T.I.

Oizerman
The Main Trends
in Philosophy
Т. I. Oizerman, member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, is
head of the sector of the history of philosophy of West European
Countries and America of the Academy's Institute of Philosophy.
He is well known throughout the world for his many fundamental
works on the history of pre-Marxian, Marxian, and contemporary
West European philosophy, and on the theory of the history of
philosophy, which are noted for their deep theoretical approach
to the problems studied, and their clear, brilliant manner of ex­
pounding the most complicated problems.
Prof. Oizerman's main works (in Russian) are the following: The
Development of Marxian Theory on the Experience of the 1848
Revolution (1955); German Classical Philosophy — One of the
Theoretical Sources of Marxism (1955); Hegel's Philosophy (1956);
The Principal Stages in the Development of Pre-Merxian Philo­
sophy (1957); The Main Stages in the Process of Knowing (1957);
The Main Features of Modern Bourgeois Philosophy (1960);
Fichte's Philosophy (1962); Problems of Historico-Philosophical
Science (1969, 2nd ed. 1982); The Crisis of Contemporary Ideal­
ism (1972); The Forming of the Philosophy of Marxism (1974);
Dialectical Materialism and the History of Philosophy. Historico-
Philosophical Essays (1979).
This monograph is a theoretical investiga-
tion of the process of the history of philo-
sophy. The author examines the polari-
sation of philosophical systems in their
main trends, viz., the materialist and
idealist. He traces the struggle between
materialism and idealism on the basis
of the dialectical-materialist conception
of the history of philosophy, and brings
out the scientific and cultural-historical
significance of dialectical materialism in
present-day world philosophical thought.
 T.I.Oizerman
The MainTrends
in Philosophy
A Theoretical Analysis
of the History of Philosophy

Translated by H. Campbell Creighton, M. A. (Oxon)

PROGRESS PUBLISHERS
Moscow
 Designed by Yuri Yegorov

ОЙЗЕРМАН Т. И.
ГЛАВНЫЕ ФИЛОСОФСКИЕ НАПРАВЛЕНИЯ

На английском языке

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

0301030000-464
© Издательство «Мысль», 1984
o 014(01 )-88 1 9 - 8 8

English translation of the revised

Russian text
ISBN 5-01-000506-9 © Progress Publishers 1988
 CONTENTS

Page
INTRODUCTION 5
Part One. THE BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION AS A PRO­
BLEM OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
I. THE SENSE AND MEANING OF THE BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL
QUESTION 19
1. The Basic Philosophical Question and the Problematic of Philo­
sophy 19
2. Self-Awareness and the External World. The Epistemоlogical Ne­
cessity of the Basic Philosophical Question 22
3. On the Origin and Development of the Basic Philosophical Que­
stion 33
4. The Basic Philosophical Question: Objective Content and Subjec­
tive Form of Expression. The Real Starting Point of Philosophical
Inquiry 37
II. THE TWO SIDES OF THE BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUES­
TION 54
1. The Ontological Aspect: the Materialist Answer to the Basic
Question 54
2. The Ontological Aspect: a Contribution to the Delineation of the
Idealist Answer t o the Basic Philosophical Question . . . . 74
3. The Epistemological Aspect. The Principle of Reflection and the
Idealist Interpretation of the Knowability of the World . . . 87
4. The Epistemological Aspect. The Principle of the Knowability of
the World and Philosophical Scepticism 104
Part Two. PHILOSOPHICAL TRENDS AS AN OBJECT OF RE­
SEARCH IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
III. THE DIVERGENCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINES AND
ITS INTERPRETATION. METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTITHESIS BETWEEN MA­
TERIALISM AND IDEALISM ' 138
1. Dispute about Trends or Dispute of Trends? . . ' 138
2. Metaphysical Systems. Spiritualism and the Naturalist Ten­
dency 155
3. Materialism—the Sole Consistent Opponent of Speculative Me­
taphysical Systems . . 165

3
 4. Kant's Transcendental Dualist Metaphysics 173
5. T o w a r d a Critique of Irrationalist Speculative Metaphysics . 184
6. T h e Dispute between Materialism and Idealism and Differences
in Understanding Speculative Metaphysics 195
IV. T H E G R E A T C O N F R O N T A T I O N : M A T E R I A L I S M VS IDEA­
LISM. T H E A R G U M E N T S A N D C O U N T E R A R G U M E N T S . . 215
1. T h e Struggle of Materialism and Idealism as an Epochal Cul­
tural and Historical Phenomenon 215
2. Idealism vs Materialism. Materialism vs Idealism. Results and
Prospects 234
3. T h e Dialectical-Materialist Critique of Idealism. T h e Episte­
mological Roots of Idealist Fallacies 262
4. T h e Dialectical-Materialist Critique of Idealism. T h e Principle of
the Partisanship of Philosophy 274
CONCLUSION 296
LITERATURE 306
NAME INDEX
SUBJECT INDEX
 INTRODUCTION

T h e r e is no doubt a b o u t the ideological significance of a t h e ­

oretical analysis of the history of philosophy. F o r philosophy
is the sole field of knowledge in which a g r e e m e n t a m o n g
its leading spokesmen is the exception r a t h e r than the rule.
In t h e sciences usually called exact or special, the a r e a of
disagreement is a comparatively small p a r t of the vast t e r ­
ritory already mastered, in which p e a c e and h a r m o n y seemingly
reign. W h o e v e r studies any of these sciences to some extent
1

lacks choice; he assimilates established t r u t h s that will, of

course, be refined, supplemented, and in p a r t even revised,
but hardly refuted. It is not so in philosophy, in which there
is a host of doctrines, trends, and directions each of which, as
a rule, has not only historical justification but also a certain
actual sense. In philosophy one has to choose, to soak oneself
in a specific a t m o s p h e r e of philosophical thinking, by n a t u r e
polemical, so as to find one's point of view, refuting all others
that a r e incompatible with it. But a search of that kind
presupposes study of the whole variety of philosophical d o c ­
trines, a condition that is obviously not practicable.
In c o n c r e t e historical social conditions this situation of
course has a certain, obligatory c h a r a c t e r . He who studies
philosophy (or is beginning to) is not, of course, like t h e
person browsing in a s e c o n d h a n d bookshop looking for some­
thing suitable for himself. T h e moment of choice is inseparable
from the purposive activity by which any science is mastered.
Since the history of philosophy investigates the real gains of
philosophy, this choice becomes an intellectual conviction
and ideological decision.
T h e aim of my book is to investigate t h e initial propositions
of the history of philosophy. This c o n c e r n s t h e basic philo-

5
sophical question and the main trends and directions in philo­
sophy, themes that are organically connected with one ano­
ther; special study of them makes it possible to understand
philosophy as law-governed developing knowledge whose final
result is dialectical and historical materialism.
T h e present work is a direct continuation of my Problems
of the History of Philosophy, 1
the subject of which was such
inadequately studied (in the general view) and largely debatable
problems as the specific nature of the philosophical form of
knowledge, the distinguishing feature and ideological function
of the problematic of philosophy, and the n a t u r e of philosophical
argument and dispute. In this new monograph, at least in its
first part, on the contrary, I examine problems that are usually
only treated in textbooks, i.e. that do not constitute the subject
of research at all. But since these problems are of fundamental
significance, they deserve m o r e than the attention just of
teachers. Problems that are usually called elementary are
basic ones, the starting point of research, and the answers to
them in no small way predetermine its direction and results.
Lenin, stressing that politics 'is a concentrated expression of
economics' and that 'it must take precedence over economics',
noted in this connection that 'it is strange that we should have
to return to such elementary questions' (142:83). It is well
known that this elementary question has proved to be not
so simple, so matter-of-fact as not to need investigation.
Roughly the same can be said of the basic philosophical question.
T h e Marxian proposition ' T r u t h is a process' (143:201) also
relates to elementary but, I should say, fundamental truths
that do not remain invariable since they are enriched by new
scientific data.
Textbooks that expound the main philosophical question
in popular form and provide a correct idea of the struggle
of trends in philosophy, do a very useful job. But they often,
unfortunately, create a deceptive impression of excessive sim­
plicity and very nearly absolute clarity about matters that are
by no means simple and clear. This fault is seemingly the obverse
of the methods standards that a textbook has to meet, since
it is limited to exposition of simply the fundamentals of the
science. T h e sole means of overcoming these shortcomings of
3

popular expositions is to investigate the theoretical fundamen­

tals of the science. It was not just these general considerations,
however, whose importance should not be overestimated, that
determined my theme. T h e point is that the basic philosophical
question, and likewise the problem of the main trends in philo-

6
sophy, are not truisms but quite special problems for research
in t h e history of philosophy. W h a t m a k e s t h e m so? T h e aim
of my i n t r o d u c t i o n is to p r o v i d e a p r e l i m i n a r y a n s w e r to that,
w h i c h will, a t t h e s a m e t i m e , p o s e t h e p r o b l e m .
F i r s t o f all, let m e p o i n t o u t t h e i n d i s p u t a b l e b u t f a r f r o m
a l w a y s realised truth that the M a r x i a n proposition about
the basic philosophical q u e s t i o n is n o t simply a s t a t e m e n t of an
e m p i r i c a l l y o b v i o u s f a c t , b u t a t h e o r e t i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n of a
definite discovery m a d e by F r e d e r i c k Engels. Only a few
pre-Marxian philosophers came near to theoretical awareness
that t h e r e is a basic question c o m m o n to various philosophical
doctrines, including opposing ones. Most of them r a t h e r assumed
t h a t e a c h d o c t r i n e w a s c h a r a c t e r i s e d b y its o w n m a i n p h i l o ­
sophical question precisely because it largely diverged from
others. T h a t is also, a n d even m o r e so, t r u e of c o n t e m p o r a r y
n o n - M a r x i a n philosophers. Albert C a m u s , for instance, claims
lhat
t h e r e is only one truly serious philosophical problem, that of suicide.
To decide w h e t h e r life is, or is not worth the t r o u b l e of living, is to
answer t h e f u n d a m e n t a l question of philosophy (28:15). 4

T h e s e p a r a t e exceptions only confirm this prevailing tendency.

T h e question posed by C a m u s must not be underestimated,
e v e n if o n l y b e c a u s e it f o r m s p a r t of a d e f i n i t e p h i l o s o p h i c ­
a l t r a d i t i o n w h o s e b e g i n n i n g w a s laid b y t h i n k e r s o f t h e A n c i e n t
East and philosophers of the Hellenistic era. T h e alienation
o f h u m a n a c t i v i t y a n d o f its p r o d u c t , a n d t h e a l i e n a t i o n o f
n a t u r e regularly e n g e n d e r it and give it p r o f o u n d sense. Yet
it is n o t t h e b a s i c p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n , if o n l y b e c a u s e
it is n o t s u c h f o r t h e m a j o r i t y of p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e s . B u t
p e r h a p s it is a t r a n s m u t e d f o r m of it, s i n c e it is a m a t t e r of t h e
attitude of h u m a n consciousness to h u m a n existence? Or is it
the b a s i c issue of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t p h i l o s o p h y ? It is still i n c u m b e n t
o n u s , h o w e v e r , t o i n v e s t i g a t e w h e t h e r e a c h p h i l o s o p h y h a s its
special basic question.
N e o p o s i t i v i s t s , h a v i n g got rid o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s
as i m a g i n a r y and in fact not real p r o b l e m s , long a g o c o n c l u d e d
that the question of the relation of the spiritual to the m a ­
terial was a typical p s e u d o p r o b l e m , since it was quite u n c l e a r
w h e t h e r w h a t a r e called m a t t e r a n d spirit existed a n d w h e t h e r
these verbal names were abstractions without meaning.
Mind and matter alike a r e logical constructions [Bertrand Russell,
for example, w r o t e ] , the particulars out of which they a r e constructed,
or from which they a r e inferred, have various relations, some of
which are studied by physics, others by psychology ( 2 3 0 : 3 0 7 ) .

7
This point of view, expressed h a l f - a - c e n t u r y ago, has received
unexpected support in o u r day from those w h o suggest that
no psyche exists, as cybernetics is alleged to demonst r a t e .
A m o n g those w h o s h a r e this conviction one must also n a m e the
a d h e r e n t s of the philosophy of linguistic analysis, who try
to show that t h e material a n d spiritual a r e not facts that theory
should be guided by, but only logical spectres. As for t h e philo­
sophical question that they call basic, it (in the opinion of the
analytic philosophers) was generated by incorrect word-use:
meanings were ascribed to words of the o r d i n a r y c o m m o n
l a n g u a g e that did not belong to them, with the c o n s e q u e n c e
that disputes arose a b o u t t h e sense of words that was quite
clear until they b e c a m e philosophical terms.
C o n t e m p o r a r y idealist philosophy, especially in its existen­
tialist and neopositivist variants, h a s had considerable influence
on s o m e w h o think themselves Marxist philosophers, and who
have u n d e r t a k e n a revision of dialectical and historical m a t e ­
rialism. T h e fact that the basic philosophical question does not
lie on the surface serves them as convenient g r o u n d s for denying
its real significance. But it is found here that those w h o claim
to h a v e created a ' n e o - M a r x i s t ' philosophy have not engaged
in serious research. T h e y simply proclaim it. T h e Yugoslav
philosopher Gajo Petrović, for instance, declares:
I do not m a i n t a i n t h a t t h e basic p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n , as u n d e r s t o o d
by E n g e l s , P l e k h a n o v , a n d L e n i n , is m e a n i n g l e s s . B u t e v e r y t h i n g that
is m e a n i n g f u l is not ' b a s i c ' ( 2 0 4 : 3 3 1 ) .
T h a t quite c o m m o n idea is supplemented by a consideration
of an ontological c h a r a c t e r :
Division intо m a t t e r a n d spirit is not the basic division of t h e world
we live in, n o r is this basic division within m a n . H o w then c a n the
basic question of p h i l o s o p h y be t h e question of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p
b e t w e e n m a t t e r a n d spirit? ( 2 0 4 : 3 3 2 ) .

T h e 'spirit-matier' relationship is not, in fact, the primary,

initial one; it presupposes the rise of the spiritual, which, though
a result of the material, is not a property of matter in any of
its states. It is that c i r c u m s t a n c e , in spite of Petrović's conviction,
that makes it possible to realise t h e significance of the question
of the relationship of the spiritual and material, the sense of
which consists in f o r m u l a t i n g t h e dilemma: which is primary,
the material or the spiritual?
Petrović, however, does not allow for the fact that the basic
philosophical question d e m a r c a t e s two main, mutually exclusive
t r e n d s in philosophical research. He proclaims t h a t only the
problem of man has f u n d a m e n t a l philosophical significance.

8
He accompanies that with sweeping declarations about socialist
humanism, the humanist mission of philosophy, the significance
of philosophical anthropology, etc. T h e r e is no arguing that
the problem of man (especially in its concrete historical posing,
i.e. as that of the social emancipation of the working people)
has a central place in the world outlook of Marxism. But to
counterpose the problem of man to the question of the rela­
tionship of the spiritual and material means not to understand
the decisive point that this question began to be called basic
first of all because it theoretically predetermined the pola­
risation of philosophy into two main trends. It is also not
difficult to understand that the existence of materialist and
idealist solutions of the problem of man also indicates why,
precisely, the relation of the spiritual and material became
the basic question of philosophy. It is to Engels' credit that
he singled out this question, the answer to which forms the
theoretical basis for tackling all other philosophical questions,
from a host of philosophical problems.
In summing up my introductory remarks on the problem
that constitutes the object of investigation in the first part of
my book, I must note that disputes around the basic philosophical
question also take place among philosophers who defend and
develop the dialectical-materialist outlook. A point of view
is often expressed in Soviet philosophical literature that the basic
philosophical question is, properly speaking, the subject-matter
of philosophy, since all the problems considered philosophical
in the past have passed into the province of special sciences.
That point of view has been formulated most definitely by
Potemkin:
T h e s t a t e m e n t that t h e question of the relation of thought to existence
is the great basic question of all philosophy has been a consistently
scientific g e n e r a l definition of the s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of philosophy from
the moment it a r o s e ( 2 1 4 : 1 2 ) .
Stressing in every way possible the special place occupied
by the basic philosophical question in determination of the
specific nature of the philosophical form of knowledge, he
criticised those workers who suggest that even though this
question, and that of the subject-matter of philosophy, overlap,
they are still different problems. But he does not explain, unfor­
tunately, what is the relationship between the basic philosophical
question and the Marxian doctrine of the most general laws
of development of nature, society, and knowledge. P r e - M a r x i a n
philosophy, he says, considered 'the world as a whole its
subject-matter' (ibid.). Marxian philosophy, he suggests, does

9
not include any conception of the world as a whole. But don't
the materialist and idealist answers to the basic philosophical
question form two opposing views of the world as a whole?
I shall limit myself here simply to asking the questions, since
they call for developed answers that I propose to set out in the
respective chapters of my monograph.
Some Marxist philosophers consider the basic philosophic­
al question as a most important aspect of the subject-matter
of philosophy.
T h e relationship of m a t t e r and consciousness [Alfred Kosing writes]
f o r m s a f u n d a m e n t a l aspect of t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t
philosophy, and the basic question of philosophy, a f u n d a m e n t a l
p a r t of its c o n t e n t , as t h e t h e o r e t i c a l formulation of this relationship.
T h e o r e t i c a l l y it is t h e s u p r e m e question of philosophy, b e c a u s e t h e t w o
possible trends in p h i l o s o p h y — m a t e r i a l i s m and idealism—follow from
the different a n s w e r s to it, a n d that d e t e r m i n e s both the materialist
a n d idealist solution of all philosophical p r o b l e m s and the c o r r e s p o n d ­
ing i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of all philosophical categories ( 1 2 4 : 9 0 2 ) .
Kosing does not limit the subject-matter of philosophy
to investigation of the 'spiritual-material' relation, since the
subject-matter of any science cannot be confined once and
for all to an established round of questions. He stresses the
principled ideological significance of the question, which for­
mulates the basic philosophical dilemma, and as such forms
the basic philosophical question. In stating that fact I cannot
help asking, however: in what way is philosophy, especially
in our day, concerned with investigation of the 'spiritual-mate­
rial' relation. For this relationship is studied in its specific
forms primarily by the appropriate scientific disciplines. Histo­
rical materialism, an integral part of Marxist-Leninist philo­
sophy, of course examines the relation of social consciousness
and social being, but the particular forms of social consciousness
also constitute the object of study of several special sciences.
So, for a proper understanding of the sense and meaning
of the basic philosophical question, it is necessary to investigate
its real extension and its relation to the psychophysical problem
with which the physiology of higher nervous activity and
psychology are primarily concerned. What does one have in
mind when calling the question of the relation of conscious­
ness and being, the spiritual and the material, the basic philo­
sophical question? It is necessary to clarify the sense of the
term 'basic' employed in a definite context in particular because
some Marxian philosophers consider the philosophical
question being discussed to be a problem subject to investigation
(and, moreover, the main p r o b l e m ) , while others treat it (or

10
rather its materialist answer) as a firmly established scientific
premiss, with the significance of a principle, in knowledge
of everything that constitutes the subject-matter of philosophy.
Understanding of the real meaning of the basic philo­
sophical question calls for investigation, in my view, of its
epistemological necessity. Only such investigation can demon­
strate the legitimacy of the statement that it is precisely this
question that constitutes the necessary premiss of all philo­
sophical problems that are not deducible from one or other
of its answers.
T h e expression 'basic question of philosophy' points to
there being other philosophical problems that also constitute
the subject-matter of philosophy. But can one consider them
simply derivatives of the basic philosophical question? T h e
problem of the particular and the general, essence and pheno­
menon, change and development are all problems, of course,
that do not logically stem from the content of the basic philo­
sophical question.
I said above that the problem of man is undoubtedly one
of the chief philosophical themes. T h e same must seeming­
ly also be said of the problem of the unity of the world. What
is the relation of the basic philosophical problem to these?
That requires special investigation which, it is to be hoped,
will show that the concept of the basic philosophical question
has a specific sense and that the meaning of other philosophical
problems is consequently in no way diminished. 5

T h e second part of my book will comprise an analysis of

philosophical trends as natural forms of the existence and
development of philosophy. Since the basic philosophical que­
stion formulates a dilemma, its alternative answers theoretically
predetermine the polarisation of philosophy into materialism
and idealism. But there are other trends in philosophy besides
materialism and idealism. Why do we single out materialism
and idealism precisely as the main philosophical trends? It
is necessary, in my view, to make a special investigation of the
whole diversity of trends in philosophy and of their relation
to materialism and idealism.
Philosophical trends must seemingly be distinguished from
doctrines, schools, and currents. A doctrine, as a system of
definite views, logically connected with one another, can be
treated as the primary phenomenon of the historico-philosoph­
ical process. Since one doctrine or another, created by an
individual philosopher or group of like-minded ones, finds
its continuers who develop or modify it, philosophical schools

11
take shape. T h e aggregate of the various modifications of one
and the same philosophical doctrine, developed by various,
sometimes competing, schools can be called a c u r r e n t . Such,
for example, are the most influential currents in contemporary
bourgeois philosophy: viz., existentialism, neopositivism, 'critical
rationalism', philosophical anthropology, and Neothomism.
Each of them is built up from a n u m b e r of doctrines and schools
that usually enter into polemics with one another in spite of their
community of basic theoretical premisses.
A trend represents an aggregate of philosophical currents
(and, consequently, of doctrines), which for all their differences
with one another defend certain common positions of principled
significance. T r e n d s usually exist over very long historical
periods, and some of them have existed right from the rise
of philosophy to our day. Rationalism, empiricism, metaphy­
sical systems, dualism, pluralism, naturalism, 'realism', nomi­
nalism, phenomenalism, supranaturalism, scholasticism, mysti­
cism; irrationalism, intuitionism, organicism, sensualism, essen­
tialism, mechanism, anthropologism, pantheism—such is a far
from complete list of the philosophical trends, not altogether
free of elements of a conventionality that can only be sur­
mounted in the course of a further substantiation of the typology
of philosophical doctrines.
Inquiry into the relation between the main trends in philo­
sophy, i.e. materialism and idealism, is a most important task
of the history of philosophy. It must be theoretically substan­
tiated by evidence that there really are main trends in philosophy
and that these trends are precisely materialism and idealism.
Both are directly linked with two mutually exclusive answers
to the basic philosophical question. One cannot say that, of
course, about rationalism, empiricism, naturalism, anthropo­
logism, and several other trends, which may have both a
materialist and an idealist character. Does that not indicate
that these trends are linked, though in a mediated way, with one
or other answer to the basic philosophical question? T h e same
can seemingly be said as well about the opposition between the
metaphysical mode of thinking and the dialectical.
It does not call for great penetration to discover within
empiricism, sensualism, anthropologism, naturalism, rational­
ism, and other philosophical trends an opposition of materialism,
and idealism, i.e. materialist empiricism and idealist empiricism,
anthropological materialism and anthropological idealism, and
so on. This witnesses that all the trends named are specific
forms of materialism or idealism. Materialism and idealism

12
are consequently really the main philosophical trends, but
contemporary bourgeois philosophers interpret these facts diffe­
rently. T h e y usually treat empiricism, rationalism, anthro­
pologism, and other trends as a surmounting of the basic philo­
sophical dilemma, the discovery of new fields of inquiry across
the traditional, 'one-sided' opposition of materialism and idea­
lism.
6

T h e specific form that materialist (or idealist) philosophy

takes, thanks to empiricism or anthropologism, does not, of
course, follow with logical necessity from one or other of the
answers to the basic philosophical question. T h e peculiarity
of these main philosophical trends is due to the diversity of the
content of philosophy, and its interaction with other forms
of social consciousness, social development, the achievements of
science and engineering, etc.
One must remember, however, that far from all the trends
listed are polarised into an opposition of materialism and
idealism. T h e r e is no materialist irrationalism, intuitivist ma­
terialism, or materialist phenomenalism. Irrationalism, intuitio­
nism, and phenomenalism are varieties of idealist, and only
idealist philosophy. Mechanism, atheism, and hylozoism, on the
contrary, mainly characterise certain historical forms of mate­
rialism. Analysis of some of the concrete, historical modifications
of materialism and idealism is a task of the present inquiry.
T h e survey of philosophical trends is usually reduced in
popular works to a description of materialism and idealism.
T h e reader is sometimes given the impression that there are
no other trends at all. But in that case one cannot, of course,
understand why materialism and idealism form the main trends
in philosophy. It is consequently necessary to analyse the
different trends from the angle of their relation to materialism
or idealism. An inquiry of that kind not only has to reflect the
real confrontation that constitutes the content of the history
of philosophy, but also has to concretise our understanding of
materialism and idealism.
T h e history of philosophy is a picture of a supreme diversity
of ideas and dramatic tension. No doctrine (let alone current
or trend) can be concretely defined simply by relating it to one
of the main trends, just as no phenomenon can be characte­
rised by an indication alone of its belonging to a certain kind
or type. Aristotle, and Leibniz, and Schopenhauer were idealists,
but that very important circumstance does not indicate the
differences between their doctrines, which are very substantial.
It is necessary to inquire into the different types of idealism; and

13
that presupposes elucidation of the attitude of the thinkers
being studied to other doctrines and trends within which there
was a development of both materialist and idealist philosophy.
T h e idealist Leibniz was a rationalist, the founder of a meta­
physical system, monadology, a pluralist, a dialectician, etc.
T h a t does not m e a n that the concept of idealism does not
adequately define his doctrine; all its characteristics are spe­
cific definitions of his idealism, i.e. his rationalism, like his
metaphysics, pluralism, etc., has an idealist character. T h e r e
7

are consequently no grounds for opposing the separate cha­

racteristics of Leibniz's philosophy to one another. They
indicate that idealism, like any doctrine, possesses both general,
particular, and individual features. T h a t is seemingly not taken
into account by those inquirers who a r e inclined to regard
rationalism, empiricism, anthropologism, and all the other
features of one doctrine or another, as something existing in
them over and above materialism or idealism. With such an
approach to philosophical theory its basic content is schemati­
cised and distorted.
T h e problem of trends is a main one in study of the specific
nature of philosophical knowledge. T r e n d s exist, it is true, in
all sciences, but in them they are usually trends of research con­
ditioned by the choice of objects or methods of investigation.
T r e n d s of that kind often develop in parallel, encouraging one
another; and when contradictions arise between them they are
resolved over a comparatively short historical period, since the
dispute is about partial matters that are resolved by observa­
tion, experiments, and practical tests. It is another matter with
philosophical trends, which cannot help being opposed to one
another. These trends actually took shape as philosophical ones,
since there were other philosophical (and not only philosophic­
al) systems of views with which they came into conflict. T h e
whole historical past of philosophy witnesses to philosophi­
cal views (and that means trends, too) as a rule having a
mutually exclusive character.
Contemporary bourgeois philosophers usually make an abso­
lute of this fact, i.e. consider it an intransient fundamental
characteristic of any philosophical dispute, thus reviving the
main thesis of ancient scepticism, viz., that philosophy differs
radically from any other knowledge in that unanimity is
impossible in principle in it. Hegel wittily criticised the sceptical
interpretation of the history of philosophy as the point of view
of ordinary consciousness, which imagines itself philosophically
profound when in fact it is only fixing differences and disagree-

14
ments that appear on the surface, without noting the incom­
parably m o r e essential, though not obvious unity. Hegel treated
disagreements between philosophical doctrines as contradic­
tions in the process of development of the many-sided truth
contained in these, at first glance quite divergent philosoph­
ies. He incidentally distinguished the subjective notions of
philosophers about the sense and substance of their doctrines
from their true content (and real relation to other doctrines),
which is revealed both by the history of the development of
philosophical knowledge and by inquiry into this process.
Hegel's dialectical approach to the history of philosophy,
thanks to which the differences between doctrines, theories,
currents and trends were treated as necessarily connected
with identity, played an immense role in moulding the science
of the history of philosophy (which was impossible without
overcoming scepticism in the history of philosophy). But he
harmonised the process of the history of philosophy too much,
depicting it as the forming of absolute self-consciousness. T h e
plurality of systems is not so much a fact in the Hegelian history
of philosophy as a semblance of fact that is removed by the
triumphal progress of the Absolute Spirit. This root fault of
Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy can only be
eliminated by a thorough analysis of the struggle between
materialism and idealism as the essential content of the world
process of the history of philosophy.
T h e contemporary epoch in philosophy is that of the confir­
mation of dialectical and historical materialism, on the one
hand, and of the crisis of idealist philosophising on the other.
Indirect recognition of this fact is the militant denial, characte­
ristic of contemporary bourgeois philosophy, of the possibility
and necessity of the unity of philosophical knowledge. T h e
Greek sceptics, in denying the unity of philosophical knowledge,
rejected philosophy as incapable of yielding indisputable truths.
T h e followers of the bourgeois 'philosophy of the history of
philosophy', on the contrary, consider the greatest merit of
8

philosophy to be that it is allegedly not interested in ' i m p e r s o n a l '

objective truths; philosophy allegedly creates its own world
in which the place of the facts recorded as truths is taken by
statements that have sense irrespective of their possible truth.
From the angle of this modernism in the history of philosophy,
a philosophical statement ceases to be such when it becomes an
'acquired truth'. T h e real content of philosophy, according to
this view, is formed by the mode of self-assertion of the philo­
sophising individual and his inimitable creative individuality.

15
An e x t r e m e e x p r e s s i o n of this c o n c e p t i o n is t h e s t a t e m e n t that
p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r e n d s a n d c u r r e n t s a r e only o u t w a r d divisions
established by c o m m e n t a t o r s , since e v e r y p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e
is a u t h e n t i c only in so far as it is u n i q u e . G e n e r a l , c o m m o n
f e a t u r e s , if t h e y a r e p r e s e n t in v a r i o u s p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e s ,
p o i n t t o t h a t which p r e s e n t s n o interest i n t h e latter. R e c o g n i t i o n
of t h e essential significance of philosophical t r e n d s m e a n s , in the
c o n t e x t of t h e ' p h i l o s o p h y of t h e history of philosophy', denial
of t h e specific n a t u r e of philosophical k n o w l e d g e and of its
radical difference from s c i e n c e . T h e t h e o r y of t h e c o u r s e of
t h e history of p h i l o s o p h y m a k e s an a b s o l u t e of t h e e l e m e n t of
the singularity i n h e r e n t in e v e r y o u t s t a n d i n g philosophical
d o c t r i n e . But t h e u n i q u e n e s s is relative, a n d t h e r e a l m e a n i n g
of a t h e o r y is d e t e r m i n e d n o t simply by its u n i q u e n e s s but by
its a c t u a l i n v o l v e m e n t in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of k n o w l e d g e , its
a n s w e r s to q u e s t i o n s a l r e a d y posed b e f o r e it, w h i c h m e a n s its
inclusion in t h e existing p r o b l e m a t i c .
In spite of t h e fact t h a t individual s p o k e s m e n of the ' p h i l o ­
s o p h y of t h e history of p h i l o s o p h y ' m a k e a substantial c o n t r i ­
bution to t h e s c i e n c e of t h e history of p h i l o s o p h y in their 9

c o n c r e t e inquiries devoted to the great p h i l o s o p h e r s of the past,

t h e i r theoretical c o n c e p t i o n is clearly u n s o u n d . It intensifies
t h e historically obsolete metaphysical c o u n t e r p o s i n g of philo­
s o p h y to n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c r e s e a r c h , a n d in the end r e d u c e s
p h i l o s o p h y to a variety of artistic c r e a t i o n . T h i s must not,
of c o u r s e , be t r e a t e d as a belittling of the significance of
philosophy, but it is still a fact that philosophical systems a r e
not artistic w o r k s even w h e n they a r e written in verse. T h e
i n t r o d u c t i o n of aesthetic c r i t e r i a into p h i l o s o p h y is t h e r e f o r e
in fact an indirect denial of philosophy as a specific form of
knowledge.
I h a v e a l r e a d y r e m a r k e d that a d i s c a r d i n g of t h e basic
philosophical question, a n d likewise a t t e m p t s to 'rise a b o v e '
the opposition of materialism and idealism, a r e a c h a r a c t e r ­
istic f e a t u r e of c o n t e m p o r a r y b o u r g e o i s philosophy. T h e
subjectivist denial of t h e i m p o r t a n c e of philosophical t r e n d s
is a modification of t h e r e a c t i o n a r y t e n d e n c y often met u n d e r
the flag of d e - i d e o l o g i s a t i o n of philosophy. S i n c e t h e subject-
m a t t e r of my b o o k is a t h e o r e t i c a l analysis of t h e c o u r s e of
t h e h i s t o r y of p h i l o s o p h y , it is at t h e s a m e t i m e a critical analysis
of t h e most influential idealist philosophical c o n c e p t i o n s of
o u r day.

16
 NOTES

1
In c o n t r a s t to t o d a y ' s p h i l o s o p h e r - m e t h o d o l o g i s t s of a s c e p t i c a l t u r n , t h e
classical scientists of the twentieth c e n t u r y h a v e been profoundly convinced
t h a t t h e s c i e n c e s o f n a t u r e r e a l l y c o g n i s e it, w h i c h e x p l a i n s scientists'
a g r e e m e n t o n most f u n d a m e n t a l m a t t e r s . A s M a x P l a n c k w r o t e : ' O u r p r e s e n t
p i c t u r e o f t h e w o r l d a l r e a d y ... i n c l u d e s c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s t h a t c a n n o l o n g e r
b e effaced b y a r e v o l u t i o n e i t h e r i n n a t u r e o r i n t h e h u m a n s p i r i t ' ( 2 0 7 : 6 3 1 ) .
H e r e a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y , t h e first n u m b e r i n b r a c k e t s i n d i c a t e s t h e n u m b e r
of t h e s o u r c e in t h e b i b l i o g r a p h y at t h e e n d of t h e b o o k ; t h e n u m b e r in
italics i n d i c a t e s t h e v o l u m e , w h e n t h e r e i s m o r e t h a n o n e i n a w o r k , a n d
t h e last n u m b e r t h e p a g e .

2
Problemy istoriko-filosofskoi nauki, 2 n d ed. (Mysl, Moscow, 1982).

3
In this c o n n e c t i o n it is not o u t of p l a c e to cite L . A . A r t s i m o v i c h ' s f o l l o w i n g
interesting r e m a r k : ' T h e a u t h o r of a textbook, compelled by the necessity to
p r e s e n t a s c i e n c e as a s t a b l e c o m p l e x of i n f o r m a t i o n , s e l e c t s a p p r o p r i a t e
m a t e r i a l , r e j e c t i n g w h a t s e e m s t o h i m n o t t o b e a d e q u a t e l y verified, p r o b l e m a ­
tical, a n d u n s t a b l e . A s a r e s u l t h e u n w i t t i n g l y m a n a g e s t o g i v e t h e r e a d e r w h o
is s t a r t i n g to s t u d y a n e w field t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t it is c o m p l e t e d . E v e r y t h i n g
s e e m s in t h e m a i n to h a v e b e e n d o n e , a n d it n o w r e m a i n s , chiefly, to fill in t h e
d e t a i l s . T h e t e x t b o o k m a y t h e r e f o r e s o m e t i m e s w e a k e n t h e r e a d e r ' s will for
independent thinking by d e m o n s t r a t i n g the science to him as a collection of
well p r e s e r v e d m e m o r i a l s of t h e p a s t a n d n o t as a r o a d to a f u t u r e s h r o u d e d
in f o g . T h e r e is a l s o a p u r e l y p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a s o n for t h e c o n s e r v a t i s m of
t e x t b o o k s . T h e y a r e u s u a l l y w r i t t e n b y p e o p l e o f t h e o l d e r g e n e r a t i o n for
y o u n g b e g i n n e r s , a t a t i m e w h e n t h e m i d d l e g e n e r a t i o n i s a l t e r i n g t h e face
of t h e s c i e n c e by its e f f o r t s , b r o a d e n i n g or s m a s h i n g p r e v i o u s l y e s t a b l i s h e d
n o t i o n s ' ( 9 : 1 4 2 ) . I t must b e said that A r t s i m o v i c h h a d i n m i n d p r i m a r i l y
t e x t b o o k s of p h y s i c s , but it w o u l d be at least p r e s u m p t u o u s not to see that
this c o n s i d e r a t i o n a p p l i e s mutatis mutandis to t e x t b o o k s of p h i l o s o p h y ,
despite the very substantial differences in the content and rates of develop­
m e n t of t h e t w o s c i e n c e s .

4
O n e must n o t e , i n c i d e n t a l l y , that C a m u s is d e v e l o p i n g a p r o p o s i t i o n h e r e
e x p r e s s e d b y N i e t z s c h e w h o s u g g e s t e d that G r e e k t r a g e d y ' g u e s s e d w h e r e
t h e g r e a t q u e s t i o n m a r k w a s put, a b o u t t h e v a l u e o f e x i s t e n c e ' ( 1 9 4 : 2 ) . A s a
p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y t h i n k i n g w r i t e r , C a m u s b e l i e v e d that this t r a g i c q u e s t i o n
should occupy the main place in philosophy.

5
B u h r a n d I r r l i t z ( G D R ) point out in a b o o k on G e r m a n classical p h i l o s o p h y ,
that t h e basic p r o b l e m o f classical b o u r g e o i s p h i l o s o p h y — f r o m B a c o n a n d
D e s c a r t e s t o H e g e l a n d F e u e r b a c h — w a s that o f m a s t e r i n g laws o f n a t u r e
a n d r a t i o n a l r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f p u b l i c life. ' B a c o n a n d D e s c a r t e s n o longer
r e g a r d e d o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , like f e u d a l - c l e r i c a l t h o u g h t , a s G o d - g i v e n a n d
d e p e n d e n t on Him, but as g o v e r n e d by man himself—and s h a p e a b l e by him'
( 2 4 : 1 9 ) . Hegel and F e u e r b a c h 'over and over again c a m e back to the
q u e s t i o n w h i c h B a c o n a n d D e s c a r t e s first f o r m u l a t e d implicitly, viz., h o w
c a n M a n r a t i o n a l l y m a s t e r n a t u r e a n d s o c i e t y ? ( i b i d . ) . T h i s 'basic p r o b l e m '
of classical b o u r g e o i s p h i l o s o p h y d o e s n o t in t h e least lessen t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e
of t h e basic p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n .

6
T h e following statement of the Western philosopher Gehlen is indicative
in this r e s p e c t : 'If p h i l o s o p h y c o m e s a l o n e to m a n " f r o m o u t s i d e " it risks

2-01603 17
 b e c o m i n g m a t e r i a l i s t . If it s t a r t s f r o m f a c t s of c o n s c i o u s n e s s it will be
abstract immanent-idealist and speak about an incompatible ideal—and an
i n d e t e r m i n a t e g e n e r a l h u m a n origin' ( 7 3 : 2 7 3 ) . I n t r y i n g t o avoid both
m a t e r i a l i s m a n d idealism, G e h l e n c o u n t e r p o s e s a p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n t h r o p o l o g y
t h a t e c l e c t i c a l l y c o m b i n e s i d e a l i s t e m p i r i c i s m a n d i r r a t i o n a l i s m with s e p a r a t e
materialist propositions.

7
It is w o r t h s t r e s s i n g t h a t t h e f e a t u r e s of L e i b n i z ' s i d e a l i s m listed ( i n c i d e n t a l l y
as with the main features of any outstanding philosophical doctrine) far from
e x h a u s t its c o n t e n t a n d all its i n h e r e n t p e c u l i a r i t i e s ; I h a v e said n o t h i n g of
his d y n a m i s m , a b o u t t h e t h e o r y o f s m a l l p e r c e p t i o n s , t h e p r i n c i p l e o f
c o n t i n u i t y , t h e s u b s t a n t i a t i o n o f o p t i m i s m , t h e o d i c y , logical i n v e s t i g a t i o n s ,
e t c . I n d i c a t i o n of t h e p l a c e of a p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e in t h e f r a m e w o r k
of s o m e t r e n d or c u r r e n t a n d e l u c i d a t i o n of its main ( m a t e r i a l i s t or i d e a l i s t )
c o n t e n t , h a v e t o b r i n g t o light t h e specific f o r m s i n w h i c h i t i s e x p r e s s e d a n d
d e v e l o p e d a n d n o t r e p l a c e c o n c r e t e i n q u i r y i n t o its f e a t u r e s .

8
My article ' M a r x i s m a n d t h e C o n t e m p o r a r y Bourgeois " P h i l o s o p h y of the
History of Philosophy"' in t h e s y m p o s i u m Leninism and Contemporary
Problems of Historico-Philosophical Science (edited by M.T. Iovchuk,
L . N . S u v o r o v , et al.) ( M o s c o w , 1 9 7 0 ) is d e v o t e d to a c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s of
the m a i n propositions of the 'philosophy of the history of philosophy'.

9
I w o u l d m e n t i o n in p a r t i c u l a r t h e f o l l o w i n g i n q u i r i e s by M a r t i a l G u é r o u l t :
L'évolution et la structure de la doctrine de la science chez Fichte, 2 vols.
( L e s belles l e t t r e s , P a r i s , 1 9 3 0 ) , La. p h i l o s o p h i e t r a n s c e n d e n l a l e de Salomon
Maimon ( L e s belles lettres, P a r i s , 1931) ( t h e s e t w o w o r k s r e c e i v e d p r i z e s
of t h e F r e n c h A c a d e m y of S c i e n c e s ) ; Dynamiquc el métaphysique l e i b n i z i e n ­
nes ( L e s belles l e t t r e s , P a r i s , 1 9 3 4 ) ; Descartes selon I'ordre des raisons, 2 vols.
(Aubrier, Paris, 1953).
 Part One

THE BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION

AS A PROBLEM OF THE HISTORY
OF PHILOSOPHY

I
THE SENSE AND MEANING
OF THE BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION

1. T h e Basic Philosophical Question

and the Problematic of Philosophy

T h e question of t h e relation of c o n s c i o u s n e s s to being, of t h e

spiritual to t h e m a t e r i a l (is t h e spiritual a p r o p e r t y of m a t t e r ,
a p r o d u c t of its d e v e l o p m e n t ? or, on t h e c o n t r a r y , is t h e m a t e r i a l
a d e r i v a t i v e of t h e spiritual?) h a s not constituted a p r o b l e m
for a long time, strictly s p e a k i n g , if, g r a n t e d , o n e calls unresolved
matters, subject to investigation, p r o b l e m s . T h e materialists of
antiquity h a d a l r e a d y posed this question correctly, t h o u g h only
on t h e basis of e v e r y d a y o b s e r v a t i o n s . T h e m a t e r i a l i s m of
m o d e r n times, a n t i c i p a t i n g special inquiries a n d their results,
s h o w e d t h a t t h e spiritual does not exist w i t h o u t m a t t e r organised
in a c e r t a i n way. N a t u r a l science h a s not only confirmed t h e
materialist a n s w e r to t h e basic philosophical question, b u t also
successfully investigates t h e m e c h a n i s m of t h e f o r m a t i o n ,
functioning, a n d d e v e l o p m e n t of the psychic. Only a few ideal­
ists a r e now so bold as to claim u n r e s e r v e d l y t h a t t h e psychic
is i n d e p e n d e n t of its physiological s u b s t r a t u m . W h i l e rejecting
the materialist a n s w e r to t h e basic philosophical q u e s t i o n ,
c o n t e m p o r a r y idealism is also forced to r e - e x a m i n e its o w n
traditional idealist a n s w e r . T h i s e x p l a i n s t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
1

striving to e l i m i n a t e this question as not, allegedly, c o r r e c t l y

posed.
A resolved philosophical p r o b l e m is not, of c o u r s e , c o n s i g n e d
to t h e a r c h i v e s b e c a u s e of its ideological significance.
N e w scientific discoveries ( c y b e r n e t i c devices, say, t h a t
model t h e t h i n k i n g b r a i n ) u n d o u b t e d l y e n r i c h the materialist
a n s w e r . And idealists' a t t e m p t s to discredit t h e basic materialist
position e v o k e a necessity a g a i n a n d a g a i n to e x p l a i n its c o n t e n t
a n d m e a n i n g , basing oneself on t h e a g g r e g a t e of t h e facts of
science a n d p r a c t i c e . But t h a t c a n n o t , o f c o u r s e , b e g r o u n d s
for revising t h e materialist a n s w e r to t h e basic philosophical

19
question. To convert it again into a problem means to drag
philosophy back, which incidentally is what contemporary
idealists are engaged in. In philosophy, as in any science, the
researcher is dealing with problems. As for resolved matters,
they find their rightful place in textbooks.
All these considerations anent the proposition that can be
called an axiom of all materialism enable one to conclude that
there are no grounds for the notion common in Marxist litera­
ture about the coincidence of the subject-matter of philosophy
(including the subject-matter of the philosophy of Marxism)
and the basic philosophical question. T h e subject-matter of
philosophy, and of any science, must be defined, indicating the
class of objects that it studies. This subject-matter can, of course,
be described as the aggregate of the historically established,
logically interconnected problems whose origin is due to socio­
economic processes, the development of knowledge, and the
discovery of new objects of philosophical inquiry or new inter­
pretations of already known facts. But it is quite obvious that
this set of problems cannot be reduced to one question, however
important.
T h e character of the posing of the problems that philosophy
is concerned with is theoretically determined, of course, by one
answer or the other to the basic philosophical question. That
enables one to understand in what sense this question is really
basic. T h e identification of the subject-matter of philosophy
with the basic philosophical question is apparently linked with
the extremely general interpretation of the content of the latter.
T h a t interpretation is not legitimate, because it deprives the
basic philosophical question of the place it occupies by right
by distinctly formulating a definite dilemma.
T h e epistemology of dialectical materialism also cannot be
reduced to its necessary, initial premiss, viz., the materialist
answer to the second aspect of the basic philosophical question.
T h e psychophysical problem differs essentially in its content
from the basic philosophical question, since it presupposes
investigation of the whole diversity of forms of the psycho­
logical in its relation to the diversity of the properties of the
physiological. One must therefore not confuse the basic philo­
sophical question with the whole problematic of the objectively
existing 'spiritual-material' relation, the various forms of which
are studied by several sciences. T h e basic philosophical question
is one of the priority of one aspect of this relation. Its classical
formulation, given by Engels, speaks only of 'which is primary:
spirit or nature' (52:346).

20
 L e n i n stressed that the scientific m e a n i n g of Engels' formula­
tion of the basic philosophical question was that it singled out
from t h e whole diversity of the c o n t e n t of both materialism
and idealism just that which theoretically p r e d e t e r m i n e s their
mutually exclusive opposition.
E n g e l s w a s right w h e n he said that t h e essential t h i n g is not w h i c h of t h e
n u m e r o u s s c h o o l s of m a t e r i a l i s m or idealism a p a r t i c u l a r p h i l o s o p h e r
belongs to, but w h e t h e r h e takes n a t u r e , t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d , m a t t e r
in m o t i o n , or spirit, r e a s o n , c o n s c i o u s n e s s , etc., as p r i m a r y ( 1 4 2 : 1 4 9 ) .

In Materialism and Empirio-Criticism he constantly stressed

t h e need to delimit the basic philosophical question distinctly
in order to f o r m u l a t e the alternative that no philosophical
doctrine could avoid. In view of the i m p o r t a n c e in principle
of delimiting the basic philosophical question and the whole
domain of philosophical inquiry, I would cite a n o t h e r well-
known statement of Lenin's:
W h e t h e r n a t u r e , m a t t e r , the physical, t h e e x t e r n a l world should b e
taken a s p r i m a r y , a n d c o n s c i o u s n e s s , mind, sensation ( e x p e r i e n c e — a s
the widespread t e r m i n o l o g y of o u r time h a s it), the psychical, etc.,
should be r e g a r d e d as s e c o n d a r y — t h a t is t h e root q u e s t i o n w h i c h in
fact c o n t i n u e s to divide t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s i n t o two great camps ( 1 4 2 : 3 1 5 ) .

T h e materialist answer to the basic philosophical question

is an initial theoretical proposition of materialism, which
naturally does not include the whole wealth of that doctrine's
ideas. Its identification with the subject-matter of philosophy
is as unsound as all attempts to extend Lenin's philosophical
definition of matter, the immense heuristic significance of which
is, in particular, that it excludes all the attributes of matter from
its philosophical definition, except one, which epistemologically
constitutes its differentia specifica, so disclosing its opposition
to consciousness and the d e p e n d e n c e of the latter on it. Is it
worth while d e m o n s t r a t i n g that any attempt to extend the
philosophical definition of matter by including its physical,
chemical and other attributes in it, only reveals i n c o m p r e h e n ­
sion of the real sense of this definition? 2

If the subject-matter of philosophy and the basic philosophical

question w e r e one and the same, then the former has not altered
historically, in spite of radical socio-economic c h a n g e s and
great scientific discoveries. In that case either philosophy does
not pose any new questions or their posing goes beyond its
subject-matter. It would turn out that the subject-matter of
philosophical inquiry had lost c o n t a c t with the historical
conditions that d e t e r m i n e t h e development of philosophy and
knowledge in general. T h e idealist illusion would be c r e a t e d

21
that philosophy exists independent of the events of its epoch,
rises above them, and so on. A philosophy that occupied itself
with one and the same question would ve wholly the prisoner
of tradition, while its development in fact presupposes revision,
and not just inheritance of tradition. Identification of the
subject-matter of philosophy with the basic philosophical
question indirectly, if not directly, rejects the development
of philosophy, which is reduced in that case simply to various
modifications of the basic philosophical question and various
answers to it. But the development of philosophy presupposes
the rise of new problems, research tasks, and fields of inquiry.
Identification of the subject-matter of philosophy with the
basic philosophical question glossed over the qualitative
difference between the philosophy of Marxism and preceding
philosophy. T h e subject-matter of the former is the most
general laws of the motion, change, and development of nature,
society, and knowledge. T h e universal laws of men's changing
both of the external world and of their social being also constitute
the subject-matter of dialectical and historical materialism.
T h e materialist answer to the basic question of philosophy
theoretically predetermines the corresponding understanding
of the most general laws of development. But to identify the
two is to make a gross error." 3

I have dwelt on what the basic philosophical question is not

at such length that it may, perhaps, cause perplexity. Why do
we call this question basic? And if it is not the subject-matter
of philosophy, what is the sense of the adjective 'basic'? Will
drawing a line between the subject-matter of philosophy and
the basic philosophical question not lead to a belittling of the
significance of the latter? These fears all merit close attention,
and I shall try to show why it is the basic philosophical question
that forms the most important philosophical dilemma, and why
the materialist answer to it is one of the outstanding gains of
philosophical thought. T h e task consists in getting clear about
the specific nature of this question and its epistemological
necessity, and finally, too, about the sense in which it never­
theless forms a problem, a problem of the history of philosophy.

2. Self-Awareness and the External World.

The Epistemological Necessity
of the Basic Philosophical Question
Philosophical analysis of any theoretical proposition calls for
elucidation of its epistemological premisses. Kant correctly

22
called it dogmatism to reject an epistemological investigation
of principles on the grounds that they were obvious. Hegel,
who demonstrated that sensory reliability if sublated by theore­
tical analysis, by virtue of which philosophy should recognise
only that as true which is obtained through the logical move­
ment of a concept. T h e fact that both Kant and Hegel employed
this epistemological imperative to criticise materialism and
substantiate idealism does not discredit the principle itself;
for Hegel employed dialectics to the same end.
Lenin called categories stages in the development of know­
ledge. Did he mean that cause and effect, essence and pheno­
menon, space and time did not exist independent of the process
of knowing? Such a conclusion would be a subjective-idealist
interpretation of the epistemological significance of categories.
T h e philosophy of Marxism rejects the metaphysical notion
of unchangeable forms of knowledge, given once and for all,
which prompted Kant to convert categories into a priori forms
of sense contemplation and rational t h o u g h t . Our concepts of
causality, essence, space, etc., develop historically, and are
enriched by a new content that not only supplements their old,
accustomed content but also subjects it to dialectical negation.
One should not, therefore, identify the concept of causality with
the objectively existing relation of causality; the concept only
reflects objective reality approximately. A change in the
content of concepts and categories does not give grounds for
denying the objective existence of what they reflect; Lenin
criticised that mistake of subjective relativism in detail in his
Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.
In the first three chapters of that work, devoted to the episte­
mology of dialectical materialism, Lenin examined not only
the process of knowing but also the categories usually called
ontological. It was an epistemological analysis of causality,
necessity, space, etc., that served as the basis for the conclusion
about their objective content: the forms of thinking do not,
of course, coincide with the forms of being, but they do reflect
them. That conclusion rejects the metaphysical opposing of the
epistemological and the ontological, and substantiates their
unity. Analysis of the objective 'spiritual-material' relation must
be approached from that angle, since it is it that forms the
content of the basic philosophical question. What is its epistemo­
logical necessity? What is its origin? Why is it really a basic
question and not a derivative one?
In my view, a most necessary condition of all conscious and
purposive h u m a n activity, i.e. distinguishing between the subjec-

23
tive a n d t h e objective, f o r m s t h e factual basis of t h e question
of the relation of the spiritual and the material. Everyone (the
i d e a l i s t i n c l u d e d ) d i s t i n g u i s h e s h i m s e l f f r o m all o t h e r s , a n d
t h r o u g h that is c o n s c i o u s of himself as I, a h u m a n personality,
an individuality. P e r c e p t i o n of the s u r r o u n d i n g world is
impossible without consciousness of one's difference from the
o b j e c t s b e i n g p e r c e i v e d . M a n ' s c o n s c i o u s n e s s (if o n e a b s t r a c t s
f r o m its e l e m e n t a r y m a n i f e s t a t i o n s ) i s a t t h e s a m e t i m e self-
a w a r e n e s s , since no o n e w o u l d t a k e it into his h e a d to c o n s i d e r
h i m s e l f a t r e e , r i v e r , ass, o r a n y t h i n g e l s e t h a t h e p e r c e i v e s .
And it follows f r o m this t h a t s e l f - a w a r e n e s s is impossible simply
as consciousness of one's E g o ; it is realised t h r o u g h reflection
o f a r e a l i t y i n d e p e n d e n t o f i t . D e s c a r t e s , i n c i d e n t a l l y , did n o t
4

k n o w that when he tried to prove that only the doubting,

thinking consciousness, or thought, was absolutely reliable,
i.e. w h o l l y e x c l u d e d a n y d o u b t s a b o u t its e x i s t e n c e . H e w a s
mistaken, since he could not in principle assume that a condition
of the self-obvious e x i s t e n c e of s e l f - a w a r e n e s s w a s a far from
o b v i o u s link b e t w e e n d o u b t a n d t h e o b j e c t o f d o u b t , b e t w e e n
thinking and being. He a s s u m e d that o n e could s e p a r a t e oneself
f r o m e v e r y t h i n g s e n s u a l l y p e r c e i v a b l e , a n d t h r o w d o u b t o n its
existence, but that it was impossible to d o u b t the reality of the
i n t e l l e c t u a l o p e r a t i o n itself t h a t w a s e f f e c t e d i n t h a t w a y . H e
did n o t , h o w e v e r , ask: b u t i s t h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l o p e r a t i o n p o s s i b l e
irrespective of the external world? F o r denial of the external
world presupposes some content known to thought, some
t h i n k a b l e fact t h a t is d e c l a r e d in this case to be an illusion. T h a t
is w h y the line of d e m a r c a t i o n b e t w e e n s u b j e c t a n d object
(irrespective of how the one and the other a r e understood)
c o m e s i n t o a n y e l e m e n t a r y act o f h u m a n k n o w i n g a n d
b e h a v i o u r , i n s o f a r as it is p e r f o r m e d c o n s c i o u s l y .
U n l i k e D e s c a r t e s , K a n t c a m e t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e self-
e v i d e n c e of consciousness of one's existence (albeit inde­
p e n d e n t of perception of t h e external w o r l d ) was essentially
a n i l l u s i o n r e f u t e d b y its l a t e n t ( a n d d e n i e d ) p r e m i s s , i.e. t h e
fact of perception of the e x t e r n a l world.
K a n t added a short section 'Refutation of Idealism' to the
s e c o n d e d i t i o n of Critique of Pure Reason—a r e p l y to t h o s e
o f his c r i t i c s w h o l i k e n e d his s y s t e m , n o t w i t h o u t g r o u n d s ,
to B e r k e l e i a n i s m a n d H u m i s m . In this section he d e m o n s t r a t e d
that self-awareness was impossible without sense perception
of t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d : 'The simple but empirically determined
consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of
external objects in space' ( 1 1 6 : 1 7 0 ) . He a f f i r m e d t h a t i n n e r

24
e x p e r i e n c e was only possible t h r o u g h external experience, so
refuting the Cartesian thesis of t h e absolute reliability of self-
a w a r e n e s s alone. T h e external world is also reliable, according
to Kant, because 'the consciousness of my own existence is at
the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of
other things without me' ( 1 1 6 : 1 7 1 ) .
T h e idealist philosopher, of course, while demonstrating the
need to d e m a r c a t e the subjective from the objective, may then
declare the difference between them to exist only for h u m a n
consciousness or only in it. In that case, too, recognition of the
external world is interpreted idealistically, i.e. is reduced to
denial of the i n d e p e n d e n c e of reality from consciousness. T h a t
is what happened essentially with Kant, since, a c c o r d i n g to his
doctrine, the sense-perceived world of p h e n o m e n a posits an
external, a priori form of sensory contemplation, which he
defined as space. F r o m that angle the external world (in
contrast to t h e supersensory 'things-in-itself) is not formed
without the involvement of h u m a n senses and a categorial,
synthesis performed by reason. Still, K a n t could not get along
without d e m a r c a t i n g the subjective from the objective, and
without asking what was t h e relation of consciousness to what
was not consciousness.
Idealism often reduces the objective to the subjective, makes
a gulf between them or, on the c o n t r a r y , identifies them. But it
c a n n o t ignore this difference, and likewise deny the existence
of consciousness (and self-awareness), even when it interprets
it as a simple a p p e a r a n c e not unlike an ineradicable illusion
about the i n d e p e n d e n c e of will from motives. W h a t e v e r the
idealist's ideas a b o u t the essence of the subjective and the
objective, and a b o u t the relation between them, he has to
recognise their difference if only as directly given to conscious­
ness or as established by it.
Neokantians have tried to r e d u c e all sense-perceived, cog­
nised, thinkable reality to constructs of logical thought, and
products of scientific-theoretical or artistic creation. In other
words they have made an attempt to eliminate being and
objective reality, and to interpret them as special modes of the
existence of consciousness. Rickert claimed that the objects
of knowing ' a r e then my ideas, perceptions, sensations, and
expressions of my will', i.e. t h e content of consciousness,
while the subject of knowing 'is that which is a w a r e of what
this content is' ( 2 2 1 : 1 3 ) . But in o r d e r to distinguish the content
of consciousness from awareness of it, he in fact restored the
difference between consciousness and being, declaring that

25
consciousness, the c o n t e n t of which generates objects, is a uni­
versal, supraindividual consciousness, although it also only
exists in h u m a n individuals. T h a t forced him to establish a
difference of principle b e t w e e n the empirical subject and its
direct, subjective consciousness, and the epistemological subject,
whose consciousness is impersonal and in that sense objective.
T h e theoretical s o u r c e of this conception was the doctrines
of Kant and Fichte.
T h e concepts of the subjective and objective, whatever
c o n t e n t is ascribed to them, form a dichotomy such as makes
it possible to mentally grasp everything t h a t exists, everything
possible, and everything conceivable, and also, consequently,
what does not exist a n y w h e r e except in fantasy. One can always
attribute any one p h e n o m e n o n to t h e objective or the subjective.
It is a n o t h e r matter that people can disagree with one a n o t h e r
about what to consider objective and what subjective. They
may take the objective for t h e subjective and vice versa. This is
d o n e by some idealists, in particular, who interpret t h e objective
as s o m e sort of relation between p h e n o m e n a of consciousness,
i.e. as an i m m a n e n t characteristic of the subjective. But in that
case the dividing line between the subjective and the objective
is maintained, in spite of the subjectivist interpretation.
Neopositivists d e c l a r e the concept 'objective reality' a term
without scientific sense. But they, too, call for a strict d e m a r c a ­
tion between the subjective and 'intersubjective' or, as B e r t r a n d
Russell expressed it, between the personal and t h e 'social'.
While disregarding objective reality the neopositivist n e v e r ­
theless strives to retain the counterposing of the objective to
the subjective, since denial of this fundamental difference
makes it impossible to d r a w a line between knowledge and
ignorance, truth and e r r o r .
One must note, incidentally, that there a r e also those a m o n g
philosophers who dispute the epistemological significance in
principle of the dichotomy of the subjective and objective, who
try to set some third thing, differing from subject and object,
from consciousness and being, above them both, this something
forming the original essence as it were, in which nothing is yet
divided or differentiated. T h u s , a c c o r d i n g to Schelling's
doctrine, the s u p r e m e first principle is neither subjective nor
objective, since it is absolute identity free of all differences,
the unconscious state of the world spirit. Nevertheless, with
Schelling, too, this absolute indifferentiation was divided into
subjective and objective as a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e self-differentia­
tion caused by an unconscious inclination and blind will. And

26
these concepts b e c a m e universal characteristics of everything
that existed in n a t u r e a n d society.
In t h e latest idealist p h i l o s o p h y a t e n d e n c y p r e d o m i n a t e s to
d e m a r c a t e the subject and object; this is particularly c h a r a c t e ­
ristic o f b o t h e x i s t e n t i a l i s m a n d H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y .
Husserl t h o u g h t it necessary to 'factor out' the external world,
i.e. n a t u r e a n d s o c i e t y , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d o n t h e o t h e r
consciousness, at least in t h e form in w h i c h it is registered not
only by everyday observation but also by psychology. N e x t he
set a b o u t d e s c r i b i n g t h e g e n u i n e reality, t o b e called ideal b e i n g
or (what is the s a m e thing) p u r e consciousness. Ideal being
was neither subjective nor objective because it was absolute.
But in contrast to the Platonic realm of transcendental a r c h e ­
types, H u s s e r l ' s ideal b e i n g w a s not t o b e f o u n d b e y o n d h u m a n
l i f e b u t i n h u m a n c o n s c i o u s n e s s itself, t h o u g h i n d e p e n d e n t o f
the latter. W h e r e Plato ascribed a timeless, other-world
existence to ideas, Husserl's 'eide' or intuitively c o m p r e h e n d e d
phenomenоlogical essences, have no existence in general, at
least not a n e c e s s a r y o n e . E x i s t e n c e , a c c o r d i n g to H u s s e r l ' s
doctrine, is an empirical determinacy, which cannot be inherent
in the absolute, and in particular in truth, the good, and beauty.
Sense, meaning, and value are inherent in the absolute. Husserl's
ideal being is thus quite similar to the N e o k a n t i a n world of
absolute values, w h i c h do not exist but h a v e m e a n i n g as criteria
of any empirical existence.
Husserl's doctrine about the intensionality of consciousness
was also aimed at o v e r c o m i n g the 'dualism' of subjective a n d
objective, which, in his opinion, w a s to be achieved by b r i n g i n g
out the i m m a n e n c e of the object in consciousness. Since pure
consciousness is meant here, consciousness was independent
o f t h e e x t e r n a l o b j e c t ; i t h a d it, i n f a c t , n o t a s e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t y ,
b u t a s a n i n n e r i n t e n s i o n i n h e r e n t i n itself. T h e o b j e c t w a s
therefore not something that was outside consciousness;
c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' i n t e n s i o n e d ' t h e o b j e c t , i.e. d i s c o v e r e d i t ( r e c a l l e d
it, r e c o g n i s e d it, a s i t w e r e , i f o n e a p p e a l e d t o P l a t o ) w i t h i n
itself. C o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d t h e o b j e c t — t h e s u b j e c t i v e a n d t h e
o b j e c t i v e — p r o v e in the end to be o n e and the same, because
c o n s c i o u s n e s s is o b j e c t i v e as a c o n s e q u e n c e of i n t e n s i o n a l i t y
a n d s o f r e e o f s u b j e c t i v i t y , w h i l e t h e o b j e c t , t h r o u g h its ' i d e a t i v e
c h a r a c t e r ' , i.e. its i n t e n s i o n a l g i v e n n e s s , i s f r e e o f o b j e c t i v i t y .
It m a y s e e m t h a t H u s s e r l in fact s u c c e e d e d ( t h o u g h t h r o u g h
idealist mystification) in e l i m i n a t i n g t h e epistemological n e c e s ­
sity o f s e p a r a t i n g t h e s u b j e c t i v e a n d t h e o b j e c t i v e , s i n c e h e
treated p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l ideal being as outside both. But that

27
impression is deceptive, since the earlier rejected opposition
of the subjective and the objective was imperceptibly restored in
Husserl's counterposing of the ideal and the empirical. T h e
empirical (both being and consciousness) is defined as purely
subjective, illusory, i m a g i n a r y , a n d ideal b e i n g (or pure
consciousness) as absolutely objective with no relation what­
s o e v e r with the b e i n g a n d consciousness with w h i c h h u m a n
existence, natural science, and practice are connected.
Husserl thus r e p e a t e d t h e mistake of those idealists w h o
d e c l a r e the real i m a g i n a r y and the imaginary the only existent,
and who, confusing subjective and objective idealism, assume
t h a t they h a v e d o n e a w a y with all t h e e x t r e m e s o f subjectivism
and objectivism.
Existentialism m a d e Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y the basis of
its o n t o l o g y o f h u m a n e x i s t e n c e . S i n c e r a t i o n a l , c o n c e p t u a l
thought (from the standpoint of the existentialist) cannot be
the authentic (existential) m o d e of h u m a n existence, existen­
tialism c o n d e m n s the c o u n t e r p o s i n g of consciousness to being
a n d of the subject to the object as a superficial a n d essentially
false o r i e n t a t i o n t h a t e x c l u d e s m a n from b e i n g a n d so distorts
both being and h u m a n e x i s t e n c e . Existentialism calls for the
inclusion of m a n in being. T h a t does not, in g e n e r a l , m e a n that
the existentialist protests against treating the h u m a n individual
o u t s i d e his r e l a t i o n t o n a t u r e a n d social b e i n g . N e i t h e r t h e o n e
nor the other interests him m u c h in essence; following Husserl
he factors out the empirical being about which everyday obser­
vations and the sciences speak. To include m a n in being means
to treat h u m a n existence as the key to solving the puzzle of
being. W h i l e stressing that being, at least for m a n , manifests
itself o n l y i n h u m a n e x i s t e n c e , t h e e x i s t e n t i a l i s t a t t h e s a m e
t i m e f e n c e s m a n off f r o m b e i n g , d e c l a r i n g t h a t t h e l a t t e r i s n e v e r
c o m p r e h e n d e d as b e i n g but a l w a y s o n l y as w h a t exists, as
m a t e r i a l . C o n s c i o u s n e s s , b y c o n s t a n t l y g o i n g o u t s i d e itself
(transcending, in the existentialist's t e r m i n o l o g y ) , therefore
d o e s n o t p e n e t r a t e b e i n g , a n d r e m a i n s a l i e n a t e d f r o m it; i t c a n
n e v e r b e c o m e being just as being c a n n o t b e c o m e consciousness.
T h i s c o u n t e r p o s i n g of consciousness as 'being for itself to
'being in itself' is p a r t i c u l a r l y clearly e x p r e s s e d in t h e d o c t r i n e
of J e a n - P a u l Sartre. T h e counterposing of the two is absolute.
'Being in itself does not know temporality, destruction,
s u f f e r i n g ; all t h e s e c a t e g o r i e s c h a r a c t e r i s e o n l y ' h u m a n r e a l i t y ' ,
w h o s e n a t u r e consists in limitless subjectivity a n d mortality.
'It i s w e w h o will d e s t r o y o u r s e l v e s , a n d t h e e a r t h will r e m a i n
i n its l e t h a r g y u n t i l a n o t h e r c o n s c i o u s n e s s a r r i v e s t o a w a k e n

28
if (236:90). True, in h i s Critique de la raison dialectique,
S a r t r e stresses t h e relativity of the opposition between the
subjective and the objective: the subject is constantly being
e x t e r n a l i s e d , i.e. p a s s e s f r o m t h e i n s i d e t o t h e o u t s i d e , b u t t h e
o b j e c t i s c o n t i n u o u s l y b e i n g i n t e r n a l i s e d , i.e. b e i n g a s s i m i l a t e d
by the subject. T h e dialectic of the subject and object does not,
however (according to Sartre), eliminate the mutual alienation
of ' b e i n g f o r itself' a n d 'being in itself; it is c o n s t a n t l y revived
a n d reinforced b e c a u s e t h e objective, since it is objective, is
absolutely outside consciousness, which is essentially only
'consciousness of consciousness' and, moreover, 'nothing',
s i n c e i t d o e s n o t c o n t a i n a n y t h i n g i n itself t h a t i s i n h e r e n t
in ' b e i n g in itself'.
E x i s t e n t i a l i s m , w h i c h set itself t h e t a s k o f o v e r c o m i n g t h e
'split' b e t w e e n s u b j e c t a n d o b j e c t , t h u s d e e p e n s t h e o p p o s i t i o n
of s u b j e c t i v e a n d o b j e c t i v e in fact, since it i n t e r p r e t s it
subjectively and anti-dialectically. But the conclusion already
d r a w n a b o v e f o l l o w s f r o m t h a t , viz., t h a t it is i m p o s s i b l e in
principle to eliminate the question of the relation of conscious­
ness to being, and of the subjective to the objective. T h e whole
disagreement about the nature of the relation between them
p r e s u p p o s e s this d e m a r c a t i o n a n d , t o s o m e extent, t h e c o u n t e r ­
posing.
C o n s c i o u s n e s s of t h e necessity of this d e m a r c a t i o n (and
even c o u n t e r p o s i n g ) does not, of course, coincide with recogni­
tion of the existence of the spiritual a n d the material. Vulgar
m a t e r i a l i s t s d i d n o t r e c o g n i s e t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e s p i r i t u a l , i.e.
wholely r e d u c e d it to the material. Subjective idealists on the
c o n t r a r y d e n i e d the existence of matter, calling it simply a
b u n d l e of sensations. S o m e idealists claimed that consciousness
a n d the s p i r i t u a l did not e x i s t at all, a n d r e d u c e d t h e o b j e c t i v e
content of consciousness to physiological reactions. N o n e of
these views, h o w e v e r , affected the epistemological basis of the
q u e s t i o n t h a t E n g e l s c a l l e d t h e s u p r e m e o n e o f all p h i l o s o p h y ;
they r e f e r r e d only to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of this basis.
T h e divergences in the interpretation of the 'spiritual-
material' relation give rise to different w a y s of posing the
b a s i c p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n , a n d a l s o t o d e n i a l o f its r e a l
significance. T h e s e differences and the converted forms of the
basic philosophical question c o n n e c t e d with them merit special
study, without which our view of the course of the history of
p h i l o s o p h y will be s c h e m a t i c . B u t it is n e c e s s a r y first of all to
recognise that the difference between consciousness and being,
and subjective a n d objective, is an objective one, existing

29
i n d e p e n d e n t l y of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . C o n s c i o u s n e s s is a f u n c t i o n
o f t h e b r a i n , b u t b o t h t h e b r a i n a n d c o n s c i o u s n e s s o n l y exist
insofar as they relate to the external world with which m a n
interacts. Experimental research has shown that w h e n a person
is p u t in a s i t u a t i o n t h a t m a x i m a l l y e x c l u d e s t h e effect of
countless stimuli on h i m (most of t h e m not even realised) he
suffers emotional and psychic disturbances to t h e point of
hallucinations and paranoid symptoms. T h e cause of these
disturbances of consciousness is the limitation of the n u m b e r
of s e n s o r y stimuli or sensory h u n g e r (see 7 4 ) . T h u s the sensua­
list p r i n c i p l e : Nihil est in intellectи quod поп fuerit in s e n s u
(nothing is in the mind that was not in t h e senses) is supported
in both the epistemological a n d anthropological aspects. O n e
must not, of c o u r s e , t a k e t h a t old d i c t u m literally; sense data
a r e not simply perceived or r e p r o d u c e d by consciousness.
Consciousness is founded on sense perceptions of the external
w o r l d , a n d o n all p r a c t i c a l s e n s u a l activity; a n d t h e r e i s n o
consciousness (and knowledge) without sense reflection of
objective reality. It is that (but n o t only t h a t alone, as I shall
show later) which makes the question of the relation of
consciousness and being, and of the spiritual and the material,
the basic philosophical question.
T h u s , since m a n possesses consciousness, he is a w a r e of the
world a r o u n d him and distinguishes himself f r o m the things he
i s c o n s c i o u s of, h e f i n d s h i m s e l f i n a s i t u a t i o n t h a t i s f i x e d a n d
formulated by the basic philosophical question. Philosophers
h a v e n o t i n v e n t e d t h i s q u e s t i o n ; i t h a s g r o w n f r o m all h u m a n
p r a c t i c e , a n d t h e history of k n o w l e d g e , but it d o e s not follow
f r o m t h i s t h a t w e a r e a w a r e o f i t p r e c i s e l y a s a q u e s t i o n , let
a l o n e as a philosophical o n e and, m o r e o v e r , the basic one.
M a r x and Engels wrote: 'Consciousness ( d a s Bewusstsein)
c a n n e v e r b e a n y t h i n g e l s e t h a n c o n s c i o u s b e i n g ( d a s bewusste
Sein), a n d the b e i n g of m e n is their a c t u a l life-process'
( 1 7 6 : 3 6 ) . This is not only a definite posing of ( a n d a n s w e r to)
t h e basic philosophical question but is also a direct indication
of t h e main facts f r o m w h i c h this question stems.
T h e idealist, o r idealistically t h i n k i n g physiologist a n d p s y c h o ­
logist, do not, of c o u r s e , a g r e e , w i t h s u c h a m a t e r i a l i s t i n t e r ­
pretation of the relation of consciousness a n d being, of the
p s y c h i c a n d the m a t e r i a l . T h e y try t o c o u n t e r i t with a n idealist
a n s w e r to the basic philosophical question. But in this case, too,
they cannot eliminate the direct or indirect demarcation of
c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d w h a t i s c o g n i s e d , i.e. b e i n g , t h e a c t u a l p r o c e s s
o f h u m a n life, a b o u t w h i c h t h e f o u n d e r s o f M a r x i s m s p o k e o f

30
in t h e q u o t a t i o n a b o v e . A n d it is impossible to r e f r a i n h e r e
from a q u e s t i o n t h a t h a s a l r e a d y suggested itself e a r l i e r , viz.,
why c a n ' t p h i l o s o p h y start i m m e d i a t e l y a n d directly with
investigation of the reality that constitutes the basis of h u m a n
life, i.e. with m a n himself, w h o is u n d o u b t e d l y the most
interesting and i m p o r t a n t object of i n q u i r y for himself? W h y
c a n n o t t h e o r e t i c a l analysis of t h e most i m p o r t a n t vital r e l a t i o n s
of m a n a n d t h e world of things ( r e l a t i o n s t h a t c a n n o t , of
c o u r s e , be r e d u c e d just to a w a r e n e s s of b e i n g ) be t r e a t e d as
t h e m a i n , really most i m p o r t a n t philosophical question as
p h i l o s o p h e r s suggest w h o hold t h a t t h e relation of t h i n k i n g a n d
being, of t h e spiritual a n d m a t e r i a l , is t o o abstract a question
to be c o n s i d e r e d t h e main o n e ? F o r t h e spiritual, insofar as it
is t h o u g h t of in the most g e n e r a l , undifferentiated f o r m , is an
a b s t r a c t i o n , existing only in thought. A n d m a t t e r , too, as a
c o n c e p t that integrates an infinite a g g r e g a t e of p h e n o m e n a ,
is also an a b s t r a c t i o n . Berkeley, i n t e r p r e t i n g it from a subjective-
-idealist a n d nominalist position, d e c l a r e d it an e m p t y a b s t r a c ­
tion, as t h e n a m e of an object t h a t did not in fact exist. A similar,
b u t m u c h m o r e sophisticated a t t e m p t a t discrediting not only
m a t t e r but also t h e basic philosophical question has been m a d e
in o u r time by B e r t r a n d Russell, w h o w r o t e that m a t t e r a n d
consciousness w e r e essentially c o n v e n t i o n a l c o n c e p t s , and that
it was as senseless to defend t h e p r i m a c y of m a t t e r or c o n s c i o u s ­
ness in face of t h e latest scientific d a t a as to dispute a b o u t
which h a n g s a b o v e and which below, t h e Sun or E a r t h (see
2 3 0 ) . By ' t h e latest scientific d a t a ' , he m e a n t t h e t h e o r y of
b e h a v i o u r i s m , which e n d e a v o u r e d to e l i m i n a t e consciousness.
We n o w see t h e epistemological s o u r c e of t h e a r g u m e n t s
that the basic question of philosophy is not, actually, t h e basic
o n e b e c a u s e its c o n t e n t is f o r m e d by a b s t r a c t i o n s and not by
actual ( h u m a n a n d n a t u r a l ) reality. A clearly oversimplified
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e c o n c r e t e as t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of philo­
sophic inquiry is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of all these a r g u m e n t s . In that
r e g a r d K o n s t a n t i n o v has c o r r e c t l y noted:

An u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the c o n c r e t e as empirical d a t u m has b e c o m e quite

c o m m o n a m o n g us. . . . B u t it s h o u l d not be f o r g o t t e n t h a t in M a r x i s m
t h e r e is a n o t h e r , d e e p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e c o n c r e t e , w h i c h is r e p r o ­
d u c e a b l e in t h e o r y a n d is t h e result of k n o w l e d g e ( 1 2 1 : 1 7 )

But, in o r d e r to u n d e r s t a n d the epistemological essence of t h e

basic philosophical question precisely in this 'abstract' form of it,
it is n e c e s s a r y to t a k e full a c c o u n t of t h e p a t t e r n of t h e ascent
from t h e a b s t r a c t to t h e c o n c r e t e in the c o u r s e of theoretical
inquiry.
31
 O n e c a n n o t begin t o i n v e s t i g a t e a n y c o n c r e t e , c o m p l e x
p h e n o m e n o n f r o m its t h e o r e t i c a l r e p r o d u c t i o n i n c o n c e p t s .
I f t h a t w e r e p o s s i b l e s c i e n c e w o u l d h a v e b e e n a b l e t o solve its
tasks b y t h e s h o r t e s t r o u t e , i.e. f r o m t h e c o n c r e t e i n r e a l i t y t o
the c o n c r e t e in thought. But the c o n c r e t e in reality can only
b e t h e o b j e c t o f c o n t e m p l a t i o n a n d n o t o f scientific u n d e r ­
standing, and any attempt to express the contemplated directly
in concepts generates only empty abstractions. T h e concrete
in s c i e n c e is built up f r o m scientific a b s t r a c t i o n s . It is a unity
of v a r i o u s definitions, e a c h of w h i c h i n e v i t a b l y h a s an a b s t r a c t ,
one-sided c h a r a c t e r . Science t h e r e f o r e begins investigation of
the c o n c r e t e by b r e a k i n g it d o w n into s e p a r a t e parts, aspects,
f o r m s , a n d r e l a t i o n s . S c i e n c e c r e a t e s a b s t r a c t i o n s t h a t reflect
t h e s e essential f a c t o r s o f t h e c o n c r e t e , a n d a n a l y s e s t h e r e l a t i o n s
between these abstractions, because the real complexity, and
many-sidedness of the concrete, and the contradictions, changes,
a n d d e v e l o p m e n t p r o p e r t o it, a r e r e f l e c t e d i n t h e m .
W h o e v e r begins an inquiry from a survey of the concrete
whole, the c o m p o n e n t parts, aspects, and premisses of which
a r e still u n k n o w n to h i m , in e s s e n c e b e g i n s with an e m p t y
abstraction. T h e c o n c r e t e in theoretical thought, M a r x pointed
out,
a p p e a r s ... in r e a s o n i n g as a s u m m i n g - u p , a r e s u l t , a n d n o t as t h e
s t a r t i n g point, a l t h o u g h it is the real point of origin, a n d thus also the
point of origin of p e r c e p t i o n and i m a g i n a t i o n ( 1 6 6 : 2 0 6 )

W e e m p l o y this c o n c l u s i o n — t h e r e s u l t o f a m a t e r i a l i s t r e w o r k ­
ing of the H e g e l i a n idealist c o n c e p t i o n — n o t j u s t in political
e c o n o m y b u t also in o t h e r s c i e n c e s , t h o u g h not, o b v i o u s l y , in all.
T h e A r i s t o t e l i a n n o t i o n o f t h e velocity o f f r e e - f a l l i n g b o d i e s
( a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r s h a p e , weight, e t c . ) is a n a i v e ( h i s t o r i c a l l y
n a i v e , i.e. i n e v i t a b l e ) a t t e m p t to c o m p r e h e n d a c o m p l e x p r o c e s s .
G a l i l e o took a n o t h e r r o u t e , w h e n f o r m u l a t i n g t h e l a w o f fall
of b o d i e s . He w a s a w a r e of the necessity of a b s t r a c t i o n a n d
r e j e c t e d the weight a n d s h a p e o f the falling b o d y , f o r w h i c h h e
h a d n a t u r a l l y t o a s s u m e ( a l s o a n a b s t r a c t i o n ! ) t h a t b o d i e s fall
in a v a c u u m . A r i s t o t l e c o u l d n o t , with his ' c o n c r e t e ' a p p r o a c h
to t h e p r o b l e m , f o r m u l a t e a law of fall of bodies. G a l i l e o ,
t a k i n g the r o u t e of scientific a b s t r a c t i o n , d i s c o v e r e d this law
( a b s t r a c t , it is t r u e ) w h i c h , h o w e v e r , r e f l e c t e d t h e r e a l p r o c e s s
of t h e u n i f o r m l y a c c e l e r a t e d m o t i o n of falling b o d i e s fairly
c o r r e c t l y , i.e. within c e r t a i n limits. A e r o d y n a m i c s c a n n o t , of
c o u r s e , be r e s t r i c t e d to a p p l i c a t i o n of G a l i l e o ' s law; in it a n e e d
a r i s e s t o s y n t h e s i s e scientific a b s t r a c t i o n s t h a t b y n o m e a n s
reflect t h e p r o c e s s of falling in an airless m e d i u m , a n d that

32
allow for the weight and shape of the falling body; the task of
this concrete knowledge of the process is resolved within the
context of these scientific disciplines. In this connection,
however, Galileo's law retains its significance within certain
empirically fixed limits, the more so that at great altitudes the
rarefaction of the atmosphere corresponds approximately to
the abstraction of an airless medium introduced by Galileo,
which consequently reveals its objective content.
Thus, when examining the basic philosophical question from
the angle of the development of scientific, theoretical know­
ledge, we come to the conclusion that it forms the starting point
of philosophical inquiry. I shall try to confirm this conclusion
in the following sections of this chapter.

