with
Cena's own conclusion reached without regard to that Memorandum Circular. In view of
the conclusion that we today reached in the instant case, this last ruling of Cena is
properly regarded as merely orbiter.
We also do not believe it necessary to determine whether Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 27 is fully compatible with Office of the President's Memorandum Circular
No. 65; this question must be reserved for detailed analysis in some future justiciable
case.
Applying now the results of our reexamination of Cena to the instant case, we believe
and so hold that Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the
appeal of petitioner Rabor and affirming the action of CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated
26 July 1991, must be upheld and affirmed.
ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Quiason, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I vote to grant the petition for the same reasons stated in my concurring opinion in Cena
vs. CSC reported in 211 SCRA 192.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I vote to grant the petition for the same reasons stated in my concurring opinion in Cena
vs. CSC reported in 211 SCRA 192.
Footnotes
1 Annex "A," Letter/Petition, Rollo, p. 4.
2 Annex "A-1," Letter/Petition, Rollo, p. 5.
3 Annex "B," Letter/Petition, Rollo, p. 6.
4 Annex "B-1," Letter/Petition, Rollo, p. 7.
5 Annex "C," Letter/Petitioner, Rollo, p. 8.
6 CSC Resolution No. 92-594, Rollo, pp. 11-12.
7 211 SCRA 179 (1992).
8 Rollo, p. 3.
9 Supreme Court Resolution dated 24 August 1993, Rollo, p. 17.
10 Rollo, p. 40-A.
11 211 SCRA 179 (1992).
12 Two (2) Justices dissented — Griño-Aquino and Romero, JJ. — from the
Cena decision.
13 211 SCRA at 192.
14 211 SCRA at 186.
 15 211 SCRA at 200-201.
16 211 SCRA at 190.
17 101 Phil. 1125 (1957).
18 101 Phil. at 1129.
19 152 SCRA 730 (1987).
20 152 SCRA at 740-741.
21 35 SCRA 481 (1970).
22 35 SCRA at 497 (note 43).
23 See Addendum to Comment filed by Civil Service Commission dated 5
August 1991; Cena Rollo, p. 91.
24 211 SCRA at 196.
25 202 SCRA 507 (1991). We are not here, of course, reexamining Toledo for
this case is not, strictly speaking, involved at present. At the same time, we
cannot disregard the intellectual relevance of the doctrine in Toledo to the issues
that we are presently addressing.
26 Toledo held:
"[Section 22, Rule III] is entirely a creation of the Civil Service Commission,
having no basis in the law itself which it was meant to implement. It cannot be
related to or connected with any specific provision of the law which it is meant to
carry into effect, such as a requirement, for instance, that age should be
reckoned as a factor in the employment or reinstatement of an individual, or a
direction that there be a determination of some point in a person's life at which he
becomes unemployable or employable [only] under specific conditions. . . .
[S]ince there is no prohibition or restriction on the employment of fifty-seven (57)
year old persons . . . there was nothing to carry into effect through an
implementing rule on the matter." (202 SCRA at 513-514, per Paras, J.;
Emphasis supplied)
27 64 Official Gazette 3295 (1 April 1968).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92646-47 October 4, 1991
AUGUSTO TOLEDO, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Toledo & Toledo for petitioner.
Itaas-Fetalino, Limare and Huerta for CSC.

