Government's Motions in Limine: Fotios Geas Case

Case 1:09-cr-01239-PKC Document 110 Filed 01/07/11 Page 1 of 56
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------x
:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :
:
- v.- : S4 09 Cr. 1239 (PKC)
:
ARTHUR NIGRO, :
a/k/a “Artie,” :
a/k/a “the Short Guy,” :
a/k/a “the Little Guy,” :
FOTIOS GEAS, :
a/k/a “Freddy,” and :
TY GEAS, :
:
Defendants. :
:
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GOVERNMENT’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE
PREET BHARARA
United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York
Attorney for the United States
of America
MARK LANPHER
ELIE HONIG
DANIEL S. GOLDMAN
Assistant United States Attorneys
- Of Counsel -
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------x
:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :
:
- v.- : S4 09 Cr. 1239 (PKC)
:
ARTHUR NIGRO, :
a/k/a “Artie,” :
a/k/a “the Short Guy,” :
a/k/a “the Little Guy,” :
FOTIOS GEAS, :
a/k/a “Freddy,” and :
TY GEAS, :
:
Defendants. :
:
------------------------------x
GOVERNMENT’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE
The Government respectfully submits motions in limine: (1)
to admit evidence of other bad acts of the defendants as relevant
proof of the charged crimes; (2) to admit evidence of the
defendants’ prior prison terms; (3) to admit statements made by
defendant Fotios Geas regarding the murder of Gary Westerman; (4)
to admit certain statements that the defendants’ victims (Adolfo
Bruno and Gary Westerman) made to law enforcement prior to their
murders; (5) to admit expert testimony regarding organized crime;
and (6) to empanel an anonymous jury.