3. On the Origin and Development

of the Basic Philosophical Question

I said above that the basic philosophical question is answered

by the whole development of materialist philosophy; there are
no grounds for revising that answer. All the same, this question
still remains a problem in one very essential respect; namely,
a problem of the history of philosophy. Its rise did not coincide
with the origin of philosophy ; its history, which covers
5

thousands of years, characterises the development of philo­

sophical knowledge in a specific way.
T h e r e is a multitude of philosophical questions that prove
to be modifications of the basic one, which is by no means
directly obvious and is only established through inquiry. Let me
clarify this idea by a comparison. Marx proved that the price
of production is a specific modification of value (in the condi­
tions of developed capitalism), although it functions directly
as its negation, this direct relation existing, moreover, not only
in ordinary consciousness but also in objective reality. Is there
not such a relation between the basic philosophical question
and the other numerous problems of philosophy?
Engels considered that primitive religious beliefs already
contained a certain notion about the relation of the psychic
and the physical, the soul and the body. Primitive primordial
consciousness inevitably recorded the difference between
waking and sleeping, between a living and a dead creature,
a man and an animal. This difference was not simply ascertained
as a consequence of curiosity (though that undoubtedly was
inherent in our remote ancestors; for it is inherent in animals

3-01603 33
that a r e at a much lower level of development, and is probably
a necessary precondition of progress in the animal kingdom).
T h e establishing of this fact is an expression of a practical
attitude to the external world, because man treated the roused
and the sleeping, the living and the dead, differently. Primitive
men were obviously not inclined to reflection; they did not ask
what distinguished the living from the dead, the roused from
the sleeping. Nevertheless certain ideas about this difference
arose, and were manifested not as answers to questions that
had not yet been formulated, but as spontaneously built-up
notions. When questions originated and new notions became
answers, that was already evidence that reflection had begun on
facts that had previously been accepted without questioning.
T h e first explanations of the established facts obviously could
not be based on an exact description of them; a cognitive
capacity of that kind took shape comparatively late. T h e
primitive explanation only indicated that the sleeping or even
dead person differed from the roused (and living) one not
in his body, but in something else, i.e. in the absence of
something incorporeal that living, waking creatures had. This
unknown later began to be called spirit or soul.
T h e soul did not immediately begin to be represented as
immaterial, because bodilessness, as philological and ethno­
graphic research witness, was initially understood as the absence
of a certain physical form; air and wind, for example, were
considered to be incorporeal. Spirit and soul therefore seemed
a rather special, very fine substance. T h a t point of view was
subsequently substantiated by the materialists of antiquity to
counterbalance the then arising spiritualist view of the spiritual.
One must also r e m e m b e r that, although the notion of the
difference between a living and dead creature took shape very
early under the influence of urgent practical need, it was a
very vague notion, so that the boundaries between the living
and the non-living (inanimate) were only realised within very
n a r r o w limits. Primitive men seemingly judged the things
around them by analogy with themselves, i.e. they transferred
their own capacities that they were aware of to all or nearly all
phenomena of nature. T h e habit of measuring by one's own
yardstick was the first heuristic orientation, from which stemmed
the humanising (or rather, perhaps, animating) of everything
that existed. T h e inanimate could only be imagined as the
previously living, and that, of course, presupposed a very
expanded understanding of life. In short, the primitive outlook
on the world was seemingly organismic.

34
 T h e question of the relation of consciousness to being,
and of the spiritual to the material, could thus only be
consciously posed when the development of a capacity for
disengagement, self-observation, and analysis had reached a
comparatively high level. If the origin of the initial religious
ideas presupposed the shaping of an abstracting power of
thought (which is revealed in all its obviousness in religious
fantasy), how much the more that applies to philosophical
ideas, however primitive. 6

Philosophy, as is evidenced by the historical facts, only arose

at that stage of social development when private property,
a stratification into classes, a social division of labour, and,
what is particularly vital, an opposition between intellectual
activity and the production of material goods already existed.
As the founders of Marxism pointed out:
F r o m this m o m e n t o n w a r d s consciousness can really flatter itself that
it is s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n consciousness of existing practice, that it
really represents s o m e t h i n g without representing s o m e t h i n g real;
from now on consciousness is in a position to e m a n c i p a t e itself from
the world and to proceed to the formation of ' p u r e ' theory, theology,
philosophy, morality, etc. ( 1 7 8 : 4 5 ) .

That kind of forgetfulness of its origin and real content is

manifested as consciousness's conviction that it does not reflect
sensually perceived reality but a special essence differing
radically not only from what it perceives but also from what
constitutes its corporeal, material basis.
In Greek philosophy a system of idealist views was first
created by Plato. It is not difficult to disclose a process in his
doctrine of ideas of the shaping of an idealist outlook on the
world. In Greek the word 'idea' signified form, appearance,
image. Plato interpreted form and image as something inde­
pendent of a thing and even preceding it. From the very start
idealism distorted the sense of already formed concepts. But
it did not simply invent and make things up; it interpreted the
act of creation, in which the ideal image preceded its embodi­
ment, universally and ontologically. Analogy, having become a
principle of the explanation of phenomena, led to idealism,
which came out, for example, in Aristotle's doctrine. 7

T h e opposition of materialism and idealism is thus clearly

traced out only at the pinnacle of the development of Greek
philosophy. But there was still no conscious posing then of the
basic philosophical question, which was paradoxical since
idealism and materialism were already giving opposing answers
to this question. How could answers be possible to a question

35
that had not yet been posed or formulated? To answer that
historical p a r a d o x it is necessary to concretise our under­
standing of the origin of the counterposing of the main philo­
sophical trends.
Investigation of the epistemological necessity of the basic
philosophical question brings out the theoretical sources of the
polarisation of philosophy into two mutually exclusive trends.
But one must not oversimplify the historical process of the
forming of this opposition, i.e. consider the peculiar content
of the basic philosophical question, a content that implicitly
includes the inevitability of two diametrically opposite answers,
the cause of the rise of materialism and idealism. Like any
other phenomenon of social consciousness the forming of the
opposition of materialism and idealism was d u e in the final
count to historically determined social relations. As for the
theoretical grounds of the radical antithesis of materialism
and idealism, they took shape after these trends had arisen.
T h e i r formation testified that the split in philosophy had become
generally recognised, which called for theoretical explanation.
It goes without saying that the socio-economic conditioning
of the polarisation of philosophical trends did not in the least
lessen the role of the basic philosophical question in the system
of internally mutually connected philosophical views.
All these considerations enable one to understand Engels'
conclusion more profoundly: the basic philosophical question
could achieve its full significance, only after h u m a n i t y in E u r o p e had
a w a k e n e d from t h e long h i b e r n a t i o n of t h e Christian Middle Ages
(52:346).

It is hardly necessary to demonstrate that in an age when

religion was practically the masses' sole spiritual food, the very
posing of the question of which existed first, matter or spirit,
was perceived as an infringement of the holy of holies, for,
according to the scholastic definition, God was the physical
and moral cause of everything that existed. T h a t same scholas­
ticism also taught that the highest cannot arise from the lowest.
Matter was interpreted as the source of every kind of deforma­
tion and monstrosity, as the element from which arose worms,
bugs, lice, etc. (not without the help of the devil). Even the
mediaeval philosophers who were close to materialism had not,
as a rule, broken completely with the doctrine of creationism.
T h e idea of the co-eternity of nature and God signified a
revolutionary challenge to the prevailing ideology. Whole
historical epochs were thus needed for the development of

36
philosophical thought before the basic philosophical question
took on all its actual significance.
T h e bourgeois transformation of social relations, the liquida­
tion of the C h u r c h ' s spiritual dictatorship, and the emancipa­
tion of philosophy from the shackles of theology completed the
historical process of the forming and confirmation of the
question of the relation of consciousness and being, of the
spiritual and the material, as the basic philosophical question,
giving it a definite content that could only be analysed by
appeal to facts. Engels linked this historical process directly
with the struggle against the Middle Ages:
T h e question of t h e position of t h i n k i n g in relation to being, a question
which, by the way, had played a g r e a t p a r t also in t h e scholasticism
of t h e Middle Ages, t h e question: which is p r i m a r y , spirit or n a t u r e — t h a t
question, in relation to the c h u r c h , was s h a r p e n e d into this: Did God
c r e a t e the world or has the world been in existence eternally? ( 5 2 : 3 4 6 ) .

It would be naive, however, to suppose that a correct theore-

tical understanding of the basic philosophical question took
shape (and was generally accepted) in philosophy from that
time. T h e r e is no doubt that the development and realisation
of the radical opposition of materialism and idealism, and the
conscious counterposing of the main philosophical trends to
one another, characteristic of classical bourgeois philosophy,
fostered the shaping of this understanding and frequently came
close to it. But the fact that the opposition of materialism and
idealism developed within the context of one and the same
bourgeois ideology created certain difficulties for bringing out
the whole depth and ideological significance of this antithesis
of ideas. Only the creation of the dialectical-materialist concep­
tion of the historical course of philosophy made it possible to
fully reveal the real sense and significance of the basic question
of philosophy.

4. The Basic Philosophical Question:

Objective Content
and Subjective Form of Expression.
The Real Starting Point of Philosophical Inquiry

It is necessary, in the history of philosophy, more than in any

other discipline that studies the development of knowledge and
performs a certain ideological function in the class struggle,
to draw a line between the objective content of philosophical
doctrines and their subjective, often even arbitrary form of

37
expression. This is a most important principle of inquiry in the
history of philosophy, which is based directly on the initial
proposition of historical materialism about the relation of social
consciousness and social being. Because of that, consciousness
as awareness of being is by no means an adequate reflection;
knowledge, at any rate in its developed and systematic form,
presupposes inquiry. In philosophy, insofar as it is, on the one
hand, investigation, and on the other awareness of historically
determined social being, there is constantly a contradiction
between its objective content and subjective form of expression.
This contradiction is only overcome by Marxism, which has
created a scientific, philosophical world outlook that is at the
same time a scientific ideology. 8

T h e drawing of a line between the objective content and

subjective form of philosophical doctrines is thus a dialectical-
materialist principle of scientific inquiry. M a r x and Engels
constantly applied and developed this principle they had
formulated. Their attitude to Hegel is particularly indicative
in this sense, since there is perhaps no other philosopher for
whom they had such a high regard and whom they so sharply
criticised. This attitude, at first glance inconsistent, was in fact
a consistent drawing of a line between the objectively true in
Hegel's doctrine, and the subjective in it, often even inimical
to his own outstanding philosophical discoveries. In reference
to Hegel's dialectic, for instance, M a r x said: ' T h i s dialectic is,
to be sure, the ultimate word in philosophy and hence there is
all the more need to divest it of the mystical a u r a given it by
Hegel' (173:316). F u r t h e r on, in the same letter to Lassalle,
Marx said, speaking of his own dissertation on Epicurus, that
in it he had himself attempted
the p o r t r a y a l of a c o m p l e t e system from fragments, a system which I am
convinced, by the by, w a s — a s with H e r a c l i t u s — o n l y implicitly present
in ( E p i c u r u s ' ) work, not consciously as a system. E v e n in the case of
philosophers w h o give systematic form to their w o r k , Spinoza for
instance, the true inner s t r u c t u r e of the system is q u i t e unlike the form
in which it was consciously presented by him ( i b i d . ) .

If one had said to Spinoza that the theoretical starting

point of his system was a materialist answer to the question of
the relation of the spiritual and material, he would not, judging
from the inner structure and exposition of his system, have
agreed with that characterisation of his doctrine. Neither
matter (extent) nor the spiritual (thought) were in any causal
relationship, according to his doctrine; they constituted attri­
butes of a single (and sole) substance. N a t u r e as a whole was

38
called God, contrary to Christian theology, which absolutely
counterposed the divine to the earthly. Spinoza's system was
essentially an atheistic doctrine, a materialist pantheism, that
differed in principle from the idealist pantheism developed by
several Neoplatonists, and in modern times by the occasionalists
(Malebranche, Geulincx), and to a certain extent also by Hegel.
In delimiting the objective content and subjective mode of
expression in Spinoza's doctrine, M a r x stressed the need to
differentiate between 'what Spinoza considered the keystone
of his system and what in fact constitutes it' (181:506). T h e
objective content of Spinoza's doctrine is incomparably richer,
more significant, and more original than what he consciously
formulated as his basic conviction.
I have dwelt in rather more detail than may seem necessary
on setting out one of the most important principles of the
Marxian analysis of the history of philosophy, since this helps
explain why philosophers who have posed the basic philo­
sophical question and given it a quite definite answer, were not
conscious, as a rule, that it was in fact a matter of the basic
philosophical question. They were not concerned with investi­
gating its origin and its relation to its varied themata and proble­
matic, so important for distinguishing philosophic doctrines
from one another. Philosophers have often called quite other
problems basic in general in their doctrines and in philosophy.
T h a t point has been noted by Lyakhovetsky and Tyukhtin
in their entry ' T h e Basic Question of Philosophy' in the Soviet
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, where they say in particular:
Helvetius considered the basic question of philosophy to be that of the
essence of h u m a n happiness, Rousseau the question of social inequality
and ways of o v e r c o m i n g it, Bacon the question of extension of m a n ' s
power over n a t u r e by inventions, etc. (154:172).

But it follows from a concrete analysis of those philosophers'

doctrines that what they called basic in their teaching did not
form its chief, initial theoretical proposition or principle
determining the direction of their philosophic inquiry; it was a
matter rather of the sense and humanist purpose of the philo­
sophy, and of the philosophic problems that each of them
represented as the most important. 9

I do not see negations of the basic philosophical question

in these philosophers, or attempts to counterpose some other
one to it. But there is no epistemological analysis in them of
the initial theoretical premisses of their own doctrines, and that
prevents understanding of the sense in which the question I
am concerned with is really basic. As soon as this epistemo-

39
logical approach is outlined, the philosopher begins to formulate
his real starting point m o r e or less consciously.
Kant's proposition cited above, about the self-obviousness of
the existence of self-awareness posited perception of the
external world and so recognition of its existence. Having
drawn that important conclusion, however, Kant rejected the
materialist answer to the basic philosophical question and
took up a dualist position akin to Cartesianism. Philosophy had
to begin with the recognition of consciousness, on the one hand,
and on the other of a reality (the 'thing in itself) independent
of it. T h e question of the existence of a causal connection
between them could not be decided, and therefore neither the
subject nor the object, taken separately, could become the
starting point of philosophy. Fichte's basic statement against
that solution of the problem of the fundamental position boiled
down to affirming that philosophy had to deduce the necessity
of facts from its adopted fundamental position rather than
ascertaining them empirically. T h e r e were consequently only
two routes: either to take the object as initial and deduce the
subject from it or, taking the subject as initial, to deduce the
object from it. Fichte said categorically:
One of the two, spirit or n a t u r e , must be eliminated; t h e two a r e by no
m e a n s unitable. T h e i r s e e m i n g union is partly hypocrisy a n d lies, partly
an inconsistency imposed t h r o u g h i n n e r feeling ( 6 0 : 3 2 ) .

Consciousness of the necessity of the basic philosophical

question, and an understanding of the inevitability of the
dilemma and of its alternative answer, are to be seen in this
categoricalness of Fichte's. Since he answered it in a subjectively
idealist way, he called for elimination of one of the opposites,
namely, nature. T h e opposite approach (elimination of spirit),
be called 'transcendental materialism', suggesting that any
materialism transformed reality into something suprasensory,
because the whole, sensually perceivable world, in his convic­
tion, presupposed the existence of a subject
Schelling criticised Fichte for his subjective-idealist,
essentially negative interpretation of nature.
F o r him n a t u r e is an a b s t r a c t c o n c e p t — d e n o t i n g a m e r e b a r r i e r — o f
t h e not-I, the wholly void object in which n o t h i n g w h a t e v e r is perceivable
except just that it c o n f r o n t s the subject ( 2 4 0 : 1 1 0 ) .

T h e objective idealist Schelling, armed with the achievements

of the natural science of his day, developed a dialectical
philosophy of nature, well aware that the objective could not

40
be reduced to the subjective. The opposite view, i.e. the materia­
list, was also unacceptable to him. A return to the Kantian point
of view was hopeless because it dismissed the problem. So
Schelling modified the basic philosophical problem. It was no
longer one of the relation of subject and object, since the
difference between them was not primary. The rise of this
difference witnessed to the birth of consciousness, but if
consciousness had not always existed, did it not follow that
materialism was true? Schelling rejected that conclusion,
substantiating the fundamental idealist principle, viz., that
consciousness was the product of the self-development and
self-differentiation of the unconscious world spirit. But why
did the unconscious divide into two, generating its opposite,
consciousness? Schelling's philosophy of nature could not
answer that.
Hegel, inheriting the most valuable ideas of his idealist
predecessors, rejected both the Fichtean reduction of the
object to the subject and Schelling's conception of absolute
identity without inner difference. T h e metaphysical abstraction
of absolute identity essentially did not work, as Hegel showed;
while there was this identity, in which every determinacy
disappeared, there was no world, and as soon as the world
manifested itself, absolute identity disappeared. In opposition
to Schelling, Hegel showed that substantial identity was dialec­
tical, and by virtue of that initially contained the difference
between the subjective and the objective. Hegel formulated
the initial proposition of philosophy as the relation of thought
and being, whose unity was the 'absolute idea'. He came fully
to a conscious formulation of the basic philosophical question
when he wrote that 'spirit and nature, thought and being, are
the two infinite sides of the Idea' (85:III, 161), a unity of
which all philosophical doctrines strove to achieve. Continuing
his idea, he wrote:
Philosophy hence falls into the two main forms in which the opposition
is resolved, into a realistic and an idealistic system of philosophy, i.e.
into one which makes the objectivity and the content of thought to arise
from the perceptions, and one which proceeds to truth from the inde­
pendence of thought (85:III, 162).

Hegel consequently saw the necessary character of the opposi­

tion between materialism (realism, in his terminology) and
idealism, and found its sources in reality itself, the main deter­
minations of which, in his doctrine, were thought and being. 10

Feuerbach was more aware than other pre-Marxian

materialists of the many-sided content of the struggle between

41
materialism and idealism. Anthropological materialism arose
during the disintegration of G e r m a n classical idealism and,
for all its opposition to the doctrines of Kant, Fichte, Schelling,
and Hegel, was their natural completion. F e u e r b a c h fought
against the most developed, significant, profound idealist
doctrines that had ever existed in history. We find in him a
thorough critical analysis of the speculative-idealist answer to
the basic philosophical question. He traced how Hegel, con­
verting thought into the subject and being into the predicate,
stood the real relation on its head. T h e Hegelian deduction of
nature from the 'absolute idea', as Feuerbach explained, by no
means proved that nature was implicitly contained in this idea;
if there were no n a t u r e it would be impossible to 'deduce' it
from the supernatural. It was necessary, consequently, to return
from speculative constructs to the facts, whose existence was
obvious to everyone; n a t u r e existed, man existed, human
thought existed. And he who also discarded the notion of a
supernatural spirit together with theological prejudices thus
planted the question of the relation of the spiritual and material
in real, human soil. Insofar as philosophy answered the question
of the relation of thought and being, it must be anthropology,
i.e. a doctrine of man, whose existence formed the actual reso­
lution of this problem. 'The unity of thought and being,' he
wrote, 'has sense and truth only when man composes the basis,
the subject of this unity' (57:339).
Feuerbach thus reduced the basic philosophical question
to that of man, and the relation of the psychic and physical.
This was a narrowing of the problem, but at the same time a
concretisation of it, since it was in his time that natural science
had provided adequate proof that thought was a function of the
brain, i.e. of matter organised in a special way.
T h e idealist who is compelled by physiology to recognise
this fact does not, of course, reject his convictions thereby;
he endeavours to find a spiritual first principle outside
h u m a n existence, pleading that the dependence of the
spiritual on the physical in the structure of h u m a n existence
must itself have arisen from (and be explained by) something
else, not only supernatural but also s u p e r h u m a n . Feuerbach,
being conscious of the inevitability of such objections to
materialism, argued that study of n a t u r e did not reveal the
necessity for the existence of a supernatural and was not
evidence, even indirectly, of its presence. Any supernaturalist
explanation of the origin of the psychic was therefore quite
without grounds.

42
 H o w c a n m a n a r i s e f r o m n a t u r e , i.e. t h e s p i r i t f r o m m a t t e r ? [he w r o t e ] .
F i r s t o f a l l , a n s w e r m e this q u e s t i o n : how can matter arise from spirit?
If you do n o t find any, in t h e least r e a s o n a b l e a n s w e r to t h a t question,
y o u will a p p r e h e n d t h a t o n l y t h e c o n t r a r y q u e s t i o n will lead y o u t o t h e
goal (56:179).

F e u e r b a c h w a s thus c o n s c i o u s o f t h e difficulties s t a n d i n g
in the w a y of a systematic proof of t h e materialist position
on t h e e s s e n c e a n d origin of t h e spiritual. But t h e s e difficulties
w e r e those of scientific study, while t h e c o n t r a r y idealist thesis
was not only u n p r o v a b l e but also incompatible in principle
with a scientific posing of the p r o b l e m . T h e idealist inter­
pretation of the relation between the spiritual and material was,
as F e u e r b a c h showed, essentially theological:
T h e question whether a God created the world, the question of the
relation a c t u a l l y of G o d to t h e world, is o n e of t h e relation of the spirit
to sensuality, of the general or abstract to the real, of the species to the
individual; this question belongs to the most i m p o r t a n t a n d at t h e s a m e
t i m e m o s t difficult o n e s o f h u m a n k n o w l e d g e a n d p h i l o s o p h y , a n d , a s
has already b e c o m e clear, the whole history of philosophy virtually
turns on it ( 5 7 : 1 3 6 ) .

Lenin, citing this passage, c o m p a r e d it with Engels's formulation

of the basic philosophical question (144:70). We see that
F e u e r b a c h , to an even greater extent than Hegel, expressed a
p r o f o u n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of this question. C o n s e q u e n t l y , at this
point, too, G e r m a n classical philosophy w a s a direct f o r e r u n n e r
of dialectical and historical materialism.
T h u s , o v e r m a n y c e n t u r i e s , p h i l o s o p h y p r o c e e d e d , i n its
theoretical self-determination, from one answer or other to
the basic philosophical question, without being a w a r e of t h e
fact, s o m e t i m e s e v e n c o m i n g close to a c o r r e c t a p p r e c i a t i o n
o f it. T h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s t o b e f o u n d , o n
the one hand, in n a t u r e , in the genesis of the basic philosophical
question, and on the other hand in the general patterns of
development of theoretical knowledge.
S c i e n c e a l w a y s a t t a i n s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f its t h e o r e t i c a l
f o u n d a t i o n s , and of the principles by w h i c h it is in fact guided,
by very complicated paths. C o n t r a r y to the ordinary view
scientific principles a r e not so m u c h the starting point of t h e
d e v e l o p m e n t of a s c i e n c e as a result of t h a t d e v e l o p m e n t .
In other words, before the principles become methodological
directives they must be brought out through comprehension
of the results of scientific d e v e l o p m e n t . As M a m a r d a s h v i l i
has correctly noted:

There is no unilinearity of development and continuity in the history

of science a n d philosophy, identical to the logical course of t h o u g h t in

43
 a theoretical system. T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of k n o w l e d g e proceeds in the
form of a mass of lines t h a t e m b r a c e t h e subject a n d go deep into it
from v a r i o u s aspects. Philosophy ( a n d science) develops on different
'planes', and singles out aspects of t h e subject of different complexity
and depth simultaneously, and reflection of these aspects develops as
a whole ( 1 6 0 : 1 8 0 - 1 8 1 ) .

T h e development of each science is built up from two main,

qualitatively different, though ultimately interconnected
processes, i.e. increase in knowledge about t h e objects that
it studies, and investigation of its own theoretical foundations.
Inquiries of the latter type are usually late, i.e. are only begun
at that stage of a science's development when contradictions
in its fundamental theoretical principles come to light that had
hitherto seemed incontrovertible.
A person who is not engaged in scientific work usually
imagines the development of science as harmoniously occurring
process. He thinks that scientific problems arise and are resolved
in a strict order of priority and corresponding sequence (to
begin with, the simplest tasks are tackled, then m o r e complicated
ones, and a new matter is not taken up until the old one has been
finished with). He pictures the proliferation of scientific know­
ledge as something like the erection of a multistoreyed building;
first a solid foundation is laid, in the constructing of which it
is already known in advance how many storeys are to be
erected. Then the floors a r e added one after another (again
in strict sequence), after which, the interior finishing of the
building is completed. Since science is probably the most
planned, purposeful, theoretically comprehended form of
human activity, the existence of spontaneity in its development
seems, if not unnatural, at least irregular, improper, and
undesirable, although many scientific discoveries have been
made more or less by chance, while the results of research
(in contrast to those of other labour processes) cannot be
anticipated in advance; we cannot know today what we shall
know tomorrow. Each researcher is aware of his own activity,
and of the research techniques he employs, but there is an
immense gulf between these notions (often, moreover, subjective
and superficial) and understanding of the principles and
theoretical foundations of the science. Only through the
accumulation and development of knowledge, and the rise of
incompatible conceptions, contradictions, and paradoxes within
the context of a definite science is its real theoretical foundation
brought out, and illusions dispersed about convictions un­
critically adopted as axioms or even as facts that it was enough

44
simply to state, since they were obvious. As Karl M a r x said:
T h e historical progress of all sciences leads only t h r o u g h a multitude
of c o n t r a d i c t o r y moves to t h e real point of d e p a r t u r e . Science, unlike
other architects, builds not only castles in the air, but m a y construct
s e p a r a t e h a b i t a b l e storeys of t h e building before laying the foundation
stone ( 1 6 6 : 5 7 ) .

It is therefore not surprising that the basic philosophical

question—which is really the theoretical point of departure
of all more or less systematically developed philosophical
doctrines—could be scientifically comprehended, formulated,
and, if you please, even discovered only at that historical stage
when the main trends in philosophy had been fully singled out,
and when it had become more or less obvious that they were
materialism and idealism.
Scientific understanding of the nature of philosophic know­
ledge presupposes investigation of the genesis of the basic
philosophical question and of its place in the development
of philosophy. T h e contradiction between the objective content
of philosophical systems and the subjective form of their
construction and exposition must not only be explained but
also resolved by way of a distinct, scientific demarcation of
the point of theoretical departure (answer to the basic philo­
sophical question) and the theoretical principle and initial
thesis of the doctrine from which the most important proposi­
tions of the system are deduced. Until this important line is
drawn, the real significance of the basic philosophical question
remains in the dark, since the theoretical principle of philo­
sophical systems always figures in the foreground. T h a t is why
philosophers attach paramount importance to it, and see in it,
above all, the essence of their discoveries. And this theoretical
principle, of course, has far from always coincided with the
answer to the basic philosophical question. T h e first thesis of
Descartes' philosophy—'I think, therefore I am'—did not
bring out, at least with sufficient definiteness, the dualist
c h a r a c t e r of his system. T h e principle of Kant's philosophy—
the demarcation of empirical and a priori knowledge, and the
problem formulated in connection with it, namely how a priori
synthetic judgments are possible—undoubtedly included several
idealist notions, though the demarcation of types of knowledge
(which, moreover, did not lack a rational kernel) did not
follow directly from an idealist answer to the basic philo­
sophical question.
T h e basic question thus blends with the problems posed by a
philosophical system, and with the initial theoretical premisses

45
that distinguish o n e philosophy from a n o t h e r . A philosopher
usually starts the exposition of his system of views with a
statement that leads in some cases to a definite answer to the
basic philosophical question, and in others already includes
this answer in essence, which only comes out, however, during
the logical development of the initial statement, r a t h e r than
starting from the question of which is p r i m a r y , the spiritual
or the material. Both t h e idealist and the materialist may
adopt t h e concept of being as the theoretical principle of their
system; while it b e a r s a general form t h e r e is nothing in it,
e x c e p t the stating of existence, that is i n h e r e n t in any objects
of possible knowledge. A philosopher b e c o m e s a materialist
or an idealist only w h e n he passes from this ' n e u t r a l ' , but
essentially empty, unpremissed, theoretical principle to the
differences i n h e r e n t in it. Aristotle's idealism, for instance,
11

began when he stated (dividing being into m a t t e r and form)

that form was a n o n - m a t e r i a l principle d e t e r m i n i n g matter.
Analysis of c o n t e m p o r a r y idealist philosophy, in particular,
confirms the need for a principled theoretical d e m a r c a t i o n of
the initial theoretical proposition (principle) and the real
answer to the basic philosophical question, even in those cases
when t h e two coincide in form. T h e latest Christian spiritualism,
for instance, can easily mislead the unsophisticated reader,
in putting forward, as its initial thesis, that being is primary,
and consciousness s e c o n d a r y . Only a critical analysis of the
c o n c r e t e content that Christian spiritualists invest the concept
of being with shows that this thesis formulates an idealist
answer to t h e basic philosophical question.
Sciacca, a spokesman of Italian Christian spiritualism,
substantiates an idealist-theological system of views as follows,
starting from the thesis of the primacy of being:
Being is primary; only b e i n g is the p r i m a r y . И is not even exact to say
that it is 'first', in so far as b e i n g is t h e beginning; It is presence, it is,
it states itself from itself; t h e r e is n o t h i n g ' b e f o r e ' a n d "after' being.
We c a n imagine n o t h i n g n e s s before a n d after, that is to say the absence
of being, but s u c h a s u p p o s i t i o n is only possible insofar as t h e r e is
being. N o t h i n g n e s s does not a n n i h i l a t e being, for it is i m a g i n a b l e
t h a n k s to being... T h i s a b s e n c e , w h i c h is b e c a u s e of p r e s e n c e , we call
n o n - b e i n g ; it is a m i s t a k e to call it n o t h i n g n e s s . All t h a t exists is 'dialectic';
it is a p r e s e n c e a n d an a b s e n c e of being, but t h e a b s e n c e is c o n d i t i o n e d
by the presence (243:15-16).

L a t e r he counterposes being on the one h a n d to the subject

and on the other to the object. He takes up a r m s against the
idealism (subjective) that reduces the object to the subject,
and against materialism, which allegedly reduces t h e subject

46
to the object. Being prevails over all qualitative differences
and ultimately over reality; 'the real is not being and being is
not the real' (243:19). T h e real is declared to be a derivative
form of being, which is interpreted as a supra-empirical,
trans-subjective and trans-objective reality, and ultimately as
God.
A line between the basic philosophical question and the
theoretical principle of a philosophic system is essential not
only for the critique of idealism but also for a correct under­
standing of materialist philosophy. Hobbes took as the initial
concept (principle) of his materialist system, the concept of
body, which he counterposed to the abstract, and sometimes
ambiguous (as the history of scholasticism has s h o w n ) , concept
of being. For Hobbes philosophy was a doctrine of bodies,
because nothing else existed at all.
T h e subject of philosophy, or the m a t t e r it treats of, is every Body of
which we c a n conceive any g e n e r a t i o n , and which we may by any
consideration thereof c o m p a r e with o t h e r Bodies; or which is c a p a b l e
of composition and resolution; that is to say, every Body, of whose
G e n e r a t i o n or P r o p e r t i e s we can h a v e any knowledge ( 1 0 1 : 7 ) .

T h e initial concept of Hobbes' system, namely that of body,

contains a materialist answer to the basic philosophical question,
but the two must not be identified since he included a nominalist
interpretation of the objects of knowledge in his answer, a denial
of the objectivity of the general, identification of matter and
substance, and a denial of immaterial phenomena. T h a t under­
standing of the object of knowing is unacceptable to the philo­
sophy of Marxism, despite the fact that it agrees with the
materialist point of departure of Hobbes' doctrine.
T h u s there are constantly different initial theoretical concepts
or fundamental statements within the materialist or idealist
answer to the basic philosophical question. These concepts and
statements differ from one another in both form and content.
Anaximander's apeiron, Empedocles' elements, the concept
of a single nature of the eighteenth-century French materia­
lists, and the conception of objective reality in the doctrine of
dialectical materialism are initial materialist propositions that
are as essentially different as the varieties of materialist philo­
sophy connected with them. T h e importance of these differences
comes out as soon as we analyse the premisses and conclusions
associated with them more deeply.
Idealism, probably to an even greater degree than material­
ism, is distinguished by a diversity of modes of formulating
initial philosophical concepts and fundamental statements,

47
which is largely due to the fact that the development of natural
science constantly discredits its initial propositions, forcing its
adherents to transform them within the context of an idealist
interpretation of reality. Some idealists take a concept of world
reason as the theoretical principle of their system, others one
of a world will, and still others one of the unconscious. These
are all, of course, only variants of the concept of a spiritual
first principle, but they have essential significance within the
limits of the idealist system of views. If the absolute principle
of everything that exists is reason, the world is depicted as an
ordered, rationally organised hierarchical system. If the
substantial essence of the world is considered to be an irrational
world will, the world is likened to chaos, in which there is no
direction whatsoever, no system, or consistency, or basis for
purposive h u m a n activity.
T h e different variants of the idealist answer to the basic
philosophical question thus also, to some extent, determine the
peculiarity of the content of philosophic systems. T h e difference
between the initial concept (or statement) and the answer to
the basic philosophical question must therefore also be treated
positively, i.e. as a mode of developing philosophy, since the
initial theoretical proposition does not play a formal role but is
a profound statement that often marks a new historical stage
in the development of philosophical knowledge. If that were
not so, then the philosophers who attribute so much significance
to the theoretical principle of a system could be reproached
with superficiality. But as is readily to be seen from the example
of the Cartesian cogito, the initial theoretical proposition is
often the formulation of the most important idea of a philo­
sophic system. T h e statement 'I think, therefore I am' had
epoch-making socio-historical and heuristic significance. It
proclaimed the right of every h u m a n being to answer the
question of the truth of any statement and gave Descartes'
doctrine (for all its inconsistencies and tendencies to compro­
mise with theology) the character of a revolutionary challenge
to mediaevalism. From that angle its theoretical principle was
not only and not so much a mode of substantiating a certain
system of views as a philosophical thesis whose profound sense
was brought out by its theoretical development and method­
ological application.
Spinoza's system was constructed on the analogy of Euclid's
Principles which, in the conviction not only of the seventeenth
century rationalists but also of naturalists (recall that Newton
expounded his Principia mathematica philosophiae naturalis

48
according to Euclid's method), was the standard of the con­
nected, consistent, demonstrative exposition of a theory. Such a
standard seemed particularly necessary in philosophy, in which
unsubstantiated or insufficiently substantiated hypotheses
competed with one another. T h e progressing divergence of
doctrines, and the barren struggle (as it seemed at the time)
between incompatible theories equally claiming to incontro­
vertible truth, and the crisis of scholasticism with all its carefully
developed apparatus of discrimination and 'proofs', all inspired
a conviction that only mathematics could rescue philosophy
from permanent confusion.
Spinoza began with a definition of the basic concepts of his
system (substance, attributes, necessity, freedom, etc.); then
followed axioms, and then theorems, corollaries, and scholia.
There is no need to explain that this mode of exposition (and,
as Spinoza imagined, proof) seemed to the author of the
Ethica Ordine Geometricо Demonstrata (and, of course, not
just to him) to be probably his main achievement; the truths
of philosophy were proved mathematically for the first time,
which it was expected would wholly eliminate the grounds for
disagreement. And it would be highly unhistorical to under­
value the method of exposition and proof worked out by
Spinoza just because he did not allow for the specific nature of
philosophical knowledge (i.e. simply borrowed the method of
geometry), and because he did not pose the question of the
reality of what constituted the content of his definitions when
formulating those that preceded the axioms (and were there­
fore the real initial concepts of his system). The method of
more geometrico employed in philosophy was a really philo­
sophical achievement, and that is perhaps more obvious in our
time than it was a hundred years ago.
Spinoza said that the beginning was always most difficult
and important. He obviously had in mind his own system, too.
Stressing the importance in principle of the basic philosophical
question does not diminish the significance of the initial theoret­
ical propositions of doctrines; it is simply a matter of demarcat­
ing the one from the other, and then of investigating their
relationship. And the main thing in this relationship is deter­
mined by the choice of alternative, i.e. by a definite answer
to the dilemma formulated by the basic philosophical question.
I must warn the reader against a formal interpretation of
this choice. T h e opponents of materialism often argue as if it
started from one postulate and idealism from another, opposite
one. But the materialist answer to the basic philosophical

4-01603 49
q u e s t i o n is n o t a p o s t u l a t e or a h y p o t h e s i s . As t h e G D R scientist
Klaus has remarked:
T h e correct answer to the basis of philosophy is a very broad abstraction
from the whole development of h u m a n practice and human thought.
Scientific hypotheses that propose a false answer to the basic question
to us are therefore rejected because they contradict this practice of
mankind (120:69).

P h i l o s o p h y w a s a l r e a d y e n d e a v o u r i n g , a t t h e d a w n o f its
e x i s t e n c e , to find a firm t h e o r e t i c a l basis t h a t c o u l d p r o v i d e a
r e l i a b l e p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e for t h e w h o l e f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t
o f p h i l o s o p h i c t h o u g h t . M a n k i n d ' s scientific a n d historical
experience demonstrates that the materialist answer to the
basic p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n is this s o u g h t - a f t e r f o u n d a t i o n .
Engels characterised materialism as 'a general world outlook
r e s t i n g u p o n a definite c o n c e p t i o n of t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n
matter and mind' (52:349). What does the word 'general' mean
in that context? It seemingly points to the difference between
philosophy and those special forms of outlook on the world
that h a v e either only n a t u r a l , or only social, reality, as their
subject-matter. T h e natural-science, irreligious world outlook
t h a t t o o k s h a p e i n d i r e c t c o n n e c t i o n with C o p e r n i c u s ' g r e a t
d i s c o v e r y did not c o m e t o b e c a l l e d h e l i o c e n t r i c b y c h a n c e .
Engels characterised b o u r g e o i s ideology as a juridical one.
I n s o f a r as t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of p h i l o s o p h y is b o t h n a t u r a l
a n d social r e a l i t y , it is t h e m o s t g e n e r a l of all possible t y p e s of
world outlook.
Engels' statement cited above, in formulating the principled
basis o f the m a t e r i a l i s t w o r l d o u t l o o k , t h u s s t r e s s e d t h e i d e o ­
logical i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e m a t e r i a l i s t a n s w e r t o t h e basic
p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n . T h e idealist c r i t i q u e o f m a t e r i a l i s m i s
e v i d e n c e that t h e l a t t e r ' s o p p o n e n t s a r e distinctly c o n s c i o u s
o f its ideological s i g n i f i c a n c e a n d g r o w i n g i n f l u e n c e . C o n ­
t e m p o r a r y idealists often criticise t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s f o r h a v i n g
d e r i v e d b e i n g f r o m t h o u g h t a n d c o n s c i o u s n e s s ; that kind o f
idealist p h i l o s o p h i s i n g is n o w c o n d e m n e d as b a r r e n , u n ­
realistic intellectualism, rationalism, panlogism, and so on.
T h e one answer to the basic philosophical question or the
o t h e r t h u s c o n s t i t u t e s t h e b a s i s of e a c h of t h e s y s t e m s of p h i l o ­
s o p h i c a l views, s o t h e o r e t i c a l l y d e t e r m i n i n g t h e m a i n t r e n d o r
direction of inquiry. I stress t h e m a i n trend, a n d not m o r e ,
b e c a u s e i t w o u l d b e a n o b v i o u s fallacy t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e
a n s w e r p r e d e t e r m i n e s all t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d c o n c l u s i o n s of a
g i v e n p h i l o s o p h y . W i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of a s y s t e m , like a n y
t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t i n g e n e r a l , logical n e c e s s i t y i s n o t t h e sole

50
form of determination. One must also allow for the fact that
the answer to the basic question gets theoretical expression in
the results of inquiry only in so far as the philosopher is
consistent. But a desire to follow consistently the principle
adopted is not enough to attain that end. Berkeley's principle
esse ist perсipi (to be is to be perceived) cannot be followed
consistently in a system whose direct goal is to substantiate a
theistic world outlook.
T h e p r e - M a r x i a n materialists undoubtedly endeavoured to
pursue the materialist principle in philosophic analysis both
of nature and of social reality. But, without being aware of it,
they remained idealists in their understanding of history. And
even in natural philosophy they sometimes retreated from
materialism, e.g. the mechanistic assumption of a first impulse,
the subjectivist interpretation of so-called secondary qualities,
and so on.
T h e inconsistency of a materialist or an idealist not only has
theoretical and epistemological roots, of course, but also socio-
economic ones. T h e metaphysical character of the materialism
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was not, of course,
due to the materialist answer to the basic philosophical question,
as has been claimed more than once by opponents of the
materialist understanding of the world. T h e idealists of that
time, too, were as a rule metaphysicists.
Any philosophical system takes shape in the socio-economic
conditions of a definite historical epoch, and it would be
unscientific to deduce its concrete propositions directly from
its principle, which at best can only be a guiding thread in the
course of inquiry.
This general consideration is necessary so as to avoid over­
simplifying the idea of the place and role of the basic philo­
sophical question, and at the same time to stress its principled
ideological significance.

NOTES
1
An e x a m p l e of h o w far this revision sometimes goes is t h e following claim
of M a x S c h e l e r , the f o u n d e r of philosophical a n t h r o p o l o g y : ' T h e physio­
logical and psychic life processes are ontologically strongly identical
( 2 3 8 : 7 4 ) . 1 shall show, f u r t h e r on, that this proposition, a n d others like it,
coincides fully with the idealist interpretation of objective reality and
k n o w l e d g e of it.
2
It must be stressed t h a t L e n i n , when tackling t h e most i m p o r t a n t problems
of the theory of M a r x i s m , often employed definitions whose c o n t e n t was

51
 d e m a r c a t e d b y a s i n g l e a t t r i b u t e ; this m a x i m u m l i m i t a t i o n c o n v i n c i n g l y
disclosed the main, decisive thing in the M a r x i a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the
p r o b l e m . ' O n l y h e i s a M a r x i s t , ' h e w r o t e , f o r e x a m p l e , ' w h o extends t h e
r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e c l a s s s t r u g g l e to t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of the dictatorship of
the proletariat. T h i s is w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e m o s t p r o f o u n d d i s t i n c t i o n b e ­
t w e e n t h e M a r x i s t a n d t h e o r d i n a r y p e t t y ( a s well a s b i g ) b o u r g e o i s . T h i s i s
t h e t o u c h s t o n e o n w h i c h t h e real u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e c o g n i t i o n o f M a r x i s m
s h o u l d b e t e s t e d ' ( 1 4 5 : 3 5 ) . I t s e e m s t o m e t h a t this e x a m p l e m a k e s t h e
s e n s e of o p t i m a l d e m a r c a t i o n of t h e c o n t e n t of a d e f i n i t i o n p a r t i c u l a r l y
obvious. By e m p l o y i n g this a n a l o g y one can readily u n d e r s t a n d that a
c o r r e c t a p p r o a c h t o t h e b a s i c q u e s t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y c o n s i s t s i n fixing t h e
really principal thing that distinguishes the main parties in philosophy,
a n d n o t i n e x t e n d i n g its c o n t e n t .

3
I h a v e e x a m i n e d this p o i n t s y s t e m a t i c a l l y i n m y a r t i c l e ' O n t h e C h a n g e i n t h e
S u b j e c t - M a t t e r of P h i l o s o p h y ' p u b l i s h e d in M . T . I o v c h u k , et al. ( E d s . ) .
Problemy istorii filosofskoi i sotsiologicheskoi mysli XIX veka (Nauka,
Moscow, 1960).

4
I am n o t r e f e r r i n g h e r e ( s i n c e it is a m a t t e r o n l y of t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l
aspect of the question interesting me) to the fact obvious from the angle of
historical materialism, that self-awareness presupposes not only perception
of the e x t e r n a l world but also m a n ' s attitude to m a n , t h e interaction between
people, the result of which is society. M a n , M a r x said, is not born either
w i t h a m i r r o r in his h a n d s , or with a F i c h t e a n s e l f - a w a r e n e s s 'I am I'. ' P e t e r
o n l y e s t a b l i s h e s his o w n i d e n t i t y as a m a n by first c o m p a r i n g himself with
P a u l a s b e i n g o f like k i n d ' ( 1 6 7 : I , 5 9 ) .

5
O n e m u s t a g r e e w i t h P l e k h a n o v : ' T h e r e w a s a t i m e w h e n p h i l o s o p h e r s did
not d i s c u s s s u c h q u e s t i o n s . T h i s w a s i n t h e initial p e r i o d o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t
of ancient Greek philosophy. For instance, Thales taught that water was the
p r i m a r y s u b s t a n c e f r o m w h i c h all t h i n g s c o m e a n d t o w h i c h all t h i n g s r e t u r n .
B u t h e did n o t ask himself: w h a t r e l a t i o n h a s c o n s c i o u s n e s s t o t h a t p r i m a r y
s u b s t a n c e ? N o r did A n a x i m e n e s ask himself t h e s a m e q u e s t i o n w h e n h e
a v e r r e d that the p r i m a r y s u b s t a n c e was not w a t e r b u t air' ( 2 1 0 : 5 7 7 ) .

6
I t h e r e f o r e c a n n o t a g r e e w i t h A n i s i m o v ' s v e r y c a t e g o r i c a l s t a t e m e n t that
p r i m i t i v e m a n ' w a s a l w a y s a b o v e all a r a t i o n a l i s t , a n d n a t u r a l m a t e r i a l i s t '
( 5 : 1 2 4 ) . I t b y n o m e a n s follows f r o m t h e o b v i o u s fact that p r i m i t i v e m e n ,
insofar as they a d a p t e d themselves s o m e h o w to their e n v i r o n m e n t and
possessed c e r t a i n c o r r e c t i d e a s a b o u t it, t h a t t h e s e i d e a s w e r e p h i l o s o p h i c a l
or theoretical. S o m e w o r k e r s , in trying to disclose the historical roots of
m a t e r i a l i s t a n d r a t i o n a l i s t v i e w s , s e e m i n g l y g o t o o f a r not o n l y i n t o h i s t o r y
but also into the prehistory of m a n k i n d .

7
C o n v e r s i o n o f a n a l o g y i n t o a p r i n c i p l e for e x p l a i n i n g r e a l i t y i s a l s o c h a r a c ­
t e r i s t i c o f t h e m o s t d e v e l o p e d v a r i e t i e s o f i d e a l i s m . S h i n k a r u k n o t e s this
f e a t u r e in Hegel's philosophy: ' T h e idealistically i n t e r p r e t e d purposive
a c t i v i t y o f m a n s e r v e s a s a n e m p i r i c a l m o d e l o f t h e w o r l d . T h e initial
p r e m i s s e s o f this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a r e a s follows: t h i n k i n g p r e c e d e s m a t e r i a l
activity; t h e material, objective world is t h e p r o d u c t of purposeful activity
a n d consequently of thought; the subject of purposive activity ( m a n ) is
e i t h e r r e d u c e d t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s o r his c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s s e p a r a t e d f r o m this
real subject a n d interpreted in the spirit of theology as t h e self-existant
d e m i u r g e of the world (245:127).

52
8
I h a v e s u r v e y e d t h i s q u e s t i o n in g r e a t e r d e t a i l in my m o n o g r a p h Problemy
isloriko-filosofskoi nauki ( P r o b l e m s of t h e H i s t o r y of P h i l o s o p h y ) , 2 n d e d .
(Mysl, Moscow, 1 9 8 2 ) . See C h a p . 2, §5; C h a p . 7, §3.

9
This comes out with even g r e a t e r obviousness in the doctrines of the Russian
materialists, the r e v o l u t i o n a r y d e m o c r a t s . Pisarev, for instance, claimed
t h a t t h e final g o a l o f p h i l o s o p h y a n d k n o w l e d g e i n g e n e r a l ' c o n s i s t e d i n
answering the always inevitable question of h u n g r y and naked people; outside
this q u e s t i o n t h e r e i s a b s o l u t e l y n o t h i n g t h a t i t i s w o r t h c a r i n g a b o u t , t h i n k i n g
about, and bustling about' ( 2 0 6 : 1 2 5 ) . Quite obviously, he had in mind h e r e
n o t an initial t h e o r e t i c a l f u n d a m e n t a l p r o p o s i t i o n , n o t a mode of s o l v i n g
p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s , b u t a s u p r e m e task o f p h i l o s o p h y f r o m t h e a n g l e o f
the interests of the oppressed and exploited masses.

10
I t h e r e f o r e c a n n o t a g r e e with L y a k h o v e t s k y a n d T y u k h t i n w h e n t h e y say,
i n t h e i r e n t r y cited a b o v e : ' N e i t h e r H e g e l n o r F e u e r b a c h , h o w e v e r ,
distinguished t h e question of the relation of thought to being as t h e basic
o n e o f all p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n s ' ( 1 5 4 : 1 7 2 ) . T h a t i s said t o o c a t e g o r i c a l l y .
I t i s a n o t h e r m a t t e r t h a t H e g e l often s m o o t h e d o v e r t h e a l t e r n a t i v e — b e i n g
or t h o u g h t — w h e n proving that thought was being, and that the latter was
a n a t t r i b u t e o f t h o u g h t . T h a t fault did n o t e x i s t i n F e u e r b a c h , a s w e s h a l l
see later.

11
T h a t is why Engels stressed t h a t 'as soon as we d e p a r t even a millimetre from
t h e s i m p l e b a s i c f a c t t h a t b e i n g i s c o m m o n t o all t h e s e t h i n g s , t h e differences
between these things begin to e m e r g e — a n d w h e t h e r these differences
consist i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t s o m e a r e w h i t e a n d o t h e r s a r e b l a c k , t h a t
s o m e a r e a n i m a t e a n d o t h e r s i n a n i m a t e , t h a t s o m e m a y b e o f this w o r l d a n d
o t h e r s o f t h e w o r l d b e y o n d , c a n n o t b e d e c i d e d b y u s f r o m t h e fact t h a t m e r e
existence is in e q u a l m a n n e r ascribed to t h e m all' ( 5 0 : 5 4 - 5 5 ) .
 II

THE TWO SIDES

OF THE BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION

1. T h e Ontological Aspect:
the Materialist A n s w e r to the Basic Question

T h e question of the relation of the spiritual and the material is

a b o v e all o n e o f t h e e s s e n c e , o f t h e n a t u r e o f w h a t e x i s t s . W h e n
o n e asks ' W h a t is t h e world?', ' W h a t is it that exists?', the answers
a r e necessarily concretised as follows: ' W h a t is m a t t e r ? ' , ' W h a t
is spirit?'. T h e relation 'spiritual-material' is an objective one,
e x i s t i n g i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f o u r c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f it. T h a t i s t h e
ontological aspect of the basic philosophical question. W h e n
t h e p s y c h i c r e a c h e s t h e level o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n its d e v e l o p m e n t ,
and knowledge of the reality a r o u n d it begins, an epistemologi­
cal, subject-object relation arises.
T h e notion t h a t s o m e t h i n g i s p r i m a r y a n d s o m e t h i n g else
s e c o n d a r y is based on t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t both exist. T h e s e c o n ­
d a r y posits t h e p r i m a r y , w h i c h , h o w e v e r , i s p r i m a r y i n t h e c o n ­
text of t h e ' s p i r i t u a l - m a t e r i a l ' relation. B u t this relation does not
h a v e a correlative c h a r a c t e r , since only o n e aspect of it depends
on the other, which, on the contrary, is independent, primordial,
substantial. T h e G r e e k materialists started from the concept of
a p r i m a r y m a t t e r ( m a t e r i a prima), a p r i m a r y s u b s t a n c e , t r e a t i n g
e v e r y t h i n g d i f f e r e n t f r o m i t a s t r a n s f o r m e d f o r m s o f it. D e s p i t e
t h e n a i v e t e o f t h a t p o s i n g o f t h e q u e s t i o n , w h i c h did n o t r u l e o u t
t h e p r i m a r y i n t i m e ( a n d s o t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e w o r l d ) , its p r i n ­
c i p l e d i d e o l o g i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e is o b v i o u s ; it is a m a t t e r of t h e m a ­
terial unity of the world. Is that not w h y the idea of p r i m a r y
m a t t e r retains a significance of principle also for c o n t e m p o r a r y
physics? This idea contradicts the metaphysical notion that
e v e r y t h i n g c o g n i s e d will a l w a y s b e a n i n f i n i t e l y s m a l l p a r t o f t h e
u n k n o w n . M a r k o v has remarked, apropos of that:

T h e drive to understand 'something' as constituted of 'something' 'sim­

pler' and fundamental has always been progressive a n d led, as history
witnesses, to quite substantial positive results. T h e idea of primary matter

54
 as t h e basis a n d driving m o t i v e of a definite a p p r o a c h to analysis of the
material world has always been and remains productive (165:66-67).

T h e 'spiritual-material' relation is not a substantial or abso­

lute ontological one in the sense in which the motion, change,
and d e v e l o p m e n t of matter a r e absolute. It arises of objective
necessity, b u t only in c e r t a i n conditions. It also d i s a p p e a r s , c o n ­
s e q u e n t l y , of objective necessity, b e c a u s e of a c o r r e s p o n d i n g
c h a n g e in the conditions. O n e must not, therefore, as Svidersky
remarks,
confuse t h e basic question of philosophy with the basic relationship of
reality itself. T h e relationship of m a t t e r and consciousness is not always
universal and in that sense the basic relation of reality itself (252:45).

T h e r e is evidently an endless n u m b e r of heavenly bodies

l a c k i n g t h e m o s t e l e m e n t a r y p h e n o m e n a o f life.
Idealism has often, since S c h o p e n h a u e r ' s time, depicted
h u m a n reason as an anomaly, doomed to disappear without
t r a c e . T h a t view suits not only irrationalists but also theologians,
w h o suggest that the advent of rational beings was an indubitable
miracle.
F r o m the angle of materialism reason is not something foreign
to matter. T h e spiritual is a n a t u r a l c o n s e q u e n c e of matter's c o n ­
tinually o c c u r r i n g transformations. T h e first materialists, the hy­
lozoists, w h o identified life w i t h t h e m o t i o n o f m a t t e r , m a d e a
p r o f o u n d , t h o u g h n a i v e g u e s s a b o u t t h e e s s e n c e o f t h e living.
T h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t t h e r e w a s a t i m e w h e n t h e r e w a s n o life i n
t h e infinite U n i v e r s e c a n n o t b e s c i e n t i f i c a l l y s u b s t a n t i a t e d , just
like t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t life exists o n l y o n o u r p l a n e t . E n g e l s
seemingly h a d that in mind w h e n he said:
We have the certainty that ... none of (matter's) attributes can ever be
lost, and therefore, also, that with the same iron necessity that it will ex­
t e r m i n a t e on the earth its highest creation, the thinking mind, it must
s o m e w h e r e else and at a n o t h e r time again p r o d u c e it ( 5 1 : 3 9 ) .

P r e - M a r x i a n materialists sometimes expressed an idea of the

co-eternity of spiritual and material, while at the s a m e time
stressing the f o r m e r ' s d e p e n d e n c e on t h e latter. S p i n o z a called
thought an attribute of substance-nature. Diderot considered
sensitivity, t h e e l e m e n t a r y f o r m of t h e psychic, to be i n h e r e n t in
m o l e c u l e s . I n t h e l a n g u a g e o f c o n t e m p o r a r y logic t h i s ' r o o t i n g '
of t h e spiritual in the m a t e r i a l c a n be expressed as follows, in
N a r s k y ' s v i e w : ' I n t h e d i s p o s i t i o n a l s e n s e c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s al-
ways i n h e r e n t in m a t t e r as an i n a l i e n a b l e p r o p e r t y of it'
( 1 9 0 : 6 8 ) . T h a t posing of the question rules out the assumption of
a c h a n c e o r i g i n of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . B u t a c l a r i f i c a t i o n is s e e m i n g l y

55
necessary here. It should not be supposed that everything that
i s n o t c h a n c e i s n e c e s s a r y o r i n e v i t a b l e . D e f i n i t e possibilities
( i n c l u d i n g t h a t o f t h e o r i g i n o f life i n c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s ) , f o r
instance, a r e not s o m e t h i n g h a p h a z a r d or c h a n c e . But the con­
c e p t of necessity is i n a p p l i c a b l e to possibilities of t h a t k i n d p r e ­
c i s e l y b e c a u s e a n y p o s s i b i l i t y i s n e c e s s a r i l y c o n t r a d i c t e d b y its
n e g a t i o n . A n y possibility posits t h e e x i s t e n c e of a n o t h e r o n e as
a c o n d i t i o n of its e x i s t e n c e as a p o s s i b i l i t y . In t h a t c o n n e c t i o n
Shklovsky r e m a r k e d with reason:
One c a n n o t , of course, e x c l u d e the possibility in principle that in the
c o n t e m p o r a r y age E a r t h is t h e sole focus of intelligent life in the Galaxy
a n d , who knows, p e r h a p s also in considerably g r e a t e r spacetime regions
of t h e Universe. It is w o r t h philosophers' while to p o n d e r seriously about
t h a t possibility. P r o b l e m s of a quite non-trivial c h a r a c t e r arise here,
it would seem, especially w h e n one allows for t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e that the
length of t h e 'psychozoic' e r a on E a r t h may be limited ( 2 4 6 : 6 2 ) .

T h e question of the primary thus has nothing in common, in

its m a t e r i a l i s t ( a n d e v e n m o r e d i a l e c t i c a l - m a t e r i a l i s t ) p o s i n g ,
w i t h t h e m y t h o l o g i c a l n o t i o n o f a p r i m a e v a l c h a o s t h a t i s often
a s c r i b e d t o m a t e r i a l i s m b y its c r i t i c s . T h e c o u n t e r p o s i n g o f t h e
m a t e r i a l to the spiritual m e a n s only that the existence of matter
d o e s not p r e s u p p o s e a necessity for c o n s c i o u s n e s s to exist. T h e
spiritual on t h e c o n t r a r y , h o w e v e r , does not exist without matter.
T h e counterposing of spiritual and material consequently
has absolute significance only within t h e b o u n d s of a very limited field—
in this case exclusively within t h e bounds of the f u n d a m e n t a l epistemolo­
gical problem of what is to be regarded as p r i m a r y and what as secon­
d a r y . Beyond these b o u n d s the relative c h a r a c t e r of this antithesis is
indubitable ( 1 4 2 : 1 3 1 ) .

T h i s proposition of Lenin's indicates that an absolute c o u n t e r ­

p o s i n g of spiritual a n d m a t e r i a l is i n c o m p a t i b l e with m a t e r i a l ­
ism; it constitutes t h e essence of philosophical dualism, which
substantialises the antithesis of spiritual a n d material. Idealism,
too, often starts f r o m a thesis of t h e a b s o l u t e antithesis of the
p s y c h i c a n d t h e p h y s i c a l , a s s u m i n g a t t h e s a m e t i m e that this r e ­
lation of absolute incompatibility is r e m o v e d by t h e s u p e r n a t u r a l
spirit.
F r o m the standpoint of dialectical materialism the spiritual
i s a n i m m a t e r i a l p r o p e r t y o f t h e m a t e r i a l , its i m m a t e r i a l i t y ,
moreover, not consisting in anything transphysical; the nature
of this immateriality is expressed by t h e epistemological concept
of r e f l e c t i o n .
T h e difference of principle of the philosophy of Marxism
f r o m t h e p r e c e d i n g m a t e r i a l i s m finds d i r e c t e x p r e s s i o n n o t o n l y

56
in a materialist answer, but also in a dialectical one, to the basic
philosophical question. This answer comes, in the first place,
from a scientifically realised, epistemologically investigated, dis­
tinctly formulated basic philosophical question, while pre-
Marxian materialists had no clear idea of its structure, place, and
significance. Secondly, dialectical materialism excludes in prin­
ciple any identifying or confusing of the spiritual and material.
Lenin noted Dietzgen's mistake in calling everything that exists
matter. That seemingly consistent materialist view proved in fact
to be a concession to idealism. And Lenin warned: 'to say that
thought is material is to make a false step, a step towards confu­
sing materialism and idealism' (142:225). For it is objective
idealism that interprets the spiritual as a reality existing outside
and independent of human consciousness.
T h e dialectical-materialist understanding of the immateriality
of consciousness is organically connected with the epistemologi­
cal definition of matter developed by Lenin, according to which
the concept of matter 'epistemologically implies nothing but
objective reality existing independently of the h u m a n mind and
reflected by it' (142:242). T h e epistemological understanding
of the spiritual as immaterial corresponds to this philosophical
definition of the concept of the material.
A third feature of the dialectical-materialist answer to the ba­
sic philosophical question consists in historism. T h e pre-Marxi­
an materialists often said that the spiritual, like matter, did not
originate. T h a t point of view limited the materialist understand­
ing of the 'spiritual-material' relation to recognition solely of
a dependence of the former on the latter. T h e theory of evolu­
tion, confirmed in biology in the second half of the nineteenth
century, rejected this limited view. Natural science brought out
the error of another metaphysical materialist notion as well,
namely that certain combinations of elementary particles caused
the a p p e a r a n c e of consciousness. T h e unsoundness of that notion
was revealed by dialectical materialism, which counterposed a
concept of development to it that is characterised by continuity,
succession, direction, irreversibility, preservation of achieved re­
sults, etc. Unfortunately this difference has not yet been ade­
quately studied philosophically, which provides grounds for certain
critics of materialism to deny the materialist understanding of
the origin of consciousness, since (as they claim) no combina­
tion of elementary particles can lead to the formation of a think­
ing brain.
One of the most important characteristics of the dialectical-
materialist answer to the basic philosophical question is its socio-

57
logical aspect. T h e p r e - M a r x i a n materialists defined matter as
s u b s t a n c e or body, a n d this characteristic of objective reality,
drawn from mechanistic natural science, provided no notion of
the peculiarities of material social relations and of t h e spiritual
processes caused by t h e m . It b e c a m e possible to o v e r c o m e that
historical limitation of p r e - M a r x i a n materialism t h r o u g h the
d i s c o v e r y a n d investigation of t h e specific m a t e r i a l basis of social
life.
T h e history of philosophy thus brings out various types of
materialist answer to the basic philosophical question, c o r r e ­
s p o n d i n g to the main stages in the d e v e l o p m e n t a n d to the most
important forms of materialist philosophy. T h e dialectical-mate­
rialist a n s w e r s u m s up t h e c e n t u r i e s - l o n g history of this question,
which deserves special investigation. Such an inquiry, of course,
is b e y o n d t h e s c o p e of my b o o k , yet a brief e x c u r s u s into history
is necessary for a p r o p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e c o n t e n t and
significance of the materialist a n s w e r to t h e basic philosophical
question.
T h e m a t e r i a l i s t n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e a n c i e n t s — t h e first
historical form of philosophical t h o u g h t — d i d not yet single out
the c o n c e p t of the psychic as s o m e t h i n g different from the m a ­
t e r i a l , a l t h o u g h t h e t e r m 'spirit' w a s e m p l o y e d , w i t h w h i c h , i t
seems, c o n c e p t s w e r e associated that w e r e derived both from
e v e r y d a y e x p e r i e n c e and from mythology. T h a l e s supposed that
a m a g n e t h a d a s o u l , i.e. t r i e d t o e x p l a i n t h e p h e n o m e n o n o f
m a g n e t i s m in that w a y ; the c o n c e p t of soul served h i m to explain
a far from spiritual p h e n o m e n o n .
T h e fact that T h a l e s , incidentally, d r e w on t h e n o t i o n of a spir­
it to explain such a m y s t e r i o u s p h e n o m e n o n for his t i m e as m a g ­
n e t i s m i n d i c a t e s t h a t s p e c i a l p r o p e r t i e s w e r e still a s c r i b e d t o t h e
s o u l . A c c o r d i n g t o H e r a k l e i t o s i t w a s n o t s i m p l y a f l a m e , but t h e
m o s t p e r f e c t s t a t e o f fire, f r e e o f m o i s t u r e . D e m o c r i t o s c o n s i d ­
ered it composed of very smooth, r o u n d atoms. T h e spiritual was
t h e n still n o t c o u n t e r p o s e d t o m a t t e r a s s o m e t h i n g q u a l i t a t i v e l y
d i f f e r e n t , t h o u g h d e r i v e d f r o m it. T h i s u n d e v e l o p e d c h a r a c t e r
of t h e notion of the spiritual was a main reason why t h e material­
ist p h i l o s o p h y o f a n t i q u i t y , a s E n g e l s s t r e s s e d , ' w a s i n c a p a b l e
of clearing up the relation between mind and matter' (50:159).
T h i s p h i l o s o p h y t r e a t e d qualitative differences as significant only
from the standpoint of everyday consciousness ('opinion').
P h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , h a v i n g fixed t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e
a g g r e g a t e s t a t e s o f w a t e r , j u d g e d all o t h e r o b s e r v e d s t a t e s b y
a n a l o g y w i t h it. T h e o r i g i n a l n a t u r a l m a t e r i a l i s m , E n g e l s
pointed out,

58
 r e g a r d s t h e unity of the infinite diversity of n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n a as a mat­
ter of course, and seeks it in something definitely c o r p o r e a l , a p a r t i c u l a r
thing, as T h a l e s does in w a t e r ( 5 1 : 1 8 6 ) .

It was that conception of the material unity of n a t u r e that con­

stituted the central point of G r e e k n a t u r a l philosophy, since it
h a d n o t y e t s i n g l e d o u t t h e p s y c h o p h y s i c a l p r o b l e m , let a l o n e t h e
basic philosophical question.
T h e idea of the substantial identity of the psychic and the
physical w a s n o t specially s u b s t a n t i a t e d o r p r o v e d , p a r t l y b e c a u s e
t h e r e w a s a s yet n o n o t i o n o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e d i f f e r e n c e
between them, and partly as a c o n s e q u e n c e of the p r e d o m i n ­
a n c e of naturally formed hylozoist views. T h e theoretical roots
of that c o n c e p t i o n of the unity of t h e world lay in the m o d e of
r e g a r d i n g t h e w o r l d i n h e r e n t i n t h e first m a t e r i a l i s t d o c t r i n e s . A s
Engels stressed,
A m o n g the Greeks—just because they were not yet advanced enough
to dissect, analyse n a t u r e — n a t u r e is still viewed as a whole, in general.
T h e universal connection of natural p h e n o m e n a is not proved in regard
to particulars; to the Greeks it is the result of direct contemplation. Herein
lies the i n a d e q u a c y of Greek philosophy, on a c c o u n t of which it had to
yield later to other modes of outlook on the world. But herein also lies
its superiority over all its subsequent metaphysical opponents (51:45,46).

T h e metaphysically thinking philosophers of m o d e r n times, by

rejecting the naive dialectical views of the world, blocked their
own progress 'from an understanding of the part to an u n d e r ­
standing of t h e whole, to an insight into the g e n e r a l i n t e r c o n ­
nection of things' (51:45).
Engels thus considered that philosophy (and incidentally
k n o w l e d g e i n g e n e r a l ) a s c e n d e d i n its d e v e l o p m e n t f r o m under-
standing of the particular to understanding of the whole.
T h e problem of the world as a whole is a m o n g the root problems
of philosophy. D e m a r c a t i o n of philosophy from the special
s c i e n c e s d o e s not i n t h e least e l i m i n a t e t h i s p r o b l e m f r o m
p h i l o s o p h y . T h e f a c t t h a t c e r t a i n scientific d i s c i p l i n e s a r e
c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h i s p r o b l e m d o e s n o t i n t h e least d i m i n i s h its
s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r p h i l o s o p h y , b u t o n t h e c o n t r a r y i n c r e a s e s it.
T h e w o r l d a s a w h o l e (it is, o f c o u r s e , n o t s i m p l y t h e a g g r e ­
gate of e v e r y t h i n g that exists) is boundless and inexhaustible. It
is a m a t t e r , a b o v e all, of t h e u n i v e r s a l a n d , in a c e r t a i n s e n s e ,
absolute interconnection and interdependence of phenomena,
of the unity of t h e world. It seemed s o m e t h i n g quite obvious to
the G r e e k materialists, constantly confirmed by everyday ex­
perience. But when there b e c a m e an awareness in philosophy
of t h e real antithesis b e t w e e n t h e spiritual and material, this

59
unity b e c a m e p r o b l e m a t i c . Subsequently it was m o r e and m o r e
often called in question, with the c o n s e q u e n c e that the qual­
itatively h e t e r o g e n e o u s p h e n o m e n a of n a t u r e w e r e systematical­
ly and specially investigated by isolating t h e m from one another.
T h e primitive naive notion of the universal i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e and
interconversion of n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n a , which was based on
a proposition of their substantial identity, gave way to a meta­
physical view that interpreted the qualitative differences between
things as evidence of their essential i n d e p e n d e n c e of one a n o t h ­
er. Yet the idea of the unity of the world did not get consigned
to oblivion. It was constantly revived by natural science and phi­
losophy in the course of their development. Both materialism
and idealism, and both metaphysically thinking philosophers and
dialecticians, defended a n d substantiated t h e idea of the unity
of t h e world, each, of course, in his own key.
T h e moulding of the materialism of m o d e r n times was close­
ly linked with the revival of G r e e k cosmological doctrines that
p r e c e d e d this historical process in the natural-philosophy sys­
tems of the Renaissance. T h e n a t u r a l philosophers of t h e be­
ginning of the seventeenth c e n t u r y developed t h e view of the
atomistic materialism of antiquity about the infinite universum,
which received a n a t u r a l - s c i e n c e substantiation for the first time
t h r o u g h C o p e r n i c u s ' system and the c o r r e c t i o n s introduced into
it by G i o r d a n o Bruno.
T h e idea of the space-time infinity of the universe smashed
the scholastic notion of the radical antithesis of heavenly 'mat­
ter' to base earthly substance. T h e dualism of m a t t e r and form
was also shattered along with that of the earthly and the h e a v e n ­
ly, i.e. the Aristotelian-scholastic hyiomorphism that interpreted
m a t t e r only as material for the creative activity of a s u p e r n a t u r a l
spirit. T h e infinity of the universum was c o m p r e h e n d e d as an
unlimited diversity of the potentials contained in matter, and as
evidence that matter was not confined to any limits; it was uni­
versal reality, a unique and single world.
T h e hylozoism of the ancients was reborn in the organicist
conceptions of n a t u r a l philosophers who ascribed vegetable
and animal functions to metals and minerals. T h o s e views u n d e r ­
mined t h e theological, scholastic dogmas a b o u t the s u p e r n a t u r a l
c h a r a c t e r of the spiritual, a n d denied t h e theological division
of t h e world into this one and the other. T h e pantheistic identi­
1

fication, typical of m e d i a e v a l ideology, also provided substan­

tiation of the principle of material unity, since it led to denial
of God.
T h e materialists of m o d e r n times, unlike their predecessors,

60
had already singled out the question of the relation of spiritual
and material, attaching ever greater importance to it. T h e anti-
feudal struggle against religious-scholastic mystification of the
spiritual as something transcendental and out of this world which
was the primary essence and other-world principle of human life
in this world, brought this question to the foreground. Material­
ism demystified the spiritual, seeing in it a natural phenomenon
governed by the laws of nature. Toland, who ascribed life to
everything that existed, linked its highest manifestations with
a special, material basis, the brain. In that connection he criti­
cised Spinoza's conception of thought as an attribute of matter,
but of matter in general. 'Whatever be the Principle of Thinking
in Animals,' he wrote, 'yet it cannot be performed but by the
means of the Brain' (256:139). Citing Hippokrates and Demok­
ritos, Toland claimed that all emotional and psychic disorders
had their cause in a disturbance of the normal state of the brain.
T h a t was the point of view, too, of Lamettrie, Holbach, Diderot,
and others. If the existence of reason presupposed the existence
of a specific, material substratum, Holbach argued,
likewise to say that n a t u r e is g o v e r n e d by an intelligence, is to claim
that it is g o v e r n e d by a being provided with organs, seeing that it could
not, w i t h o u t organs, h a v e either perceptions, ideas, intentions, thoughts,
desires, plan, or actions ( 1 0 3 : 7 2 ) .

Thus, in modern times, too, just as in antiquity, denial of the

supernatural and recognition of the material unity of the world
were inseparable. But whereas the natural philosophers of anti­
quity and the Renaissance substantiated the principle of the ma­
terial unity of the world by reducing the supernatural to the nat­
ural, sensually perceived, the materialists of modern times en­
riched this principle of the explanation of the world, while devel­
oping it from itself, by a developed materialist answer to the
basic philosophical question. This was a new stage in the devel­
opment of materialist philosophy; substantiation of the material
unity of the world coincided with materialist monism.
Both monism and recognition of the unity of the world, as
Plekhanov stressed, were of course compatible with idealism.
But only materialist monism ruled out the spiritualist, absolute
counterposing of the psychic to the physical, of the mentally
comprehended to sensually perceived reality. Only materialist
monism, consequently, consistently followed the principle of
the unity of the world. According to this tenet nature in 'its
broadest sense' as Holbach said, was the sole reality, or 'the great
whole that results from the assemblage of different substances,
from their different combinations, and from the different mo-

61
tions that we see in the universe' (103:11). In opposition to ma­
terialism the idealist conception of the unity of the world
inevitably includes a latent dualism of spiritual and material.
I must stress, incidentally, that recognition of the unity of the
world and the concept 'the world as a whole' do not fully cover
one another. Idealist philosophers, who counterpose a dualist or
pluralist interpretation to the principle of the unity of the world,
in no way eliminate the concept of the world as a whole even
when they deny it. T h e y only interpret the whole world dual­
istically or pluralistically. Even irrationalists, for whom the
world and the universe are something like chaos, ruling out
order of any kind, interpret the world as a whole in their own
way. But only materialism indissolubly links the concepts of
the world as a whole and of the unity of the world as the essential
content of its materiality.
Any attempts to picture matters as if the questions of the world
as a whole and of the unity of the world were essentially differ­
ent ones are therefore in principle unsound. For the materialist
the concept of the unity of the world is a concretisation of the
more general one of 'the world as a whole', since to recognise
the unity of the world and at the same time to deny the legitima­
cy of the philosophical concept of the world as a whole (as some
Marxists unfortunately do) means to admit quite incompatible
statements.
T h e principle of the material unity of the world does not sim­
ply precede the comprehensive materialist posing of the basic
philosophical question historically. In that case it could seem to
be the natural-philosophy past of modern materialism. But this
principle is one of the most important aspects of the materialist
answer to the basic philosophical question, from which it follows
that the concept of the world as a whole, too, continues to be
developed and enriched by new content disclosing the unity of
an endless diversity of phenomena.
P r e - M a r x i a n materialists spoke of the great whole of nature.
In our day the expression often provokes an indulgent smile,
since the world as a whole cannot directly be the object of know­
ing. Neopositivists especially make fun of this kind of 'archaic',
'natural philosophy' t u r n of phrase. ' T o be real in the scientific
sense', C a r n a p , for example, declares, 'means to be an element
of the system; hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied
to the system itself (30:207). In other words, one system or
another can only be the object of inquiry when it itself is a sub­
system, i.e. an element of another system. T h e world as a whole
cannot be singled out as a subsystem, and so is unreal in the sci-

62
entific sense. Carnap's idea seems at first glance to be indispu­
table; one cannot shift the E a r t h if there is no fulcrum outside it.
But if the unity of the world, to use Engels' words, cannot be
shown by a pair of juggler's phrases, then denial of this unity
cannot be substantiated by the same means. It is worth looking
into this matter in more detail, if only because Carnap's point of
view justifies epistemological subjectivism and agnosticism.
T h e subjectivist denies the reality of the world as a whole,
since this whole is not a directly given, sensually perceived object
of existing or possible experience. He represents the term 'whole'
in application to the whole aggregate of p h e n o m e n a as devoid
of any sense. T h e agnostic argues differently. By claiming that
sciences (and philosophy) do not recognise the world as a whole
either directly or indirectly, or in any degree whatever (corre­
sponding to their level of development), the agnostic thus some­
how recognises the Kantian unknowable 'thing in itself, i.e.
a reality beyond the limit of quite knowable phenomena. T h e
metaphysical gulf between phenomena and 'things in themselves'
is revived as an absolute incompatibility of knowledge of the
world of phenomena and of the world as a whole. C a r n a p , too,
is consistent in his own way when he declares that objective
reality (or the world of things) is not an object of scientific
knowledge:
those who raise the question of the reality of the thing world itself h a v e
p e r h a p s in mind not a theoretical question as their formulation seems
to suggest, but r a t h e r a practical question, a m a t t e r of a practical decision
c o n c e r n i n g the s t r u c t u r e of o u r l a n g u a g e ( 3 0 : 2 0 7 ) .