PARAS, J.:p
Petitioner Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then Comelec Chairman Ramon
Felipe as Manager of the Education and Information Department of the Comelec, on
May 21, 1986. At the time of his appointment, petitioner, having been born on July 8,
1927 was already more than fifty-seven (57) years old. It was the first time petitioner
joined the government service as he was then engaged in active private practice prior to
said appointment.
Petitioner's appointment papers, particularly Civil Service Form No. 333 and his oath of
office were endorsed by the Comelec to the Civil Service Commission (CSC, for brevity)
on June 11, 1986, for approval and attestation. However, no prior request for exemption
from the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action
and Policies (CSRPAP, for brevity) was secured. Said provision prohibits the
appointment of persons 57 years old or above into the government service without prior
approval by the Civil Service Commission (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of
1983).
Petitioner officially reported for work and assumed the functions of his office on June 16,
1986.
On January 29, 1989, public respondent Comelec, upon discovery of the lack of
authority required under Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP, and CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 5, Series of 1983 issued Resolution No. 2066, the pertinent portion of
which is hereinbelow quoted, to wit:
WHEREAS, for the validity then of the appointment of Atty. Toledo as Manager of the
Education and Information Department it was necessary that not only must prior authority
from the Civil Service Commission be obtained considering that he was more than fifty-
seven (57) years old at the time, it must as well be shown that (a) the exigencies of the
service so required, (b) Atty. Toledo possesses special qualification not possessed by
other officers or employees in the Commission, and (c) the vacancy cannot be filled by
promotion of qualified officers or employees in the Commission;
 WHEREAS, there is nothing in the 120 File of Atty. Toledo that indicates that such
authority was even obtained from the Civil Service Commission or from the President of
the Philippines; moreover, conditions (a), (b) and (c) stated in the immediately preceding
clause did not then exist;
WHEREAS, the appointment then of Atty. Toledo was made in violation of law and
pursuant to Section 7, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action, the
appointment was void from the beginning.
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved, as it is hereby resolved, to DECLARE as VOID from
the beginning the appointment of Atty. Augusto Toledo as Manager of the Education and
Information Department of this Commission. (pp. 49-50, Rollo)
Petitioner appealed the foregoing Comelec Resolution No. 2066 to public respondent
CSC on February 4, 1989.
On July 12, 1989, public respondent CSC promulgated Resolution No. 89-468 which
disposed of the appeal, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to declare, as it
hereby declares the appointment of Augusto V. Toledo as Manager, Information and
Education Department, Commission on Elections, there being no basis in law, merely
voidable and not void ab initio. Hence, Atty. Toledo is considered a de facto officer from
the time he assumed office on June 16, 1986, until and up to the promulgation of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2066 on January 29, 1989. (pp. 35-36, Rollo)
Unable to obtain a reconsideration from the aforesaid Resolution, petitioner filed the
present petition for certiorari.
It is first contended by petitioner that CSC Resolution No. 89-468 is without legal basis
because the CSRPAP is invalid and unenforceable for not having been published in the
Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation as required under Section
9(b) of P.D. 807. This being the case, petitioner argues that the requirement of prior
CSC authority to appoint persons 57 years or older under Section 22, Rule III of the
CSRPAP has not "become effective" and cannot be invoked against him.
It will be recalled that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Republic Act No. 2260) took effect
on June 19, 1959. That act, among other things, established a Civil Service
Commission one of the functions of which was, "with the approval by the President, to
prescribe, amend, and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the
provisions of ... the Civil Service Law," said rules "to become effective thirty days after
publication in the Official Gazette" [Sec. 16 (e)].
The Commission subsequently adopted and promulgated rules intended to carry the law
into effect, known as the Revised Civil Service Rules. Those rules were published in the
supplement to Vol. 58, No. 49 of the Official Gazette, dated December 3, 1962.
Section 5, Rule VI of those Revised Civil Service Rules provided that:
SEC. 5. No person shall be appointed or reinstated in the service if he is already 57 years
old, unless the President of the Philippines, President of the Senate, Speaker of the
 House of Representatives, or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as the case may
be, determines that he possesses special qualifications and his services are needed.
It is worthy of note, however, that the statute itself (RA 2260) contained no provision
prohibiting appointment or reinstatement in the Government service of any person who
was already 57 years old, or otherwise requiring that some limitation as regards to age
be placed on employment in the Government service. This prohibition was purely a
creation of the Civil Service Commission.
On October 6, 1975, pursuant to the 1973 Constitution, Presidential Decree No. 807
was issued by President Marcos, establishing "an independent Civil Service
Commission." The decree, known as the "Civil Service Decree of the Philippines,"
repealed or accordingly modified all laws, rules, and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent" with its provisions (Sec. 59), although it declared that "the former Civil
Service Commission created under Republic Act No. 2260, as amended, and as
organized under the Integrated Reorganization Plan may serve as the nucleus of the
Civil Service Commission" (Fourth Whereas Clause, Preamble). Like RA 2260 which it
superseded, PD 807 empowered the Commission to "prescribe, amend, and enforce
suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Decree," and
also provided that said "rules and regulations shall become effective thirty (30) days
after publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation."
The new Civil Service Commission adopted "rules and regulations for carrying into
effect the provisions" of the Civil Service Decree on November 20, 1983. The rules were
named, "Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies" (CSRPAP). Section 22,
Rule III of the CSRPAP is substantially the same as Section 5, Rule VI of the quondam
"Revised Civil Service Rules" and it reads as follows:
SEC. 22. No person shall be appointed, reinstated, or re-employed in the service if he is
already 57 years old, unless the President, or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in
the case of employees in the judiciary, determines that he possesses special
qualifications urgently needed by the hiring agency.
Omitted, it will be observed, was reference to the "President of the Senate" and the
"Speaker of the House of Representatives," both of whom were expressly mentioned in
the counterpart provision in the former rules (Section 5, Rule VI, supra).
Noteworthy, too, is that there is no provision at all in PD 807 dealing in any manner with
the appointment, reinstatement or re-employment in the Government service of any
person already 57 years or any particular age, for that matter. Again, the provision
regarding persons 57 years of age was purely a creation of the Commission, having no
reference to any provision in the decree intended to be implemented.
It was this provision of the CSRPAP (Sec. 22, Rule III) which was applied to Toledo.
According to the CSC, since prior authority for Toledo's appointment had never been
obtained — indeed, it would appear that the appointment papers were not transmitted
by the COMELEC to the CSC until February, 1989 at which time Toledo's appointment
was "approved as permanent" by the Executive Director of said CSC—the appointment
had to be struck down.
Now, these rules and regulations (CSRPAP) were never published either in the Official
Gazette or any newspaper of general circulation, at least as of the time that Section 22,
Rule III thereof was applied to Toledo to the latter's prejudice. As much was admitted by
the Chairman of the Commission, Hon. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas in a letter written by her
to Toledo dated February 2, 1989. In that letter, the Chairman stated that (a) the
Commission had "no record of the publication of said Rules ("Rules on Personnel
Actions and Policies") in newspapers of general circulation" although said Rules were
"published and distributed by the National Media Production Center in 1975," and that
(b) only "the Rule on Promotion embodied in CSC Resolution No. 83-343 repealing Rule
V of the said Rules was published on August 15, 1983 in Volume 79 No. 33 of the
Official Gazette" (Annex I, petition). The lack of publication is also attested by the
Director of the National Printing Office who, in a Certification issued by him on January
30, 1989, stated that "the RULES ON PERSONNEL ACTIONS AND POLICIES'
promulgated on November 20, 1975 by the Civil Service Commission implementing
Presidential Decree No. 807 was not submitted to this office for publication" (Annex J,
petition).
The Revised Civil Service Rules implementing R.A. No. 2260 cannot be considered
valid and effective after RA 2260 was repealed and superseded by PD 807. PD 807
was obviously intended to take the place of RA 2260. In all matters dealt with by both
laws, the provisions of PD 807 were obviously intended to be controlling. So, also, the
rules promulgated by the Civil Service Commission to carry the provisions of PD 807
into effect were meant to supersede or take the place of the rules implementing RA
2260. In other words, PD 807 and the CSRPAP were intended to make RA 2260 and its
implementing rules functus officio, render them without force and effect except only as
regards any provision, if at all, not dealt with by PD 807 or the CSRPAP.
Now, it may reasonably be assumed that the law-making authority at the time, the
President, was aware of the provision on 57-year old persons in the Revised Civil
Service Rules promulgated under RA 2260. Yet when he promulgated PD 807 the
President did not see fit to incorporate therein any provision regarding 57-year old
persons or for that matter, to prescribe any age beyond which persons could become
ineligible for appointment, reintatement or re-employment. This surely is an indication of
an intention not to continue the provision in effect.
In any event, the provision on 57-year old persons in the Revised Civil Service Rules
(under said RA 2260) cannot be accorded validity. As already pointed out, it is entirely a
creation of the Civil Service Commission, having no basis in the law itself which it was
meant to implement. It cannot be related to or connected with any specific provision of
the law which it is meant to carry into effect, such as a requirement, for instance, that
age should be reckoned as a factor in the employment or reinstatement of an individual,
or a direction that there be a determination of some point in a person's life at which he
becomes unemployable, or employable only under specific conditions. It was therefore
an unauthorized act of legislation on the part of the Civil Service Commission. It cannot
be justified as a valid exercise of its function of promulgating rules and regulations for
that function, to repeat, may legitimately be exercised only for the purpose of carrying
the provisions of the law into effect; and since there is no prohibition or restriction on the
employment of 57-year old persons in the statute—or any provision respecting age as a
factor in employment—there was nothing to carry into effect through an implementing
rule on the matter.
The power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to implement the law or put it
into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply
perceived omissions in it. "By its administrative regulations, of course, the law itself can
not be extended; said regulations 'cannot amend an act of Congress.' " (Teoxon v.
Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration, 33 SCRA
585, 589 [1970], citing Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 [1960]; see also, Animos v.
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214, 223-224 [1989] in turn citing
Teoxon).
The considerations just expounded also conduce to the conclusion of the invalidity of
Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP. The enactment of said section, relative to 57-year
old persons, was also an act of supererogation on the part of the Civil Service
Commission since the rule has no relation to or connection with any provision of the law
supposed to be carried into effect. The section was an addition to or extension of the
law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect.
Apart from this, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of the
application to Toledo of a provision thereof, for the reason that said rules were never
published, as is admitted on all sides. The argument that the CSRPAP need not be
published, because they were "a mere reiteration of existing law" and had been
"circularized," flies in the teeth of the explicit and categorical requirement of PD 807 that
rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Decree shall become
effective thirty (30) days after publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of
general circulation. Moreover, the CSRPAP cannot properly be considered a mere
reiteration of existing law, for as already discussed, the implementing rule governing 57-
year old persons is invalid and cannot in any sense be considered "existing law."
Assuming without conceding that the rule regarding employment of 57-year old persons
is valid and enforceable, it can only apply, according to its express terms, to employees
under the supervision of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or of the President of
the Philippines, these two being the only officials mentioned as having to give consent
to the employment of said persons. It cannot be construed as applying to employees
over whom neither the President nor the Chief Justice exercises supervision, such as
the Senate or the House of Representatives, or the COMELEC or other Constitutional
Commissions.
One last word. There is absolutely no question about the fact that the only reason for
Toledo's separation from the service was the fact that he was already more than 57
years old when he was invited to work in the COMELEC by its former Chairman, but
through no fault of his own, not all the conditions for his employment appear to have
been satisfied. There is no question that it was not Toledo's fault that his papers were
tardily submitted to the Civil Service Commission and approval of his appointment was
made only by the Executive Director of the Commission and not by the Chairman
thereof (to whom the function of the President of approving appointments like those of
Toledo had been delegated under LOI 47, CSC Memo Circular No. 5, Series of 1983).
There is no question, too, that he was actively engaged in law practice when taken into
the COMELEC. There is absolutely no question about the fact that he was otherwise a
competent and efficient officer of the COMELEC and had not given the remotest cause
for dismissal. These are equitable considerations proscribing application to him of the
provision in question, assuming its validity, or impelling at least a restrictive application
thereof so that it may not work to his prejudice.
Premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., concur in the result.
Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 180055 July 31, 2009