I. Motion to Admit Evidence of Other Bad Acts of the Defendants
The Government respectfully requests an in limine
ruling from the Court that evidence of various crimes and other
bad acts of the defendants and their co-conspirators may be
offered at trial. The proffered evidence is admissible to prove
the specific charged predicate offenses underlying the
racketeering conspiracy; to prove the existence and nature of the
charged racketeering enterprise more generally; and to prove the
background of the relationships of the defendants with their co-
conspirators, and with the enterprise.
A. Relevant Facts
1. The Indictment – Racketeering Charges
Count One of the Indictment charges Arthur Nigro,
Fotios Geas, and Ty Geas with conspiring to participate in the
affairs of a racketeering enterprise, from in or about 2001
through in or about February 2010, in violation of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 1962(d). (Indictment ¶ 14).1 The
charged racketeering enterprise is the Genovese Organized Crime
Family of La Cosa Nostra (the “Genovese Family”). (Indictment ¶¶
1-8, 14). Count One charges that Nigro, Fotios Geas, Ty Geas,
and their co-conspirators agreed to conduct and participate in
the affairs of the Genovese Family through a pattern of
1
All references to paragraphs of and Counts in the
Indictment are references to the proposed Redacted Indictment,
being filed today by the Government under separate cover.
2
racketeering activity consisting of the following underlying
predicate offenses: murder, extortion, loansharking, gambling,
interstate travel, union corruption, and narcotics trafficking –
all committed in violation of federal and/or state statutes that
are cited specifically in the Indictment. (Indictment ¶ 14).
Count Two of the Indictment charges Nigro, Fotios Geas,
and Ty Geas with a substantive racketeering offense, from in or
about 2001 through in or about February 2010, in violation of
Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962(c). (Indictment ¶¶
21-31). Count Two is comprised of nine separate racketeering
acts, including the following: (1) Racketeering Act One, the
November 2003 murder of Adolfo Bruno, which is alleged against
all three defendants (Indictment ¶ 23); (2) Racketeering Act Two,
the November 2003 murder of Gary Westerman, which is alleged
against Fotios Geas and Ty Geas (Indictment ¶ 24); (3)
Racketeering Act Three, the May 2003 attempted murder of Frank
Dadabo, which is alleged against all three defendants (Indictment
¶ 25); (4) Racketeering Act Four, the Fall 2003 conspiracy to
murder Louis Santos, which is alleged against all three
defendants (Indictment ¶ 26); (5) Racketeering Act Five, the
conspiracy to extort and extortion of James Santaniello, which is
alleged against all three defendants (Indictment ¶ 27); (6)
Racketeering Act Six, the conspiracy to extort Carlo and Genaro
Sarno, which is alleged against Fotios Geas and Ty Geas
3
(Indictment ¶ 28); (7) Racketeering Act Seven, the conspiracy to
extort and attempted extortion of Michael and Anthony Grant,
which is alleged against all three defendants (Indictment ¶ 29);
(8) Racketeering Act Eight, loansharking involving loans made in
Florida, which is alleged against Arthur Nigro (Indictment ¶ 30);
(9) Racketeering Act Nine, operation of an illegal gambling
business, which is alleged against Arthur Nigro, (Indictment ¶
31).2
2. Evidence of Other Bad Acts
The Government intends to offer evidence at trial of
numerous additional specific crimes and bad acts committed by
each of the defendants. As discussed in more detail below, the
evidence set forth in this motion is admissible to prove the
specific charged predicate offenses underlying the racketeering
conspiracy; to prove the existence and nature of the charged
racketeering enterprise more generally; and to prove the
background of the relationships of the defendants with their co-
conspirators, and with the enterprise.
Proof of the criminal acts described below will, in
most instances, take the form of testimony from cooperating
witnesses. In a few instances, there will be additional evidence
2
The Government does not intend to proceed to trial with
the originally-numbered Racketeering Act Nine of the S4
Indictment, or the originally numbered Counts Eight through
Eleven, which alleged a specific instance of loansharking against
Arthur Nigro.
4
such as corroborating testimony or evidence from law enforcement.
To the extent that the Government becomes aware, prior to or
during the course of trial, of evidence of additional uncharged
acts or crimes that it will seek to offer, the Government will
provide prompt notice to the Court and defense counsel.
The following is a list of certain evidence – in rough
chronological order - beyond the specifically identified crimes
in the Racketeering Acts and additional substantive counts that
the Government seeks to prove at trial:
a. Prison Beating by Ty Geas
Anthony Arillotta, who is expected to testify at trial
pursuant to a cooperation agreement with the Government, met Ty
Geas for the first time when they were incarcerated in the same
facility in approximately 1990. While incarcerated together,
Arillotta and Ty Geas formed a close bond and, through Ty Geas,
Arillotta met Fotios Geas (when he visited his brother, Ty, in
prison). Indeed, while incarcerated together, Arillotta and Ty
Geas made plans to continue committing crimes together upon their
release. Arillotta was scheduled to be released in approximately
February 1991; Ty Geas was scheduled to be released in
approximately March 1991.
However, after Arillotta was released, Arillotta
learned from both Fotios Geas and Ty Geas that Ty would not be
released as scheduled and, rather, would be incarcerated for
5
approximately 4 more years, because he had viciously assaulted a
prison guard. Specifically, Ty Geas told Arillotta that he had
assaulted the guard after he believed the guard disrespected him.
Fotios Geas, who was then on the street with Arillotta, also told
Arillotta the same thing. This delayed Arillotta’s plan to
commit crimes with Ty Geas, while at the same time reinforcing
the confidence Arillotta had that Ty Geas was a “capable” guy who
could help to commit acts of violence once released from prison.
In the meantime, while awaiting Ty Geas’s release from prison,
Arillotta began to commit crimes with Fotios Geas, as described
in more detail below.
b. Robberies by Fotios Geas and Ty Geas
Arillotta is expected to testify that on multiple
occasions beginning in the early 1990s, he, Fotios Geas, and
others (including Louis Santos, whom the defendants later
conspired to kill because they believed him to be a law
enforcement informant) robbed goods from tractor trailers to sell
on the street in Massachusetts. While robbery is not a charged
predicate offense of the RICO conspiracy, these robberies were a
critical factor in the developing criminal relationship between
Arillotta and Fotios Geas, and Fotios Geas’s association with the
enterprise.
In addition, Arillotta is expected to testify that
Fotios and Ty Geas committed numerous additional robberies
6
throughout 1990s and 2000s. In particular, Fotios and Ty Geas
robbed drug dealers of drugs and/or money on numerous occasions,
and used the proceeds of those robberies to finance their
narcotics trafficking. Evidence of these robberies is directly
relevant not only to prove the conspiratorial relationships at
issue, but also to prove the charged predicate offense of
narcotics trafficking; Fotios and Ty Geas frequently robbed other
drug dealers of narcotics and then sold the narcotics themselves.
Separately, Frank Roche3 is also expected to testify
that Fotios Geas and Ty Geas discussed committing robberies with
him. In addition, Fotios Geas made arrangements for Roche to
commit robberies in the New York area after Roche had murdered
Bruno and fled the area (which Roche did with Fotios Geas’s
assistance).
c. 1996 Truck Theft by Fotios Geas
The Government expects to offer evidence of a 1996
robbery that Fotios Geas committed along with Gary Westerman (who
eventually became the victim of the November 4, 2003 murder
charged in Count Two of the Indictment). Both Fotios Geas and
Westerman were arrested on May 28, 1996, after they were caught
trying to sell merchandise that they had robbed from a tractor
trailer days earlier. In total, the stolen trailer and its
3
Roche is expected to testify at trial, pursuant to a
cooperation agreement with the Government.
7
contents (which primarily consisted of 48 computer systems) were
valued at approximately $100,000.
After their arrests, both Fotios Geas and Gary
Westerman were released on bail. Within weeks of his arrest,
Gary Westerman began cooperating with the Massachusetts State
Police, including by providing information about Fotios Geas.
Indeed, the Government expects to offer testimony that on June
20, 1996, Gary Westerman provided a tip to the Massachusetts
State Police that led directly to a car stop of Fotios Geas.
Fotios Geas was found in possession of not only merchandise from
the tractor trailer robbery, but also marijuana and a ledger
appearing to document loansharking debts, for which he was again
arrested. Fotios Geas and Westerman ultimately both pleaded
guilty to the tractor trailer theft, and each served several
years in prison.4
The Government intends to offer testimony and evidence
about this theft not only to show the relationship among co-
conspirators in the enterprise, but also to establish Fotios and
Ty Geas’s motive for murdering Gary Westerman seven years later.
Specifically, the Government expects Arillotta to testify that
4
Notwithstanding the fact that he cooperated with the
Massachusetts State Police, Westerman thereafter breached his
cooperation agreement by committing additional crimes, including
a check fraud scheme. At the time of sentencing on the 1996
truck theft, Westerman asked for no consideration for having
cooperated, hoping that it would conceal the fact of his
cooperation - which had not been made public.
8
both Fotios and Ty Geas repeatedly stated that they believed
(correctly) that Westerman was an informant for law enforcement
and, more specifically, believed (correctly) that Westerman had
cooperated with the authorities against Fotios Geas following the
1996 truck heist for which they were both arrested.
d. Prior Conspiracies to murder Gary Westerman
Anthony Arillotta is expected to testify regarding two
prior conspiracies to murder and/or shoot Gary Westerman, each of
which he himself participated in, along with Fotios Geas. First,
Arillotta is expected to testify that shortly after Fotios Geas’
initial arrest in the 1996 tractor trailer theft case, Fotios
Geas reached out for Arillotta’s assistance in a plan to kill
Westerman - for fear that Westerman would cooperate against him.
Arillotta, Louis Santos, and Fotios Geas made arrangements to
carry out such a murder, whereby Santos would lure Westerman to a
van where Arillotta and Fotios Geas would be waiting, and where
Fotios Geas would shoot him. The plan was aborted after Santos
went to Westerman’s house to lure him out, and a woman answered
the door.
Second, in approximately 2002, Arillotta sought
assistance from Fotios Geas and an individual named Michael
DeCaro in a plan to shoot Gary Westerman. This time, the primary
motivation for shooting Westerman was that Westerman was dating
Arillotta’s sister-in-law. Arillotta did not approve, and
9
thought Westerman was disrespecting him by continuing to date his
sister-in-law. Arillotta and Fotios Geas developed a plan for
Fotios Geas (who was at that point again friendly with Westerman)
to lure Westerman to a dinner. Fotios Geas would then page
Arillotta, and walk outside with Westerman, at which time
Arillotta and DeCaro would do a drive-by shooting of Westerman.
The plan was initiated – Fotios geas in fact lured Westerman to
the location – but, because of miscommunication, Arillotta and
DeCaro did not get to the scene in time to shoot Westerman. The
plan was then aborted.
In each case, these events not only go to establishing
the existence of the enterprise and the predicate act of murder;
but also to showing how the relationships developed among Fotios
Geas and Arillotta, and establishing Fotios and Ty Geas’s motives
for killing Westerman.
e. Conspiracy to Murder Guiseppe Manzi5
The Government intends to offer evidence regarding
Fotios and Ty Geas’s relationship with Guiseppe Manzi, including
their efforts to murder him in the summer and fall of 2003. This
evidence is admissible proof of Fotios and Ty Geas’s membership
in the enterprise, and their efforts to commit the charged
5
The Government may seek to add a racketeering act to
Count Two, the substantive RICO charge, relating to the Manzi
murder conspiracy. At a minimum, as discussed herein, evidence
of this act is directly relevant to the RICO conspiracy charged
in Count One.
10
predicate racketeering offenses of murder and narcotics
trafficking. In addition, the evidence is necessary to prove the
relationship of trust that existed among the defendants,
Arillotta, and Roche, as they not only participated in these
crimes together, but would go on to commit additional serious
crimes in the following months.
Guiseppe Manzi is a narcotics dealer based in
Springfield, Massachusetts who has long been affiliated with
Italian Organized Crime. Fotios and Ty Geas’s relationship with
Manzi was rooted in their rival criminal activities. For
example, in approximately 2002, Fotios and Ty Geas robbed Manzi’s
cousin at gunpoint of approximately $100,000 in marijuana.6 In
addition, Ty Geas was frustrated that he believed Manzi was
stealing his marijuana customers and was an informant for law
enforcement.
The rivalry escalated in 2003, when Fotios and Ty Geas
enlisted Frank Roche to murder Guiseppe Manzi, and initially
offered Roche $10,000 to kill Manzi. Around the time of the
murder plot, Fotios and Ty Geas were involved in numerous
altercations with Manzi and members of Manzi’s crew. For
example, at one point in summer 2003, Ty Geas broke a window in
Manzi’s restaurant because Manzi refused to confront him.
6
Fotios and Ty Geas agreed to give approximately $5,000
of the proceeds of this robbery to Adolfo Bruno.
11
Shortly thereafter, on August 29, 2003, Fotios and Ty Geas,
Arillotta, Roche, and numerous others, participated in a fight
and shooting at the Civic Pub in downtown Springfield. That
evening, Arillotta’s crew received a telephone call that Brandon
Croteau (another associate of the defendants) had been involved
in a confrontation with Manzi and several of Manzi’s associates.
Believing that Manzi and his associates were then located at the
Civic Pub, Arillotta, Roche, Fotios Geas, Ty Geas, and several
others drove to the Civic Pub to confront them. The group was
armed with a firearm, golf clubs, baseball bats, and an ice pick.
As they arrived at the Civic Pub, they were confronted by several
employees. Fotios Geas then brandished a firearm and shot
several rounds at the front door. Two individuals were injured
as a result of this shooting. Fotios and Ty Geas then fled the
scene, as did Arillotta, Roche, and others.7
Two nights later, on August 31, 2003, Arillotta’s home
was shot numerous times.8 The same evening, Arillotta met with
Fotios and Ty Geas, and drove around the city planning to locate
those whom they believed had shot at Arillotta’s house (suspected
7
Springfield Police Officers recovered a handgun, three
golf clubs, an ice pick, a baseball bat, and eight .22 caliber
shell casings at the scene. A short time after the shooting,
police officers stopped a car driven by Ty Geas. Arillotta was
one of four passengers, and the police recovered an ice pick in
the car.
8
Arillotta was not present at the time, but his wife and
children were. No one was hurt.
12
to be Manzi and his associates), with an intention of killing
them with AK-47 assault rifles. Ultimately, they did not locate
or kill anyone that evening.
However, Frank Roche is expected to testify that after
this shooting, Fotios and Ty Geas “upped” their offer, and
promised him $25,000 if he would murder Manzi and those who had
shot Arillotta’s house. Fotios and Ty Geas suggested that he use
an AK-47 assault rifle and execute the murders at a busy
intersection in downtown Springfield, Massachusetts. Ultimately,
the plan was aborted.
f. Additional Acts of Violence by the Defendants
The defendants are specifically charged with several
completed and planned acts of violence, including the murders of
Adolfo Bruno and Gary Westerman, the attempted murder of Frank
Dadabo, and the conspiracy to murder Louis Santos. The
Government also intends to offer evidence of numerous additional
acts of violence by the defendants, in each case as evidence of
their criminal relationships with each other and their co-
conspirators, their relationship with the enterprise, and their
use of threats and intimidation to enforce their criminal aims.
For example, in October 2003, Fotios Geas offered Frank
Roche $1,000 to assault a Massachusetts resident named Jeff
Solely whom Fotios Geas indicated “needed to be taught a lesson”
because he was having a relationship with the wife of another mob
13
associate. Roche carried out the beating with a baseball bat,
and the victim ultimately went to the hospital. Several days
later, Ty Geas gave Roche $1,000 for having carried out the
attack.
In the fall of 2003, Arthur Nigro participated in a
violent beating of a Genovese Family associate named Anthony
DeFranco in Bronx, New York. This beating was rooted in a
dispute Nigro was having with another member of the Genovese
Family, and Nigro’s belief that DeFranco had disrespected another
individual, named Thomas Amaratti.
On July 11, 2004, Fotios Geas (along with another
associate named Angelo Malafronte) violently assaulted three
individuals in downtown Springfield, Massachusetts. Fotios Geas
and Malafronte were arrested for that assault, and Geas
subsequently pleaded guilty on February 22, 2005, to assault and
battery with a dangerous weapon in Hampden County Superior Court.
Geas was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment.
In August 2006, Fotios Geas, who was carrying a gun at
the time, and others participated in a violent beating of Felix
Tranghese.9 There will be evidence that Fotios Geas did this
because he believed Tranghese was preventing him from being able
to extort people successfully, and that Arthur Nigro approved of
9
Tranghese is expected to testify at trial, pursuant to
a cooperation agreement with the Government.
14
the beating because Tranghese had been “put on the shelf.”
Tranghese will testify that, as a result of this beating, his
ties with the defendants on trial and the Genovese Family were
severed.
g. Additional Extortions
The defendants are specifically charged with extorting
and/or conspiring to extort three sets of victims: (1) James
Santaniello, the owner of the Mardi Gras and other establishments
(Racketeering Act Five); (2) Genaro and Carlo Sarno, the owners
of a vending machine business (Racketeering Act Six); and (3)
Michael and Anthony Grant, the owners of the Hustler strip club
and other establishments (Racketeering Act Seven).
To prove the predicate offenses of extortion and
loansharking in the racketeering conspiracy, as well as to
establish the defendants’ relationship with the enterprise and
with each other, the Government expects to offer cooperating
witness testimony regarding the extortion and attempted extortion
of a number of other victims. These victims include but are not
limited to owners of local businesses, such as the Red Rose, Café
Manhattan, and the Hot Club in Springfield, Massachusetts, Club
Blu in Hartford, Connecticut, assorted Springfield-based
loansharks and bookmakers (including Robert Desimone, Louis
Naioleari, and Ryan Fattini), and (in the case of Nigro only)
assorted individuals and business owners in Florida (including
15
Michael Kordish and the owners of Opsis Tech. Corp.). This
testimony will be limited in nature, and will be almost
exclusively in the form of cooperating witness testimony.
h. Narcotics Trafficking
The Government expects to offer evidence that each of
Ty and Fotios Geas were involved in trafficking marijuana,
cocaine, and other drugs during the time charged in the RICO
conspiracy. The Government further expects to offer testimony
that several other members and associates of the Genovese Family
located in Springfield (including Arillotta, Emilio Fusco and
Louis Santos) were also involved in narcotics trafficking, both
with the Geases and separately, as well. Narcotics trafficking
is one of the RICO predicates alleged in the Indictment. In
addition, this evidence will be directly relevant to the
defendants’ relationship with their co-conspirators, and their
motivation for committing certain of the substantively charged
crimes (such as the murder of Gary Westerman).
B. Discussion
All of the evidence discussed above is admissible at
trial on at least one of three independent bases.
1. Predicate Offenses Charged In The Racketeering