It turns out that we only have the right to speak of the reality of
those things or events that we include in a certain system by
means of our language. But to recognise the existence of the
world as a whole, and likewise the unity of the world, means to
employ ordinary 'thing language' (which has an unscientific
character) unconsciously.
Such is the position of the neopositivist; it differs from that
of objective idealism in denying the real existence of the world
as a whole. T h a t is a pseudoconcept, C a r n a p explains, and from
his position objective reality is just such a pseudoconcept. Both
recognition and denial of objective reality should therefore be
rejected as pseudopropositions, which means that one should
adhere to philosophical scepticism on the question of objective
reality, i.e. reserve judgment on it.
It is not enough, in order to refute a false point of view, of
course, just to point out the untenable conclusions that follow
from it. T h e erroneous proposition must be refuted in essence.

63
It is necessary, consequently, to r e t u r n to the thesis that the world
as a whole c a n n o t be the object of knowing. T h i s is c o r r e c t in the
sense that investigation posits singling out of t h e object of in­
quiry, but a procedure of that kind is impracticable as regards the
world as whole. T h e r e is no tower from which o n e could observe
t h e whole world; that must not only be u n d e r s t o o d literally but
also taken in the figurative sense. But it does not follow from
2

this, as the c o n t e m p o r a r y West G e r m a n idealist philosopher Lei­-

segang claims, that
the world as a whole, the universe, and nature are something outside ex­
perience. We see and experience always only this or that in the world,
this or that which nature has produced, but never the world, or nature,
as such and as a whole (137:72).
It is very notable that Leisegang equates the world as a whole,
the universe, and n a t u r e with one a n o t h e r . In fact, for one who
denies the possibility of cognising t h e world as a whole, all ob­
jective reality proves to be u n k n o w a b l e .
In stressing t h e unlimited qualitative diversity of the universe,
we do not simply establish a methodological postulate t h a t pos­
sibly comes into contradiction with the principle of the unity of
the world, but we formulate a conclusion that sums up the whole
history of knowledge. And that conclusion, like many other propo­
sitions of natural science (about which I shall speak b e l o w ) ,
refers to the world as a whole. W h e n we say that t h e r e a r e no
objective limits to knowing t h e world, we a r e o n c e again arguing
about the world as a whole. But how a r e j u d g m e n t s of that kind
possible? T h e y a r e possible primarily because t h e r e a r e no abso­
lute antitheses in t h e ontological sense. W h a t e v e r 'marvellous'
p h e n o m e n a cosmology has discovered, we a r e quite justified in
claiming that they will not be wholly incompatible with those
already known to science. T h e r e a r e no g r o u n d s for assuming
that cosmology or any other science will discover s o m e w h e r e
that which the theologists and scholastics of t h e Middle Ages
tried to discover at distances incomparably closer to our planet.
N a t u r a l science confirms the scientific, atheistic conviction that
t h e r e is nothing absolutely opposite to what exists and what is
already known. Difference posits identity and is inseparable
from it. Diversity and unity do not exclude o n e a n o t h e r . H e t e r o ­
geneity, like homogeneity, is not absolute. An 'antiworld' in
the precise full sense of t h e t e r m is impossible; it fixes antitheses,
whose relativity is attested by their constantly being revealed
unity. In the 'antiworld' t h e material does not b e c o m e a product
of t h e spiritual; any f e a t u r e of the 'antiworld' exists in a certain
n a t u r a l relation with its antipode. T h e s e general propositions

64
a c q u i r e a non-trivial c h a r a c t e r as soon as they are applied in
a c o n c r e t e i n q u i r y a n d i n e v a l u a t i n g its r e s u l t s . A s G o t t j u s t l y
remarks:
T h e concept of impossibility not only reflects that certain possibilities
do not exist, but also reflects what processes do not permit the existence
of these possibilities, i.e. h a v e a positive as well as a negative aspect
(78:220).

T h e concept of the ontological is applied to the problem of the

w o r l d as a w h o l e , of c o u r s e , in a d i a l e c t i c a l - m a t e r i a l i s t s e n s e ,
which presupposes an epistemological interpretation of any
form of universality inherent in n a t u r e , society, and knowl­
e d g e . A n y d e s c r i p t i o n o f o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y a n d its s c i e n t i f i c r e f l e c ­
t i o n is b a s e d on a d e f i n i t e level of d e v e l o p m e n t of k n o w l e d g e .
This description consequently changes, and is enriched by new
c o n t e n t a s k n o w l e d g e d e v e l o p s . I n t h a t s e n s e o n t o l o g i c a l defi­
nitions a r e also epistemological ones. And this unity of the episte­
mological a n d ontological in scientific a n d philosophical k n o w l ­
edge is of decisive i m p o r t a n c e in t h e dialectical-materialist
posing of the p r o b l e m of t h e world as a w h o l e .
T h e history of science enables one to say that the existence of
a b s o l u t e antitheses is epistemologically e x c l u d e d , at least within
the c o n t e x t o f scientific k n o w l e d g e ; n e w scientific t r u t h s d o not
refute 'old' ones. T h e y m a k e t h e m m o r e precise, concretise and
s u p p l e m e n t them, taking t h e m into a system of m o r e p r o f o u n d
scientific n o t i o n s . As K u z n e t s o v c o r r e c t l y notes:
T h e o r i e s whose correctness has been established experimentally for
any field of physical p h e n o m e n a a r e not eliminated as something false
when new, m o r e general theories appear, but retain their significance for
the f o r m e r domain of p h e n o m e n a , as a limiting form and partial case
of the new theories ( 1 3 0 : 1 5 6 ) .

It f o l l o w s f r o m this t h a t a s c i e n t i f i c , t h e o r e t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n of t h e
diversity and unity of the world is i n s e p a r a b l e from t h e processes
of i n q u i r y .
B e i n g , b e y o n d t h e limits o f o u r k n o w l e d g e , i s a n o p e n q u e s ­
tion, precisely an o p e n a n d not a closed o n e . T h a t also applies 3

to w h a t is called 'the world as a w h o l e ' , since it r e c o g n i s e s that

such a w h o l e exists ( n o m a t t e r h o w a b s t r a c t this t r u t h is relative
to t h e world as a w h o l e , it is by no m e a n s a t a u t o l o g y ) . T h e histo­
ry of science has s h o w n that the investigation of unobservable
p h e n o m e n a is a r e g u l a r p r o c e s s of d e v e l o p m e n t of scientific
knowledge. Many p h e n o m e n a have become observable because
they were first discovered theoretically.
Observability w a s an a b s o l u t e p r e m i s s of knowability only for
the empiricists of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. T o d a y

5-01603 65
empiricism takes up a m o r e flexible epistemological position,
since science successfully anticipates unobservable p h e n o m e n a ,
e s t a b l i s h e s t h e i r e x i s t e n c e , a n d i n t h e final a n a l y s i s m a k e s t h e m
observable indirectly, if not directly. T r u e , the unobservable ob­
ject called 'the world as a whole' c a n n o t be r e c o r d e d even n e g a ­
t i v e l y like, f o r e x a m p l e , a f i l t r a b l e v i r u s . W h i l e s p a c e p r o b e s h a v e
p h o t o g r a p h e d t h e far side of the m o o n , u n o b s e r v a b l e from t h e
earth (recognition of the existence of which was deemed scien­
tifically s e n s e l e s s b y n e o p o s i t i v i s t s b e c a u s e o f t h e u n v e r i f i a b i l i t y
o f t h e r e l e v a n t s t a t e m e n t s ) , o n e will n e v e r fly a r o u n d t h e w o r l d
as a whole, of c o u r s e , in a s p a c e p r o b e . But o n e m u s t not u n d e r ­
stand singling out of the object of inquiry in an oversimplified
way. Science singles out not only the individual a n d the particu­
lar, b u t a l s o t h e g e n e r a l , a n d e v e n t h e u n i v e r s a l , i.e. a d e f i n i t e ­
n e s s o f p h e n o m e n a t h a t i t r e l a t e s t o all p h e n o m e n a without
exception, o r i n o t h e r w o r d s t o t h e w o r l d a s a w h o l e . T h e
universalisation of scientific p r o p o s i t i o n s of t h a t k i n d is far f r o m
a l w a y s justified, o f c o u r s e , b u t e v e n t h e n s c i e n c e g e t s t h e c h a n c e
t o e s t a b l i s h its f r o n t i e r s , i.e. t o c o n c r e t i s e u n i v e r s a l i t y . T h e
discovery of laws of n a t u r e is the singling out of t h e most g e n e r a l ,
n e c e s s a r y , a n d r e c u r r i n g r e l a t i o n s t h a t a p p l y a t l e a s t partially
to t h e world as a w h o l e , e v e n if only b e c a u s e t h e p a r t of a w h o l e
is not s o m e t h i n g foreign to it but includes the n a t u r e of the
w h o l e to s o m e e x t e n t or o t h e r ( a n d this h a s , of c o u r s e , to be
investigated).
Necessity and universality are inseparable. But not every
statement about universality applies to the world as a whole.
A n d it is i m p o s s i b l e to e s t a b l i s h a p r i o r i t h a t it d o e s n o t a p p l y to
e v e r y t h i n g that exists; that, too, has to be prove d . Limitation
o f t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f l a w s a n d scientific p r o p o s i t i o n s i s j u s t a s
difficult a r e s e a r c h t a s k in g e n e r a l as s u b s t a n t i a t i o n of t h e i r
universality.
T h e law o f universal g r a v i t a t i o n w a s d i s c o v e r e d b y N e w t o n
p r e c i s e l y a s a law o f t h e universum. A n d t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e n u b
of the discovery, because terrestrial attraction was known be­
fore N e w t o n ; it h a d been r e c o r d e d in t h e law of falling bodies
discovered by Galileo. N e w t o n ' s genius in this case was that he
e x t e n d e d the idea of attraction to t h e w h o l e universe, which
was i n c o m p a t i b l e with c o m m o n sense since it called for the as­
s u m p t i o n of actio in distans a n d w a s f r a u g h t w i t h p a r a d o x e s t h a t
N e w t o n tried to avoid by m e a n s of t h e o l o g i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s . Yet
the law he d i s c o v e r e d w a s confirmed by s u b s e q u e n t r e s e a r c h
a n d e x p e r i m e n t s , a n d i s still b e i n g c o n f i r m e d t o d a y . T h a t d o e s
n o t m e a n t h a t its u n i v e r s a l i t y will n e v e r b e l i m i t e d . M o r e e s s e n t i -

66
ally, l i m i t a t i o n of t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y of t h i s l a w will be a f u r t h e r
d e e p e n i n g of u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e , s i n c e it c a n ­
n o t be a m a t t e r of its r e p u d i a t i o n as n o n - e x i s t e n t , in fact i n o p e ­
r a t i v e , e t c . B u t i s t h e law o f u n i v e r s a l g r a v i t a t i o n r e a l l y a n e x ­
c e p t i o n ? A r e n ' t t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n l a w s also r e a l l y l a w s o f t h e
universum?.
N e o p o s i t i v i s t s , i t t u r n s out, c l e a r l y u n d e r e s t i m a t e t h e possibili­
ties o f s c i e n c e . D e s p i t e C a r n a p ' s p r o t e s t a t i o n s , n a t u r a l s c i e n c e
d o e s n o t r e n o u n c e s t u d y o f t h e w o r l d a s a w h o l e a t all. T h i s
s e e m s a b a n a l t r u t h w h e n it is g r a s p e d . B u t still, let me cite t h e
naturalists themselves. H e r e , for e x a m p l e , is w h a t L a n d a u and
Lifschitz wrote:
the world as a whole in the general theory of relativity (my italics—
Т.О.) must not be regarded as a closed system, but as one that is in a var­
iable gravitational field; in that connection application of the law of
increasing entropy does not lead to a conclusion about the necessity of
a statistical equilibrium (132:46).

But w h a t applies to the g e n e r a l t h e o r y of relativity is seemingly

also a p p l i c a b l e t o o t h e r f u n d a m e n t a l scientific t h e o r i e s .
Z e l m a n o v notes t h a t t h e c o n c e p t of t h e world as a whole a n d of
t h e u n i v e r s e as a w h o l e is t r e a t e d in c o s m o l o g y in at least t h r e e
a s p e c t s . ( 1 ) T h e u n i v e r s e i s r e g a r d e d a s a single o b j e c t i r r e s p e c ­
tive of its p a r t s . ( 2 ) T h e u n i v e r s e as a w h o l e is r e g a r d e d in its
r e l a t i o n s to its p a r t s , a n d t h e l a t t e r in r e l a t i o n to t h e w o r l d as a
whole. (3) T h e c o n c e p t of t h e universe as a whole is applied to
all its r e g i o n s i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r r e l a t i o n to e a c h o t h e r a n d to
the whole universe. He concludes accordingly: 'cosmology is
a p h y s i c a l d o c t r i n e of t h e U n i v e r s e as a w h o l e , i n c l u d i n g t h e
theory of the whole world covered by astronomical observations
as a p a r t of t h e U n i v e r s e ' ( 2 6 8 : 2 7 7 ) . As f o r t h e views of t h o s e
c o s m o l o g i s t s w h o d o n o t t h i n k i t possible t o s p e a k o f t h e k n o w -
ability in p r i n c i p l e of t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e , Z e l m a n o v justly
r e m a r k s (in my v i e w ) in a n o t h e r of his w o r k s :
Paradoxically, denial of the legitimacy of the doctrine of the Universe as
a whole, based on any considerations of the Universe whatsoever, is
logically contradictory, since these considerations themselves can be
treated as elements of such a doctrine, while denial of its legitimacy also
means denial of the legitimacy of the considerations adduced (267:321).

So t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e is n o t a s p e c u l a t i v e a b s t r a c t i o n of
n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h e r s b u t a s p e c i a l , I w o u l d s a y mediated, object
of scientific i n q u i r y . T h e w o r l d as a w h o l e is n o t s o m e t h i n g t r a n ­
scendent, b e y o n d all limitations in r e g a r d to a n y attained k n o w l ­
e d g e . D e n i a l o f its k n o w a b i l i t y i n p r i n c i p l e ( a n d a l w a y s h i s t o r ­
ically l i m i t e d ) — a t first g l a n c e a p r o f o u n d p o i n t of v i e w —

67
proves on closer examination to be a superficial, empiricist one,
for empiricists have always asserted that we know the finite,
and that the infinite is unfathomable.
T h e real problem is something else; how to study the world
as a whole? How is this cognitive process performed? H o w far
can scientific propositions regarded as referring to the whole
universum be rigorously substantiated? Are they not destined
to remain hypotheses for ever? Dialectical-materialist analy­
sis of the process of cognition gives an answer to that in general
form; in knowing the finite, individual, passing, and partial, we at
the same time (within certain limits, of course) know the
infinite, general, intransient, and whole. As Engels put it:
In fact all real, exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the in­
dividual thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from
this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the fi­
nite, the eternal in the transitory. The form of universality, however, is
the form of self-completeness, hence of infinity; it is the comprehen­
sion of the many finites in the infinite.... All true knowledge of nature
is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and hence essentially absolute
(51:234).

Comprehension of the world as a whole is thus the mediated

result of scientific cognition in respect of a certain 'section' of the
universum, and not simply of the whole conceivable aggregate
of existing and possible phenomena. If everything consists of
atoms, for example, and of the elementary particles that form
them, then atomic physics studies the world as a whole, though
it does not study psychic processes, social life, etc. If, say, the
proposition of quantum mechanics that the dualism of wave-
particles is absolutely general, applying to the whole physical
world, is correct, then here, too, it is a matter of study of the
world as a whole. Recognition of that has nothing in common
with justification of the unscientific, metaphysical assumption
of the possibility of absolute knowledge, which is incompatible
with materialist dialectics.
In saying that physics and certain other fundamental sciences
study the world as a whole, we also start from the assumption
that the unity of the world (the world as whole) is revealed
in its parts, and so in special fields of scientific inquiry. The whole
of the universum, then, must not be understood as an external
aggregate of parts, but rather as something inner, i.e. as the na­
t u r e of the whole, which incidentally is expressed by dialectical
laws and categorial relations. It is also important to stress that
recognition of the reality of definite (of course, limited) knowl­
edge of the world as a whole not only has ideological and meth-

68
odological significance, but also constitutes a necessary ele­
ment of concrete, historical research at a quite high level of
theoretical generalisation. As Sergei Vavilov wrote:
It seems to me that there is an undoubted grain of truth in the tenden­
cies of the theory of relativity to explain the properties of elementary
particles from the properties of the world as a whole. If the properties
of particles really explain very much in the behaviour of the world as
a whole, then, on the other hand, we can rightly expect, according to the
general laws of dialectics, that the properties of elementary particles
themselves are determined by those of the world as a whole ( 2 5 8 : 7 1 ) .
4

Lenin constantly stressed, when characterising materialist

philosophy, that it posits a definite understanding of the world as
a whole. 'There is nothing in the world but matter in motion,
and matter in motion cannot move otherwise than in space and
time' (142:158). Marxian authors who insist that the concept of
the world as a whole is illegitimate should ponder whether their
position is compatible with the basic propositions of materialism,
for it is quite obvious that denial of this concept cannot be agreed
with such a truth, formulated by Lenin, as 'the world is matter in
motion' (142:262). Natural scientists also undoubtedly agree
with that statement about the world as a whole and in that sense
it is not only a philosophical concept, but also a scientific one.
Lenin remarked that the sciences elucidate the unity of the
world in a specific way, by virtue of which a special epistemol­
ogical investigation of these forms of scientific knowledge is
needed. 'The unity of nature is revealed in the "astonishing
analogy" between the differential equations of the various
realms of phenomena' (142:269). Contemporary natural science
has given new, at times quite unexpected confirmations of
Lenin's idea. I have in mind the broad spread of mathematical
methods of inquiry in sciences that developed for ages indepen­
dent of mathematics, the peculiar 'welding together' of several
fundamental sciences such as physics and chemistry, the rise
of a multitude of 'butt' disciplines, which witnesses to the unity
of qualitatively different processes of nature, the progress of
cybernetics and electronics in modelling several higher psychic
functions. Epistemological comprehension of the historical
process of the differentiation and integration of sciences also
confirms the dialectical-materialist conception of the world
as a whole. T h e unity of the world is recorded in the classifica­
tion of the sciences, which brings out the link between them
as having an objective ontological basis. As Fedoseev has
written:

69
 T h e i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n of t h e sciences reflects t h e interconnection of p h e ­
n o m e n a in reality itself. T h e problem of the i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n of the scien­
ces is one of the unity of t h e world and a qualitative f e a t u r e of its different
fields ( 5 4 : 1 3 8 ) .

T h e e x p r e s s i o n 'to c o g n i s e t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e ' is often u n ­

d e r s t o o d quite w r o n g l y , as if it w e r e a m a t t e r of p o s i n g t h e task of
c o g n i s i n g all a n d e v e r y t h i n g , s u m m i n g u p all k n o w l e d g e , a n d
so on, i g n o r i n g the historically f o r m e d division of l a b o u r in t h e
s c i e n t i f i c field. A u t h o r s w h o a r g u e i n t h a t m a n n e r u s u a l l y affirm
t h a t o n l y all t h e s c i e n c e s t a k e n t o g e t h e r s t u d y t h e w o r l d a s a
whole, while each s e p a r a t e science deals with s o m e p a r t or facet
of t h e world. Views of t h a t kind do not, in my view, touch
the n u b of the question posed here. Study of the world as a whole
has nothing in c o m m o n , of course, with claims to c o m p r e h e n d
all a n d e v e r y t h i n g ( e v e r y t h i n g t h a t e x i s t e d i n t h e p a s t , e x i s t s
n o w , a n d w h a t will b e ) o r t o s u b s t i t u t e s o m e s o r t o f s p e c i a l s c i ­
e n c e for t h e w h o l e a g g r e g a t e of existing scientific disciplines. F r o m
m y p o i n t o f v i e w , t h e w h o l e a g g r e g a t e o f p r e s e n t l y e x i s t i n g sci­
e n c e s does not dispose of k n o w l e d g e of t h e w h o l e , since n e w
b r a n c h e s of s c i e n c e will arise, a n d n o w u n k n o w n fields of r e s e a r c h
will b e d i s c o v e r e d t h a t will e s s e n t i a l l y a l t e r o u r n o t i o n s o f t h e
universum.
E n g e l s r e m a r k e d that G r e e k philosophy h a d a l r e a d y antici­
pated the correct notion that
the whole of n a t u r e , from the smallest element to the greatest, from grains
of sand to suns, from Protista to man, has its existence in eternal coming
intо being and passing a w a y , in ceaseless flux, in u n r e s t i n g motion and
change (51:30-31).

T h a t understanding of the world as a whole, at which the G r e e k

philosophers had only brilliantly guessed, has b e c o m e one of the
most vital t h e o r e t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s n o t o n l y o f t h e d i a l e c t i c a l -
materialist o u t l o o k on t h e w o r l d b u t also of c o n c r e t e , scientific
research.
T h e unity of the w o r l d — i t is constantly necessary to stress—
is not d e m o n s t r a t e d by speculative, logical a r g u m e n t s , but by
the whole edifying history of science and material p r o d u c t i o n .
T h e scientific p h i l o s o p h i c a l s u m m i n g - u p a n d c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f
this world-historical p r o c e s s n o t only rejects t h e idealist notions
of t h e i m m a t e r i a l essence of t h e m a t e r i a l or t h e s u p e r n a t u r a l es­
sence of t h e spiritual, but also helps bring out a n d describe the
diverse forms of t h e m a t e r i a l unity of t h e world. Philosophy, it
goes without saying, studies t h e world as a w h o l e a n d the unity
of t h e world only in a c e r t a i n aspect, s i n c e it wholly e x c l u d e s
t h e specific p r o b l e m a t i c of t h e special sciences. It d o e s n o t r e q u i r e

70
great a c u m e n to u n d e r s t a n d that investigation of the most
general patterns of the motion, change, and development of
n a t u r e , society, a n d k n o w l e d g e is a limitation of t h e investigative
task that corresponds to t h e subject-matter and c o m p e t e n c e of
the philosophy of Marxism.
T h e explanations adduced seemingly m a k e it comprehensible
in what sense one not only can but must recognise both the
possibility a n d necessity of studying t h e w o r l d as a whole. As
M e l y u k h i n justly r e m a r k s , t h e p r o b l e m should be formulated
as follows:
C a n a scientific philosophy a n s w e r t h e questions w h e t h e r 'the world as
a whole' was c r e a t e d by a God or w h e t h e r it has existed eternally, in­
finite in space and time, w h e t h e r t h e whole world is material, whether
matter has certain universal properties and laws of being, type of motion,
interaction, space, and time, conservation laws, law of causality, and so
on? T h e a n s w e r can and must be quite unambiguous, because any devia­
tion from it and any v a c u u m in t h e c o m p r e h e n d e d philosophical infor­
mation provide an excuse to spokesmen of religious-idealist doctrines
to fill that v a c u u m in a c c o r d a n c e with the spirit of these doctrines. T h e
fact that no science can provide complete u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e world
as a whole by no m e a n s signifies that t h e r e c a n n o t be reliable information
in o u r notions about t h e properties of t h e whole material world, a n d that
a meaningful outlook on t h e world is impossible ( 1 8 3 : 1 4 4 ) .

T h a t is w h y one c a n n o t a g r e e with those Marxist researchers

w h o suggest t h a t t h e task of s t u d y i n g the w o r l d as a w h o l e has
s u n k into oblivion along with n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y . '
It is h a r d l y necessary to e x p l a i n in detail that t h e u n s o u n d n e s s
o f n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y w a s n o t a t all t h a t i t s t u d i e d t h e w o r l d a s a
w h o l e ; it d r e w m a i n l y on s u r m i s e s for lack of c o n c r e t e scientific
d a t a . N a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y , E n g e l s p o i n t e d o u t , o u t l i v e d its t i m e
b e c a u s e it w a s n o w possible to ' p r e s e n t in an a p p r o x i m a t e l y sys­
tematic form a c o m p r e h e n s i v e view of the i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n in na­
t u r e by m e a n s of t h e facts provided by empirical n a t u r a l science
itself ( 5 2 : 3 6 4 ) . He c o n s e q u e n t l y considered it possible, by re­
j e c t i n g t h e n a t u r a l - p h i l o s o p h i c a l s y s t e m s , to give a general pic-
ture of nature as a connected whole on t h e b a s i s of p r o p e r l y
t e s t e d s c i e n t i f i c f a c t s . H i s Dialectics of Nature w a s an a t t e m p t of
that kind to c o m p r e h e n d t h e material unity of the world philo­
sophically. T h i s n e w posing of t h e p r o b l e m differed radically
from the natural-philosophical one; the principle of natural
p h i l o s o p h y w a s a c o m p l e t e ' s y s t e m of n a t u r e ' , a s y s t e m of final
t r u t h s i n t h e last i n s t a n c e . O p p o s i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e w i t h o u t w h i c h
natural philosophy was inconceivable, Engels wrote:
T h e world clearly constitutes a single system, i.e., a c o h e r e n t whole,
but t h e knowledge of this system presupposes a knowledge of all n a t u r e
and history, which m a n will never attain. H e n c e he who makes systems

71
 must nil in the countless gaps with figments of his own imagina-
tion (50:386).
W a r n i n g against t h e systematics of n a t u r a l philosophy, which
squeezes t h e infinite w h o l e into the P r o c r u s t e a n bed of always
historically limited knowledge, Engels (we see) did not consider
k n o w l e d g e of t h e world as a whole an idle business. He simply
pointed out the dialectical contradictoriness of this cognitive
process:
cognition of the infinite is therefore beset with double difficulty and
from its very nature can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress.
And that fully suffices us in order to be able to say: the infinite is just
as much knowable as unknowable, and that is all that we need
(51:234-235).

Engels thus fought against t w o metaphysical extremes; on the

one h a n d , against denial of t h e knowability in principle of the
world as a whole and, on t h e other, against the dogmatic u n d e r ­
standing that m a d e an absolute of t h e k n o w l e d g e of t h e world
as a whole that science already to some extent disposed of.
T h e philosophy of M a r x i s m bases itself in its statements about
the universum on the results obtained by all the sciences of na­
t u r e and society. But that is why its conclusions naturally do not
coincide with those arrived at by each of these sciences. Both
philosophical statements about the world as a whole and about
p a r t i c u l a r sciences a r e absolutely ineradicable, necessary,
and heuristically fruitful w h e n they h a v e (1) a materialist, and
(2) a dialectical c h a r a c t e r . Let philosophers w h o think t h e m ­
selves spokesmen of a scientific outlook on the world, try to manage
without 'metaphysical', 'ontological', and 'natural-philosophical'
statements of such a kind. Materialism, of course, is a system of
logically interconnected theoretical propositions. I shall list a
few, apologising in a d v a n c e to the r e a d e r to whom I am c o m m u ­
nicating nothing new in this case. T h e unity of the world consists
in its materiality. M a t t e r is u n c r e a t a b l e and indestructible. C o n ­
sciousness is a product of the development of matter. Motion is
the form of existence of matter. Matter exists in space and time.
T h e world is k n o w a b l e in principle. Do all these statements relate
to the world as a whole or only to that p a r t of it t h a t has already
been mastered by science and practice? Positivists and other
spokesmen of t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y subjective-agnostic philos­
ophy of science reject these propositions, declaring them to lack
scientific sense, and c o m e quite logically to an absolute rela­
tivism.
S o m e of them, incidentally, h a v e already begun to revise their
former denial of the comprehensibility of the concept of the

72
world as a whole. P o p p e r , for instance, wrote in t h e foreword
to his Logic of Scientific Inquiry ( 1 9 5 9 ) :
I, h o w e v e r , believe t h a t t h e r e is at least one philosophical p r o b l e m
in w h i c h all t h i n k i n g m e n a r e i n t e r e s t e d . It is the problem of cosmo-
logy: the problem of understanding the world—including ourselves, and
our knowledge, as part of the world ( 2 1 1 : 1 5 ) .

His p a p e r at t h e 14th International Congress of Philosophy was

evidence that he was trying to treat t h e problem of the world
as a whole from a stance of neorealist pluralism, some p r o p o ­
sitions of which a r e similar to the idealist postulates of
Platonism (see: 2 1 3 : 2 4 - 2 5 ) .
Dialectical materialism rejects positivist scepticism as a
subjective, anti-dialectical view, by investigating the real facts
of scientific knowledge. Marxist materialism not only affirms
the truths of p r e - M a r x i a n materialism but also goes incom­
parably further in philosophical generalisation. Development
is universal and absolute. Contradictions, and the i n t e r c o n v e r ­
sion and struggle of opposites, constitute the inner c o n t e n t
of the process of development. Development takes place t h r o u g h
the conversion of quantitative changes into qualitative ones,
through negation and negation of the negation. No special insight
is needed in o r d e r to understand t h a t these statements refer to
the world as a whole, otherwise they simply lack scientific sense.
W h e n developing, elucidating, and enriching them we once
again h a v e the world as a whole in mind and not some part of it.
T h a t is why denial of the world as a whole (in w h a t e v e r sense,
epistemological or ontological) is a denial of t h e unity of the
world, and of t h e universality of motion, space, time, etc. N a t u r a l
science does not provide any g r o u n d s for conclusions of that
kind; on the c o n t r a r y it confirms t h e materialist proposition
of the unity of the world on this point, as on other matters.
F u r t h e r m o r e , as I showed above, n a t u r a l science has passed of
necessity, at the present time, to t h e notion of a diversity of links
and i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e s between t h e world as a whole and its
c o m p o n e n t parts, right down to e l e m e n t a r y particles. O n e can
a g r e e with Kedrov:
The problem of the unity of the world loses nothing from the fact that
it is treated simultaneously as a philosophical and a scientific one, but on
the contrary only gains through the creative union of advanced phi­
losophy and natural science (118:36).
But I do not s h a r e his conviction that the concept of t h e
world as a whole and that of t h e unity of the world a r e essen­
tially different from one a n o t h e r .
I h a v e pointed out that the history of materialism begins

73
with t h e t h e o r e t i c a l s u b s t a n t i a t i o n o f s p o n t a n e o u s l y establish­
ed convictions about the eternity of n a t u r e and matter. T h e
d e v e l o p m e n t of t h o s e ideas signified a d e m y s t i f i c a t i o n of n a ­
ture, and demolition of the religious-mythological interpre­
t a t i o n of t h e w o r l d , f o r w h i c h n a t u r e w a s a p r o d u c t of the
supernatural. Materialism has formulated and substantiated the
principle of the material unity of the world from t h e very
s t a r t ; d e v e l o p m e n t of t h a t p r i n c i p l e led to a f a c t u a l s i n g l i n g
o u t o f a n d m a t e r i a l i s t a n s w e r t o t h e basic p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s ­
t i o n . B u t t h a t did not e l i m i n a t e t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e w o r l d a s
a w h o l e , w h i c h w a s t a k e n f u r t h e r p r e c i s e l y on t h e basis of
this a n s w e r , s i n c e t h e a n t i t h e s i s o f m i n d a n d m a t t e r , c o n ­
sciousness and being, the subjective and t h e objective gave
it the content and significance that natural philosophers had
always had a very h a z y notion about. T h a t also witnesses to
t h e m a n y - s i d e d c o n t e n t o f t h e m a t e r i a l i s t a n s w e r t o t h e basic
philosophical question.

2 . T h e O n t o l o g i c a l Aspect:
a Contribution to t h e D e l i n e a t i o n
of the Idealist A n s w e r to the Basic P h i l o s o p h i c a l
Question

E x p l a n a t i o n of t h e w o r l d f r o m i t s e l f — s u c h is t h e p r i n c i p l e
of materialist philosophy that even the first, 'naive' mate­
rialist d o c t r i n e s s t a r t e d f r o m . A n d it w o u l d be a c l e a r mis­
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e h i s t o r i c a l s h a p i n g of p h i l o s o p h y if we
b e g a n t o e v a l u a t e this ' d i r e c t ' r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h i n k i n g m a n
a n d t h e w o r l d that o p p r e s s e s h i m b y its u n l i m i t e d p o w e r a s
s o m e t h i n g that t o o k s h a p e o f itself. T h e i n t e l l e c t u a l n e e d t o
e x p l a i n t h e w o r l d f r o m itself i s i n d u b i t a b l e e v i d e n c e t h a t m a n ­
k i n d is b e g i n n i n g to o v e r c o m e its s p o n t a n e o u s l y f o r m e d d e l u ­
s i o n s a n d fallacies a n d t o r e c o g n i s e t h e m a s fallacies that
a r e by no means those of s e p a r a t e individuals. In o r d e r to
a s c e n d e v e n t o t h e ' n a i v e ' , ' d i r e c t ' view o f p r i m i t i v e s p o n t a n e ­
o u s m a t e r i a l i s m , it w a s n e c e s s a r y to g e t rid of t h e m o n s t r o u s
s p e c t r e s t h a t m y t h o l o g y a n d r e l i g i o n h a d e n v e l o p e d h u m a n life
in, t h e r e f l e c t i o n i n f a n t a s y o f m a n ' s d e j e c t i o n b y t h e d o m i n a ­
tion o f e l e m e n t a l f o r c e s o f n a t u r e a n d s o c i a l d e v e l o p m e n t .
A s p o n t a n e o u s l y f o r m e d s u p r a n a t u r a l v i e w o f t h e w o r l d his­
torically preceded philosophy. Primitive materialism was the
first intelligent intellectual protest against s u p r a n a t u r a l i s m ;
it w a s b o t h a c r i t i q u e a n d a d e n i a l of it. T h e s t r e n g t h a n d
weakness of primitive materialism comes out particularly ob-

74
viously in its naturalistic theogony by which the gods (whose
existence was not yet d o u b t e d ) arose now from water, n o w from
fire, now from some other 'substantial' matter. T h e s u p e r n a t ­
ural was thus interpreted as n a t u r a l , i.e. 'explained' from
n a t u r e and so converted into a n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n o n . As for
idealism, which took shape later, it e n d e a v o u r e d to defend the
s u p r a n a t u r a l i s t world outlook by r e - i n t e r p r e t i n g it. While not
discarding explanation of n a t u r e by assuming beings above n a ­
t u r e (i.e. s u p e r n a t u r a l ones) idealism developed theoretical
conceptions that gradually wiped out the antithesis between the
s u p e r n a t u r a l and the n a t u r a l . While materialism is a denial
6

of religion, idealism is an attempt to t r a n s f o r m it into an

intellectual outlook on the world. Idealism consequently is
an ally of religion even when it reforms its traditional n o ­
tions. It is in that case, moreover, that it really p e r f o r m s
its social function, in spite of the desperate protests of con­
servative zealots of religion, w h o often see in idealism re­
fined heresy. T h e young M a r x probably had that in mind when
he wrote:
all the philosophies of the past without exception have been accused
by the theologians of abandoning the Christian religion, even those
of the pious Malebranche and the divinely inspired Jakob Böhme
(171:190).
T h e idealist doctrines of G r e e c e and R o m e differed essentially
from the religious outlook then prevalent. It is sufficient to
c o m p a r e the Platonic transcendental ideas with the Olympian
gods of the H o m e r i c epic. This evolution of idealist philosophy,
incidentally, also expresses the evolution of religion to some
extent.
Mediaeval Christian philosophy, which took shape in an
age when religion m o r e or less directly dominated the every­
day consciousness of people, put the concept of an absolutely
immaterial, s u p e r n a t u r a l essence in the place of the idealist
notion of antiquity of the immateriality and impersonal basis
of the universum. This r e t u r n to mythology was m a d e , however,
1

on a new basis, since the scholastic assimilation of Plato's

doctrine, and then of Aristotle's, e n c o u r a g e d the forming of
a speculative-idealist interpretation of God as world reason.
Essentially this was the f o r e r u n n e r of the idealist philosophy
of m o d e r n times, in spite of the fact that t h e rising bourgeois
philosophy was a repudiation in o t h e r respects of scholasticism.
It the age of the assertion of capitalism the idealist answer
to the basic philosophical question was gradually m o r e and
m o r e secularised, so acquiring a mode of expression formally

75
independent of theology. And while scholasticism had carried
divine reason beyond the limits of finite, allegedly created
nature, which it interpreted as contingent being, the idealist
philosophy of modern times, while rejecting the theological
disparagement of the earthly, finite, and transient, has striven
to overcome the 'split' between the world and God. This philo­
sophy developed on the background of the outstanding progress
of natural science; it was often linked with the latter's advances,
assimilating and interpreting them in its own way; what schol­
asticism had deemed supernatural, also gradually began to be
interpreted as immanent to nature. T h e supernatural was
eliminated to some extent, since divine law, according to the
rationalist idealists, was essentially natural law.
While materialism had previously condemned idealist phi­
losophy for an unsubstantiated assumption of the supernatural,
idealists were now already accusing materialists of believing
in miracles, for example, in the rise of consciousness from
matter. Leibniz wrote: 'It is enough that we cannot maintain
that matter thinks unless we attribute to it an imperishable
soul, or rather a miracle' (136:166). T h a t was not simply a
polemical trick, but a natural turn in the history of idealism,
since science was developing criteria of scientific c h a r a c ­
ter and idealism could not help allowing for them. Leibniz pro­
claimed it one of the urgent tasks of philosophy to draw a distinct
line between the natural and the supernatural, i.e. what
contradicted the laws of nature, and so reason. But, remaining
an idealist, he claimed that 'it is not natural to matter
to have sensation and to think' (136:165), and if they were
inherent in it, then it was necessary to admit the existence
of an immaterial substance within matter. It would be supernat­
ural, he argued further, if people were mortal as spiritual
beings, i.e. shared the fate of their mortal transitory body.
So 'souls are naturally immortal' and '... it would be a miracle if
they were not' (136:166).
In Leibniz's doctrine the material was active only through
its immaterial essence, a monad, which was undoubtedly created.
Thus, in the order of nature (miracles apart) God does not arbitrarily
give to substances such and such qualities indifferently, and He never
gives them any but those which are natural to them, that is to say,
qualities which can be derived from their nature as explicable modi­
fications (136:164).

So, although the supernatural still formally occupied its ap­

pointed place, all the properties observed in natural phenom­
ena were treated as necessarily inherent in them. T h e y must

76
therefore be derived from nature and not from a supernatural
being, which meant that the materialist principle of explain­
ing the world from itself was no longer discarded right away
but was interpreted idealistically as a mode of ascending from
experiential to the superexperiential. It was necessary, Leib­
niz said, 'to lead men little by little by the senses to what
is outside the senses' (135:70). From that angle the supersen­
sory had to be revealed through investigation of the sense-
perceived world, and the super-experiential found in experience.
Speculative idealism, which pursued the goal of going
beyond any possible experience, sought points of contact with
the empirical investigation of nature. In that connection it
was not only interested in the results, but also in the cogni­
tive process itself, investigation of which threw light on the
nature of the objects studied.
Condillac, a thinker who wavered between materialism and
idealist empiricism, formulated a principle by which the philos­
opher differed indeed from other people in giving everything
a natural explanation:
It is not enough for a philosopher to say that a thing has been done by
extraordinary ways; it is his duty to explain how it would have been
done by natural means (cited after 19:209).
Idealism also needed to accept that naturalistic principle,
though not by any means without reservations, and very incon­
sistently. Such is the regular trend of the evolution of the
idealist answer to the basic philosophical question conditioned
by the development of bourgeois society. This trend comes out
quite markedly even in such an unswerving theist as Bishop
Berkeley.
Berkeley was an empiricist, but an idealist one. T h e very
development of that variety of idealism was evidence of a
developing need for a naturalist interpretation of this philos­
ophy, including its theological conclusions that were in
reality its hidden basic principles.
The reduction of sense-perceived reality to a variety of
combinations of sensations was the central point of Berkeley's
doctrine. To be was to be perceived. But then where did God
come from, to whom Berkeley in the final analysis led his
readers? For the idea of God, as Berkeley's predecessors had
shown, could not be drawn from experience; His existence was
comprehended through our innate ideas and by a priori princi­
ples, and by means of intellectual intuition or inferences.
Berkeley categorically disagreed with these rationalist no­
tions, which he qualified, not without grounds, as unconvinc-

77
ing. A c c o r d i n g t o his d o c t r i n e w e c o m p r e h e n d e d t h e e x i s t e n c e
of G o d e m p i r i c a l l y ; o u r sensations w e r e not p e r c e p t i o n s of
m y t h o l o g i c a l t h i n g s but p e r c e p t i o n s , t h o u g h n o t direct, of God
himself.
T h e c o u r s e of t h e Irish b i s h o p ' s t h o u g h t is interesting.
He did not e v a d e t h e question of t h e external source of t h e
diversity of t h e sense d a t a at t h e disposal of t h e h u m a n indi­
vidual. He s t r o v e simply to s h o w t h a t t h e c a u s e s of sensations
could not be things, b e c a u s e w h a t we called things, a n d c o n ­
s i d e r e d w i t h o u t g r o u n d s t o b e s o m e t h i n g different from o u r
sensations, w e r e built u p wholly from sensations. T h e r e must
c o n s e q u e n t l y be s o m e o t h e r e x t e r n a l s o u r c e of t h e i n e x h a u s t i b l e
diversity of sensations ( s u c h is t h e logic of t h e subjective
i d e a l i s t ) , since m a n himself (in w h o m t h e s e sensations a r e
r e v e a l e d , discovered, a n d realised in a q u i t e i n v o l u n t a r y w a y )
c o u l d not be it. T h e s o u r c e of o u r s e n s a t i o n s , B e r k e l e y c o n ­
c l u d e d , could only b e God; H e g a v e t h e m t o m a n , w h o h a d t o
see in t h e m signs a n d symbols t h a t c a r r i e d G o d ' s w o r d .
B e r k e l e y ' s mystic idealism (as K a n t aptly c h r i s t e n e d it)
claimed that n o t h i n g s e p a r a t e d m a n a n d G o d ( e x c e p t materialist
m i s c o n c e p t i o n s , of c o u r s e ) , since n a t u r e or m a t t e r did not
exist as a reality i n d e p e n d e n t of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . T h e revelation
of G o d was directly accessible to m a n , a c c o r d i n g to this d o c t r i n e ;
it was the s e n s e - p e r c e i v e d world, t h e world of m a n ' s sen­
sations, which c a m e t o h i m f r o m o n h i g h for h i m t o deci­
pher and so grasp the divine purpose.
T h e God of B e r k e l e i a n p h i l o s o p h y differed n o t a b l y from
t h e All-Highest of t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n d o g m a ; He p e r m a n e n t l y
r e v e a l e d himself to m a n a n d , so to say, existed in e v e r y t h i n g ,
or r a t h e r in every c o m b i n a t i o n of sensations. M a n saw, h e a r d ,
a n d p e r c e i v e d or felt the divine p r e s e n c e , as it w e r e , a n d it
only r e m a i n e d for him to be a w a r e of that fact, c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y
c o m p r e h e n d i n g his s e n s a t i o n s .
It is specially o b v i o u s from t h e e x a m p l e of Berkeley that
the difference b e t w e e n subjective a n d objective idealism
s h o u l d not be e x a g g e r a t e d . S u b j e c t i v e idealism does not, as
a r u l e , go b e y o n d an epistemological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the
facts of k n o w l e d g e or e x p e r i e n c e s . If it leaves t h e question of
t h e ontological p r e m i s s e s of c o g n i t i o n a n d e m o t i o n a l life
o p e n , t h a t is agnosticism of a H u m e a n h u e . If, on t h e c o n t r a ­
ry, h o w e v e r , it goes b e y o n d a p u r e l y epistemological analysis,
it is inevitably c o m b i n e d with objective idealism, as h a p p e n e d
not only with B e r k e l e y b u t also with F i c h t e . K o s i n g c o r r e c t l y
notes:

78
 T h e boundaries between subjective and objective idealism are fluid,
because subjective idealists generally, in order to avoid the conclusions
of solipsism, aim mainly at broadening individual consciousness into
a general one (for instance, Rickert's consciousness in general or
epistemological subject) (124:72).

R e s e a r c h w o r k e r s o f a positivist t u r n u s u a l l y t r y t o s h o w t h a t
s u b j e c t i v e idealism is f r e e of t h e s u p e r n a t u r a l i s t a s s u m p t i o n s
p r o p e r t o o b j e c t i v e idealism. I n fact b o t h v e r s i o n s o f t h e idealist
a n s w e r t o t h e basic p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n m a k e c o n t a c t i n t h e i r
main trends.
B e r k e l e y ' s t r a n s i t i o n to a s t a n c e of a kind of P l a t o n i s m
with a c l e a r l y e x p r e s s e d p a n t h e i s t i c c o l o u r i n g was n o t a c c i d e n ­
tal; his s u b j e c t i v e idealism w a s m e a n t f r o m t h e s t a r t t o s u b ­
stantiate the religious outlook. Nevertheless Western workers
a p p r a i s e B e r k e l e i a n i s m as a system of ' n a t u r a l r e a l i s m ' , a
philosophy of c o m m o n sense, and so on.
Idealist p h i l o s o p h y t h u s a c q u i r e d its o w n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
of t h e s p i r i t u a l first p r i n c i p l e d u r i n g t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of
b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y ; w i t h o u t , i n e s s e n c e , b r e a k i n g with r e l i ­
g i o u s belief in a s u p e r n a t u r a l b e i n g , it e l i m i n a t e d t h e p e r s o n a l
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a t t r i b u t e d t o this b e i n g b y t h e o l o g y , a n d t e n d ­
ed m o r e a n d m o r e to a p a n t h e i s t i c d e n i a l of t h e t h e o l o g i c a l
antithesis of God and n a t u r e , G o d and h u m a n i t y . While m a t e r i a l ­
ist p h i l o s o p h y g r a d u a l l y o v e r c a m e p a n t h e i s m , o b j e c t i v e i d e a l ­
ism f o u n d in it t h e s o u g h t - f o r b o u r g e o i s s e c u l a r i s a t i o n of
the religious outlook.
P a n t h e i s t i c t e n d e n c i e s w e r e m o s t fully r e p r e s e n t e d i n
classical G e r m a n idealism i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f H e g e l ; h e t r a n s ­
f o r m e d S p i n o z a ' s m a t e r i a l i s t p a n t h e i s m i n t o a n idealist p a n ­
logism. His ' a b s o l u t e i d e a ' , w h i c h h e f r e q u e n t l y d i r e c t l y c a l l e d
G o d , w a s a n i m p e r s o n a l logical p r o c e s s , s u p e r h u m a n b u t n o t
s u p e r n a t u r a l , b e c a u s e ' M i n d h a s f o r its presupposition N a t u r e '
( 8 7 : 1 6 3 ) , a l t h o u g h , of c o u r s e , 'it is S p i r i t itself w h i c h gives
itself a presupposition in Nature, ( m y i t a l i c s — Т . О . ) (86:295).
N a t u r e was the o t h e r - b e i n g of absolute reason, which,
h o w e v e r , did n o t exist o u t s i d e its o w n s e l f - a l i e n a t i o n a n d ,
consequently, outside natural and h u m a n being. T h e latter w e r e
not simply involved in the absolute (as Neoplatonism asserts)
b u t c o n s t i t u t e d an a t t r i b u t i v e f o r m of its e x i s t e n c e a n d self-
consciousness. 8

F e u e r b a c h defined p a n t h e i s m as a d o c t r i n e t h a t did n o t
distinguish t h e e s s e n c e o f G o d f r o m t h e e s s e n c e o f n a t u r e a n d
m a n , i.e. a d o c t r i n e t h a t s e c u l a r i s e d t h e o l o g i c a l n o t i o n s b u t
did n o t fully b r e a k with t h e m . In his s t u d i e s in t h e h i s t o r y

79
of philosophy he showed that idealist philosophy came to panthe­
ism by virtue of the inner logic of its development. Its pri­
mary premisses had a theistic character, but theism, too, in
so far as it acquired a speculative form, became pantheism.
What then was the attitude of pantheism to the radical anti­
thesis between materialism and idealism? Feuerbach said: ' P a n ­
theism therefore unites atheism with theism, i.e. the negation
of God with God... It is theological atheism, theological ma-
terialism, the negation of theology, but all this from the
standpoint of theology (57:297). Elsewhere, however, he assert­
ed with no less grounds that 'idealism is the truth of panthe­
ism' (57:302). These different appraisals of pantheism express
a real contradiction inherent in the pantheistic outlook,
within which the radical antithesis between materialism and
idealism is not only smoothed over, but even continues to be
deepened.
T h e idealist answer to the basic philosophical question
retains its content of principle in spite of the change of
form, and seemingly precisely because of this change, since
it otherwise could not resist the facts refuting it that the
sciences of nature, society, and man are discovering and
materialistically interpreting.
T h e idealistic notion of the spirit arose from prescientific
introspection, the impelling motives of which, at least for a long
time, were not so much connected with intellectual curiosity as
linked with fear and man's actual helplessness in face of the
elemental forces of nature that dominated him. Idealism
mystified these forces, which it interpreted as supernatural
beings. Mystification of the human psyche gave rise to the idealist
notion of a superhuman spirit. But these speculations also
retained a certain link with reality, i.e. with nature and the
human psyche, which played the role of a springboard from
which idealism broke into the absolute intellectual vacuum in
which, as Goethe said:
Naught, in the everlasting void afar,
Wilt see, nor hear thy footfall's sound,
Nor fore thy tread find solid ground! (76:II, 218)
T h e history of idealism indicates that it, while despairing
of the possibility of a positive, profound description of the
supernatural and superhuman, and rejecting fruitless attempts
to demonstrate the existence of the transcendental absolute log­
ically, did not renounce the goal that inspired it. It began
to concern itself with a scrupulous analysis of empirically
established, scientifically proven facts which it no longer,

80
at least directly, rejected but interpreted c o n t r a r y to their
actual, materialist sense. In other words, while idealism
flourished in the past in those domains that scientific r e ­
search did not touch, now, partly conscious of the groundless­
ness of its former speculative constructs and partly finding
itself ' s u r r o u n d e d ' as a c o n s e q u e n c e of the increasing e x p a n ­
sion of science, it is trying to root itself in science's own
soil, so as to live parasitically on its often intransient
achievements r a t h e r than on its e p h e m e r a l flaws. This t e n d e n ­
cy, born in t h e seventeenth century, b e c a m e particularly in­
fluential in the latter half of t h e nineteenth century, and has
won a dominating position in our d a y . 9

S c h o p e n h a u e r was p e r h a p s the first idealist philosopher

to treat reason and consciousness as physiologically condi­
tioned. He identified himself with natural science on this
question, while nevertheless taking an idealist s t a n c e . T h e 10

idealist answer to the basic philosophical question does not

necessarily consist in the p r i m a r y being directly interpreted
as consciousness, thought, or reason. T h a t understanding of
the p r i m a r y is characteristic of rationalist idealism. Its
antithesis within the idealist t r e n d is irrationalism. T h e
latter rejects the thesis of the p r i m a c y of reason, thought,
and consciousness, arguing that these intellectual forms of
the spirit a r e secondary; only will, the unconscious, the ir­
rational 'vital impulse', etc., are p r i m a r y . It would therefore
be an oversimplification or a dogmatic ignoring of the real
tendencies of development of idealism to r e d u c e its i n t e r p r e ­
tation of the 'spiritual-material' relation to a monolinear
stereotype: consciousness ( t h o u g h t ) is primary, matter (being)
secondary. T h e irrationalist interpretation of the p r i m a r y
principle is often counterposed both to the materialist and
to the idealist (rationalist) answer to the basic philosophic­
al question. T h a t was characteristic of the 'philosophy of
life' that interpreted life (its initial concept) as something
nonspiritual but at the same time immaterial.
A peculiar f e a t u r e of this idealist interpretation of
life was that life itself was declared to be p r i m a r y and sub­
stantial. In that connection, however, life was regarded as
unconscious, psychic activity manifesting itself in instincts,
inclinations, etc. So we see that analysis of the diversity of
idealist answers to the basic philosophical question is a vital
task of the history of philosophy, because only a special in­
quiry into this diversity can bring out the i n h e r e n t internal
unity of the answers. W h e r e t h e r e is no understanding of this

6-01603 81
unity, the various versions of idealism a r e often taken as phi­
l o s o p h i c a l t r e n d s i n d e p e n d e n t of it.
A p a r a d o x i c a l f o r m of t h e idealist a n s w e r is d e n i a l of the
existence of consciousness and the spiritual in general. This
position is usually associated with vulgar materialism, but
t h e r e is also an idealist denial of t h e reality of c o n s c i o u s ­
n e s s , w h i c h s h o u l d be c a l l e d vulgar idealism.
I f H e g e l c l a i m e d t h a t 'all c o n t e n t , e v e r y t h i n g o b j e c t i v e ,
is only in relation to consciousness' (85:I, 3 7 4 ) , Nietzsche,
r e j e c t i n g r a t i o n a l i s t i d e a l i s m , p r o c l a i m e d a t h e s i s a t first
g l a n c e quite alien to idealism: ' t h e r e is no intelligible
world' (196:326). T h i s denial of spirituousness was associated
w i t h a s p i r i t u a l i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f life a n d h u m a n c o r ­
p o r e a l i t y , i.e. h a d n o t h i n g i n c o m m o n w i t h t h e m a t e r i a l i s t
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e spiritual as a specific p r o p e r t y of t h e
m a t e r i a l . N i e t z s c h e did n o t , i n e s s e n c e , d e n y t h e s p i r i t u a l ;
h e w a s o p p o s e d o n l y t o its r a t i o n a l i s t - i d e a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a ­
tion, the central point of which was recognition of the sub­
stantiality of r e a s o n and of rational reality.
In contrast to Nietzsche, William J a m e s attempted to show,
f r o m a s t a n c e of idealist empiricism (not alien, incidentally,
to irrationalism), that the existence of consciousness was no
m o r e than an illusion s t e m m i n g from t h e fact that things
not only existed but a r e also differentiated and cognised by
m a n . T h e r e w e r e t h u s things a n d witnesses of t h e fact; w h a t was
called consciousness, say, of a c o l o u r did not include
a n y t h i n g e x c e p t this c o l o u r . C o n s c i o u s n e s s w a s c o n s e q u e n t l y
s o m e t h i n g illusory.
T h a t entity [consciousness] is fictitious, while thoughts in the con­
crete a r e fully real. But thoughts in the c o n c r e t e a r e made of the same
stuff as things a r e ( 1 1 0 : 1 8 3 ) .

W h a t w a s t h i s 'stuff' f r o m w h i c h t h i n g s a n d t h o u g h t s w e r e
f o r m e d ? It was not, of c o u r s e , m a t t e r , t h o u g h J a m e s called it ' m a ­
t e r i a l ' a n d e v e n ' p r i m a l stuff'. B u t listen t o J a m e s himself:
if we start with t h e supposition that there is only one primal stuff
or material in the world, a stuff of which e v e r y t h i n g is composed,
and if we call t h a t stuff ' p u r e e x p e r i e n c e ' , then k n o w i n g can easily
be explained as a p a r t i c u l a r sort of relation t o w a r d s o n e a n o t h e r into
which portions of p u r e e x p e r i e n c e m a y enter. T h e relation itself is a
part of p u r e e x p e r i e n c e ; o n e of its 'terms' becomes the subject or b e a r e r
of the knowledge, the k n o w e r ( 1 1 0 : 1 7 0 ) . "

I t will r e a d i l y b e u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h i s d e n i a l o f t h e r e a l i t y
o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s ( a n d t h e s p i r i t u a l i n g e n e r a l ) h a s a n illu­
sory c h a r a c t e r : ' p u r e experience', in spite of J a m e s ' convic-

82
tions, is something spiritual that includes consciousness.
But it was that which J a m e s denied just as the empiriocritics
denied the subjectivity of sensations (treating them as neu­
tral, i.e. neither material nor spiritual, elements of both
the physical and the psychic). James argued more simply, per­
haps: he declared the spiritual ('pure experience') to be
the material. So the idealist answer to the basic philosophical
question acquired a materialist a p p e a r a n c e that deceived cer­
tain behaviourists as well, who based themselves on James'
doctrine. Roback, for instance, argued that 'behaviorism ...
is merely a philosophical attitude as applied to the subject-
matter of psychology. This attitude will be recognised as that
of materialism' (222:32-22). James' point of view has been
taken in our day by certain influential idealist scholars who
are orientated on behaviourist psychology and interpret the
cybernetic modelling of mental actions subjectively. Adherents
of the philosophy of linguistic analysis, for instance, sug­
gest rejecting such concepts as 'consciousness', 'thought',
'sensation', and 'subjective', replacing all these (as they
suggest) unscientific, ordinary notions or 'pseudoconcepts'
by a description of the corresponding actions and processes
performed in the nervous system. T h a t point of view has been
systematically set out in Ryle's Concept of Mind ( 1 9 4 9 ) . Flew,
a follower of Ryle's, claims that this book, and Wittgens­
tein's Philosophical Investigations (1953) must be acknowl­
edged "as major contributions to materialist philosophy' (63:110).
How can denial of the reality of consciousness (and the
spiritual in general) be combined with idealism? T h e kernel of
this idealism, which undoubtedly differs from the traditional
doctrine of the dependence of the material on the spiritual,
consists in reducing all our knowledge about objective reality
to reactions of various kind to external stimulation, i.e. in denial
of an objective content of our notions. T h e purposiveness of
h u m a n behaviour, which presupposes adequate response reac­
tions to effects from outside, is characterised as activity that
does not include any sort of knowledge about the external world.
T h e images of objects of the external world that exist in man's
consciousness are treated as physiological states, and not a
reflection of reality. Linguistic or ordinary language philos­
12

ophy, basing itself on behaviourist psychology, which identifies

mind and behaviour (i.e. the aggregate of actions), in the end
concludes that the concept of objective reality has sense only
when there is consciousness. Denial of consciousness thus
proves to be a means of denying objective reality.

83
 Analytical philosophers reduce thought to an aggregate of
operations that can also be performed by a machine. T h e process
of cognition is interpreted in roughly the same way; knowing
is treated as a proper combining (corresponding to the purpose
of the machine) of signs and elements of ordinary language, or
an artificial one. In the last analysis man's emotional life, too,
is reduced to movements of various kind, and combinations of
same, which form what are called, in common speech, joy, grief,
anger, compassion, love, etc. An automatic machine is put in
the place of man who perceives the reality around him (includ­
ing other people) and cognises, understands, feels, experiences,
and acts accordingly, though far from always rationally. T h e
automaton, of course, does not feel, does not experience, does
not think but it performs all the actions inherent in the 'feeling',
'experiencing', 'thinking' being. So it is said to be proved that no
feelings or emotions, no experiences, no thoughts exist; all are a
special kind of illusion that will sooner or later be reduced
to machine acts. Such are some of the extremely subjectivist
and agnostic conclusions of the 'philosophy of linguistic
analysis'. In several respects they border on vulgar material­
ism, which is not surprising, for the vulgar materialists of
the nineteenth century often came to extravagant subjectivist
and agnostic conclusions.
Idealism's denial of the reality of the spiritual is not the sole
metamorphosed form of the idealist answer to the basic philoso­
phical question. An even commoner version consists in interpret­
ing the material as essentially immaterial, this creates an ap­
pearance as if idealism, like its antipode, accepts something
material as primary, for example a law, energy, time, nature, etc.
But the idealist deprives this material of its real properties,
citing modern physics in that connection, which is claimed to
have proven that the material is essentially immaterial.
T h e idealist philosopher Ostwald employed the concept of
energy as substantial essence as a fundamental principle, which
he declared to be neutral in relation to the material and the
spiritual, forming the essence of both. In counterposing ener­
gy to matter he argued that it was immaterial. T h e antithesis
of energy and the spiritual served to substantiate the thesis
that energy was not a spiritual essence. On closer examination,
however, it turned out that Ostwald was trying, by distin­
guishing energy from substance (which he identified with matter)
and from human consciousness (the subjective), to create an
objective-idealist natural-philosophical system related to
Schelling's philosophy of identity. 13

84
 Bergson's undisguised idealist philosophy started from the
concept of duration (durée), which was essentially time, i.e.
something material. He considered duration to be something
different from physical time. He counterposed duration (time)
to matter and reason as some supernatural creative force
(eternal becoming, élan vital) the products of whose decay
were, on the one hand, matter, and on the other, intellect as­
sociated with it. T h e material, so idealistically interpret­
ed, became the point of d e p a r t u r e of an irrationalist system.
It was probably this kind of idealism that Lenin had in mind
when he said: 'time outside temporal t h i n g s = G o d ' (144:70). We
see that the essence of the idealist answer to the basic philo­
sophical question is not directly revealed in what is called
primary. One has to clarify what content the concept of the
primary is invested with. Only then does it become obvious
what is the character of an answer to the basic question that
is considered non-idealist.
T h e modernisation of the idealist answer, the idealist inter­
pretation of the materialist answer, the 'acknowledgement'
of the material fobbed off as immaterial—all these la­
test methods of substantiating idealism and reconciling it
with science (materialist at bottom) show that it remains
idealism even when it formally rejects the traditional ideal­
ist answer to the basic question of philosophy. T h e nub of
this idealist revision of idealism, which must be treated as
a transformation of its form, was profoundly revealed by Lenin
in his critique of the Russian Social-Democratic epigones of
Machism. In his Materialism and Empirio-Criticism he showed
that even the subjective idealist is sometimes ready to de­
clare nature primary, but only on condition that it is under­
stood as an aggregate of the data of experience, as something
that posits a subject perceiving it. T h a t is how the subjective
idealist Bogdanov interpreted nature, when affirming that his
initial propositions 'fully accord with the sacramental for­
mula of the primacy of nature over mind' (cited from 142:207).
Criticising this sophisticated mystification of the material­
ist answer to the basic philosophical question, Lenin wrote:
The physical world is called the experience of men and it is declared
that physical experience is 'higher' in the chain of development than
psychical... It is simply farcical for Bogdanov to class this 'system' as
materialism. With me, too, he says, nature is primary and mind is
secondary. ... Not a single idealist will deny the primacy of nature taken
in this sense, for it is not a genuine primacy, since in fact nature is not
taken as the immediately given, as the starting point of epistemology
(142:208).

85
T h e whole significance of a r e m a r k L e n i n m a d e later, viz.,
' n a t u r e outside, independent of m a t t e r = G o d ' (144:69),
becomes u n d e r s t a n d a b l e in the light of his critique of one of the
varieties of idealist empiricism. T h a t r e m a r k disclosed the ob­
jective tendency of the naturalistic metamorphosis of idealism;
the formal renunciation of both fideism and spiritual substance,
and similarly the formal a g r e e m e n t with the materialist r e q u i r e ­
ment to take n a t u r e as the starting point, proved to be one of the
latest versions of idealism, resignedly gravitating to the same
sophisticated fideism. It is not e n o u g h , however, to state this
a p p e a r a n c e of a negation of idealism; it is necessary to disclose
the objective logic of the historical metamorphosis of idealist
philosophy. It then becomes evident that it really is a denial, but
a denial of discredited modes of idealist philosophising, while
preserving its basic content. It is a denial such as turns our in
fact to be a reconstruction of idealism t h r o u g h a renewal of its
tradition and an idealist assimilation of t h e materialist answer
to the basic philosophical question. It is thus clear that the crisis
of idealist philosophy is so impressive a fact that even idealists
themselves have noted it. In t h e second part of my book I shall
give a description of this crisis in detail in connection with
analysis of the struggle of the main philosophical trends. Just
now I shall limit myself to pointing out that an undisputed
symptom of this crisis is the critique of the idealist hypostasising
of mind and reason, and irrationalist scepticism about philosoph­
ical intellectualism.
Nietzsche saw in the Miletians, Heraklitos, and other
natural philosophers of antiquity a higher degree of philos­
ophical u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the world than in Sokrates and his
followers. It was not the materialism or dialectics of these
dосtrines that enraptured him; it was the сosmiс frame оf mind
that attracted him, which he counterposed to the h u m a n , 'too
h u m a n ' contemplation of the world, locked in its own subjec­
tivity. But this a d m i r e r of majestic cosmological objectivism
was a clear, though inconsistent subjectivist. T h e same has
to be said of Heidegger who, following Nietzsche, extolled the
P r e s o c r a t i a n s above the later philosophers, although his own
philosophy was a quite quaint mixture of e x t r e m e subjectivism
and an objective-idealist postulating of an unfathomable abso­
lute being. C o n t e m p o r a r y idealist philosophy fully combines a
leaning toward cosmic objectivism with subjectivism, which,
however, has been subjected to limited criticism as a provin­
cial view of the universe from an earthly gateway.
One of the main papers at the 14th International Congress

86
of Philosophy (Vienna, 1968) 'Postulates of t h e History of P h i ­
losophy' was read by the F r e n c h philosopher Martial G u e r o u l t
( 8 0 ) . In it he criticised the subjective-idealist world outlook
as naive a n t h r o p o c e n t r i s m , incapable of taking in the infinity
of cosmos and the contingent c h a r a c t e r of h u m a n life and
h u m a n reason (whose a b o d e is an insignificant planet in an
insignificant solar system, dwarfed to insignificance in o n e of
the countless g a l a x i e s ) . G u e r o u l t exclaimed fervently:
For shouldn't a philosophy worthy of the name try to elevate itself
above any finite point of view to the infinitely infinite infinity of the
universe and consequently wouldn't it want to rid itself of what aspires
to enclose it in the circle of man? ... Won't a philosophy that counts
itself authentically philosophy want to be authentically cosmic? So, in
the infinitely infinite immensity of astronomical spaces and times, it will
restore the human race living cramped on a star of the lowest magnitude
over a stretch of time infinitely short compared with the billions
of centuries during which billions of stars have flared up and been
extinguished, and it will hold it derisory to shut the sense of all philoso­
phy, a fortiori the sense of everything, up in the few centuries of human
history, even if one does not go so far as to see in it realisation of
the Absolute and the profound basis of the universal system of Nature
(80:10).

G u e r o u l t did not define what he called cosmic philosophy

m o r e concretely: he simply m a d e the claim. But in this claim
for a new understanding of the s u p e r h u m a n and the Absolute
(with a capital) t h e r e a r e distinct attempts to f o r m u l a t e a
new idealist credo, the point of d e p a r t u r e of which would be
a counterposing of the s u p e r n a t u r a l , s u p e r h u m a n , s u p e r -
rational to the natural, h u m a n , a n d rational, a c r e d o that
(starting from cosmological ideas) would save idealism from
the inferiority c o m p l e x organically i n h e r e n t in it. 14

Idealism seeks an empirical basis for its notions formed by

emasculating the real content of the theoretical reflec­
tion of objective reality. T h a t largely explains its m e t a m o r ­
phoses and the diverse versions of the idealist answer to the
basic philosophical question.

3. The Epistemological Aspect.

The Principle of Reflection
and the Idealist Interpretation
of the Knowability of the World

T h e antithesis of principle between materialism and idealism

is d e t e r m i n e d above all by the different answers to t h e first,
ontological aspect of the basic philosophical question. But

87
this answer does not define the epistemological position of a
philosophy directly; acknowledgement of the knowability or, on
the contrary, unknowability of the world in itself (i.e. irre­
spective of understanding of the process of cognition) does not
provide grounds for classing a philosophy in the materialist
or idealist trends.
Most materialists are consistent adherents of the prin­
ciple of the knowability of the world. This principle is in­
tegrally linked in their doctrines with an explanation of the
world from itself (and consequently with denial of a transcen­
dental reality), with a high evaluation of sense experience
and science, and with denial of religious humbling of the indi­
vidual. But idealists, too, quite often acknowledge the know-
ability of the world. Most philosophers, as Engels remarked,
answer this epistemological question in general in the affirm­
ative (see 52:346). In Hegel, for instance, the principle of the
knowability of the world follows directly from the funda­
mental proposition of his idealist system, i.e. from the iden­
tification of being and thought. Since being is the content
of thought, consciousness of its own content in thought makes
being knowable in principle. Nothing consequently divides mind
and being except the empirical singleness of the human individ­
ual, which is overcome by his historically developing generic
essence, humanity. Engels called Hegel's arguments against the
agnosticism of H u m e and Kant decisive, in the context of the
idealist system of views, of course. To counter agnosticism
Hegel proclaimed that
the closed essence of the Universum has no power in itself that could
resist the daring of perception; it must be open to it and lay its riches and
depths before its eyes and lead it to delight (84:1XXV). 15

How then is the absence of a direct link between one answer

or the other to the ontological aspect of the basic philosophical
question and the answer to the second, epistemological aspect to
be explained? Apparently by the point that the polarisation
of philosophy into materialist and idealist trends is theoretically
predetermined by two alternative answers to the question
of the relation of the spiritual and the material. As for the
antithesis between philosophers who substantiate the principle
of the knowability of the world and the sceptics (or agnostics),
it is associated with two mutually exclusive interpretations
of specifically h u m a n activity, which of course presupposes
the existence of an external world but is not determined by
the existence of the latter, because knowing is a social p r o ­
cess which, like all social processes, is not determined by

88
natural conditions or objects. Does this mean that the episte­
mological and ontological aspects of the basic philosophical
question exist unrelated to each other? Does it not follow from
everything said above that inquiry into the epistemological
aspect of this question does not even indirectly bring out
the fundamental antithesis of materialism and idealism? Of
course not. T h e r e is a mediated unity between the answer to the
two aspects of the basic philosophical question, but a unity
that is not an obviousness establishable without inquiry. One
therefore cannot agree with those workers who claim that the
epistemological antithesis between the main philosophical trends
consists in the one's substantiating the principle of the know-
ability of the world and the other's substantiating epistemolo­
gical scepticism. An example of this view, which clearly con­
tradicts the facts of the history of philosophy, is to be found
in Gaidukov's article in the symposium On Dialectical Mate­
rialism, in which it is said:
W h e r e a s the spokesmen of materialism start (my italics—Т.О.) from
recognition of the knowability of t h e material world by m a n , the
spokesmen of idealism deny t h e possibility of such knowledge and d e c l a r e
the s u r r o u n d i n g world mysterious, inaccessible to h u m a n knowledge
and science ( 7 0 : 3 5 7 ) .

But materialists start, of course, from recognition of the

primacy of matter and the secondariness of mind. Materialists
have one initial fundamental principle, by virtue of the mon­
istic character of their philosophy, while two are ascribed
to them in Gaidukov's article; the principle of the primacy of
matter and the principle of the knowability of the world. This
augmenting of the initial fundamental principles comes from
identifying the second aspect of the basic philosophical ques­
tion with the first.
Since the sole organising principle of idealism consists
in recognition of the primacy of the spiritual, philosophical
scepticism (which declares the psychophysical problem unsolv­
able in principle) does not, of course, stem of necessity
from the idealist answer to the basic philosophical question.
T h e sceptic is, actually a sceptic because he treats both the
materialist and the idealist answer to this question slight­
ingly as dogmatism. Lenin persistently stressed that 'the ag­
nostic does not go on either to the materialist recognition
of the reality of the outer world, or to the idealist recogni­
tion of the world as our sensation (142:96). In most cases,
incidentally, this compromise position tends to an idealist
answer to the ontological problems as well as to the episte-

89
m o l o g i c a l o n e s . B u t o n e m u s t d i f f e r e n t i a t e t h e final, q u i t e
often idealist conclusions a n d points of d e p a r t u r e of s c e p ­
t i c i s m ( a n d a g n o s t i c i s m ) , a n d l i k e w i s e its c o n s t a n t w a v e r i n g
b e t w e e n m a t e r i a l i s m a n d i d e a l i s m , b e c a u s e all this c o n s t i t u t e s
the essential c o n t e n t of this doctrine.
T h e mistaken preposition cited a b o v e w a s published in
1953, but was not criticised in subsequent years, and, m o r e o v e r ,
it was repeated almost word for word in 1960 in a n o t h e r
popular publication, A Reader in Marxist Philosophy (edited
by M . M . R o s e n t h a l ) in which it was said:
D e n i a l of t h e k n o w a b i l i t y of t h e w o r l d is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of idealist
p h i l o s o p h y . T r u e , t h e r e a r e also idealists w h o d o n o t d e n y m a n ' s
c a p a b i l i t y o f c o g n i s i n g t h e real p r o p e r t i e s o f t h i n g s , b u t t h e y , t o o , c l a i m
t h a t h e d o e s not k n o w n a t u r e a n d m a t t e r , b u t s o m e m y s t e r i o u s , invisible
spirit t h a t c r e a t e d n a t u r e a n d c o n s t i t u t e s t h e basis o f all t h i n g s ( 2 2 7 : 2 0 2 ) .

It is quite i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e w h y even those idealists w h o , in

the words cited, 'do not d e n y man's capability of cognising
t h e r e a l p r o p e r t i e s o f t h i n g s ' all t h e s a m e c l a i m t h a t h e d o e s
not k n o w either n a t u r e or m a t t e r . But the idealist proposition
about the secondariness of nature and matter, which represent
only the external envelope of the soul, is evidence
that idealism c o n s i d e r s the essence of the m a t e r i a l a n d n a t u ­
ral to be w h o l l y k n o w a b l e .
Recognition of the knowability or the unknowability in
principle of the world t h u s d o e s n o t i n itself c o n s t i t u t e
g r o u n d s f o r s i n g l i n g o u t t h e main t r e n d s i n p h i l o s o p h y . B u t
i t s h o u l d not b e c o n c l u d e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e r e i s n o e p i s t e ­
mological antithesis between materialism and idealism. Such
a c o n c l u s i o n s e e m s to me to be superficial. T h e r e is a radical
antithesis b e t w e e n t h e materialist a n d idealist u n d e r s t a n d i n g s
of the knowability of the world.
An e r r o r of epistemological idealism (from M a c h i s m and
n e o r e a l i s m to o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e p h i l o s o p h y ) is a d o g m a t i c
c o n v i c t i o n that t h e r e is a p u r e l y e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l solution of
p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s t h a t e x c l u d e s a n y ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' , i.e.
a n y ontological premisses. In fact, a n y epistemological posing
of a philosophical p r o b l e m implicitly includes ontological pre­
m i s s e s , a n d a b o v e all a d e f i n i t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e ' s p i r i t u ­
al-material' relation. T h e expression 'epistemological ideal­
i s m ' is t h e r e f o r e l a r g e l y a r b i t r a r y ; it is a m a t t e r of a v e r s i o n of
idealist p h i l o s o p h y that poses a n d tries to a n s w e r only t h e o r e t i ­
cal, c o g n i t i v e p r o b l e m s , f r o m w h i c h it does, n o t follow, h o w ­
ever, that it succeeds in eliminating 'metaphysics'.
Thus I hold, in spite of epistemological idealism, that

90
both the materialist and idealist answers to the first aspect
of the basic philosophical question form the initial fundamen­
tal principle of the corresponding (materialist or idealist)
epistemological doctrine.
Materialism, in setting out from acknowledgement of the
primacy of the material and secondariness of the spiritual,
treats the material as a reality different from and indepen­
dent of mind that determines consciousness and so, too, its
content. T h a t is why the materialist answer to the second as­
pect of the basic philosophical question does not boil down
to recognition of the knowability in principle of the world.
Its essence is understanding of cognition as reflection of
objective reality that exists irrespective of the process of
knowing. It is the concept of reflection, the scientific inter­
pretation of which posits recognition of the reflected, which
exists independent of the reflection, that constitutes the point
of departure of materialism in epistemology. As Lektorsky and
Shvyrev write:
The fundamental importance of the category of reflection for the
whole system of dialectical materialism is precisely that its development
makes it possible to throw a bridge from matter that feels to matter that
does not, and to indicate the potential possibility of the development
of matter {hat feels, and in the final count possesses consciousness, from
matter thai does not possess sensation, a psyche, and consciousness
(138:27).

Metaphysical materialism interpreted reflection one-sidedly

as an adequate reproduction of the object of knowing, as a
consequence of which false notions were considered not to re­
flect anything. Metaphysical materialists did not consistently
follow the principle of reflection, since they denied the
existence of reflection in human errors and did not see what
these errors reflected. They interpreted religious conscious­
ness as lacking any objective content. To consider religion a
reflection of objective reality meant, for them, to justify a
theistic world outlook.
P r e - M a r x i a n materialism had no idea of social conscious­
ness reflecting social being. T h e metaphysically interpreted
epistemological phenomenon of reflection played a limited role
in general in its system of concepts. Only the philosophy of
Marxism, thanks to the dialectical understanding of the pro­
cess of reflection, and application of the concept of reflection
to sociological investigation of cognition and mind, demonstrated
that misconceptions (as distinct from logical mistakes)
reflect objective reality. Mind (consciousness), whatever its

91
form, is a reflection of reality i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e latter.
This consistently materialist understanding of the n a t u r e of
mind is a very i m p o r t a n t epistemological principle of m a t e r i a ­
lism, systematically substantiated by Marxist-Leninist philo­
sophy.
T h e epistemological concept of reflection indicates that the
c o n t e n t of consciousness (and of knowledge) is not generat­
ed by mind itself b u t is d r a w n from what is realised and cog­
nised and forms the object of inquiry. Even w h e n the object of
cognition is knowledge itself, the concept of reflection re­
tains its sense, since knowledge as the object of inquiry
exists independently of the investigation. T h e fact that the
object is a reflection of the external world alters nothing in
principle, because the reflection of the e x t e r n a l world in
mind is a process g o v e r n e d by objective laws.
One must stress, f u r t h e r m o r e , that u n d e r s t a n d i n g of mind
(consciousness) as a reflection of objective reality c h a r a c ­
terises its form as well as its content. W e r e t h e r e no sun
t h e r e would also be no vision, this specific form of reflec­
tion of objective reality. Logical forms, as Lenin stressed,
reflect the most general relations of things, established
every day in e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s feature of logical forms is also
revealed by c o n t e m p o r a r y mathematical logic, since it treats
them as relations between the signs by which objects a r e thought
about.
Cognition, knowing, is a specific form of reflection, because
not all of a living c r e a t u r e ' s (including m a n ' s ) reflection of
the external world is knowledge. M a n reflected q u a n t u m
mechanical processes even when he did not have the
slightest notion of t h e m . Animals obviously also reflect the
diversity of the laws of n a t u r e in their activity insofar as
they adapt spontaneously to them. But t h e r e can be nothing
h e r e , of course, to do with cognition. Knowing does not e m b r a c e
all the reflective activity peculiar to the a n i m a t e .
M o r e than 70 years ago Lenin expressed t h e following hy­
pothesis in his Materialism and Empirio-Criticism: 'it is logi­
cal to assert that all matter possesses a p r o p e r t y which is
essentially akin to sensation, the p r o p e r t y of reflection'
( 1 4 2 : 7 8 ) . T h e latest research in the field of cybernetics,
and in particular the concept of information as an objective
process, indicates the legitimacy of the ontological i n t e r p r e ­
tation of reflection as an attribute of certain forms of the
interaction of material p h e n o m e n a . F r o m that angle reflection
as a cognitive process is the highest level of development of

92
the property of reflection inherent in matter. With that un­
derstanding of the 'spiritual-material' relation, the organic
unity between the materialist answer to both the first and
second aspects of the basic philosophical question is brought out.
A Social-Democratic review of Materialism and Empirio-
Criticism called the materialist principle of reflection
'Platonism inside out'. T h a t clearly erroneous statement, how­
ever, indirectly pointed out the radical epistemological anti­
thesis of the main philosophical trends that Helvetius called
the lines of Plato and of Demokritos. T h e latter formulated
the first, naive version of the theory of reflection in his
doctrine of eidola, according to which the reflections of
things in men's minds were the consequence of 'contact' of the
sense organs with the images of objects that were moving in
the air, separated from them. Demokritos considered errors a
consequence of deformation of the eidola in the medium in
which they moved, collided, and combined with one another.
In opposition to him Plato affirmed that ideas (eide) did
not reflect things but that things, on the contrary, reflected
transcendental ideas. That, too, was also a denial of the epis­
temological theory of reflection that knowing is a reflection
of reality independent of it. Platonism, however, as the Ital­
ian existentialist Castelli has remarked, is 'precisely the
categorical affirmation of the impossibility of knowing exactly
beyond remembrance, the possibility of reducing the unknown
to the known' (32:8). From that point of view one knows ir­
respective of the existence of an external world.
Thus, despite the Social-Democratic critic's assertion,
it is not the materialist theory of knowledge, but the idealist
one that is a turning upside-down of the real relation existing
between h u m a n consciousness and the material world. Therefore
reflection was a static relation for Plato that jelled the
structure of the world, while for Demokritos, in spite of his
oversimplified understanding of reflection, the cognitive p r o ­
cess appeared as continuous movement, in which the notions of
things created by reason entered into a contradiction with
their sensual images, and 'opinions', i.e. ordinary notions,
were refuted by real knowledge of what actually existed.
Plato's epistemology was a theory of recollection, accord­
ing to which one knew because the human soul turned away
from the sense-perceived world and forgot its perishable earthly
life so as, having concentrated, to immerse itself in itself and
discover precisely in itself the knowledge that it was impossible
to acquire in the world of things. He therefore called for a

93
stopping of the ears and a closing of the eyes; only by
tearing loose from nature, did the soul get back to itself
from the world of alienated existence. And then it was faced
not with things, but with ideas of things, the transcendent
primary essences that it had contemplated before its fall,
i.e. its incarnation in the human body. Plato attributed a
mystical sense to the ordinary notion (everyone knows what it
means to r e m e m b e r ) ; during remembrance the soul mentally re­
turned to its transcendent primary source.
T h e antithesis between Plato and Demokritos brings out the
main epistemological alternative particularly sharply.
What forms the source of our knowledge? N a t u r e or the super­
natural? Matter or spirit?
Lenin, when criticising 'physical' idealism, which argued
that the change in the scientific understanding of physical
reality overthrew the materialist outlook on the world, made
it clear that the development of scientific notions about matter
had 'no relation to the epistemological distinction between
materialism and idealism' (142:240), since this distinction was
not linked with any understanding of the structure and forms of
existence of matter, elementary particles, etc. T h e epistemolog­
ical antithesis of the main philosophical trends is determined
by differences in understanding the source of knowledge.
Materialism and idealism [he wrote] differ in their answers to the
question of the source of our knowledge and of the relation of
knowledge (and of the 'mental' in general) to the physical world (ibid).
Materialism regards cognition as a specific reflection of the
material world. T h e idealist denial of the material world is
a denial of the real epistemological function of reflection,
which means that the idealist can employ the concept of reflec­
tion only by mystifying its real content as a cognitive pro­
cess, which was already to be found in Plato.
In the idealist philosophy of modern times the concept of
reflection has been employed by Leibniz, Hume, Hegel, and
other philosophers. In Hegel it (reflexion) serves to describe
such relations as 'essence-being', and 'appearance-phenomenon'.
He endeavoured to demonstrate that the antitheses inherent
within objective reality were reflectively related and reflected
each other. Essence, for example, is sublated being, which is
retained in it as appearance or 'reflected being' (see 86:162,
and 89:15-22). Consequently
reflection, or light thrown into itself, constitutes the distinction
between Essence and immediate Being, and is the peculiar characteristic
of Essence itself (86:162).