FRANKLIN M. DRILON as President and in representation of the LIBERAL PARTY OF

THE PHILIPPINES (LP), AND HON. JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA, HON. WAHAB M.
AKBAR, HON. MARIA EVITA R. ARAGO, HON. PROCESSO J. ALCALA, HON.
ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, HON. MARY MITZI CAJAYON, HON. FREDENIL H.
CASTRO, HON. GLENN ANG CHONG, HON. SOLOMON R. CHUNGALAO, HON.
PAUL RUIZ DAZA, HON. ANTONIO A. DEL ROSARIO, HON. CECILIA S. LUNA,
HON. MANUEL M. MAMBA, HON. HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS, HON. ALVIN
SANDOVAL, HON. LORENZO R. TAÑADA III, HON. REYNALDO S. UY, HON.
ALFONSO V. UMALI JR., HON. LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE DE VENECIA JR. in his official capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives; HON. ARTHUR D. DEFENSOR, SR., in his official capacity as Majority
Floor Leader of the House of Representatives, HON. MANUEL B. VILLAR, in his official
capacity as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments, ATTY. MA.
GEMMA D. ASPIRAS, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments, HON. PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, HON. EDGARDO C. ZIALCITA,
HON. ABDULLAH D. DIMAPORO, HON. JOSE CARLOS V. LACSON, HON. EILEEN
R. ERMITA-BUHAIN, HON. JOSE V. YAP, HON. RODOLFO T. ALBANO III, HON.
EDUARDO R. GULLAS, HON. CONRADO M. ESTRELLA III, HON. RODOLFO
"OMPONG" PLAZA, HON. EMMYLOU J. TALIÑO-MENDOZA and HON.
EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, in their individual official capacities as "elected"
members of the Commission on Appointments, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 183055 July 31, 2009

SENATOR MA. ANA CONSUELO A.S. MADRIGAL, Petitioner,

vs.
SENATOR MANUEL VILLAR in his capacity as Senate President and Ex-Officio
Chairman of the Commission on Appointments, REPRESENTATIVE PROSPERO
NOGRALES in his capacity as the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

In August 2007, the Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents
to the Commission on Appointments (CA).

The contingent in the Senate to the CA was composed of the following senators with their
respective political parties:

Sen. Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal PDP-Laban

Sen. Joker Arroyo KAMPI

Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano Lakas-CMD

Sen. Panfilo Lacson UNO

Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada PMP

Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile PMP

 Sen. Loren Legarda NPC

Sen. Richard Gordon Lakas-CMD

Sen. Mar Roxas LP

Sen. Lito Lapid Lakas-CMD

Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago PRP

The members of the contingent of the House of Representatives in the CA and their respective
political parties were as follows:

Rep. Prospero C. Nograles Lakas-CMD

Rep. Eduardo C. Zialcita Lakas-CMD

Rep. Abdullah D. Dimaporo Lakas-CMD

Rep. Jose Carlos V. Lacson Lakas-CMD

Rep. Eileen R. Ermita-Buhain Lakas-CMD

Rep. Jose V. Yap Lakas-CMD

Rep. Rodolfo T. Albano III KAMPI

Rep. Eduardo R. Gullas KAMPI

Rep. Rodolfo "Ompong" G. Plaza NPC

Rep. Conrado M. Estrella NPC

Rep. Emmylou J. Taliño-Mendoza NP

Rep. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva CIBAC Party List

In the second week of August 2007, petitioners in the first petition, G.R. No. 180055, went to
respondent then Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for the Liberal Party in the CA.
Speaker Jose de Venecia merely said that he would study their demand.1