Conspiracy
Evidence of Fotios and Ty Geas’s plan to murder
Guiseppe Manzi (and all of the evidence regarding their
16
relationship preceding the murder plan), as well as Fotios Geas’s
role in the prior plans to murder and/or shoot Gary Westerman, is
admissible because it is direct proof of one of the specific
predicate offenses charged in Count One of the Indictment:
murder. The same is true of the evidence of additional
extortions and narcotics trafficking that the Government intends
to offer at trial, as extortion and narcotics trafficking are two
of the specific predicate offenses charged in Count One.
The defendants’ participation in and knowledge of the
charged underlying predicate offenses is directly relevant and
admissible here to prove the charged racketeering conspiracy.
The Second Circuit has held that, to prove that a defendant
participated in a racketeering conspiracy, the Government need
only show that the defendant agreed that either he or other co-
conspirators would commit two or more underlying predicate acts:
To establish a RICO conspiracy, the

government must prove that a defendant agreed
to participate in the affairs of the
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity. However, in Salinas v. United
States, 522 U.S. 52, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139
L.Ed.2d 352 (1997), the Supreme Court made
clear that to establish this pattern, the
government need not prove that the defendant
himself agreed that he would commit two or
more predicate acts. See id. at 64, 118
S.Ct. (noting that, although the RICO statute
“broadened conspiracy coverage by omitting
the requirement of an overt act; it did not,
at the same time, work the radical change of
requiring the government to prove [that] each
conspirator agreed that he would be the one
to commit two predicate acts.”). Indeed,
17
Salinas held that to be found guilty of RICO

conspiracy, a defendant need only know of,
and agree to, the general criminal objective
of a jointly undertaken scheme.
United States v. Yannotti, 541 F.2d 112, 122 (2d Cir. 2008)
(internal citations omitted). Thus, the Government may prove a
defendant’s participation in a racketeering conspiracy either by
proving (1) that the defendant himself participated in at least
two predicate acts, or (2) that the defendant agreed that other
co-conspirators would commit at least two predicate acts. Much
of the evidence discussed above goes to both of these points: the
evidence shows that not only did each of the defendants know that
his co-conspirators would commit the specified predicate offenses
– murder, extortion, and narcotics trafficking – but that each of
the defendants himself directly participated in certain of those
crimes.10
2. Nature And Existence Of Charged Racketeering

Enterprise
Separate and apart from the fact that much of the
evidence described above is admissible as direct proof of
specific predicate offenses of the charged conspiracy, all of the
evidence is independently admissible to prove the existence,
nature, and background of, as well as membership in, the charged
10
Rule 404(b) is not relevant here because the evidence
constitutes direct proof of elements of the crimes charged in the
racketeering counts of the Indictment. See, e.g., Coonan, 938
F.2d at 1561 (determining admissibility of uncharged criminal act
evidence in a RICO case without regard to Rule 404(b)).
18
enterprise. In a racketeering case, the Government must prove
(a) the existence of the racketeering enterprise alleged in the
indictment, and (b) a “pattern of racketeering activity.” See 18
U.S.C. §§ 1959(a), 1961(5), 1962(c), 1962(d). The Second Circuit
has repeatedly held that the Government may prove the existence
and nature of the racketeering enterprise, as well as the pattern
of racketeering activity, by offering evidence of crimes
committed by persons associated with the enterprise that are not
specifically charged in the indictment. See United States v.
Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 875
(1999); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 682 (2d Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 905 (1998). This rule applies to
criminal acts committed by the charged defendants, as well as
acts committed by other members of the enterprise. United States
v. Brady, 26 F.3d 282, 286-88 (2d Cir.) (Section 1959 case),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 894 (1994); United States v. DiNome, 954
F.2d 839, 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 830 (1992).
Thus, in United States v. Diaz, a racketeering case,
the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to
admit testimony concerning uncharged crimes – including drug
trafficking, the stockpiling of weapons to protect the gang’s
drug trade, and acts of violence committed on behalf of the gang
– because “it tended to prove the existence, organization and
nature of the RICO enterprise, and a pattern of racketeering
19
activity by each defendant-appellant.” 176 F.3d at 79.
Similarly, in United States v. Miller, the Second Circuit held
that evidence “of numerous killings by” members of the
racketeering enterprise was properly admitted “as proof of the
existence of the RICO enterprise alleged in the indictment which
used such acts of violence in furtherance of its narcotics
conspiracy.” 116 F.3d at 682.
In United States v. DiNome, the Second Circuit
recognized the propriety of demonstrating the existence of a
racketeering enterprise through its members’ violent acts,
regardless of whether those acts were expressly charged in the
indictment. The Court stated:
[E]vidence of numerous crimes, including the