94
 Hegel thus understood reflection as an ontological relation.
On the one hand he mystified the real process of cognition, and
on the other, revealed the basic elements of the actual essential
relation. T h e correlativeness of the elements of essence (identity
and difference, the positive and the negative, the ground and
the consequence, etc.) were defined as Reflexion, i.e. a relation
of mutual reflection. In that connection the term 'reflection' also
meant contemplation, in accordance with traditional usage,
but there was no thinking subject and object of thought inde­
pendent of it in this contemplation, since it was a matter of an
impersonal logical process which, according to Hegel, formed
the essence of everything that existed. He analysed the dialectical
nature of essence, i.e. the inner relationship, and inter­
dependence of phenomena, but the concept of reflection as a
human cognitive process, positing both mind and the realisable
objective reality, remained alien to his philosophy.
Cognition, according to Hegel, was the de-objectifying
of nature, and overcoming of its objectivity by exposure of
the 'semblance' of everything natural. While nature was exter­
nal, 'outside' in relation to spirit (including the h u m a n mind),
an alienated discovery of the Absolute I d e a ) , cognition had
to tear the material 'envelope' off nature, which it had already
done (in Hegel's view) at the stage of its development when
science discovered laws of nature (which he interpreted as laws
of objective thought, or the rational in the universum). Natu­
ral science, according to Hegel's doctrine, confirmed the truth
of idealism, since it proved that natural processes were gov­
erned by definite laws which, according to him, were rational,
immaterial relations. T h e fault of science, however, in his
view, was that it treated laws as relations between things,
i.e. did not bring out the teleological relation in them. Philo­
sophical inquiry, in contrast to scientific research, strip­
ped all the material covers from nature, penetrated to the in­
terior of things, finding these the incorporeal, ideal, and
supernatural. T r u t h , Hegel taught, was immaterial; it had no
need of covers or cloaks; it was impossible to see, or hear,
or smell, or feel; it was discoverable only by speculative
thought, which knew itself in nature and outside nature. Cogni­
tion of nature was, according to him, a surmounting of the natu­
ral, an ascent from the antithesis of thought and being to
their dialectical identity or, in other words, demonstration of
the truth of idealism. 16

Recognition of the knowability of the world in principle,

and agreement with the epistemological principle of reflection

95
are not quite the s a m e thing. O n e cannot agree with Horn, a
Marxist from the G D R , who treated the term 'knowledge' and
'reflection' as essentially s y n o n y m o u s . S u c h a point of view
is acceptable for a materialist, but should not be ascribed
to idealists. But H o r n wrote:
In the w h o l e t h e o r y of k n o w l e d g e t h e c o n c e p t of reflection h a s a
c e n t r a l p l a c e . I t a l w a y s used t o b e falsely a t t r i b u t e d o n l y t o m a t e r i a l i s m ;
i n r e a l i t y i t a l s o u n d e r l i e s i d e a l i s m , t h o u g h often u n d e r a n o t h e r n a m e
(104:61).

H o r n tried to s h o w that the p r o b l e m of reflection was of

s u c h a f u n d a m e n t a l c h a r a c t e r t h a t no idealist d o c t r i n e c o u l d
a v o i d it. T h a t i s c o r r e c t , o f c o u r s e , b u t i t d o e s n o t f o l l o w
f r o m i t a t all t h a t i d e a l i s t s a g r e e w i t h t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l
principle of reflection. Idealism interprets the process of
k n o w i n g as an a u t o n o m o u s activity i n d e p e n d e n t of material r e ­
ality. S o m e idealists d e s c r i b e c o g n i t i o n as a logical p r o c e s s
of the self-movement of p u r e thought, independent of sense per­
ceptions. O t h e r s c o n s i d e r it s u p e r s e n s o r y vision, a mystical
d a w n i n g o n o n e , a n d a n i n t u i t i v e m e r g i n g w i t h t h e w o r l d . Still
others, being inclined toward idealist empiricism, see in
cognitive activity an o r d e r i n g of sense data, the establishing
of connections between them, and the constructing of things
from the material of sensations. T h e different interpretations
often o v e r l a p , a d e n i a l of k n o w i n g as reflection of a w o r l d
i n d e p e n d e n t o f it, m o r e o v e r r e m a i n i n g i n e v i t a b l e f o r t h e m .
T h a t , as Lenin stressed, determines t h e epistemological anti­
thesis between materialism and idealism:
T h e fundamental distinction between the materialist a n d the a d h e r e n t of
idealist p h i l o s o p h y c o n s i s t s i n t h e fact t h a t t h e m a t e r i a l i s t r e g a r d s
s e n s a t i o n , p e r c e p t i o n , idea, a n d t h e m i n d o f m a n g e n e r a l l y , a s a n
i m a g e of o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y ( 1 4 2 : 2 4 8 ) .

T h e materialist considers the sensually perceived world to be

r e a l i r r e s p e c t i v e o f its b e i n g k n o w n b y t h e e x i s t i n g w o r l d .
T h a t is o n e of the most i m p o r t a n t features of the principle of
reflection, which presupposes reliance on the evidence of
the sense organs. T h e objective necessity, justification, and
l e g i t i m a c y of this c o n f i d e n c e is f o u n d e d on p r a c t i c e , s i n c e it is
by sense perceptions that m a n orientates himself in the material
w o r l d a r o u n d h i m , a d a p t s h i m s e l f t o it, a n d a l t e r s it.
Idealism scorns this allegedly uncritical confidence in
t h e e v i d e n c e of the sense organs, in spite of the fact that
materialist epistemology h a s always b e e n c o n c e r n e d with a criti­
cal analysis of the c o n t e n t of sensory reflection, and the
philosophy of M a r x i s m disclosed the dialectical contradiction

96
between rational and sense reflection of the e x t e r n a l world.
But c o n t e m p o r a r y science, which has developed very precise
methods of investigating the reflective activity peculiar to the
n e r v o u s system, has fully confirmed materialist confidence in
sense data. As A n o k h i n has pointed out, investigation of in­
formation relations in the world of living c r e a t u r e s witnesses
that 'the n e r v o u s system achieves striking precision of infor­
mation of the brain about t h e original effects of e x t e r n a l ob­
jects' ( 6 : 1 1 6 ) . And further:
the theory of information indicates that any object reflected in the
nervous system through a number of recodings of the original signal,
in the final stage quite exactly reflects the chief, biologically most im­
portant parameters of the reflected object (6:118).
This scientific evaluation of the epistemological principle of
reflection is at the same time confirmation of the materialist
answer to the first aspect of the basic philosophical question,
since it indicates that the sense-perceived world a r o u n d us is
an actual and not illusory reality.
In opposition to materialism, idealism interprets sense-
perceived reality now as a specifically ' h u m a n ' reality, now
as an external, i n a d e q u a t e expression of the suprasensitive,
substantial essence of the world. T h e materialist does not,
of course, deny that t h e r e a r e sensuously unperceivable p h e ­
n o m e n a that form causes, hidden components, and the essence of
observed p h e n o m e n a . But he rejects an antithesis in principle
of the observable and imperceptible, because the latter is a
sort of 'thing in itself that will b e c o m e a 'thing for us' in
certain conditions and t h r o u g h the development of knowledge.
T h e difference between a 'thing in itself and 'thing for us'
has an epistemological r a t h e r than an ontological c h a r a c t e r .
In other words, t h e r e a r e no absolute, unconditional, insur­
m o u n t a b l e limits of possible e x p e r i e n c e ; and consequently t h e r e
is also no suprasensitive or t r a n s c e n d e n t reality.
Lenin's Materialism and Empirid-Criticism not only d e m o n ­
strated the incompatibility in principle of idealism and the
theory of reflection; in it he gave a profound analysis of the
main idealist a r g u m e n t s against t h e epistemology of material­
ism. I h a v e in mind first and foremost his critique of the
views of Bishop Berkeley against the materialist conception of
sense perceptions.

But say you [Berkeley wrote], t h ô the ideas themselves do not exist
without the mind, yet there may be things like them whereof are
copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind, in an un­
thinking substance. I answer an idea can be like nothing but an idea,

7-01603 97
 a colour, or figure, can be like nothing but another colour or figure.
If we look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it
impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas.
Again I ask whether those suppos'd originals or external things, of which
our ideas are the picture or representations, be themselves perceivable
or no? If they are, then they are ideas and we have gained our point; but
if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense, to
assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like
something which is intangible and so of the rest (15:31).

Berkeley claimed that the concept of reflection lacked sense.

C o n t e m p o r a r y idealist empiricism has not added anything
essentially new to this a r g u m e n t . Berkeley counterposed idealism
directly to materialism (he called the f o r m e r i m m a t e r i a l i s m ) ,
while the latest positivism, in rejecting the epistemological
principle of reflection, quite often is not a w a r e of the ideal­
ist c h a r a c t e r of this stance. C o n t e m p o r a r y positivists in
fact resort in essence to the Berkeleian a r g u m e n t s : acknowledge­
ment of external objects independent of sensuality (and r e ­
flected by it) is unprovable in principle. Berkeley was m o r e
consistent, declaring the assumption of t h e existence of sen­
sual objects 'in themselves' to be absurd, since sense data
consisted of sensations only.
Berkeley's main a r g u m e n t deserves special attention, viz.,
that ideas (as he called both sensations and sense perceptions)
cannot be like things precisely because they a r e ideas and not
things. T h a t consideration served him not in o r d e r to c o u n t e r ­
pose sensations and things, but in o r d e r to c o n c l u d e that sensa­
tions were the sole reality directly accessible to us. Sensations,
according to him, a r e not evidence of the existence of things;
they were things. T h e r e f o r e any attempt to d r a w some kind of
distinction between sensations and things and divide them from
one a n o t h e r was fruitless, scholastic philosophising. We had no
right to assert that there was something distinct in things
from what was in sensations, since this distinction did not
exist in sensations. But if everything that was in things was
also in sensations, what basis was there for thinking that
something existed distinct from sensations? Such is the logic
of subjective-idealist epistemology.
T h e r e h a v e n e v e r been materialists, of course, who would
have claimed that sensations as such, i.e. as psychic p h e n o m ­
ena, were like things. T h e principle of reflection registers
the difference between the subjective image and the object,
pointing at the s a m e time to the content of the image, d r a w n
from outside, from the object that is somehow r e p r o d u c e d in
this image. Materialism does not ascribe a n y physical, c h e m i -

98
c a l , o r o t h e r p r o p e r t i e s t o t h e s e n s u a l i m a g e o f t h e object
( o r t h e c o n c e p t t h a t s u m s u p t h e a t t r i b u t e s o f a w h o l e class
of objects). T h e images of objects do not h a v e t h e mass or
c o l o u r i n h e r e n t i n t h e latter, a l t h o u g h t h e y d o c o n t a i n a
n o t i o n o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( k n o w l e d g e ) a b o u t all t h e s e p r o p e r ­
ties. T o d o r P a v l o v c o r r e c t l y r e m a r k s :
colours, tones, smells, lines, geometrical figures, magnitudes, and various
relations, when they 'enter' consciousness (or rather, the world of our
ideas), do not cease to be colours, tones, smells, lines, etc., but
have already lost their material being. No mind, of course, has ever
smelled of rose, but every mind is, incidentally, consciousness of the fra­
grance of a rose or the smell of garlic, which really are properties of the
things themselves (roses and garlic) but ideally enter the content
of our idea-images as components, i.e., so enter our world of ideas
(203:172).

T h e reflection a n d t h e reflected a r e dialectical opposites

w h o s e unity h a s a s its basis a n o b j e c t e x i s t i n g i n d e p e n d e n t l y
of t h e process of reflection. T h i s antithesis of t h e ideal and
t h e m a t e r i a l is t r a n s f o r m e d t h r o u g h r e f l e c t i o n i n t o an a n t i ­
thesis b e t w e e n t h e s u b j e c t i v e f o r m a n d t h e o b j e c t i v e c o n t e n t
of t h e i m a g e . T h e objectivity of t h e c o n t e n t of i m a g e s is an
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l objectivity, s i n c e this c o n t e n t is n o t i d e n t i ­
cal with t h e c o n t e n t of t h e objects; it o n l y r e p r o d u c e s it,
a n d o f c o u r s e , m o r e o v e r , n o t fully, b u t a p p r o x i m a t e l y , a n d
u s u a l l y o n e - s i d e d l y , etc. T h e o b j e c t i v e c o n t e n t o f i m a g e s i s
t h e idealised c o n t e n t of t h e r e f l e c t e d objects, by v i r t u e of
w h i c h t h e r e is a l w a y s an e l e m e n t of t h e s u b j e c t i v e in it. T h e
l a t t e r n e e d s t o b e u n d e r s t o o d n o t o n l y a s a n illusion o r i n c o m ­
p l e t e k n o w l e d g e b u t also as t h e m o d e of m e n t a l a s s i m i l a t i o n of
o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , w h i c h gets specific e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e r e f l e c t e d
c o n t e n t . As Mitin writes:

the ideal and the material are characterised by a relation of dialectical

antithesis. T h e image of an object is not extended, does not contain any
grain of the substance of the object reflected by it, and cannot perform
the functions that the object itself does. But the structure of the
ideal image is determined by the material interaction of the knowing
subject with the object, has an objective content, and adequately,
approximately truly, ideally, and exactly expresses the essence of the
structure of the object itself (184:76).

T h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e o f r e f l e c t i o n i n its c o n t e m p o ­
r a r y f o r m , i.e. as it is b e i n g d e v e l o p e d by t h e p h i l o s o p h y of M a r x ­
ism, t h u s p r e s u p p o s e s n o t o n l y a d e m a r c a t i o n of t h e s u b j e c t i v e
a n d o b j e c t i v e , b u t also o n e w i t h i n t h e s u b j e c t i v e a n d w i t h i n
the objective. T h e subjective in reflection is not only that
which is not related to the object, which must t h e r e f o r e be

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a b s t r a c t e d so as to u n d e r s t a n d t h e object precisely as it exists
i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e subject, b u t also t h a t w h i c h is r e v e a l e d in
t h e inclination itself of cognition, in t h e m e t h o d s of i n q u i r y e m p ­
loyed by t h e cognising subject, in t h e m o d e of 'coding' t h e
reflected c o n t e n t , t h e varied f o r m s of w h i c h a r e historically
d e v e l o p e d a n d consciously p e r f e c t e d d u r i n g t h e d e v e l o p m e n t
of k n o w l e d g e . T h e objective is not only w h a t exists outside
of a n d i n d e p e n d e n t of c o n s c i o u s n e s s ; that, of c o u r s e , is its
m a i n definition, but o n e must not forget a b o u t t h e e p i s t e m o ­
logically objective a n d t h e logically objective. T r u t h is ob­
jective a l t h o u g h it is a p h e n o m e n o n of t h e process of c o g n i ­
tion. T h e laws ( r u l e s ) of logical t h o u g h t a r e also objective,
b u t they do not exist outside t h o u g h t .
Berkeley identified objects with sensations, a n d t h a t was t h e
i n e r a d i c a b l e fault of his essentially solipsistic t h e o r y . S u b s e q u e n t
idealism, u n l i k e Berkeleianism, b e g a n to t r e a t objects and sense
p e r c e p t i o n s as similar but not m u t u a l l y identical p h e n o m e n a of
t h e mind. H u m e h a d a l r e a d y put impressions ( p e r c e p t i o n s ) in
t h e p l a c e of objects, a n d treated ideas (notions, c o n c e p t s ) as
images of impressions. T h i s t h e o r y , h o w e v e r , was an illusory
c o n c e p t i o n of reflection, since ideas, a c c o r d i n g to him, differed
from impressions like r e m e m b r a n c e s from direct e x p e r i e n c e s ,
i.e. w e r e less lively, direct, a n d vivid.
Those perceptions [Hume wrote], which enter with most force and
violence, we may name impressions; and under this name I comprehend
all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first
appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in
thinking reasoning (106:I, 11).

T h i s subjective-psychological d e m a r c a t i o n of impressions and

their ' i m a g e s ' has n o t h i n g in c o m m o n with t h e epistemological
p r i n c i p l e of reflection, which starts from recognition of a
m a t e r i a l reality i n d e p e n d e n t of cognition.
H u m e ' s a m e n d i n g of Berkeley's epistemological subjectivism
t h u s boils d o w n to c l a i m i n g that things w e r e identified with
sensations only b e c a u s e t h e y f u n c t i o n e d as things for us. T h e
q u e s t i o n of w h a t t h i n g s w e r e in themselves lacked sense b e c a u s e
w e only k n e w w h a t sensations witnessed t o a b o u t t h e m . T h i s
t e n d e n c y , b a r e l y e m e r g i n g in H u m e ' s p h i l o s o p h y , got systematic
d e v e l o p m e n t in K a n t ' s d o c t r i n e of t h e 'thing-in-itself. N e o k a n ­
tianism, which h a s d i s c a r d e d this i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t of K a n t ' s
d o c t r i n e , h o w e v e r , r e t a i n e d t h e agnostic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of
sense d a t a as a specific m o d e of d e n y i n g t h e epistemological
p r i n c i p l e of reflection. T h i s line was most consistently followed
by C a s s i r e r in his Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff, in

100
which we find, in particular, such a categorical statement as
the following:
Our sensations and ideas are signs or symbols, not images of objects.
For one requires some kind of equality of the picture with the
reflected object, which we can never assure ourselves of here (31:404).
T h e concept of a sign, of course, has a varied content.
Since sensations are regarded as images of objective reality,
the images (reflections) can also function as signs. But the
concept of a sign lacks any objective content for the Neokan­
tian, being counterposed precisely in this sense to the concept
of an image.
T h e r e are relations in the reality around us whose separate
elements appear as objectively existing signs, since they are
attributes or signs of definite phenomena. As the old saw says,
there is no smoke without fire. Smoke is both an attribute and
a sign of fire; it is the latter, of course, only in man's
mind, i.e. in reflected form. Man interprets the attributes
or traits of objects as signs or symbols, or even creates
arbitrary, conventional signs, symbols, names, etc. As for the
reflection of the world in sensations, ideas, etc., that is
essentially an objective process, the patterns of which are
discovered and investigated by contemporary science. T h e N e o ­
kantian interpretation of sensations as symbols quite emascu­
lates the objective content of sense reflection of material
reality, which wholly corresponds to the Neokantian concep­
tion of the world as a logical construction. ' 1

T h e idealist denial of reflection as the essence of the

cognitive process is often expressed in the form of a cri­
tique of the limited understanding of reflection peculiar to
pre-Marxian materialism. T h e idealist stresses that knowing
is not a passive process of perceiving something external that
man has come up against, and concludes on that basis that
knowing is not reflection. But the contemporary dialectical-
materialist understanding of reflection as a cognitive process
is organically linked with recognition of the cognising sub­
ject's activity and with analysis of the interconversion of
theoretical activity into practical activity and vice versa.
Having overcome the deficiencies of the metaphysical-material­
ist conception of reflection, the philosophy of Marxism has
enriched the concept by investigation of the dialectics of
cognitive activity. But idealism ignores this very important
circumstance, interpreting the materialist understanding of
reflection as a simplified interpretation of the process of
knowing. T h u s Pratt, the American 'critical realist', rejecting

101
t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e of r e f l e c t i o n , simplified its r e a l
c o n t e n t t o t h e e x t r e m e a n d s o d i s t o r t e d it. ' T h e m i n d i s n o t a
m i r r o r n o r a p i c t u r e gallery.... T h e c o n t e n t o f t h e m i n d d o e s n o t
n e e d t o r e s e m b l e t h e o b j e c t s for w h i c h i t s t a n d s ' ( 2 1 5 : 1 9 3 ) .
But e v e n p r e - M a r x i a n m a t e r i a l i s m did n o t t r e a t r e f l e c t i o n a t all
as P r a t t p i c t u r e d it. T h e c o m p a r i s o n with a m i r r o r , if it w a s e v e r
m a d e , was no m o r e than an analogy, of course, and such an
a n a l o g y h a s p e r h a p s n o t lost s e n s e e v e n i n o u r t i m e .
O r d i n a r y u s a g e c o n n e c t e d t h e w o r d ' r e f l e c t i o n ' with t h e
n o t i o n of passive p e r c e p t i o n of e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s . W h e n s c i e n c e
b o r r o w s s o m e of its t e r m s f r o m o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e , it gives
them a new content, sense, and meaning. T h e critique of scien­
tific t e r m i n o l o g y t h a t s t a r t s f r o m t h e m e a n i n g of t e r m s in
their ordinary usage is mistaken. Idealism makes precisely that
k i n d of m i s t a k e in its c r i t i q u e of t h e m a t e r i a l i s t c o n c e p t of
r e f l e c t i o n . T h e r o o t o f t h e e r r o r i s t h e idealist u n d e r s t a n d i n g
of t h e p r o c e s s of k n o w i n g by w h i c h t h e w o r l d is c o g n i s e d o n l y
i n s o f a r as it h a s a m e n t a l c h a r a c t e r , i.e. c o i n c i d e s , if not
d i r e c t l y t h e n u l t i m a t e l y , with h u m a n m e n t a t i o n . I f t h e w o r l d
w e r e m a t e r i a l it w o u l d be u n k n o w a b l e — s u c h is t h e logic of t h e
idealist. T h e mystic d o c t r i n e o f t h e m e r g i n g o f m a n a n d G o d
is an e x t r e m e e x p r e s s i o n of this idealist idea.
O n e m u s t n o t e i n p a s s i n g that c o n t e m p o r a r y idealist d o c ­
t r i n e s u s u a l l y avoid a d i r e c t identification of t h e k n o w a b i l i t y
o f t h e w o r l d with m e n t a t i o n . 18
T h e d o m i n a n t idealist c o n c e p ­
tion in c o n t e m p o r a r y b o u r g e o i s p h i l o s o p h y of an initially
alienated relations between the knowing subject and the sur­
r o u n d i n g reality is f r e q u e n t l y e x p r e s s e d in a s s e r t i o n s a b o u t t h e
' m i n d l e s s n e s s ' or 'spiritlessness' of t h e w o r l d , f r o m w h i c h it
d o e s not follow, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e w o r l d i s m a t e r i a l . T h i s c o n ­
c e p t i o n of a s u b s t a n t i a l a l i e n a t i o n links up d i r e c t l y , in s o m e
c a s e s with a g n o s t i c i s m , in o t h e r s is c o m p e l l e d to s e e k n e w
m o d e s of idealist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e k n o w a b i l i t y of t h e
w o r l d . I n H e i d e g g e r ' s ' f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y ' , for i n s t a n c e ,
t h e possibility of k n o w i n g t h e w o r l d is s u b s t a n t i a t e d by t h e
' o p e n n e s s ' of h u m a n e x i s t e n c e , i.e. its p r i m o r d i a l u n i t y with
t h e b e i n g of w h a t exists. T h e r a t i o n a l i s t d o c t r i n e of lumen
naturale ( n a t u r a l light of r e a s o n ) , a c c o r d i n g to H e i d e g g e r ,
is an oversimplified e v o c a t i v e n o t i o n of this p r e r e f l e x i v e
existence of the individual which precisely makes knowledge
possible, t h o u g h o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t r e t a i n s this o r i ­
g i n a l ' t u n a b i l i t y ' of e x i s t e n c e . It is n o t difficult to dis­
c o v e r i n t h e s e a r g u m e n t s o f this v e n e r a b l e e x i s t e n t i a l i s t t h e
Platonic conception of knowledge being preformed in the

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h u m a n soul. A c c o r d i n g to this view ( w h i c h H e i d e g g e r freed of
t h e m y t h o l o g i c a l m o d e of e x p r e s s i o n ) , k n o w l e d g e is not a c q u i ­
red a n d is not multiplied d u r i n g c o g n i t i o n a n d d u r i n g all h u m a n
life; it is a l r e a d y given ( m e a s u r e d off) in a d v a n c e , i.e. b e f o r e t h e
b i r t h of t h e h u m a n individual. His cognitive activity is r e d u c e d
to d i s c o v e r i n g and, so to say, c o n s u m i n g this k n o w l e d g e .
T h e materialist p r i n c i p l e of reflection took s h a p e long
b e f o r e t h e rise of idealist philosophy; in its original f o r m
it was e x p r e s s e d by so-called n a i v e realism, i.e. o r d i n a r y c o n ­
sciousness b a s e d o n e v e r y d a y 'materialist' p r a c t i c e . T h e epis­
t e m o l o g y of idealism took s h a p e historically as a denial of t h e
epistemological p r i n c i p l e of reflection first in its n a i v e and then
in its t h e o r e t i c a l l y s u b s t a n t i a t e d form.
In opposition to m a t e r i a l i s m idealism puts t h e real m a t e ­
rial world within t h e mind or s o m e o t h e r mental essence, whose
o u t c o m e is c o n s i d e r e d to be consciousness. Idealism does not
stop at t h e o r d i n a r y religious n o t i o n of t h e spiritual as
t h e e x t e r n a l c a u s e of t h e m a t e r i a l w o r l d . T h e logic of idealist
philosophising inevitably leads to t h e reality of t h e real world
cognised by the sciences being a c k n o w l e d g e d only in so
far as t h e a s s u m p t i o n of its d e p e n d e n c e on t h e spiritual is
a c c e p t e d , i.e. on its reflection, which in t h a t case is no long­
er t r e a t e d , of c o u r s e , as reflection. T h i s principle of t h e
idealist ' t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ' of t h e world, k n o w l e d g e of which
t h e idealist obtains from t h e s a m e s o u r c e s as the materialist,
was expressed most u n e q u i v o c a l l y by S c h u p p e , t h e leader of
' i m m a n e n t philosophy', w h o wrote: ' T h e sun, m o o n , and stars,
a n d this e a r t h with all its rocks a n d animals, volcanic m o u n ­
tains, etc., a r e all t h e c o n t e n t of consciousness' ( 2 4 1 : 7 0 ) .
T h e idealist says: 'I do not d e n y a n y t h i n g that exists or
that you d e e m to exist, but I do not a g r e e that it exists as
y o u i m a g i n e it t o ' . S c h u p p e c o n v e r t e d consciousness into a
s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l a l l - e m b r a c i n g reality in which, so to say,
all existing things w e r e p o n d e r e d . S u c h consciousness, of
c o u r s e , — h o w does it differ from G o d ? — c a n n o t be reflection.
T h e idealist opposes the p r i n c i p l e of t h e subjectivity, activity,
and c r e a t i v e f r e e d o m of cognition to t h e materialist u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g of it as reflection of objective reality. But this a n t i ­
thesis is only justified insofar as t h e r e is denial of an objective
reality existing outside and i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e mind. Otherwise,
i.e. if o n e a c c e p t s t h e dialectical-materialist a n s w e r to t h e basic
philosophical question, this antithesis (like t h e idealist c r i t i q u e of
t h e t h e o r y of reflection) lacks a n y sense. As K o p n i n has rightly
remarked,

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 the two statements about knowledge (subjective creative activity and
reflection) not only agree with one another, but even necessarily
posit each other. Knowledge can only be active, practically directed
reflection of objective reality. Subjective activity without reflection
leads to an arbitrariness practically without results, rather than to
creativity and the creation of things needed by man (122:23).

T h e antithesis between the materialist and idealist answers to

the epistemological aspect of the basic philosophical question
thus comes out with full obviousness in these incompatible
interpretations of the principle of the knowability of the world.

4. The Epistemological Aspect.

The Principle of the Knowability
of the World and Philosophical Scepticism

Philosophy had in fact already proclaimed the principle of

the knowability of the world at the dawn of its existence, since
philosophers began with reflections about cosmos foreign to
scepticism, leaving it to 'opinion', i.e. the ordinary mind, to
decide what was directly accessible to sense perception. This
position of the fathers of the materialist understanding of the
world was soon, however, rejected by those philosophers, the
predecessors of idealism, who first denounced the cosmological
claims of Ionian natural philosophy to cognise the universum,
and later began to argue about the illusoriness of any human
knowledge, whatever objects it was related to.
T h e Eleatics claimed that the picture of the world based on
sense contemplation completely deceived us; real existence
could only be mentally comprehendable reality free of the
qualities our senses endowed it with. Zenо of Elea logically
tried to prove the validity of denying the sensuous picture of
the world. His aporias were, as a matter of fact, the first school
of philosophical scepticism. It was not without reason that
sceptics were later called aporetics.
T h e Sophist Gorgias, who developed the dialectical mode
of thought in the negative form that Zeno had given it, gave
a proof of the following theses: (1) nothing exists; (2) if any­
thing existed, it would be unknowable; (3) if anything were
knowable it would be impossible to express knowledge of it.
'This is no idle talk, as was formerly supposed,' Hegel comment­
ed, 'for Gorgias' dialectic is of a quite objective kind, and is most
interesting in content' (85:380).
So, already in the early stages of philosophy's existence,
an antithesis arose between theories that substantiated the

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knowability of the world in principle and doctrines that inclined
to an opposite opinion. And although this antithesis did not form
the main trends in philosophy, despite the claims of the Sceptics,
it would be shallow to underestimate the antithesis between
them, which has developed over the thousands of years of the
existence of philosophy. T h e fundamental theoretical and
ideological significance of the posing of the question of the
knowability (or unknowability) of the world does not boil down
to an appraisal of already available knowledge, although this
appraisal, too, acquires more and more significance as science
develops. T h e nub of the matter is the global posing of the
question, which therefore, properly speaking, has a philosophical
character, forming one of the epistemological aspects of the
basic philosophical question. A concrete, historical study of
this epistemological antithesis is therefore necessary.
A scientific critique of philosophical scepticism presupposes
a concrete delimitation of its historical forms and an appraisal
of each of them from the angle of the socio-economic and
cultural conditions giving rise to it. In that connection, of
course, one has in mind, as well, the historical connection
between the various types of scepticism, i.e. its development,
during which new tendencies, and new epistemological and
ideological functions, come to light. T h e Marxist-Leninist
critique of scepticism thus does not come down to an analysis
and refutation of its arguments; it is a theoretical summing
up of its history, and exploration both of its real development
and of its naturally changing places in mankind's intellectual
life. Here, too, the main role belongs to the history of philosophy.
Greek Scepticism, unlike its forerunners (mentioned at the
beginning of this section), reflected the decline of the slave-
owning mode of production. It was a philosophy of social
indifferentism and submissiveness to historical fate. It was
generated by the disillusionment of the masses of the free
population with the ideals and norms of the existing social
set-up. This disillusionment did not contain either a denial
of the existing order, or an attempt to develop a new social
p r o g r a m m e . Scepticism sought the road to individual's salvation
in the conditions of the decaying social structure: only you
yourself could save yourself. This salvation was ataraxia, or
the real happiness attainable by turning away from public
affairs and abstaining from judgments in matters not directly
related to one's personal experiences. Abstention from actions,
except those most necessary, also corresponded to abstention
from ideological judgments.

105
 Greek Scepticism was thus not just a philosophy, but also
a psychology and a theory of education that reflected the p r o ­
gressing alienation of the individual in a society in which there
was no class that could take on the initiative of radical social
transformations. T h a t was its social sense. But from the angle of
the history of philosophy it is an incomparably more interesting
phenomenon, since it was scepticism that systematically summed
up the preceding development of philosophy, though in a
negative form, disclosed its inherent contradictions, and put
forward problems whose significance went far beyond the
bounds of the historical epoch that gave rise to it. Disputes about
first principles and elements, about the universal flux of things,
or about immobile existence, the counterposing of what truly
existed to what existed in opinions, the dividing of the world
into a this-side realm of things and a transcendent realm of ideas,
the dualism of matter and form—all that, according to the
Sceptics' doctrine, proved that any philosophical statement
could be countered by one that excluded it. No one, con­
sequently, knew what things consisted of, whether of water or of
fire, of homoeomeries or atoms or something else. T h e only
correct stance in a philosophical dispute was therefore to abstain
from judgments. T h a t did not mean that no meaning should be
attached to the evidence of the sense organs. On the contrary,
only that evidence deserved attention; honey was sweet, and it
was impossible not to acknowledge that perception as a fact.
One should only not affirm that the sweetness was inherent in
the honey in itself.
Greek Scepticism was primarily a denial of the possibility
of reliable philosophical knowledge. One must not forget, of
course, that any theoretical knowledge was in essence called
philosophy in those days, and the Sceptics waged polemics
against mathematics, too, trying to prove that truth was also
unattainable in that field. Roman Scepticism, while directly
associated with the Greek, took this whole tendency to the
logical extreme. T h e teaching of Ainesidemos of Knossus and
his successor Agrippa about tropes or modes boiled down to this
that it primarily stressed the subjectivity of sense perceptions
and in that regard anticipated the agnosticism of modern times.
Roman Scepticism also campaigned against logical thinking,
pointing out that inferences did not yield truths, because the
premisses from which they were drawn could never be proved.
So logic was employed to refute logic.
T h e Sceptic analysis of causality presents special interest.
Ainesidemos, citing everyday experience, concluded that it was

106
impossible not to acknowledge that m a n y of the p h e n o m e n a
we observed a p p e a r e d to be the consequences of other p h e n o ­
m e n a also r e c o r d e d by observations. This evidence of everyday
experience, however, could not be justified by logic; analysis of
the concept of cause indicated that it could not be in what
preceded the action, in what existed simultaneously, or in what
followed after it. T h e r e is no need to dwell on his a r g u m e n t a t i o n
to see that it was a matter of quite real problems that a r e also
being discussed in our day.
In his doctoral dissertation and his work on it young M a r x
gave a very interesting appraisal of G r e e k Scepticism, c o m p a r i n g
it with other tendencies in Hellenistic philosophy that also
expressed the historical decline of the c u l t u r e of antiquity in
a specifically philosophical way. He characterised Scepticism
(together with Stoicism and E p i c u r e a n i s m ) as a basic type of
G r e e k spiritual culture. 'Is not their essence, he asked, 'so full
7

of c h a r a c t e r , so intense and eternal that the m o d e r n world

itself has to admit them to full spiritual citizenship?' ( 1 6 9 : 3 5 ) .
He expressed that proposition at a time when he was not yet
a materialist; yet it was not foreign to a scientific understanding
of the course of the history of philosophy, in which Scepticism,
and Epicureanism, and Stoicism w e r e periodically reborn and
enriched with new ideas over a stretch of two thousand
years.
In 1839-41 M a r x criticised Scepticism from a Y o u n g Hege­
lian position, claiming that the creative force and cognitive
power of self-awareness were unlimited and in essence coincid­
ed. T h e Sceptics, on the c o n t r a r y , 'consider the powerlessness of
the spirit to c o m p r e h e n d things as its essential aspect, its real
activity' ( 1 7 4 : 4 2 8 ) . T h e Sceptic t h e r e f o r e did not get beyond
semblance, which he sought, found, and defended as his own
sole birthright. This point of view was 'professional opposition
to all thought, the negation of determination itself (174:429-
4 3 0 ) . But thought was impossible without judgments, and the
latter without determinations. And the Sceptic
accepts all determinations, but in the determinateness of semblance;
his activity is therefore just as arbitrary and displays everywhere the
same inadequacy. He swims, to be sure, in the whole wealth of the world,
but remains in the same poverty and is himself an embodiment of the
powerlessness which he sees in things (174:430)

M a r x revealed the hopeless contradictions of Scepticism,

which, in its fight against so-called dogmatism, defended the
dogmatism of semblance. But he also noted Sceptics' positive
role in the development of philosophy. T h e y w e r e

107
 the scientists among the philosophers, their work is to compare, and
consequently to assemble together the various assertions already avail­
able. They cast an equalising, levelling learned glance back on the
systems and thereby brought out the contradictions and oppositions
(174:504).

T h e main content of G r e e k Scepticism consisted, consequent­

ly, in a critique of the varied, mutually exclusive philosophical
conceptions, to which, however, it counterposed ordinary
notions, without insisting on their truth, but suggesting that
they w e r e m o r e capable all t h e same of achieving a t a r a x i a than
all previous philosophy. G r e e k Scepticism was a self-criticism
of philosophy at that stage of its development when it was
almost wholly based on everyday e x p e r i e n c e alone and differed
from o r d i n a r y consciousness in its theoretical interpretation,
which was not, however, confirmed by e x p e r i e n c e .
T h e scepticism of the age of the forming of t h e capitalist
system, while reviving t h e ideas of its G r e e k f o r e r u n n e r s , al­
ready appeared in a new quality; it fought against clericalism,
theology, and scholasticism, and also against those bourgeois
rationalist doctrines that, for all their historical progressiveness,
reconciled reason and faith. Christian phraseology, behind
which (as Engels pointed out) 'the present-day philosophy has
had to hide for s o m e time' ( 5 3 : 4 2 2 ) , often served this scepticism
only as an ideological cover. While making use of this shield,
scepticism defended toleration, and sometimes even c a m e to
a justification of religious indifferentism and atheism.
P i e r r e Bayle c a m e forward in his Historical and Critical
Dictionary, as a pious erudite w h o collated t h e views of philos­
ophers and theologians, and set out the historical facts. His
conclusions were far from categorical and were still quite un­
a m b i g u o u s for a n y o n e who could read between the lines. He
believed that a logical substantiation of religious dogmas was
impossible in principle and only discredited the lofty aim it
pursued. T h e rationalist critique of religion, too, was unsound,
because the latter did not b e c o m e divine revelation in o r d e r
to justify itself before limited h u m a n reason, which constantly
c a m e into conflict with itself when it tried, for example, to
p r o v e the reality of the sense-perceived world or to formulate
criteria to d e m a r c a t e t r u t h from e r r o r . Philosophy did not
frighten religion, because t h e latter was based on faith, which
could not be demolished by logical a r g u m e n t s of any kind.
Neither the dogmatics nor the sceptics will ever be capable of entering
the kingdom of God, unless they become little children, unless they
change maxims, unless they renounce their wisdom, and unless they make

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 a holocaust of t h e i r vain systems at the foot of t h e cross, for t h e alleged
nonsense of our (i.e. C h r i s t i a n — Т . О . ) p r e a c h i n g ( 1 3 : 3 1 4 ) .

It goes w i t h o u t saying t h a t this a s s u m e d o r t h o d o x y , w h i c h

c o n t a i n e d n o little t o u c h o f i r o n y , d e c e i v e d n o o n e a n d w a s a n
unreliable defence. Bayle was not only refuted but also persecut­
ed, b u t he c o n t i n u e d his s t r u g g l e for f r e e d o m of c o n s c i e n c e ,
camouflaged as dogmatic o r t h o d o x y (though seemingly not
alien to real religious feeling), demonstrating that reason and
faith w e r e i n c o m p a t i b l e , b e c a u s e faith, t h e H o l y S c r i p t u r e s
taught, was of s u p e r n a t u r a l origin. Morality, he claimed, was
independent of religion, since real virtue was not maintained
a t all b y f e a r o f r e t r i b u t i o n f r o m o n h i g h . T h e a t h e i s t , t o o , c o u l d
t h e r e f o r e be a moral person, especially w h e n one took into
a c c o u n t that disavowal of religion ( h o w e v e r mistaken it was)
called for i n c o m p a r a b l y g r e a t e r c o u r a g e t h a n mindless following
o f its d o g m a s . T h e s e b o l d t r u t h s w e r e p r e s e n t e d a s i f t h e u n ­
f a t h o m a b l e wisdom of God was revealed in t h e m in t h e most
miraculous way.
T h a t the greatest scoundrels w e r e not atheists, and that most of the
atheists whose n a m e s have c o m e d o w n to us were honest folk in the
world's opinion, is a f e a t u r e of t h e infinite wisdom of God, and a cause
for a d m i r i n g his P r o v i d e n c e ( 1 3 : 2 7 7 ) .

M a r x and Engels regarded Bayle as an eminent f o r e r u n n e r of

the F r e n c h E n l i g h t e n m e n t . His place in the d e v e l o p m e n t of
philosophical k n o w l e d g e was d e t e r m i n e d by his c r i t i q u e of the
metaphysical systems of the seventeenth century. Descartes and
M a l e b r a n c h e had proved the existence of an external world
independent of the h u m a n mind by a r g u m e n t s akin to scholasti­
c i s m : G o d c o u l d n o t b e a d e c e i v e r , i.e. i n s p i r e m a n w i t h false
c o n v i c t i o n s a b o u t w h a t did n o t i n f a c t e x i s t . B a y l e r i d i c u l e d this
a r g u m e n t a t i o n , noting that one must not put the responsibility
for h u m a n opinions and delusions onto God.
F r o m his point of view, philosophical propositions w e r e
u n d e m o n s t r a b l e : even self-evidence did not g u a r a n t e e t r u t h ;
scepticism w a s an a s p i r a t i o n for t r u t h t h a t tirelessly t r i e d to
find objections to everything accepted as truth and constantly
subverted the custom of agreeing with what seemed obvious.
T h a t theoretical position was groping for the element of truth
contained in scepticism, but at the s a m e time m a d e an absolute
of it.
Dialectics—as Hegel in his time explained [Lenin w r o t e ] — c o n t a i n s an
element of relativism, of negation, of scepticism, but is not reducible
to relativism. T h e materialist dialectics of M a r x and Engels certainly
does contain relativism, but is not reducible to relativism, t h a t is, it

109
 r e c o g n i s e s t h e r e l a t i v i t y o f all o u r k n o w l e d g e , n o t i n t h e s e n s e o f d e n y i n g
o b j e c t i v e t r u t h , b u t i n t h e s e n s e t h a t t h e limits o f a p p r o x i m a t i o n o f
o u r k n o w l e d g e t o this t r u t h a r e h i s t o r i c a l l y c o n d i t i o n a l ( 1 4 2 : 1 2 1 ) .

T h e metaphysical systems of the seventeenth century interpret­

ed their results dogmatically, and m a d e absolutes of the truths
that they had discovered in battle with scholasticism. Bayle's
scepticism was thus not only directed against scholasticism and
theology—the general opponent of the progressive philosophy
of the seventeenth c e n t u r y — b u t also against those features of
the metaphysical systems that had b e c o m e fetters on their
f u r t h e r p r o g r e s s in c o n d i t i o n s of rapidly d e v e l o p i n g scientific
knowledge. M a r x and Engels wrote of Bayle:

Pierre Bayle n o t o n l y p r e p a r e d t h e r e c e p t i o n of m a t e r i a l i s m a n d of
the philosophy of c o m m o n sense in F r a n c e by s h a t t e r i n g metaphysics
w i t h his s c e p t i c i s m . He h e r a l d e d t h e atheistic society w h i c h w a s s o o n
to c o m e i n t o e x i s t e n c e by proving t h a t a s o c i e t y c o n s i s t i n g only of
a t h e i s t s is possible, t h a t an a t h e i s t can be a m a n w o r t h y of r e s p e c t ,
a n d t h a t it is n o t by a t h e i s m b u t by s u p e r s t i t i o n a n d i d o l a t r y t h a t
m a n d e b a s e s himself ( 1 7 9 : 1 2 7 ) .

A n e w historical form of scepticism, reflecting the conversion

of t h e b o u r g e o i s i e into a c o n s e r v a t i v e class, w a s t h e d o c t r i n e
of David H u m e . T h e Scottish philosopher considered himself
a n o p p o n e n t o f 'excessive s c e p t i c i s m ' ; h e t r i e d t o c o u n t e r p o s e
' m i t i g a t e d s c e p t i c i s m ' ( 1 0 5 : 1 1 1 ) t o it, w h i c h i n h i s o p i n i o n
was a philosophy of c o m m o n sense obliging m a n to observe
r e a s o n a b l e c a u t i o n in his assertions. B u t his belief in t h e m o d ­
e r a t e n e s s of his s c e p t i c i s m was u n f o u n d e d ; he led t h e r e a d e r
i n t o e r r o r b e c a u s e h e w a s h i m s e l f m i s t a k e n . S c e p t i c i s m h a d its
objective logic t h a t c o m p e l l e d it to pass f r o m o n e n e g a t i o n to
another, and which it was impossible to avoid. In proclaiming
t h e g o a l o f s c e p t i c i s m t o b e ' t o d e s t r o y reason' ( 1 0 5 : 1 0 7 ) , s i n c e
i n q u i r y h a d t o r e f u t e all outward a u t h o r i t y , H u m e s u b j e c t i v e l y
belittled the significance of theoretical t h o u g h t . Both the
metaphysicians of the seventeenth century, and Bayle, and
H u m e ' s contemporaries, the French Enlighteners, categorically
o p p o s e d r e a s o n t o f a i t h . H u m e r e v i s e d t h i s p r i n c i p l e o f all t h e
progressive philosophy of the time and considered knowledge
a s p e c i a l k i n d of belief, w h i c h he d e f i n e d as ' m e r e l y a p e c u l i a r
feeling or sentiment (106:II,313). The objective logic of
s c e p t i c i s m i s s t r o n g e r t h a n t h e d e s i r e t o a v o i d its h a r m f u l
conclusions and hopeless contradictions. On the one hand H u m e
a s s e r t e d t h a t r e a s o n , o p e r a t i n g a c c o r d i n g t o its g e n e r a l p r i n c i p ­
l e s , i.e. b y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f l o g i c , ' l e a v e s n o t t h e l o w e s t d e g r e e
of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or c o m m o n

110
life' (106:I, 2 5 2 - 2 5 3 ) , and on the other hand declared: 'for to
me it seems evident, that the essence of the mind being unknown
to us with that of external bodies' (106:I,6). He consequently
both denied and recognised the significance of obviousness,
depending on what it was a matter of.
H u m e unconditionally rejected the possibility of finding an
indisputable truth that could serve as the point of departure
for further reasoning: 'But neither is there any such original
principle, which has a prerogative above others, that are self-
evident and convincing' (105:103). T h a t thesis was quite un­
avoidable for any sceptic. Nevertheless Hume not only suggest­
ed that principles of that kind (the doctrine of the correspon­
dence of ideas and perceptions) were indisputable but also re­
commended in a more general form that it was necessary 'to
begin with clear and self-evident principles' (ibid.).
Above I cited Hume's assertion about the impossibility of
knowing 'the essence of external bodies'. T h a t statement may
seem a phrase accidentally dropped, since he persistently stressed
that 'nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image
or perception' (105:104). But it was by no means a slip of the
pen, since he was really trying to combine incompatible proposi­
tions: 'We never really advance a step beyond ourselves' (106:I,
7 2 ) ; nevertheless 'external objects become known to us only
by those perceptions they occasion' (106:I, 7 1 ) . While denying
the objective reality of primary as well as of secondary qualities
(following Berkeley, whose doctrine he characterised as scepti­
cism), he did, however, consider that there was 'a certain-
unknown, inexplicable something, as the cause of our percep­
tions' (105:107).
T h e principle of causality was the main object, of course,
of Hume's critique. He denied the existence of objective causal
connections, arguing that any link was introduced by reason
into the stream of sense perceptions. Yet he regarded the above-
mentioned 'something' precisely as the objective cause of per­
ceptions, anticipating Kant's 'thing-in-itself. But if one really
held Hume's point of view, then the concept of existence had
no objective content: 'The idea of existence, then, is the very
same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent' (106:I,
71).
Hume himself was to some extent conscious that his philos­
ophy of common sense was not in tune with real common sense.
But the latter was essentially quite impossible from his point
of view. Common sense was only feasible in practice and in be­
haviour, the motives of which had neither a philosophical nor

1ll
a theoretical c h a r a c t e r . It was impossible to be consistent, ra­
tional, a n d logical in t h e s p h e r e of theory. T h e theorist was
t h e r e f o r e left s i m p l y t o c h o o s e b e t w e e n c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t w e r e
useful a n d a g r e e a b l e a n d others t h a t did n o t lead to e x p e r i e n c e s
of such a kind. And, anticipating pragmatism, H u m e declared:
t h a t ' I f I m u s t b e a f o o l , a s all t h o s e w h o r e a s o n o r b e l i e v e
a n y t h i n g certainly a r e , m y f o l l i e s s h a l l a t l e a s t b e n a t u r a l a n d
a g r e e a b l e ' ( 1 0 6 : I , 2 5 4 - 2 5 5 ) . B u t did n a t u r a l o r a g r e e a b l e folly
exist, a t least for t h e t h i n k e r ? H u m e s p o k e bitterly a b o u t t h e
'forelorn solitude, in which I am plac'd in my philosophy' (106:I,
2 4 9 ) . We see, consequently, that the 'mitigated scepticism' was
a t h e o r y that revealed a n d at the s a m e time veiled t h e c o n t r a d i c ­
tions of scepticism.
H u m e was the philosopher w h o e x p o u n d e d the doctrine of
scepticism with the greatest fullness, t h o r o u g h n e s s , and system;
t h a t i s w h y its u n s o u n d n e s s i s r e v e a l e d w i t h s p e c i a l c l a r i t y i n
his w o r k s , w h i c h , w h i l e insisting o n r e f r a i n i n g f r o m p h i l o s o p h ­
ical j u d g m e n t s , a d o p t e d t h e p o s e o f s u p r e m e a r b i t e r i n p h i l o ­
sophy and, while rejecting dogmatism, at the s a m e time convert­
e d his o w n theses i n t o d o g m a s .
H u m e , as we know, had a great influence on Kant, rousing
h i m ( t o u s e K a n t ' s e x p r e s s i o n ) f r o m d o g m a t i c s o m n o l e n c e , i.e.
from the 'pre-critical' views that he subsequently rejected.
K a n t regarded both dogmatism and scepticism as inevitable
stages in the history of h u m a n reason. T h e sceptic was right in
relation to the dogmatist, w h o was not a w a r e of the necessity
of a critical s t u d y of his f u n d a m e n t a l p r o p o s i t i o n s , a n d of t h e
cognitive peculiarities of m a n in general. But scepticism claimed
too m u c h , while it w a s in fact

a r e s t i n g - p l a c e for r e a s o n , in w h i c h it m a y reflect on its d o g m a t i c a l

w a n d e r i n g s , and gain s o m e k n o w l e d g e of the region in which it h a p p e n s
to b e , that it m a y p u r s u e its w a y with g r e a t e r c e r t a i n t y ; b u t it c a n n o t
be its p e r m a n e n t d w e l l i n g - p l a c e . It must t a k e up its a b o d e o n l y in the
r e g i o n o f c o m p l e t e c e r t i t u d e , w h e t h e r this r e l a t e s t o t h e c o g n i t i o n o f
o b j e c t s t h e m s e l v e s , o r t o t h e limits w h i c h b o u n d all o u r c o g n i t i o n
(116:434).

In spite of his d o c t r i n e of 'things-in-themselves' u n k n o w a b l e

in principle, and the d e p e n d e n c e of the world of p h e n o m e n a
on the s t r u c t u r e of h u m a n cognitive abilities, K a n t not only
did n o t c o n s i d e r h i m s e l f a s c e p t i c , b u t s u g g e s t e d t h a t only his
d o c t r i n e finally o v e r c a m e scepticism. T h a t w a s n o s i m p l e
illusion. K a n t really disagreed with H u m e and his predecessors
on a n u m b e r of questions, although in the final count he
c o n t i n u e d the s a m e line in philosophy.

112
 F r o m point of view of Kant, who inordinately limited the
concept of scepticism, and so the task of overcoming it, the
essence of this doctrine consisted in a denial of the possibility of
judgments that had strict universality and necessity. 19
He
reproached H u m e for not recognising, along with empirical
synthesis of perceptions, the a priori synthetic judgments that
alone make theoretical knowledge possible. 'This sceptical
philosopher did not distinguish these two kinds of judgments'
(116:436). F r o m his point of view empiricism was doomed to
sceptical conclusions when it did not resort to the aid of aprior­
ism. But the sceptics, of course, criticised the apriorism of
seventeenth-century metaphysics, convincingly demonstrating
its unsoundness. Kant agreed with that critique as regards the
a priori not being some content of knowledge and not being
a means of supra-experiential knowledge, which was impossible
in principle. But sceptics, according to him, did not see the
possibility of a rational understanding of the a priori and came
to the mistaken conclusion that it did not in general exist.
But a priori principles (i.e. pre-experiential, and possessing
universal and necessary significance) did exist but they possessed
only a form of knowledge applicable only to experience, which
was impossible as something ordered, properly speaking,
without them.
We see what a dear price Kant paid for this partial, and in
many ways illusory overcoming of the sceptic denial of the
possibility of categorial synthesis and theoretical knowledge
in general, for a priori forms of contemplation (space and
time) and a priori forms of thinking (categories) were subject­
ive, i.e. inapplicable to a reality existing prior to cognition
and irrespective of it. They were applicable only to the world
of phenomena, which was treated as being correlative to the
knowing subject. T h e objectivity of the world of phenomena,
which Kant doggedly stressed, consists not in its being inde­
pendent of cognition but rather in the mechanism of their forma­
tion during cognition not being dependent on the subject's will.
When Kant spoke of the universality of space, time, causal­
ity, and other categories, this universality was limited to the
world of phenomena. 'Things-in-themselves' were therefore
unknowable. A condition of the knowability of the object
forms its dependence on knowing; reality independent of
cognition is unknowable in principle.
Kant also differed from the sceptics in recognising the attain­
ability of truth, the possibility of differentiating truth from error
and, furthermore, the possibility of scientific, theoretical know-

8-01603 113
ledge. Cognition of p h e n o m e n a was not limited by any bounds,
but progressing knowledge of the world of p h e n o m e n a did not
bring us a whit closer to the 'things-in-themselves', i.e. to objec­
tive reality, which was treated as above experience and trans­
cendental.
Kant thus did not defeat scepticism. Like the sceptics he
interpreted cognition subjectively and recognised something un­
knowable, this something, moreover, being not some infinitely
remote residue left (as Herakleitos put it) at the bottom of a
bottomless well, but everything that gave rise to sensations, i.e.
objective reality. Kant's scepticism consisted in his mode of inter­
preting the fact of knowledge rather than in denying it. In order
to understand this form of scepticism properly, which differs
essentially from Hume's (not to mention earlier forms), it is
important to stress that the unknowable 'thing-in-itself was not
the starting point of Kant's doctrine, but its end result. He
created it not in order to prove the existence of an unknowable
reality, but with the aim of substantiating the knowability of
the world of phenomena in principle and the possibility of
science as theoretical knowledge embracing universal and
necessary judgments. But his anti-dialectical understanding of
the universality and necessity of theoretical judgments as abso­
lute universality and absolute necessity led to his opposing
a priori principles to empirical data, to a dualism of phenome­
na and 'things-in-themselves', of the world of experience and
the transcendental, and ultimately to a subjectivist, agnostic
interpretation both of cognition and of knowable reality.
Considering the difference between Kant's doctrine and
Humism and other varieties of scepticism, it is expedient to call
it agnosticism rather than scepticism, although this term did not
yet exist in his day. Scepticism and agnosticism are doctrines
of the same type, of course, but the differences between them
are substantial and the student of philosophy should not ignore
them.
T h e agnostic, like the sceptic, denies the knowability of
objective reality or even throws doubt on its very existence,
but he does not deny either the possibility of theoretical know­
ledge or the attainability of truth, and accordingly does not stick
to the principle of refraining from theoretical judgments. Agno­
sticism can be regarded as a form of scepticism that developed
in the period when science had achieved social recognition, and
its outstanding advances were making the old sceptical denial of
the possibility of science simply impossible; despite the commonly
held view, facts also play a significant role in philosophy.

114
 T h e term 'agnosticism' was introduced into scientific currency
by the famous English Darwinist Т . Н . Huxley, who counter­
posed the concept of agnosticism not only to the forgotten
Christian gnosticism but also to theology in general, and to the
dogmatic (in his opinion) scientific theories that followed from
the allegedly unscientific assumption that everything could be
known. Huxley claimed that agnosticism was not in fact a profes­
sion of faith but a method, the essence of which consisted in
strict application of a principle (see 49:21). He defined this
principle positively as recognition only of that as true which
had been quite firmly established and which therefore did not
evoke doubts of any kind. T h e gist of this fundamental
proposition was defined negatively as refusal to recognise as
truth that which has not been fully proved or adequately
confirmed.
T h e agnosticism of Huxley and the philosophers and scien­
tists who agreed with him did not consist simply in demands
for scientific rigorousness that ruled out credulity and neglect
of the criteria of scientific character (demands acceptable
to the most consistent adherents of the principle of the knowa­
bility of the world) but also in convictions that scientific
methods of inquiry were in principle inapplicable to objects
of religious belief and also to matter and force, since by these
was meant not separate material phenomena and the forces
operating in them but what was thought of as the general es­
sence of these things and processes. Huxley thus not only
counterposed science to religion but also tried to discover in
science itself a radical antithesis of reason and faith, and so to
register their principle unknowable but not transcendental.
T h e physiologist du Bois­Reymond, who was close to Huxley's
agnosticism, claimed that the most exact knowledge of the
processes taking place in man's brain and nervous system did not
provide any possibility of comprehending their essence. In
his work Über die Grenzen des Naturerkennens (Leipzig,
1873, p. 34) he argued that there were seven problems unre­
solvable in principle: viz., (1) the nature of matter and force;
(2) the origin of motion; (3) the origin of life; (4) the orderly
arrangement of nature; (5) the origin of simple sensation and
consciousness; (6) the nature of thought and speech; and
(7) the question of freedom of will (see 82:12­13). Haeckel
convincingly showed, in his Riddle of the U niverse, which
caused a storm in university circles, that science was nearing
solution of all these problems, and had partially answered them.
Nevertheless he also tried to establish the boundaries of possible

115
k n o w l e d g e , i.e. t o i n d i c a t e s o m e t h i n g i n p r i n c i p l e u n k n o w a b l e .
' T h e m o n i s t i c p h i l o s o p h y , ' h e d e c l a r e d , 'is u l t i m a t e l y c o n f r o n t e d
with b u t o n e simple and c o m p r e h e n s i v e e n i g m a — t h e " p r o b l e m
of s u b s t a n c e " ' ( 8 2 : 1 2 ) .
Engels called H u x l e y ' s agnosticism a n d that of related
s c i e n t i s t - t h i n k e r s shamefaced materialism ( 5 2 : 3 4 7 ) . T h a t was
a v e r y apt definition t h a t m a d e it p o s s i b l e to d i s t i n g u i s h t h e
p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t m a t e r i a l i s m o f scientists f r o m K a n ­
t i a n a g n o s t i c i s m , w h i c h c o m b i n e d d u a l i s m with i d e a l i s m a n d
u l t i m a t e l y passed t o t h e s t a n c e o f t h e l a t t e r .
T h e 'shamefaced' materialist agnostic in essence a c k n o w l e d g e d
all t h e r e a l c o n c r e t e p r o b l e m s o f s c i e n c e a n d p h i l o s o p h y
to be solvable; what he called unsolvable enigmas were incor­
rectly formulated problems t h e anti-dialectical posing of which
blocked the way to their solution.
T h e agnostic of the type of H u x l e y or Haeckel was an
inconsistent materialist (usually of the metaphysical, mechanis­
tic t y p e ) , a n d o p p o n e n t o f t h e religious, idealist o u t l o o k o n
t h e w o r l d . B u t h e d i s s o c i a t e d himself f r o m m a t e r i a l i s m , w h i c h
h a d a b a d r e p u t a t i o n in b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y . H a e c k e l , for e x a m ­
ple, called his o u t l o o k not m a t e r i a l i s t b u t m o n i s t i c , a n d even
p r e a c h e d a s o r t of ' m o n i s t i c r e l i g i o n ' t h a t on c l o s e r e x a m i ­
nation proved to be polite atheism.
P u r e monism [he wrote] is identical neither with the theoretical
materialism that denies the existence of spirit, and dissolves the world
into a heap of dead atoms, nor with the theoretical spiritualism
(lately entitled 'energetic' spiritualism by Ostwald) which rejects the
notion of matter and considers the world to be a specially-arranged
group of 'energies', or immaterial natural forces (82:16-17).

T h e r e i s n o n e e d t o p r o v e t h a t t h e position o f H u x l e y a n d his
a s s o c i a t e s i n t h e l a t t e r half o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y w a s h i s t o r ­
ically p r o g r e s s i v e a n d as a m a t t e r of f a c t a n t i - r e l i g i o u s . So it
is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e why the English writer G.K.Chesterton, an
a d h e r e n t of T h o m i s m , ruefully wrote: ' N o w so m a n y bishops
a r e agnostics' (35:432). 2 0

E n g e l s stressed t h a t s c i e n t i s t s ' ' s h a m e f a c e d m a t e r i a l i s m ' ,

t h o u g h t h e y c a l l e d i t a g n o s t i c i s m , differed e s s e n t i a l l y f r o m t h e
Kantian doctrine of 'things-in-themselves'. T h e latter, according
to Kant, w e r e outside time and space and could not be an
o b j e c t of c o g n i t i o n . But, as E n g e l s p o i n t e d out 'scientists t a k e
c a r e not to apply the p h r a s e about the thing-in-itself no natural
s c i e n c e , t h e y p e r m i t t h e m s e l v e s this only i n p a s s i n g i n t o p h i l o s ­
o p h y ' ( 5 1 : 2 4 1 ) . If a s c i e n t i s t a p p l i e d t h e c o n c e p t ' t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f
t o p h e n o m e n a c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e o b j e c t o f his r e s e a r c h , h e w o u l d

116
find himself in an embarrassing position, i.e. he would have
to go much further than Kant (according to whose doctrine
phenomena were knowable) and say that a dog, it seems, has
four legs, and so on. No scientist, of course, would go so far;
his argument about the unknowable relates only to what he is
not engaged in knowing and which seems to him to belong
essentially to the competence of philosophy. T h a t indicates that
'shamefaced materialism' in essence shares the prejudices of
those empiricist scientists who fence themselves off in every way
from philosophy and imagine themselves quite free of its
'prejudices', but in fact are under the influence of the most
outmoded and eclectic philosophical conceptions.
Agnosticism thus, even in the weakened form in which it
is expressed by certain empiricist-scientists, is by no means the
outcome proper of natural sciences, even when it is based on
real contradictions in their development. It is the reflection
in science of subjective and agnostic notions prevailing in
bourgeois society. One must therefore not counterpose this
agnosticism absolutely to Kantianism and Humism; they have
many ideas in common. As Ilichev has rightly remarked:
the spectre of the unknowable 'thing-in-itself inevitably arises every­
where where the contradictions of the cognitive process are not
rationally resolved, which is inevitable, of course, with a metaphysical
understanding of this process and its specific difficulties, contradictions,
and historical limitedness (107:20).

My brief digression into the history of scepticism lacks a

last necessary link, namely a description of contemporary
agnosticism which, unlike its forerunners, is concerned almost
exclusively with a critique of scientific knowledge. In its irra­
tional form this critique is a further 'deepening' of the Nietz­
schean principle of the 'revaluing of values'. As for positivist
agnosticism, it comes forward as (sic!) a denial of agnosticism
and a strict scientific interpretation of scientific knowledge.
Nietzsche considered that when striving for truth became a
passion (the ideal of Spinozism) it was evidence of a degradation
of the substantial will to power ( a u t h o r i t y ) . He valued know­
ledge only ecologically as a means of adaptation to the environ­
ment. This limited view suggested the following conclusion: a
'will to power' needed useful fallacies more than truth. In fact,
he declared, 'suppose we want the truth: why not rather untruth?
and uncertainty? even ignorance?' (195:9). What role, come to
that, do truth and adequate knowledge play? Nietzsche had no
unambiguous answer to that: unlike Kant he did not consider
consistency an achievement of philosophy. Sometimes he asserted

117
that knowledge and t r u t h were no m o r e t h a n illusions since
this seeming world was essentially unique. In other cases he saw
a fatal destiny, threat, and challenge in knowledge and truth:
it might be a basic characteristic of existence that those who would
know it completely would perish, in which case the strength of a spirit
should be measured according to how much of the 'truth' one could
still barely endure—or to put it more clearly, to what degree one would
require it to be thinned down, shrouded, sweetened, blunted, falsified
(195:49).

T h e Nietzschean conception of truth and knowledge registered

a contradiction i n h e r e n t in bourgeois ideological consciousness,
but it was not this contradiction that animated Nietzsche's
irrationalist epistemology. T h e basis of his epistemological
pessimism lay in an aristocratic fear of the spread of knowledge
a m o n g the masses, w h o would b e c o m e enlightened in the
struggle against the 'elite' by c o m p r e h e n d i n g t h e basic truths
about which they had always been kept in ignorance.
T h e scepticism of antiquity and of m o d e r n times stemmed
from a high evaluation of knowledge, but considered it, alas,
an unattainable ideal. Nietzsche developed an anti-intelleclualist
view that, although opposed to Christian doctrine, was quite
close to the belief in the futility and even harmfulness of
knowledge characteristic of the latter. T h e latest irrationalism
is a further development of the Nietzschean epistemological
nihilism, though it does not h a v e such an e x t r a v a g a n t c h a r a c t e r .
Its distinguishing feature is denial of the n e e d for h a r m o n y
between knowledge and man's practical achievements, for
e x a m p l e , in the s p h e r e of material production. Mastering of the
elemental forces of n a t u r e , according to the doctrine of irration­
alism, is therefore by no means evidence of the progress of
knowledge and ever d e e p e r penetration into the essence of
natural p h e n o m e n a . ' W e have no better vision of n a t u r e and
life than some of our predecessors', G e o r g e S a n t a y a n a wrote,
'but we have g r e a t e r material resources' ( 2 3 4 : 2 7 ) . What is this
proliferation of material resources due to? Irrationalism sup­
poses it is connected with cognition of the external, but insists
that knowing of this kind blocks the way to u n d e r s t a n d i n g the
profound essence of being.
Existentialism, we know, proclaimed a c a m p a i g n against the
'spirit of abstraction' p r o p e r to science, which naturally ascends
from the directly observed and k n o w n to t h e u n k n o w n , ob­
servable only by indirect means, which is possible only by form­
ing abstractions of a h i g h e r and h i g h e r level, since c o n c r e t e
understanding of the patterns d e t e r m i n i n g directly observable

118
processes can only be built up from them. Existentialism inter­
prets this process subjectively as a permanent distancing of
science from reality. T h e scientist does not comprehend this
tragedy of scientific cognition, while the irrationalist philos­
opher, free of intellectualist illusions, understands that know­
ledge is only realised ignorance.
T h e pseudodialectical (relativist) elimination of the antithesis
between knowledge and ignorance guided the Spanish exist­
entialist Ortega у Gasset to a quite free-will interpretation
of physics, which he characterised as a special kind of poetry
that created its own peculiar 'abstractionist' world, i.e. the
universes of Newton and of Einstein. T h e world of physics, he
suggested, 'can be only a reality of the fourth of fifth degree'
(200:96), which means that the probability of its existence is
correspondingly less than the probability of the existence of
'human reality', i.e. existence and its objectivisation.
But it is of course—I repeat—a reality. By reality I mean everything
with which I have to reckon.
And today I have to reckon with the world of Einstein and De
Broglie (ibid.).

T h e goblins and hobgoblins that the superstitious person

fancies lurk in every dark corner are real for him. One can,
of course, say that goblins exist, certainly in the imagina­
tion. By obliterating the antithesis between subjective and
objective reality, Ortega suggested that it was only a differ­
ence of degree. Hence it followed that physical reality was
actually more doubtful than imaginary reality, distinguished by
undoubted existence.
What the physical world is, we do not know, nor even what is an
objective world, hence a world that is not only the world of each
but the world common to all (200:74).

T h e existentialist denial of criteria of objective reality (practice)

is a reduction of reality to 'human reality', to images of the
mind interpreted not as reflections of objective reality, but
as reality itself, a situation experienced by the human individual.
This latest version of the old agnostic conception that we know
only the content of the mind, which cannot jump out of
itself and break through sensation to whatever is other. But
the mind (consciousness) does not exist in itself, autonomously,
independent of the world and of practical activity, which links
it firmly with things. Practice is the way out from the confines
of consciousness and, moreover, is a conscious way out.
T h e existentialist loves to argue that to exist means to be in

119
a c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n : I exists o n l y in u n b r e a k a b l e c o n n e c t i o n
w i t h t h e n o t - I . A n d h e s t u b b o r n l y f e n c e s c o n s c i o u s n e s s off
f r o m b e i n g , a r g u i n g t h a t it is n o t c o n s c i o u s n e s s of b e i n g , b u t
o n l y c o n s c i o u s n e s s of w h a t is, w h i c h differs r a d i c a l l y f r o m
b e i n g . T h e d u a l i s m o f m i n d a n d b e i n g , i.e. t h e m y t h o f t h e
p r i m o r d i a l a l i e n a t i o n o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , c o n s t i t u t e s t h e basis
of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t a g n o s t i c i s m . ' T o k n o w b e i n g as it is,' S a r t r e
w r o t e , 'it i s n e c e s s a r y t o b e i t ' ( 2 3 5 : 2 7 0 ) . T h e K a n t i a n
'thing-in-itself is transformed into 'being-in-itself, and the
world of cognised p h e n o m e n a has b e c o m e simply consciousness,
or ' c o n s c i o u s n e s s of m i n d ' .
Existentialist agnosticism transforms into a new, frequently
irreligious mode the Christian conception of the unreality
of h u m a n e x i s t e n c e , w h i c h is r e v e a l e d , in p a r t i c u l a r , in
s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t t h e u n r e a l i t y o f k n o w i n g a n d t h e illusori­
n e s s of its object. H e n c e , t o o , t h e d e n i a l of t h e p l e a s u r e of
knowing, related to Nietzscheanism, which is mainly connected
with n e g a t i v e e m o t i o n s , a n d p r i m a r i l y with f e a r t h a t P a n d o r a ' s
b o x w o u l d b e o p e n e d . T h e r e s e r v a t i o n s o f all s o r t s t h a t w h a t
is m e a n t h e r e is not o r d i n a r y , vulgar fear alter nothing.
About whom and what can I, [Camus wrote] in effect, say: 'I know
that!'
This heart inside me I can put to the test, and I deem it to exist. This
world I can touch, and again I deem it to exist. T h e r e all my
knowledge stops, the rest is construction. For if I try to seize this me
of which I am sure, if I try to define it and to sum it up, it is no more
than water that runs through my fingers (28:34).

W h y t h e n d o e s t h e closest a n d u n d o u b t e d p r o v e i n e s s e n c e t o b e
incomprehensible? T h e a n s w e r is the existentialist doctrine
about the 'schism' between subject and object that C a m u s sup­
p l e m e n t e d with a thesis a b o u t t h e s e l f - a l i e n a t i o n of e x i s t e n c e
itself.
T h e rift between the certainty I have of my existence and the content
that I try to give that certainty will never be filled. I shall always be
a stranger to myself. T h e r e are truths in psychology as in logic, but no
truth (28:34).

I t m u s t n o t b e t h o u g h t t h a t this h o p e l e s s ( a s h e p u t it) s i t u a ­
t i o n i n t h e s p h e r e o f c o g n i t i o n r e a l l y h o r r i f i e d C a m u s : for e v e r y ­
thing that science knows m e a n s nothing for an individual who
exists, i.e. w h o is c o n s c i o u s of his m o r t a l i t y . 'It is u t t e r l y i m m a ­
terial w h e t h e r the earth or the sun rotates a r o u n d the other. In
s h o r t it is a trifling q u e s t i o n ' ( 2 8 : 1 6 ) . B u t w h a t is n o t a trifle?
T h e f a c t t h a t m a n i s m o r t a l , t h a t life l a c k s s e n s e , t h a t t h e a b s u r d
is the most fundamental p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l reality.

120
 T h u s t h e knowable is trivial or terrible; t h e existential­
ist likes to lay on the colours. He therefore ascribes the
greatest heuristic significance to fear, and considers science
the source of existential fallacies. Real knowledge terrifies
the existentialist, ignorance inspires hope. Long before the
rise of contemporary existentialism Timiryazev ridiculed this
pretentiously unoriginal, though eloquent 'mystic ecstasy of
the ignoramus, beating his breast, and wailing ecstatically:
"I do not understand! I have not caught on! I never shall!"'
(255:439). With a few slight corrections that also applies
to the irrationalist agnosticism of our day.
During the half-century of logical positivism's existence
it has changed its stance many times. Substantial disagree­
ments between its spokesmen a r e also characteristic of it.
Nevertheless scepticism in the H u m e a n sense, however, remains
the common ideological platform of all neopositivism. As the
Canadian historian of philosophy Wisdom justly remarks, neo­
positivism is 'a meta-ontological negativism, is a negative
ontology, based on a sceptical epistemology' (263:205). Log­
ical positivist scepticism does not call itself either scepti­
cism or agnosticism; it preaches a purging of science from 'me­
taphysics'. T h e neopositivist usually stresses that not only
are pseudopropositions 'metaphysical' but so are their nega­
tions, which should also be considered pseudopropositions. Thus,
from the standpoint of logical positivism, the following pairs
of mutually exclusive propositions are identically unsound:
The world is knowable in The world is unknowable in
principle principle
There is a realily independent There is no reality independent
of cognition of cognition
Even statements of the type of 'I do not know whether or not
there is an external world' a r e considered scientifically meaning­
less since t h e notion of an external world is defined as
a pseudoconcept. This stance differs little from that of scep­
ticism, the whole wisdom of which boils down to a demand to
refrain from philosophical judgments. Logical positivism, it is
true, has concretised this imperative: refrain from 'metaphysi­
cal' judgments. But logical positivists interpret 'metaphysics'
very broadly. N o n e of them can, in essence, draw a clear line
of demarcation between 'metaphysical' and scientific judgments.
Even in science such a line proves beyond them. T h e task has
simply been incorrectly formulated. With them the concept
'metaphysics' proved essentially to be a pseudoconcept. Their
claim to rise above the antithesis of 'dogmatism' and scepti-

121
cism proved in fact to be an eclectic reconciliation of the
former with the latter.
T h e logical positivist 'third way' is thus an idealist empiricism
that does not, however, extend to logical and mathematical
propositions. T h e latter a r e characterised as non-empirical and
consequently analytical or tautological. By means of that limita­
tion of the competence of empiricism neopositivists have tried
to cope with the arguments of Kant, who demonstrated the
possibility, despite empiricism (and scepticism), of judgments
with a strict universality and necessity. Logical positivists
object that judgments of that kind a r e only possible as logical
and mathematical ones that are not based on facts but on
agreement among scientists about terms and their definitions and
applications. Neither logic nor mathematics cognise anything.
T h a t is the thesis of agnosticism, of the most sophisticated
kind, it is true.
T h e a priori does not exist, logical positivists declare with
reason. All judgments relating to facts therefore have no real
universality and necessity. So, if any factual proposition relates
to an unlimited class of objects, it has a 'metaphysical' c h a r a c ­
ter; it is not verifiable (in the positivist sense, of course, the
inadequacy of which is now recognised even by positivists
themselves) and is not demonstrable in a purely logical way.
This line of argument is distinguished by a greater rigo­
rousness than that of the Greek Sceptics or even Hume. It un­
doubtedly poses essential epistemological problems, but no
more; we do not find a single new idea in it.
T h e Greek Sceptics said that all philosophical judgments
were refutable. T h e y also, it is true, included mathematics
in philosophy and also tried to refute it. Contemporary po­
sitivism seems more modest; it rejects only 'metaphysical' sen­
tences. But it turns out in fact that any proposition of science,
insofar as it relates to an unlimited class of objects, must
be considered 'metaphysical' from the standpoint of logical
positivism. This not only applies to formulations of the laws
of n a t u r e but also to sentences like 'all bodies have extension',
'everything living is mortal', and so on.
Logical positivists h a v e long felt that they present such
'rigorous' demands to science that their fulfilment would pos­
sibly make it purer, but of course less productive. Science re­
jected this unjustified epistemological rigorousness based on
a separation of theory from practice, and logical positivists
have been compelled in fact to reject the verifiability prin­
ciple, and to replace it by that of confirmation. But that con-

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cession to science (and so to 'metaphysics') also proved insuf­
ficient, and empirical sentences themselves (like logico-mathe­
matical ones) ultimately began to be interpreted as essential­
ly conventional or arbitrary, i.e. based on 'rules of the game'
specified by an ordinary or artificial language.
T h e collapse of t h e principle of verifiability brought into
being a principle of falsifiability, formulated by Popper, at
first glance absolutely contrary to it. Whereas empirical state­
ments had previously been counted as scientifically meaning­
ful only insofar as they were 'verified' or 'confirmed'
(I put these words in inverted commas so as to empha­
sise the limited character of the logical positivist interpre­
tation of these p r o c e d u r e s ) , now these same statements have
acquired the status of scientific character to the extent that
they can be comprehended as refutable. 'A theory which is not
refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific. Irrefuta­
bility is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think)
but a vice' 21
(213:159).
I am not referring here to the grain of truth that is contained
in Popper's seemingly quite extravagant statement, viz.,
that a statement about an unlimited number of facts cannot be
confirmed by any finite n u m b e r of facts (no matter how l a r g e ) ,
while a single fact not agreeing with it is enough to refute
it. Bacon formulated that in his doctrine of the role of neg­
ative instances in the process of induction. T h e 'original­
ity' of Popper's conception consequently is that he for­
mulated a subjective principle of absolute relativism by which
any description of facts ultimately proves to be a fallacy.
This is the most sophisticated version of the latest agnosticism,
whose roots (it is not difficult to show) are discoverable
in the epistemological constructs of irrationalism.
Popper started from the point that science is constantly
formulating an endless number of factual propositions whose
universality cannot be confirmed precisely because of their
factual character. These propositions cannot be repudiated be­
cause science is impossible without them. To acknowledge their
truth, since they are constantly being confirmed, is also im­
possible, according to Popper (because the dialectics of rela­
tive and absolute truth is quite incomprehensible to h i m ) .
Sooner or later, he declares, these propositions will be refut­
ed, which is why they must be considered scientific. T h e poor
Greek Sceptics!—it never even entered their heads that an at­
tribute of scientism was refutability. If they had known that
in time philosophy would have been saved!