During the session of the House of Representatives on September 3, 2007, petitioner in the first
petition, Representative Tañada, requested from the House of Representatives leadership2 one
seat in the CA for the Liberal Party.3 To his request, Representative Neptali Gonzales II4 begged
the indulgence of the Liberal Party "to allow the Legal Department to make a study on the
matter."5

In a separate move, Representative Tañada, by letter of September 10, 2007, requested the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives the reconstitution of the House contingent in
the CA to include one seat for the Liberal Party in compliance with the provision of Section 18,
Article VI of the Constitution.6 Representative Tañada also brought the matter to the attention of
then Speaker De Venecia, reiterating the position that since there were at least 20 members of the
Liberal Party in the 14th Congress, the party should be represented in the CA.7

As of October 15, 2007, however, no report or recommendation was proffered by the Legal
Department, drawing Representative Tañada to request a report or recommendation on the matter
within three days.8
In reply, Atty. Grace Andres of the Legal Affairs Bureau of the House of Representatives
informed Representative Tañada that the department was constrained to withhold the release of
its legal opinion because the handling lawyer was directed to secure documents necessary to
establish some of the members’ party affiliations.9

Hence spawned the filing on October 31, 2007 of the first petition by petitioner former Senator
Franklin M. Drilon (in representation of the Liberal Party), et al., for prohibition, mandamus, and
quo warranto with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order, against then Speaker De Venecia, Representative Arthur Defensor, Sr. in his
capacity as Majority Floor Leader of the House of Representatives, Senator Manuel B. Villar in
his capacity as ex officio chairman of the CA, Atty. Ma. Gemma D. Aspiras in her capacity as
Secretary of the CA, and the individual members of the House of Representatives contingent to
the CA.10 The petition in G.R. No. 180055 raises the following issues:

a. WHETHER THE LIBERAL PARTY WITH AT LEAST TWENTY (20) MEMBERS WHO
SIGNED HEREIN AS PETITIONERS, IS CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTITLED TO ONE (1)
SEAT IN THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS.

b. WHETHER THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES’ RESPONDENTS HAVE

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN CONSTITUTING THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS IN
CONTRAVENTION OF THE REQUIRED PROPORTIONAL CONSTITUTION BY
DEPRIVING THE LIBERAL PARTY OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL ENTITLEMENT TO ONE
(1) SEAT THEREIN.

c. WHETHER AS A RESULT OF THE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION COMMITTED BY

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RESPONDENTS, THE WRITS PRAYED FOR IN
THIS PETITION BE ISSUED NULLIFYING THE CURRENT COMPOSITION OF THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, RESTRAINING THE CURRENT HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERS FROM SITTING AND PARTICIPATING IN THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, OUSTING THE
AFFECTED RESPONDENTS WHO USURPED, INTRUDED INTO AND UNLAWFULLY
HELD POSITIONS IN THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS AND REQUIRING THE
RESPONDENTS TO RECONSTITUTE AND/OR REELECT THE MEMBERS OF SAID
COMMISSION.11 (Italics in the original)

And it prays that this Court:

a. Immediately upon the filing of the instant Petition, issue a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction, enjoining all
Respondents and all persons under their direction, authority, supervision, and control
from further proceeding with their actions relating to the illegal and unconstitutional
constitution of the Commission on Appointments and to the unlawful exercise of its
members’ functions, contrary to the rule on proportional representation of political parties
with respect to the House of Representatives contingent in the said Commission;

b. After careful consideration of the merits of the case, render judgment making the
injunction permanent and ordering Respondents and all persons under their direction,
authority, supervision, and control;

xxxx

c. Declare Respondents’ action in not allotting one (1) seat to Petitioners null and void for
being a direct violation of Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution;
 d. Declare the proceedings of the Commission on Appointments null and void, insofar as
they violate the rule on proportional representation of political parties in said
Commission;

e. Oust the affected respondents, whoever they are, who usurped, intruded into and have
unlawfully held positions in the Commission on Appointments and

f. Require Respondents to alter, reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure the composition

of the Commission on Appointments in accordance with proportional representation
based on the actual numbers of members belonging to duly accredited and registered
political parties who were elected into office during the last May 14, 2007 Elections by,
at the very least, respecting and allowing Congressman Alfonso V. Umali, Jr. as the duly
nominated Commission on Appointments member of the Liberal Party of the Philippines
to sit therein as such.12

Respondents Senator Villar and CA Secretary Aspiras filed their Comment13 on December 6,
2007, moving for the dismissal of the petition on these grounds:

I. THE POWER TO ELECT MEMBERS TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

BELONGS TO EACH HOUSE OF CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTION.
AS SUCH, THE PETITION IS NOT DIRECTED AT THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS.

II. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE COMMISSION MUST
HAVE COMPLETE MEMBERSHIP IN ORDER THAT IT CAN FUNCTION. WHAT
THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES IS THAT THERE MUST AT LEAST BE A
MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION FOR IT TO VALIDLY
CONDUCT ITS PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSACT ITS BUSINESS.14 (Emphasis in the
original)

Then Speaker De Venecia and Representative Defensor filed their Comment and Opposition15 on
February 18, 2008, moving too for the dismissal of the petition on these grounds:

I. THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF DO NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION THAT WILL JUSTIFY THE GRANT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY
WRIT OF MANDAMUS.16

II. THE LIBERAL PARTY DOES NOT POSSESS THE REQUISITE NUMBER OF
MEMBERS THAT WOULD ENTITLE THE PARTY TO A SEAT IN THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. IT IS, THEREFORE, NOT THE PROPER
PARTY TO INSTITUTE THE INSTANT PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO.17

III. THE PETITIONERS FAILED TO EXHAUST THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO

THEM.18

IV. THE CONFLICTING CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES AS TO THE AFFILIATION OF

THE MEMBERS NEED TO BE SETTLED IN A TRIAL.19 (Emphasis in the original)

Meantime, Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal of PDP-Laban, by separate letters of April
17, 2008 to Senator Villar and Speaker Prospero Nograles, claimed that the composition of the
Senate contingent in the CA violated the constitutional requirement of proportional
representation for the following reasons:

1. PMP has two representatives in the CA although it only has two members in the Senate
and thus [is] entitled only to one (1) seat.