routine resort to vicious and deadly force to
eliminate human obstacles, was relevant to
the charges against each defendant because it
tended to prove the existence and nature of
the RICO enterprise . . . . Such evidence
was also relevant to prove a pattern of
racketeering activity by each defendant.
954 F.2d at 843. Similarly, in United States v. Coonan, the
Second Circuit stated that evidence of extreme acts of violence
by members of a RICO enterprise “was certainly probative of the
existence of the charged enterprise.” 938 F.2d at 1561.
In sum, evidence of uncharged acts is routinely
admitted in racketeering trials in this Circuit. See United
States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 812-13 (2d Cir.) (uncharged acts
admissible as evidence of “the existence and structure of the
20
[RICO] enterprise”; such acts are not “other” crimes evidence
governed by Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 977
(1994); United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1561 (2d Cir.
1991) (evidence of uncharged acts of extreme violence by members
of a RICO enterprise “was certainly probative of the existence of
the charged enterprise”), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941 (1992);
United States v. Kaplan, 886 F.2d 536, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1989)
(continuity of a pattern of activity may be established by
evidence of uncharged acts), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1076 (1990);
United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1382-83 (2d Cir.) (en
banc) (where predicate acts are closely related in time, facts
external to those acts may be offered to establish continuity
requirement), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 907 (1989).
Thus, for example, even though robbery is not one of
the specifically charged predicate offenses of the RICO
conspiracy, the fact that Fotios and Ty Geas were involved in
robberies - particularly with Arillotta and other members or
associates of the Genovese Family – is admissible because it
tends to show the existence of the enterprise and the defendants’
affiliation with it. The same applies to the various acts of
violence each of the defendants was involved in, many of which
also were taken in specific furtherance of the conspiracy. Even
where specific proffered acts of violence or crimes arguably were
not committed specifically in furtherance of the enterprise, they
21
at least cemented the defendants’ criminal relationships with and
among each other by solidifying trust and co-dependence in
various criminal ventures. That kind of trust formed the
foundation necessary for the defendants to commit more heinous
crimes together for the enterprise, such as murder.
3. Background Of The Conspiracy And Relationships

Between Co-Conspirators
The evidence discussed above is also independently
admissible to “‘inform the jury of the background of the
conspiracy charged,’ ‘to complete the story of the crimes
charged,’ and to ‘help[] explain to the jury how the illegal
relationship between [participants in the crime] developed.’”
United States v. Roldan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 804 (2d Cir. 1990)
(quoting United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d 581, 589-90 (2d Cir.
1986), and United States v. Harris, 733 F.2d 994, 1006 (2d Cir.
1984)). See also Diaz, 176 F.3d at 79-80; United States v.
Inserra, 34 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1994) (“evidence of other bad
acts may be admitted to provide the jury with the complete story
of the crimes charged by demonstrating the context of certain
events relevant to the charged offense”); United States v.
Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1307 (2d Cir. 1992) (evidence of other
crimes is admissible “to delineate the background details of a
conspiracy -- to ‘inform the jury of the background of the
conspiracy charged, to complete the story of the crimes charged,
and to help explain to the jury how the illegal relationship

22
between the participants in the crime developed.’”); Coonan, 938
F.2d at 1561 (“‘[T]he trial court may admit evidence that does
not directly establish an element of the offense charged, in
order to provide background for the events alleged in the
indictment.’”).
For example, Anthony Arillotta and Frank Roche are both
expected to testify about how they came to befriend Fotios and Ty
Geas, and how they learned to trust them. It would be impossible
for these witnesses to explain the trust that developed among
them without describing to the jury the various criminal
activities that they committed together and/or discussed among
themselves. It would similarly be unnatural (and misleading) for
various cooperating witnesses to describe their relationship with
Arthur Nigro without describing the various acts of violence and
extortion that he had committed and/or ordered on behalf of the
enterprise (including ones beyond those specifically charged in
the Indictment). Similarly, the evidence that Fotios Geas and
others assaulted Tranghese in 2006 is essential to explaining how
and why Tranghese’s relationship with Geas, and the Genovese
Family, effectively ended several years ago, and how Geas
continued to carry out the means and methods of the enterprise
through at least 2006.
23
4. Rule 403
The proffered evidence is directly probative of the
charged crimes, and will not be unduly prejudicial, confusing, or
wasteful for purposes of Fed. R. Evid. 403. First, as discussed
above, all of the proffered evidence goes directly to issues at
the heart of the Indictment: the fact that each of the defendants
conspired to participate in a racketeering enterprise; the
nature, structure, and membership of the enterprise; and the
relationships between the defendants and their co-conspirators.
Second, the vast bulk of the proffered evidence will be
presented through cooperating witness testimony, in the natural
course of describing the relationships among the defendants and
their co-conspirators; it will not unduly delay or confuse the
jury. Indeed, quite to the contrary, it would likely confuse the
jury if the cooperating witnesses were instructed not to testify
in a natural way about how their criminal relationships with the
defendants developed and progressed. That is because without the
proffered evidence as background, the jury would be left with
virtually no understanding of how or why the defendants and their
co-conspirators came to trust each other enough to commit murder
and other serious crimes together.
Third, none of the proffered evidence is unduly
prejudicial. In assessing the potential for undue prejudice
under Rule 403, the Court should consider whether the proffered
24
evidence of other acts is more or less inflammatory than the
charged crimes. In United States v. Williams, 205 F.3d 23, 33-34
(2d Cir. 2000), the Second Circuit found that there was no undue
prejudice where the evidence of certain prior acts was not more
serious than the specifically charged conduct. Similarly, in
United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1120 (2d Cir. 1990), the
Second Circuit found that the danger of unfair prejudice is
lessened if “other acts” evidence involves crime of equal or less
seriousness than the charged crimes. Here, the proffered
evidence is clearly no more inflammatory than the specifically-
charged Racketeering Acts in Count Two and the freestanding
charges. The specifically-charged acts include two completed
murders, an attempted murder where the victim (Frank Dadabo) was
shot more than half-a-dozen times, and numerous extortions,
narcotics trafficking, loansharking, and gambling. None of the
proffered “other” evidence is as inflammatory as that - let alone
more inflammatory.
Finally, if necessary, the Court can further guard
against any potential undue prejudice by instructing the jury
about the proper and improper uses of the “other crimes”
evidence. Such an instruction serves as an appropriate “final
protection” against possible prejudice. See United States v.
Levy, 731 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1984). Juries are presumed to
25
follow judicial instructions. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d
88, 116 (2d Cir. 1998).
26
II. Motion to Admit Evidence of Defendants’ Prior Prison Terms
The Government further seeks an in limine ruling
permitting testimony and evidence regarding prior prison terms
served by each of the defendants. This evidence is necessary to
prove how the defendants’ relationships developed with other co-
conspirators, including the Government’s cooperating witnesses,
and to explain the whereabouts of the defendants during certain
relevant time periods.
For example, Anthony Arillotta first met Ty Geas when
both were incarcerated in Concord, Massachusetts, in around 1990.
During their incarceration in Concord, Fotios Geas came to visit
Ty Geas in prison, and formed a relationship with Arillotta, as
well. Similarly, Frank Roche is expected to testify that he met
Fotios Geas in prison in 2000, while both were incarcerated in
Shirley, Massachusetts. While incarcerated together, Roche and
Fotios Geas, and Arillotta and Ty Geas (and through Ty, Fotios
Geas), formed close bonds, grew to trust one another, and became
comfortable with plans to commit crimes together upon their
release from prison. Indeed, Arillotta and Fotios Geas committed
various crimes together throughout the 1990's and into the early
2000's. Moreover, after Ty Geas was released from a narcotics
prison sentence in or about 2001, and after Roche was released
from prison in approximately July 2002, Roche and Fotios and Ty
Geas began spending more and more time together, along with
27
Arillotta, and they went on, in essence, a violent crime spree
together in 2003. In each case, this evidence will be directly
relevant to explaining the narrative of the defendants’
relationships and their participation in the RICO enterprise.
The Government also intends to offer testimony and
evidence (as described above) that Fotios Geas was incarcerated
after being arrested for a 1996 truck theft that he committed
with Gary Westerman, and regarding which Westerman provided
information to law enforcement.
The fact of Fotios Geas’s most recent incarceration
will also become evident because the Government intends to offer
certain recorded prison calls Fotios Geas made to Ty Geas in
April 2010, after Fotios Geas had been arrested in the instant
case but before Ty Geas had been arrested. In those calls,
Fotios Geas and Ty Geas discussed, among other things, news
reports that the FBI was digging for Gary Westerman’s remains in
Agawam, Massachusetts. In these calls, which are plainly
admissible admissions as to each defendant, see Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(A), the Geases make a number of statements which the
Government intends to argue tend to show their culpability in the
Westerman murder.
Similarly, the Government intends to offer testimony
and evidence that Arthur Nigro was incarcerated as of at least
2008. Specifically, the Government intends to offer multiple
28
consensual recordings that a cooperating witness (John Bologna)
made of Arthur Nigro while Nigro was incarcerated at Fort Dix
during that time. In those recordings, Bologna and Nigro
discussed, among other things, what other Genovese Family members
and associates were doing while Nigro was incarcerated.11 In
addition, Arillotta is expected to testify that his relationship
with the Genovese Family leadership in New York changed after he
was released from prison in approximately 2008 because, by that
point, Nigro was himself incarcerated. Thus, as with the
evidence of Fotios and Ty Geas’ prior prison terms, this evidence
is necessary quite simply to explain other key evidence and to
explain Nigro’s whereabouts during a significant, relevant time
period charged in the Indictment.12
11
These recordings are admissible on several grounds.
First, they are admissible as admissions against Nigro. See Fed.
R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). Second, they are admissible as co-
conspirator statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy as
to each of the defendants. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).
Third, they are admissible on the non-hearsay ground of
establishing not the truth of what was said but, simply, the fact
that Nigro knew Fotios Geas and other members and associates of
the enterprise based in Springfield, whom he discussed.
12
The Government will request and consent to a limiting
instruction on admission of such evidence to inform the jury that
the evidence is offered solely to show the relationships between
the parties and the whereabouts of the defendants at certain
times, and prohibiting the jury from drawing any adverse
propensity inference. See, e.g., United States v. Levy, 731 F.2d
at 1002; United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d at 116.
29
III. Motion to Admit Statements by Fotios Geas Regarding the