123
 So, from Popper's point of view, scientific assertions pos­
sessing unlimited universality are necessary scientific fallacies
(he seemingly would not accept this term and would say
refutable t r u t h s ) . We already find this bent for witticisms,
however, in Nietzsche who, without claiming to develop a scien­
tific methodology, wrote: 'we are fundamentally inclined to
claim that the falsest judgments (which include the synthetic
judgments a priori) a r e the most indispensable for us' (195:12).
Nietzsche said—for us; Popper specifies—for science.
Nietzsche not only showed the necessity of mistaken, gener­
ally affirmative judgments but directly declared, without any
pedantry: 'It is certainly not the least c h a r m of a theory that
it is refutable; it is precisely thereby that it attracts sub­
tler minds (195:24). Popper also defined m o r e exactly here:
refutability gives a scientific character to a theory and not
charm.
I am quite disinclined to accuse the worthy professor of
plagiarism. Coincidences do happen. And so, too, does congeni­
ality—congeniality between the 'critical rationalist' and the
irrationalist, the theorist of rigorous scientism and the think­
er who treated science as decadence. They agree on one point,
viz., a subjectivist agnostic interpretation of knowledge and
the process of cognition.
T h e latest form of positivist scepticism is thus absolute
relativism. It starts from the point, long established in phi­
losophy, but which has become specially obvious owing to the
advances of science in this century, that our knowledge (the
most reliable, exact, and scientific included) has a relative
character. Its relativity consists in its inevitable incomplete­
ness, appoximateness, and dependence on the specific laws
of the process of cognition. Exhaustive knowledge is possible
only in the form of a statement of the fact which is (so to
say) already 'exhausted', i.e. cannot be repeated, and if, be­
sides, this statement satisfies the requirements of logic that
delimit it.
T h e relativity of knowledge has not always been realised
of course, and even now is not always acknowledged. T h e r e was
a time when mathematicians were not a w a r e that Euclid's ge­
ometry did not fully describe the properties of space. A fallacy
of a subjectivist character followed from that, viz., the uni­
versalisation of Euclidean space. Such fallacies also occur
today, since awareness of the relativity of any knowledge pre­
supposes not only an appropriate methodological orientation,
but also investigation of this relativity. Relative truth is

124
objective truth, and it is an error to go beyond its limits
(in particular, to universalise it). T h e subjectivist ignores
the objective content of a relative truth, interpreting rela­
tivity as subjectivity or, what is the same thing, as refut­
ability.
This conclusion is a corollary of the metaphysical abso­
lutising of the relativity of knowledge, of the divorce of
scientific ideas from the objects they reflect, and a denial
of either the objective reality of these objects or the pos­
sibility of reliable knowledge of their existence.
We know from the history of science that scientific notions
of matter, atoms, molecules, space, time, etc., have altered
substantially, and that this was brought about by the development
of knowledge and not by changes in the p h e n o m e n a themselves.
This fact, i.e. the absence of a direct link between change
in the object and the change in scientific ideas about it, merits
special epistemological investigation. It indicates the specific
patterns of development of cognition, its passage from one level
to another, higher one. Logical positivists interpret this fact as if
the changing scientific ideas were essentially subjective ones.
Hypotheses about the n a t u r e of ether were developed over
2,000 years and certain, allegedly inherent properties were as­
cribed to it, until it was shown that no ether whatsoever exist­
ed. Such is roughly the inner logic of the relativist's argu­
ments. If one agrees with him, one has to recognise that the
existence of the scientific concepts of matter, space, time,
etc., is not evidence of the real existence of matter, space,
and time; science does not prove the existence of objective
reality, and the history of science offers a choice of a host
of different scientific pictures of the world. Is it worth both­
ering to fix on any one of them? For it will inevitably be
replaced by a new one. 22

One discovers the unity of the epistemological sources of

contemporary positivist agnosticism and subjective idealism in
that. Both claim that there is no evidence in the content of
knowledge of its dependence on the object of knowing since the
content of knowledge is constantly being transformed by the proc­
ess of cognition. This whole argument is built on a one-sided
statement of fact, from which agnostic conclusions a r e then
drawn. But the development of cognition consists as well in
changes in existing scientific notions (I stress 'as well' be­
cause new scientific ideas also appear that supplement those al­
ready available). It is not enough, however, simply to ascertain
the c h a n g e in scientific ideas, because this process occurs in

125
a definite d i r e c t i o n , o n e o f c o m i n g e v e r c l o s e r t o t h e o b j e c t .
T h e agnostic, h o w e v e r , begins to protest at this point that we
h a v e no right to s p e a k of t h e a p p r o x i m a t i o n of scientific ideas
to objects b e c a u s e we only h a v e notions (representations) at
o u r d i s p o s a l . W e c a n , o f c o u r s e , call s o m e n o t i o n s objects a n d
o t h e r s descriptions of t h e m . It is t h e old B e r k e l e i a n a n d Hu­
m e a n a r g u m e n t : w e c a n n o t e x c e e d t h e limits o f o u r conscious­
ness. E v e n w h e n a t h e o r y is confirmed, that does not p r o v e that
t h e objects it describes exist i n d e p e n d e n t l y , irrespective of t h e
process of cognition; they a r e p e r h a p s results of cognition,
t h e s a m e a s t h e t h e o r y itself.
T h e British M a r x i s t J o h n L e w i s pointed out that even t h e
Papal Inquisition took a pragmatic stance w h e n evaluating
Copernicus' hypothesis:
C a r d i n a l Bellarmine tried to p e r s u a d e Galileo to d e s c r i b e t h e p l a n e t a r y
theory as no m o r e t h a n an instrument of calculation, and not a descrip­
tion o f t h e a c t u a l u n i v e r s e ( 1 5 0 : 4 9 ) .

T h e point of view of c o n t e m p o r a r y neopositivism is the same;

when comparing various theories about one and the same matter
it suggests c h o o s i n g the o n e that is m o r e c o n v e n i e n t and effec­
t i v e , w i t h o u t p o s i n g t h e ' m e t a p h y s i c a l ' q u e s t i o n o f its c o r ­
respondence to objective reality. T h e fact of t h e existence of
v a r i o u s solutions of o n e a n d the s a m e p r o b l e m or different in­
terpretations of o n e and t h e s a m e fact a r e evidence (according
to t h e d o c t r i n e of logical positivism) of t h e scientific a b s u r d ­
ity o f s u c h c o n c e p t s a s ' o b j e c t i v e t r u t h ' , ' o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y ' ,
etc. F r o m that a n g l e it is not simply an u n r e s o l v a b l e task to
establish t h e o b j e c t i v e c o n t e n t of a t h e o r y but a pointless
exercise of the 'metaphysicians'. It is w o r t h stressing that
t h e 'critical rationalism' w h i c h has s u c c e e d e d logical posi­
tivism i n t h e m a i n d e v e l o p s this s a m e subjectivist-agnostic p h i l o s o ­
phy of science. N a t u r a l science, in w h o s e n a m e logical positiv­
ists a n d p o s t p o s i t i v i s t s s p e a k , i s c a t e g o r i c a l l y h o s t i l e t o s u c h
an interpretation of science. As M a r x Born wrote:

N a t u r a l s c i e n c e is s i t u a t e d at t h e e n d of this s e r i e s , at t h e p o i n t w h e r e
t h e ego, t h e s u b j e c t , p l a y s o n l y a n i n s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t ; e v e r y a d v a n c e i n
t h e mouldings of the concepts of physics, a s t r o n o m y and chemistry
denotes a f u r t h e r step t o w a r d s the goal of e x c l u d i n g t h e ego. T h i s does
not, of course, deal with t h e act of k n o w i n g , which is b o u n d to the
subject, but with t h e finished p i c t u r e of N a t u r e , t h e basis of w h i c h is the
idea t h a t t h e o r d i n a r y w o r l d exists i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f a n d u n i n f l u e n c e d
by the process of k n o w i n g (21:2).

Lenin brought o u t , i n h i s Materialism and E m p i r i o - C r i t i ­

cism, t h e link of positivist agnosticism ( a n d in p a r t i c u l a r

126
absolute relativism) with the methodological crisis in physics.
Discovery of the electron structure of matter, and rejection
of the mechanistic-materialist notion of it, had been inter­
preted as the 'annihilation' of matter, i.e. a refutation of
what t h e preceding, insufficiently developed science had con­
sidered to exist. Lenin showed the indissoluble link of posi­
tivist agnosticism with idealism, and likewise the theoretical
roots of absolute relativism. Against the 'physical' idealists
(among whom there were some eminent physicists), Lenin
affirmed, starting from the dialectical-materialist understanding
of cognition and of the objective world, that the interpretation
of matter provided by the latest physics did not discard the
old physics, that the change in scientific concepts of matter
was evidence of a m o r e profound knowledge of it, and not that
there was nothing objectively real corresponding to them. It
is important to note that physicists themselves subsequently
c a m e to this sole correct epistemological conclusion. Planck,
for instance, pointed out in his ' T h e Sense and Limits of
Exact Science' that the scientific picture of the world was a
reflection of objective reality which was already known to some
extent in everyday practice, that it was not complete and fi­
nal, and that the change in it was evidence of the develop­
ment of knowledge of the objective world.
The former picture of the world is consequently retained, but it now
appears as a special part of a yet bigger, fuller, and at the same time
more homogeneous picture. And it is so in all cases, so far as our
experience goes (208:17).
It will be readily understood that the theoretical basis of
logical positivist agnosticism is idealist empiricism, correspond­
ing in the main to Mach's 'psychology of knowledge'. Mach,
however, 'imprudently' claimed that things were complexes
of sensations. Neopositivists avoid such formulations and
limit themselves to claiming that science and thought deal in
general only with 'sense data', and that any arguments about
what things are in themselves should be rejected as metaphysi­
cal pretensions lacking sense. From that angle theory is the
analysis and interpretation of sense data. T h e checking or test­
ing of a theory consists in comparing its propositions with
these data; and there is no necessity to recognise a reality in­
dependent of them. T h e logical positivist counterposes recogni­
tion of the sensually given as the sole reality known to science
to materialism, on the one hand, and to solipsism, on the
other. T h e materialist regards sensations and perceptions as a
reflection of a reality independent of them; the solipsist

127
claims that t h e r e is no other reality t h a n t h e sensually given.
T h e neopositivist c o n d e m n s b o t h ' e x t r e m e s ' , d e c l a r i n g : 'as a
m a n o f s c i e n c e I h a v e n o r i g h t t o affirm t h e o n e o r t h e o t h e r .
Sense data a r e evidence only of their own existence, and I h a v e
n o r i g h t t o c o n s i d e r t h e m a p h e n o m e n o n o f s o m e t h i n g else. B u t
I also c a n n o t d e n y t h a t s o m e t h i n g q u i t e u n k n o w n t o m e exists'.
Such are the two main forms of the c o n t e m p o r a r y agnostic
a n s w e r to t h e second aspect of t h e basic philosophical question.
B o t h h a v e a n i d e a l i s t c h a r a c t e r a n d , i n s p i t e o f vital d i f f e r ­
ences, h a v e m u c h in c o m m o n . I h a v e pointed out t h e closeness of
absolute relativism to irrationalism. I must note that the latter
widely employs a relativist line of a r g u m e n t . T h e irrationalist
d e v a l u a t i o n of s c i e n c e is b a s e d to a c o n s i d e r a b l e e x t e n t on a
c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f it. J a s p e r s c l a i m s t h a t
science leads, in order to know, to how and on w h a t g r o u n d s and
within w h a t limits, and in w h a t sense one knows. It teaches k n o w i n g by
consciousness of t h e method of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e knowledge.
It gives certainty, t h e relativity of which—i.e. d e p e n d e n c e on sup­
positions and research methods—is its decisive f e a t u r e ( 1 1 5 : 2 1 2 ) .

T h e r e is no need to e x a m i n e that proposition; I have already

s h o w n a b o v e that the subjectivist interpretation of t h e fact of
k n o w l e d g e is a very c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e of c o n t e m p o r a r y ag­
nosticism, which can no longer d e n y the existence of knowledge,
n o r its d e v e l o p m e n t , n o r s c i e n t i f i c p r o g r e s s .
H o w e v e r fragmentary my excursion into the history of philo­
s o p h i c a l s c e p t i c i s m is, i t m a k e s i t p o s s i b l e t o d r a w s e v e r a l
theoretical conclusions. T h e philosophy of scepticism took shape
in the age of t h e forming of theoretical k n o w l e d g e as t h e nega­
t i o n o f t h e l a t t e r . I r r e s p e c t i v e o f its i d e o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n
scepticism then posed important epistemological problems, and
furthered investigation of the foundations of theoretical knowl­
edge. To s o m e extent that also applies to the historical forms
of scepticism that a r o s e in t h e age of the bourgeois revolutions
in struggle against scholasticism, theology, and rationalist
m e t a p h y s i c a l systems. But t h e p r o g r e s s of scientific k n o w l e d g e
and development of the dialectical world outlook deprived
s c e p t i c i s m of its e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . In t h e l i g h t of
c o n t e m p o r a r y scientific a c h i e v e m e n t s a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f
t h e dialectical-materialist outlook, philosophical scepticism
( a g n o s t i c i s m ) is a historically o u t d a t e d intellectual p h e n o m e n o n .
Scepticism p o i n t e d out t h e physiological limitedness of t h e
s e n s e o r g a n s , w h i c h allegedly put limits to t h e cognitive
process. It h a s b e e n s h o w n t h a t this limitedness, b e i n g a n e c e s ­
s a r y condition of cognitive activity, m a k e s it possible to e x -

128
tend the sphere of sense reflection endlessly, and to observe
phenomena, in an indirect way, that man does not have the sense
organs to perceive.
Scepticism registered the historically occurring succes­
sion of scientific theories, discovery of the scientific unsound­
ness of many of them, and the struggle of opposing conceptions
in science and philosophy. It thus brought out its real histo­
rical premisses. But scepticism wrongly interpreted the history
of science (and philosophy) as the history of permanent falla­
cies. This anti-dialectical generalisation has long been refut­
ed by the development of knowledge and the activity based on
it, which is the main refutation of agnosticism—the main one,
since theory and practice merge together in it.
Scepticism proved incapable of critically comprehending
the concept 'thing-in-itself, to which it attributed a mean­
ing of supersensory reality. But from the standpoint of epistemo­
logical historism the concept of an unknowable 'thing-in-it-
self means only, as Engels stressed, that 'we can only know
under the conditions of our epoch and as far as these allow'
(51:241). But since the conditions alter (including and thanks
to knowledge), the 'thing-in-itself is converted into a 'thing-
for-us', i.e. the opposition between it and phenomena is not
absolute but relative.
Dialectical materialism thus recognises not only the exist­
ence of 'things-in-themselves' but also that they appear, are
discovered, cognised, and in practice converted into 'things-
for-us'. This conversion of the unknown into the known is at the
same time a transformation of the objective 'necessity-in-it­
self into freedom, or 'necessity-for-us'. In that sense free­
dom becomes a refutation of agnosticism.
Marx wrote of the Kantians that 'their daily business is
to tell their beads over their own powerlessness and the power
of things' (174:429). It is not surprising therefore that prac­
tical mastery of the 'power of things' forms the basis of a
world outlook incompatible in principle with scepticism. T h e
latter was justified in regard to dogmatism and the metaphysi­
cal mode of thinking as their abstract negation. But an abstract
antithesis of dogmatic-metaphysical thinking of that kind is
itself dogmatic and metaphysical to the core.
T h e philosophy of Marxism, by critically summing up the
history of knowledge and revealing the inner contradictions and
incompleteness inherent in it, also overcomes the dogmatic-
metaphysical interpretation of the cognitive process, together
with scepticism, an interpretation that is usually formulated

9-01603 129
as if everything not yet k n o w n will be s u b s e q u e n t l y k n o w n . But
s u c h a f o r m u l a t i o n is u n s o u n d , s i n c e it a s s u m e s t h e feasibility
of k n o w i n g e v e r y t h i n g t h a t exists, i.e. as c a l c u l a t e d infinity.
But t h e e x h a u s t i n g of a n y possible k n o w l e d g e is n e i t h e r a real
n o r even an a b s t r a c t possibility, i.e. is simply impossible.
And it must not be t h o u g h t , in addition, t h a t m a n is interest­
ed in k n o w i n g all a n d e v e r y t h i n g simply so t h a t n o t h i n g would
r e m a i n u n k n o w n . E v e n in t h e s p h e r e of e v e r y d a y e x i s t e n c e
p e o p l e still do not e x p e r i e n c e a need for k n o w l e d g e of all t h e
t h i n g s k n o w n to t h e m . But t h a t 'still' applies in p a r t i c u l a r to w h a t
lies b e y o n d e v e r y d a y e x p e r i e n c e . T h e i n c o m p l e t e n e s s of h u m a n
k n o w l e d g e is always being o v e r c o m e , w h i c h m e a n s that k n o w l ­
e d g e is always i n c o m p l e t e . C o n s c i o u s n e s s of t h a t truth distin­
guishes t h e g e n u i n e scientist from both t h e d o g m a t i s t and
t h e agnostic, w h o bewails t h e p o w e r l e s s n e s s of h u m a n reason
that he himself has i n v e n t e d .
K n o w l e d g e is both a b s o l u t e a n d relative, w h i c h m e a n s that
a n y i g n o r a n c e is s u r m o u n t a b l e (from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of m a n ­
kind's historical d e v e l o p m e n t ) a n d that a n y k n o w l e d g e is
i n c o m p l e t e , even w h e n it yields a b s o l u t e t r u t h . S p i n o z a h a d
a l r e a d y essentially f o r m u l a t e d t h a t p r i n c i p l e : 1. t h e r e is an
infinite n u m b e r of k n o w a b l e things; 2. t h e finite mind c a n n o t
c o m p r e h e n d the infinite ( 2 4 9 : 4 ) . T h e r e a r e n o things w h o s e
n a t u r e would m a k e t h e m in p r i n c i p l e u n k n o w a b l e . But d o e s that
m e a n that t h e t e r m ' u n k n o w a b l e ' simply lacks scientific sense
in all cases? We obviously will n e v e r k n o w t h e c o n t e n t of m a n y
Egyptian p a p y r i that h a v e vanished for e v e r ; a n d it will r e m a i n
u n k n o w n b e c a u s e of c e r t a i n empirical c i r c u m s t a n c e s . It is
c i r c u m s t a n c e s like that which m a k e it impossible, for e x a m p l e , to
establish w h a t was in a given, a r b i t r a r i l y selected spot ten
t h o u s a n d y e a r s ago. We usually p r e f e r to speak in these cases,
of c o u r s e , of t h e u n k n o w n and not. t h e u n k n o w a b l e . But s o m e ­
thing u n k n o w n can b e c o n v e r t e d into t h e u n k n o w a b l e t h r o u g h
d i s a p p e a r a n c e of t h e factual d a t a n e e d e d for k n o w i n g it. And
in t h e history of k n o w l e d g e t h e r e a r e seemingly irreversible
processes, gaps, and omissions that c a n n o t be m a d e good. And
t h e t e r m ' u n k n o w a b l e ' h a s a c e r t a i n sense w h e n it is not a m a t t e r
of u n k n o w a b i l i t y in p r i n c i p l e or of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l .
T h e m e t a p h y s i c i a n i m a g i n e s t h e a g g r e g a t e of t h e objects of
cognition as a definite sum or set, p a r t of w h i c h is a l r e a d y
k n o w n , so that f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t of k n o w l e d g e r e d u c e s all
that r e m a i n s u n k n o w n . T h e i n a d e q u a t e n e s s of that view is that it
r e p l a c e s t h e infinite by t h e finite. It usually c o n s i d e r s t h e a g ­
g r e g a t e of possible objects of k n o w l e d g e to be i n e x h a u s t i b l e

130
only as regards quantity, overlooking the qualitative inexhaust­
ibility of phenomena. Not only is the whole set of phenomena
of the universe infinite, but also the subsets of this set.
Lenin's remark about the inexhaustibility of the electron must
be understood above all in the epistemological sense.
In the nineteenth century naturalists were already express­
ing the idea that knowledge of physical, chemical, and other
phenomena was nearing completion. Contemporary science
exploded that view as epistemologically primitive. Heisenberg
hardly deserved the reproaches levelled at him when he said, not
only wittily but essentially correctly, that the number of things
unknown was being increased thanks to the process of cognition.
That, did not, of course, mean that the number of known things
is being reduced during the historical course of the development
of knowledge. T h e matter is that most of the phenomena modern
science is concerned with were unknown in the past. For the
atomists of antiquity and of modern times there was no un­
known structure of the atom since they did not know of its
existence and did not think that the atom was a complex forma­
tion. T h e unknown is the objective reality existing outside and
independent of consciousness, but its description as unknown is,
of course, an epistemological one, which means that in order to
know some fragment of objective reality it is necessary to sepa­
rate it from what is already known, and to single out and recog­
nise the unknown in it. 23

T h e history of Marxist philosophy witnesses that in one

historical period problems of the struggle against epistemologi­
cal dogmatism, and in another the critique of epistemological
scepticism, were brought to the fore. In spite of the difference
in the conditions and tasks, however, the founders of Marxism
waged a constant battle against both metaphysical conceptions.
Engels, for instance, pointed out that 'human thought, is just as
much sovereign as not sovereign, and its capacity for knowledge
just as much unlimited as limited' (50:103), and at the same
time stressed that knowledge of the unique, finite, and tran­
sient was also knowledge of the universal, infinite, and eternal.
T h e same consistently dialectical approach is characteristic of
Lenin's works. In Materialism and Empirio-Criticism he criti­
cised first and foremost absolute relativism, demonstrating that
the difference between relative and absolute truth was by no
means absolute, by virtue of which 'human thought then by its
nature is capable of giving, and does give, absolute truth,
which is compounded of a sum-total of relative truths'
(142:119). In other works of that and later periods, he explained

131
t h a t M a r x i s m s t o o d firmly, as a g e n u i n e s c i e n c e of society, on a
f o u n d a t i o n of historical facts, and precisely for that reason
rejected in principle t h e possibility of theoretical solutions
w h e r e the necessary historical e x p e r i e n c e for it h a d not been
gathered. As for M a r x i s m ' s views on the c o m m u n i s t future of
mankind, he remarked: ' T h e r e is no trace of an attempt on
M a r x ' s part to m a k e up a utopia, to indulge in idle guesswork
about what cannot be k n o w n ' (145:81). T h e epistemological
m e a n i n g of t h a t is that it rejects, t o g e t h e r with scepticism,
u n s o u n d a t t e m p t s to c o n v e r t scientific k n o w l e d g e in an absolute.
' D i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m insists o n t h e a p p r o x i m a t e , r e l a t i v e
c h a r a c t e r of every scientific t h e o r y of t h e s t r u c t u r e of m a t t e r a n d
its p r o p e r t i e s ' ( 1 4 2 : 2 4 2 ) .
It would be dogmatism to suppose that a dialectical under­
standing of the knowability of the world introduces an element
of u n c e r t a i n t y into people's conscious activity. On t h e c o n t r a ­
ry, it m a k e s this activity m o r e c o n s c i o u s , self-critical, c r e a ­
tive, r e s o u r c e f u l , a n d mindful of t h e c h a n g e in conditions.
Philosophical scepticism (agnosticism) is thus refuted by the
w h o l e history of m a n k i n d ' s knowledge and practice. But it
retains considerable influence in bourgeois society. T h a t is not
simply inertia; historically outlived tendencies a r e preserved
in society not b e c a u s e o n e p r e v e n t s their existence, but
because there are reactionary forces that maintain them. T h e
crisis of c o n t e m p o r a r y idealist philosophy, i n c a p a b l e of assimi­
l a t i n g m a t e r i a l i s t d i a l e c t i c s b e c a u s e o f its s o c i a l o r i e n t a t i o n ,
is o n e of the m a i n reasons for t h e existence of philosophical
doctrines that h a v e long b e e n historical a n a c h r o n i s m s .

NOTES
1
T h e hylozoistie-organicist u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e unity of t h e spiritual and
m a l e r i a l w a s a l s o r e t a i n e d by e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y m a t e r i a l i s t s , in s p i t e of
the already established mechanistic interpretation of n a t u r e . Even J o h n
T o l a n d , w h o substantiated the principle of the self-motion of matter argued
t h a t t h e r e w a s n o t h i n g not o r g a n i c i n t h e e a r t h a n d c o u l d b e n o t h i n g t h a t
was self-generated; and that everything arose from an a p p r o p r i a t e embryo.
Nihil interra, ut verbo dicam, поп organicum est; пес aequivoca datur
illius rei, seи absque p r o p r i o femine, g e n e r a t i o ( 2 5 7 : 2 1 ) . In a n o t h e r p l a c e he
w r o t e t h a t t h i s m u s t be t h o u g h t a b o u t t h i n g s in the Universe, not just of
a n i m a l s a n d p l a n t s , b u t also a b o u t s t o n e s , m i n e r a l s , a n d metals, w h i c h w e r e
n o less c a p a b l e o f g r o w t h , a n d o r g a n i c , possessed t h e i r o w n s e e d s , w e r e
formed in an a p p r o p r i a t e e n v i r o n m e n t , a n d grew from a special nutrient,
l i k e m e n , q u a d r u p e d s , r e p t i l e s , birds, a q u a t i c a n i m a l s , a n d p l a n t s . Idem esto
de reliquis Universi speciebus judicium, поп de animalibus tantum and
stirpibus; sed etiam de lapidibus, m i n e r a l i b u s , and metallis: quae поп

132
 minus vegetabilia sunt and organica, suis gaudentia seminibus, proprijs
in matricibus formata, et peculiari crescentia nutrimento; quam homines,
quadrupedes, reptiles, alites, natatiles, aut plantae (257:17). There were
s i m i l a r v i e w s a s well a m o n g t h e F r e n c h m a t e r i a l i s t s o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h
c e n t u r y , e s p e c i a l l y with R o b i n e t , w h o still l a r g e l y s h a r e d t h e v i e w s o f
Renaissance philosophers.

2
A m b a r t s u m y a n a n d Kazyutinsky h a v e formulated their understanding of
t h e scientific a s p e c t s of t h e p r o b l e m of t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e in t h e fol­
l o w i n g w a y : ' A t a n y g i v e n m o m e n t n a t u r a l s c i e n c e i s d e a l i n g o n l y with
s e p a r a t e a s p e c t s of t h a t p a r t of o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y t h a t is s i n g l e d out by t h e
e m p i r i c a l a n d t h e o r e t i c a l m e a n s a v a i l a b l e a t t h a t t i m e . C o s m o l o g y d o e s not
h a v e a special place a m o n g the other natural sciences in that respect—"all
m a t t e r " ( t h e m a t e r i a l w o r l d as a w h o l e ) is n o t n o w , a n d n e v e r will b e , its
object. T h e v e r y p o s i n g o f this p r o b l e m i s not l e g i t i m a t e ' ( 4 : 2 3 5 ) . L a t e r I
shall s h o w t h a t f a r f r o m all n a t u r a l i s t s (in p a r t i c u l a r , a s t r o n o m e r s ) s h a r e
t h a t point of v i e w . Its v a l u e , in my v i e w , lies in its c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e to t h e
u n l i m i t e d , often u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d e x t r a p o l a t i o n of e x i s t i n g scientific n o t i o n s
to the whole universe, which undoubtedly contains m u c h that does not a g r e e
with t h e m . A n d i t i s n o t b e c a u s e t h e s e n o t i o n s a r e m i s t a k e n , b u t b e c a u s e they
a r e relative. 'Being', Engels r e m a r k e d , 'indeed, is always an open question
b e y o n d t h e point w h e r e o u r s p h e r e o f o b s e r v a t i o n s e n d s ' ( 5 0 : 5 5 ) .

3
C o n t e m p o r a r y i d e a l i s m , h o w e v e r , p e r s i s t e n t l y s t r i v e s t o c l o s e this q u e s t i o n ,
i.e. to w i t h d r a w it f r o m t h e c o m p e t e n c e of s c i e n c e a n d p h i l o s o p h y . T h i s
s t r i v i n g to e l i m i n a t e t h e p r o b l e m of t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e is p a r t i c u l a r l y
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of n e o p o s i t i v i s m . ' T h e w o r l d as a w h o l e ' , s a y s V i c t o r K r a f t ,
'remains beyond science. T h e r e is t h e r e f o r e an i n s u r m o u n t a b l e dualism of
mechanism and determinism in n a t u r e on the one hand, and of creative
d e v e l o p m e n t a n d f r e e d o m i n life a n d c o n s c i o u s n e s s o n t h e o t h e r ' ( 1 2 6 : 6 2 ) .
K r a f t , we s e e , d o e s not limit himself to an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c r i t i q u e of t h e
m a t e r i a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e ; he c o u n t e r p o s e s a dualist
m e t a p h y s i c s to it. So t h e latent o n t o l o g i c a l p r e m i s s e s of e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l
idealism c o m e out, in w h i c h a d e m o n s t r a t i v e d e n i a l of e v e r y t h i n g o n t o ­
logical is t y p i c a l .

4
It is c o n v e n i e n t to n o t e h e r e that a s i m i l a r view h a s b e e n e x p r e s s e d by a
n a t u r a l i s t , a s r e m o t e from d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m a s H e r m a n n Bondi:
' T h e p r o b l e m is, of c o u r s e , t h a t t h e u n i v e r s e c a n n o t be s h u t off from o u r
o r d i n a r y p h y s i c s . It c o m e s i n t o it at e v e r y t u r n . . . . T h e u n i v e r s e c o m e s into
e v e r y e x p e r i m e n t b e c a u s e it p r o v i d e s t h e i n e r t i a of t h e bodies t a k i n g p a r t in
it' ( 2 0 : 8 3 ) . T h e c o n c e p t o f t h e w o r l d a s a w h o l e c o n s e q u e n t l y c a n n o t b e
e x c l u d e d e i t h e r from t h e g e n e r a l p i c t u r e o f t h e w o r l d o r from s t u d y o f
s e p a r a t e fragments of objective reality.

5
'In t h e p a s t ' , A b d i l d i n (for e x a m p l e ) w r i t e s , ' p h i l o s o p h e r s c r e a t e d d o c t r i n e s
a b o u t t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e , a n d c o n s t a n t l y a n d tirelessly l o o k e d for an
a b s o l u t e p r i n c i p l e o n w h i c h t o build t h e i r c u m b e r s o m e s y s t e m s o f t h e w o r l d .
All that w a s t o l e r a b l e s o l o n g a s c o n c r e t e k n o w l e d g e ( p h y s i c s , c o s m o l o g y ,
a s t r o n o m y , b i o l o g y , p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y , e t c . ) h a d n o t yet b e e n d e v e l o p e d '
( 1 : 1 6 8 - 1 6 9 ) . A little l a t e r A b d i l d i n s p e a k s of t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e that ' t h e
fundamental Leninist proposition about the inexhaustibility of matter'
h a s f o r s c i e n c e ( i b i d . ) , s e e m i n g l y not c o n s c i o u s t h a t t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n
r e f e r s not t o s o m e s e p a r a t e f r a g m e n t o r o t h e r o f r e a l i t y , b u t t o t h e w h o l e
universum.

133
6
O n e c a n n o t , t h e r e f o r e , a g r e e w i t h S u k h o v , w h o i n fact identifies idealism
a n d r e l i g i o n . ' R e l i g i o n , ' he w r i t e s , 'is a f o r m of o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m ; its most
c r u d e a n d p r i m i t i v e f o r m ' ( 2 5 1 : 1 1 6 ) . But r e l i g i o n , a s a f o r m o f social c o n ­
s c i o u s n e s s , differs e s s e n t i a l l y f r o m p h i l o s o p h y ( e v e n idealist p h i l o s o p h y ) , a n d
arose, furthermore, m a n y thousand years earlier than philosophy. T h e history
of p h i l o s o p h y as a s c i e n c e t h e r e f o r e d o e s not i n c l u d e t h e h i s t o r y of r e l i g i o n ,
w h i c h m u s t n o t , in g e n e r a l , be r e g a r d e d as t h e h i s t o r y of k n o w l e d g e , if o n ­
ly b e c a u s e religious consciousness is opposed to the conscious, realistically
orientated practical activity within which the cognitive process takes place
d i r e c t l y , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e e a r l y s t a g e s o f social e v o l u t i o n . O n l y s u b s e q u e n t l y
did religious images begin to be interpreted as expressing cognitive strivings.
T h e f u n d a m e n t a l t h e o r e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s o f i d e a l i s m s h o u l d n o t b e identified
w i t h r e l i g i o u s n o t i o n s a b o u t t h e s u p e r n a t u r a l , a l t h o u g h t h e y a r e l i n k e d with
o n e a n o t h e r h i s t o r i c a l l y . S u k h o v d o e s n o t a l l o w f o r t h e real h i s t o r i c a l
r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n p h i l o s o p h y a n d religion w h e n , for e x a m p l e , h e says:
T h e idealist a n s w e r t o t h e b a s i c p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n i s t h e e p i s t e m o l o g ­
ical e s s e n c e o f a n y r e l i g i o n ' ( 2 5 1 : 1 1 7 ) .

7
T h i s t e n d e n c y i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f idealist i d e o l o g y w a s n o t e d b y v o n
E i c k e n . But h e , b e i n g himself an idealist, i n t e r p r e t e d it as t h e t r e n d of
d e v e l o p m e n t of all p h i l o s o p h y from ' c r u d e ' n a t u r a l i s t i c v i e w s to ' s u b l i m e '
religious­idealist ones. He t h e r e f o r e claimed that 'the leading thought of
philosophy was obviously t h e t e n d e n c y to attribute the multiplicity of p h e ­
n o m e n a t o a s i n g l e first c a u s e , t о a b s t r a c t t h e l a t t e r m o r e a n d m o r e f r o m
m a t e r i a l i t y , a n d to c o n c e i v e of it as an i m m a t e r i a l b e i n g ' ( 4 8 : 3 8 ) . T h e
opposite tendency, which adequately expresses the development of natural
science and the historical process of the mastering of nature's elemental
f o r c e s , is i g n o r e d by idealists.

8
' R e a s o n , ' w r o t e H e g e l , 'is t h e soul of t h e w o r l d it i n h a b i t s , its i m m a n e n t
p r i n c i p l e , its most p r o p e r a n d i n w a r d n a t u r e , its u n i v e r s a l ' ( 8 6 : 3 7 ) . F e u e r ­
b a c h justly e v a l u a t e d t h e H e g e l i a n p h i l o s o p h y a s ' p a n t h e i s t i c i d e a l i s m ' .
H e g e l , himself, besides, had r e c o g n i s e d this fact, t h o u g h n o t w i t h o u t r e s e r ­
v a t i o n s . P a n t h e i s m , h e w r o t e , 'by n o m e a n s s h a d e s i n t o a b r e a k i n g d o w n
a n d s y s t e m a t i s i n g . N e v e r t h e l e s s t h i s view f o r m s a n a t u r a l s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r
every healthy soul' ( 9 0 : 4 9 ) .

9
T o d a y , a s i n t h e p a s t , n o few idealists, o f c o u r s e , reject t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l
n o r m a t i v e s of scientific r e s e a r c h , or o n l y a d o p t t h e m as a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n
of r e s p e c t a b i l i t y in p h i l o s o p h y . T h e N e o t h o m i s t c o n c e p t i o n of t h e h a r m o n y of
r e a s o n a n d faith is s u c h a p s e u d o s c i e n t i f i c d o g m a , that o n l y o u t w a r d l y
c o n t r a d i c t s t h e P r o t e s t a n t belief a b o u t t h e a b s o l u t e a n t i t h e s i s o f r e l i g i o n
a n d s c i e n c e . I n o u r d a y idealists a l s o often s t r u g g l e w i t h t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n
of d e s p a i r to affirm a p u r e l y r e l i g i o u s c o n t e n t in p h i l o s o p h y . At t h e 13th
International Congress of Philosophy the Spanish philosopher M u ñ o z ­ A l o n s o
was deservedly likened to a prophet preaching the truths of revelation.
H e r e a r e s o m e e x t r a c t s f r o m his p a p e r Homeless Man.
' T h e s u p e r n a t u r a l is n o t of this w o r l d . But t h a t is n o t to s a y t h a t it c a n n o t
b e c o n c e r n e d with this w o r l d ' ( 1 8 7 : 7 4 ) . C l a i m i n g t h a t c o n t e m p o r a r y
philosophy was too 'stuck' in t h e earthly, historically transient, he argued
t h a t this p a t h w a s l e a d i n g i t a w a y f r o m t h e u r g e n t p r o b l e m s o f h u m a n life.
' C o n t e m p o r a r y philosophy is m a k i n g it quite evident that it has no a n s w e r to
t h e vitally i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n , o f Biblical p r o v e n a n c e , t h a t p h i l o s o p h y c a n n o t
1
shirk: My God, My God, why hast thou foresaken me? (187:78).
M u ñ o z ­ A l o n s o i s q u i t e t y p i c a l . Did H e g e l n o t h a v e t o d e f e n d himself

134
deferentially against t h e mystic a n d political r e a c t i o n a r y von B a a d e r , w h o
accused him of making concessions to materialist philosophy? (See
84:xxxviii-xii).
10
T h e Swiss M a r x i s t S c h w a r z notes a p r o p o s of this that S c h o p e n h a u e r ' s
'physiological-biological point of view is m u c h m o r e materialist t h a n
that of B ü c h n e r and Moleschott' (242:18). O n e c a n n o t a g r e e with that,
h o w e v e r , s i n c e t h e u n c o n s c i o u s spirit, t h e b l i n d u n i v e r s a l will t h a t c r e a t e s
e v e r y t h i n g and destroys everything, was p r i m a r y for S c h o p e n h a u e r . C o n ­
sciousness actually proved to be derivative, but matter, too, with which it was
directly linked, was treated as derivative of t h e blind, unconscious, cosmic
will. T h e r e is n o t a g r a i n of m a t e r i a l i s m in this c o n c e p t i o n d e s p i t e t h e
q u i t e d e l i b e r a t e u s e of a c e r t a i n m a t e r i a l i s t p r o p o s i t i o n .
11
T h i s idealist d e n i a l of t h e r e a l i t y of c o n s c i o u s n e s s is n o t o n l y an e n d e a v o u r
to eliminate the d i l e m m a formulated by t h e basic philosophical question,
b u t a l s o a n a t t e m p t a t p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l r e d u c t i o n o f p s y c h i c life t o t h e
d i r e c t l y o b s e r v e d b e h a v i o u r in w h i c h it is m a n i f e s t e d a n d objectified.
William J a m e s anticipated behaviourism, which, starting from zoopsychol­
o g y ( w h i c h s t u d i e s t h e b e h a v i o u r of a n i m a l s w h i c h , it is a s s u m e d , do n o t
possess c o n s c i o u s n e s s ) c o n c l u d e d t h a t h u m a n b e h a v i o u r w a s w h o l l y e x p l i ­
cable without admitting such 'survivals' of t h e metaphysical conception of
s o u l o r spirit s u c h a s t h e c o n c e p t s o f p s y c h e , c o n s c i o u s n e s s , a n d t h o u g h t .
Watson, the founder of behaviourism, wrote: ' T h e time seems to have
c o m e w h e n p s y c h o l o g y m u s t d i s c a r d all r e f e r e n c e t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' ( 2 6 0 : 7 ) .
Behaviourists e q u a t e d t h o u g h t and speech, which they treated in t u r n as a
c e r t a i n reaction of t h e l a r y n x . Sensations, e m o t i o n s , self-awareness, etc.,
w e r e i n t e r p r e t e d i n r o u g h l y t h e s a m e w a y . W e t h u s s e e t h a t t h e idealist d e n i a l
of c o n s c i o u s n e s s w a s a false, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of facts t h a t e x p e r i m e n t a l
p s y c h o l o g i s t s w e r e e n g a g e d i n i n v e s t i g a t i n g . T h e m i s c o n c e p t i o n o f idealism
s o o n b e c a m e t h e f a l l a c y of a s c h o o l of p s y c h o l o g y .

12
Weiss, an a d h e r e n t of behaviourism, w r o t e for instance, that 'the question,
" I s t i m e a n d s p a c e i n d e p e n d e n t o f h u m a n b e i n g s ? " m e r e l y r e d u c e s itself
to t h e absurdity, " C a n special forms of h u m a n behavior occur without
h u m a n b e i n g s " ' ( 2 6 2 : 2 3 ) . I n s p i t e o f its d e n i a l o f t h e r e a l i t y o f c o n ­
s c i o u s n e s s , b e h a v i o u r i s m t h u s a r r i v e d a t a s u b j e c t i v e idealist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
of the objective conditions of men's existence. T h e conclusion was by
n o m e a n s a c h a n c e o n e ; i t f o l l o w e d logically f r o m t h e s u b j e c t i v i s t u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g of k n o w l e d g e (and science) as a m o d e of b e h a v i o u r a n d a d a p t a ­
tions to the 'stimulus-response' principle (262:25).
13
It w o u l d be i n c o r r e c t to i g n o r e t h e theoretical r o o t s of O s t w a l d ' s e n e r g i s m ,
w h i c h h a v e been justly pointed out by Kuznetsov: 'Discovery of t h e law
of t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n a n d t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of e n e r g y a n d t h e s u c c e s s e s of
t h e r m o d y n a m i c s w h e n a p p l i e d t o m a n y classes o f n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n a w e r e
the excuse for making attempts to convert " p u r e " energy into an absolute that
allegedly eliminated m a t t e r from n a t u r e and b e c a m e t h e ultimate c o n t e n t
of everything in g e n e r a l that exists' ( 1 3 0 : 6 4 ) . Ostwald, seemingly, by no
m e a n s m e a n t t o s a v e idealism b y m e a n s o f e n e r g i s m . I f h e h a d u n d e r s t o o d
matter as objective reality existing outside a n d independent of the mind,
he would not h a v e b e g u n to c o u n t e r p o s e m a t t e r to energy.

14
It is s y m p t o m a t i c t h a t G u e r o u l t c a l l e d his idealist c o n c e p t i o n ' t h e p o i n t of
v i e w o f a p o s i t i v e a n d m a t e r i a l i s t r e a l i s m t h a t w a n t s t o b e s t r i c t l y scientific'
( 8 0 : 1 0 ) . B u t ' r e a l i s t ' m a t e r i a l i s t s differ, i n his view, f r o m t h o s e t h a t P l a t o

135
 had already criticised as 'friends of the e a r t h ' , i n c a p a b l e of rising a b o v e the
h o r i z o n o f t h e e a r t h l y . G u e r o u l t ' s ' m a t e r i a l i s t ' p h i l o s o p h y , a s h e himself
a c k n o w l e d g e d , is a g n o s t i c p h i l o s o p h y of e t e r n i t y t h a t c o n s i d e r s t i m e an
illusion o r e v e n a d e c e p t i o n . M y p a p e r ' P o s t u l a t e s o f t h e I r r a t i o n a l i s t P h i l o s ­
o p h y of H i s t o r y ' in t h e s y m p o s i u m on t h e r e s u l t s of t h e 14th I n t e r n a ­
t i o n a l C o n g r e s s of P h i l o s o p h y [ P . N . F e d o s e e v ( E d . ) Filosofiya i sov­
r e m e n n o s t ' , N a u k a , M o s c o w , 1 9 7 1 ] w a s d e v o t e d t o a c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s o f this
c o n c e p t i o n of G u e r o u l t ' s .

15
T h e Hegelian epistemological optimism of c o u r s e had a negative aspect.
H i s Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences s u b s t a n t i a t e d the attain­
ability o f a b s o l u t e k n o w l e d g e , a n d t h e possibility o f c o m p l e t i n g t h e h i s t o r i c a l
p r o c e s s of its d e v e l o p m e n t , at least in its t h e o r e t i c a l f o r m , w h i c h he r e d u c e d
basically to philosophy. T h i s c o n s e r v a t i v e epistemological tendency is essen­
tially p e c u l i a r t o all m e t a p h y s i c a l s y s t e m s . O n e d o e s n o t h a v e t o s h o w t h a t t h e
c l a i m to a b s o l u t e k n o w l e d g e , in p a r t i c u l a r w h e n it is l i n k e d w i t h idealist
s u b s t a n t i a t i o n of t h e r e l i g i o u s o u t l o o k , a n d w i t h a c o u n t e r p o s i n g of p h i l o s ­
o p h y (as ' a b s o l u t e s c i e n c e ' ) r e l a t i v e t o scientific k n o w l e d g e , i s a s alien
t o t h e scientific o u t l o o k o n t h e w o r l d a s s c e p t i c a l n e g a t i o n o f m a n ' s c o g n i t i v e
power.

16
I t will r e a d i l y b e u n d e r s t o o d t h a t H e g e l r e j e c t e d t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e
o f r e f l e c t i o n for t h e s a m e r e a s o n s t h a t P l a t o h a d d o n e s o i n a n t i q u i t y ; this
p r i n c i p l e posits r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y of n a t u r e , r e c o g n i t i o n of
s e n s e - p e r c e i v e d r e a l i t y a s r e a l i t y , a n d n o t s i m p l y a p p e a r a n c e o r e v e n illusion.
O n e must r e m e m b e r , however, that in d e n y i n g t h e epistemological principle
of r e f l e c t i o n H e g e l s u b s t a n t i a t e d t h e i d e n t i t y in p r i n c i p l e of d i a l e c t i c s ,
logic, a n d e p i s t e m o l o g y . I n t h a t w a y h e b r o u g h t out p r o f o u n d l y ( a n d a t
t h e s a m e t i m e mystified) t h e u n i t y o f t h o u g h t a n d b e i n g , t h e c o g n i t i v e
activity of the subject, the objectivity of the forms of thinking, the i n t e r c o n ­
n e c t i o n o f c a t e g o r i e s , a n d m u c h else t h a t m e t a p h y s i c a l m a t e r i a l i s t s did not
understand, and which promoted the development of the dialectical-mate­
rialist p r i n c i p l e of t h e r e f l e c t i o n of o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , i r r e s p e c t i v e of H e g e l ' s
i n t e n t i o n s . L e n i n w r o t e : ' H e g e l a c t u a l l y proved t h a t logical f o r m s a n d laws
a r e n o t a n e m p t y s h e l l , b u t t h e reflection o f t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . M o r e
с o r r e c t l y , he did not p r o v e , b u t made a brilliant guess (144:180-181).
In s p i t e of his b r i l l i a n t g u e s s , h o w e v e r , H e g e l , b e i n g an o p p o n e n t of m a t e ­
rialism, rejected the t h e o r y of reflection, c o n s i d e r i n g it an empirical c o n c e p ­
tion t h a t c o u l d not rise to u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e n a t u r e of t h e o r e t i c a l ,
in particular philosophical knowledge.

17
In this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of s e n s a t i o n s is to be felt t h e r e j e c t i o n c h a r a c t e ­
ristic of N e o k a n t i a n i s m not o n l y of t h e ' t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f ' b u t also of t h e
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a e s t h e t i c in w h i c h K a n t , in s p i t e of his a p r i o r i s m , still
set o u t f r o m t h e c o n v i c t i o n t h a t t h e b a s i s o f k n o w l e d g e w a s p r o v i d e d b y s e n s e
e x p e r i e n c e . C a s s i r e r t o o k a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n , a f f i r m i n g t h a t 'all
c o n s c i o u s n e s s r e f e r s first of all o n l y to t h e s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e s of t h e i n d i v i d ­
ual Ego, which is precisely that these states constitute t h e content of the
i m m e d i a t e l y given' ( 3 1 : 3 9 1 ) . T h a t , too, is an a b a n d o n i n g of t h e e p i s t e m o l o g ­
ical p r i n c i p l e of r e f l e c t i o n , w h i c h is r e p l a c e d by a s u b j e c t i v i s t c o n s t r u i n g
of the sense-perceived p i c t u r e of t h e w o r l d .

18
E v e n N e o t h o m i s t s , f o r w h o m ( a s B y k h o v s k y r e m a r k s ) ' t h e possibility o f
rational k n o w l e d g e is based on the substantial identity of t h e rational mind
and the spiritual f u n d a m e n t a l principle of being' ( 2 7 : 1 2 7 ) , admit the know-

136
a b i l i t y in p r i n c i p l e of t h e m a t e r i a l w o r l d , t h e e x i s t e n c e of w h i c h is n o t
d e n i e d a n d is r e g a r d e d as t h e r e s u l t of d i v i n e c r e a t i o n .

19
T h e s c e p t i c a d m i t s o n l y j u d g m e n t s o f p e r c e p t i o n ( t o use K a n t ' s e x p r e s s i o n ) ,
i.e. a s i m p l e s t a t e m e n t o f t h e o b s e r v e d . H e m a y s a y , ' w h e n t h e s u n i s w a r m ,
a s t o n e g e t s h o t ' , b u t h e d a r e n o t affirm t h a t ' t h e s u n h e a t s t h e s t o n e ' ,
s i n c e s u c h a j u d g m e n t posits r e c o g n i t i o n a n d a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e p r i n c i p l e of
causality. In opposition to t h e sceptics, Kant claimed that a categorial
synthesis of sense contemplations was possible and had objective significance.
In s p i t e of t h e i n e v i t a b l e i n c o m p l e t e n e s s of e m p i r i c a l i n d u c t i o n , j u d g m e n t s
o f strict u n i v e r s a l i t y a n d n e c e s s i t y e x i s t e d , a n d w e r e e v i d e n c e d b y p u r e
m a t h e m a t i c s a n d ' p u r e s c i e n c e ' ( t h e o r e t i c a l m e c h a n i c s ) . T h e t a s k consisted
o n l y i n e x p l o r i n g h o w t h i s fact o f k n o w l e d g e ( i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h s c e p t i c a l
p h i l o s o p h i s i n g ) w a s possible.

20
O n e m u s t not a s s u m e t h a t this a p p r a i s a l o f a g n o s t i c i s m w a s d e t e r m i n e d
b y C h e s t e r t o n ' s T h o m i s m . T h e t e r m ' a g n o s t i c i s m ' w a s e m p l o y e d i n this c a s e
i n a v e r y c o m m o n s e n s e . A n a t o l e F r a n c e , r i d i c u l i n g religion a n d t h e o l o g y ,
said of a c h a r a c t e r in his Revolt of the Angels: ' H e w a s a g n o s t i c , as o n e
says, in society, so as not to employ t h e odious t e r m of freethinker. And
h e c a l l e d himself a g n o s t i c , c o n t r a r y t o t h e c u s t o m o f h i d i n g t h a t . I n o u r
c e n t u r y t h e r e a r e so many ways of believing and not believing that future
h i s t o r i a n s will h a r d l y b e a b l e t o find t h e i r b e a r i n g s ' ( 6 5 : 5 ) .

21
It w o u l d be a m i s t a k e to c o u n t e r p o s e t h e p r i n c i p l e of falsifiability to t h a t of
verifiabilily a s s o m e t h i n g t h a t e x c l u d e s it. N a r s k y , w h o c h a r a c t e r i s e s
P o p p e r ' s p r i n c i p l e as a v e r s i o n of a w e a k e n e d p r i n c i p l e of v e r i f i c a t i o n , is r i g h t .
P o p p e r p r o p o s e d n e g a t i v e v e r i f i c a t i o n (falsification) in p l a c e of posi­
tive, i.e. o n e 'by w h i c h n e g a t i v e s e n t e n c e s r a t h e r t h a n a f f i r m a t i v e o n e s a r e
s u b j e c t t o v e r i f i c a t i o n ' ( 1 9 1 : 2 6 4 ) . T h a t did n o t , o f c o u r s e , e l i m i n a t e t h e
difficulties t h a t t h e positivist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f s c i e n c e c a m e u p a g a i n s t .

22
Even such a m o d e r a t e neopositivist as R e i c h e n b a c h , w h o does not accept
the neopositivist rejection of objective reality, treats physics purely relatively.
' T h e axioms of Euclidean geometry, the principles of causality and
s u b s t a n c e a r e no longer recognized by the physics of our days' ( 2 2 0 : 4 8 ) . This
essentially nihilistic c o n c l u s i o n follows from t h e e m p i r i c i s t n e g a t i o n p e c u l i a r
to n e o p o s i t i v i s m of t h e right of s c i e n c e to g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s t h a t h a v e a
universal and necessary significance.

23
In this s e n s e t h e finding of u n k n o w n p h e n o m e n a ( ' b l a n k s p o t s ' ) is an act
of k n o w i n g . T h a t is o b v i o u s l y w h a t H e i s e n b e r g h a d in m i n d . A n d it is q u i t e
c l e a r that i t i s w h a t d e B r o g l i e h a d i n m i n d w h e n h e w r o t e : ' W e m u s t n e v e r
f o r g e t , t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e s c i e n c e s p r o v e s it, t h a t e v e r y a d v a n c e i n o u r
k n o w l e d g e raises m o r e p r o b l e m s t h a n i t s o l v e s a n d t h a t i n t h i s d o m a i n
e a c h n e w l a n d d i s c o v e r e d g i v e s us a g l i m p s e of v a s t c o n t i n e n t s yet u n k n o w n '
( 2 3 : 3 8 1 ) . A n a d h e r e n t o f a g n o s t i c i s m w o u l d p r o b a b l y n o t fail t o i n t e r p r e t
t h e s e w o r d s , t o o , in his o w n w a y . T h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l possibility of s u c h a
w r o n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a c o r r e c t scientific p r o p o s i t i o n lies in t h e r e l a t i v i t y of
t h e opposition between knowledge and ignorance, truth and error. T h e
i g n o r i n g of this a n t i t h e s i s , a n d a b s o l u t i s i n g of it, a r e m e t a p h y s i c a l e x t r e m e s
characteristic of sceptics on the one h a n d and dogmatists on the other.
 Part Two

PHILOSOPHICAL T R E N D S AS AN OBJECT
OF RESEARCH IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
III
THE DIVERGENCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINES
A N D ITS INTERPRETATION.

METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS A N D T H E DEVELOPMENT

OF T H E ANTITHESIS BETWEEN MATERIALISM
AND IDEALISM

1. Dispute about Trends or Dispute of Trends?

T h e problem of philosophical trends is one of the most c o m ­

plicated ones in the history of philosophy. T h e variety of trends
that c h a r a c t e r i s e s p h i l o s o p h y in a specific w a y h a s always c a u s e d
d i s t r u s t o f its c a p a c i t y t o a n s w e r t h e m a t t e r s d i s c u s s e d i n a
positive way. R o u s s e a u w r o t e with indignation of t h e rival philo­
sophical trends:
I shall only a s k : W h a t is p h i l o s o p h y ? W h a t do t h e w r i t i n g s of t h e best
k n o w n p h i l o s o p h e r s c o n t a i n ? W h a t a r e t h e lessons o f t h e s e f r i e n d s o f
w i s d o m ? L i s t e n i n g t o t h e m w o u l d o n e n o t t a k e t h e m for a p a c k o f
c h a r l a t a n s , e a c h s h o u t i n g his w a r e s i n p u b l i c : ' C o m e t o m e ; I'm t h e only
o n e w h o d o e s n ' t d e c e i v e ' ? O n e c l a i m s t h a t t h e r e i s n o b o d y a n d that
everything is representation; a n o t h e r that t h e r e is no substance other than
matter and no God other than the world. This one suggests that there
a r e no virtues or vices, and that good and bad morals a r e c h i m e r a s ; a n d
that o n e that men a r e wolves a n d can d e v o u r each o t h e r with a safe
conscience (229:17-18).

Rousseau condemned the progressing divergence of philoso­

phical doctrines, being u n a w a r e that it had deep and far from
c h a n c e causes.
Trends in philosophy a r e a b o v e all disputing parties
that d o not r e a c h a g r e e m e n t since they d o not c e a s e t o dispute.
I n t h a t r e s p e c t t h e y a r e n o t l i k e t h o s e old p r o f e s s o r s w h o a r g u e d
b e c a u s e they essentially agreed with o n e a n o t h e r . A constant
c o n f r o n t a t i o n f o r m s t h e i n n e r r h y t h m o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f all
philosophical trends. And the great philosopher comes forward,
as a rule, as a t h i n k e r w h o disagrees, m o r e t h a n a n y o n e else,
with w h a t t h e philosophers b e f o r e h i m affirmed. S u c h , in any
c a s e , i s his c o n v i c t i o n , w h i c h m o r e o r less r e f l e c t s t h e real s t a t e
of affairs. T h e following s t a t e m e n t of Fichte's, addressed to t h e
o p p o n e n t s of his p h i l o s o p h y , is t h e r e f o r e typical: ' B e t w e e n y o u
a n d m e t h e r e i s n o p o i n t i n c o m m o n a t all o n w h i c h w e c a n

138
a g r e e a n d f r o m w h i c h w e c a n a g r e e o n a n y t h i n g else' ( 5 9 : 2 0 8 -
2 0 9 ) . H e o b v i o u s l y e x a g g e r a t e d his d i s a g r e e m e n t s w i t h o t h e r
idealists, b u t t h e y w e r e v e r y s u b s t a n t i a l o n e s . H i s system c a m e
i n t o p r o f o u n d conflict e v e n w i t h K a n t ' s , of w h i c h it w a s a d i r e c t
c o n t i n u a t i o n . T h a t well i l l u s t r a t e s t h e d e p t h o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l
d i v e r g e n c e s e v e n w i t h i n o n e a n d t h e s a m e , i n this c a s e i d e a l ­
ist, t r e n d .
P h i l o s o p h e r s w h o reflect o n t h e d i v e r g e n c e o f p h i l o s o p h i ­
cal d o c t r i n e s d i s a g r e e in t h e i r e v a l u a t i o n of this p h e n o m e n o n ,
a n d of its e s s e n c e , s i g n i f i c a n c e , a n d p r o s p e c t s . In o t h e r w o r d s ,
t h e r e a r e various trends even in t h e understanding of philo­
s o p h i c a l t r e n d s : t h e i r e x i s t e n c e reflects t h e v e r y f u n d a m e n t a l
fact t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e s u b j e c t o f m y i n q u i r y .
S o m e p h i l o s o p h e r s view t h e d i v e r s i t y o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r e n d s
as e v i d e n c e of p h i l o s o p h y ' s i n a b i l i t y to be a s c i e n c e , w h i l e o t h e r s
s e e it as s t r i k i n g e v i d e n c e t h a t it s h o u l d n o t be o n e : o n e d o e s
n o t d e m a n d t h a t a r t b e scientific, s o w h y d e m a n d i t o f p h i l o ­
s o p h y , w h i c h differs both f r o m s c i e n c e a n d f r o m a r t ?
T h e r e a r e a l s o w o r k e r s w h o d e n y t h e fact o f t h e e x i s t e n c e
of philosophical trends, but not, of course, because they h a v e
n o t n o t i c e d a n essential d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c ­
t r i n e s . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e y d o not n o t i c e t h e essential s i m i l a r ­
ity b e t w e e n t h e m , i.e. t h e g r o u n d s t h a t e n a b l e s o m e t o b e
classed i n o n e t r e n d a n d o t h e r s i n a n o t h e r . F r o m t h e i r a n g l e
p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r e n d s a r e a n illusion b o r n o f classificatory
thinking.
T h e r e a r e also v e r y different views, s o m e t i m e s m u t u a l l y
exclusive, about t h e reasons for t h e existence of philosophi­
cal t r e n d s . S o m e s u p p o s e t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s h a v e r u s h e d i n
different d i r e c t i o n s s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e y w e r e i n c a p a b l e o f
a p p l y i n g in t h e i r field t h e scientific m e t h o d s d e v e l o p e d by
mathematics and natural science. Others, on the contrary,
see t h e reasons for t h e progressing divergence of philosophi­
cal d o c t r i n e s i n t h e v e r y n a t u r e o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l k n o w l e d g e ,
i.e. r e g a r d t h e c e n t r i f u g a l t e n d e n c i e s a s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i ­
tion of p h i l o s o p h y ' s e x i s t e n c e .
T h i s p r o b l e m o f t r e n d s m a y b e defined i n f i g u r a t i v e t e r m s
as o n e of interspecific a n d i n t r a s p e c i f i c d i f f e r e n c e s . In t h a t
s e n s e t h e task of t h e h i s t o r y of p h i l o s o p h y is s i m i l a r to t h a t w h i c h
D a r w i n c o p e d with in his d a y , i.e. to e x p l o r e t h e origin of t h e s e
d i f f e r e n c e s . H e c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e e x i s t i n g set o f a n i m a l a n d
plant species had c o m e about t h r o u g h development or evolution,
t h e m a i n elements of which w e r e t h e d i v e r g e n c e of intraspecific
characteristics, inheritance and a c h a n g e in heredity, adaptation

139
to conditions, and struggle for existence. Philosophical doctrines,
tendencies, and trends, and consequently, too, the differences
between t h e m are also the product of historical development, in
which the original differences between a few scholars b e c a m e
ever d e e p e r and m o r e essential. This d i v e r g e n c e of philosophical
d o c t r i n e s led t o t h e r i s e o f n e w p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s ,
t h e o r i e s , a n d s y s t e m s . T h e s u c c e e d i n g d o c t r i n e s did not s i m p l y
inherit the content of the preceding ones but also opposed them,
selecting ideas in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e new conditions that
brought these doctrines into existence. 1

T h i s c o m p a r i s o n of the historical process of philosophy

with t h e p i c t u r e of t h e e v o l u t i o n of living c r e a t u r e s is no
m o r e , of course, than an analogy. But analogies o c c u r in
o b j e c t i v e reality as well as in t h o u g h t . In this c a s e they
often p r o v e to be essential relations of similarity.
T h e c o n c e p t 'philosophical t r e n d ' , like most philosophical
c o n c e p t s , h a s n o r i g o r o u s l y fixed c o n t e n t . N o t o n l y i s t h e r a n g e
of m a i n ideas c o m m o n to a n u m b e r of d o c t r i n e s often called a
t r e n d , but a l s o c e r t a i n fields of i n q u i r y , for e x a m p l e , n a t u r a l
philosophy, epistemology, and ontology. Those doctrines,
schools, and tendencies that a r e r e b o r n in new historical condi­
tions, h a v i n g survived their d a y , a r e also often c o n s i d e r e d trends.
In c o n t e m p o r a r y bourgeois literature on the history of
p h i l o s o p h y , t h e c o n c e p t of t r e n d is q u i t e often c o n v e n t i o n a l .
Heinemann, one of the authors (and publisher) of the huge
monograph Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, declared:
In E u r o p e a n cultural circles four main trends are distinguished: (1)
life-philosophy; (2) p h e n o m e n o l o g y ; (3) ontology; (4) existentialism.
In Anglo-Saxon cultural circles the following stand out: (1) p r a g m a ­
tism; ( 2 ) i n s t r u m e n t a l i s m ; ( 3 ) logical p o s i t i v i s m ; (4) the analytical
schools (96:268).

I w o u l d n o t e , first o f a l l , t h a t H e i n e m a n n a t t r i b u t e d f u n d a ­
m e n t a l i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n t h e idealist c a m p .
He said nothing about the materialist trend, which incidentally
is n a t u r a l ; in c o n t e m p o r a r y b o u r g e o i s p h i l o s o p h y materialism is
n o t a m a i n t r e n d , d e s p i t e its b e c o m i n g t h e c o n s c i o u s c o n v i c t i o n
of most w o r k e r s in the natural sciences. F r o m that angle one
could understand the historian of c o n t e m p o r a r y bourgeois phi­
l o s o p h y , w h o s i n g l e s o u t t h e m a i n t r e n d s o f idealist p h i l o s o p h y
p r e v a i l i n g in m o d e r n b o u r g e o i s society. But H e i n e m a n n did not
follow that line; t h e s e p a r a t e t e n d e n c i e s a n d c u r r e n t s within
irrationalism, and also within positivism and p r a g m a t i s m , w e r e
m a i n t r e n d s for him. H e c o n s e q u e n t l y refrains f r o m t r a c ­
ing t h e differences both b e t w e e n t r e n d s a n d c u r r e n t s a n d

140
between t h e latter and s e p a r a t e doctrines, e.g. pragmatism.
O n e might not attribute essential significance to this ter­
minological discrepancy at first glance. But one must stress
that refusal to d e m a r c a t e such concepts as 'trend' and 'main
t r e n d ' is a b o v e all a denial of t h e polarisation of philosophy
into t h e antithesis of materialism and idealism.
Underestimation of t h e fundamental i m p o r t a n c e of trends
in philosophy is often manifested in a reduction of t h e problem
to a methods matter of classification, i.e. the rational g r o u p ­
ing of doctrines in a c c o r d a n c e with a propaedeutic task.
In Bocheński's Contemporary European Philosophy, for e x a m ­
ple, t h e following six main (in his opinion) trends or positions
a r e named: 'empiricism, idealism, life-philosophy, p h e n o m e n ­
ology, existentialism, and metaphysics' ( 1 6 : 3 1 ) . In this list
idealism is one of the six trends in c o n t e m p o r a r y philosophy.
T h e others a r e not considered idealist, which witnesses, to put
it mildly, to a very peculiar understanding of the essence of
idealism.
It is also worth drawing attention to t h e point that m a t e ­
rialism did not figure in Bocheński's list. T h a t was not d u e
to the c i r c u m s t a n c e already noted a b o v e that materialism
has an insignificant place in c o n t e m p o r a r y bourgeois philoso­
phy. F r o m Bocheński's angle materialism was only a variety of
empiricism. Its other versions w e r e neorealism and neopositiv­
ism. Empiricism was characterised as t h e 'philosophy of matter';
the antithesis between materialist and idealist empiricism was
ignored. It could not be otherwise, incidentally, if one followed
Bocheński's scheme, according to which idealism was distin­
guished in principle from empiricism.
Bocheński's e r r o r was not simply that he overlooked the
opposition of materialism and idealism within empiricism. As
is evident from his classification, he interpreted the latest
idealist doctrines ( p h e n o m e n o l o g y , metaphysical systems, in­
cluding N e o t h o m i s m ) as non-idealist. T h e c o n t e m p o r a r y , mod­
ernised forms of idealism represented, for him, an overcoming of
idealist philosophy, so that he did not see idealism—in idealism.
W h o are idealists for Bocheński? Croce, Brunschvicg, and
t h e Neokantians. Arguing that their basic positions 'unques­
tionably rise above the primitive level of materialism, posi­
tivism, and psychologism as well as theoretical and axiolog­
ical subjectivism' ( 1 6 : 9 8 ) , he nevertheless considered idealism
a trend that had already left t h e historical a r e n a ; in most
E u r o p e a n countries, he wrote, 'idealism still exercised the
greatest influence' in the first q u a r t e r of t h e century, 'but

141
ceased to do so ... by about 1925' (16:26). I leave that to
this idealist author's conscience.
T h e reverse side of the classificatory approach to philo­
sophy is a subjectivist (mainly irrationalist) denial of the
significance (and even existence) of philosophical trends, which
are declared in this case to be simply labels invented by teachers
of philosophical propaedeutics. T h e adherents of this conception
a r e most clearly represented by the French school of the
'philosophy of the history of philosophy' already mentioned.
Like the nominalists, they claim that only the individual, unique,
exists in philosophy. Adherents of the 'philosophy of the
history of philosophy', criticising any attempt to classify doc­
trines as a populariser's interpretation of the history of philo­
sophy, substantiate a metaphysical understanding of philosophy
as an aggregate of sovereign systems even more categorically
than the 'classifiers'. While Bocheński established six main trends
in contemporary philosophy, every system, from the standpoint
of Gueroult and his disciples forms a trend of its own,
because philosophy is the 'institution of true realities, or philo­
sophical realities, by philosophising thought' (81:10). From
that standpoint there are as many trends in philosophy as
there are systems; and all of them, if you please, are main
ones. In that connection, however, the concept of a main
trend has no sense.
From the standpoint of dialectical and historical materi­
alism trends in philosophy are regular forms of its internal
differentiation, divergence, and polarisation. T h e singling out
of materialism, idealism, and other trends therefore has nothing
in common with a purely methods grouping of doctrines by
quite obvious attributes. T h e inquirer discovers, and cognises
objectively governed, historically moulded differences and an­
titheses in philosophy, and does not establish them. T h e an­
tithesis between materialism and idealism, rationalism and em­
piricism, intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, and dialectical
and metaphysical modes of thinking is a fundamental fact of
a kind that can least of all be considered a conclusion from
some system of classification. A philosophical school is a r e ­
markable phenomenon in the intellectual history of the human
race. T h e historian of philosophy studies doctrines, currents,
schools, and trends, elucidating their problematic, content, di­
rection, and relation to other doctrines, schools, and trends.
As for investigation of the antithesis between materialism and
idealism, it is analysis of the main contradiction inherent in
the development of philosophy, which directly characterises the

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s t r u c t u r e o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l k n o w l e d g e a n d t h e specific f o r m o f
its d e v e l o p m e n t .
Study of t h e historical c o u r s e of philosophy indicates that
the question of trends had already, in antiquity, b e c o m e t h e
problem of t h e contradictions in t h e development of philosophy,
of its e s s e n c e , a n d of its r i g h t to exist as a s c i e n c e . D i o g e n e s
L a e r t i u s h a d a l r e a d y a s s e r t e d t h a t all p h i l o s o p h e r s w e r e d i v i d e d
into dogmatists and sceptics.
All those who make assertions about things assuming that they can be
known are dogmatists; while all who suspend their judgement on the
ground that things are unknowable are sceptics (42:1,17).
K a n t said a l m o s t t h e s a m e t h i n g 2 , 0 0 0 y e a r s a f t e r t h e G r e e k
d o x o g r a p h e r , though, unlike Diogenes Laertius, he distinguished
an a n t i t h e s i s of m a t e r i a l i s m a n d idealism w i t h i n ' d o g m a t i s m ' .
In s u b s t a n t i a t i n g a d u a l i s t ( a n d u l t i m a t e l y idealist) p o s i t i o n ,
K a n t r e p r o a c h e d b o t h m a t e r i a l i s t s a n d idealists w i t h t a k i n g o n
faith w h a t w a s s u b j e c t t o c r i t i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n a n d did n o t ,
in his o p i n i o n , s t a n d up to it.
T h e 'critical p h i l o s o p h y ' c r e a t e d b y K a n t w a s i n t e n d e d ,
on t h e one h a n d , to o v e r c o m e t h e antithesis between 'dogmat­
ism' a n d s c e p t i c i s m , a n d , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t o f o u n d a n e w ,
third trend in philosophy that would reconcile materialism and
idealism, r a t i o n a l i s m a n d e m p i r i c i s m , s p e c u l a t i v e m e t a p h y s i c s
and science. Kant treated 'dogmatism' (or rather dogmatic met­
aphysics) and scepticism as main philosophical trends, and
m a t e r i a l i s m a n d idealism a s v a r i e t i e s o f ' u n c r i t i c a l ' m e t a ­
physics.
As I h a v e a l r e a d y p o i n t e d o u t , H e g e l in e s s e n c e b r o u g h t
out t h e p a t t e r n of t h e r a d i c a l p o l a r i s a t i o n of p h i l o s o p h y i n t o
m a t e r i a l i s t a n d idealist t r e n d s . But h e u n d e r e s t i m a t e d t h e
s i g n i f i c a n c e of m a t e r i a l i s m as a m a i n t r e n d . A n d he did n o t
p a y s u b s t a n t i a l a t t e n t i o n to e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e a n t i t h e s i s of
m a t e r i a l i s m a n d idealism in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e basic p h i l o s o ­
p h i c a l q u e s t i o n . A c t u a l b e i n g — s u c h w a s his i d e a — c o u l d b e
physical r e a l i t y , b u t b e i n g - f o r - i t s e l f w a s a l w a y s ideal. T h e
ideal, h e c l a i m e d , w a s t h e t r u t h o f e v e r y t h i n g m a t e r i a l , o b j e c t i v e ,
u n i q u e , o r ( p u t t i n g i t his w a y ) f i n i t e . ' T h i s ideality o f t h e
finite is t h e m a i n m a x i m of p h i l o s o p h y ; a n d f o r t h a t r e a s o n
every g e n u i n e philosophy is idealism' (86:140). 2

T h e classical w r i t e r s o f p r e - M a r x i a n p h i l o s o p h y u s u a l l y
counterposed the main philosophical trends categorically to
o n e a n o t h e r . T h a t c a n n o t b e said o f t h e b o u r g e o i s p h i l o s o p h y
of t h e last c e n t u r y , in w h i c h a s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of t h e o r e t i c a l
a r g u m e n t is c o m b i n e d with a c l e a r u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n ( o r d e n i a l )

143
of this fundamental antithesis and illusory notions about the
existence of trends beyond materialism and idealism. According
to Dilthey, for example, philosophy existed either as a met­
aphysical outloook with pretensions to sovereignty or in the
form of a theory orientated on a synthesis of scientific data.
T h e antithesis between materialism and idealism developed, ac­
cording to him, only within metaphysical system-making:
A bifurcation of the system, with an antithesis of realist and idealist
standpoints, or something similar, corresponds to the main counter­
posing of ideas in thinking which is grounded, at best, in the nature of
this metaphysical concept-forming (41:97).

He represented the antithesis between the 'living' metaphysical-

irrationalist ideological trend in philosophy and the require­
ment of scientific character, also taking shape within philoso­
phy, as a characteristic of philosophical knowledge constantly
being revived in each new historical age, and consequently
attributive.
Reduction of the main philosophical antithesis to an op­
position between speculative metaphysics claiming to be knowl­
edge above experience, and a specialised, mainly epistem­
ological philosophical theory became a favourite idea of
positivism. Having proclaimed struggle against metaphysics
the cardinal task of philosophy, the positivists considered
both objective idealism of a rationalist turn and materialist
philosophy to be metaphysics.
Some positivists recognised spiritualism and positivism as
the main philosophical trends, others empiricism and rational­
ism, and still others epistemology and natural philosophy.
Ultimately these notions about the main trends agreed with
one another on the chief, decisive point, i.e. in denying the fun­
damental antithesis between materialism and idealism, and in
evaluating 'positive philosophy' as the 'philosophy of science',
which rejected in principle the task of philosophical com­
prehension of natural and social reality as scientifically senseless.
T h e latest irrationalist idealism, despite its characteristic
denial of positivist scientism, in general accepts the positivist
notion about the main philosophical trends, although evaluating
each of them differently. Some irrationalists speak of the
opposition of metaphysics and empiricism, coming forward as
reformers of traditional metaphysics or claiming to surmount
the antithesis they proclaim; others interpret irrationalist met­
aphysics as a true empiricism retaining intimate contact with
life.
T h e Bergsonian, Gilbert Maire, counterposing the irration-

144
alist m e t a p h y s i c s o f b e c o m i n g t o t h e r a t i o n a l i s t m e t a p h y s i c s
of being, defined their inter-relation as an antithesis between
idealism and empiricism. 'Philosophy is compelled to choose
b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o a t t i t u d e s , ' h e w r o t e , ' a n d a c c o r d i n g t o its
choice, it b e c o m e s idealist or empiricist' ( 1 5 7 : 1 9 - 2 0 ) . In a n o t h e r
place he stressed that idealism and empiricism w e r e 'the two
cardinal points around which philosophical doctrines are
grouped' (157:29).
Maire, of course, considered himself an o p p o n e n t of idealism
(like his t e a c h e r H e n r i B e r g s o n ) , t h e n u b of w h i c h (in his
view) was that it trusted the 'evidence of the senses and the
data of consciousness only after their refraction in ideas or
concepts' (ibid.), w h i l e t h e e m p i r i c i s m t h a t B e r g s o n i s m p r o ­
c l a i m e d itself t h e p i n n a c l e o f ' a c c e p t s , a t l e a s t a s its s t a r t i n g
point, inward or external experience as the senses and con­
s c i o u s n e s s c o n f i d e i t t o it' (ibid.). E m p i r i c i s m w a s t h u s c h a r a c ­
terised as a s p o n t a n e o u s attitude to t h e sensually given, alien
to speculative premisses, imbued with confidence and enthu­
s i a s m , a n d a s a w a r e n e s s o f its i n e x h a u s t i b l e r i c h n e s s a n d v i t a l
truth.
W h a t p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e s did M a i r e class a s e m p i r i ­
cism? His answer was rather interesting:
m a t e r i a l i s m , positivism, a c e r t a i n e v o l u t i o n i s m , p r a g m a t i s m , Bergson­
ism, c o m p r i s e t h e c a t e g o r y of e m p i r i c i s t p h i l o s o p h i e s , in s p i t e of
their dissimilarity and disagreement ( 1 5 7 : 2 9 ) .