2. KAMPI has only one (1) member in the Senate and thus is not entitled to a CA seat
and yet it is represented in the CA.
 3. PRP has only one (1) member in the Senate and thus is not entitled to a CA seat and
yet it is represented in the CA.

4. If Senators Richard Gordon and Pilar Juliana Cayetano are Independents, then Sen.
Gordon cannot be a member of the CA as Independents cannot be represented in the CA
even though there will be three Independents in the CA.

5. If Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano is now NP, he still can sit in the CA representing NP.20

She also claimed that the composition of the House of Representatives contingent in the CA
violated the constitutional requirement of proportional representation for the following reasons:

1. Lakas-CMD currently has five (5) members in the Commission on Appointments

although it is entitled only to four (4) representatives and thus [is] in excess of a member;

2. KAMPI currently has three (3) members in the Commission on Appointments although
it is entitled only to two (2) representatives and thus is excess of a member;

3. Liberal Party is not represented in the Commission on Appointments although it is

entitled to one (1) nominee; and

4. Party-List CIBAC has a representative in the Commission on Appointments although it

only has two members in the House of Representatives and therefore [is] not entitled to
any seat.21

Senator Madrigal thus requested the reorganization of the membership of the CA and that, in the
meantime, "all actions of [the] CA be held in abeyance as the same may be construed as illegal
and unconstitutional."22

By letter of May 13, 2008, Senator Madrigal again wrote Senator Villar as follows:

Today, I was advised that the Committee on Budget and Management of Senator Mar Roxas has
endorsed the ad interim appointment of Rolando G. Andaya as Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management for approval by the CA in the plenary. I believe it is imperative that the
serious constitutional questions that I have raised be settled before the plenary acts on this
endorsement by the Committee on Budget and Management. Otherwise, like Damocles’ sword, a
specter of doubt continues to be raised on the validity of actions taken by the CA and its
committees.23

Still later or on May 19, 2008, Senator Madrigal sent another letter to Senator Villar declaring
that she "cannot in good conscience continue to participate in the proceedings of the CA, until
such time as [she] get[s] a response to [her] letters and until the constitutional issue of the CA’s
composition is resolved by the leadership of the Commission,"24 and that without any such
resolution, she would be forced to invoke Section 20 of the CA rules against every official whose
confirmation would be submitted to the body for deliberation.25

The CA Committee on Rules and Resolutions, by letter-comment of May 26, 2008, opined that
the CA has neither the power nor the discretion to reject a member who is elected by either
House, and that any complaints about the election of a member or members should be addressed
to the body that elected them.26

By letter of May 28, 2008, Senator Villar advised Senator Madrigal as follows:

xxxx

Noting your position that you will not continue to participate in the proceedings of the CA …
"until the constitutional issue of the CA’s composition is resolved by the leadership of the
Commission" x x x, the Secretary of the Commission, upon my instructions, transmitted the
same to the CA Committee on Rules and Resolutions. It was my intention to have the Committee
study and deliberate on the matter and to recommend what step/s to take on your request that "all
actions of the Commission be held in abeyance" x x x.

In view however, of your manifestation during the May 26, 2008 meeting of the CA Committee
on Rules and Resolutions, and of the written comment of Sen. Arroyo that "If there is a
complaint in the election of a member or members, it shall be addressed to the body that elected
them, namely the Senate and/or the House," I have given instructions to transmit the original
copies of your letters to the Senate Secretary for their immediate inclusion in the Order of
Business of the Session of the Senate so that your concerns may be addressed by the Senate in
caucus and/or in plenary.27 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Undaunted, Senator Madrigal, by letter of June 2, 2008 addressed to Senator Villar, reiterated her
request that all actions of the CA be held in abeyance pending the reorganization of both the
Senate and House of Representatives contingents.28

Senator Madrigal thereafter filed on June 13, 2008 the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, for
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order/writ of
preliminary injunction against Senator Villar in his capacity as Senate President and Ex-Officio
Chairman of the CA, Speaker Nograles, and the CA,29 alleging that respondents committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

A. . . . IN FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED

PROPORTIONAL PARTY REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS;

B. . . . IN CONTINUOUSLY CONDUCTING HEARINGS AND PROCEEDINGS ON

THE APPOINTMENTS DESPITE THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS’
UNCONSTITUTIONAL COMPOSITION WHICH MUST BE PROHIBITED BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT; and

C. . . . IN FAILING, DESPITE REPEATED DEMANDS FROM PETITIONER, TO RE-

ORGANIZE THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE MANDATED PROPORTIONAL PARTY REPRESENTATION OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, WHICH REQUIREMENT MUST BE ENFORCED BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT.30 (Emphasis in the original)

She thus prayed for the

1. . . . issu[ance of] a temporary restraining order/a writ of preliminary injunction to

enjoin Respondents from proceeding with their illegal and unlawful actions as officials
and members of the Commission on Appointments which composition is
unconstitutional, pending resolution of the instant Petition;

2. Declar[ation that] the composition of the Commission on Appointments [is] null and
void insofar as it violates the proportional party representation requirement mandated by
Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution;

3. Issu[ance of] a Writ of Prohibition against respondents Senate President Manuel Villar,
Speaker Prospero Nograles and Secretary Gemma Aspiras to desist from further
proceeding with their illegal and unlawful actions as officers of the Commission on
Appointments, the composition of which is null and void for being violative of the
proportional party representation requirement under Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution; and
 4. Issu[ance of] a Writ of Mandamus commanding respondents Senate President Manuel
Villar, Speaker Prospero Nograles and Secretary Gemma Aspiras to reorganize and
reconstitute the Commission on Appointments in accordance with the 1987
Constitution.31

The Court consolidated G.R. No. 18005532 and G.R. No. 183055 on July 1, 2008.