Murder of Gary Westerman
The Government further seeks an in limine ruling to
admit testimony of admissions made by Fotios Geas regarding his
role in the murder of Gary Westerman, in which he also implicated
his brother Ty Geas.
A. Relevant Facts
The Government expects that Frank Roche will testify
that, in approximately February 2005, while Roche and Fotios Geas
were both incarcerated at MCI-Concord, Geas told Roche that he
(Fotios Geas), Ty Geas, and Anthony Arillota had murdered
Westerman. Fotios Geas told Roche that they had arranged to meet
Westerman under the ruse of committing a robbery together, and
that Fotios and Ty Geas had then proceeded to shoot and kill
Westerman.
B. Discussion
This conversation is plainly admissible against Fotios
Geas, as a non-hearsay admission. See Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(A).
The statement is also admissible against Ty Geas as
non-hearsay because it was a co-conspirator statement made in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Fed R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E);
804(b)(2).
30
1. Co-Conspirator Statements
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides that an out-of-court
statement “is not hearsay if . . . [t]he statement is offered
against a party and is . . . a statement by a co-conspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Hence, in order for a statement to
be admissible under this Rule, the District Court must find:
“(1) there was a conspiracy; (2) its members included the
declarant and the party against whom the statement is offered;
and (3) the statement was made [i] during the course of and [ii]
in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Glen v. Bartlett, 98 F.3d
721, 728 (2d Cir. 1996).
Here, there will be ample evidence that the RICO
conspiracy in which Fotios Geas, Ty Geas, and Frank Roche (along
with many others) participated was ongoing at the time of Geas’s
2005 admissions. See United States v. Arrington, 867 F.2d 122,
130 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Even where particular crimes have already
been committed, ‘the conspiracy does not necessarily end; it
continues until its aim has been achieved, it has been abandoned,
or otherwise terminated.’ The fact that some of the conspirators
have been indicted and incarcerated does not inexorably lead to
the conclusion that the conspiracy has been terminated.” (quoting
United States v. Rucker, 586 F.2d 899, 906 (2d Cir. 1978));
United States v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705, 715-16 (2d Cir. 1987)
31
(conspiracy continued after incarceration of some members).
Indeed, Geas was not arrested for the murder of Adolfo Bruno
until several years after he made the statements to Roche in
2005, and he continued to commit crimes on the street in the
interim (including, for example, the assault of Felix Tranghese
in August 2006).
Fotios Geas also made his admissions to Frank Roche in
furtherance of the RICO conspiracy. The Second Circuit has taken
an expansive view of the “in furtherance” requirement of Rule
801(d)(2)(E), particularly in RICO cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Russo, 302 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that
statements about individuals’ status within the RICO conspiracy
were “in furtherance” of the conspiracy). Statements between co-
conspirators that “provide reassurance, serve to maintain trust
and cohesiveness among them, or inform each other of the current
status of the conspiracy,” further the conspiracy. United States
v. Simmons, 923 F.2d 934, 945 (2d Cir. 1991); see also United
States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 813 (2d Cir. 1994) (“statements
relating past events meet the in-furtherance test if they serve
some current purpose in the conspiracy, such as to promote[ ]
cohesiveness”) (internal quotations omitted); United States v.
Rahme, 813 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1987) (statements “that apprise a
coconspirator of the progress of the conspiracy” further the
conspiracy); see also United States v. Rivera, 22 F.3d 430, 436
32
(2d Cir. 1994) (statements “designed to promote or facilitate
achievement of the goals of the conspiracy,” further the
conspiracy); United States v. SKW Metals & Alloys, Inc., 195 F.3d
83, 88 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he statements need not be commands,
but are admissible if they ‘provide reassurance, or seek to
induce a coconspirator's assistance, or serve to foster trust and
cohesiveness, or inform each other as to the progress or status
of the conspiracy.’”) (citation omitted). Indeed, “[s]tatements
that describe past events are in furtherance of the conspiracy if
they are made . . . simply to keep coconspirators abreast of
current developments and problems facing the group.” United
States v. Jefferson, 215 F.3d 820, 824 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting
United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1529 (8th Cir. 1995)); see
United States v. Flemmi, 402 F.3d 79, 95 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating
same). In fact, retrospective statements made as long as three
years after a specific violent act have been held by the Second
Circuit to be “in furtherance” of a larger conspiracy. See
United States v. Dessena, 260 F.3d 150, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2001)
(statements by co-conspirator at 1997 meeting of motorcycle gang,
ridiculing defendant for conduct of 1994 arson attempt against
rival gang, “could be understood as informing other
coconspirators about the status of the conflict between the two
gangs, and perhaps as an exhortation to avoid ridicule by doing
things right”).
33
That is precisely the case here. At the time Fotios
Geas admitted to Roche that he, along with Ty Geas and Anthony
Arillotta, had murdered Gary Westerman, Roche still was not
charged with the murder of Adolfo Bruno. Nor had the conspiracy
charged in the Count One ceased to operate or been terminated; in
fact, the charged conspiracy continued through February 2010, and
several of the co-conspirators continued to commit various acts
in furtherance of the conspiracy after this conversation in 2005.
As a result, Geas’ statement to Roche served to promote “trust”
and “cohesiveness” among the charged conspirators.
Moreover, there was an additional purpose underlying
Fotios Geas’ statement to Roche. Geas intended to ensure that
Roche, if ultimately charged, would resist any temptation to
cooperate. By telling Roche that he, Ty Geas, and Arillotta had
murdered Gary Westerman – someone they had long believed to be
cooperating - Fotios Geas was also relaying to Roche in no
uncertain terms the consequences of cooperating against them.
This served a critical purpose to the RICO enterprise: Keeping a
potential witness from cooperating against the enterprise and the
co-conspirators, which worked for another two years until Roche
decided to cooperate on the eve of his state trial.
2. There is No Confrontation Clause Problem
The admission of this testimony against Ty Geas will
not run afoul of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) or
34
the Confrontation Clause because Fotios Geas’s statements to
Roche were not “testimonial,” as that term is defined in Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 126
S. Ct. 2266 (2006). Specifically, in Crawford, “the Supreme
Court held that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission
of out-of-court ‘testimonial’ statements against a criminal
defendant, unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” United
States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing
Crawford). Later, in Davis, the Supreme Court specifically
concluded that the Confrontation Clause applies only to
testimonial hearsay, and further defined the term “testimonial.”
See 126 S. Ct. at 2274. Thus, “[t]estimony . . . is typically a
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact. An accuser who makes a formal
statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that
a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”
Id. Applying Davis, the Second Circuit has explained that “the
Confrontation Clause has no application to nontestimonial
statements.” United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 220, 231 (2d Cir.
2006); accord United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d at 155-56.
Accordingly, because Bruton protects against a violation of the
Confrontation Clause, it necessarily only applies to
“testimonial” statements of the kind outlined in Crawford and
35
Davis. See United States v. Gedinez, 280 Fed. Appx. 47, 50 (2d
Cir. 2008).
3. Statement Against Interest
Should the Court conclude that Fotios Geas’s statements
were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy, Frank Roche
should nevertheless be permitted to testify to Fotios Geas’s
statements in redacted form (without mention of Ty Geas’s name).
Such redacted testimony would still be admissible against Ty Geas
as a statement made against the penal interest of Fotios Geas,
who (presuming he opts not to testify) will be unavailable as a
witness at trial.
Under Rule 804(b)(3), a statement that would normally
be precluded as hearsay is admissible if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness at the time of trial and if it was “so
far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or propriety interest,
or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal
liability . . . that a reasonable person in the declarant’s
position would not have made the statement unless believing it to
be true.” That is plainly the case here: Fotios Geas admitted
his own involvement in Gary Westerman’s murder. At the time of
Fotios Geas’s admissions, Westerman was missing, and although law
enforcement had actively investigated the disappearance (and had
received an anonymous tip that Fotios Geas, Ty Geas, and
Arillotta had killed Westerman), no arrests had been made.
36
IV. Motion To Admit Statements Of Adolfo Bruno and Gary