T h a t proposition includes an indirect recognition of the polari­

sation of empiricism into an opposition of materialism and
idealism. But M a i r e was far f r o m c o n s c i o u s of that, since
he c o u n t e r p o s e d e m p i r i c i s m to idealism. F r o m his point of view
Bergsonism was closer to materialism than to idealism. Is
m o r e eloquent evidence needed of the unsoundness in principle
of this idea of t h e m a i n t r e n d s in p h i l o s o p h y ?
I h a v e e x a m i n e d the opinion that philosophy is polarised
into two main, mutually exclusive trends that do not correspond
to materialism and idealism. Along with t h e 'bifurcation' of
philosophy, there h a v e been, h o w e v e r , no few attempts to
d e m o n s t r a t e the existence of a m u c h larger n u m b e r of main
t r e n d s . T h e Russian idealist G i l y a r o v , for e x a m p l e , a r g u e d
that t h e r e w e r e f o u r of t h e m . His line of r e a s o n i n g was as
f o l l o w s : p h i l o s o p h y , h o w e v e r f a r i t g o e s i n its s p e c u l a t i o n s ,
always starts f r o m t h e directly obvious. F o r m a n this w a s only
m a n himself, a n d not, m o r e o v e r , m a n i n g e n e r a l but h u m a n
existence proper, perceivable by the philosophising individual.
B u t m a n — a n d t h i s w a s a l s o d i r e c t l y o b v i o u s — w a s a corporeal,

110-01603 145
spiritual living creature. These attributes of h u m a n existence,
according to Gilyarov, determined the inevitability of four main
philosophical trends:
We can try to comprehend reality from the corporeal basis, or
from the spiritual, or from the one or the other in their isolation,
or from both taken in their unity. T h e first point of view is called
materialism, the second spiritualism, the third dualism, and the fourth
monism. T h e r e are no other philosophical trends, and cannot be
(75:3)

According to him none of these trends could cope with its

task. Materialism discovered the impossibility of reducing
everything that existed to matter; idealism the impossibility
of reducing what exists to spirit; dualism could not explain
the interaction of the spiritual and t h e material; and mon­
ism could not demonstrate the unity of the spiritual and
the material that it postulated. N o n e of the trends, con­
sequently, surpassed the others; they were all only attempts,
doomed to failure since there were no roads leading from
the directly authentic to being as such, from human exist­
ence to the absolute.
To some extent Gilyarov's ideas anticipated the existentialist
'philosophy of philosophy' that interprets philosophising as
the return of mind to itself from the depersonalised sphere of
alienation. And although this return does not, in the existential­
ists' view, bring us any closer to objective truth, it clarifies our
understanding of its fatal unattainability and gives it profound
sense.
Dilthey saw the difference in principle between philoso­
phical trends and scientific ones in philosophy's being authentic
intellectual experience of life, while science was concerned with
things that were not experienced but simply studied for the sake
of some, usually practical end, necessary but not expressing
the sense of life. No one won in the fight between philoso­
phical trends, since each of them expressed a living feeling
inevitable for a definite historical age, that was not subject to
appraisal as either true or false; it simply existed, like life
itself. It was because of its closeness to life that philosophy
could not exist as gradually developing knowledge, possessing
an inner unity and conforming in its parts. ' E v e r y w h e r e (he
contended) we see an infinite variety of philosophical systems
in chaotic disorder' (41:75). Each system claimed general sig­
nificance, which was justified, since philosophy was a life-sensi­
tive expression of its epoch. But along with the rise of a new
attitude to the world there also arose a new philosophy cor-

146
responding to it, whose claims to general significance w e r e as
justified as those of all t h e other systems. T h e sense of philo­
sophising, a c c o r d i n g to this conception, wholly mastered by exis­
tentialism, consisted in awareness of this contradiction, which
was evidence that philosophy's tasks could be c o m p r e h e n d e d but
not resolved. Philosophising should t h e r e f o r e be r e g a r d e d as
self-comprehension r a t h e r than mastery of t r u t h or k n o w l e d g e
of s o m e material content, and so as discovery of the sense of
t h e life situation from which each trend (or mode) of philoso­
phising grew.
T h e historical process of philosophy, from Dilthey's stand­
point, was a very profound expression of t h e substantiality
and spontaneity of life; it was an ' a n a r c h y of philosophi­
cal systems' ( 4 1 : 7 5 ) . Dilthey rejected t h e Hegelian conception
of t h e progressive development of philosophy. Philosophical
doctrines w e r e of equal value in principle as specific vital
formations. T h a t conclusion did not, however, a g r e e with the
p r e f e r e n c e he g a v e to irrationalist idealism. ' T h e r e is no room,'
he declared, 'for looking on t h e world from t h e angle of values
and aims' in the materialist conception ( 4 1 : 1 0 5 ) . T h e n u b of
this statement is that the sense and aim of life can only be brought
out through analysis of t h e religious, mythological, poetic,
and metaphysical mind. All these forms of consciousness, it
is true, only expressed symbolically the ' n a t u r e of world
unity' which was incomprehensible. But objective idealism,
according to Dilthey, expressed this mystery of life most m e a n ­
ingfully (see 4 1 : 1 1 7 ) .
While t h e classical writers of p r e - M a r x i a n philosophy saw
evidence of the weakness of philosophy, which had to be over­
c o m e by developing scientific methods of exploring philosophical
problems, in the existence, rivalry, and succession of n u m e r o u s
philosophical systems, c o n t e m p o r a r y thinkers of an irrationalist
turn of mind (following Dilthey) consider the a n a r c h y of sys­
tems a n o r m a l situation specifically characteristic of philosophy.
T h e irrationalist philosopher believes that conviction of the
t r u t h of one's philosophical views is a prejudice; he c o n s e q u e n t ­
ly suggests, as a postulate, a conviction that all existing and
possible doctrines a r e u n t r u e but h a v e the attractive force in­
h e r e n t in truth because each has its sense, at least: for those
w h o discover it.
Irrationalism is only one of the main trends of c o n t e m p o ­
r a r y idealist philosophy, of course, and its conception of t h e
a n a r c h y of systems clashes with the opposite conceptions that
d e n o u n c e or deny this a n a r c h y . Neopositivists and Neothomists,

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while interpreting the subject-matter and tasks of philosophy
d i f f e r e n t l y , n e v e r t h e l e s s find a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e w h e n e v a l u a t ­
ing the pluralism of doctrines existing in philosophy. T h e y
d e n o u n c e the irrationalist apologia for the a n a r c h y of systems,
t a k i n g it as a very h a r m f u l fallacy of philosophy on h u m a n i t y ' s
r o a d s t o truth a n d justice, not being a w a r e t h a t this a n a r c h y
is essentially an irrationalist myth.
F r o m the angle of neopositivism the 'anarchy of philosoph­
ical s y s t e m s ' is a fatal c o n s e q u e n c e of ' m e t a p h y s i c a l ' p h i l o ­
sophising, which, by not allowing for the principle of veri­
f i c a t i o n a n d t h e s t r i c t r e q u i r e m e n t s o f l o g i c , a b a n d o n s itself
on t h e whole to a speculative imagining c a p a b l e of creating
an unlimited n u m b e r of identically u n s o u n d systems. Only a
f e w n e o p o s i t i v i s t s a t t e m p t t o ask t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e p r o g r e s s i v e
d i v e r g e n c e of doctrines, justly r e g a r d i n g it as a d a n g e r to the
v e r y e x i s t e n c e of p h i l o s o p h y as a s c i e n c e .
I am far from u n d e r v a l u i n g t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e differ­
ences between existentialists, neopositivists, Neothomists, and the
adherents of philosophical anthropology, the 'new ontology',
p e r s o n a l i s m , and o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e or linguistic philosophy, etc.
I a m s i m p l y c o n v i n c e d t h a t all t h e s e d o c t r i n e s ( b u t c o n ­
t e m p o r a r y b o u r g e o i s philosophers dispute just this) a r e factions
of idealist philosophy, w h o s e differences by no m e a n s outweigh
their f u n d a m e n t a l unity. T h e analysis in C h a p t e r 1 of the
n u m e r o u s versions of t h e posing a n d a n s w e r i n g of t h e basic
philosophical question provides the key to understanding the
c o n t e m p o r a r y varieties of idealist p h i l o s o p h y , w h i c h differ
substantially in several respects from the idealism of past cen­
turies. T h i s difference is q u i t e often t a k e n by c o n t e m p o r a r y
b o u r g e o i s philosophers as a rejection of t h e main propositions
o f i d e a l i s t p h i l o s o p h y r a t h e r t h a n a d e n i a l o f its t r a d i t i o n a l
forms. But the history of philosophy of m o d e r n times has
a l w a y s b e e n a p i c t u r e of an i m p r e s s i v e d i v e r s i t y of idealist
doctrines. It is enough to c o m p a r e Descartes' metaphysics,
L e i b n i z ' s m o n a d o l o g y , B e r k e l e y ' s idealist e m p i r i c i s m , M a i n e d e
Biran's irrationalism, Fichte's subjective idealism, Schelling's
philosophy of identity, to see t h e u n s o u n d n e s s of t h e view that
t h e e x i s t e n c e of d i s a g r e e m e n t s b e t w e e n idealists calls in question
t h e i r u n i t y i n p r i n c i p l e o n t h e m a i n , d e t e r m i n i n g p o i n t , i.e. t h e i r
a n s w e r to the basic philosophical question. It is h a r d l y necessary
to demonstrate that the divergences between contemporary
idealist d o c t r i n e s a r e n o m o r e substantial t h a n t h o s e b e t w e e n the
classic w r i t e r s of idealist philosophy.
The unity in principle of idealist doctrines does not in

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the least rule out the existence of opposing systems of views
within this trend. Existentialists and neopositivists hold incom­
patible views on a number of problems. Hegel and Schopen­
hauer also took opposite idealist stances. A polarisation, and even
more a divergence of doctrines, is possible within one trend,
especially in the idealist one. That essential fact makes it
necessary to demarcate the main trends of idealist philosophy
in both the past and the present.
T h e r e are thus no grounds for speaking of an anarchy of
systems in contemporary bourgeois philosophy, since almost
all these systems (the exception being only a few materialist
doctrines or ones related to materialism) have an idealist
character. Lenin wrote, characterising the bourgeois philosophy
of the beginning of this century:
scarcely a single contemporary professor of philosophy (or of theology)
can be found w h o is not directly or indirectly engaged in refuting
materialism (142:10).
In that respect contemporary bourgeois philosophy does not
differ essentially from its immediate predecessor.
The uncritical statement about a host of philosophical doctrines
usually leads metaphysically thinking philosophers to a denial
of the fundamental antithesis between materialism and idealism,
which are declared to be at best nothing but two trends among
a host of others. But, as I have stressed above (and I am deli­
berately returning to this thesis so that it can be thoroughly
grasped), materialism and idealism are trends of a kind such
that the antithesis between them is constantly being revealed
within other trends. T h e r e is no rationalism in general, for
example; each rationalist is an idealist or a materialist, because
it is impossible to be only a rationalist. And those bourgeois
philosophers who counterpose rationalism to both materialism
and idealism as a rule display an extremely narrow, over-simpli­
fied understanding of them.
A philosopher does not have to be a rationalist or an em­
piricist, a sensualist, irrationalist, or phenomenalist, a nominalist
or a 'realist', etc. He can reject all of them or defend only one
of them. But he cannot reject both materialism and idealism;
he has to choose between them, i.e. to take a stand for one
and against the other. That pattern of the moulding of all,
in any way developed doctrines is not made less important
by the existence of eclectic and dualist theories.
Eclecticism is first and foremost an attempt to unite materi­
alism and idealism. As Plekhanov noted:

149
 those people w h o a r e incapable of consistent thought stop half-way
a n d a r e c o n t e n t with a m i s h - m a s h o f idealism a n d m a t e r i a l i s m . S u c h
i n c o n s i s t e n t t h i n k e r s a r e c a l l e d eclectics ( 2 1 0 : 5 7 8 ) .

O n e ' c o m p o n e n t ' usually p r e d o m i n a t e s in any eclecticism. In

most cases philosophical eclecticism tends to idealism, since
o n e o f its m a i n s o u r c e s i s a b s e n c e o f a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o p u r s u e
a materialist line in philosophy. It c a n n o t , of c o u r s e , be r e d u c e d
simply to inconsistency; it would be m o r e correct to say that
t h i s i n c o n s i s t e n c y itself is a c o n s e q u e n c e of an o r i e n t a t i o n t h a t
considers it necessary to conjoin essentially incompatible prin­
ciples.
An eclectic o r i e n t a t i o n is s o m e t i m e s d i s t i n g u i s h e d as a
s u r m o u n t i n g o f ' o n e - s i d e d n e s s ' . L e n i n p o i n t e d o u t its l i n k
w i t h s o p h i s m , w h i c h , b y b r i n g i n g e x a m i n a t i o n o f all a s p e c t s
o f a n o b j e c t t o t h e f o r e , a n d a l l o w a n c e f o r all a n d e v e r y t h i n g ,
v e i l e d t h e n e e d t o s i n g l e o u t t h e m a i n o n e a n d its s y s t e m a t i c ,
consistent, logical d e v e l o p m e n t . Consistency, w h i c h m u s t not
be confused with persuasiveness, constitutes a m a i n p r o p e r t y
of philosophical t h i n k i n g , w h i c h explains t h e often p a r a d o x i c a l
and even extravagant conclusions. Eclecticism is therefore
e s s e n t i a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h s o u n d p h i l o s o p h y , w i t h its i n t r e p i d
r e a d i n e s s t o g o t o t h e l o g i c a l e n d , a n d t o a c c e p t all c o n c l u s i o n s
that follow from t h e initial, f u n d a m e n t a l statement.
O n e must not c o n f u s e eclecticism, h o w e v e r , with inconsist­
ency in p u r s u i n g a principle linked with i n a d e q u a t e develop­
ment of s a m e , a l t h o u g h that often gives rise to c o n t r a d i c t i o n s
o f a k i n d t h a t m a y s e e m a t first g l a n c e t o b e a c o n s e q u e n c e
of e c l e c t i c i s m . It is not e c l e c t i c i s m w h e n a p h i l o s o p h e r p r o v e s
i n c a p a b l e o f d r a w i n g all t h e c o n c l u s i o n s s t e m m i n g f r o m h i s
principle since these conclusions m a y simply not be deducible
but p r e s u p p o s e d i s c o v e r y of c e r t a i n facts. T h e e s s e n c e of
e c l e c t i c i s m is r e p u d i a t i o n of a p r i n c i p l e d p o s i t i o n in a d i s p u t e
b e t w e e n fully e x p o u n d e d , m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e t h e o r i e s , a n d
a readiness to replace o n e line of principle by another, op­
posite o n e 'for a time'.
L e n i n ' s c r i t i q u e of Machism is a brilliant e x a m p l e of
u n m a s k i n g of the anti-philosophical essence of eclecticism.
He c i t e d Mach's The Analysis of Sensations, in w h i c h it is
said in p a r t i c u l a r :
If I i m a g i n e that w h i l e I am e x p e r i e n c i n g s e n s a t i o n s , I or s o m e o n e
else c o u l d o b s e r v e m y b r a i n with all p o s s i b l e p h y s i c a l a n d c h e m i c a l
m e a n s , it would be possible to ascertain with what processes of t h e
o r g a n i s m p a r t i c u l a r s e n s a t i o n s a r e c o n n e c t e d (cited from 1 4 2 : 3 1 ) .

Citing this essentially materialist position, Lenin concluded

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that M a c h ' s view was an e x a m p l e of eclectic half-heartedness
and muddle:

A delightful philosophy! First sensations are declared to be 'the real

elements of t h e world', on this an 'original' Berkeleianism is e r e c t e d —
a n d t h e n t h e v e r y o p p o s i t e view i s s m u g g l e d in, viz., t h a t s e n s a t i o n s
a r e c o n n e c t e d with definite p r o c e s s e s i n t h e o r g a n i s m . A r e n o t t h e s e
'processes' c o n n e c t e d with metabolic e x c h a n g e b e t w e e n t h e ' o r g a n i s m '
and the external world? Could this metabolism take p l a c e if the sensa­
tions of t h e p a r t i c u l a r o r g a n i s m did n o t g i v e it an o b j e c t i v e l y c o r ­
r e c t idea of this e x t e r n a l w o r l d ? ( 1 4 2 : 3 1 ) .

Lenin counterposed brilliantly consistent idealists to Mach

and his a d h e r e n t s , pointing out that t h e y in fact refused to t a k e
m o r a l responsibility for the fundamental principles they accept­
ed; they ignored t h e m w h e n n a t u r a l science forced t h e m t o a g r e e
with facts clearly i n c o m p a t i b l e with idealism.
My appreciation of philosophical eclecticism m a y seem
e x t r e m e l y s e v e r e a n d unjustified; for Aristotle w a s s o m e t i m e s
called an eclectic for his w a v e r i n g b e t w e e n idealism a n d
materialism. I t h e r e f o r e think it necessary to concretise t h e
c o n c e p t o f e c l e c t i c i s m b y a h i s t o r i c a l a p p r o a c h t o its d e f i n i ­
tion. F r o m my angle t h e rise of philosophical eclecticism
belongs to the time when the tendency toward a radical polarisa­
tion of philosophy into materialism a n d idealism was c o n v e r t ­
e d i n t o a p a t t e r n , i.e. w h e n t h e m a i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r e n d s h a d
already taken shape and were opposed to each other. Eclectic­
ism b e c a m e a n u n p r i n c i p l e d ( a n d i n t h a t s e n s e a n t i - p h i l o s o p h i ­
cal) conception, because the centuries-long evolution of phi­
losophy not only b r o u g h t out but consolidated the m u t u a l ­
ly exclusive systems. But that w a s not yet in Aristotle's
times.
L e n i n d e s c r i b e d A r i s t o t l e ' s Metaphysics a n d t h a t w h o l e p e ­
riod of the m o u l d i n g of t h e main philosophical t r e n d s in t h e fol­
lowing way: 'What the Greeks had was precisely modes of fram­
i n g q u e s t i o n s , a s i t w e r e tentative s y s t e m s , a n a i v e d i s c o r d a n c e
of views, excellently reflected in Aristotle' ( 1 4 4 : 3 6 7 ) . Aristotle's
w a v e r i n g , his q u e s t s a n d f r a m i n g of q u e s t i o n s , a n d also his c r i ­
tique of Plato's theory of ideas (which disclosed t h e main w e a k ­
ness of idealism, with which Aristotle, h o w e v e r , did not b r e a k )
have to be appraised from that angle.
T h e p r e s e n c e of materialist propositions in Aristotle's idealist
d o c t r i n e s e e m i n g l y i n d i c a t e s its i n c o m p l e t e n e s s , w h i c h w a s l i n k e d
in t u r n with t h e historically d e t e r m i n e d lack of d e v e l o p m e n t of
the antithesis between materialism a n d idealism. T h e r e f o r e one
can only apply the concept of eclecticism to separate proposi­

151
tions of his and by no m e a n s to his doctrine as a whole.
I must stress that a limited notion of the antithesis of material­
ism and idealism was not just characteristic of antiquity. We
meet it even a m o n g materialists of m o d e r n times w h o c o m b i n e
a materialist u n d e r s t a n d i n g of n a t u r e with an idealist (true, na­
turalistic) conception of social life. It would be w r o n g to inter­
pret that a m b i v a l e n c e of p r e - M a r x i a n materialism as eclecticism;
h e r e we h a v e an inadequate, clearly limited understanding of t h e
main philosophical principle of materialism, and not a rejection
of it.
T h e question of the e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y materialists w h o held
deist views is r a t h e r special. It needs a special inquiry, t h e results
of which I c a n n o t of c o u r s e anticipate. Such an inquiry, it goes
without saying, should fully allow for t h e fact that in t h e
eighteenth c e n t u r y deism was a m o d e of a tacit, but quite definite
rejection of religious ideology. We must also r e m e m b e r , too, the
inner contradictions of the materialist philosophy of that cen­
tury, caused by the mechanistic form of its development.
It is important to distinguish dualism from eclecticism, for it
consciously counterposes recognition of two substances, two
initial propositions to monistic philosophical doctrines, consid­
ering that no one of them can be deduced from the other. W h e r e
the materialist considers the spiritual a p r o p e r t y of matter or­
ganised in a certain way, and the idealist tries to d e d u c e matter
from a spiritual p r i m a r y substance, t h e dualist rejects both paths,
suggesting that one cannot start just from t h e material or just
from t h e spiritual. He consequently motivates, and tries consist­
ently to follow, a quite definite principle according to which
two realities originally existed, independent of each other. T h e
dualist principle played a historically progressive role in the sys­
tems of Descartes and Kant; Cartesianism counterposed it to
scholastic idealism, Kantianism to the metaphysics of supersen­
sory knowledge. T h e e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y materialists criticised
t h e Cartesian dualism from the left, relying on Descartes' phys­
ics, in t h e main materialist. T h e idealists, on the c o n t r a r y , crit­
icised it from the right, rejecting Cartesian physics (natural phi­
l o s o p h y ) , which explained natural p h e n o m e n a by materialist
principles. T h e s a m e was repeated in respect of Kant.
If one agrees with t h e d e m a r c a t i o n of t h e concepts of dualism
and eclecticism, o n e c a n n o t accept P l e k h a n o v ' s proposition that
'dualism is always eclectic' ( 2 1 0 : 5 7 8 ) . Eclecticism has not en­
riched philosophy by a single significant idea, while dualism was
an e p o c h - m a k i n g event in philosophy. T h e eclectic can be com­
p a r e d with t h e scientists w h o , while accepting Einstein's postu-

152
late that no velocity can be greater than that of light, nevertheless
try to apply the rule of the addition of velocities formulated by
classical mechanics to light. T h e unsoundness of dualism is not
its inconsistency but its incapacity to explain the unity of the psy­
chic and physiological rationally.
Despite its being counterposed to both materialism and ideal­
ism, dualism cannot exist as an independent doctrine, indepen­
dent in fact from those it is endeavoured to be opposed to. Fur­
thermore, its claim to be a third line in philosophy is unsound.
Its historical role was that it was a transitional stage in some cases
from idealism to materialism, and in others from materialism
to idealism. T h e development of a dualist system of views inevi­
tably begot its negation, since it revealed the impossibility of con­
sistently following opposing principles within one and the same
doctrine. T h e basic philosophical question is a dilemma calling
for a substantiated choice and an alternative answer, which can­
not be avoided either by means of eclecticism or by way of dual­
ism, the historical fates of which confirm the law-governed na­
ture of the radical polarisation of philosophy into two main
trends, viz., materialist and idealist.
T h e progressing divergence of philosophical doctrines regu­
larly leads to their polarisation in opposing trends, and to the
development of diverse forms of the mutually exclusive anti­
thesis between materialism and idealism. T h e irrationalist
interpretation of this as an anarchy of philosophical systems
is unsound in principle since it ignores the existence of main
trends and the development of an antithesis between them, and
also overestimates the role of divergences within the idealist
trend, displaying a clear incomprehension of the unity in prin­
ciple of the latter's qualitatively different forms.
T h e distinguishing of main trends in philosophy, it goes
without saying, has nothing in common with underestimation
of the significance of others. T h e point is simply that the sense
and meaning of all other trends can only be understood by their
attitude to materialist philosophy on the one hand and idealist
on the other. T h e diversity of the forms of development of ma­
terialism and idealism is also manifested precisely in the exist­
ence of a host of philosophical trends. T h e history of philosophy
has to study these transmuted forms of the main trends, bringing
out their peculiarity, which does not stem directly from material­
ist or idealist basic principles. T h e opposition between scholas­
ticism and mysticism, for instance—the two main trends in me­
diaeval European philosophy—did not coincide with the anti­
thesis of materialism and idealism, which can be brought out,

153
however, by analysis of each of these mediaeval trends. Engels
wrote of T h o m a s Münzer:
His philosophico-theological doctrine attacked all the main points not
only of Catholicism, but of Christianity generally. Under the cloak of
Christian forms he preached a kind of pantheism, which curiously re­
sembles modern speculative contemplation and at times approaches
atheism (53:70-71).

From Münzer's point of view, revelation was nothing other than

human reason, faith was awakened reason, paradise was not the
other world but what believers were called on to build on earth.
Summing up this characterisation of Münzer's mystic yet revolu­
tionary doctrine, Engels stressed that 'Münzer's religious phi­
losophy approached atheism' (53:71). 3

Thus, when distinguishing the main philosophical trends and

elucidating their attitude to others, the outstanding significance
of which it would be ridiculous to underestimate, we thereby
prove the unsoundness of any counterposing of any doctrine,
current, or trend whatsoever to materialism and idealism. A phi­
losopher cannot: avoid choice; he chooses insofar as he philoso­
phises. Materialism or idealism—such is the inevitable alterna­
tive in philosophy. Realisation of this alternative puts an end to
superficial understanding of philosophy as a labyrinth in which
all paths lead to a dead end. T h e choice the philosopher makes
(and to some extent the student of philosophy) is ultimately
one between two really alternative answers and not among
many. It is a choice, if one can so express it, of his philosophical
future, after which he has to choose between one or other
concrete, specific version of materialism or idealism.
It would be very frivolous to underestimate the significance
of this secondary choice; for materialism and idealism do not
exist in some pure form, isolated from other not only numerous
but also meaningful trends. Materialism can be dialectical or,
on the contrary, metaphysical, mechanistic, and finally even
vulgar. These are not only different historical stages in the devel­
opment of one and the same doctrine but also versions of
materialism existing at the present time. And acquaintance with
contemporary bourgeois philosophy indicates that the few of its
spokesmen who are materialists, having surmounted the ideo­
logical prejudices prevailing under capitalism, far from always
make this decisive choice in the best way.
T h e r e are very many forms of idealism, and the differences
between them are often significant in principle; suffice it to recall
the struggle between rationalist idealism and irrationalism,
which was already developing in the nineteenth century and

154
has acquired even greater ideological significance in our day.
T h e revival of rationalist traditions, and the struggle of certain
contemporary idealist philosophers against the irrationalist bac­
chanalia in philosophy, are undoubtedly evidence of the exist­
ence of differences among the forms of idealism. It is unscientific
and unwise to ignore these differences, their epistemological
sense, and their ideological implication.
T h e dispute about philosophical trends, and about whether
t h e r e are main trends in philosophy and what kinds they are,
is a reflection within the context of the history of philosophy of
the struggle between the various doctrines, schools, currents,
and trends in philosophy.

2. Metaphysical Systems.
Spiritualism and the Naturalist Tendencies

T h e establishment of the fact of a radical polarisation of the

numerous philosophical trends into an antithesis of materialism
and idealism is the grounds for singling out these as the main
trends in philosophy and opens up a perspective of a new, m o r e
profound interpretation of the antitheses of rationalism and
empiricism, rationalism and irrationalism, naturalism and sup­
ranaturalism, metaphysical systems and phenomenalism, the
metaphysical and dialectical modes of thinking, etc. T h e content
and significance of these undoubtedly opposite trends are fully
disclosed only by an inquiry that fixes the radical antithesis of
materialism and idealism as the starting point. In the light of this
methodological premiss, which reflects the actual state of affairs,
the struggle of the many philosophical doctrines figures as a
development of the main antithesis between materialism and
idealism rather than as a process taking place outside it.
Exploration of the specific (and diverse) relations between
the main trends on the one hand and all other trends in philoso­
phy on the other thus has to concretise the general, often sche­
matic presentation of the struggle between materialism and ideal­
ism, and to deepen our understanding of the unity of the histor­
ical course of philosophy. It is impossible within the scope of
one monograph to explore the history of empiricism, rationalism,
dialectics, and other trends of philosophical thought from the
angle of the struggle between materialism and idealism. I shall
therefore limit myself to an analysis of metaphysical systems,
since they have been less studied in Marxian literature on the
plane of the radical antithesis mentioned above.

155
 T h e terms 'metaphysics', 'metaphysical system', and 'specula­
tive m e t a p h y s i c s ' h a v e b e e n a n d a r e e m p l o y e d i n s o m a n y differ­
ent, at times quite i n c o m p a t i b l e m e a n i n g s that it w o u l d be un­
w i s e t o t r y a n d s i n g l e o u t a s e n s e c o m m o n t o all t h e s e u s a g e s .
S u c h a s e n s e simply d o e s n o t exist. T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e s
called metaphysical systems often p r o v e to be a n e g a t i o n of m e t ­
aphysics. And philosophies that claim to finally refute metaphys­
i c s a r e o f t e n , o n t h e c o n t r a r y , o n l y m o d e r n i s a t i o n s o f it. T h e r e ­
f o r e , instead of a q u e s t f o r a u n i v e r s a l definition of t h e c o n c e p t
o f m e t a p h y s i c s I s h a l l e n d e a v o u r t o g r a s p t h e m a i n t r e n d s i n its
actual d e v e l o p m e n t theoretically. In that respect it is necessary
t o d e l i m i t s u c h c o n c e p t s a s m e t a p h y s i c a l system, a n d m e t a p h y s ­
i c a l method, o r m o d e , o f t h i n k i n g f r o m t h e s t a r t . A t f i r s t g l a n c e
this d e m a r c a t i o n d o e s not give rise to difficulties, s i n c e m e t a p h y s ­
ics a s a m e t h o d i s t h e d i r e c t o p p o s i t e o f d i a l e c t i c a l t h i n k i n g . B u t
the question then arises w h e t h e r the metaphysical m o d e of think­
ing is inevitable for a m e t a p h y s i c a l system a n d t h e dialectical
m e t h o d for an antimetaphysical one. An u n a m b i g u o u s a n s w e r to
that is impossible if only b e c a u s e Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y was a m e t a ­
physical system a n d his m e t h o d dialectical. A n d t h a t c a n n o t b e
explained simply by reference to the contradiction between the
m e t h o d a n d s y s t e m i n his d o c t r i n e . L o c k e ' s system m i g h t b e c h a r ­
a c t e r i s e d a s a n t i m e t a p h y s i c a l , a n d his m e t h o d a s m e t a p h y s i c a l ,
in s p i t e of t h e fact that t h e r e is no c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m .
In that c o n n e c t i o n his m e t a p h y s i c a l m e t h o d w a s a c l e a r o p p o s i t e
of that inherent in the rationalist systems of s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y
metaphysics.
T h e simplest e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e difficulties a n d a m b i g u i t i e s
associated with the t e r m ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' is to point out that it is e m ­
p l o y e d in at least t w o s e n s e s that m u s t n o t be c o n f u s e d . T h a t is
c o r r e c t , but only w i t h i n c e r t a i n limits, s i n c e it is n o t just a m a t ­
ter of h o m o n y m s but of p h e n o m e n a that a r e s o m e t i m e s associat­
ed with o n e a n o t h e r in a very close way. 4

T h e s e preliminary r e m a r k s indicate that the investigation of

metaphysical systems in their relation to the main philosophical
t r e n d s is a very c o m p l i c a t e d business, in p a r t i c u l a r b e c a u s e t h e
antithesis between them and antimetaphysical doctrines by no
m e a n s always coincides with the antithesis between idealism and
materialism. It is also w r o n g to s u p p o s e that metaphysical sys­
tems inevitably h a v e a rationalist, a n d even m o r e an a priori c h a r ­
acter, that they always interpret reality as rational, a n d so on.
M e t a p h y s i c a l systems a r e p r e d o m i n a n t l y idealist d o c t r i n e s , but
n o t o n l y s u c h . I t d o e s n o t follow, h o w e v e r , a s will b e s h o w n b e ­
low, that the c o n c e p t of a metaphysical system equally e m b r a c e s

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both materialism and idealism. T h e relation of metaphysical
systems to this basic antithesis is an indirect one, which makes
the job of the inquirer even more complicated.
T h e authors of textbooks usually point out that the term 'met­
aphysics' owes its origin to a historical accident; Aristotle's com­
mentator Andronikos of Rhodes, when classifying the works
of the great Stagyrite, signified by the words meta ta physika
those works that he placed 'after physics'. T h e title of Aristotle's
famous work Metaphysics thus actually arose in that sense quite
accidentally; it was not yet in the list of Aristotle's works given
by Diogenes Laertius. What was called Metaphysics was
seemingly not one of Aristotle's works, but several joined to­
gether by his disciples and commentators.
I do not intend to dispute the traditional idea of the origin of
the term 'metaphysics', but wish to stress that it was applied by
Andronikos of Rhodes to those works of Aristotle's that their
author classed as 'first philosophy' and not as physics and other
parts of the philosophy of his day. I would also note that the pre­
fix 'meta', as Aristotelian scholars have already remarked, had
a double sense in Greek, since it meant not only 'after' but also
'over', 'above', or 'higher' (see 79:16). From that angle the title
'metaphysics' is not so chance a one; it was given to those works
of Aristotle's in which the question of the first principle of physi­
cal (natural) processes was discussed. 5

It will readily be understood that there were grounds for a

meaningful application of the term 'metaphysics' not only in Aris­
totle's philosophy but above all in Plato's doctrine, which first
introduced the concept of transcendent, all-defining reality into
philosophy, and considered n a t u r e only a hazy image of the
transcendent world.
T h e definition of being as immobile, invariant, radically op­
posed to sense-perceived nature, belongs to Plato's forerunners,
the Eleatics. But only Plato can be considered the first creator of
a metaphysical system. T h e antithesis between the intelligible
and the sensual world in his system is one between the spiritual
and the material (the incorporeal and the c o r p o r e a l ) , the origi­
nal and the derivative, the motionless and the changing, the in-
transient and the transient, perfection and imperfection, unity
and aggregate, the general and the particular. Plato thus ex­
pressed a significant part of the principles of subsequent metaphysi­
cal systems. His epistemology, as the most categorical denial of
the significance of sense experience for knowing transcendent
reality was an extreme expression of the rationalist antithesis
of reason and sensuality. N o n e of the succeeding rationalist

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metaphysicians p e r h a p s went so far, and that is very essential
for u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e development of metaphysical systems,
w h o s e creators, especially in m o d e r n times, could no longer
i g n o r e empirical k n o w l e d g e and its scientific-theoretical com­
prehension.
Plato's d o c t r i n e about i n n a t e ideas anticipated t h e epistemo­
logical problematic of succeeding metaphysics, including t h e
d o c t r i n e of a priori knowledge. It is also important to note h e r e
that n o n e of Plato's successors (having in mind, of course, out­
standing philosophers) adopted his epistemological conception
as a whole, a c c o r d i n g to which man knows nothing essential in
his real life, i.e. life in this world, in the world he sees, hears, feels
and, finally, alters. This deviation from Platonism is a regular
tendency in the d e v e l o p m e n t of metaphysical systems in t h e new
socio-historical cultural environment.
Aristotle's Metaphysics was less metaphysical than Plato's
system. In that sense one can say that the origin of t h e term 'met­
aphysics' is really associated with his works by c h a n c e , since his
f o r e r u n n e r had already had a much m o r e clearly expressed con­
cept of metaphysical reality. Aristotle was an idealist but he did
not accept the Platonic denial of the i m p o r t a n c e of t h e sensual
picture of the world. Single material objects w e r e transient but
m a t t e r as t h e essence of all of them did not arise and was not
destroyed. T r u e , material things could not ( a c c o r d i n g to him)
arise just from matter (and be correspondingly e x p l a i n e d ) ; mat­
ter was only the material cause of individual things. But form
was also inherent in things (not just external a p p e a r a n c e but
also any other substantial d e t e r m i n a c y ) , and was something dis­
tinct from m a t t e r ( s u b s t a n c e ) , because a ball, for example, could
be m a d e of copper, marble, wood, etc. Consequently, he suggest­
ed, it was reasonable to recognise t h e existence of a cause that
determined the s h a p e of things, i.e. a formal cause. T h e form
of any single thing was inseparable from it, but t h e r e was also,
seemingly, a form of everything that existed, which lay outside
single things, and consequently outside matter. It was t h e pri­
m a r y form, or the form of forms.
T h e motion of single things was something different from their
materiality and form. It could only be t h e c o n s e q u e n c e of the
effect of a special kind of c a u s e on a body, which Aristotle called
efficient, which causes motion. A moving body posited what
moved it. Any motion had a beginning but the chain of causes pro­
voking it could not be infinite. T h e r e was consequently a first
or p r i m a r y cause, a first mover.
Finally, t h e r e was also a final (specific or purposeful) cause,

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s i n c e all t h e o t h e r c a u s e s d i d n o t e x p l a i n f o r w h a t p u r p o s e c e r ­
tain bodies existed and t h o s e of their relations with o n e a n o t h e r
that could be defined as relations of m e a n s and end. T h a t refer­
red not only to actual purposefulness in t h e world of t h e living
b u t a l s o t o a n y effect o f t h e l a w s o f n a t u r e , w h i c h s e e m e d t o A r i s ­
t o t l e t o b e p u r p o s i v e . A t h r o w n s t o n e fell, f o r e x a m p l e , b e c a u s e
its ' n a t u r a l p l a c e w a s o n t h e g r o u n d ' .
M e t a p h y s i c s a s a s y s t e m , first c r e a t e d b y P l a t o , i s t h u s a n i d e a l ­
ist d o c t r i n e a b o u t a s p e c i a l , ' m e t a p h y s i c a l ' r e a l i t y t h a t d e t e r ­
mines material, sense-perceived reality. Aristotle, like Plato,
c r e a t e d a m e t a p h y s i c a l s y s t e m , b u t h e c o u n t e r p o s e d his d o c t r i n e
to Plato's metaphysics. W h a t was the n u b of the divergence be­
tween Aristotle and Plato? In a dispute b e t w e e n t w o varieties of
m e t a p h y s i c s ? I n a c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i t h i n t h e idealist c a m p ? T h a t
i s f a r f r o m all, a n d i s p e r h a p s n o t t h e m a i n p o i n t . L e n i n n o t e d
materialist features in Aristotle's critique of the Platonic d o c t r i n e
of i d e a s :
Aristotle's criticism of Plato's 'ideas' is a criticism of idealism as ideal-
ism in g e n e r a l : for w h e n c e concepts, abstractions, a r e derived,
t h e n c e c o m e also 'law' and 'necessity', etc. ( 1 4 4 : 2 8 1 ) .
Aristotle posed the question of t h e genesis of general concepts
a n d u n i v e r s a l s , a q u e s t i o n t h a t did n o t e x i s t f o r P l a t o ; t h e g e n e r a l
was p r i m a r y and substantial. T h a t is an essential d i v e r g e n c e ,
which anticipated the struggle of nominalism and 'realism' in
mediaeval philosophy, a struggle in which t h e antithesis between
materialism a n d idealism was developed in an indirect way.
A r i s t o t l e c o n s t a n t l y r e t u r n e d i n t h e Metaphysics t o t h e q u e s ­
tion o f t h e r e l a t i o n o f t h e g e n e r a l , p a r t i c u l a r , a n d i n d i v i d u a l ,
trying to explain their unity and mutual penetration.
But man and horse and t e r m s which a r e thus applied to individuals, but
universally, a r e not s u b s t a n c e but something composed of this p a r t i c u l a r
formula and this particular matter treated as universal ( 8 : 5 5 9 ) .
In a n o t h e r place he again stressed that 'clearly no universal
e x i s t s a p a r t f r o m its i n d i v i d u a l ' ( 8 : 5 6 4 ) . T h e s e p r o p o s i t i o n s w e r e
n o t y e t , o f c o u r s e , a n s w e r s t o t h e difficult q u e s t i o n o f t h e n a t u r e
of t h e universal, but they w e r e a w e l l - f o u n d e d denial of Plato's
posing of t h e p r o b l e m of metaphysics.
A r i s t o t l e ' s i d e a l i s m , u n l i k e P l a t o ' s , h a d a s its m a i n t h e o r e t i c a l
s o u r c e not a substantiation of t h e g e n e r a l but a limited empirical
notion of t h e causes of t h e motion of bodies e v e r y w h e r e and c o n ­
stantly observed in nature. Aristotle considered the sole possible
e x p l a n a t i o n of this fact to be r e c o g n i t i o n of a first m o v e r w h i c h
could not be anything material, in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e c o u r s e of
his a r g u m e n t , b e c a u s e e v e r y t h i n g m a t e r i a l , i n h i s belief, w a s set

159
in motion from outside. 'Of course,' Lenin pointed out,
it is idealism, but more objective and further removed, more general
than the idealism of Plato, hence in the philosophy of nature more fre­
quently=materialism (144:280).
In o r d e r to emphasise t h e principled significance of this im­
p o r t a n t conclusion, let me point out that m a n y p r e - M a r x i a n m a ­
terialists w e r e not atheists. J o h n T o l a n d , w h o first put forward
and substantiated t h e very important materialist proposition
about the self-motion of matter, was nevertheless a deist. T h e
outlook of Joseph Priestley was even m o r e contradictory.
Meerovsky rightly stresses:
A materialist philosopher and splendid naturalist, he was at the same
time a religious man. A doctrine of matter, a criticism of the idea of two
substances, an affirmation that thought was a property of matter with
a definite system of organisation, denial of the immortality of the soul,
and a proclaiming of the universality of the principles of determinism
were combined in Priestley's world outlook with belief in revelation,
resurrection of the dead, and the divine authority of Jesus Christ. He
not only did not see the inner contradictoriness of his views but, on the
contrary, was convinced that materialism was fully compatible with
religion (182:43).

I am far from thinking that the idealist Aristotle and t h e ma­

terialist T o l a n d held the s a m e views; but it is important to stress
that a materialist tendency, expressed in recognition of the eter­
nity of matter, existed in the womb of Aristotle's metaphysical
system. In t h e Middle Ages this tendency got clear expression in
Averrоism; it facilitated t h e moulding of t h e materialist philoso­
phy of m o d e r n times. Its essential significance was above all that
the basic contradiction organically inherent in metaphysical sys­
tems was manifested in it; t h e latter laid claim to knowledge
above experience but based this claim on observations drawn from
everyday e x p e r i e n c e and science. T h a t was inevitable, of course,
for t h e r e was no other m e a n s at all of idealist philosophising,
since there was no transcendent reality and knowledge above expe­
rience. A n y o n e w h o tried to prove the existence of the one or the
other could not help appealing to this world. An appeal to the na­
tural and empirical for ' p r o o f of the existence of the s u p e r n a t u ­
ral and s u p e r e x p e r i e n t a l m o r e and m o r e b e c a m e a pressing ne­
cessity, the m o r e advances w e r e m a d e by n a t u r a l - s c i e n c e knowl­
edge of n a t u r e . Such, in my view, a r e the deep-lying sources of
t h e crises that periodically wrack carefully constructed meta­
physical systems.
T h e idealist metaphysician c a n n o t avoid confrontations either
with the 'naive realism' of everyday experience, which is d r a w n
t o w a r d a materialist understanding of the world, or with science,

160
which sustains materialism. It is therefore no accident that the
most outstanding, comprehensively developed metaphysical
system, Hegel's philosophy, was materialism stood on its head.
Explaining that quite, at first glance, incomprehensible phenom­
enon, Engels pointed out that philosophers (including ideal­
ists)
w e r e by no m e a n s impelled, as they t h o u g h t they w e r e , solely by t h e
force of p u r e r e a s o n . On t h e c o n t r a r y , w h a t really pushed t h e m f o r w a r d
most was t h e powerful and ever m o r e rapidly o n r u s h i n g progress of n a t u ­
ral science and industry. A m o n g t h e materialists this was plain on t h e
surface, but t h e idealist systems also filled themselves m o r e and m o r e
with a materialist content and attempted pantheistic ally to reconcile t h e
antithesis between mind and matter. T h u s , ultimately, t h e Hegelian
system represents merely a materialism idealistically t u r n e d upside down
in m e t h o d and content ( 5 2 : 3 4 8 ) .

T h a t brings out the progressive tendencies in the development

of metaphysical systems, tendencies that w e r e always, however,
resisted by reactionary conceptions, viz., denial of t h e ideological
significance of scientific discoveries, a striving to subordinate
philosophical inquiry to substantiation of a religious world out­
look, etc.
T h e mediaeval metaphysical systems disclosed both these ten­
dencies in forms appropriate to an age when religion in essence
constituted t h e sole developed, systematised ideology. T h e anti­
thesis between mediaeval 'realism' and nominalism, as I have
already mentioned, anticipated the struggle of materialism
and idealism in the philosophy of modern times. 'Realism', which
bordered on Plato's doctrine, was more and m o r e drawn, in the
course of its development, to a pantheistic outlook that excluded
recognition of a supernatural or supranatural reality. This ten­
dency already existed in J o h n Scot Erigena's metaphysical sys­
tem. It is not surprising, therefore, that theology condemned not
only the nominalism that attached p a r a m o u n t importance to the
existence of individual sense-perceived material things, but also
extreme 'realism'. In the latter the Christian God was a universal
being who merged with this world by virtue of his universality
and integrity. It is understandable why T h o m a s Aquinas defend­
ed moderate 'realism', basing his arguments not on Plato but on
Aristotle.
Thomas Aquinas and his successors removed the anti-metaphys­
ical features from Aristotle's metaphysics. Matter, which he had
considered uncreatable and indestructible, embracing diverse
possibilities for modification, was interpreted by t h e Scholastics
as a pure possibility that was not being and that b e c a m e such
only due to the actualising activity of form. T h a t interpretation

11-01603 161
o f m a t t e r w a s fully c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e C a t h o l i c d o g m a o f t h e
creation of the world from nothing.
In Aristotle's d o c t r i n e G o d only w o u n d up t h e world clock;
in t h e metaphysics of T h o m i s m he is t r a n s f o r m e d into a c o n c e p t
o f a b s o l u t e , s u p r a n a t u r a l b e i n g . T h e r e l a t i o n ' G o d - n a t u r e ' (in
which n a t u r e was interpreted as contingent being, wholly depen­
dent on the supernatural) was explained as the highest subject-
m a t t e r of philosophical consideration. I say 'consideration' and
6

not investigation, b e c a u s e T h o m i s m starts in fact from t h e point

t h a t t h e a n s w e r s t o all t h e q u e s t i o n s i n t e r e s t i n g p h i l o s o p h y will
be found in Holy Scripture, and that philosophers' job is simply
t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e s e a n s w e r s (i.e. t h e C h r i s t i a n d o g m a s ) , a n d t o
lead h u m a n reason t o t h e m , w h i c h must r e c o g n i s e t h e s u p e r ­
natural as truth above reason (but not against r e a s o n ) , incom­
p r e h e n s i b l e w i t h o u t t h e h e l p o f r e l i g i o u s belief. I t m a y s e e m t h a t
T h o m i s m , w h i c h b a s e d its d o c t r i n e o n t h e ' s u p r a r a t i o n a l ' d o g ­
m a s o f C h r i s t i a n i t y , finally p u t a n e n d t o t h e f a t a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n
c o r r o d i n g metaphysical systems from within. But that c o n t r a ­
diction is also p r e s e r v e d in T h o m i s m , which 'proves' m e t a p h y s ­
ical-theological propositions by a r g u m e n t s of c o m m o n sense
and everyday experience and, moreover, quotes the discoveries
of natural science as authority.
T h e p h i l o s o p h y o f m o d e r n t i m e s f o r m u l a t e d its p r o g r a m m e
in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e interests of t h e rising bourgeoisie on t h e
one hand, and the main tendencies of the development of the
sciences of nature on the other. T h e development of the bour­
geois e c o n o m i c s t r u c t u r e a n d t h e pressing needs of social p r o ­
duction orientated science on investigation of everything that
was involved in o n e w a y or a n o t h e r in t h e s p h e r e of social p r o ­
duction. Description of the different minerals and metals, clas­
sification of plants a n d a n i m a l s — a l l g r a d u a l l y a c q u i r e d not only
scientific but also practical significance. By g a t h e r i n g factual
d a t a , a n d delimiting p h e n o m e n a t h a t h a d been identified with
o n e a n o t h e r in the preceding period (substances diverse in their
proper!ies w e r e r e d u c e d , for e x a m p l e , t o f o u r ' e l e m e n t s ' — e a r t h ,
w a t e r , air, a n d fire), n a t u r a l s c i e n c e inevitably h a d to isolate t h e
studied p h e n o m e n a , a b s t r a c t i n g their i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s a n d in­
teractions, w h o s e significance could not yet be p r o p e r l y evaluat­
ed. T h e l i m i t e d n e s s o f t h e f a c t u a l d a t a still m a d e i t i m p o s s i b l e
to understand the universality of c h a n g e and development,
w h i c h could not, of c o u r s e , be registered by d i r e c t o b s e r v a t i o n .
T h e naive dialectical a p p r o a c h to natural p h e n o m e n a peculiar to
G r e e k philosophers gave natural science nothing at that stage
o f its d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e s c h o l a s t i c m e t h o d o f r e f i n e d d e f i n i t i o n s

162
and distinctions lacking real empirical content was quite unsuit­
able for describing and investigating natural phenomena. T h e
problem of method, as Bykhovsky has rightly stressed, acquired
key importance in both philosophy and natural science. T w o
of the founders of the philosophy of modern times, Descartes
and Bacon, one a rationalist and the other an empiricist, w e r e
equally convinced that the prime task of philosophy was to create
a scientific method of inquiry. Bacon considered this method
7

to be induction; the need for a systematic development of it was

evidenced by 'natural philosophy', i.e. natural science. T h e meth­
od he developed had, of course, a metaphysical character in
Engels' (and particularly in Hegel's) sense of the word, since he
ignored the inner mutual conditioning of phenomena, and their
change and contradictory development. But his metaphysical
method was irreconcilably hostile to the method that was the tool
for constructing speculative metaphysical systems. T h e inductive
method called for careful generalisations and their constant con­
firmation by new observations and experiments. I am thus con­
vinced that the concept of a metaphysical method must also be
employed in at least two senses.
T h e r e is nothing easier than to represent the metaphysical
method that took shape in the natural science and philosophy
of modern times as a kind of methodological interpretation of
certain basic ontological notions of the preceding idealist meta­
physics. Its representatives distinguished invariant, supersensory
being in general from empirical, definite being. Variability,
emergence, and destruction were considered attributes of every­
thing 'finite' and transient, and evidence of its contingency and
imperfection. In contrast to that speculative-idealist metaphysi­
cal method, the metaphysical method of seventeenth-and
eighteenth-century naturalists and empiricist philosophers gen­
erally ignored 'metaphysical', intelligible reality and denied the
importance and universality of change precisely in sense-per­
ceived material reality. It denied it, of course, not because it
ascribed perfection to empirical reality but because it did not see
all those qualities in it. That is why Engels, when describing the
metaphysical mode of thinking predominant in the eighteenth
century, stressed its link with empirical natural science,
remote from speculation: 'the old metaphysics, which accepted
things as finished objects, arose from a natural science
which investigated dead and living things as finished objects'
(52:363).
In contrast to Bacon Descartes developed a method of theo­
retical investigation (both philosophical and natural-science)

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starting from m a t h e m a t i c s and mechanics. It m a y seem that his
method, which also had a metaphysical c h a r a c t e r , fully c o r r e ­
sponded to t h e tasks of constructing an idealist metaphysical sys­
tem, t h e m o r e so that he was striving to c r e a t e such. But closer
examination of t h e 'main rules of t h e m e t h o d ' he formulated
shows that they theoretically s u m m e d up t h e e x p e r i e n c e of scien­
tific inquiry in the exact sciences and w e r e not very suitable
for metaphysical system-creation.
Descartes was t h e f o u n d e r of t h e rationalist metaphysics of t h e
seventeenth c e n t u r y and his method was t h e scientific method
of his time; the essence of t h e 'Cartesian revolution' in philoso­
phy consisted in t h e attempt to c r e a t e a scientific metaphysical
system by means of mathematics and mechanics.
T h e contradiction between t h e idealist metaphysics and m a t e ­
rialist science of m o d e r n times b e c a m e t h e i m m a n e n t c o n t r a ­
diction of Descartes' metaphysical system, t h e contradiction be­
tween metaphysics and physics, idealism and materialism.
Descartes in his physics [Marx and Engels wгote] endowed matter
with self-creative power and conceived mechanical motion as the mani­
festation of its life. He completely separated his physics from his meta­
physics. Within his physics, matter is the sole substance, the sole basis
of being and of knowledge (179:125).

This negation of metaphysics by physics was m a d e in t h e context

of a metaphysical system and started from its main premiss,
to wit, the absolute antithesis of t h e spiritual and material. But
w h e r e a s that kind of absolute antithesis stemmed in preceding
metaphysical systems from an assumption of a t r a n s c e n d e n t
reality radically different from t h e sense-perceived world, with
Descartes and his followers it followed logically from reduction
of t h e spiritual to thinking alone, and the material to extension
alone.
T h e spirit and the body; the substance that thinks, and that which is ex­
tended [Malebranche wrote] are two kinds of being quite different and
entirely opposed: what suits the one cannot suit the other (159:III, 439).
Such a framing of t h e question had a dualistic, metaphysical
(anti-dialectical) c h a r a c t e r , but was not necessarily connected
with an assumption of t r a n s c e n d e n t reality. A necessary corol­
lary of that postulate was the separation of physics from meta­
physics. T h e concept of metaphysical reality was freed of t h e
t r a n s c e n d e n c y ascribed to it; it was mainly interpreted epistemo­
logically, as t h e essential definiteness of t h e world, which was
inaccessible to sense perceptions. 'It is a prejudice that is not
based on any reason to believe that one sees bodies as they a r e in
themselves,' M a l e b r a n c h e categorically declared (159:III, 50) . 8

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T h a t t u r n i n g away from a fundamentally unscientific interpre­
tation of metaphysical reality as s u p e r n a t u r a l to an epistemolog­
ical distinction between t h e metaphysical and p h e n o m e n a l
(in spite of the latter's not being free of certain ontological prem­
isses) was a retreat of metaphysics in face of t h e forces of m a ­
terialism and n a t u r a l science hostile to it and united in their ideo­
logical orientation. Metaphysics was evolving and was compel­
led, to s o m e extent, to assimilate ideas of n a t u r a l science alien to
it, even if only so as to 'prove' its propositions about a non-exist­
ent s u p e r n a t u r a l world by t h e ' n a t u r a l ' way and a r g u m e n t s of
ordinary c o m m o n sense. T h a t crisis of metaphysical speculation
was p r o m p t e d by t h e anti-speculative doctrines of materialist
philosophers and naturalists.

3. Materialism—the Sole Consistent Opponent

of Speculative Metaphysical Systems
T h e a t t e m p t at a radical restructuring of speculative metaphysics
was Descartes'; and that attempt, as shown above, led to philo­
sophical dualism. T h e d o c t r i n e of his direct successor Spinoza
was a negation of idealist metaphysics, but in t h e context of the
new metaphysical system he created.
T h e pantheistic identification of God and n a t u r e , and the
ascribing of certain divine attributes to t h e latter in Spinoza's
system proved to be essentially a materialist denial of a n y t r a n ­
scendency. Spinoza did not, true, reject supersensory reality; he
interpreted it as a substantialness of n a t u r e inaccessible to expe­
rience, a strict orderliness, 'reasonableness', and universal pat­
tern of a single, omnipresent, and omnipotent universum. Denial
of c h a n c e and freedom of will w e r e t h e r e v e r s e side of this con­
ception, a c c o r d i n g to which an eternal, invariant, motionless
metaphysical reality constantly r e p r o d u c e d a world of transient,
finite phenomena, i.e. the whole diversity of the states of substance.
But both the metaphysical natura naturans (creative n a t u r e )
and t h e sense-perceptible natura naturata (created n a t u r e )
constituted o n e and t h e s a m e this world.
Spinoza was a resolute opponent of t h e teleological interpre­
tation of n a t u r e characteristic of all p r e c e d i n g metaphysical
systems, which led to theological conclusions. He differentiated
between t h o u g h t as an attribute of substance and h u m a n intel­
lect; the latter he defined as a mode, infinite, it is t r u e . This 9

distinction was m e a n t to p r o v e not only t h e existence of a

substantial basis to people's thinking but also t h e identity of the
empirical and logical foundations, t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e of the

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order of ideas and order of things, the existence of an u n c h a n g ­
ing universal p a t t e r n of e v e r y t h i n g t h a t exists, w h i c h w a s
interpreted as natural predetermination.
Spinoza's philosophy was a most convincing expression of t h e
reality of t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n h e r e n t in metaphysical systems
I have already mentioned above. He endeavoured to resolve
t h e s e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s b y c r e a t i n g a materialist m e t a p h y s i c a l s y s ­
t e m . But a m a t e r i a l i s m t h a t r e t a i n e d t h e f o r m of a m e t a p h y s i c a l
s y s t e m w a s i n c o n s i s t e n t , if o n l y b e c a u s e it a s s u m e d a s u p e r s e n ­
s o r y r e a l i t y . T h a t s h o w e d itself i n S p i n o z a ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f
t h e ' s p i r i t u a l - m a t e r i a l ' r e l a t i o n , i n his a n a l y s i s o f t h e r e l a t i o n b e ­
t w e e n s u b s t a n c e a n d m o d e s , in his t h e o r y of k n o w l e d g e ( w h i c h
g r e a t l y limits t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e p r i n c i p l e of r e f l e c t i o n ) , a n d
finally i n t h e v e r y i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f G o d a n d n a t u r e . T h e a m b i v a ­
l e n c e i n h e r e n t i n his p h i l o s o p h y s t e m m e d f r o m t h i s u n i t i n g o f
materialism and a metaphysical system and not simply
f r o m p a n t h e i s m , a s t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y British N e o t h o m i s t h i s t o ­
rian Copleston suggests (see 3 8 : 1 0 3 ) .
In C h a p t e r 1 I noted the c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e objective
content and subjective form of Spinoza's doctrine. That he was
s e e m i n g l y n o t w h o l l y a w a r e s u b j e c t i v e l y o f his p h i l o s o p h y a s a n
a t h e i s t i c a n d m a t e r i a l i s t o n e , i s t h e e s s e n t i a l i n c o n s i s t e n c y o f his
d o c t r i n e . It was not an i n a d e q u a c y of exposition but a c o n t r a ­
diction h a r m f u l t o t h e system. O n e should t h e r e f o r e not b e s u r ­
p r i s e d that m a n y i d e a l i s t s h a v e f o u n d i d e a s c o r d i a l t o t h e m i n
Spinoza's doctrine. And the materialists w h o in fact developed
his c o n c e p t i o n o f s u b s t a n c e i n t h e i r d o c t r i n e s o f t h e s e l f - m o t i o n
of m a t t e r as self-cause (like T o l a n d , for e x a m p l e , and t h e
eighteenth-century F r e n c h materialists) usually polemicised
against him.
Spinoza's system was the result of t h e c e n t u r i e s - l o n g devel­
o p m e n t of metaphysical philosophising a n d a result, m o r e o v e r ,
that not only b r o u g h t out t h e antithesis of t h e spiritualist and
naturalist tendencies a d v a n c i n g within metaphysics, but also
d r o v e it to direct, t h o u g h not quite realised conflict.
M e t a p h y s i c a l systems did n o t exist and d e v e l o p on t h e p e r i ­
p h e r y of scientific k n o w l e d g e ; D e s c a r t e s a n d L e i b n i z , t h e g r e a t ­
est m e t a p h y s i c i a n s o f t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y , w e r e a m o n g t h e
most outstanding m a t h e m a t i c i a n s and n a t u r a l scientists of their
t i m e . S p i n o z a , w h o did n o t p l a y a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n t h e d e v e l o p ­
m e n t of t h e s c i e n c e s of n a t u r e , w a s au fait with all t h e i r a d v a n c e s ;
his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e p r o v i d e s e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e materialist
metaphysical system he created was to s o m e extent a philosophi­
cal s u m m i n g up of them. T h a t comes out not only in t h e c o n -

166
ception of the applicability in principle of mathematical methods
outside mathematics, but also in his treatment of one of the most
important scientific (and philosophical) problems of the age,
that of determinism.
Spinoza's system was a revolution in t h e history of metaphysi­
cal systems, which had been idealist doctrines in the main in the
preceding ages. Does that not explain why many of his contem­
poraries, and even thinkers of subsequent times, persistently did
not understand him as a materialist philosopher? And in fact
a metaphysical system and a materialist world outlook were mu­
tually exclusive phenomena. But they presumed each other in
Spinoza's doctrine, the speculative-metaphysical system of which
was metaphysical materialism. T h e term 'metaphysical' functions
in this case, of course, in t w o quite different meanings, neither
of which can be discarded.
Metaphysics (speculative metaphysics) took shape historically
as a system during the development of philosophical supranatu­
ralism, the primary source of which was the religious outlook
on the world. T h e history of speculative metaphysics is a history
in t h e main of objective idealism, whose development could not
help reflecting the social processes that were compelling religion
to adapt itself to new conditions and w e r e making science the
authentic form of theoretical knowledge. T h e head-on offensive
of natural science, materialist in its basis, the philosophical van­
guard of which was metaphysical materialism, resolutely hostile
to speculative idealist metaphysics, of necessity led to what might
be called the Spinoza case or, if you like, a scandal in meta­
physics.
Speculative metaphysics, however, was a Procrustean bed for
materialist philosophy. T h e Middle Ages knew doctrines, mate­
rialist in their prevailing tendency, that developed within a
mystic integument that clearly did not correspond to them. T h e
philosophy of modern times, developing in close association
with bourgeois enlightenment, would not stand this flagrant
contradiction and strove to bring the form of philosophising into
line with its content. A metaphysical system could not be an
adequate form of development or exposition of materialism
primarily because it was senseless without assuming a special
transphenomenal reality. T h e latter retained a ghost of the t r a n ­
scendent even when it denied it, or interpreted it in t h e spirit of
rationalist materialism.
Spinoza maintained that substance possessed an infinite
number of attributes, but knowledge only of thought and exten­
sion was accessible to man. T h a t was a clear and, of course, not

167
sole concession to theology; the concession was not a c h a n c e one,
b e c a u s e Spinoza's w h o l e system was a c o m p r o m i s e of speculative
metaphysics with materialism. Hobbes, Gassendi, and other ma­
t e r i a l i s t s c a m e o u t a g a i n s t it. T h e i r d o c t r i n e s w e r e b a s e d o n a
m e c h a n i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n , p r o g r e s s i v e f o r its t i m e , t h a t w a s b e i n g
affirmed in n a t u r a l science, and that was in essence a s y n o n y m
for materialism a n d t h e sole real alternative to a theological out­
look.
H o b b e s and Gassendi successfully argued that t h e r e w e r e
no scientific g r o u n d s for assuming s o m e m e t a p h y s i c a l reality
radically different from that observed. Gassendi counterposed
the atomistic materialism of Epicurus, whose natural philosophy
and ethics w e r e frankly hostile to a metaphysical f r a m e of mind,
to speculative metaphysics. Atoms w e r e not, of course, accessible
to sense perception, but they also did not form a s u p e r s e n s o r y
reality, since their properties w e r e similar to those of sense-per­
ceived things and w e r e governed by laws that operated every­
where. Gassendi, true, endeavoured to reconcile Epicureanism
with C h r i s t i a n d o g m a s , b u t t h a t w a s an e x o t e r i c p a r t of his p h i ­
losophy, since the d o g m a s w e r e not substantiated theoretically
but s i m p l y t a k e n as w h a t p h i l o s o p h y s h o u l d a c c o r d with, at least
outwardly. 1 0

Hobbes took an even m o r e irreconcilable stand in regard to

speculative metaphysics. His references to Christian dogmas,
in particular to the works of Christian writers (both, according
to his interpretation, confirmed t h e truth of m a t e r i a l i s m ) w e r e
seemingly not simply an exoteric veiling of materialist free-
thinking but also a sophisticated m e a n s of exposing the flagrant
contradictions of the theology of Christianity. And since every­
thing that existed was, a c c o r d i n g to him, nothing except body,
the question of a metaphysical reality was u n r e s e r v e d l y re­
moved.

T h e W o r l d , ... is C o r p o r e a l l , that is to say, B o d y ; a n d h a t h t h e d i m e n ­

sions of M a g n i t u d e , namely L e n g t h , Bredth, and D e p t h : also every part
of Body, is l i k e w i s e B o d y , a n d h a t h t h e like d i m e n s i o n s ; a n d c o n s e q u e n t ­
ly e v e r y p a r t of t h e U n i v e r s e , is b o d y ; a n d t h a t w h i c h is not B o d y , is
n o p a r t o f t h e U n i v e r s e : A n d b e c a u s e t h e U n i v e r s e i s All, that w h i c h
is no p a r t of it, is Nothing; a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y no where ( 1 0 2 : 3 6 7 - 3 6 8 ) .

T h a t a r g u m e n t indicates that Hobbes employed the 'geometrical'

m e t h o d o f r e a s o n i n g a l m o s t w i t h t h e s a m e skill a s S p i n o z a .
He considered metaphysics a pseudoscience, stipulating, true,
that he had in mind university philosophy, which 'hath no
otherwise place, than as a h a n d m a i d to the R o m a n e Religion'
( 1 0 2 : 3 6 7 ) . T h i s p h i l o s o p h y , h e n o t e d , w a s c o n s i d e r e d t h e basis

168
of all other sciences but was not in fact such since its content
was determined by authority, while t r u e philosophy 'dependeth
not on Authors' (ibid.), i.e. was demonstrated and not imposed
from outside. Hobbes scorned metaphysical systems as foreign
to t h e spirit of science, counterposing them to geometry, which
he called genuine philosophy. He attributed universal signi­
ficance to the geometrical method, which m a d e conclusions
possible that w e r e independent of t h e thinker's subjectivity.
Metaphysics' incapacity for rigorous logical thought was
due, according to Hobbes, to its inherent verbalism, i.e. to a
striving to replace study of real bodies by the defining of words
and terms, like body, time, place, matter, form, essence, subject,
substance, accidence, force, act, finite, infinite, quantity,
quality, motion, passion, etc. But metaphysics did not under­
stand the n a t u r e of language, i.e. the sense of the signs or names
given to things, the separate properties of things, and also to
combinations of signs. Some signs, he claimed, did not signify
anything that really existed. It is interesting to note that he
considered the verb 'to be' to be one of those signs that did not,
as he said, signify any thing but was only a logical copula.
And if it were so, that there were a Language without any Verb an­
swerable to Est, or Is, or Bee; yet the men that used it would bee not a
jot the lesse capable of Inferring, Concluding, and of all kind of
Reasoning, than were the Greeks, and Latines. But what then would
become of these Terms, of Entity, Essence, Essentiall, Essentiality, that
are derived from it, and of many more that depend on these, applyed
as most commonly they are? They are therefore no Names of Things;
but Signes, by which wee make known, that wee conceive the Conse­
quence of one name or Attribute to another (102:368).

Pardon me for such a long quotation from Leviathan, but it

was necessary as indisputable evidence that the neopositivist
critique of metaphysics (at least to the extent that it is on target)
was essentially anticipated by the materialists of the seventeenth
century. T h e neopositivists, who borrowed their semantic
arguments from the materialist Hobbes, have turned them
primarily against materialism by interpreting the meaningful
categories of the materialist understanding of n a t u r e as terms
without scientific sense. Let us return, however, to the real
11

opponents of seventeenth-century metaphysics, viz., its

materialist contemporaries.
M a r x and Engels called J o h n L o c k e the creator of 'a positive,
anti-metaphysical system' (179:127). T h a t sounds paradoxical;
for Locke, as Engels noted elsewhere, was t h e founder of a
metaphysical method (see 5 0 : 2 9 ) . But as I have already pointed
out, the metaphysical method that took shape in natural science

169
and philosophy in t h e seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a
mode of empirical inquiry differed radically from the specula­
tive method of metaphysical systems, though the latter usually
also had an antidialectical character.
I lack the space to m a k e a special examination of Locke's
positive anti-metaphysical system. Let me simply say that the
main principle of its construction was a sensualistic, in the main
materialistic analysis of the concepts employed in philosophy
in order to bring out their actual content and fitness for knowl­
edge. For Locke the sensualist method was not so much a mode
of deducing new concepts from available sense data, as a means
of reducing existing abstract concepts to their empirical source,
if t h e r e was one. But it often happens that concepts that
comprise the theoretical arsenal of metaphysical systems do not
stand the test; they do not designate anything existing in sense
perceptions, which means they lack real sense and need to be
rejected. Other terms to which metaphysics ascribes funda­
mental significance in fact possess a very scanty empirical
content. It is necessary, consequently, to re-examine and define
their sense and meaning more accurately. From Locke's point
of view, metaphysics was a consequence of the abuse of words,
the possibility of which was latent in the imperfection of
language.
In Locke's classification of the sciences he singled out a
'doctrine of signs', calling it semeiotics or logic. T h e business
of logic, he wrote,

is to consider the nature of signs the mind makes use of for the under­
standing of things, or conveying its knowledge to others.... T h e consid­
eration, then, of ideas and words as the great instruments of knowl­
edge, makes no despicable part of their contemplation who would take
a view of human knowledge in the whole extent of it (152:608).

As we shall see, Locke, like Hobbes, foresaw certain very

important ideas of contemporary positivism, in particular the
principle of verification, logical syntax, and reductionism.
But he was not a positivist, of course, and employed these ideas
mainly to substantiate a materialist outlook.
According to him the sensualist criterion excluded both the
metaphysical conception of innate ideas and the notion of a
supernatural reality. T h e criterion of reality was inseparable
from sense perceptions of the external world. T h e sense of
touch, for instance, always evoked an idea of solidity in us.
' T h e r e is no idea which we receive m o r e constantly from
sensation than solidity' (152:76). T h e concept of impenetrability
that physicists employed only expressed the same sense content
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in a n e g a t i v e w a y ; it c o u l d t h e r e f o r e be r e g a r d e d as a c o r o l l a r y
of solidity.
M o r e t h a n a n y o t h e r idea, t h a t o f solidity w a s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h
our representations of bodies. F u r t h e r m o r e , it f o r m e d t h e most
essential c o n t e n t o f t h e s e n o t i o n s . I t w a s t h e r e f o r e
n o w h e r e else to be found or imagined but only in matter; and though
our senses take no notice of it but in masses of matter, of a bulk
sufficient to cause a sensation in us; yet the mind, having once got this
idea from such grosser sensible bodies traces it farther and considers it,
as well as figure, in the minutest particle of matter that can exist, and
finds it inseparably inherent in body, wherever or however modified
(ibid.).

Protesting against t h e isolation of m a t t e r from sense-perceived

bodies, and against t h e tendency to counterpose t h e m and to
a c c e p t n a m e s for t h i n g s (i.e. c o n v e r t g e n e r a l c o m m o n n a m e s
or even t h e n a m e s of names into supersensory and so t r a n ­
s c e n d e n t essences t h a t did n o t i n f a c t e x i s t ) , L o c k e a r g u e d
t h a t t h e c o n c e p t of m a t t e r w a s a c o m p o n e n t p a r t of a m o r e
g e n e r a l , i n his o p i n i o n , c o n c e p t o f b o d y . T h e w o r d ' m a t t e r ' ,
he claimed, designated something dense and uniform, while t h e
t e r m ' b o d y ' i n d i c a t e d e x t e n s i o n a n d f i g u r e a s well, i n a d d i t i o n
t o t h o s e q u a l i t i e s . I t will r e a d i l y b e n o t e d t h a t t h e s e d e l i m i t a ­
tions connected with Locke's nominalism (or r a t h e r c o n c e p t u a l -
ism) in no w a y affected t h e basis of m a t e r i a l i s m . T h e y w e r e
d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t s c h o l a s t i c m e t a p h y s i c s , f o r w h i c h , a s h e said,
'those o b s c u r e and unintelligible discourses and disputes...
concerning materia prima' were characteristic (152:404).
L o c k e opposed the metaphysical conception of the objective
reality of universals, defending t h e materialist (but anti-
dialectical, conceptualist) u n d e r s t a n d i n g of matter as t h e reality
o f c o r p o r e a l s u b s t a n c e s . H e c o n s e q u e n t l y a r g u e d , t h o u g h not
w h o l l y c o n s i s t e n t l y , for t h e m a t e r i a l i t y o f t h e w o r l d .
O n e must evaluate Locke's critique of t h e concept 'substance',
w h i c h h e t e n d e d t o assign t o u n i v e r s a l s ( w h i c h o b s c u r e d t h e
problem of reality) from that standpoint. He claimed that the
word 'substance' was applied by philosophers to t h r e e quite
d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s : ' t o t h e infinite i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e G o d , t o finite
spirits, a n d t o b o d y ' ( 1 5 2 : 1 1 6 ) . Did t h a t m e a n t h a t G o d , t h e
h u m a n spirit, a n d b o d y w e r e o n l y m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f o n e a n d t h e
s a m e substance? No one, evidently, would a g r e e with that. In
that case, seemingly, it must be supposed that philosophers
' a p p l y i t t o G o d , finite spirits, a n d m a t t e r , i n t h r e e d i f f e r e n t
s i g n i f i c a t i o n s ' ( i b i d . ) . But t h a t , t o o , l a c k e d s e n s e , s i n c e i t w a s
e x p e d i e n t , i n o r d e r t o avoid m u d d l e , t o e m p l o y d i f f e r e n t w o r d s .

171
What, in that case, r e m a i n e d of t h e concept of substance?
L o c k e sometimes expressed himself in t h e sense that philosophy
could m a n a g e without this term; t h e c o n c e p t of body fully
covered t h e positive content contained in t h e idea of substance.
T h e historical originality of t h e materialism of Hobbes,
L o c k e , and their successors is largely d e t e r m i n e d by t h e nega­
tion of speculative metaphysics, and the struggle against that
specific variety of objective idealism. I cannot, within t h e scope
of this study, p u r s u e t h e qualitatively different stages of this
struggle, and must limit myself to pointing out that t h e successors
of Hobbes and L o c k e in their struggle against speculative
metaphysics w e r e t h e English materialists ( T o l a n d , Priestley,
and Collins) and t h e e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y F r e n c h materialists,
beginning with Lamettrie.
I must stress that the F r e n c h materialists' irreconcilability
t o w a r d speculative metaphysics did not p r e v e n t them from
positively evaluating t h e real advances of philosophical thought
associated with it. T h e contradiction between t h e naturalist
and spiritualist tendencies in t h e doctrines of Descartes, Spinoza,
and Leibniz w e r e first systematically b r o u g h t out precisely by
F r e n c h materialism. Descartes' physics b e c a m e one of its
theoretical sources. I h a v e already spoken a b o v e of the signi­
ficance of Spinoza's d o c t r i n e of substance for t h e development
of the materialist conception of t h e self-motion of matter.
In contrast to the materialists of t h e seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries t h e spokesmen of idealist empiricism saw
nothing in metaphysical systems except fallacies and clear
sophistry. T h a t applies in p a r t i c u l a r to H u m e , w h o opposed
metaphysical system-creation after it had already been subjected
to very fundamental materialist criticism. T h e crisis of specula­
live metaphysics was o n e of t h e main reasons for t h e a p p e a r a n c e
of idealist empiricism. H u m e claimed, from a s t a n c e of p h e n o m ­
enalism and scepticism, that t h e r e was no essence, no sub­
stance, no thing-in-itself, no objective necessity, no regularity—
they w e r e all speculative constructs of metaphysics. T h e r e was
no other connection between p h e n o m e n a t h a n what was
revealed psychologically, subjectively, t h r o u g h association by
similarity, contiguity, etc. He interpreted t h e c o n c e p t of m a t t e r
as an illusion of something supersensory t h a t really did not
exist, and rejected it as a variety of scholastic philosophising
about a mythical substance. He also considered causality an
illusory notion about t h e succession of our impressions in time
and a habitual belief that what followed was t h e c o n s e q u e n c e
of what preceded. But t h e p r e c e d i n g could not be t h e c a u s e just

172
because it was earlier, he correctly noted. T h e relation of
causality presumed dependence of the subsequent on the
preceding. But if any link were introduced by the mind, then
objective causality did not exist and this category only made
sense within the context of the psychology of cognition. P h e ­
nomenalism was thus subjective idealism, the solipsistic tendency
of which was mitigated and so veiled by agnosticism. T h e
struggle of phenomenalism against metaphysics was a polemic
of subjective idealism against objective idealism on the one
hand, and against materialist philosophy on the other. In the
course of the development of bourgeois philosophy this other
hand acquired p a r a m o u n t importance, since the divergence
between the two varieties of idealism mentioned became less
substantial.
It must be acknowledged, incidentally, that phenomenalism
demonstrates the real weakness of essentialism, of the philo­
sophical trend which, instead of explaining the world of
p h e n o m e n a from itself, treats all phenomena as the realisation
of some essences independent of them. T h a t sort of opposing
of essence to p h e n o m e n a is an inseparable feature of metaphys­
ical systems that the materialists of the seventeenth century
had already noted. But materialism, while criticising the
mystification of the categories of essence and substance, did
not reject them, and began to develop them from the standpoint
of the doctrine of the unity of the world, the interaction of
phenomena, causality, necessity, and regularity. In other words,
materialism took on the job of theoretical interpretation of
these categories, based on a critical analysis of experimental
data, while the phenomenalist understanding of the sense-
perceived world proved a kind of continuation of the speculative
metaphysical line to its epistemological discredit.
Thus, idealist metaphysics was opposed in the eighteenth
century by materialism, on the one hand, which developed a
positive anti-metaphysical system of views, and by phenomen­
alism, on the other hand, which criticised idealist metaphysics
from subjective and agnostic positions. Only materialism was
a consistent opponent of speculative metaphysics.

4. Kant's Transcendental Dualist Metaphysics

A new stage in the history of metaphysical systems began with

Kant's 'critical philosophy', which was both a negation of
metaphysics as a theory of supersensory knowledge, and a
substantiation of t h e possibility of a new, transcendental

173
metaphysics. Its basis, in Kant's scheme, was not formed by
experience and, of course, not by supra-experience, but by that
which, in Kant's view, m a d e experiential knowledge possible,
viz., a priori forms of sensual contemplation and thinking.
Kant had already expressed a belief in the impossibility of
supra-experiential knowledge in his 'precritical' period. T h e
transition from inconsistent materialism to 'critical philosophy'
did not lead him to reject his belief in the illusory character
of such knowledge. His critique of the conception of the a priori
developed by seventeenth-century metaphysics was associated
with this basic belief. According to him t h e r e was no a priori
content of knowledge; only t h e forms of theoretical knowledge
w e r e a priori, and they could not be deduced from experience
by virtue of the universality and necessity inherent in them, and
so preceded it. A priori forms therefore did not take us outside
experience. T h e main fallacy of the old metaphysics was that
it tried to overstep the bounds of any possible experience by
means of categories and a whole arsenal of logical methods.
T h e critique of metaphysics coincided in that respect with the
critique of rationalism.
Kant thus defined metaphysics as a theory of metaphysical
knowledge impossible in principle from his point of view. His
agnosticism was above all a denial of the possibility of meta­
physical knowledge but, since he considered recognition of an
objective reality, existing irrespective of h u m a n knowledge,
also to be a metaphysical assumption, his whole epistemology
acquired a subjective-agnostic character.
T h e Kantian definition of metaphysics was primarily
epistemological. He called any judgments and inferences
metaphysical that were not based on sense data. In the language
of contemporary positivism the same idea is expressed by the
following formula: metaphysical propositions are unverifiable
in principle, i.e. can neither be confirmed nor refuted by
experience. Kant, furthermore, defined metaphysical inferences
as logically unsound, pointing out that all metaphysical doctrines
about mind, the world as a whole, and God inevitably lapsed
into paralogisms or even antinomies. Logical positivism repeats
Kant here, too, asserting that metaphysical judgments are
logically unprovable.
Kant, however, did not limit himself to an epistemological
characterisation of metaphysics. He also defined its ontological
content, viz., recognition of a supersensory reality and an
evaluation of it as primary, determining the world of sense-
perceived phenomena. While denying the possibility of c o m p r e -

174
hending the supersensory, he still postulated its existence as
'things-in-themselves' and noumena. But metaphysical systems
were not so much doctrines about 'things-in-themselves' that,
according to Kant, 'affected' our sensuality, without being an
object of sense perception, as ones 'about t h e absolute world
as a whole, which no sense could grasp, and also about God,
freedom, and immortality' (117:18). Do these transcendent
essences, or n o u m e n a exist? We do not and can never know,
Kant said, whether they exist or not. T h e questions had no
basis in experience, and were therefore theoretically unan­
swerable. But were they not rooted in what preceded experience?
Kant claimed that t h e basic metaphysical ideas were a priori
ideas of p u r e reason. Reason, in contrast to understanding,
which synthesised sense data, synthesised concepts created by
the latter. These, he suggested, could be either empirical or
pure; the latter had their origin exclusively in understanding,
i.e. were a priori. T h e ideas comprising p u r e concepts of that
kind were ideas of p u r e reason, metaphysical ideas, or noumena.
They did not, consequently, contain any knowledge of objective
reality; they were the consequence of reason's aim of 'carrying
out the synthetical unity which is cogitated in the category,
even to the unconditioned' (116:225). Because of that reason
directs the activity of understanding, pointing out to it the final,
in principle unattainable, goal of cognition which, however,
retained the significance of an ideal. Whereas empirical
concepts were objective, t h e concepts of reason (or ideas) did
not, by virtue of their a priori character, indicate the existence
of what was cogitated, personal immortality, say, or the inde­
pendence of will from motives. By rejecting the rationalist
identification of the empirical basis with the logical, Kant
thereby condemned the efforts of all previous metaphysics to
deduce the existence of what is being thought from concepts.
Kant, following Wolf, supposed that only t h r e e main
metaphysical ideas existed, viz., those of a substantial soul,
of the world as a whole, and of God. Accordingly there were
t h r e e metaphysical disciplines, viz., rational, i.e. speculative,
psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology. He
scrupulously examined the main arguments of these disciplines,
demonstrating the impossibility in principle of a theoretical
proof of the substantiality of the soul, personal immortality,
and the existence of God. T h a t did not mean, however,
according to him, that a theoretical proof of t h e contrary
theses was possible.
Rational cosmology differed from the other metaphysical

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d i s c i p l i n e s i n t h a t its m a i n t h e s e s , a n d t h e a n t i t h e s e s o p p o s i n g
them, were equally provable. O n e could show that the world
had no beginning in time and was not limited in space. But the
opposite thesis c o u l d also be proved. T h e a n t i n o m i e s inevitable
in a n y metaphysical inquiry into cosmological problems w e r e
evidence, according to Kant, of their unresolvability in principle
by theory.
K a n t t h u s c o n v i n c i n g l y s h o w e d t h a t all m e t a p h y s i c a l s y s t e m s
that had ever existed w e r e unsound, not b e c a u s e of t h e errors
of their inventors, but by virtue of their basic content and
c h a r a c t e r , i.e. b e c a u s e t h e y c l a i m e d t o c o m p r e h e n d s u p e r -
experiential ( t r a n s c e n d e n t ) reality. Metaphysics d r a g g e d out
a m i s e r a b l e e x i s t e n c e ; p e o p l e d i d n o t e v e n d i s d a i n it, b u t w e r e
s i m p l y i n d i f f e r e n t t o it. I t w a s still w o r t h p o n d e r i n g , h e w r o t e ,
w h e t h e r this indifferentism was a superficial, dilletante attitude
to a vitally i m p o r t a n t p r o b l e m . M e t a p h y s i c s , of c o u r s e , did not
exist as a science, and it w a s not clear w h e t h e r it could b e c o m e
s u c h , b u t its h i s t o r y c o n v i n c e d o n e a t l e a s t o f o n e t h i n g , v i z . ,
that interest in t h e metaphysical problematic was a p r o p e r
interest of reason, not forced on it from outside, but rooted in
the very essence of the rational.
T h e ineradicable bent of h u m a n reason for metaphysics was
s h o w n by the constant manifestations of this inclination. And
t h e first q u e s t i o n t h a t f a c e d t h e e x p l o r e r o f t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l
odyssey of h u m a n reason was h o w was metaphysics possible as a
natural inclination? T h e new philosophical discipline (from
w h i c h K a n t t o o k t h e t i t l e o f h i s f a m o u s w o r k Critique o f Pure
Reason) w a s c a l l e d u p o n t o p r o v i d e t h e a n s w e r .
Rationalism, Kant claimed, had an uncritical character.
Rationalists, for example, w e r e convinced that p u r e reason,
i.e. r e a s o n f r e e o f s e n s u a l i t y ( o f s e n s e d a t a a n d a f f e c t s ) w a s
n e v e r m i s t a k e n , a n d t h a t all t h e e r r o r s o f r e a s o n w e r e t h e
c o n s e q u e n c e of i n t e r f e r e n c e by affects and unsystematic sense
perceptions. T h e adherents of rationalism w e r e mistaken in
supposing that reason was c a p a b l e of grasping what existed
beyond any possible e x p e r i e n c e in a purelv logical way, with­
o u t b a s i n g itself o n e m p i r i c a l d a t a . T h e s e e r r o r s w e r e n o t
c h a n c e ones, but inevitable; p u r e reason erred not as a conse­
q u e n c e of outside interference but precisely because it was
p u r e reason. Kant's transcendental dialectic was a theoretical
generalisation of t h e history of metaphysical systems, or an
analysis of t h e logic of m e t a p h y s i c a l philosophising.
But if p u r e reason inevitably lapsed into paralogisms and
antinomies, perhaps the answer to metaphysical problems was

176
realisable t h r o u g h theoretical comprehension of experience?
Kant ruled that alternative out; comprehension of sense data
did not take one beyond t h e limits of the world of phenomena,
which was proved by the transcendental analytic. So was
metaphysics impossible as a science? Yes, it was impossible as
a positive doctrine about noumena. But since it was possible
and necessary and, in fact, already feasible to m a k e a systematic,
conclusive investigation of the metaphysical inclination of
human reason, and of those even though imaginary objects to
which it was directed, t h e question of how metaphysics was
possible as a science was quite legitimate. Such was the p r o b ­
lematic of Critique of Pure Reason, which Kant expected not
only to overthrow all previous dogmatic metaphysics theoret­
ically but also to substantiate the principles of a new, trans­
cendental metaphysics.
Transcendental metaphysics thus did not claim to be a
positive investigation of metaphysical essences, and even
refrained (true, without d u e consistency) from any statements
about their factual existence. Its immediate task was to inquire
into the n a t u r e of theoretical knowledge and its relation to
sense-perceived objects and experience in general. T h a t task
did not boil down to an epistemological exploration of the fact
of knowledge, because that meant, according to Kant, estab­
blishing the presence of an unknowable transcendent reality,
which was already an ontological conclusion. Nature, unlike
the supersensory world of 'things-in-themselves' was a knowable
reality, which did not exist, however, outside and independent
of the process of cognition. Ontology was converted into
epistemology, i.e. into an investigation of rational knowledge
that synthesised sense data through a priori principles and so
created a picture of surrounding reality that the 'uncritical'
minds took for an objective world independent of knowledge.
Therefore,
the proud name of an Ontology, which professes to present synthetical
cognitions a priori of things in general in a systematic doctrine, must
give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding
(116:185).