Petitioners in the first petition, G.R. No. 180055, later filed on August 15, 2008 a Motion with
Leave of Court to Withdraw the Petition,33 alleging that with the designation of Representative
Alfonso V. Umali, Jr. of the Liberal Party as a member of the House of Representatives
contingent in the CA in replacement of Representative Eduardo M. Gullas of KAMPI, their
petition had become moot and academic.

In his Comment of August 19, 2008 on the second petition, respondent Senator Villar proffered
the following arguments:

I.

Petitioner has no standing to file [the] petition.

II.

Petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort. Each House
of Congress has the sole function of reconstituting or changing the composition of its own
contingent to the CA.

III.

Petitioner is estopped.

IV.

Presumption of regularity in the conduct of official functions.

V.

The extraordinary remedies of Prohibition and Mandamus and the relief of a TRO are not
available to the Petitioner.34 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

In his Comment and Opposition35 filed on September 3, 2008, Speaker Nograles proffered the
following arguments:

A. WITH RESPECT TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE PETITIONS

HAVE ALREADY BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC UPON THE ELECTION OF
REPRESENTATIVE ALFONSO V. UMALI, JR., MEMBER OF THE LIBERAL PARTY,
TO THE HOUSE CONTINGENT TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS.36

B. THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF DO NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION THAT WILL JUSTIFY THE ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION BY
THE

HONORABLE COURT AND THE GRANT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY WRITS OF

MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION.37

C. THE REMEDY OF THOSE WHO SEEK TO RECONSTITUTE THE HOUSE

CONTINGENT TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS RESTS, IN THE FIRST
INSTANCE, WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.38
D. CONSIDERING THE AFOREMENTIONED FACTS AND JURISPRUDENCE, IT IS
SUBMITTED THAT SENATOR MADRIGAL HAS NO STANDING TO PURSUE THE
INSTANT CASE.

E. THE PETITION IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY A VERIFICATION AND

CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING AS REQUIRED BY RULE 65
SECTIONS 2 AND 3 AND SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 28-
91. (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

The first petition, G.R. No. 180055, has thus indeed been rendered moot with the designation of
a Liberal Party member of the House contingent to the CA, hence, as prayed for, the petition is
withdrawn.

As for the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, it fails.

Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained direct injury as a result of the act complained
of.39 Her petition does not in fact allege that she or her political party PDP-Laban was deprived
of a seat in the CA, or that she or PDP-Laban possesses personal and substantial interest to
confer on her/it locus standi.

Senator Madrigal’s primary recourse rests with the respective Houses of Congress and not with
this Court. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that prior recourse to the House is
necessary before she may bring her petition to court.40 Senator Villar’s invocation of said
doctrine is thus well-taken, as is the following observation of Speaker Nograles, citing Sen.
Pimentel, Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:41

In order that the remedies of Prohibition and Mandamus may be availed of, there must be "no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law".lavvph!1

It is worth recalling that, in the 11th Congress, Senator Aquilino Pimentel advocated the
allocation of a position in the Commission on Appointments for the Party-List Representatives.
Just like the Petitioner in the instant case, Senator Pimentel first wrote to the Senate President,
requesting that the Commission on Appointments be restructured to conform to the constitutional
provision on proportional representation. xxx Without awaiting final determination of the
question xxx, Pimentel filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with the Supreme Court.
In the said case, the Honorable Court ruled:

"The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives
those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18,
Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to
elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House
members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution,
each chamber exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among
their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal.

xxxx

Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have
agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse
clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not this Court. Under Sections 17 and
18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House that
they possess the required strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the
House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of
political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this
Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior
recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the
court. Consequently, petitioner’s direct recourse to this Court is premature.

Following the ruling in Pimentel, it cannot be said that recourse was already had in the House of
Representatives. Furnishing a copy of Petitioner’s letter to the Senate President and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives does not constitute the primary recourse required prior
to the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Further, it is the Members of the
House who claim to have been deprived of a seat in the Commission on Appointments that must
first show to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in
the Commission on Appointments. Just like Senator Pimentel, demanding seats in the
Commission on Appointments for Congressmen, who have not even raised the issue of its
present composition in the House, is not Senator Madrigal’s affair.42 (Italics, underscoring, and
emphasis supplied by Representative Nograles)

It bears noting that Senator Villar had already transmitted original copies of Senator Madrigal’s
letters to the Senate Secretary for inclusion in the Order of Business of the Session of the Senate
to address her concerns. Senator Madrigal’s filing of the second petition is thus premature.

Senator Madrigal’s suggestion – that Senators Pilar Juliana Cayetano and Richard Gordon be
considered independent senators such that the latter should not be allowed to be a member of the
CA,43 and that Senator Alan Peter Cayetano be considered a member of the NP such that he may
sit in the CA as his inclusion in NP will entitle his party to one seat – involves a determination of
party affiliations, a question of fact which the Court does not resolve.

WHEREFORE, the Motion with Leave of Court to Withdraw the Petition in G.R. No. 180055
is GRANTED. The Petition is WITHDRAWN. The Petition in G.R. No. 183055 is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION* DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
*
On official leave.
1
Vide rollo (G.R. No. 180055), pp. 23-24.
2
Vide id. at 14.
3
Ibid.
4
In what capacity he replied to Representative Tañada is not mentioned in the rollo.
5
Rollo (G.R. No. 180055), p. 14.
6
Id. at 25.
7
Ibid.
8
Id. at 14-15.
9
Id. at 53.
10
Id. at 3-44.
11
Id. at 26.
12
Id. at 35-36.
13
Id. at 69-77.
14
Id. at 71, 73.
15
Id. at 111-181.
16
Id. at 113.
17
Id. at 125.
18
Id. at 133.
19
Id. at 137.
20
Rollo (G.R. No. 183055), pp. 34-35.
 21
Id. at 37.
22
Id. at 37-38.
23
Id. at 39.
24
Id. at 42.
25
Ibid.
26
Id. at 43.
27
Id. at 44.
28
Id. at 46.
29
Id. at 3-29.
30
Id. at 12.
31
Id. at 26-27.
32
Id. at 106.
33
Id. at 245-257.
34
Id. at 133.
35
Id. at 158-184.
36
Id. at 163.
37
Id. at 164.
38
Id. at 174.
39
Vide David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160,
327.
40
Sen. Pimentel, Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 441 Phil. 492, 503
(2002).
41
Id. at 497-498, 500-503.
42
Rollo (G.R. No. 183055), pp. 175-176.
43
Id. at 18-19.