Westerman
The Government further moves for an in limine ruling to
admit certain statements made by Adolfo Bruno and Gary Westerman
– both of whom were later murdered by the defendants - to law
enforcement. The statements by these murder victims are
admissible not only for the fact that they were made (which
provided a motive to the defendants for their murders), but also
for the truth of the matters asserted (which tend to establish
the existence of the charged RICO enterprise and other relevant
facts).
A. Relevant Facts
1. Statements by Adolfo Bruno
On February 12, 2002, Adolfo Bruno spoke with Special
Agent Cliff Hedges of the FBI at the Red Rose Pizzeria in
Springfield, Massachusetts. Among other things, Bruno told
Special Agent Hedges that he did not care for Emilio Fusco, and
that Fusco had been “made” while Bruno was in jail. Bruno went
on to state that “It’s not like the old days Cliff, [Baba
Schibelli] should not have done this while I was away . . . Fusco
is a hothead, and I hear you have some bad tapes of him talking a
lot of shit. . . He is too young and needs to learn how to
respect people.” A copy of Special Agent Hedge’s report
summarizing this conversation has been produced in discovery.
37
2. Statements by Gary Westerman
Gary Westerman spoke with law enforcement on numerous
occasions regarding Fotios and Ty Geas, as well as other members
and associates of Organized Crime in the Springfield,
Massachusetts area. As explained above, after being arrested in
1996 for committing a truck theft, Gary Westerman agreed to
cooperate with law enforcement and signed a cooperation agreement
with the Massachusetts State Police. Westerman provided
meaningful intelligence at the time by confirming that Fotios
Geas had been part of the tractor trailer heist, and also by
providing a tip that Geas was driving in a car containing some of
the stolen merchandise (which led to Fotios Geas’s re-arrest on
June 20, 1996).
In 1997, Westerman was found in breach of his
cooperation agreement for having engaged in a check fraud scheme,
and he was ultimately sent to prison for several years.
In approximately Spring 2003, after he had been
released from prison, Westerman again reached out to the
Massachusetts State Police and offered to become an informant
once again. Thereafter, Westerman met with law enforcement
officers on numerous occasions and provided specific intelligence
information about crimes being committed by various individuals,
including Fotios and Ty Geas.
38
For example, on multiple occasions in 2003, Westerman
told law enforcement that Anthony Arillotta, Fotios Geas, and Ty
Geas were “making moves,” and seeking authorization from members
of organized crime in New York to “retire” Al Bruno.
In another example, on September 2, 2003, Westerman met
with a Massachusetts State Police Officer and told him about
events that had taken place in the prior three days involving the
Geases and Guiseppe Manzi. Specifically, Westerman told the
officer that Ty and Fotios Geas had an ongoing dispute with Manzi
and that Ty and Fotios Geas had robbed Manzi’s cousin out of
approximately $50,000. Westerman went on to explain that the
dispute had escalated in the prior week, and told the officer
details regarding Ty and Fotios Geas’s involvement in the August
29, 2003 shooting at the Civic Pub. He also explained to the
officer that the following day, an individual had shot
Arillotta’s home 21 times, and that Arillotta and Ty Geas were
actively seeking to retaliate against the person who they
believed had committed the shooting. Full copies of
Massachusetts State Police reports documenting these and other
debriefings with Westerman have been and/or will be provided to
the defense.
B. Applicable Law
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
39
enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Accordingly, as a general matter,
the rules of hearsay preclude the Government from offering
statements such as the ones described above at a trial, for the
truth of the matters asserted therein, without calling the
declarants.
Nonetheless, there is a well-established exception that
applies to cases such as this to permit the admission of
statements of a victim who was killed to prevent his
communication of information to law enforcement. The reason is
simple: “‘[T]he law [will not] allow a person to take advantage
of his own wrong,’” United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269,
272 (2d Cir. 1982)(quoting Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442,
458 (1912) (other internal quotation marks omitted)). As a
matter of “[s]imple equity” and “common sense,” the right to
confrontation is forfeited if the defendant has “wrongfully
procured the witnesses' silence through threats, actual violence
or murder,” United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 651 (2d Cir.)
(internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897
(2001). See, e.g., id. at 652 (“‘It is hard to imagine a form of
misconduct more extreme than the murder of a potential witness. .
. . We have no hesitation in finding, in league with all circuits
to have considered the matter, that a defendant who wrongfully
procures the absence of a witness or potential witness may not
40
assert confrontation rights as to that witness.’” (quoting United
States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 960 (1997))); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 667-68
(2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 905 (1998); United States
v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 814 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 977
(1994); United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992);
Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272-73; United States v. Cherry, 217
F.3d 811, 814-15 (10th Cir. 2000); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d
1193, 1201-02 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1053
(1983); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1358-60 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). See also Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (“the rule of forfeiture by
wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on
essentially equitable grounds”). United States v. Stewart, 485
F.3d 666, 672 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[a] defendant who wrongfully and
intentionally renders a declarant unavailable as a witness in any
proceeding forfeits the right to exclude ... the declarant's
statements at that proceeding and any subsequent proceeding.”).
This rule is codified in Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(6). Under the heading “Forfeiture by wrongdoing,” Rule
804(b)(6) provides that the hearsay rule does not require the
exclusion of “[a] statement offered against a party that has
engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and
did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.”
41
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6). Obviously, the murder of a declarant
renders him unavailable.
Accordingly, the district court may admit hearsay
evidence as to statements by an unavailable declarant if it finds
by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) the “party against
whom the out-of-court statement is offered[ ] was involved in, or
responsible for, procuring the unavailability of the declarant
through knowledge, complicity, planning or in any other way,” and
(b) that party “acted with the intent of procuring the
declarant's unavailability as an actual or potential witness,”
Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 653-54 (internal quotation marks omitted).
C. Discussion
Here, there will be ample evidence that both Bruno and
Westerman were murdered - at least in large part - to prevent the
communication of information to law enforcement. Thus, the
proffered statements by Bruno and Westerman are admissible for
their truth.13 Such admission presents no confrontation clause
or hearsay problem, because, under settled Second Circuit law,
the defendants have forfeited their claims by causing their
murders. They are also plainly relevant to establishing the RICO
enterprise itself, the relationships among the defendants, and
13
The statements of Westerman will be offered only
against Fotios and Ty Geas, as Nigro is not alleged to have
played a role in his murder.
42
various crimes that Fotios and Ty Geas were committing in
furtherance of the enterprise.
Even if they were not admissible for their truth,
however, these statements would be admissible simply for the fact
that they were made. Indeed, in each case, the fact of Bruno and
Westerman speaking to law enforcement was one of the key factors
leading the defendants to seek to kill them.
43
V. Motion to Permit Expert Testimony About Organized Crime
A. Relevant Facts
By letter dated December 27, 2010, the Government
notified defense counsel that it intends to call an organized
crime expert witness, John Carillo, to testify at trial. The
Government specified that the substance of Mr. Carillo’s
testimony will include:
(1) the names of the LCN families in New York