T h e next, and most important task of the transcendental

metaphysics (in Kant's view) was to investigate reason as
h u m a n spiritual essence immanently generating metaphysical
ideas. T h e latter were regarded as fundamental p h e n o m e n a
of the mind since the question of whether transcendent essences
corresponded to the ideas of reason was theoretically unan­
swerable. At that stage of the inquiry metaphysics had only to

12-01603 177
explain the origin in reason of the idea of a substantial soul,
the idea of the world as a whole, and the idea of God. T h a t
framing of the question brought Kant close to awareness of the
need to investigate the epistemological roots of religion and
idealism, an awareness absent among the French materialists,
who considered religion a product of ignorance and deceit, and
did not ponder on what it reflected and why it was so deeply
rooted in men's minds. Kant, of course, was far from under­
standing religion as a reflection of historically determined
social being, but he was also far from a superficial conviction
that belief in transcendent essences was an ordinary prejudice
overthrowable by enlightenment.
Kant's attempt to explain the main metaphysical ideas
epistemologically from the logical n a t u r e of the t h r e e principal
types of inference was, of course, unsuccessful. It does not
follow at all from the fact that there are categorical, hypo­
thetical, and disjunctive deductions and inferences, that the
thinking individual comes of necessity to questions of the
essence of the soul, the nature of the world as a whole, and
about whether God exists. Kant himself, incidentally, did not
attach great significance to this formal deduction of meta­
physical ideas, perhaps being aware that they, and the frames
of mind associated with them, were not reducible in general
to logical structures. For, according to his doctrine, the deepest
foundation of metaphysical ideas lay in moral consciousness
rather than in epistemology. T h e metaphysics of morals had
primacy over the metaphysics of nature in his system. That is
why the most important principle of his metaphysical system
was formed not by theoretical reason but by p u r e practical
reason, i.e. by moral consciousness, since it did not depend on
sensuality and any other motives, and therefore followed one
a priori moral law alone, the categorical imperative.
T h e idea of the autonomy of moral consciousness led Kant
to affirm what before him had mainly been done by materialists,
viz., that morality is independent of religion, since this depen­
dence would have made its existence impossible. Establishing
of the existence of morality was therefore, from Kant's angle,
proof of the autonomy of moral consciousness. But unlike the
French materialists he did not strive to overthrow religion,
but rather to accord it with 'pure reason', both theoretical and
practical. Theoretical reason led of necessity to agnosticism,
so leaving room for faith, as Kant himself stressed. As for
practical reason, its very existence as unconditional morality
excluding any compromises was only possible because its

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postulates w e r e recognition of t h e existence of God, retribution
beyond t h e grave, and t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e of will of motives.
T h e contradictions in t h e t r e a t m e n t of t h e relation between
moral and religious consciousness w e r e organically linked
with t h e duality characteristic of Kant in his understanding
of 'things-in-themselves' and n o u m e n a . In t h e first edition of
Critique of Pure Reason ( w e k n o w ) , he defined a 'thing-in-
itself simply as a limitation concept, so questioning its r e a l
existence, i.e. its i n d e p e n d e n c e of t h e process of cognition.
In t h e second edition he attempted to eliminate that subjectivist
accent. In t h e addition entitled 'Refutation of Idealism' (already
m e n t i o n e d a b o v e ) , he categorically declared that his d o c t r i n e
ruled out a n y doubts of t h e existence of 'things-in-themselves'.
But no declaration could eliminate t h e contradiction contained
in t h e very c o n c e p t of an absolutely u n k n o w a b l e essence, in
relation to which it was considered established that it existed,
affected our sensuality, etc. This contradiction of t h e agnostic
interpretation of t h e traditional metaphysical problematic is
particularly obvious in t h e c h a p t e r of Critique of Pure Reason
entitled 'On t h e G r o u n d of t h e Division of All Objects into
P h e n o m e n a and N o u m e n a ' ( 1 1 6 : 1 8 0 ) . In it K a n t explained
that the dividing line between p h e n o m e n a and n o u m e n a h a d
only a negative c h a r a c t e r b e c a u s e t h e r e could not be positive
statements about t h e existence of what was not an object of
experience. In stating t h a t t h e sensually perceived a r e only
p h e n o m e n a , one thus (in his idea) counterposed it to what was
not an object of experience, which m e a n t that t h e fixing of
b o u n d a r i e s of e x p e r i e n c e was at t h e s a m e time a mental
assumption of what existed outside experience. But w h y did
these b o u n d a r i e s indicate t h e existence of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t ?
T h e explanation was that t h e b o u n d a r i e s of sense c o n t e m p l a ­
tion (and of any possible e x p e r i e n c e in g e n e r a l ) comprised
space and time, and everything that existed outside space and
t i m e must be considered transcendent. But what did t h e c o n c l u ­
sion about t h e existence of extraspatial and e x t r a t e m p o r a l
essences follow from? F r o m t h e fact, K a n t suggested, that time
and s p a c e w e r e only forms of sense contemplation. Ultimately
he admitted that t h e reality of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t was unprovable:
But, after all, the possibility of such noumena is quite incomprehen­
sible.... The conception of a noumenon is therefore merely a limitation
conception, and therefore only of negative use (116:188).
U n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e absurdity of solipsism, K a n t argued that
consciousness of t h e subjectivity of t h e sensual was precisely
an establishing of its b o u n d a r i e s , beyond which lay objective

179
reality i n d e p e n d e n t of sensibility. T h i s speculative a r g u m e n t
was essentially t h e sole o n e possible from t h e angle of t h e
Kantian pure, theoretical reason. T h e Critique o f Practical
Reason i n t e r p r e t e d n o u m e n a a s n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e
possibility of m o r a l consciousness. If it w a s possible only
b e c a u s e o f t h e t r a n s p h e n o m e n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e o f will f r o m
s e n s u a l m o t i v e s , d i d i t n o t f o l l o w f r o m this t h a t p u r e g o o d will
was also a n o u m e n o n ? And if the motives of m o r a l actions w e r e
t r a n s c e n d e n t essences (substantial soul, G o d , etc.) did it not
follow that they w e r e not simply conceivable but actually
existing realities? Otherwise, it t u r n e d out that the h u m a n
i n d i v i d u a l w a s m o r a l o n l y b e c a u s e o f e r r o r , i.e. b e c a u s e h e o r
s h e believed that God and t r a n s c e n d e n t justice existed, t h o u g h
i n fact n e i t h e r t h e o n e n o r t h e o t h e r did. B u t t h a t a s s u m p t i o n ,
t o o , left t h e m a i n p o i n t u n c l e a r : h o w w a s f r e e w i l l , b a s e d o n l y
on a conviction that f r e e d o m really existed, possible? Kant
a r g u e d that the h u m a n individual as a sensuous being (or
phenomenon) was absolutely determined and consequently
d i d n o t b e l o n g t o itself, d i d n o t p o s s e s s m o r a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,
w a s not, in essence, even an individual. It b e c a m e an individual
a n d b e a r e r of m o r a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s only insofar as it w a s also a
supersensuous being.
T h e Critique of Pure Reason i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e of
n o u m e n a w a s e s s e n t i a l l y p r o b l e m a t i c . T h e Critique o f Practical
Reason u l t i m a t e l y c o n v e r t e d t h e s e p o s t u l a t e s i n t o a c t u a l c o n d i ­
tions of morality. T h e existence of p u r e morality, treated as
fact ( b e c a u s e Kant considered ' i m p u r e ' morality as t h e most
obvious negation of the fact of m o r a l i t y ) , was interpreted as
practical p r o o f o f t h e s u b s t a n t i a l i t y o f t h e s o u l , f r e e w i l l , e t c .
T h e e x a c t e s t a b l i s h i n g a n d d e s c r i p t i o n o f a fact s h o w e d ,
a c c o r d i n g t o h i s d o c t r i n e , t h e f a c t u a l c o n d i t i o n s o f its p o s s i b i l ­
i t y , i.e. o t h e r f a c t s n o t a m e n a b l e t o o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t , h o w e v e r ,
had t o e x i s t b e c a u s e o t h e r w i s e w h a t w a s , i.e. t h e e s t a b l i s h e d
d e s c r i b e d fact, w a s impossible.
T h e f r a m i n g of the question that epistemological analysis
of s o m e facts argued the existence of others, to s o m e extent
foresaw t h e real significance of practice, in p a r t i c u l a r of
t h e o r e t i c a l a n a l y s i s o f its c o n t e n t , f o r p r o v i n g t h o s e j u d g m e n t s
of science that could not be obtained by logical deduction.
But K a n t h a d no u n d e r s t a n d i n g of practice as universal h u m a n
activity; for him practical reason w a s only moral consciousness
a n d b e h a v i o u r c o r r e s p o n d i n g to t h e strict r e q u i r e m e n t s of the
categorical imperative. It w a s a matter, f u r t h e r m o r e , of t h e
absolutely p u r e moral consciousness ascribed to the sensuous

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h u m a n individual, although it was independent, according to
the definition, of sensibility. Such consciousness did not, of
course, exist (as Kant himself was to some extent a w a r e ) ,
but the logic of his argument was as follows: to the extent to
which t h e r e was p u r e moral consciousness, t h e r e w e r e t h e
transcendent, theological premisses of h u m a n morality. But
the whole point was that all these premisses (or cogitated
facts) could not partly exist precisely because they were
cogitated not only as ideas but also as noumena.
Kant's philosophy was thus a negation of traditional meta­
physical systems whose ideological downfall had been brought
about by materialism's struggle against idealist speculation,
by the outstanding advances of natural science, and by the
development of bourgeois society. T h e reform of metaphysics
undertaken by him started from awareness of these facts. T h e
main problem he posed was how was science possible. Corres­
pondingly, metaphysics, too, according to his doctrine, should
become a science, since any other alternative was ruled out in
principle. Kant developed metaphysics (1) as a doctrine of the
forms of knowledge that transformed sense data into a system
of science, and (2) as an epistemological study of the origin
of the fundamental philosophical ideas that were not related to
p h e n o m e n a of the sense-perceived world. (3) He mapped out
a new path of development of metaphysical ideology on the
basis of a philosophical doctrine of practical reason, substantiat­
ing the primacy of the latter over theoretical reason. He
developed that principle only in relation to ethics; even the
question of the existence of 'things-in-themselves' as the
source of sense data was not posed from the angle of practical
reason, since moral necessity was not inherent in reality of
that kind. Nevertheless Kant considered it absurd to deny the
existence of 'things-in-themselves', i.e. recognised them, in
contrast to noumena, as undoubtedly existent.
Kant understood metaphysics as a rationalist philosophical
system, a system of pure reason. T h a t was a one-sided view,
not only because anti-metaphysical views had also developed
on the soil of rationalism, and because certain opponents of
rationalism had created idealist-empirical metaphysical systems.
T h e limitedness of identifying metaphysics with rationalism
consisted also in an incorrect radical antithesis of rationalism
and empiricism, which in fact often supplemented each other,
as it had been with Descartes and his opponent Hobbes, and
just as it was with Kant himself. This identification, moreover,
left out the irrationalist tendency of metaphysical philosophis-

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ing, first brought out in t h e systems of Neoplatonism, and
which have again become common, but now in the twentieth
century, which Kant, of course, could not foresee.
Along with this one-sided understanding of speculative
metaphysics in Kant t h e r e was also a very broadened inter­
pretation of it, since only philosophical scepticism was declared
its opposite. Kant's 'critical philosophy' claimed to overcome
the extremes of metaphysical dogmatism and scepticism. Such
a conception condemned all doctrines foreign to scepticism
and criticism as dogmatic metaphysics. It ignored the idealist
character of criticism and rejected materialism as 'uncritical'
metaphysical philosophising. These contradictions in Kant's
understanding of metaphysics were rooted in the contradictions
of his own metaphysical system, in which he tried to join
together scientific knowledge and superscientific assumptions,
the principle of the knowability of the sense-perceived world
and agnosticism, materialism and idealism, reason and faith.
T h e failure of this attempt again brought to the fore the
alternative—metaphysics or materialism?
I shall not go into the metaphysical systems of Fichte,
Schelling, and Hegel, since it is sufficient, to answer the question
of metaphysics' attitude to the antithesis between materialism
and idealism, to stress that these thinkers developed new
varieties of speculative metaphysics. To the metaphysics of
immutable essences they counterposed a metaphysics of
becoming, change, and development. This turn, which Kant
clearly did not foresee, was largely the work of Hegel, who
created a dialectical metaphysical system. 12

What had been absolute opposites for Kant, i.e. subjective

and objective, phenomenon and essence, knowledge and the
'thing-in-itself, freedom and necessity, this world and the
transcendent one, in short everything that he and his predeces­
sors had antidialectically opposed to one another, were treated
by Hegel as a dialectical relation, a relation of opposites being
converted into one another. T h e r e is no need specially to trace
this dominant tendency of the Hegelian metaphysical system.
Suffice it to point out that, according to Hegel, 'in cognition ...
the contrast is virtually superseded, as regards both the one-
sidedness of subjectivity and the one-sidedness of objectivity'
(86:283). Reason, on the one hand, and the external world on
the other, which had remained essences alien to each other
in pre-Hegelian metaphysics, proved (according to him) to
be t w o interpenetrating aspects of one whole that could be
defined as subject-object, or thought-being. In that way the

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world b e c a m e rational and reason objective and secular.
G e r m a n classical idealism was a very important epoch in
the history of metaphysical systems. As M a r x and Engels wrote:
S e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y metaphysics, driven from t h e field by t h e F r e n c h
E n l i g h t e n m e n t , notably by French materialism of t h e eighteenth c e n t u r y ,
experienced a victorious and substantial restoration in German
philosophy, p a r t i c u l a r l y in t h e speculative German philosophy of t h e
n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . After Hegel linked it in a masterly fashion with all
subsequent metaphysics and with G e r m a n idealism and f o u n d e d a
metaphysical universal kingdom, the attack on theology again correspond­
ed, as in t h e eighteenth c e n t u r y , to an attack on speculative metaphysics
and metaphysics in general. It will be defeated for ever by materialism,
which h a s now been perfected by t h e w o r k of speculation itself and
coincides with humanism ( 1 7 9 : 1 2 5 ) .

They noted in this connection the historical significance of

Feuerbach's materialism, which 'counterposed sober philosophy
to wild speculation' (ibid.). On the other hand they pointed
out the development of communist theories that opened up a
historical prospect of solution of radical social problems.
These problems w e r e unresolvable in principle in bourgeois
society (which was presented by speculative philosophers as
the sole possible form of civilisation). In that way Marxism
disclosed t h e deep social roots not only of t h e theological but
also of the philosophical conception of the transcendent,
which thus functioned not simply as a misconception in the
way of knowing but also as a specific form (of course illusory
but fully fulfilling its ideological purpose) of resolving the
antagonist contradictions of social development. In the light
of the antithesis of communism (which M a r x and Engels also
called practical materialism) and idealism the whole preceding
materialist critique of the metaphysical conception of trans­
cendent reality, which seemed to rise above the empirical
reality that oppressed human individual, proved one-sided, not
affecting the social sense of freedom. Was that only a theoret-
ical flaw or rather a consequence of the fact that the antithesis
between materialism and idealist metaphysics developed in
the context of one and t h e same bourgeois ideology?
' T h e standpoint of the old materialism,' Marx wrote, 'is
civil society; the standpoint of the new is human society, or
social humanity' (177:5). It is therefore not surprising that
eighteenth-century materialism, irreconcilably hostile to theo­
logical and idealist speculations about a transcendent reality,
proved quite incapable of disclosing the social roots of that
speculation in the alienated social relations of an antagonistic
society.

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 5. T o w a r d a Critique
of Irrationalist S p e c u l a t i v e M e t a p h y s i c s

H e g e l ' s p h i l o s o p h y w a s t h e last g r e a t s y s t e m o f s p e c u l a t i v e
metaphysics. Dialectically rethinking t h e traditional meta­
physical p r o b l e m a t i c , he g r o p e d for a w a y out of t h e dead end
o f m e t a p h y s i c a l s y s t e m - m a k i n g . B u t t h a t w a y o u t w a s o p e n only
for those w h o rejected idealism together with t h e metaphysical
m o d e o f t h i n k i n g . H e g e l c o u l d n o t t a k e t h a t r o a d . H e limited
h i m s e l f t o s u b s t a n t i a t i n g t h e thesis t h a t t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t w a s
i m m a n e n t to empirical reality, t h a n k s to which it was rational.
H i s d o c t r i n e , h o w e v e r , a s L e n i n s h o w e d , implicitly i n c l u d e d a
conclusion that 'the struggle against existing w r o n g and
p r e v a l e n t evil, is a l s o r o o t e d in t h e u n i v e r s a l l a w of e t e r n a l
d e v e l o p m e n t ' ( 1 4 1 : 2 1 ) . T h a t c o n c l u s i o n , h o w e v e r , c o u l d only
be d r a w n by a revolutionary thinker. And only consistent revo­
l u t i o n a r i e s , b a s i n g t h e m s e l v e s o n this c o n c l u s i o n , h a v e b e e n
able to develop t h e dialectical-materialist system of views not
only o n n a t u r e but a l s o o n society. T h e b o u r g e o i s p h i l o s o p h y
o f t h e l a t t e r half o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y n a t u r a l l y c h o s e
another road.
I n G e r m a n y , after t h e 1848 R e v o l u t i o n , E n g e l s w r o t e ,
the old fearless zeal for theory has now disappeared completely, along
with classical philosophy. Inane eclecticism and an anxious concern
for career and income, descending to the most vulgar job-hunting,
occupy its place (52:375).

T h i n g s w e r e r o u g h l y t h e s a m e i n t h e o t h e r d e v e l o p e d capitalist
c o u n t r i e s o f t h e t i m e , a s well. T h e positivist a n d N e o k a n t i a n
s c h o l a r s w h o filled u n i v e r s i t y c h a i r s u n a n i m o u s l y r e j e c t e d
m e t a p h y s i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n , but w h a t did t h e y o p p o s e to it?
I n d e t e r m i n a t e agnosticism which b e c a m e the refuge of
inconsistent subjective idealism. T h e latter c a m e forward in the
r o l e of a scientific p h i l o s o p h y t h a t boiled d o w n to e p i s t e m o l o g y .
P h i l o s o p h y w a s e x p o u n d e d as a special scientific d i s c i p l i n e ,
b u t in its N e o k a n t i a n a n d positivist v e r s i o n s it w a s not s u c h ,
of c o u r s e , i.e. it r e m a i n e d a specific w o r l d o u t l o o k or i d e o l o g y ,
r a t h e r e m a s c u l a t e d , it is t r u e , t h a t it w a s d i s c a r d e d by all w h o
really sought to answer ideological questions.
I t s e e m e d t h a t p h i l o s o p h y , a s t h e N e o k a n t i a n P a u l s e n said o f
t h a t t i m e , n o l o n g e r h a d a f u t u r e . A n d o n l y t h e fact t h a t t h e
u n i v e r s i t i e s still r e t a i n e d p h i l o s o p h y c h a i r s i n s p i r e d w e a k h o p e s .
B u t t h e s i t u a t i o n a l t e r e d decisively a t t h e e n d o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h
c e n t u r y . T h e e s s e n c e o f t h e t u r n , i n P a u l s e n ' s belief, w a s t h a t t h e
positive sciences, which had very nearly ousted philosophy,

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 h a v e not fulfilled all t h e expectations t h a t w e r e put in t h e m a generation
ago; they h a v e led neither to a stabilised total view of things in them­
selves n o r to a s e c u r e conception of life and s t a n d a r d of living
(202:390).

Paulsen noted the revolution in physics which had begun at

t h e e n d o f t h e c e n t u r y , a n d t h e r e s u l t i n g m e t h o d o l o g i c a l crisis:
almost all t h e basic concepts t h a t w e r e so confidently operated with a
g e n e r a t i o n a g o as eternal t r u t h s , h a v e recently been s h a k e n ... even t h e
law of conservation of e n e r g y is no longer safe from sceptical ideas
and doubting inquiries (ibid.). 13

T h e new discoveries in physics and other sciences had, in

Paulsen's opinion, caused disappointment with science. T h a t
u n e x p e c t e d conclusion reflected t h e real facts, t h o u g h in
d i s t o r t e d f o r m . T h e old a n t i - d i a l e c t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s o f t r u t h a n d
k n o w l e d g e i n g e n e r a l h a d c o l l a p s e d . T h e o v e r s i m p l i f i e d positivist
c o n c e p t i o n t h a t s c i e n c e did not deal with ' m e t a p h y s i c a l ' p r o b ­
l e m s h a d s u f f e r e d fiasco. O b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m , w h i c h s e e m e d t o b e
u t t e r l y d e f e a t e d , s t i r r e d t o life. S c i e n c e , P a u l s e n w r o t e , r e f l e c t i n g
t h i s q u i c k e n i n g i n t e r e s t f o r o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m a n d a n idealist
interpretation of ideological problems, h a d n o w h e r e got to the
root of m a t t e r s , n e i t h e r in t h e smallest n o r in t h e biggest.
O n e begins with t h e question: c a n n o t and should not philosophy, so long
despised and m u c h abused, then in t h e end p r o v i d e that without which,
after all, t h e h u m a n spirit c a n n o t m a n a g e for long, viz., an answer to the
ultimate questions of reality and life, if not in t h e form of necessary
propositions or eternal truths, as t h e old metaphysics believed, then at
least in t h e s h a p e of possible and believable opinions, in t h e s h a p e of
' r e a s o n a b l e thoughts'? ( 2 0 2 : 3 9 1 ) .

Paulsen explained the resurrection of speculative metaphysics

idealistically. T h e n u b of t h e m a t t e r was not t h e 'ideological
anguish' about which W i n d e l b a n d spoke, so realising the
i n a d e q u a c y of N e o k a n t i a n 'scientific idealism'. Bourgeois
s o c i e t y , a f t e r t h e c o m p a r a t i v e l y q u i e t , ' p e a c e f u l ' p e r i o d t h a t set
in after t h e 1848 revolutions, had again e n t e r e d an a g e of r e v o l u ­
tionary upheavals. Philosophical indifferentism in r e g a r d to
s o c i a l p r o b l e m s , w h i c h h a d p e r f o r m e d its i d e o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n
s u c c e s s f u l l y i n t h e lull, c l e a r l y d i d n o t c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e p r e -
imperialist a n d imperialist epochs. A ' r e v a l u a t i o n of values', an
apologia for tragic contradictions, and an irrationalist substan­
tiation of imperialist policy had b e c o m e necessary, since it could
n o t b e justified b y r a t i o n a l i s t p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d pacifists w h o
c l u n g t o old l i b e r a l i d e a l s . T h e i r r a t i o n a l i s t ' p h i l o s o p h y o f life',
e s p e c i a l l y i n its N i e t z s c h e a n v e r s i o n , p r o v e d t h e h i g h r o a d o f
d e v e l o p m e n t of imperialist ideology and t h e philosophy cor­
r e s p o n d i n g t o it.

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 N i e t z s c h e ridiculed the religious and idealist c o n c e p t i o n s of
a s u p e r n a t u r a l reality (sometimes even in t h e spirit of F e u e r ­
b a c h ) . H e r i d i c u l e d t h e m a s h o s t i l e t o life, b e c a u s e life a s a
w h o l e i s t h i s - w o r l d a n d d o e s n o t c a r e f o r lifeless t r a n s c e n d e n c y .
He c a m e close to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the social sense of t h e
conception of t r a n s c e n d e n c y , pointing out that it w e a k e n e d
t h e will t o life.
T h e concept of 'God' invented as a c o u n t e r c o n c e p t of life—everything
harmful, poisonous, slanderous, the whole hostility u n t o death against
life synthesized in this concept in a g r u e s o m e unity! T h e concept of t h e
'beyond', the ' t r u e world' invented in order to d e v a l u a t e t h e only world
t h e r e is—in order to retain no goal, no reason, no task for our earthly
reality! ( 1 9 6 : 3 3 4 ) .

Nietzsche, of course, r e m a i n e d a stranger to t h e materialist

u n d e r s t a n d i n g of r e l i g i o n as a f a n t a s t i c r e f l e c t i o n of t h e
d o m i n a n c e of elemental forces of social d e v e l o p m e n t over
p e o p l e . E v e n less w a s h e a b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e s o c i a l f u n c t i o n
of r e l i g i o n as a w e a p o n of s p i r i t u a l e n s l a v e m e n t of t h e e x p l o i t e d .
Exploitation, oppression, the domination of s o m e over others
w e r e t h e e s s e n c e o f life f o r h i m . H e t h e r e f o r e c r i t i c i s e d r e l i g i o n
(in c o n t r a s t t o F e u e r b a c h ) f o r its o v e r p o w e r i n g o f t h e n a t u r a l l y
l i m i t l e s s will t o life, w h o s e i n c a r n a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o his
doctrine, was whoever knew how to rule.
T h e c o n d e m n a t i o n o f t h e r e l i g i o u s ' c u r b i n g ' o f life g r e w w i t h
N i e t z s c h e into a c r i t i q u e of t h e objective-idealist c o n c e p t i o n
of m e t a p h y s i c a l reality; he s a w in that c o n c e p t i o n an illusion
of the weak about the rational order prevailing in the world.
Rationalist ideas of p r o g r e s s w e r e rejected as an u n f o r g i v a b l e
n e g l e c t of t h e s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of life, t h e e s s e n c e of w h i c h w a s
f o r m e d n o t b y r e a s o n b u t b y will, n o t b y t h o u g h t b u t b y i n s t i n c t ,
f e e l i n g , a n d i n c l i n a t i o n . N i e t z s c h e set u p o n t h e r a t i o n a l i s t m e t a ­
physics of p u r e reason: ' T h e " p u r e spirit" is a p u r e stupidity;
substract the n e r v o u s system and the senses, the 'mortal s h e l l ,
and we are left with—nothing at all!' (194:179).
Nietzsche's expression m a y seem essentially materialist to
the reader unversed in philosophy. Surely he was opposing
sensuality and corporeality to the 'pure reason' of the ratio­
nalists? But t h e w h o l e point is t h a t N i e t z s c h e spiritualised t h e
b o d y , c o n s i d e r i n g i t t h e i n c a r n a t i o n o f t h e i m m a t e r i a l will t o
p o w e r , i.e. o f a p r i m o r d i a l f o r c e t h a t a c q u i r e d its c o n s c i o u s
e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e h u m a n b o d y . H e f o l l o w e d t h e p a t h laid b y
S c h o p e n h a u e r ' s d o c t r i n e of t h e blind, anti-reason, indomitable
w i l l , w h i c h h e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a d o c t r i n e o f life's p r i m o r d i a l
n a t u r e . L i f e did n o t r e c k o n w i t h a n y l a w s o r c o n f i n e s ; i t s t r o v e

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to destroy everything that impeded its elemental expansion.
F r o m Nietzsche's point of view the will to power was not a
scientifically established fact; he had a majestic disdain for
facts of that kind. Life did not need recognition or justification.
And the will to power was life itself, experience of life that
adequately expressed its fullness and pressure. Even if the will
to power was only a myth, life expressed itself in it. All t h e rest
w e r e ghosts, because the very existence of the world was 'only
like an aesthetic phenomenon' (197:43). T h e world of a p p e a r ­
ance was the sole world, and life needed no other imaginary
world whatsoever, for the comfort of the weak.
Nietzsche, who is often called the thinker who put an end
to speculative metaphysics, in fact gave it a qualitatively new,
irrationalist form, so breathing strength into it. Contemporary
philosophical irrationalism, relying on Nietzsche, comes forward
as a critic of the historically outlived rationalism of t h e
seventeenth century, with its naive notion of the omnipotence
of reason and its rigid hierarchy, absolutely excluding chance,
of immutable laws that guaranteed h a r m o n y in every thing that
exists. This critique of rationalist illusions is a form of manifesta­
tion of contemporary irrationalist metaphysics, since irrationalist
philosophers objectively wage war not on the past but on con­
temporary science and materialist philosophy, which have long
already overcome the errors of rationalism, retaining the kernel
of truth it contained. That is obvious, in particular, from the
example of existentialism, which expresses most vividly the
transformation of metaphysics into an anti-scientific, irratio­
nalist doctrine, in spite of its coming forward, in Heidegger's
doctrine for example, as the negation of metaphysics.
Heidegger counterposed his 'fundamental ontology' to
metaphysics, which he treated not only as a false way of thinking
but also as a false mode of human existence created by the
growing alienation of the h u m a n personality throughout
civilisation, which was m o r e and more losing its authenticity
and its primaeval intuition of being initially inherent in it. But,
didn't calling his philosophy ontology lead Heidegger into a
contradiction with his intention to put an end to metaphysics
(for ontology has always been the basis of metaphysics)?
And in our time ontology (for example in Neothomist meta­
physics) is a doctrine of being, above all of higher, mentally
comprehensible being. But Heidegger broke with the traditional
understanding of ontology, claiming that being could not be an
object of cognition, and that an illusory notion of the know-
ability of being was engendered by the metaphysical exclusion

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of m a n from being and by the rationalist counterposing of
consciousness to being, as a c o n s e q u e n c e of which mind was
interpreted as s o m e t h i n g distinct from being.
Heidegger took up a r m s against t h e materialist (and not
j u s t t h e m a t e r i a l i s t ) r e c o g n i t i o n o f a n external w o r l d , i n t e r ­
preting this epistemological premiss as an i m p o v e r i s h m e n t
o f h u m a n self, a c o n v e r s i o n o f b e i n g i n t o s o m e t h i n g e x t e r n a l ,
r e d u c t i o n o f t h e h u m a n p e r s o n a l i t y t o a ' t h i n k i n g t h i n g ' , i.e.
t o a n o b j e c t t h a t s u p p o s e d l y l e n d s itself t o c o g n i t i o n l i k e o t h e r
things. Ontology in Heidegger's sense was called upon to
c o n c e r n itself w i t h i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e q u e s t i o n
of t h e sense of being. It thus appealed to m a n , to t h e real man
w h o inquires about the sense of being. In other words ontology
w a s p o s s i b l e o n l y a s p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n H u s s e r l ' s s e n s e , i.e.
exploration of the special p h e n o m e n a of h u m a n consciousness
that have the sense of being. F r o m that angle ontology was an
anti-metaphysical doctrine, whose subject-matter was not
being in general but h u m a n existence.
Existentialist ontology appraises the d e m a r c a t i o n of con­
sciousness and being, subject and object, as neglect of being.
S u c h d e m a r c a t i o n ( t h e b a s i s of w h i c h is f o r m e d by a life
situation of alienation and not by mental acts) results in being
functioning as t h e opposite of consciousness. But real being,
lost b y h u m a n i t y a n d p h i l o s o p h y , d o e s n o t b r e a k d o w n i n t o
these opposites, since it is no m o r e outside consciousness
than consciousness is outside being. T h e dualism of being and
consciousness is caused not simply by metaphysics but by the
d e v e l o p m e n t of c u l t u r e , by scientific a n d t e c h n i c a l p r o g r e s s ,
b y t h e loss o f m a n ' s initial i n t i m a t e link w i t h b e i n g . T h e p l a c e
of real being is t h e r e f o r e taken by the material world, the
e x i s t e n t , w h i c h i s t a k e n , h o w e v e r , f o r b e i n g . B e c a u s e o f its
alienation consciousness everywhere encounters only the
existent, n o w h e r e discovering being, although t h e latter does
not hide from m a n but on t h e c o n t r a r y is open to open h u m a n
existence, b e c a u s e it differs f r o m a n y existent, w h i c h h a s to
be discovered. Metaphysics, Heidegger wrote, 'thinks of the
existent as t h e existent. E v e r y w h e r e w h e r e it is asked what t h e
e x i s t e n t is, t h e e x i s t e n t a s s u c h i s i n s i g h t ' ( 9 4 : 7 ) . B u t t h e
observation of t h e existent is t a k e n as t h e observation of being.
W h a t e v e r is r e p r e s e n t e d as e x i s t e n t — w h e t h e r t h e soul in the
sense of spiritualism or m a t t e r or strength in t h e sense of
m a t e r i a l i s m , b e c o m i n g a n d life a s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o r will,
s u b s t a n c e , s u b j e c t , e n e r g y , e t e r n a l r e t u r n , etc., all t h a t i s o n l y
t h e existent. But it seems being, t h e l u m i n e s c e n c e of being,

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b e c a u s e , as a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e d u a l i s m of c o n s c i o u s n e s s
and being, t h e alienated consciousness is engrossed in t h e
existent, c o n t e m p l a t e s and cognises t h e existent.
Because metaphysics questions the existent as the existent, it remains
with the existent and does not turn to being as being.... Insofar as
metaphysics always imagines only the existent as existent, it does not
think of being itself (94:8).

T h e e x i s t e n t i s e v e r y t h i n g definite, m a t e r i a l t h a t i s p e r c e i v e d ,
c o g n i s e d , a n d utilised. B u t m e t a p h y s i c s d o e s n o t u n d e r s t a n d
t h a t all t h a t is n o t b e i n g .
At t h e s a m e time, in spite of Heidegger, t h e c r e a t o r s of t h e
m e t a p h y s i c a l s y s t e m s of t h e past did not identify t h e existent
with b e i n g . T r u e , b e g i n n i n g w i t h A r i s t o t l e , t h e y c o n s i d e r e d
t h e e x i s t e n t as s u c h t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of t h e i r i n q u i r i e s , i.e.
i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e d i v e r s i t y of its v e r s i o n s or of i n d i v i d u a l
sense-perceived things. Speculative metaphysics also e n d e a v ­
oured to c o m p r e h e n d the 'being of t h e existent' that Heidegger
constantly talked about as what was beyond the sense-perceived
w o r l d . H e i d e g g e r , o f c o u r s e , w a s well a w a r e t h a t t h e r e w a s
also t h e d e m a r c a t i o n h e a t t a c h e d f u n d a m e n t a l i m p o r t a n c e t o
( t h e e x i s t e n t a n d its b e i n g ) i n m e t a p h y s i c s . H e t h e r e f o r e
declared: everything that metaphysicians considered super­
s e n s o r y , e x t r a s e n s o r y , t r a n s c e n d e n t , w a s n o t b e i n g , b u t only
e v e r y t h i n g t h a t is. M e t a p h y s i c i a n s w e r e m i s t a k e n h e r e t o o i n
that they again took the existent for being w h a t e v e r they h a d in
m i n d , w h e t h e r t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e , s i n g l e s u b s t a n c e , materia
prima, etc. T h i s c o n f u s i n g of t h e e x i s t e n t with b e i n g , as H e i d e g ­
g e r s t r e s s e d , 'is c e r t a i n l y t o b e t h o u g h t a c o n s e q u e n c e ( E r e i g ­
nis), not a m i s t a k e ' ( 9 4 : 1 1 ) . W h a t is it a c o n s e q u e n c e of? Of
t h e fact t h a t m a n d o e s not s i m p l y live i n t h e w o r l d o f t h e e x i s t e n t
(it is i n e v i t a b l e ) b u t , so to s a y , is at h o m e in it, is a b s o r b e d by it,
d r e a d s his o w n a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d t u r n s a w a y i n d r e a d f r o m it,
i.e. f r o m t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e e x i s t e n t ( ' w h a t t h e r e i s ' ) . But
w h a t is this e x i s t e n c e of ' w h a t t h e r e is' t h a t h a s b e e n lost by
h u m a n i t y like t h e m y t h i c a l g o l d e n a g e o r t h e Biblical p a r a d i s e ?
H o w i s t h e b u l k o f ' w h a t t h e r e is' t o b e p e n e t r a t e d i n o r d e r t o
r e a c h b e i n g ? T h e a n s w e r s boil d o w n t o t h e d e m a n d , a d d r e s s e d
t o t h e h u m a n p e r s o n a l i t y t h a t h a s lost its E g o : t u r n y o u r g a z e
from the materiality that has depersonalised you, return to
yourself, r e a c h f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e t h a t i s ' a m o d e o f b e i n g , a n d
a c t u a l l y t h e b e i n g o f t h a t " w h a t t h e r e is" ( e x i s t e n t ) , w h i c h
often s t a n d s f o r t h e o p e n n e s s o f b e i n g ' ( 9 4 : 1 5 ) . B e i n g i n
e x i s t e n c e is a p e r m a n e n t p r o c e s s of r e t u r n i n g to o n e ' s self from
t h e w o r l d , w h i c h c a n n o t b e left w h i l e y o u r e x i s t e n c e i s m a i n -

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t a i n e d . It is also a p e r m a n e n t r e t u r n i n g to t h e w o r l d f r o m
e x i s t e n c e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h a t is n o t a v i c i o u s c i r c l e f r o m w h i c h
t h e r e i s n o w a y out, s i n c e t h e t a s k consists p r i m a r i l y i n e n t e r i n g
it. ' E x i s t i n g ' i s p u r e s u b j e c t i v i t y a n d a t t h e s a m e t i m e ' t r a n s ­
c e n d i n g ' , o r c o n t i n u o u s e m e r g e n c e b e y o n d t h e limits o f o n e ' s
E g o . But t h e m a i n p o i n t i n this r e a l e x i s t e n c e i s its t e m p o r a r y
character, that nothing any longer prevents constant awareness
of. E x i s t e n c e i s t h e r e f o r e ' b e i n g t o d e a t h ' , p e r m a n e n t d r e a d
of t h e last possibility, t h e possibility of not b e i n g . It is not v u l g a r
d r e a d , h o w e v e r , w h i c h is a l w a y s i m p o s e d f r o m o u t s i d e , f r o m a
c h a n c e e n c o u n t e r a n d h a p h a z a r d e x p e r i e n c e ; i t is, s o t o say,
o r i g i n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s of t h e p r i c e l e s s n e s s of o n e ' s p e r s o n a l i t y .
This d r e a d is a priori emancipation from t h e external and
i m p e r s o n a l p r e v a i l i n g in t h e w o r l d of w h a t is, a n d is t h e a n s w e r
to the q u e s t i o n — a b o u t the sense of the question of the sense
of b e i n g .
As for b e i n g as s u c h , it is i n d e f i n a b l e , i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e .
A n y definition posits t h e m a t e r i a l i t y o f t h e defined. O n e c a n
s a y of b e i n g only t h a t it is. Being is b e i n g . T h e w o r d 'is' h e r e
e x p l a i n s n o t h i n g . It c a n n o t be an e l e m e n t of a definition of t h e
concept of being since t h e concept was formed as a c o n s e ­
q u e n c e of m a k i n g a s u b s t a n t i v e of t h e v e r b 'to b e ' .
T h e d e m a r c a t i o n of being and existence stressed h u m a n
s u b j e c t i v i t y , but said n o t h i n g a b o u t b e i n g , a p a r t f r o m its not
being existence.
T h e existent, which is the mode of existence, is man. Man alone exists.
T h e rock is, but it does not exist. T h e tree is, but it does not exist. T h e
horse is but it does not exist. T h e angel is but it does not exist. God is,
but He does not exist (ibid.).

T h a t proposition of Heidegger's, explaining the difference

b e t w e e n e x i s t i n g a n d b e i n g , d o e s n o t clarify t h e q u e s t i o n o f
being. And philosophy, according to him, should go no further.
It c a n n o t s a y w h a t b e i n g is, but c a n e x p l a i n w h a t it is n o t . L i k e
a n e g a t i v e t h e o l o g y it d i s c a r d s all t h e a t t r i b u t e s a s c r i b e d to G o d ,
l i m i t i n g itself to t h e s t a t e m e n t t h a t He is not w h a t is a s c r i b e d to
H i m , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y H e exists. A n d t h a t s t a t e m e n t , after
e a c h r e j e c t i o n of w h a t is t a k e n as f o u n d a n d k n o w n , is filled
with e v e r d e e p e r s e n s e , t h o u g h n o t h i n g h a s b e e n a d d e d t o its
content.
M e t a p h y s i c s h a s a t all t i m e s m o r e o r less d e n i e d o r d e p r e c i a t ­
ed real k n o w l e d g e , e m p i r i c a l in its origin, w h i c h it h a s d e p i c t e d
n o w a s illusory, n o w a s finite, s u p e r f i c i a l , etc. B u t w h i l e r a t i o n a l ­
ist m e t a p h y s i c s c o u n t e r p o s e d a b s t r a c t i o n s of an o r d e r l y r e a l i t y ,
a w o r l d o f u n i v e r s a l laws, w o r l d h a r m o n y , etc. t o t h e m o s a i c

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of sense perceptions, Heidegger's irrationalist metaphysics
treated being as the negation of any pattern, insofar as the
sciences recognise and cognise patterns of the existent. But
everything that the sciences cognise, Heidegger averred, is only
'what there is', and to consider it being meant to repeat the
mistake of metaphysics again and again. Being could be under­
stood only as negation of the existent, which is present for man
only as what can be cognised, measured, subordinated to him­
self, and used to attain practical ends. But being as the negation
of any comprehensible definiteness is irrational. Heidegger's
d e p a r t u r e from classical metaphysics consisted not in his
denying the existence of metaphysical reality; he denied only
the metaphysical reality that rationalist metaphysicians recog­
nised. T h e supersensory reality that he recognised could not be
defined positively but its negative definition obviously meant
for him mythological chaos, a flux lacking direction, an eternal
menace, and the last judgment.
T h e irrationalist conception of metaphysical reality is a way
of interpreting reality (both natural and social) that cannot
be interpreted scientifically in terms of rationalism or irrational­
ism, in spite of the notions of speculative metaphysics in
general. It is man w h o changes, transforms the world around
him and makes it, in accordance with his knowledge and
ability and within the framework of t h e objective conditions,
independent of him, if not rational, at least more comfortable
for living, or perhaps more interesting and inviting. But all that
is only what is, the irrationalist metaphysician objects, resembl­
ing a religious preacher explaining to his flock that this world
is unreal, not authentic, in brief, is not what it is. T h e r e is little
wonder that the main expression of the alienation and self-
alienation of the human personality, for Heidegger, was not
man's enslavement by elemental forces of social development,
but man's domination over nature, which (from his point of
view) had nothing in common with the transformation of
elemental natural forces into consciously and purposefully
operating social ones. Heidegger condemned scientific and
technical progress not just because he saw its negative aspects.
He was horrified precisely by progress rather than by its
secondary effects. Mastery of the elemental forces of n a t u r e
represented for him a danger (and, moreover, not even to life
but to its sense of being) of a kind by comparison with which
the atom bomb was a m e r e trifle. ' T h e atom bomb, much
discussed as the special death-machine, is not t h e fatal one,'
he wrote. T h e most terrible thing was man's belief that he

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 c a n m a k e h u m a n existence t o l e r a b l e and o n t h e w h o l e h a p p y for
e v e r y o n e t h r o u g h p e a c e f u l r e l e a s e , t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , s t o r i n g up, a n d
control of t h e energies of n a t u r e ( 9 1 : 2 7 1 ) .

H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n c e p t i o n of irrational b e i n g is a p h i l o s o p h y
of social pessimism in t h e spirit of S c h o p e n h a u e r , w h o together
with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, was the f o r e r u n n e r of exis­
tentialist metaphysics. It w a s f r o m a s t a n c e of social pessimism
that Heidegger opposed rationalist metaphysics, one of whose
main trends he considered to be materialism; and that not at
all b e c a u s e m a t e r i a l i s m r e c o g n i s e s s o m e ' f i r s t p r i n c i p l e ' o r , a s
s o m e o f its o p p o n e n t s c l a i m , i d o l i s e s m a t t e r . T h e m e t a p h y s i c a l
s i n o f m a t e r i a l i s m , f r o m h i s p o i n t o f v i e w , i s p r i m a r i l y its
r e g a r d i n g n a t u r e a s b e i n g , e x p l a i n i n g n a t u r e f r o m itself, i.e.
c o n s i d e r i n g ' w h a t t h e r e is' a s t h e c a u s e o f itself, i g n o r i n g t h e
u n k n o w a b l e b u t o m n i p r e s e n t e x i s t e n c e o f ' w h a t is'. And
H e i d e g g e r , as not so often h a p p e n s in c o n t e m p o r a r y bourgeois
p h i l o s o p h y , d i r e c t l y o p p o s e d i d e a l i s m t o m a t e r i a l i s m , i.e. t h e
d o c t r i n e that rejects explanation of the existent by the existent:
I f t h e title ' i d e a l i s m ' m e a n s a s m u c h a s a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g that b e i n g i s
never explicable t h r o u g h the existent, but is a l r e a d y ' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l '
for a n y e x i s t e n t , t h e n idealism is t h e s o l e , c o r r e c t possibility of t h e
philosophical problematic (93:208).

H e i g n o r e d t h e point that idealism, which e x p l a i n s the existent

f r o m b e i n g , u n d e r s t a n d s t h e l a t t e r a s s o m e t h i n g s p i r i t u a l . But
the spiritual, according to existentialism, must be related to the
existent as being present in e x p e r i e n c e .
Heidegger saw the nomination of man to purposively trans­
f o r m b e i n g as t h e s e c o n d m e t a p h y s i c a l sin of m a t e r i a l i s m .
It is c e r t a i n l y a l s o n e c e s s a r y , m o r e o v e r , t h a t we rid o u r s e l v e s of n a i v e
notions about materialism and the c h e a p refutations of it we meet. T h e
e s s e n c e of m a t e r i a l i s m d o e s not consist in t h e a s s e r t i o n that all is m a t t e r ,
but r a t h e r in a m e t a p h y s i c a l n o t i o n a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g
existent a p p e a r s as the material of labour. T h e m o d e r n metaphysical
e s s e n c e of l a b o u r w a s in H e g e l ' s a f o r e m e n t i o n e d Phenomenology of
Spirit as the s e l f - o r g a n i s e d p r o c e s s of u n c o n d i t i o n a l p r o d u c t i o n , w h i c h
is a c o n c r e t i s i n g of the real t h r o u g h m a n u n d e r s t o o d as s u b j e c t i v i t y .
T h e e s s e n c e of m a t e r i a l i s m is g i v e n in t h e e s s e n c e of t e c h n i q u e , a b o u t
w h i c h m u c h h a s b e e n w r i t t e n , t o b e s u r e , but little t h o u g h t ( 9 2 : 8 7 - 8 8 ) .

H e i d e g g e r u n d o u b t e d l y displayed a d e e p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of
the essence of materialism than m a n y contemporary bourgeois
philosophers. He was a w a r e that it does not deny the existence
o f t h e s p i r i t u a l , a n d c o r r e c t l y p o i n t e d o u t its c l o s e c o n n e c t i o n
with social, primarily production, practice. T h e materiality
o f n a t u r e , t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n e x t e r n a l w o r l d , a n d its r e f l e c t i o n
in people's consciousness w e r e d e m o n s t r a t e d in practice. But

192
he did not w a n t to accept these basic propositions of m a t e r i a l ­
ism, a n d c o u l d not. His w h o l e ' a n t i - m e t a p h y s i c a l ' ontology
was directed against materialism, especially against Marxist
m a t e r i a l i s m , w h o s e s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r all o t h e r p h i l o s o p h i c a l
d o c t r i n e s he recognised. And his polemic against rationalist
metaphysics, depicted as a struggle against any metaphysics
w h a t s o e v e r , w a s only an a t t e m p t to c r e a t e an idealist ideology
t h a t w o u l d m a k e p o s s i b l e , a s h e p u t it, a ' f r u i t f u l c o n v e r s a t i o n
w i t h M a r x i s m ' , i . e . s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t it.
So H e i d e g g e r ' s ' f u n d a m e n t a l ontology' was a revival of
metaphysics, but in a new form corresponding to c o n t e m p o r a r y
c o n d i t i o n s . I n his last w o r k s h e b r o u g h t t h e c o n c e p t o f b e i n g ,
indeterminate in principle, closer and closer to the traditional
metaphysical representation of God. His attitude to speculative
metaphysics also altered:
A t h i n k i n g t h a t t h i n k s a b o u t t h e t r u t h o f b e i n g i s n o l o n g e r satisfied,
to be sure, with metaphysics; but it also does not think c o n t r a r y to
metaphysics.
M e t a p h y s i c s r e m a i n s t h e first i n p h i l o s o p h y . I t d o e s n o t a t t a i n p r i m a c y
in t h o u g h t . M e t a p h y s i c s is o v e r c o m e in t h i n k i n g on t h e t r u t h of being...
Nevertheless this ' o v e r c o m i n g of metaphysics' does not abolish m e t a ­
p h y s i c s . F o r as l o n g as m a n r e m a i n s a r a t i o n a l a n i m a l ( a n i m a l rationale)
he is a m e t a p h y s i c a l o n e ( a n i m a l metaphysicum). As l o n g as m a n u n d e r ­
s t a n d s himself a s t h e r e a s o n i n g c r e a t u r e , m e t a p h y s i c s a p p e r t a i n s (in
K a n t ' s w o r d s ) t o his n a t u r e ( 9 4 : 9 ) .

T h a t half-recognition of metaphysics as the first in philosophy

did not, of c o u r s e , p r e v e n t H e i d e g g e r f r o m d e p i c t i n g his
ontology as a fundamental o v e r c o m i n g of metaphysics, t h e m o r e
so that the definition of m a n as a rational c r e a t u r e was inter­
preted as the c o n s e q u e n c e of alienation of h u m a n essence.
In fact, he put m e t a - m e t a - p h y s i c s in p l a c e of meta-physics.
In our day of the very wide spread of metatheories of every
k i n d , this effort s e e m s v e r y p r o m i s i n g t o m a n y b o u r g e o i s
philosophers. But it is to be expected that, having m a s t e r e d
t h e logic o f H e i d e g g e r ' s a r g u m e n t s , t h e r e w o u l d a p p e a r s o m e
a m o n g his p r e s e n t s u p p o r t e r s , w h o w o u l d t r y t o c r e a t e a m e t a -
fundamental ontology.
W h e r e a s metaphysics is revealed in Heidegger only as the
hidden essence of 'fundamental ontology', differing from the
subjective f r a m e of mind, other spokesmen of existentialism
c o m p r e h e n d their critique of rationalism as an attempt to
transform speculative metaphysics.
J a s p e r s , w h o usually stressed his ideological k i n s h i p with
Kant, considered the striving to convert metaphysics into a
science the fatal e r r o r of t h e latter and other philosophers.

13-01603 193
Kant had claimed that only by creating a philosophical science
could the real need for philosophy (in contrast to the philos­
ophising that anyone who felt like it engaged in) be substantiat­
ed. Jaspers took a different stance; only philosophising, i.e.
meditation, guided by subjective needs and not t h e requirements
of science, was possible and, moreover, necessary. T h e endeav­
our to put an end to philosophising through the development
of a coherent, consistent, demonstrative system of views of
intersubjective significance meant a return (from Jaspers'
point, of view) to dogmatism, and denial of the true sense of
philosophy. 14

Jaspers was right in saying that a scientific metaphysics was

impossible. He was also right in recognising that metaphysics
constantly suffered fiasco in its efforts to overstep the bounds
of possible experience. But his conclusion from that was
unsound. He proposed not to reject metaphysics and its super-
scientific claims, but to agree that it was not knowledge but
belief and only differed from religion in being the faith of
reason, while religion could be defined as metaphysics for the
people. It could not be put more clearly.
T h e third volume of Jaspers' Philosophy is called 'Meta­
physics'. It opens with the following declaration: 'What is
being, is the eternal question in philosophising' (114:III,1).
That correct statement was interpreted, however, in the sense
that only definite being was cognisable, as if there were a being
that lacked definiteness. T h e cognition of definite being, inciden­
tally, was also reduced to discovery of the unknowable in it.
But what was that? Once again being, but being as tran­
scendency. T h e r e were thus existence and transcendency, and
between them an ephemeral world of knowable phenomena
that were nothing other than а сode to be deciphered, of
course, by other than scientific means. ' T h e modes of this hunt
for being from possible existence are ways to transcendency.
To be illumined with it, is philosophical metaphysics'
(114:III,3). Metaphysics, in Jaspers' understanding of it (in
contrast to how the classics of rationalism understood it), was
opposed to science as a real approximation to genuine meta­
physical reality. In that understanding of it existentialist philos­
ophy in essence made common cause with frankly religious
Neothomist philosophising, which proclaimed through the
mouth of Maritain: ' T h e inner being of things, situated outside
of science's own sphere, remains for science a great and fertile
unknown' (164:7).
In his popular works Jaspers said directly: transcendency

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is God. In his main work he said that the divine was t r a n ­
scendent, so assuming that it included something else as well,
possibly even non-divinity. Marcel expressed his attitude to
religion m o r e directly. Characterising his philosophy as meta­
physics free of dogmatic systematism, he argued that the central
metaphysical problem, that of the existence of t h e h u m a n Ego,
was at the same time the problem of God. Not only did man
exist thanks to God, but God, too, existed through and in man.
This new, theological-existentialist version of 'principal co-ordi­
nation' was formulated as follows: 'It must then be possible,
without attributing to the absolute Thou (my italics—Т.О.)
an objectivity that would destroy its very essence, to save its
existence' (161:304). This conception of t h e immanence of
transcendent h u m a n existence created a bond between existen­
tialism and Christian spiritualism.
So the metaphysical philosopher is illumined by the t r a n ­
scendent. Jaspers clearly fought dogmatism in a mediaeval way,
by means of mysticism, which cannot be a revolutionary
opposition in our day as regards the religious ideology dominant
in bourgeois society.
'Existentialist philosophy,' Jaspers declared, 'is essentially
metaphysics. It believes what it springs from' (114:I,27). For
all his agnosticism, he seemingly believed that he knew for
certain what source existentialist metaphysics stemmed from;
it believed in the transcendence that illumined it. Faith in the
transcendent existed, of course, as a fact of consciousness. But
this faith, like existentialist metaphysics as a whole, was rooted
in the historical situation of this world and not in a mythical
transcendence.
T h e metaphysics of existentialism is a striking expression
of the hopeless crisis of metaphysical philosophising.

6. The Dispute between

Materialism and Idealism and Differences
in Understanding Speculative Metaphysics

If we exclude Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and certain other

philosophers and natural philosophers from the history of
speculative metaphysics, in particular those who c a m e close
to materialism or even shared materialist views, then t h e r e are
no special difficulties in defining metaphysics. But such a
limiting of the concept would so distort its real development
and all its inherent contradictions, crises, transitions, negations,

195
a n d i n t e r m e d i a t e a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y results, t h a t i n q u i r y into
this very m e a n i n g f u l p h e n o m e n o n of t h e alienated form of
c o g n i t i o n is largely to lose its sense. S p e c u l a t i v e m e t a p h y s i c s , as
I h a v e tried to s h o w , is a system of objective idealist views that,
while s u b s t a n t i a t i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e of s u p e r s e n s o r y reality, at
t h e s a m e t i m e g e n e r a t e s its n e g a t i o n . T h a t is b e c a u s e speculative
m e t a p h y s i c s , h o w e v e r r e m o t e it is from science, is c o n c e r n e d
with k n o w l e d g e a n d not simply with mystification of reality.
I h a v e a l r e a d y r e f e r r e d to Engels' a p p r a i s a l of T h o m a s
M ü n z e r ' s religious outlook as a p p r o a c h i n g a t h e i s m . It would
seem t h e r e could b e n o t h i n g m o r e impossible t h a n t o c o m b i n e
religion a n d its n e g a t i o n , yet it is a fact and not, m o r e o v e r , the
sole case. T h e M i d d l e Ages a n d t h e R e n a i s s a n c e k n e w quite
a few of these religious t h i n k e r s w h o lapsed into atheistic
'mistakes', and mystics w h o w e r e not c o n s c i o u s t h a t they w e r e
inclining t o w a r d materialism. Views of t h a t kind must not be
r e g a r d e d as eclecticism (a v e r y gross m e t h o d o l o g i c a l mistake!)
but as a p e c u l i a r expression of t h e crisis of t h e religious mind.
H e n c e t h e g l a r i n g c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t h i n k e r ' s subjective
religiosity and t h e objective, s o m e t i m e s even anti-religious
c o n t e n t of his d o c t r i n e . S o m e t h i n g similar h a p p e n e d , too, in
s p e c u l a t i v e metaphysics. It took s h a p e as a s e c u l a r i s a t i o n of
t h e religious outlook that o p e n e d t h e r o a d to scientific investiga­
tion, which also d e v e l o p e d to s o m e e x t e n t within speculative
m e t a p h y s i c s , altering its c o n t e n t .
Metaphysics could not avoid n a t u r a l i s t i c t e n d e n c i e s , since
it b r o k e with religion (if only in f o r m ) and assimilated the
results of scientific d e v e l o p m e n t . But t h e s e t e n d e n c i e s w e r e
n e g a t i o n s of its basic spiritualist trend. And d u a l i s m , and s o m e ­
times even m a t e r i a l i s m , p r o v e d an inevitable c o n s e q u e n c e of
this, sinful link (for m e t a p h y s i c s ) with empirical reality. But
this metaphysical l e a n i n g t o w a r d the real and e a r t h l y c o n t r a ­
dicted t h e spiritualist f e r v o u r of metaphysics, which usually
' o v e r c a m e ' t h e split in its own c a m p by dissociating itself from
t h e dualist and materialist heresy, and again reviving as a
d o c t r i n e of a special reality allegedly q u i t e t h e opposite of the
reality we c o g i t a t e but n e v e r t h e l e s s f o r m i n g its substantial basis.
T h u s , a l t h o u g h m e t a p h y s i c s is t h e n e g a t i o n , in both t h e
epistemological and ontological respects, of t h e substantiality
of t h e reality that h u m a n i t y k n o w s a n d t r a n s f o r m s , this n e g a ­
tion is n a t u r a l l y not based on i n q u i r y i n t o t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t
( w h i c h c a n n o t be an object of cognition simply b e c a u s e it does
not e x i s t ) . M e t a p h y s i c s c o n s e q u e n t l y studies t h e world that it
denies. Is it s u r p r i s i n g t h a t n e g a t i o n of t h e ' b e y o n d ' reality,

196
and not of this one, often proves a consequence of this contra­
diction?
Just as periodical crises of overproduction are a mode of
restoring the 'normal' proportion between demand and supply
in bourgeois society, crises in the history of speculative meta­
physics a r e specific forms of its development through which
idealist conceptions of metaphysical reality become more
'realistic', assimilating the arguments of its opponents, scientific
advances, and everyday experience (to the extent, of course,
that this is possible for idealism). So neorealistic conceptions
of ontology arise that admit the existence of qualitatively
different fundamental realities, viz., material, spiritual,
subjective, and logical, denying the necessity of the basic
philosophical question and the alternative it contains on the
grounds that t h e r e is no problem of genesis for the fundamental
reality.
So dualism and materialism are far from chance phenomena
in the history of speculative metaphysics, i.e. in the essence of
idealist philosophy. These phenomena, which can be called
paradoxes of metaphysics, express in an essential way the
inevitability of the decomposition of each of its historical
forms. Dualism, for example, generally does not exist outside
metaphysics; it is the expression of the contradictions tearing
metaphysics apart. One cannot, of course, say that of material­
ism, whose essence is adequately expressed in its opposition
to speculative metaphysics, but one must note that the material­
ism, that grew on the soil provided by the decay of a certain
historical form of metaphysics, was a specific form of material­
ist philosophy. It bore many birthmarks of metaphysics,
which was evident not just in Spinoza; the materialist doctrines
of Giordano Bruno and Jean-Baptiste Robinet were no less
indicative.
While dualism and certain varieties of materialism were the
inevitable consequence of contradictions internally inherent
in speculative metaphysics, the overcoming of the crisis
provoked by them, and the rebirth of speculative metaphysics,
were the result of an idealist re-appraisal of values and of the
development of new varieties of idealism. Thus, the irrationalist
metaphysics of Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Bergson,
and their modern disciples, c a m e in place of the rationalist
metaphysics of classical German idealism. But irrationalism is
quite incapable of substantiating the need for the coexistence
and 'reconciliation' of speculative metaphysics and science.
Neothomism claims that, and so do the 'realist' versions of

197
metaphysical philosophising. So the modernisation of specula­
tive metaphysics in our time is a permanent factor in its develop­
ment. 15

Bocheński, whose Neothomist orientation was a guarantee

against his critical appraisal of speculative metaphysics, claimed
that contemporary metaphysical systems were overcoming the
one-sidedness of materialism and idealism and were therefore
the most promising trends in philosophy:
C o n s e q u e n t l y metaphysics today cannot simply be identified or contrasted
with other philosophical m o v e m e n t s — i t lowers over them just as
philosophy towers over the special sciences ( 1 6 : 2 4 9 ) .
In сounlerposing metaphysics as a 'realist' philosophy of being
to extremely narrowly interpreted idealism, he considered the
main features of contemporary metaphysical doctrines to be
empiricism ('experience alone provides a basis for philosophy'
( 1 6 : 2 0 6 ) ) , intellectualism (the assumption in addition to sense
experience of an 'intellectual experience' radically different
from it, capable of comprehending 'intelligible contents in
reality' ( 1 6 : 2 0 6 - 2 0 7 ) ) , rational method (according to which
'all reality is rational' ( 1 6 : 2 0 7 ) ) , the ontological tendency
(investigation of all 'concrete being in its totality' and of 'all
the modes of being (Seinswiesen)' in contrast to p h e n o m e n o l ­
ogy which limits itself to analysis of just one 'pure' or ideal
being), universality (investigation of all levels of being,
including 'the world's ultimate principles' and of what consti­
tutes the subject-matter of 'natural theology' ( i b i d . ) ) , and
humanism ('their systems pay considerable attention to the
philosophy of man' ( 1 6 : 2 0 8 ) ) .
T h e main feature of this apologia for speculative meta­
physics is a persistent drive to show that the metaphysical
systems of the twentieth century are free of the weaknesses of
preceding metaphysics; rationalism has been supplemented by
empiricism, ontology by philosophical anthropology, claims
to superexperiential knowledge have been coordinated with
the latest scientific discoveries, the one-sided interpretation
of being has been overcome by exploration of all its levels,
not excluding, of course, the being of God. Hence, too, the
conclusion 'there a r e no other systems so balanced, sober,
and rational as those of the metaphysicians' (16:249). These
systems were

examples of all that is best in the achievements of contemporary

philosophical study.... But the fact that Europe now possesses a promi­
nent group of genuine metaphysicians holds out hopes of a better future
for the coming generations (16:250-251).

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 To believe Bocheński, metaphysics had got its second wind,
and the 'Thomist renaissance' presaged the advance of post-
capitalist Christian civilisation! Matters are quite different, in
fact, above all because the metaphysical synthesis about which
Bocheński spoke, is no m o r e than appearance, generated by
metaphysics' adaptation to contemporary historical conditions.
T h e centuries-long evolution of speculative metaphysics
confirms t h e description of it as essentially idealist that we find
in The Holy Family of M a r x and Engels. T h e truth of that was
not always recognised by p r e - M a r x i a n philosophers, material­
ists as well as idealists. Helvetius, for example, considered
materialism one of the main trends of metaphysics. Hegel, 16

who stated the opposition between metaphysics and physics,

suggested that any philosophy worthy of the n a m e was in
essence metaphysics, since thinking was by its n a t u r e meta­
physical, i.e. went beyond experience. T h e only p u r e physicists,'
he wrote, 'are the animals: they alone do not think: while a
man is a thinking being and a born metaphysician' (86:144).
T h a t view is directly linked with his doctrine of the substantiality
of thought, but it also has a m o r e general sense: philosophy is
engaged in investigating categories and in it thought compre­
hends what has already become its content; here, consequently,
it is not something external but thought itself that constitutes
its subject-matter. Hegel called such thinking speculative,
metaphysical, philosophical. But alongside that he employed
the epithet 'metaphysical' to characterise anti-dialectical
thinking. He thus not only gave the term 'metaphysics' a new,
negative sense, but also retained the traditional meaning of the
concept. Dialectics, which, from his point of view, was not only
method and epistemology, but also ontology, i.e. a metaphysical
system, was counterposed to the metaphysical mode of thinking.
Dialectics was therefore characterised as an autonomous logical
process, the self-development of a concept, the basis of which
consisted in the logical structure of reality itself. A speculative
metaphysical system was precisely a system of purely logical
conclusions which, being independent of experience, went
beyond it and comprehended the transcendent as immanent to
thought, which constituted the essence of everything, including
h u m a n essence. Dialectics, according to Hegel, was the genuine
metaphysical method, which enabled one to rise above the
inevitable limitedness of experiential knowledge at any level
of its development.
Whereas the seventeenth century rationalists, arguing that
thinking independent of experience discovered facts inaccessible

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t o e x p e r i e n c e , c i t e d m a t h e m a t i c s , w h i c h did n o t , i n a n y c a s e
directly, appeal to experience, Hegel already understood that
philosophy could not b o r r o w the method of mathematics.
Nevertheless, he essentially s h a r e d t h e illusions of the
seventeenth century rationalists, though he supposed he had
overcome them, since he regarded the self-development of the
concept as an objective, ontological process that took place in
r e a l i t y itself a n d n o t s i m p l y i n t h e i n q u i r e r ' s h e a d . B u t i t w a s
t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f b e i n g a n d t h o u g h t t h a t w a s n o t h i n g else
t h a n a c o n s i s t e n t d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e r a t i o n a l i s t c o n f u s i o n of
t h e empirical f o u n d a t i o n s with logical ones.
T h e adherent of irrationalist metaphysics accuses the ration­
alist m e t a p h y s i c i a n o f i d e n t i f y i n g t h e e m p i r i c a l a n d t h e
logical, being and t h o u g h t . But b o t h t h e rationalist and t h e
irrationalist, in different w a y s , it is t r u e , i n d u l g e in philosophical
s p e c u l a t i o n , i.e. e n d e a v o u r t o g r a s p t h e s u p e r s e n s o r y , s u p e r ­
e x p e r i e n t i a l , t r a n s c e n d e n t p u r e l y s p e c u l a t i v e l y . I d e a l i s m is, o f
c o u r s e , a definite a n s w e r to the basic philosophical question,
and since that a n s w e r is not based on t h e s u m total of t h e facts
of s c i e n c e a n d p r a c t i c e , it h a s a s p e c u l a t i v e c h a r a c t e r . Is s p e c u l a ­
t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , not a n a t t r i b u t e o f i d e a l i s m ?
An u n a m b i g u o u s a n s w e r cannot be given, it seems, to that
q u e s t i o n . If that is so, t h e antithesis of idealism a n d materialism
is not reducible to an opposition between speculative and
anti-speculative w a y s of thinking. T a k e , for e x a m p l e , t h e
K a n t i a n definition of t h e speculative:
T h e o r e t i c a l cognition is speculative when it relates to an object or certain
conceptions of an object which is not given and c a n n o t be discovered
by means of experience. It is opposed to the cognition of nature, which
c o n c e r n s only those objects or predicates which can be presented in a
possible e x p e r i e n c e (116:369).

T h a t is an idealist u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e s p e c u l a t i v e , b u t it is
not, of c o u r s e , t h e only o n e possible. T h e materialist n a t u r a l
philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
a l t h o u g h it was based on t h e d a t a of the natural s c i e n c e of the
time, was speculative in a certain sense, like a n y n a t u r a l
philosophy in g e n e r a l , since, in Engels' words,
it could do this only by putting in place of t h e real but as yet unknown
interconnections ideal, fancied ones, filling in t h e missing facts by fig­
ments of the mind and bridging t h e actual gaps merely in imagination
(52:364).

T h i s t h e o r i s i n g against t h e facts, t h a t effaces t h e b o u n d a r y

between empirical data and the probable, conceivable, and
s u p p o s e d , is a basic f e a t u r e of t h e s p e c u l a t i v e m o d e of t h i n k i n g .

200
 T h e p h i l o s o p h y o f M a r x i s m , w h i l e disclosing t h e vast c o g n i ­
tive significance of bold scientific a b s t r a c t i o n a n d s w e e p i n g
assumptions and hypotheses, rejects speculative arbitrariness,
s c o r n i n g of t h e empirical data, a n d u n d e r v a l u i n g of facts
established scientifically. Abstract t h i n k i n g and s p e c u l a t i v e
abstracting a r e far f r o m identical things in spite of their often
merging with one another in certain historical conditions.
A l i g h t a g a i n s t s p e c u l a t i v e t h e o r i s i n g w a s a b a s i c f e a t u r e of t h e
historical moulding and development of Marxism.
M a r x and Engels highly valued F e u e r b a c h ' s brilliant critique
of t h e philosophical speculations of idealism. At t h e s a m e time
t h e y s t r e s s e d t h a t his p h i l o s o p h y w a s n o t f r e e o f s p e c u l a t i o n .
T h e fathers of Marxism argued, in continuing Feuerbach's
fight against speculative theorising, that t h e traditional opposing
of p h i l o s o p h y and scientific r e s e a r c h h a d a s p e c u l a t i v e c h a r a c t e r .
T h e M a r x i s t n e g a t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y i n t h e old s e n s e o f t h e w o r d
was also n e g a t i o n of s p e c u l a t i o n . But it w a s a n e g a t i o n t h a t did
n o t , i n c o n t r a s t t o idealist e m p i r i c i s m ( a n d p o s i t i v i s m ) , b e l i t t l e
t h e p o w e r of a b s t r a c t i o n , a n d did not d i s p a r a g e t h e o r e t i c a l
thinking.
Idealists f r e q u e n t l y m a k e an absolute out of t h e relative
independence of thought from sense data. Such an overestima­
tion is i n h e r e n t , in p a r t i c u l a r , in s p e c u l a t i v e m e t a p h y s i c s .
We find it already in the Eleatics, and in m o d e r n times a m o n g
the rationalists of the seventeenth c e n t u r y and in G e r m a n
classical p h i l o s o p h y . U n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e of t h o s e o u t s t a n d i n g
doctrines, any philosophical generalisation c a m e to be regarded
as essentially metaphysical, since it inevitably went beyond the
bounds of the experience available at t h e time.
W u n d t , w h o was far from rationalism as a philosopher,
nevertheless wrote:
metaphysics is t h e s a m e attempt u n d e r t a k e n on t h e basis of t h e whole
scientific consciousness of an age, or of a specially outstanding content,
to obtain a world outlook t h a t unifies t h e c o m p o n e n t s of special k n o w l ­
edge ( 2 6 5 : 1 0 6 ) .

A world outlook, he suggested, was n a t u r a l l y a metaphysical

s y s t e m o f v i e w s . W u n d t d i s m i s s e d t h e specific f e a t u r e s o f
speculative metaphysics, since he was endeavouring to substan­
t i a t e it by e m p i r i c a l , in p a r t i c u l a r scientific d a t a . He c o n c l u d e d ,
from t h e fact that metaphysical p r o b l e m s h a d a philosophical
c h a r a c t e r , t h a t all p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s h a d a m e t a p h y s i c a l
n a t u r e . Speculative metaphysics was t h e r e f o r e t h e sole possible
p a t h o f d e v e l o p m e n t o f p h i l o s o p h y . ' O n e will n o t g e t f r e e o f
metaphysics since metaphysical problems and hypotheses are

201
not at all the specific domain of a special science but recur
everywhere in all fields' (265:132).
T h e erroneousness of that conclusion is connected with a
very blurred and extended understanding of the problems of
speculative metaphysics. Nevertheless, even if we digress from
17

the antithesis of materialism and idealism, it is not difficult to

show that phenomenalism and the other idealist doctrines
related to it are anti-metaphysical systems of views. That point,
to which Wundt did not draw due attention, since he did not
regard metaphysics as a certain mode of speculative inquiry,
got an original interpretation in the research of Ehrlich, the
West German spokesman of 'the philosophy of the history of
philosophy'. Being a w a r e of the obvious opposition between
the metaphysical conception of a supersensory reality and
philosophical empiricism, he claimed that there was a positive
metaphysics, on the one hand, and a negative one on the other.
He reduced the antithesis between objective idealism and
subjective idealism, and likewise that between materialism
and the same subjective idealism, to a differentiating of 'being-
metaphysics' on the one hand and 'categorial-metaphysics'
on the other (47:95). T h e age-old struggle of materialism
against speculative metaphysics was presented in a distorted
light by this verbal demarcation: materialism, it turned out,
opposed its own essence, clearly not suspecting it and not being
a w a r e of the ineradicable metaphysical n a t u r e of any philos­
ophy. T h e antithesis between materialism and idealism was
treated as a contradiction between the metaphysics of everyday
experience and a logically balanced, 'critical' metaphysics,
consistent in its conclusions, transcendental, and even 'scientific'.
And while the materialist critique of idealism was attributed to
block-headedness, idealism's struggle against materialism was
presented as the necessary negation of a primitive, barren
variety of speculative metaphysics.
T h e confusing, and even complete identification, of such
concepts as 'philosophy', 'speculation', and 'metaphysics', is
not only an idealist fallacy with deep epistemological roots,
but is also a specific form of idealism's fight against material­
ism. Some idealists are adherents of speculative metaphysics,
and others its opponents. But both endeavour to refute material­
ist philosophy: the former as a false metaphysics and the latter
as a metaphysical ideology alien to science. Let us consider
their arguments.
T h e adherent of speculative metaphysics argues that material­
ism is metaphysical since it starts from recognition of the

202
primacy of matter, deduces t h e spiritual from the material,
and ascribes eternity and infinity to the universe. F r o m that
angle materialism does not differ essentially from t h e doctrine
that considers t h e spiritual primary, deduces the material from
it, etc. These are contradictory views, of course, but they have
this in c o m m o n that they go beyond the limits of any possible
experience and consequently have no right to refer to it to
confirm their speculative postulates and conclusions. T h e
adherent of speculative metaphysics thus asserts that his postu­
lates are as justified as those of the materialist. T h e essence of
this idealist critique of materialism is the assertion that the latter
has as little connection with science as idealism, and that
science cannot confirm (or refute) either t h e one point of view
or the other.
Ehrlich claimed that the materialist conception of history
was a metaphysical system since it started from such 'essences'
as social production, economic basis, superstructure, etc. T h e
principle of partisanship, substantiated by Marxism, he c h a r a c ­
terised as a metaphysical principle, and declared the scientific
socialist ideology to be a system of superexperiential knowl­
edge (see 47:106-110). T h a t interpretation of Marxian
materialism glossed over its irreconcilable opposition to religious
ideology which, as Ehrlich rightly stressed, is the initial source
of metaphysics.
Ehrlich did not consider metaphysicism a shortcoming of
materialism. He was even inclined to reproach materialism for
a lack of it. He therefore counterposed speculative idealism
to materialist philosophy, thus delimiting in principle 'good'
metaphysics from 'bad', i.e. from materialism (which in fact
is the negation of speculative metaphysics). He did not actually
dispute this fact, but tried to show that t h e materialist negation
of metaphysics failed to achieve its aim because metaphysics
was ineradicable from philosophy. If we allow for the fact that
Ehrlich, like other idealists, considered the essence of meta­
physics to be recognition of a supernatural, supersensory
reality, it becomes clear that his definition of materialism as
'metaphysics' (though, negative) veiled the incompatibility
in principle of materialist philosophy and this idealist trend.
Positivism, as a continuation of the idealist-empiricist
(phenomenalist) and agnostic line in philosophy, proclaimed
its most important job to be the critique of metaphysics. Comte
considered metaphysics a historically inevitable stage in the
development of knowledge which, in his view, passed through
three stages: theological, metaphysical, and scientific. While

203
defining metaphysics as a striving to go beyond t h e bounds of
experience, he did not ask about t h e relative n a t u r e of t h e
boundaries of any experience and consequently about whether
not only philosophy but also any special science (even when it
remained within the limits of empirical research) did not
continually go beyond its limits of experience (i.e. beyond any
available e x p e r i e n c e ) . He simply declared that knowledge of
what lay outside experience was impossible, so that metaphysics
could not be a science. While proposing to reject metaphysical
philosophising, Comte and his followers did not, however, reject
the existence of a supersensory reality, i.e. held to the ground
of an anti-dialectical counterposing of the experiential and the
superexperiential, t h e sensory and the supersensory, supposing
that they interpreted this antithesis rationally and not in the
spirit of a religious differentiating of this world and the beyond.
It was that metaphysical counterposing (in all senses of the
word) that constituted the ontological premiss of positivist
agnosticism, at least in the form in which it was presented by
its founders. T h e basically subjective epistemology of Comte,
Herbert Spencer, and other founders of positivism, rested on
that antithesis. And although they constructed their philosophy
as a doctrine of the most general patterns of t h e reality known
to science, they interpreted it (and correspondingly its laws)
as an aggregate of phenomena given in experience, whose
existence outside experience always remained problematical.
Spencer, for example, claimed that we cannot know the ultimate
n a t u r e of that which is manifested to us' (248:107), by virtue
of which 'the philosophy which professes to formulate being as
distinguished from a p p e a r a n c e ' (ibid.) must be considered im­
possible. That formulation did not just point out a banal truth
(our knowledge of being reflects not only being but also the level
of development of knowledge of it), but formulated a principle
according to which knowledge was discovery of the unknowable.
T h e differentiation of subject and object was thus not the stating
or grasping of a definite fact but was the 'profoundest of distinc­
tions among the manifestations of the unknowable' (248:130).
T h e concepts of matter, motion, space, and time were interpreted
in that same spirit; they existed only for t h e knowing subject.
T h e proposition of natural science about t h e indestructibility of
matter was treated as constantly existing in t h e content of sense
experience, from which it was concluded that experience fixed
something associated everywhere with a reality independent
of it. But experience was subjective, and therefore a phenom­
enon should not be confused with t h e unknowable.