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 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 104139 December 22, 1992

LYDIA M. PROFETA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Office of the
President of the Philippines, respondent.
PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing a portion of the decision of the Office
of the President, dated 23 October 1991, declaring petitioner as compulsorily retired as
of 15 October 1991 and the resolution dated 31 January 1992 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of said decision.

The antecedents are the following:

Petitioner, Dr. Lydia M. Profeta, served as Executive Dean of the Rizal Technological
Colleges from 24 October 1974 to 15 October 1978. From 16 October 1978 to 30 April
1979, petitioner was the appointed Acting President of said College until her promotion
to President of the same college on 1 May 1979.

After the 1986 EDSA revolution or on 5 March 1986, petitioner filed her courtesy
resignation as President of the Rizal Technological Colleges and the same was
accepted on 21 March 1986. A day before the acceptance of her courtesy resignation,
petitioner applied for sick leave.

On 4 November 1988, petitioner was appointed Acting President of Eulogio "Amang"

Rodriguez Institute of Science and Technology (hereinafter referred to as EARIST) and
was thereafter appointed its President on 29 March 1989.

After reaching the age of sixty-five (65) years on 16 June 1989, petitioner inquired from
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) as to whether she may be allowed to
extend her services with the government as President of EARIST beyond the age of
sixty-five (65) years, to enable her to avail of the old-age pension retirement benefits
under PD 1146 (Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977). In answer to her
query, petitioner was advised by the GSIS to return to the service until she shall have
fulfilled the fifteen (15) years service requirement pursuant of Section 11 of PD 1146, to
qualify for the old-age pension retirement plan. The GSIS declared that petitioner was
not yet eligible to retire under PD 1146, as she had not rendered the sufficient number
of years of service on the date of her supposed retirement on 16 June 1989 and that her
creditable service was only twelve (12) years and two (2) months. As things stood, she
could only claim one hundred percent (100%) of her average monthly compensation for
every year of creditable service or to a refund of her premium contributions with the
GSIS. 1

On 6 October 1989, as recommended by the Department of Education, Culture and

Sports (DECS) Secretary and the Board of Trustees of EARIST, President Aquino,
through Deputy Executive Secretary Magdangal B. Elma, extended the term of
petitioner as President of EARIST until she shall have completed the required fifteen
(15) years of service after reaching the age of sixty five (65) years on the date of her
normal retirement on 16 June 1989 or for an additional period of two (2) years, seven
(7) months and twelve (12) days. 2

In March 1990, the EARIST Faculty and Employees Union filed an administrative
complaint against petitioner before the Office of the President, for her alleged irregular
appointment and for graft and corrupt practices. In a memorandum, dated 16 August
1990, the Office of the President furnished petitioner a copy of the complaint with a
directive to file an answer thereto with the DECS Secretary, who was duly authorized to
conduct a formal investigation of the charges against petitioner. Pending investigation of
the complaint, petitioner was placed under preventive suspension for a period of ninety
(90) days. 3 After serving the period of suspension, petitioner re-assumed her duties and
functions as President of EARIST.
In a letter dated 20 July 1990, DECS Secretary Cariño recommended the compulsory
retirement of petitioner. 4

For the purpose of investigating the administrative charges against petitioner, 5 an Ad-
Hoc Committee was created by President Aquino on 12 February 1991. The parties
filed their respective pleadings and hearings in the case were conducted by the
committee.

Pending resolution of the administrative charges against her, petitioner was detailed
with the DECS Central Office pursuant to a memorandum dated 13 February 1991
signed by Deputy Executive Secretary Sarmiento III. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
40, seeking her reinstatement as EARIST President. After trial, said petition was
dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari on 2 April
1991. 6

Petitioner likewise assailed her reassignment with the DECS Central Office, before the
Civil Service Commission (CSC). On 30 July 1991, the CSC denied petitioner's
complaint. She moved for reconsideration of said resolution but the same was denied
on 3 December 1991, which prompted petitioner to file a petition for certiorari before this
Court docketed as G.R. No. 103271. On 3 March 1992, this Court dismissed said
petition.

After evaluating the evidence presented before the Ad-Hoc Committee, in a decision 7
dated 23 October 1991, the Office of the President dismissed the administrative
complaint against petitioner for lack of substantial evidence. In the same decision, the
Office of the President also declared petitioner as compulsory retired from government
service as of 15 October 1991, holding that:

... (I)f the aforesaid sick leave of 62 working days (approximately 3 months) were to be
added to the respondent's creditable service, together with the period of two (2) weeks
which the respondent's counsel admits in his Memorandum the respondent had served
as Professorial Lecturer, the respondent should be considered as compulsorily retired as
of Oct. 15, 1991, having completed the required 15 years in the service on or about the
said date after reaching the age of 65.

Accordingly, the administrative charges against Dr. Lydia M. Profeta for her alleged
"irregular appointment and graft and corrupt practices" are hereby dismissed. However,
Dr. Profeta is hereby considered as now compulsorily retired from the service as of
October 15, 1991, in accordance with the provisions of Section 11 (b) of Presidential
Decree No. 1146, having completed fifteen (15) years in the government service on or
about he said date after reaching the age of sixty-five (65) on June 16, 1989. 8

In a letter dated 23 October 1991, petitioner requested the GSIS to determine the exact
date of her retirement. On 5 November 1991, petitioner was advised by the GSIS that
the exact date of her retirement falls on 14 August 1992. 9

A motion for reconsideration was then filed by petitioner with the Office of the President,
assailing the portion of its decision declaring her as compulsorily retired from the service
as of 15 October 1991, alleging that the said office has no jurisdiction over the issue of
her compulsory retirement from the government service.

In a resolution 10 dated 31 January 1992, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was

denied by the Office of the President. In the same resolution, the Office of the President
clarified that there was an over extension of petitioner's period of service with the
government by failure to reckon with the sixty-two (62) working days during which
petitioner went on sick leave (from 20 March to 17 June 1986) and the period of two (2)
weeks during which petitioner served as Professorial Lecturer. In considering petitioner
as compulsory retired as of 15 October 1991, the Office of the President held that it
merely resolved motu proprio to shorten by three-and-a-half (3-1/2) months the
extension granted to petitioner to complete the required fifteen (15) years of service for
purposes of retirement. It further declared that it is for the President to determine
whether or not petitioner could still continue as EARIST President despite her
exoneration from the administrative charges filed against her.