(i.e., the Luchese, Gambino, Genovese, Bonnano
(a/k/a “Massino”), and Colombo Families) and
the operations of those Families in New York
and other geographic areas including
Massachusetts, New England, and Florida; (2)
the structure of the organized crime families
(i.e., the Boss, Underboss, Consigliere,
Capos, Soldiers, and associates); (3) the
rules and protocol governing the conduct of
organized crime families (e.g., how members
are introduced to one another, how money flows
among the various LCN ranks, etc.); and (4)
the purpose for which organized crime families
exist and the illegal means by which they
typically generate income.
The Government also provided notice of Mr. Carillo’s expert
qualifications. In sum, Investigator Carillo has spent over two
decades working for the NYPD and other law enforcement agencies,
during which time he has focused primarily on investigating
organized crime in the New York City area.
B. Applicable Law
The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides:
44
If scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.
Fed. R. Evid. 702. Under this standard, expert testimony is
generally admissible if it will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. See
United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1994)
(“[E]xpert witnesses are often uniquely qualified in guiding the
trier of fact through a complicated morass of obscure terms and
concepts. Because of their specialized knowledge, their testimony
can be extremely valuable and probative . . . .). The decision
to admit expert testimony rests soundly with the discretion of
the trial court. See United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410,
425 (2d Cir. 1991).
The Second Circuit has, on numerous occasions, approved
of the admission of expert testimony in organized crime cases.
For example, in United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 936 (2d
Cir. 1993), the Second Circuit considered the District Court’s
decision to allow an FBI agent to testify, as an expert witness,
“on the nature and function of organized crime families,
imparting the structure of such families and disclosing the
‘rules’ of La Cosa Nostra.” United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d at
936. A year later, the Second Circuit re-affirmed the admission
45
of testimony “regarding the organization, structure and
terminology of organized crime families.” United States v.
Amuso, 21 F.3d 1251, 1263-64 (2d Cir. 1994). The Court cited
Locascio, and concluded, “[a]side from the probability that the
depiction of organized crime in movies and television is
misleading, the fact remains that the operational methods of
organized crime families are still beyond the knowledge of the
average citizen.” Id. at 1264.
More recently, in United States v. Matera, 489 F.3d 115
(2d Cir. 2007), the Second Circuit approved of the admission of
expert testimony regarding “the composition and structure of
organized crime families generally” and noted that “this Circuit
has approved the admission of expert testimony in organized crime
cases ‘to help explain the operation, structure, membership, and
terminology of organized crime families.’” Id. at 121 (collecting
cases).
In United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008),
the Second Circuit – while re-affirming the admissibility of
expert testimony in organized crime cases – placed certain
limitations on expert testimony by law enforcement agents more
generally. The Second Circuit in Mejia first recounted in detail
its own history of permitting expert witness testimony, including
in particular testimony relating to the structure and internal
46
operating rules of organized crime families. Id. at 189-90
(collecting cases). The Mejia Court observed that:
Our decision to permit such expert testimony

reflects our understanding that, just as an
anthropologist might be equipped by education
and fieldwork to testify to the cultural mores
of a particular social group, law enforcement
officers may be equipped by experience and
training to speak to the operation, symbols,
jargon, and internal structure of criminal
organizations. Officers interact with members
of the organization, study its operations, and
exchange information with other officers. As
a result, they are able to break through the
group’s antipathy towards outsiders and gain
valuable knowledge about its parochial
practices and insular lexicon. Allowing law
enforcement officers to act as experts in
cases involving these oft-impenetrable
criminal organizations thus responds to the
same concerns that animated the enactment (and
their members) are typically charged with
violating, such as [the racketeering
statutes].
Id. at 190 (citations omitted). The Court further held that
“despite the utility of, and need for, expertise of this sort,
its use must be limited to those issues where sociological
knowledge is appropriate.” Id. The Court explained that
problems arise where:
that officer becomes, rather than a

sociologist describing the inner workings of a
closed community, a chronicler of the recent
past whose pronouncements on elements of the
charged offense serve as shortcuts to proving
guilt. As the officer’s purported expertise
narrows from ‘organized crime’ to ‘this
particular gang,’ from the meaning of ‘capo’
to the criminality of the defendant, the
officer’s testimony becomes more central to
the case, more corroborative of the witnesses,
47
and more like a summary of the facts than an

aide in understanding them.
Id. at 190-91. In short, problems arise where the expert’s area
of expertise “happens to be the defendant.” Id. at 191.
C. Discussion
The Government will offer Mr. Carillo’s testimony here
for precisely the purposes permitted by the Second Circuit in
Locascio, Amuso, and Matera: to explain to the jury “the
operation, structure, membership, and terminology of organized
crime families.’” Matera, 489 F.3d at 121. Further, Mr. Carillo
has routinely been permitted to testify on these topics not only
by this Court, in United States v. John Gotti, 08 Cr. 1220 (PKC),
but also by various judges in this District, including Judge
Buchwald in United States v. Angelo Prisco, 08 Cr. 885; Judge
Scheindlin in United States v. Angelo Nicosia, 07 Cr. 907; Judge
Wood and Judge Patterson in United States v. Ciro Perrone, et
al., 04 Cr. 774; and Judge Kaplan in United States v. Salvatore
Scala and Thomas Sassano, 04 Cr. 70.
Nor does Mr. Carillo’s proposed testimony run afoul of
the limitations set forth in Mejia, which identified “two
distinct ways in which the officer expert might stray from the
scope of his expertise.” 545 F.3d at 192 (citation omitted).
First, the expert might testify “about the meaning of
conversations in general, beyond the interpretation of code
48
words.” Id. (citations omitted). Second, “the expert might
interpret ambiguous slang terms based on knowledge gained through
involvement in the case, rather than by reference to the fixed
meaning of those terms either within the narcotics world or
within this particular conspiracy.” Id. The Government does not
intend to elicit either type of potentially problematic testimony
from Mr. Carillo.14
14
Nor does Mr. Carillo’s proposed testimony pose
Confrontation Clause issues under Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004). The Mejia Court held that where an expert
witness merely repeats out-of-court statements made by others for
their truth, without applying expertise or any expert synthesis,
the testimony raises Crawford concerns. Id. at 199. By
contrast, expert testimony does not violate Crawford where the
expert applies his expertise to out-of-court statements and other
sources, and synthesizes or analyzes that information, along with
other information, in the form of an expert opinion. Id. at 199.
Here, in keeping with Mejia and its predecessor decisions, the
Government will elicit Carillo’s expert opinion based on all of
his experience and learning. As the Mejia Court found proper,
Mr. Carillo will rely on out-of-court statements as one of many
bases for his expert opinion and testimony, but he will not
repeat those statements verbatim or present the statements
themselves as his own testimony; rather, he will use the
statements as one of many bases for his expert opinion, analysis,
and conclusions. Also, as discussed above, numerous judges in
this District have permitted Mr. Carillo to testify as an expert
on the same basis since Crawford.
49
VI. Motion for Anonymous Jury
The Government respectfully moves for empanelment of an
anonymous jury. Specifically, the Government requests that the
Court order that all prospective jurors on the voir dire panel,
as well as the jurors and alternate jurors who are ultimately
selected for the petit jury, not to reveal their names,
addresses, or places of employment to one another, the parties,
or the Court.
A. Applicable Law
The Second Circuit has repeatedly upheld the use of
anonymous juries where there is reason to believe that the jury
needs protection and where the Court takes reasonable precautions
to minimize any adverse effect on the jurors’ opinion of the
defendants by, for example, conducting a thorough voir dire to
uncover any potential bias and giving the jury a plausible and
non-prejudicial reason for jury anonymity. See, e.g., United
States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 295-97 (2d Cir. 2007); Unites
States v. Aulicino, 44 F.3d 1102, 1116 (2d Cir. 1995); United
States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1376 (2d Cir. 1994); United States
v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 800-801 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Vario, 943 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Tutino,
883 F.2d 1125, 1132 (2d Cir. 1989).
Courts in this Circuit have identified three factors
that should be considered in determining whether empaneling an
50
anonymous jury is appropriate, see United States v. Bellomo, 954
F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1997):
• First, the nature and seriousness of the charges,

see Vario, 943 F.2d at 241 (using an anonymous jury is
appropriate where the “trial evidence will depict a
pattern of violence by the defendants and [their]
associates such as would cause a juror to reasonably
fear for his own safety”); United States v. Persico,
832 F.2d 705, 717 (2d Cir. 1987) (upholding the use of
an anonymous jury based on “the violent acts alleged to
have been committed in the normal course of Colombo
Family business”);
• Second, the potential threat of corruption of the

judicial process, see Aulicino, 44 F.3d at 1116 (jury
anonymity is appropriate where “the Government has
demonstrated a defendant’s willingness to tamper with
the judicial process”); Vario, 943 F.2d at 240 (“An
obstruction of justice charge, particularly one
involving jury tampering, has always been a crucial
factor in our decisions regarding anonymous juries.”);
• Third, the expectation of publicity and media

coverage, see Quinones, 511 F.3d at 296; Vario, 943
F.2d at 240 (“[P]ublicity may militate in favor of an
anonymous jury because it can enhance the possibility
that jurors’ names would become public and thus expose
them to intimidation by defendants’ friends or enemies,
or harassment by the public.”).
The decision to utilize an anonymous jury is left to
the sound discretion of the District Court and is reviewed on
appeal only for an abuse of discretion, see Quinones, 511 F.3d at
295; Paccione, 949 F.2d at 1192.
B. Discussion
All three relevant factors weigh in favor of empaneling
an anonymous jury.
1. Nature and Seriousness of the Charges
51
The defendants here are charged with the most serious
of offenses, principally multiple murders committed with and for
the Mafia. The Indictment charges the defendants, in various
combinations, with two completed murders (of Bruno and
Westerman), one attempted murder (of Dadabo), and one murder
conspiracy (of Santos). Even beyond the charged murders, the
Indictment charges the defendants with a string of extortions and
other crimes which – while certainly not as serious as murders –
are nonetheless violent and could, on their own, necessitate an
anonymous jury. See, e.g., United States v. Salvatore Scala, et
al., S1 04 Cr. 70 (LAK) (ordering anonymous jury and other
protective measures in case charging one mafia-related extortion
and tax evasion charges). Thus, the first relevant factor – the
nature and seriousness of the charged offenses – weighs in favor
of an anonymous jury.
2. Corruption of the Judicial Process
The Indictment charges all three defendants with
committing murder for the purpose of obstructing justice,
specifically the 2003 murder of Bruno. (Indictment ¶¶ 16(a), 25,
42). The Indictment also charges Fotios Geas and Ty Geas with
murdering a second witness, Westerman, to prevent his cooperation
and testimony. (Indictment ¶¶ 16(a), 26).
The Second Circuit has held that jury anonymity is
appropriate where “the Government has demonstrated a defendant’s
willingness to tamper with the judicial process.” Aulicino, 44
52
F.3d at 1116. Here, the defendants have demonstrated not only
the willingness but also the ability to tamper with the judicial
process in a most serious fashion, by killing someone they
believed to be a potential witness (or, in the case of Fotios
Geas and Ty Geas, by killing two such people). Although this
case does not involve allegations of jury tampering, the fact
that this case does charge obstruction of justice weighs in favor
of empaneling an anonymous jury. See Vario, 943 F.2d at 240 (“An
obstruction of justice charge, particularly one involving jury
tampering, has always been a crucial factor in our decisions
regarding anonymous jury.”).
3. Publicity
Even during the pre-trial stages, this case has
received substantial media attention. The internet search engine
Google.com reveals that there have already been several dozen
different articles published about the investigation and charges
in this case. To date, the case has been covered by media
outlets including the New York Post, the Boston Globe, the New
York Sun, and numerous internet websites and blogs, including the
Huffington Post, Masslive, and Ganglandnews. There is no reason
to expect this coverage to wane; if anything, coverage is likely
to intensify during the trial itself as more details become
publicly available about the defendants’ crimes. Thus, this
factor also weighs in favor of an anonymous jury.
53
Conclusion
For all of the forgoing reasons, the Government’s
motions in limine should be granted.
Dated: New York, New York

January 7, 2011
Respectfully submitted,
PREET BHARARA
United States Attorney
By: ____/s/________________________
Mark Lanpher
Elie Honig
Daniel Goldman
Assistant United States Attorneys
Tel: (212) 637-2399/2474/2289
Fax: (212) 637-0086
54
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Mark Lanpher deposes and says that he is employed in

the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York.
That on January 7, 2011, he caused to be served a copy

of the foregoing Government’s Motions In Limine by ECF and e-mail
on:
Murray Richman
Law Offices of Murray Richman
2027 Williamsbridge Road, 3rd Floor
Bronx , NY 10461
(718) 892-8588
Fax: (718) 518-0674
Email: mrichman_mr@msn.com
Frederick H. Cohn
Attorney At Law
61 Broadway, Suite 1601
New York, NY 10006
(212)768-1110
Fax: 212 (267)-3024
Email: fcohn@frederickhcohn.com
Bobbi Sternheim
156 Fifth Avenue – Suite 823
New York, NY 10010
212-243-1100
Cell: 917-306-6666
Fax: 888-587-4737
Email: bcsternheim@mac.com
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing

is true and correct. 28 U.S.C. Section 1746.
_______/s/_________________
Mark Lanpher
Executed on: January 7, 2011

New York, New York

Government's Motions in Limine: Fotios Geas Case

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Case 1:09-cr-01239-PKC Document 110 Filed 01/07/11 Page 1 of 56

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

GOVERNMENT’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

GOVERNMENT’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE

The Government respectfully submits motions in limine: (1)

to admit evidence of other bad acts of the defendants as relevant

proof of the charged crimes; (2) to admit evidence of the

defendants’ prior prison terms; (3) to admit statements made by

defendant Fotios Geas regarding the murder of Gary Westerman; (4)

to admit certain statements that the defendants’ victims (Adolfo

Bruno and Gary Westerman) made to law enforcement prior to their

murders; (5) to admit expert testimony regarding organized crime;

and (6) to empanel an anonymous jury.

I. Motion to Admit Evidence of Other Bad Acts of the Defendants

The Government respectfully requests an in limine

bad acts of the defendants and their co-conspirators may be

offered at trial. The proffered evidence is admissible to prove

the specific charged predicate offenses underlying the

racketeering conspiracy; to prove the existence and nature of the

charged racketeering enterprise more generally; and to prove the

background of the relationships of the defendants with their co-

conspirators, and with the enterprise.

1. The Indictment – Racketeering Charges

Count One of the Indictment charges Arthur Nigro,

Fotios Geas, and Ty Geas with conspiring to participate in the

affairs of a racketeering enterprise, from in or about 2001

through in or about February 2010, in violation of Title 18,

United States Code, Section 1962(d). (Indictment ¶ 14).1 The

charged racketeering enterprise is the Genovese Organized Crime

Family of La Cosa Nostra (the “Genovese Family”). (Indictment ¶¶

and their co-conspirators agreed to conduct and participate in

the affairs of the Genovese Family through a pattern of

racketeering activity consisting of the following underlying

predicate offenses: murder, extortion, loansharking, gambling,

interstate travel, union corruption, and narcotics trafficking –

all committed in violation of federal and/or state statutes that

are cited specifically in the Indictment. (Indictment ¶ 14).

Count Two of the Indictment charges Nigro, Fotios Geas,

and Ty Geas with a substantive racketeering offense, from in or

about 2001 through in or about February 2010, in violation of

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962(c). (Indictment ¶¶

21-31). Count Two is comprised of nine separate racketeering

acts, including the following: (1) Racketeering Act One, the

November 2003 murder of Adolfo Bruno, which is alleged against

all three defendants (Indictment ¶ 23); (2) Racketeering Act Two,

the November 2003 murder of Gary Westerman, which is alleged

against Fotios Geas and Ty Geas (Indictment ¶ 24); (3)

Racketeering Act Three, the May 2003 attempted murder of Frank

Dadabo, which is alleged against all three defendants (Indictment

¶ 25); (4) Racketeering Act Four, the Fall 2003 conspiracy to

murder Louis Santos, which is alleged against all three

defendants (Indictment ¶ 26); (5) Racketeering Act Five, the

conspiracy to extort and extortion of James Santaniello, which is

alleged against all three defendants (Indictment ¶ 27); (6)

Racketeering Act Six, the conspiracy to extort Carlo and Genaro

Sarno, which is alleged against Fotios Geas and Ty Geas

(Indictment ¶ 28); (7) Racketeering Act Seven, the conspiracy to

extort and attempted extortion of Michael and Anthony Grant,

which is alleged against all three defendants (Indictment ¶ 29);

(8) Racketeering Act Eight, loansharking involving loans made in

Florida, which is alleged against Arthur Nigro (Indictment ¶ 30);