Under Presidential Decree No. 1146 (Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977), one
of the benefits provided for qualified members of the GSIS is the old-age pension
benefit. A member who has rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service and is at least
sixty (60) years old when separated from the service, is entitled to a basic monthly
pension for life but for not less than five (5) years. On the other hand, a member who
has rendered less than fifteen (15) years of service but with at least three (3) years of
service and is sixty (60) years of age when separated from the service is entitled to a
cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the average monthly
compensation for every year of service.

However, retirement is compulsory for a member who has reached the age of sixty-five
(65) years with at least fifteen (15) years of service. If he has less than fifteen (15) years
of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen (15)
years, 11 to avail of the old-age pension benefit.

To a public servant, a pension is not a gratuity but rather a form of deferred

compensation for services performed and his right to it commences to vest upon his
entry into the retirement system and becomes an enforceable obligation in court upon
fulfillment of all conditions under which it is to be paid. Similarly, retirement benefits
receivable by public employees are valuable parts of the consideration for entrance into
and continuation in public office or employment. They serve a public purpose and a
primary objective in establishing them is to induce competent persons to enter and
remain in public employment and render faithful and efficient service while so employed.
12
Retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because their intention
is to provide for his sustenance and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the
stamina to continue earning his livelihood. 13 The liberal approach aims to achieve the
humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and well-being of
government employees maybe enhanced. 14

In the case at bar, at the time petitioner reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-
five (65) years, she had rendered less than the required fifteen (15) years of service
under Section 11 of P.D. 1146. Thus, to enable her to avail of the old-age pension
benefit, she was allowed to continue in the service and her term as President of
EARIST was extended until she shall have completed the fifteen (15) years service
requirement, or for an additional two (2) years, seven (7) months, and twelve (12) days,
as determined by the Office of the President.

This period of extended service granted to petitioner was amended by the Office of the
President. In resolving the administrative complaint against petitioner, the Office of the
President, ruled not only on the issues of alleged irregular appointment of petitioner and
of graft and corrupt practices, but went further by, in effect, reducing the period of
extension of service granted to petitioner on the ground that the latter had already
completed the fifteen (15) years service requirement under P.D. 1146, and declared
petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991.

In other words, the extension of service of petitioner was until January 1992. However,
the Office of the President made a new computation of petitioner's period of service with
the government, the Office of the President included as part of her service the sixty-two
(62) days sick leave applied for by petitioner covering the period between 20 March to
17 June 1988 and her service as a lecturer of approximately two (2) weeks, or a total of
three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months. As a result of this new computation, petitioner's
extension of service which was supposed to end in January 1992 was reduced by the
Office of the President by three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months or until 15 October 1991.

On the other hand, the computation made by the GSIS as to the exact date of
retirement of petitioner fell on 14 August 1992. 15 Thus, the extension of service granted
to petitioner by the Office of the President for two (2) years, seven (7) months and
twelve (12) days which brought her services only up to January 1992, would not enable
herein petitioner to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for purposes of
retirement. To allow the Office of the President to shorten the extension of service of
petitioner by three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months which consist of petitioner's sick leave and
service as lecturer, would further reduce petitioner's service with the government. Such
reduction from petitioner's service would deprive her of the opportunity of availing of the
old-age pension plan, based on the computation of the GSIS.

We hold that it is the GSIS which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine
whether a member is qualified or not to avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D.
1146, based on its computation of a member's years of service with the government. 16
The computation of a member's service includes not only full time but also part time and
other services with compensation as may be included under the rules and regulations
prescribed by the System. 17

The sixty-two (62) days leave of absence of petitioner between 20 March to 17 June
1986 and her part-time service as a lecturer f approximately two (2) weeks, or a total of
three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months is not reflected in her service record. Said period should
be considered as part of her service with the government and it is only but proper that
her service record be amended to reflect said period of service.

We have observed that the computation made by the GSIS of petitioner's date of
retirement failed to take into account the three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months service of
petitioner which was not reflected in her service record. If we deduct this unrecorded
three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months service of petitioner from 14 August 1992, petitioner is
to be considered retired on 30 April 1992.

The order of the Office of the President declaring petitioner as compulsorily retired as of
15 October 1991 defeats the purpose for allowing petitioner to remain in the service
until she has completed the fifteen (15) years service requirement. Between the period
of 16 October 1991 to 30 April 1992, petitioner should have been allowed to continue in
the service to be able to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement; she was
prepared to render services for said period but was not allowed to do so; she should,
therefore, the entitled to all her salaries, benefits and other emoluments during said
period (16 October 1991 - 30 April 1992). However, petitioner's claim for reinstatement
to her former position to enable her to complete the fifteen (15) year service
requirement for retirement purposes is no longer possible, considering that she is
deemed to have completed the said service requirement as of 30 April 1992.

WHEREFORE, the portion of the decision of the Office of the President dated 23
October 1991 declaring petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991 is SET
ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby declared to have been in the service as President of
EARIST from 16 October 1991 until 30 April 1992 and therefore entitled to all salaries,
benefits and other emoluments of said office from 16 October 1991 to 30 April 1992. In
addition, she is declared as entitled to her old-age pension benefits for having reached
age 65 years while in the service with 15 years of service to her credit, subject to her
compliance with all applicable regulations and requirements of the GSIS.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 41-42

2 Ibid., p. 49

3 Rollo, p. 50

4 Ibid., pp. 82-83

5 Ibid., pp. 53-54

6 Comment, Rollo, pp. 118-120

7 Rollo, pp. 25-33

8 Ibid., p. 33

9 Rollo, p. 71

10 Rollo, pp. 35-38

11 Sections 11 & 12, PD 1146

12 Ortiz v. Comelec, G.R. No. 78957, 28 June 1998, 162 SCRA 812

13 Santiago v. COA, G.R. No. 92284, 12 July 1991, 199 SCRA 125

14 Ortiz v. Comelec, supra.

15 Rollo, p. 56

16 Section 24, PD 1146

17 Section 10, PD 1146

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