204
 An u n k n o w n c a u s e of t h e k n o w n effects which we call p h e n o m e n a ,
likenesses and differences a m o n g these k n o w n effects and a segregation
of the effects into subject and object—these a r e t h e postulates without
which we c a n n o t think ( 2 4 8 : 1 4 5 ) .

T h a t positivist c o n c e p t i o n d i f f e r s f r o m K a n t i a n a g n o s t i c i s m
i n its b a s i c e m p i r i c i s t c h a r a c t e r , w h i c h m a k e s i t p o s s i b l e t o
c o m b i n e epistemological subjectivism with e l e m e n t s of a
materialist understanding of n a t u r e .
Positivism opposed objective idealism, which it criticised as
a f a n t a s t i c r e f l e c t i o n of r e a l i t y , t h e f r u i t of s p e c u l a t i v e a r b i t r a r i ­
ness. T o objective idealism w a s c o u n t e r p o s e d empiricism,
w h i c h w a s i n t e r p r e t e d in a subjectivist a n d agnostic spirit.
This c i r c u m s t a n c e gradually altered the direction of the critical
statements of neopositivists; materialism was m a d e the m a i n
object of criticism, and was likened to objective idealism and
c o n d e m n e d as a very sophisticated speculative metaphysics
seemingly based on experience that somehow recognised the
obviously speculative essence of Matter (writing t h e word,
of c o u r s e , with a capital M ) .
Analysis of t h e attitude of S p e n c e r and other early spokesmen
of positivism to objective idealism indicates that their objections
to it related mainly to t h e p r o b l e m s of a positive description
of a reality i n d e p e n d e n t of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . T h e positivist a g r e e d
w i t h t h e o b j e c t i v e idealist t h a t t h i s r e a l i t y d i f f e r e d r a d i c a l l y
from sense-perceived p h e n o m e n a ; he also considered these
p h e n o m e n a d e r i v a t i v e . But w h i l e t h e o b j e c t i v e idealist e n d e a v ­
o u r e d to establish t h e m a i n features of this p r i m o r d i a l reality,
t h e positivist insisted t h a t i t c o u l d o n l y b e d e f i n e d n e g a t i v e l y ,
i.e. s i m p l y a s u n k n o w a b l e .
T h e d i v e r g e n c e between positivism and materialism was, of
course, incomparably m o r e substantial, the m o r e so that it was
constantly being deepened during the history of the former.
W h e r e a s its e a r l y s p o k e s m e n f r e q u e n t l y i n c l i n e d t o a c o m p r o ­
mise with materialism, especially with t h e materialism of t h e
n a t u r a l sciences, their successors m o r e and m o r e b r o k e with
materialist tendencies, including 'shamefaced materialism' of
a n a g n o s t i c h u e . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e i n this c o n n e c t i o n t h a t
M a c h , w h o rejected r e p r o a c h e s of solipsism and e n d e a v o u r e d to
p r o v e t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n p r i n c i p l e o f his d o c t r i n e f r o m B e r k e l e i ­
anism (and at t h e s a m e t i m e from K a n t i a n i s m ) , stressed that
Berkeley r e g a r d e d the 'elements' as conditioned on something lying
outside them, an u n k n o w a b l e ( G o d ) , for which Kant, in order to a p p e a r
a sober realist, invented t h e 'thing-in-itself, while t h e notion defended
h e r e is expected, with a d e p e n d e n c e of t h e 'elements' on one another,
to find t h e practical and theoretical answer ( 1 5 5 : 2 9 5 ) .

205
This explanation of M a c h ' s exactly indicates the difference of
subjective idealism, which recognises only the interconnec­
tion of t h e 'elements' (sensations), from objective idealism,
which assumes t h e existence of an immaterial reality preced­
ing sensations. A n d it w a s f r o m a s t a n c e of subjective idealism
that Mach explained everyone's inherent awareness of the
difference existing between sensations and t h e thing: it boiled
d o w n , i n his view, t o d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n s e p a r a t e s e n s a ­
tions and the w h o l e c o m p l e x of ideas ( e m b r a c i n g past and
future experience) linked with them.
T h e f a c t t h a t p o s i t i v i s m d i s t a n c e d itself m o r e a n d m o r e f r o m
o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m d u r i n g its e v o l u t i o n c r e a t e s a n i m p r e s s i o n
that it consistently fought both t h e materialist recognition of
a reality i n d e p e n d e n t of k n o w i n g , and t h e idealist r e c o g n i t i o n
o f it. B u t p o s i t i v i s m d o e s n o t d e n y i d e a l i s m i n g e n e r a l , b u t o n l y
objective idealism of t h e classic t y p e that s u b s t a n t i a t e d t h e thesis
of t h e existence of a s u p e r s e n s o r y , i m m a t e r i a l reality. In that
c o n n e c t i o n p o s i t i v i s m , w h i l e d i s s o c i a t i n g itself f r o m s o l i p s i s m ,
frequently interpreted subjective p h e n o m e n a of consciousness as
i n d e p e n d e n t of a w a r e n e s s of reality.
P o s i t i v i s m ' s f i g h t a g a i n s t ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' w a s t h u s a b o v e all
a fight a g a i n s t m a t e r i a l i s m . B u t in o u r d a y it is i m p o s s i b l e to
'refute' materialism without distancing oneself from the most
d i s c r e d i t e d idealist d o c t r i n e s a n d s o m e t i m e s even f r o m idealism
itself. I h a v e a l r e a d y e x p l a i n e d a b o v e w h a t t h e i d e a l i s t ' d i s a v o w ­
al' of idealism r e p r e s e n t s in fact. T h e p o l e m i c within the
idealist c a m p c a n t h e r e f o r e only b e p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d a n d
a p p r a i s e d i n c o n n e c t i o n with i d e a l i s m ' s c o m m o n fight a g a i n s t
materialist philosophy.
T h e c l a s h e s w i t h i n t h e idealist c a m p a r e e v i d e n c e , a t f i r s t
g l a n c e , that idealists a r e not so m u c h e n g a g e d in refuting
materialist philosophy as in settling theoretical a c c o u n t s with
o n e a n o t h e r . B u t t h a t first i m p r e s s i o n i s d e c e p t i v e , b e c a u s e t h e
w e a k n e s s e s in idealists' d o c t r i n e s disclosed by t h e materialist
critique a r e realised in the polemic between them, while the
i d e a l i s t a r g u m e n t a t i o n i s i m p r o v e d i n it, a n d a c o m m o n l i n e
of anti-materialist views is developed. Ultimately t h e divergence
between the different factions of idealism p r o v e to be closely
c o n n e c t e d with t h e fight b e t w e e n materialism and idealism.
T h a t f u n d a m e n t a l fact, w h i c h also helps us u n d e r s t a n d t h e rival­
ry a m o n g idealist d o c t r i n e s , is b r o u g h t out p a r t i c u l a r l y clearly
b y t h e h i s t o r y o f p o s i t i v i s m a n d its f i g h t a g a i n s t ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' .
T h e b a n k r u p t c y of t h e positivist interpretation of m a t e r a l i s m
as a variety of s p e c u l a t i v e m e t a p h y s i c s has been d e m o n s t r a t e d

206
historically. Nevertheless philosophical revisionism, which has
never been distinguished by independence or profound thought,
has completely assimilated these 'antimetaphysical' (in essence
idealist) arguments against materialism. P r o u c h a , who p r o ­
claimed it his task to 'enrich' t h e philosophy of Marxism by
existentialist ideas, claimed that dialectical materialism needed
to be freed of survivals of speculative metaphysics, in particular
of propositions about the eternity and indestructibility of
matter. T h e s e last, in his opinion, w e r e a 'substantialist
model', 'metaphysical essentialism', i.e. integral elements of the
classical speculative metaphysical doctrine of immutable es­
sences that had been 'uncritically' taken up by Engels
(218:614).
Just like the classical metaphysician, Engels sought the existent, which
is the final basis of any reality, and after which no questions can be
asked since there is nothing beyond it. At the same time, he also hold
this existent—matter—to be that which is in general (218:613).

Speculative metaphysics, of course, considered t h e existent as

such, and that which is in general, as supersensory reality,
radically different from the sense-perceived world. P r o u c h a
missed the main point, viz., idealist speculation about a meta­
physical super-reality. He also did not c a r e to see that a counter­
posing of matter to individual things as their universal and
immutable first essence was absolutely alien to dialectical ma­
terialism. T h e Marxist understanding of the material essence of
p h e n o m e n a does not contain any recognition of a special,
absolute being, independent of individual and transient material
things. But it was such a really metaphysical conception that
he ascribed to dialectical materialism, interpreting the material­
ist conception of n a t u r e as essentially incompatible with dialect­
ics. P r o u c h a wrote:
How often he (Engels—Т.О.) speaks about the indestructibility and
eternity of matter! From that basic aspect change and motion were
only external for him as regards matter (218:614).

So, if one agrees with him, it turns out that dialectics should
reject the principle of the indestructibility of matter, which
has become a truism of all natural science in our day. P r o u c h a
represented as unimportant the fact, that matter is conserved
precisely during the transition from one form of its existence to
another, i.e. during change and development, or, as he put it, this
'does not threaten the materialism of the metaphysical start­
ing point' (ibid.).
Bourgeois critics of the philosophy of Marxism wipe out
the radical, qualitative difference of dialectical materialism from

207
metaphysical materialism, the radical antithesis between
materialism (in particular, Marxist materialism) and specula­
tive, idealist metaphysics. T h e revisionist P r o u c h a did the same,
with the sole difference that he, of course, declared all this
a development of Marxist philosophy (which, in fact, he
disavowed).
Early positivism often identified any philosophy with specu­
lative metaphysics and replaced the speculative counterposing of
philosophy to the special sciences by a 'positive' counterpos­
ing of the special sciences to philosophy. T h a t framing of the
question inevitably led to a nihilistic denial of the whole
historically established problematic of philosophy. G.H. Lewis,
for example, wrote: 'Philosophy and Positive Science are irrec­
oncilable' (149:xviii). But, while preaching the abolition of
philosophy as a metaphysics alien to science, positivism at the
same time proclaimed the creation of a positive, scientific philos­
ophy, i.e. tried to combine philosophical nihilism with positive
philosophical inquiry. What was the source of this contradictory
position, which condemned positivist philosophising to eclectic­
ism?
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, speculative meta­
physics had lost its old hold among the scientific intelligent­
sia in England, France, Germany, and other European count­
ries. 'Shamefaced materialism' acquired a dominant position in
the form in which it was developed by Т.Н. Huxley and other
scientists, and propagandists of natural science. Positivist nihil­
ism, denial of 'metaphysics', and a striving to put 'psychic
knowledge' ( M a c h ) , epistemology, etc., in the place of philos­
ophy, signified recognition of a crisis of idealism, but at the
same time rejection of the way out of the crisis proposed by
materialist philosophy, and attempts to revive and modernise
idealism, limiting it to an epistemological problematic. Limita­
tion of the problematic did not, of course, prevent positivism
from defending an ideological doctrine that gave a subjective
(agnostic) reply, if not directly then indirectly, to all the main
philosophical problems.
Neopositivism took shape as realisation of a tendency toward
maximum limitation of the subject-matter of philosophy,
which was justified on the one hand by the need to exclude
'metaphysics' and on the other by positive investigation of
n a t u r e and society having become the subject-matter of special
sciences. This limitation of the problematic of philosophy
(like the exclusion of 'metaphysics' from it) boiled down to
a rejection of ideological (essentially materialist) conclusions

208
from the sciences of n a t u r e . Such conclusions w e r e declared
t o b e i n t r o d u c e d i n t o n a t u r a l s c i e n c e f r o m o u t s i d e , i.e. f r o m
'metaphysics'. T h e materialism of naturalists, insofar as it cons­
tantly c a m e to light in their special r e s e a r c h e s , was t r e a t e d as
h a v i n g n o r e l a t i o n t o t h e c o n t e n t o f scientific k n o w l e d g e a n d
p o s s i b l y a s s o c i a t e d o n l y w i t h its f o r m , i.e. w i t h t h e l a n g u a g e
of science, aggravated by 'metaphysical' prejudices that arose
f r o m its i m p e r f e c t i o n a n d f r o m n o n o b s e r v a n c e o f t h e r e q u i ­
r e m e n t s of logical syntax, etc. C a r n a p , for e x a m p l e , wrote:
I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to r e p r e ­
sent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all expe­
rience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about T h i n g s in themsel­
ves, the Absolute, and such like. I do not include in melaphysics those
theories—sometimes called m e t a p h y s i c a l — w h o s e object is to a r r a n g e
the most general propositions of t h e various regions of scientific
k n o w l e d g e in a well-ordered system; such theories belong actually to
the held of empirical science, not of philosophy, however daring
they may be ( 2 9 : 2 1 2 - 2 1 3 ) .

T h e e x a m p l e s o f m e t a p h y s i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s cited b y h i m w e r e
mainly d r a w n from t h e past; h e r e f e r r e d t o basic propositions
of T h a l e s , P y t h a g o r a s , P l a t o , S p i n o z a , etc., c o n c l u d i n g that
monism, dualism, materialism, and spiritualism w e r e equally
m e t a p h y s i c a l , s i n c e t h e i r p r o p o s i t i o n s c o u l d n o t b e verified
n o r p r o v e n in a p u r e l y logical way.
T h e subsequent development of neopositivism has shown,
of c o u r s e , t h a t t h e limited u n d e r s t a n d i n g of verification and
proof it proposed was inapplicable to the main principles and
laws of n a t u r a l science. F r o m t h e angle of neopositivism these
principles, laws, and premisses were 'metaphysical , 1
i.e.
subject to exclusion f r o m s c i e n c e . T h a t fact, w h i c h m a d e it
necessary to reconsider t h e neopositivist ' O c k h a m ' s razor',
showed that neopositivism was not so much aimed against spec­
ulative metaphysics as against theoretical generalisations in
s c i e n c e , s i n c e t h e y did n o t a g r e e w i t h n a r r o w ( a n d , m o r e o v e r ,
i d e a l i s t ) e m p i r i c i s m a n d led t o m a t e r i a l i s t c o n c l u s i o n s . N e o ­
positivism, while claiming only to study t h e l a n g u a g e of science
c r i t i c a l l y , i n fact t u r n e d o u t t o b e a n idealist c r i t i q u e o f its
materialists content. T h e denial of the speculative counterpos­
ing o f p h i l o s o p h y t o n a t u r a l s c i e n c e w a s i n e v i t a b l y c o n v e r t e d
into a c o u n t e r p o s i n g of positivism to t h e materialist m e t h o d o l o g y
of n a t u r a l science. It b e c a m e t h e main task of neopositivism
to ' p r o v e ' t h a t s c i e n c e was i n c o m p a t i b l e with materialism
and agreed only with subjective-agnostic absolute relativism.
Neopositivists h a v e ultimately been forced to admit that
they h a v e not succeeded in putting an end to metaphysics,

14-01603 209
and that the methods of clarifying the sense of sentences pro­
posed by them do not eliminate 'metaphysics', which seemingly
c a n n o t be banished even from natural science, not speaking
about philosophy in general. This forced recognition witnessed
to t h e collapse of the principles of neopositivist epistemology,
a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h a n y s t a t e m e n t s w e r e ' m e t a p h y s i c a l ' that did
n o t r e s p o n d to verification ( o r falsification) or else w e r e not
deductive conclusions. Since t h e r e a r e statements of that kind in
all s c i e n c e s a n d , w o r s e s t i l l , i n n e o p o s i t i v i s t p h i l o s o p h y , t h e
criterion of 'metaphysicalness' (or unscientific c h a r a c t e r ) sug­
gested by neopositivism proved bankrupt.
It has been discovered at the s a m e time (and neopositivists
had to a c k n o w l e d g e this) that m a n y of t h e 'metaphysical'
propositions of philosophy and natural science h a v e been logic­
ally p r o v e d and e m p i r i c a l l y verified in t h e c o u r s e of their h i s t o r ­
ical d e v e l o p m e n t . A s e n i o r n e o p o s i t i v i s t , V i c t o r K r a f t , w r o t e :
A t o m i s m h a s b e c o m e a t h e o r y of n a t u r a l s c i e n c e f r o m a m e t a p h y s i c a l
i d e a . I t n o l o n g e r h a n g s i n t h e a i r a s a d o g m a t i c c o n s t r u c t i o n , but
h a s its solid basis in e x p e r i e n c e ( 1 2 6 : 7 1 ) .
Neopositivists n o w often talk a b o u t the inevitability of ' m e t a ­
physical', intelligible, a n d even irrational postulates in science.
Reichenbach considers 'metaphysical' recognition of objective
r e a l i t y a sine qua поп. T h e o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e p h i l o s o p h y s e p a ­
r a t e d off f r o m n e o p o s i t i v i s m as a d o c t r i n e t h a t p r o v e d an illu­
s o r y o p p o n e n t o f ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' . But t h e l a n g u a g e p h i l o s o ­
p h e r s , t o o , p r o v e ' m e t a p h y s i c i a n s ' w h e n i t c o m e s t o t h e test,
primarily because they interpret language as the space of h u m a n
life a n d , m o r e o v e r , t h e limits o f t h e w o r l d . ' T h e r e i s b e i n g , '
Yvon Gauthier wrote, 'only in and through language... T h e
real is l a n g u a g e , the s p a c e open to the reciprocal play of
с o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d its w o r l d ' ( 7 2 : 3 3 1 ) . 1 8

T h e h i s t o r y o f p o s i t i v i s m — t h e h i s t o r y o f its l o u d l y p r o ­
c l a i m e d s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' — c u l m i n a t e s i n its c a p i ­
t u l a t i o n to s p e c u l a t i v e , idealist p h i l o s o p h i s i n g . A n d that is n o r ­
m a l , f o r i d e a l i s m , w h a t e v e r its f o r m , i s c o n s t a n t l y d r a w n t o
the speculative metaphysics of objective or subjective idealism.
T h e neopositivists' illusion is their conviction that empiricism
(idealist, of c o u r s e ) is i n c o m p a t i b l e with 'metaphysics' b e c a u s e
o f its a n t i t h e s i s t o o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m . H i s t o r y h a s d i s p e l l e d
that illusion.
I have examined the main differences in the understand­
ing of s p e c u l a t i v e m e t a p h y s i c s a n d t h e related differences as
regards metaphysical (and 'metaphysical') problems in general.
These disagreements, like the struggle against speculative

210
m e t a p h y s i c s , a r e a t a n g l e d skein of c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . It is o n e of
the most r e w a r d i n g tasks of t h e history of philosophy to unravel
it. T h e l i t t l e I h a v e b e e n a b l e t o d o i n t h i s c h a p t e r l e a d s t o
the conviction that both the defence and denial of speculative
metaphysics, and the constant c h a n g e in the sense of the term
'metaphysics', reflect t h e age-old dispute b e t w e e n materialism
and idealism, t h o u g h in an indirect way.

NOTES
1
I t r e a t e d t h e p r o b l e m of t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of p h i l o s o p h i c a l k n o w l e d g e
( j o i n t l y w i t h A . S . B o g o m o l o v ) s p e c i a l l y in o u r Principles of the Theory
of the Historical Process in Philosophy ( s e e C h a p t e r 5. Basic F e a t u r e s of
t h e Process of t h e History of Philosophy, Progress Publishers, Moscow,
1986).
2
T h i s point of view was subsequently developed by Paulsen, w h o tried to
s u b s t a n t i a t e it f r o m a r e l i g i o u s - p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n v i c t i o n t h a t t h e w o r l d is
t h e e m b o d i m e n t o f a r a t i o n a l d i v i n e will. ' O b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m , ' h e w r o t e ,
'is t h e m a i n f o r m o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l o u t l o o k o n t h e w o r l d ' ( 2 0 2 : 3 9 4 ) .
He t h u s linked t h e proposition expressed by Hegel with t h e theological
p r e m i s s implicit in it; it is t h i s r e d u c t i o n of H e g e l ' s p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t
b r i n g s o u t its r e a l s e n s e .

3
T h o m a s M ü n z e r was not, of course, an exception. As t h e G D R philos­
o p h e r L e y p o i n t s o u t in his d e t a i l e d m o n o g r a p h Studies in the History of
Materialism in the Middle Ages, m e d i a e v a l m y s t i c d o c t r i n e s h a d a s u p r a ­
naturalist c h a r a c t e r in part, and partly a p p r o x i m a t e d to a pantheistic variety
of m a t e r i a l i s m , as w a s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , for e x a m p l e , of M e i s t e r E c k h a r t .
' T h e path from Ibn-Sina to Siger and Meister Eckhart,' Ley notes,
' c o v e r s a s i g n i f i c a n t p e r i o d in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of p h i l o s o p h i c a l m a t e r i a l ­
ism' ( 1 5 1 : 5 0 6 ) .
4
It is a l s o c l e a r t h a t t h e d e m a r c a t i o n of m e t h o d a n d system in p h i l o s o p h y
has a very relative c h a r a c t e r . Herakleitos' dialectics arose not so m u c h as a
m e t h o d a s a n o u t l o o k o n t h e w o r l d . A n d i n its m o d e r n f o r m d i a l e c t i c s i s
a t h e o r y of d e v e l o p m e n t , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y a d e f i n i t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of
r e a l i t y t h a t , by v i r t u e of its u n i v e r s a l i t y a n d r i c h n e s s of c o n t e n t , is a m e t h o d
o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n a n d i n q u i r y . T h e s a m e c a n b e said o f t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l
m e t h o d ; denial of t h e i m p o r t a n c e and universality of the process of develop­
m e n t i s a b o v e all a n i d e o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t h a s s o m e t h i n g i n c o m m o n
i n s e v e r a l b a s i c e l e m e n t s , o r e v e n c o i n c i d e s , w i t h w h a t m o s t often c h a r a c t e r ­
ises m e t a p h y s i c a l s y s t e m s , s i n c e t h e y i n t e r p r e t b e i n g a s a n a b s o l u t e , a n d
invariant, ruling out any becoming, arising, and destruction.

5
T h e S o v i e t A r i s t o t e l i a n s c h o l a r , K u b i t s k y , p o i n t s out t h a t t h e title o f t h e
Metaphysics c a m e i n t o g e n e r a l use a f t e r t h e edition of A n d r o n i k o s
of Rhodes, w h o followed the e x a m p l e of t h e A l e x a n d r i a n cataloguers in
h i s classification o f A r i s t o t l e ' s w o r k s ( s e e 1 2 8 : 2 6 4 ) . But w h a t signified,
for t h e cataloguers, no m o r e t h a n an indication of t h e order of Aristotle's
w o r k s ( p o l i t i c a l , e t h i c a l , p h y s i c a l , a n d t h o s e c a l l e d t h e 'first p h i l o s o p h y ' )
a c q u i r e d a n i n f o r m a l s i g n i f i c a n c e a f t e r A n d r o n i k o s , i.e. b e g a n t o b e e m ­
p l o y e d as a c o n c e p t i n d i c a t i n g a s p e c i a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m a t i c .

211
6
C o n t e m p o r a r y T h o m i s m retains in t h e main this mediaeval u n d e r s t a n d i n g
of the subject-matter and job of philosophy. T h e leading American n e o ­
T h o m i s t , Burke, writes that t h e m a i n task of T h o m i s t philosophy is to p r o v e
t h e e x i s t e n c e of a s u p r e m e b e i n g a n d t h a t it c o l l a p s e s if G o d is r e m o v e d
f r o m it as t h e f o u n d a t i o n of a n y r e a l i t y a n d activity.

7
'Descartes and Bacon,' Bykhovsky notes, 'agreed in u n d e r s t a n d i n g the
d e c i s i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f m e t h o d for c r e a t i n g t h e n e w s c i e n c e , a n d d e v e l o p ­
m e n t o f this m e t h o d ( t h e a n t i p o d e o f s c h o l a s t i c i s m ) w a s t h e f o c u s o f t h e i r
i n t e r e s t s . D e s c a r t e s fully s h a r e d B a c o n ' s v i e w s o n t h e a d v a n t a g e s o f
methodical e x p e r i e n c e , of experiment compared with expertentia vaga,
a n d on t h e n e c e s s i t y of a r a t i o n a l w o r k i n g up of s e n s e d a t a ' ( 2 6 : 6 0 ) .

8
T h i s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l division o f r e a l i t y d o e s n o t , o f c o u r s e , r u l e out t h e
possibility of an o n t o l o g i c a l c o u n t e r p o s i n g of m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i t y to t h e
world of p h e n o m e n a . In t h e s t a t e m e n t cited a b o v e M a l e b r a n c h e to s o m e
extent anticipated Kant, w h o arrived at an ontological counterposing of an
u n k n o w a b l e w o r l d of ' t h i n g s - i n - t h e m s e l v e s ' to a k n o w a b l e w o r l d of
p h e n o m e n a precisely by w a y of a similar epistemological division. T h a t
M a l e b r a n c h e h a d a l r e a d y t a k e n t h e r o a d t h a t u l t i m a t e l y led t o K a n t
follows not o n l y from t h e d u a l i s m o f m i n d a n d m a t t e r b u t a l s o f r o m o t h e r ,
m o r e p a r t i a l p r o p o s i t i o n s s u c h as, for i n s t a n c e , t h e thesis t h a t ' t h e e r r o r s o f
p u r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n only b e d i s c o v e r e d b y c o n s i d e r i n g t h e n a t u r e o f
t h e spirit itself, a n d of t h e i d e a s that it n e e d s in o r d e r to k n o w o b j e c t s '
(159:III,340).

9
O n e must r e m e m b e r i n this c o n n e c t i o n , o f c o u r s e , t h a t t h e a s c r i p t i o n t o
s u b s t a n c e a s a n a t t r i b u t e p r e c i s e l y o f t h o u g h t , a n d not o f s o m e o t h e r m o r e
p r i m i t i v e f o r m of t h e p s y c h i c is a s s o c i a t e d with t h e r e d u c t i o n of e v e r y ­
t h i n g p s y c h i c to t h o u g h t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of r a t i o n a l i s m , i.e. to a f o r m of
t h o u g h t w h i c h it is i m p o s s i b l e in p r i n c i p l e to d e d u c e d i r e c t l y from m a t t e r .

10
Engels wrote, characterising the relation between natural science and
r e l i g i o n in t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , i.e. a h u n d r e d y e a r s a f t e r G a s s e n d i :
' S c i e n c e w a s still d e e p l y e n m e s h e d in t h e o l o g y . E v e r y w h e r e it s o u g h t a n d
f o u n d t h e u l t i m a t e c a u s e i n a n i m p u l s e from o u t s i d e t h a t w a s n o t t o b e
e x p l a i n e d from n a t u r e itself ( 5 1 : 2 5 ) . T h e i d e o l o g i c a l w e a k n e s s o f e i g h t e e n t h -
c e n t u r y n a t u r a l s c i e n c e did n o t , h o w e v e r , e x c l u d e its h o s t i l i t y t o s p e c u l a t i v e
metaphysics. Newton counterposed 'natural philosophy' to metaphysics,
a f f i r m i n g that m e t a p h y s i c a l p h i l o s o p h i s i n g w a s a g r e a t d a n g e r for p h y s i c s .
His f a m o u s p h r a s e ' H i p o t h e s e s n o n fingo' o f c o u r s e m e a n t only m e t a ­
p h y s i c a l h y p o t h e s e s t h a t e x c l u d e d t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f scientific c r i t e r i a .

11
T h e h i s t o r y o f m e t a p h y s i c s , t h e F r e n c h neopositivist R o u g i e r , for e x a m p l e ,
claimed, is largely a play of w o r d s a r o u n d the verb 'to be' t r a n s f o r m e d into
a n o u n by m e a n s of t h e d e f i n i t e a r t i c l e in G r e e k . A r i s t o t l e ' s m e t a p h y s i c s
w a s b a s e d o n t h a t logical j u g g l i n g , w h i c h w o u l d h a v e b e e n i m p o s s i b l e , for
e x a m p l e , i n A r a b i c . R o u g i e r , b y t h e w a y , did n o t c o n s i d e r i t n e c e s s a r y
to explain why t h e most e m i n e n t followers of Aristotle in the Middle
Ages w e r e precisely Arabic philosophers. He simply stated that t h e concept
' t o b e ' , o n w h i c h all o n t o l o g y i s b a s e d , w a s o n e t h a t l a c k e d c o n t e n t a n d
t h a t did n o t c o r r e s p o n d t o a n y l i v i n g e x p e r i e n c e w h a t s o e v e r ( s e e 2 2 8 : 2 3 1 ) .
By b o r r o w i n g t h e a r g u m e n t from H o b b e s (or from those w h o b o r r o w e d it
from h i m ) , R o u g i e r , unlike Hobbes, employed it to criticise materialism.
T h e s a m e is d o n e by the c o n t e m p o r a r y Spanish philosopher of an existen-

212
tialist t u r n , M a r i a s , w h o c l a i m s t h a t t h e c o n c e p t o f b e i n g , d e r i v e d f r o m t h e
v e r b ' t o b e ' d o e s n o t signify a n y t h i n g t h a t r e a l l y exists ( s e e 1 6 2 : 8 5 ) .

1 2
W h e n t h e contradiction between Hegel's dialectical method a n d metaphysic­
al s y s t e m is s p o k e n a b o u t , t h e d u a l s e n s e of t h e t e r m ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' is
sometimes overlooked. Hegel's system was metaphysics in t h e original m e a n ­
ing o f t h e t e r m ( w h i c h h a s n o t lost its s e n s e e v e n i n o u r d a y ) , d e s p i t e t h e
f a c t t h a t m a n y o f its p r o p o s i t i o n s , i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e final c o n c l u s i o n s , w e r e
m e t a p h y s i c a l in t h e second basic m e a n i n g of t h e word. An idealistically
interpreted dialectical principle of t h e c o i n c i d e n c e of epistemology, logic,
a n d o n t o l o g y , o f c o u r s e , c o n s t i t u t e d t h e basis o f H e g e l ' s m e t a p h y s i c a l s y s t e m .

13
Several decades later O r t e g a у Gasset appraised t h e situation in philosophy
in the latter half of t h e nineteenth c e n t u r y in roughly the s a m e way, writing
t h a t ' t h e p h i l o s o p h e r i s a s h a m e d t o b e s u c h ; t h a t i s t o say, h e i s a s h a m e d n o t
to be a physicist. As t h e g e n u i n e l y philosophical p r o b l e m s do not lend
themselves to solution after t h e fashion of physical k n o w l e d g e , he refuses
t o t a c k l e t h e m , a n d r e j e c t s his p h i l o s o p h y , r e d u c i n g i t t o a m i n i m u m a n d
putting it h u m b l y at t h e service of physics' ( 2 0 0 : 4 8 ) . Philosophy was slighted
a s a n o n - s c i e n c e , a n d t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s did n o t d a r e a n s w e r t h a t i t w a s
s o m e t h i n g m o r e t h a n s c i e n c e . B u t t h e crisis i n p h y s i c s r a d i c a l l y a l t e r e d t h e
situation. It b e c a m e evident that physics could not r e p l a c e metaphysics.
' H a v i n g o v e r c o m e t h e idolatry of experiment and shut physical k n o w l e d g e
u p i n its m o d e s t o r b i t , t h e m i n d r e m a i n s f r e e f o r o t h e r m o d e s o f k n o w i n g a n d
r e t a i n s lively s e n s i b i l i t y f o r t r u l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s ' ( 2 0 0 : 5 7 ) . T h a t w a s
written forty years ago. T h e Spanish philosopher had a rather v a g u e notion
o f t h e p r o g r e s s o f p h y s i c s . S i n c e t h e scientific a n d i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n
based on the outstanding achievements of science, the capacity of the
natural sciences to enrich the philosophical outlook by discovery of new,
unexpected, even paradoxical aspects of objective reality a n d k n o w l e d g e of
it, h a s b e e n c o n v i n c i n g l y d e m o n s t r a t e d .

14
In t h e postscript t o t h e t h i r d e d i t i o n o f his m a g n u m o p u s Philosophy,
J a s p e r s d e c l a r e d , a n s w e r i n g t h o s e w h o r e p r o a c h e d him for l a c k o f c l a r i t y
and definiteness, that this ' i n a d e q u a c y ' a p p e r t a i n e d to the essence of philo­
s o p h y . ' T h e s t r e n g t h o f p h i l o s o p h y d o e s n o t lie i n firmly b a s e d t h o u g h t s , n o r
i n t h e p i c t u r e , s h a p e , a n d t h o u g h t i m a g e , n o r i n e m b o d i m e n t o f p e r c e p t i o n (all
t h a t is s i m p l y m e a n s ) , b u t in t h e possibility of it ( p h i l o s o p h y ) b e i n g r e a l i s e d
t h r o u g h e x i s t e n c e in its h i s t o r i c i t y . So t h i s p h i l o s o p h y [he w a s r e f e r r i n g to
existentialism—Т.О.] is philosophy of freedom a n d at t h e s a m e time of t h e
limitless will t o c o m m u n i c a t i o n ' ( 1 1 4 : I , x x x i i ) . T h a t did n o t , o f c o u r s e , a n s w e r
t h e fully d e s e r v e d r e p r o a c h . N o o n e d e m a n d s o f p h i l o s o p h y a p i c t u r e s q u e
e x p o s i t i o n of t h o u g h t s , b u t its c o n s i s t e n c y a n d s y s t e m do n o t e x c l u d e a
' b o u n d l e s s will t o c o m m u n i c a t i o n ' . T h e h e a r t o f t h e m a t t e r i s different;
m e t a p h y s i c a l p h i l o s o p h i s i n g lost t h e c o n f i d e n c e t h a t used t o b e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
of t h e r a t i o n a l i s t m e t a p h y s i c i a n s . T h e d e n i a l of system t h a t J a s p e r s p a s s e d
off a s s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t d o g m a t i s m (in a n o t h e r p l a c e h e d e c l a r e d t h a t h e
did n o t w a n t p h i l o s o p h y t o b e a d o g m a , l e a d e r , o r d i c t a t o r , i m p o s i n g
o b e d i e n c e a g a i n s t t h e will) w a s t h e r e v e r s e o f t h e i r r a t i o n a l i s t c r i t i q u e o f
t h e idea of a scientific p h i l o s o p h y , w h i c h h a d n o t in t h e least lost its signifi­
c a n c e after t h e collapse of rationalist metaphysics.

15
S k v o r t s o v h a s c o r r e c t l y s t r e s s e d this p o i n t i n t h e s o l e s t u d y i n S o v i e t
l i t e r a t u r e o n t h e h i s t o r y o f s p e c u l a t i v e m e t a p h y s i c s : ' T h e old i d e a o f
m e t a p h y s i c s as a d o c t r i n e of h i d d e n , e t e r n a l e s s e n c e s o u t s i d e t h e visible

213
 empirical world and at t h e s a m e time comprising t h e basis of being, is
being modernised by contemporary bourgeois philosophy' (247:5).

16
'I c o m p a r e these t w o kinds of metaphysics,' w r o t e Helvetius, analysing
the opposition of materialism and idealism, 'to the t w o different philosophies
of Democritus and Plato. T h e former gradually rose from earth to heaven,
while t h e latter gradually sank from heaven to e a r t h ' (99:156). O n e must
n o t e , i n c i d e n t a l l y , t h a t H e l v e t i u s , l i k e H o l b a c h , i n s p i t e o f this c o n f u s i o n
of c o n c e p t s , w a s an i r r e c o n c i l a b l e o p p o n e n t of s p e c u l a t i v e m e t a p h y s i c s .

17
H a n s Leisegang, a philosopher of an irrationalist turn, wrote, w h e n asserting
t h a t t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r o f m e t a p h y s i c s c o m p r i s e d 'all t r a n s - s u b j e c t i v e
objects in the sense of t h e w o r d " t r a n s - s u b j e c t i v e " ' ( 1 3 7 : 7 2 ) : ' w h e r e t h e
o b j e c t s o f m e t a p h y s i c s ( f o r c e , life, t h e s o u l , t h e s p i r i t , infinity, e t e r n i t y , t h e
w o r l d s o u l , t h e w o r l d spirit, a n d m a n y o t h e r s ) a p p e a r , t h e y will b e e m p l o y e d
a s a m e a n s t o g i v e s e n s e t o t h e real a n d k n o w a b l e ' ( 1 3 7 : 7 7 ) . M a t e r i a l i s m ,
h e c o n t i n u e d , a l s o s t e m m e d f r o m this i n t r o d u c t i o n o f s e n s e i n t o s t u d i e d
o b j e c t s , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of m e t a p h y s i c s . ' M a t t e r is l i k e w i s e a m e t a p h y s i c a l
o b j e c t ' ( i b i d . ) . T h a t c o n c l u s i o n f o l l o w e d , i n his o p i n i o n , f r o m t h e f a c t
that m a t t e r was treated as s u b s t a n c e . T h e c o n t e m p o r a r y apologia for
speculative metaphysics is thus based on effacing t h e difference between
t h e real o b j e c t s of p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n q u i r y a n d illusory o n e s t h a t do n o t in
fact exist.

18
T h e s e p r o p o s i t i o n s d e v e l o p i d e a s e x p r e s s e d by W i t t g e n s t e i n in Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus, w h i c h of c o u r s e p l a y e d a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e in t h e
m o u l d i n g of n e o p o s i t i v i s m . ' T h e limits of my language,' Wittgenstein
w r o t e , ' m e a n t h e limits o f m y w o r l d ' ( 2 6 4 : 1 4 9 ) .
T h e o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e philosophy, which supposes that it has solved
t h e t a s k p r o c l a i m e d b y n e o p o s i t i v i s m , i n t h e final a n a l y s i s r e t r a c e s t h e
p a t h of e r r o r s followed by t h e l a t t e r .
 IV

T H E GREAT CONFRONTATION:
MATERIALISM VS IDEALISM.
T H E ARGUMENTS A N D COUNTERARGUMENTS

1. T h e Struggle of Materialism and Idealism

as an Epochal Cultural
and Historical P h e n o m e n o n

Study of t h e basic philosophical question and of t h e natural

polarisation of philosophical t r e n d s indicates that it is m a t e r i a l ­
ism a n d i d e a l i s m t h a t a r e t h e m a i n t r e n d s i n p h i l o s o p h y . I n
the preceding chapters I have already examined the material­
ist c r i t i q u e o f i d e a l i s m , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t h e i d e a l i s t a r g u ­
ments of idealism against materialism on the other, in c o n n e c ­
tion with a positive analysis of p r o b l e m s of t h e history of p h i l o s o ­
phy. T h e aim of the present chapter is to continue and sum up
this e x a m i n a t i o n , b u t on a b r o a d e r p l a n e , viz., f r o m t h e a n g l e of
t h e social d e v e l o p m e n t of m a n k i n d , w h i c h takes p l a c e not w i t h o u t
the involvement of philosophy.
A p r e j u d i c e of c o n t e m p o r a r y b o u r g e o i s history of p h i l o s o p h y
is the idea that the struggle between materialism and idealism
is an internal m a t t e r of p h i l o s o p h y of no significance for
o t h e r r e a l m s o f s o c i e t y ' s s p i r i t u a l life. N e o p o s i t i v i s t s , c l a i m i n g
to o v e r c o m e this ' o n e - s i d e d ' antithesis, p r o c l a i m e d that s c i e n c e
did not c o n f i r m e i t h e r m a t e r i a l i s m or idealism, so b o t h s h o u l d
be r e g a r d e d as l a c k i n g scientific sense.
' E v e r y o n e k n o w s , ' B e r t r a n d Russell said ironically, 'that
" m i n d " is w h a t an idealist t h i n k s t h e r e is n o t h i n g else but, a n d
" m a t t e r " is what a materialist thinks the s a m e about' ( 2 3 1 : 6 3 3 ) .
He was convinced, of course, that he was as remote from
materialism as he was from idealism. 1

Neopositivists picture the struggle between materialism and

idealism as s o m e t h i n g like t h e q u a r r e l b e t w e e n t h e Lilli­
putian T r a m e c k s a n s a n d S l a m e c k s a n s described by Swift (see
2 5 3 ) . T h e f o r m e r argued that only high heels c o r r e s p o n d e d to
the traditions and state system of Lilliput, d e m a n d i n g that only
those w h o preferred high heels to low should be appointed to
high state posts. T h e S l a m e c k s a n s , on t h e c o n t r a r y , claimed that

215
only low heels w e r e e v i d e n c e of t h e t r u e virtues and merits
t h a t d e s e r v e t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s high confidence.
T h e neopositivist idea of t h e u n s o u n d n e s s of t h e antithesis of
materialism and idealism h a s a m a r k e d influence at first on
t h o s e scientists w h o had not s u c c e e d e d in finding their way
from historically outlived m e c h a n i s t i c materialism to a m o d e r n
d i a l e c t i c a l - m a t e r i a l i s t outlook. S u b s e q u e n t l y m a n y of t h e m b e ­
c a m e a w a r e of t h e incompatibility of positivist subjectivism and
t h e ideological premisses of t h e s c i e n c e of n a t u r e , but only a few
b e c a m e conscious a d h e r e n t s of dialectical materialism in t h e
c o n d i t i o n s of capitalist society.
M a x P l a n c k w r o t e , t o c o u n t e r b a l a n c e t h e neopositivist denial
of t h e ' n a i v e ' belief in t h e e x i s t e n c e of a reality i n d e p e n d e n t
of t h e k n o w i n g subject:
This firm belief, unshakable in any way, in the absolute reality in
nature is the given, self-evident premiss of this work for him and
strengthens him again and again in the hope that he can succeed in
groping a little сloser still to the essence of objective nature, and
through that to advance on the track of its secrets farther and
farther. (208:19).

T h e t e r m i n o l o g y employed by P l a n c k is not, of c o u r s e , wholly

satisfactory, s i n c e r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e objective reality of n a t u r e
is not belief but k n o w l e d g e , which is present in every act of
m a n ' s conscious, practical activity, and in a n y fragment of scien­
tific u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h a t s o e v e r . It is t h a t which he was stressing,
but in this case t h e i n e x a c t i t u d e of t h e t e r m i n o l o g y only e m p h a ­
sises his basic materialist conviction m o r e s t r o n g l y . 2

F a r from all investigators of n a t u r e , w o r k i n g in an a t m o s p h e r e

of vulgarisation and distortion of materialism h a v e been able, of
c o u r s e , to s e p a r a t e themselves from idealist views of the world.
M a n y , o n the c o n t r a r y , a d h e r e t o idealism. T h e bourgeoisie,
L e n i n said, r e q u i r e r e a c t i o n a r y views of their professors.
T h e c o n c l u s i o n suggested by e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e philosophi­
cal views of c o n t e m p o r a r y n a t u r a l scientists brings me back to
a thought expressed at t h e b e g i n n i n g of this c h a p t e r , viz.,
that the struggle between materialism and idealism is not the
p r i v a t e business of p h i l o s o p h e r s . T h i s s t r u g g l e of ideas fills and
a n i m a t e s all s p h e r e s of social life. T h e history of f r e e t h i n k ­
ing, e n l i g h t e n m e n t , and atheism, t h e struggle against t h e spiritual
d i c t a t o r s h i p of t h e C h u r c h and against clericalism in g e n e r a l ,
t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of legal consciousness, t h e abolition of s e r f d o m ,
b o u r g e o i s d e m o c r a t i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of moral
and aesthetic criteria, and t h e t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e of socialism—
all t h e s e processes, w h o s e significance is obvious, a r e organically

216
associated with the struggle b e t w e e n the t w o basic ideologies,
i.e. m a t e r i a l i s m a n d i d e a l i s m .
Let us turn to the historical evidence. Feudal reactionaries
w e r e often distinguished by an a c u t e lucidity of class c o n ­
sciousness. In 1770 Séguier, advocate-general of the parliament
o f P a r i s , c a l l i n g f o r t h e official c o n d e m n a t i o n a n d b u r n i n g o f
Holbach's System of Nature, declared:
T h e philosophers h a v e elevated themselves as preceptors of the h u m a n
race. F r e e d o m of t h o u g h t is their cry, and this cry is m a d e audible
from o n e end of t h e world to t h e other. On t h e one h a n d they h a v e
tried to s h a k e t h e t h r o n e ; on the other they h a v e w a n t e d to over­
turn the altars (225:278).

T h e r e i s n o t o n l y f e a r i n t h o s e w o r d s , w i t h its a t t e n d a n t e x a g ­
geration of the real d a n g e r threatening feudalism from p r o ­
gressive (in this c a s e m a t e r i a l i s t ) p h i l o s o p h y , b u t also a s o b e r
a w a r e n e s s of the fact that t h e philosophical revolution in
F r a n c e was paving the w a y to a political upheaval.
Unlike advocate-general Séguier, de Maistre evaluated the
revolutionary significance of the philosophy of the F r e n c h E n ­
lightenment after t h e revolution has o c c u r r e d .
T h e present generation is witnessing one of t h e greatest spectacles that
h a s e v e r m e t t h e h u m a n e y e , t h e fight t o t h e d e a t h o f C h r i s t i a n i t y
and philosophism (158:61).

Philosophy (that of the F r e n c h Enlightenment, it goes without

saying) was 'an essentially disorganising p o w e r ' for t h e ideolog­
ist o f t h e R e s t o r a t i o n ( 1 5 8 : 5 6 ) , s i n c e i t f o u g h t r e l i g i o n i n s t e a d
o f b a s i n g itself o n it. I t s s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t f e u d a l i s m w a s i n t e r p r e t ­
ed as a nihilistic n e g a t i o n of civilisation in g e n e r a l . 'I shall n e v e r
believe in t h e fruitfulness of nothingness' ( 1 5 8 : 5 7 ) .
Although Séguier's p r o n o u n c e m e n t was aimed directly at
Holbach's 'bible of materialism', he had in mind (like de
Maistre later) the whole philosophy of the French Enlighten­
ment, w h o s e brilliant spokesmen included both materialists and
idealists. Voltaire, w h o fused t o g e t h e r N e w t o n ' s physics, deism,
L o c k e ' s sensualism, a critique of speculative metaphysics, and
philosophical scepticism, was probably the most passionate op­
ponent of feudalism. His motto 'Ecrasez l'infâme!' inspired
struggle against the spiritual dictatorship of the C h u r c h . Vol­
t a i r i a n i s m , i n s p i t e o f t h e m o d e r a t i o n o f its s o c i a l p r o g r a m m e ,
was considered very nearly a s y n o n y m for open rebellion
against the existing system then. Gogol put the following words
into the mouth of the town governor: "That's the
way God Himself has arranged things, despite what the
V o l t a i r i a n s s a y ' ' ( 7 7 : 3 1 9 ) . R u s s i a n a n d P r u s s i a n , a n d all

217
other feudal reactionaries went in t e r r o r of Voltairianism.
J e a n - J a c q u e s Rousseau was t h e spiritual father of the J a c o b ­
ins. W h y did that idealist put forward a m o r e radical social p r o ­
g r a m m e than t h e materialists Holbach, Helvetius, and Diderot?
Rousseau was an ideologist of the lower middle classes, above
all of the peasant masses, w h o w e r e not, of course, irreligious. 3

At the time of the G r e a t F r e n c h Revolution atheism was an eso­

teric philosophy of t h e aristocracy and t h e part of t h e b o u r ­
geoisie closest tо them in social position, a m o n g whom we find
the f a r m e r - g e n e r a l Helvetius. Holbach was called the personal
enemy of the Lord God. He dedicated his Ethocratic to
Louis XVI, whom the revolution soon sent to the scaffold.
H o l b a c h ' s political ideal was an enlightened constitutional
m o n a r c h y , but that was a bourgeois-revolutionary ideal of
the time, in spite of the fact that some bourgeois and lower
middle class ideologists had already proclaimed the need for a
republic. T h e c o m m o n aim of all the enlighteners, both material­
ist and idealist, was the fight against feudalism. T h e question
of t h e future form of government had not yet b e c o m e a press­
ing one.
Did that mean that t h e r e w e r e no disagreements a m o n g the
F r e n c h enlighteners, both materialist and idealist? Bу no
means. T h e disagreements related to most essential problems:
religion, atheism, and the philosophical interpretation of reality.
But in the fight against the c o m m o n enemy—clericalism and
scholasticism and the varieties of idealism related to the latter—
all the enlighteners w e r e united. T h e i r a r g u m e n t s against feu­
dal ideology were not, of course, of equal worth, and that
considerably affected the subsequent development of philosophy.
But, to the ideologists of feudal reaction, the idealist Rous­
seau was no less terrible than the materialist Holbach; this
idealist found effective a r g u m e n t s against feudal ideology that
the atheist Holbach did not. Rousseau, for example, claimed
that the Catholic religion d o m i n a n t in F r a n c e corrupted the
h u m a n mind, an a r g u m e n t acceptable to the man of the
T h i r d Estate. Holbach, however, argued that any religion
c o r r u p t e d the mind; only a few agreed with that sweeping
conclusion.
Study of the c o m p a r a t i v e role of materialism and idealism in
the history of h u m a n i t y thus suggests an organic inclusion of
these main philosophical trends in a real socio-economic con­
text. T h e philosophical ideology of the bourgeoisie w h o w e r e
storming feudalism was revolutionary even when it b o r e an
idealist or even religious c h a r a c t e r . T h e materialist philosophy

218
o f t h e b o u r g e o i s i e w h o c a m e t o p o w e r , o n t h e c o n t r a r y , was
conservative; such, for example, was vulgar materialism in
G e r m a n y i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . I n o t h e r , less d e v e l o p e d
capitalist c o u n t r i e s , i n c i d e n t a l l y , this f o r m of m a t e r i a l i s m p l a y e d
a progressive role. O n e can a g r e e with Kopnin:
T h e idealist system can be a step forward in the development of
philosophical knowledge compared with existing materialism, and play
a reactionary role in the ideological life of society, and on the con­
trary have no significance in the forward movement of philosophical
thought and exert a progressive influence on a country's social life
(122:111).

H i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , w h i c h c o n s i d e r s p h i l o s o p h y a specific
r e f l e c t i o n of social b e i n g , d e n i e s in p r i n c i p l e an u n a m b i g u o u s
definition of t h e social position of b o t h m a t e r i a l i s m a n d i d e a l ­
ism. T h e idea t h a t t h e s t r u g g l e b e t w e e n t h e t w o a l w a y s reflects
t h e o p p o s i t i o n of t h e m a i n classes of a n t a g o n i s t i c s o c i e t y is an
oversimplification, b o r d e r i n g on Shulyatikov's notorious c o n c e p ­
tion. T h e e x a m p l e of the F r e n c h enlighteners indicates that
this a n t i t h e s i s also exists i n t h e c o n t e x t o f o n e a n d t h e s a m e
bourgeois ideology. Witness t h e historical antithesis of Hegel
a n d F e u e r b a c h ; t h e i r d o c t r i n e s reflected t h e d e g r e e o f d e v e l o p ­
m e n t of b o u r g e o i s i d e o l o g y in G e r m a n y .
T h e m a t e r i a l i s t p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e b o u r g e o i s e n l i g h t e n e r s was,
of c o u r s e , hostile to t h e idealism of t h e ideologists of f e u d a l ­
ism. D i a l e c t i c a l a n d h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m is a d o c t r i n e r a d i c a l ­
ly o p p o s e d to c o n t e m p o r a r y idealist p h i l o s o p h y . In o t h e r w o r d s ,
t h e a n t i t h e s i s b e t w e e n m a t e r i a l i s m a n d idealism h e r e reflects t h e
s t r u g g l e of a n t a g o n i s t i c classes.
An ideology has a revolutionary (or progressive) c h a r a c t e r
i n s o f a r as it reflects t h e u r g e n t n e e d s of social d e v e l o p m e n t .
In c e r t a i n h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s , w h e n a t r a n s i t i o n is u n d e r
w a y from o n e h i s t o r i c a l f o r m of e n s l a v e m e n t of t h e w o r k i n g
p e o p l e to a n o t h e r c o r r e s p o n d i n g to a h i g h e r level of t h e p r o d u c ­
tive f o r c e s , t h e i d e o l o g i c a l f o r m o f t h e t r a n s i t i o n m a y b e idealism
and religion. Early Christianity, before it b e c a m e the state reli­
g i o n , w a s a h i s t o r i c a l l y p r o g r e s s i v e i d e o l o g y of t h e slaves.
R e l i g i o u s P r o t e s t a n t i s m was t h e i d e o l o g y o f t h e D u t c h r e v o l u t i o n
a n d l a t e r of t h e E n g l i s h . It t o o k centuries of t h e e m a n c i p a t i o n
struggle of t h e w o r k i n g people and long, e x p e r i e n c e of t h e
class s t r u g g l e o f t h e p r o l e t a r i a t , f o r a t h e i s m t o b e c o m e t h e
outlook of the advanced part (but by no means the majority)
of t h e o p p r e s s e d a n d e x p l o i t e d masses. D o e s t h a t belittle t h e
g r e a t c u l t u r a l a n d h i s t o r i c a l , c o g n i t i v e , p h i l o s o p h i c a l signifi­
c a n c e of atheism and materialism? Of c o u r s e not.

219
 T h e materialism of Holbach, Helvetius, and Diderot was a
m u c h h i g h e r level o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l s u m m i n g - u p o f n a t u r e
t h a n R o u s s e a u ' s idealist d o c t r i n e . T h e latter, it is t r u e , surpassed
t h e F r e n c h materialists of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y in his u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g o f s o c i a l life, b u t i t s h o u l d n o t b e f o r g o t t e n t h a t p r e -
M a r x i a n m a t e r i a l i s t s did n o t a d h e r e t o m a t e r i a l i s m i n t h a t
domain. T h e r e is consequently no sharply expressed opposition
in t h e p h i l o s o p h y of history b e t w e e n t h e idealist R o u s s e a u
a n d t h e materialist H o l b a c h , in spite of t h e s u b s t a n t i a l differences
associated with the latter's atheism a n d m e c h a n i s m . R o u s ­
seau, as we k n o w , i n t e r p r e t e d the history of m a n k i n d in a n a t u r ­
alistic w a y , w i t h o u t r e s o r t i n g t o t h e o l o g i c a l a r g u m e n t s , a n d
attached p a r a m o u n t importance to such factors as increase of
population, spread of private property, development of sciences,
culture, and the state. H o w e v e r paradoxically it m a y seem, the
idealist R o u s s e a u c a m e c l o s e r t o a m a t e r i a l i s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f
history than the materialist Holbach. T h a t was because of
the dialectical a p p r o a c h to c e r t a i n v e r y essential aspects of social
development peculiar to Rousseau.
E n g e l s pointed out that R o u s s e a u had s h o w n with p r o f o u n d
penetration, twenty years before the birth of Hegel, that the
rise of social inequality had been progress. R o u s s e a u also u n d e r ­
stood that the antagonistic f o r m of social p r o g r e s s of necessity
g a v e rise t o its n e g a t i o n , t h e a b o l i t i o n o f s o c i a l i n e q u a l i t y .
Already in Rousseau, therefore [he w r o t e ] , we find not only a line of
thought which c o r r e s p o n d s exactly to the one developed in M a r x ' s Cap-
ital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of
speech as M a r x used: processes which in their n a t u r e a r e antagonistic,
contain a contradiction; t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of one e x t r e m e into its opposite;
and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation
(50:160-161).

R o u s s e a u ' s d i a l e c t i c s w a s u n d o u b t e d l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h his
social s t a n c e , with a l o w e r middle-class c r i t i q u e of antagonistic
society. But it m u s t not be forgotten that the l o w e r m i d d l e -
class, r o m a n t i c c h a r a c t e r of this c r i t i q u e h a d a r e v e r s e , r e a c t i o n ­
a r y side which, it is true, only a c q u i r e d substantial influence later
w h e n history posed the question of transition from capitalism
to socialism.
A c o m p a r a t i v e analysis of the role of m a t e r i a l i s m a n d idealism
i n t h e i d e o l o g i c a l life o f s o c i e t y t h u s c a l l s f o r c o n c r e t e , h i s t o r i c a l
c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f v a r i o u s c i r c u m s t a n c e s . F i r s t o f all, o n e m u s t
m a k e c l e a r w h a t social interests of a given historical age a r e
e x p r e s s e d by t h e materialist or idealist d o c t r i n e b e i n g e x a m i n e d ,
a n d w h a t its s o c i a l s e n s e a n d i d e o l o g i c a l m e s s a g e a r e . O n e m u s t

220
f u r t h e r m o r e allow fully for t h e fact that, in t h e c o n t e x t of p r e -
M a r x i a n philosophy, the antithesis between materialism and
idealism is m a i n l y o n e b e t w e e n t h e materialist a n d idealist
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of n a t u r e , while their theoretical positions often
prove to be quite close to one another in the philosophy of
history. Finally, the concrete, historical form of materialism or
idealism, a n d t h e i r link with o u t s t a n d i n g scientific discoveries,
attitude to religion and to dialectics, rationalism, empiricism, and
other philosophical trends, are of particular importance. T h e r e
is c o n s e q u e n t l y a s c a l e of indices of t h e p r o g r e s s i v e significance
of p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e s in t h e c o n t e x t of a historically definite
social reality, that has been developed not only by t h e history of
philosophy but also by the w h o l e evolution of h u m a n i t y .
T h e struggle between materialism and idealism is a very c o m ­
plex, c o n t r a d i c t o r y p h e n o m e n o n that c a n only be properly
u n d e r s t o o d from a scientific analysis of t h e w h o l e socio-historic­
al process that excludes any schematisation. Theoretical general­
isations a r e only possible w h e n it is r e m e m b e r e d that d o m i n a n t
t e n d e n c i e s clash with opposite ones, w h i c h often limits their
i n f l u e n c e . A final c o n c l u s i o n a b o u t t h e c o m p a r a t i v e h i s t o r i c a l
role of materialism and idealism in the development of m a n k i n d
can only be based on a study of the qualitative difference
between historical periods and the m a n y forms of their philo­
sophical self-expression. O t h e r w i s e , it is impossible to u n d e r ­
stand, for e x a m p l e , why certain mediaeval mystical doctrines
h a d a r e v o l u t i o n a r y c h a r a c t e r , w h i c h did not r u l e it out, of
course, that there w e r e also reactionary mystical doctrines in
the s a m e periods. And that applies, of course, to m o r e t h a n
mysticism.
T h e basic social sense of the battle of ideas b e t w e e n t h e m a i n
philosophical trends that developed in m o d e r n times was for­
mulated by Lenin as follows:
T h r o u g h o u t t h e m o d e r n history of E u r o p e , and especially at the end
of the e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y in F r a n c e , w h e r e a r e s o l u t e s t r u g g l e w a s
c o n d u c t e d a g a i n s t e v e r y k i n d of m e d i e v a l r u b b i s h , a g a i n s t s e r f d o m in
i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d i d e a s , m a t e r i a l i s m h a s p r o v e d t o b e t h e only p h i l o s o p h y
t h a t i s c o n s i s t e n t , t r u e t o all t h e t e a c h i n g s o f n a t u r a l s c i e n c e a n d
hostile to superstition, cant, and so forth. T h e enemies of d e m o c r a c y
h a v e , t h e r e f o r e , a l w a y s e x e r t e d all t h e i r efforts t o ' r e f u t e ' , u n d e r m i n e
and defame materialism, and have advocated various forms of philo­
sophical idealism, which always, in one w a y or a n o t h e r , a m o u n t s to
t h e d e f e n c e or support of religion (147:24).

T h e r e i s n o d o u b t a b o u t t h e i m m e n s e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l signifi­
c a n c e of that conclusion for understanding t h e social role of
i d e a l i s m as a w h o l e .

221
 T h e antithesis between idealism and materialism is one
between mystification of n a t u r e and social reality and its
demystification. Religion was t h e first, spontaneously moulded
form of mystification of the world, which seemingly was not
realised for centuries as a system of beliefs or convictions,
since such a w a r e n e s s presupposed comparison of various
religious beliefs, t h e existence of doubts in the correctness of
certain dogmas of a religion, and consequently reflections on
matters of faith. T h e original religious notions were, to use
D u r k h e i m ' s well-known expression, only the collective notions
of primitive men which w e r e taken by each m e m b e r of t h e
clan as directly given and not subject to doubt. T h e conscious­
ness of primitive men did not, of course, stop at religious notions
existing independently of personal experience, insofar as pri­
mitive men acquired certain empirical knowledge. But personal
e x p e r i e n c e and its associated empirical knowledge did not func­
tion in direct connection with impersonal religious ideology.
T h e latter was assimilated in r e a d y - m a d e form as a system of
answers to questions that w e r e not yet in the minds of primitive
men; the questions seemingly arose under t h e influence of t h e
answers. W h e n empirical ideas began to be interwoven with
religious notions, contradiction arose between them. T h e at­
tempts to c o o r d i n a t e t h e h e t e r o g e n e o u s elements of everyday
consciousness, doubts, reflections, and waverings signified the
beginning of a b r e a k - d o w n of the first religious form of mysti­
fication of reality. And at that point in m a n k i n d ' s cultural devel­
opment philosophy arose.
Insofar as philosophy eliminated the primitive religious
consciousness, it t h e r e b y took the first steps along the road to
o v e r c o m i n g the original mystification of the world. T h e first
Greek materialists, while not denying the existence of gods,
asserted that they arose from air, fire, etc. N a t u r e was regarded
as a self-sufficing whole that had always and e v e r y w h e r e
existed. Since the gods of the mythology of antiquity w e r e des­
cribed as man-like c r e a t u r e s , the materialist theogony c a m e
into contradiction with these naive idyllic ideas. X e n o p h a n e s
of Kolophon, w h o continued the traditions of Ionic philosophy
in a n u m b e r of respects, wittily criticised religious a n t h r o p o ­
m o r p h i s m : if 'cattle and horses ... had hands ... horses would
d r a w the forms of t h e gods like horses, and cattle like cattle...'
(translator's notes cited from 85: I, 378; see also 6 8 : 9 6 ) .
T h e t e n d e n c y to depersonalise the mythological gods defi­
nitely led to pantheism. If t h e early Greek thinkers did not
c r e a t e this conception (its formulation belongs to the age of

222
H e l l e n i s m , i.e. t o t h e t i m e o f t h e b r e a k - u p o f a n c i e n t s o c i e t y
and of the religious ideology peculiar to it), that was seemingly
b e c a u s e p a n t h e i s m w a s a kind of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of m o n o t h e i s m ,
while the Greeks w e r e polytheists.
G r e e k materialism also g r a d u a l l y d e b u n k e d t h e mythological-
religious conception of fate. A c c o r d i n g to A n a x i m a n d e r of
M i l e t o s all t r a n s i e n t t h i n g s p e r i s h e d , a c c o r d i n g t o n e c e s s i t y ,
because 'they give justice and m a k e reparation to one another
for their injustice, a c c o r d i n g to t h e a r r a n g e m e n t of T i m e '
( 6 7 : 1 9 ) . F o r H e r a k l e i t o s all t h i n g s ' c o m e a b o u t b y d e s t i n y ' ,
which he identified with necessity (42:II, 4 1 5 ; see also 85:1,
2 9 3 ) . N e i t h e r view is yet freed f r o m m y t h o l o g y , p r i m a r i l y b e ­
c a u s e of t h e a b s e n c e of a distinctly e x p r e s s e d c o n c e p t of causali­
t y , w h i c h s u p p o s e s t h a t each t h i n g h a s its own, s p e c i a l c a u s e .
T h e idea of a diversity of causes, c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the diversity
of p h e n o m e n a , both significant a n d insignificant, f o r m e d a most
important stage on the road to the demystification of religious
belief in p r e d e s t i n a t i o n . D e m o k r i t o s , for e x a m p l e , discussed
both the general causes of everything that existed and the causes
that produced sound, fire, and other 'earthly phenomena',
and t h o s e that g a v e rise to plants and a n i m a l s . In his w o r k s on
4

medicine he studied the 'causes of seasonable and unseasonable

things' (see 6 8 : 2 9 8 ) .
Demokritos distinguished necessity from cause-effect rela­
tions, employing the concept of necessity to explain every­
thing that was constantly r e p r o d u c e d , a n d so p r e s e r v e d in spite
of the genesis and annihilation of individual things. A n y event
w a s inevitable, from his s t a n d p o i n t . But this fatalistic c o n c e p ­
tion differed from religious fatalism since every event was
c o n s i d e r e d t h e c o n s e q u e n c e of a s p o n t a n e o u s , in effect c h a n c e
c o i n c i d e n c e . But h e did n o t r e c o g n i s e t h e e x i s t e n c e o f c h a n c e s .
E p i c u r u s tried to e l i m i n a t e this v u l n e r a b l e point in his d o c t r i n e ,
while retaining the principles of atomistic materialism. Epi­
cureanism was an important new stage in the demystifying of
nature.
According to E p i c u r u s t h e r e was no omnipresent necessity;
s o m e things w e r e inevitable, others depended on chance, and
o t h e r s still o n o u r r e a s o n . F o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n p h i l o s o p h y
t h e p r o p o s i t i o n o f t h e objective e x i s t e n c e o f t h e c h a n c e w a s
put f o r w a r d . T h a t was a great a c h i e v e m e n t of materialist
philosophy, a real discovery w h o s e significance has only been
properly appreciated in our day.
E p i c u r u s disagreed with those p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o considered
any reference to c h a n c e was an excuse, a rejection of explana-

223
tion. He suggested, on the c o n t r a r y , that c h a n c e should not be
considered an 'uncertain cause', if only because m u c h comes to
m a n in life in a c h a n c e fashion. His d o c t r i n e of t h e declina­
tion of atoms was m e a n t to give a physical explanation for the
fact of c h a n c e . T h e declination did not r e q u i r e explanation;
it constituted an attributive definition of the atom. Epicurus
explained even free will by t h e declination of atoms. However
naive that conception, it u n d e r m i n e d the foundations of the
fatalist mystification of natural processes.
It would be better (Epicurus wrote) to accept the myth about the gods
than to bow beneath the yoke of fate imposed by the Physicists, for
the former holds out hope of obtaining mercy by honouring the gods,
and the latter, inexorable necessity (174:408; 198:33).
T h e aim of philosophy, according to him, was to teach man
to enjoy life rationally. F o r that it was necessary first and f o r e ­
most to o v e r c o m e fear of the gods, of t h e spectre of illusory
absolute necessity, and of death. T h e r e was no other way to h a p ­
piness than knowledge of n a t u r e , which dispelled all supersti­
tions, and with them fear.
It is impossible (he said) to banish fear over mailers of the greatest
importance if one does not know the essence of the universe but is
apprehensive on account of what the myths tell us. Hence without the
study of nature one cannot attain pure pleasure (174:409; 198:36).
A materialist interpretation of n a t u r e and a naturalistic c o n c e p ­
tion of man w e r e the basis of Epicurus' ethics. T h e whole s u b ­
sequent light of materialism against religion has been basically
a further theoretical development of this ethical, h u m a n i t a r i a n
c r e d o of his. Spinoza, the eighteenth-century F r e n c h material­
ists, and F e u e r b a c h w e r e continuers of Epicurus, and fighters
against the spiritual enslavement of the individual.'
T h e r e is no need, in the scope of my book, to t r a c e the history
of materialism in order to affirm the thesis stated above, namely
that materialism demystifies n a t u r e and social relations. T h a t
applies both to atheistic materialism and to those materialist
doctrines that c o m b i n e their essentially anti-religious views with
deistic and even theistic conclusions that contradict t h e basic
content of any materialist doctrine. P r e - M a r x i a n materialism
paved the way, by its critique of religious and idealist mystifica­
tion of n a t u r e , for natural science on t h e one hand and for
the development of theoretical h u m a n i s m on t h e other. By
rejecting religious and idealist postulates p r e - M a r x i a n material­
ists showed that people themselves created their own history.
T h e philosophy of Marxism, which completed t h e building of
materialism, not only disclosed t h e socio-economic roots of

224
religion but also investigated all other forms of t h e ideological
mystification of social reality as specific forms of spiritual op­
pression e n g e n d e r e d by antagonistic social relations. And while
t h e critique of religious prejudices had been confirmed as a spe­
cial domain of philosophical, sociological, and historical r e ­
search before M a r x , t h e critique of social prejudices had been
mainly limited to publicistic attacks on feudal ideology. U t o ­
pian socialism, it is true, also criticised bourgeois prejudices,
but it saw them as a delusion or manifestation of self-interest,
since it did not understand t h e objective mechanism of t h e opera­
tion (and development) of the capitalist m o d e of p r o d u c t i o n .
Only historical materialism laid t h e philosophical basis for an
all-round critical study not only of religious or idealist but also
of any other type of mystification of social life.
I c a n n o t e x a m i n e this point in detail, as it is outside, the
scope of my t h e m e . Let me cite just one example, viz., M a r x ' s
critique of the vulgar economists' t r i u n e formula: capital
p r o d u c e s profit, land rent; and labour wages. T h e unsound­
ness of that notion had already been obvious in t h e main
to R i c a r d o , w h o had shown that all forms of income ( r e v e n u e )
w e r e created by labour. But he rejected t h e t r i u n e formula
simply as a fallacy. M a r x a p p r o a c h e d t h e matter quite differ­
ently; t h e formula was not simply unsound scientifically but,
for all its falseness, it was a description of t h e external aspect of
a process actually taking place. Just try to deny the obvious fact
that t h e l a n d o w n e r received a r e v e n u e ( r e n t ) precisely b e c a u s e
he was t h e owner of land that other people worked. And did
t h e proprietor of an enterprise not receive a r e v e n u e (profit) in
a c c o r d a n c e with t h e size of his capital? And what did t h e w o r k e r
receive? Wages, and no m o r e . So does it seem that t h e vulgar
economists' false formula correctly reflects economic reality?
In that case, however, it should be considered scientific and not
at all false, while t h e scientific theory of value (and surplus
value) should be viewed as no m o r e than a speculative c o n s t r u c ­
tion refuted by t h e facts known to everyone.
M a r x posed t h e matter with all the sharpness peculiar to his
brilliant scientific penetration. He b r o u g h t out t h e contradiction
by virtue of which t h e t r i u n e formula seemed a reflection of
reality. But this reality was only a p p e a r a n c e . Vulgar political
economy passed it off as t h e essence, since every capitalist, being
guided by a p p e a r a n c e , attained his goal. This a p p e a r a n c e was
not dispelled by scientific investigation; so it r e m a i n e d t h e s t u b ­
born fact that had to be r e c k o n e d with. It reflected t h e end result
of t h e distribution of surplus v a l u e and its b r e a k d o w n into

15-01603 225
s u c h f o r m s of r e v e n u e as profit, rent, a n d interest. T h e s e r e v e ­
n u e s f u n c t i o n i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f e a c h o t h e r s i n c e e a c h h a s its
'source', n a m e l y capital and land. So t h e mystification is pres­
e n t h e r e n o t o n l y i n t h e o r y b u t a l s o i n r e a l i t y itself. L a b o u r p o w ­
er, a p p l i e d by capitalists, c r e a t e s a v a l u e c o n s i d e r a b l y g r e a t e r
than the value of the labour power, whose m o n e y expression
is wages. This 'excess' of v a l u e is surplus value. Surplus value
is produced in various quantities in different capitalist
enterprises as a c o n s e q u e n c e of differences in t h e organic c o m ­
position of capital d u e to the technology of production. But
c o m p e t i t i o n a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t flow o f c a p i t a l i n t o t h e m o s t
profitable fields bring a b o u t a redistribution of surplus v a l u e
d u r i n g the sale of c o m m o d i t i e s . In that w a y an a v e r a g e rate
of profit is f o r m e d not d i r e c t l y d e p e n d e n t on t h e n u m b e r of
w o r k e r s exploited by t h e capitalist but c o m m e n s u r a t e with
t h e size of his c a p i t a l .
S i n c e land is a m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n u n d e r capitalism, a c o m ­
m o d i t y with a definite p r i c e , it is a f o r m of c a p i t a l . T h e l a n d e d
p r o p r i e t o r r e n t s it out only on c o n d i t i o n of r e c e i v i n g t h e r a t e
of profit he w o u l d get on a m o n e y c a p i t a l c o r r e s p o n d i n g to t h e
price of land.
M a r x s h o w e d that the antagonistic essence of capitalist
p r o d u c t i o n w a s r e f l e c t e d i n its a p p e a r a n c e . T h e t r i u n e f o r m u l a
is a s t a t e m e n t of an objectively existing relation but o n e that
veils t h e a c t u a l e s s e n c e o f capitalist p r o d u c t i o n a n d d i s t r i b u t i o n .
It reflects facts, but only those that a r e a n e g a t i v e expression
of the objective pattern, w h o s e existence is denied or ignored
by the apologists of capitalism. T h e theory of c o m m o d i t y fetish­
ism c r e a t e d b y M a r x ' s g e n i u s , d i s c l o s e d t h e i n n e r m e c h a n i s m
of this mystification of capitalist relations of p r o d u c t i o n , tak­
ing p l a c e s p o n t a n e o u s l y , i n d e p e n d e n t of p e o p l e ' s c o n s c i o u s ­
ness a n d will.
Capitalist p r o d u c t i o n materialises social relations. C o m m o d i t y
e x c h a n g e , a n d all a c t s o f b u y i n g a n d s e l l i n g , a r e i n t e r p e r s o n a l
relations that take the f o r m of relations b e t w e e n things. H u m a n
life f i n d s itself d e p e n d e n t o n t h i n g s , a n d p r i m a r i l y o n t h e i r v a l u e .
But value is not a p r o p e r t y of things. 'So far,' M a r x c o m m e n t e d
ironically, 'no chemist has ever discovered e x c h a n g e - v a l u e
e i t h e r in a p e a r l or a d i a m o n d ' ( 1 6 7 : I, 8 7 ) . V a l u e is a p r o p e r t y
of a c o m m o d i t y . T h e latter as a r u l e is a t h i n g , b u t that d o e s not
m e a n t h a t t h e t h i n g i s b y its n a t u r e a c o m m o d i t y . A c o m m o d i t y
is a p r o d u c t of labour, but that does not m e a n that l a b o u r by
its n a t u r e , i.e. a l w a y s a n d e v e r y w h e r e , i s a n a c t i v i t y t h a t c r e a t e s
commodities. T h e commodity-capitalist form of production

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mystifies t h e p r o d u c t o f l a b o u r . T h e a m o u n t s o f v a l u e a l t e r i r ­
r e s p e c t i v e o f p e o p l e ' s c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d will, a s a c o n s e q u e n c e
of which people seem to be in t h e power of an elemental
social process w h o s e f o r m of existence is t h e m o v e m e n t of
t h i n g s , i.e. c o m m o d i t i e s . T h e c o m m o d i t y - c a p i t a l i s t f o r m o f p r o ­
duction transforms the ordinary thing created by labour, a table,
say, into a sensuous-supersensory thing or commodity, which
as a v a l u e is not a t h i n g in g e n e r a l , s i n c e v a l u e does n o t c o n t a i n
a g r a i n of s u b s t a n c e a l t h o u g h it e x i s t s o u t s i d e of a n d i n d e p e n d ­
e n t o f m e n ' s c o n s c i o u s n e s s , l i k e all m a t e r i a l t h i n g s .
M a r x stressed t h a t t h e mystical c h a r a c t e r of a c o m m o d i t y is
b o r n o f its e x c h a n g e v a l u e , b u t b y n o m e a n s o f its u s e - v a l u e ,
i.e. its c a p a c i t y t o satisfy c e r t a i n w a n t s o r n e e d s . O n t h e s u r f a c e ,
however, everything seems the contrary since the commodity
f o r m itself f u n c t i o n s d i r e c t l y a s d e p e n d e n t o n u s e - v a l u e ; i f c o m ­
m o d i t i e s did n o t d i f f e r f r o m o n e a n o t h e r p r e c i s e l y a s u s e - v a l u e s ,
c o m m o d i t y e x c h a n g e would be impossible. Bourgeois economists
w e r e t r a p p e d by t h e objectively o c c u r r i n g mystification of social
relations.
We see thus that M a r x ' s critique of t h e ideological distortion
of e c o n o m i c reality is not just of significance for political e c o n ­
omy. T h e t h e o r y of c o m m o d i t y fetishism provides t h e m e t h o d ­
o l o g i c a l b a s i s f o r a scientific c r i t i q u e of a n y f a n t a s t i c r e f l e c t i o n
of o b j e c t i v e reality, in p a r t i c u l a r religious and idealist distor­
tions. It helps disclose t h e m e c h a n i s m of t h e reflection of alienat­
ed social reality by alienated ideological consciousness. T h e reli­
gious a n d idealist mystification of t h e world is not simply a s u b ­
j e c t i v e f a b r i c a t i o n b u t a reflection of facts. T h e l a t t e r , h o w e v e r ,
a r e only the external aspect of real processes, and an aspect,
m o r e o v e r , t h a t r e f l e c t s t h e i r e s s e n c e i n t h e least a d e q u a t e w a y .
W h i l e r e l i g i o n , i n its o r i g i n a l f o r m , w a s a n a i v e m y s t i f i c a t i o n
of reality that was dispelled as civilisation developed, and u n d e r
t h e i m p a c t o f t h e m a t e r i a l i s t c r i t i q u e , its s u b s e q u e n t f o r m s c a n
be r e g a r d e d as a s e c o n d a r y mystification of t h e world, o n e of
w h o s e b a s e s i s f o r m e d b y t h e idealist o u t l o o k o n t h e w o r l d .
W h i l e m a t e r i a l i s m c a m e f o r w a r d , f r o m its v e r y b e g i n n i n g , a s
a spiritual force destroying religion, idealism, on t h e c o n t r a r y ,
c o m p r e h e n d e d , justified, s u b s t a n t i a t e d , a n d t r a n s f o r m e d r e l i g i ­
ous consciousness. It is very indicative that Plato, in opposition
to Demokritos, widely employed myths to expound and explain
his t e a c h i n g . F o r h i m m y t h s w e r e n o t j u s t a m o d e o f p o p u l a r
exposition, but one of thinking and understanding. He even
c r e a t e d n e w myths, t h e r e b y s h o w i n g that idealism w a s not
satisfied w i t h t h e t r a d i t i o n a l m y t h o l o g y .

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 Christianity, unlike c e r t a i n older religions, is based on a p r e ­
vious idealist t r a d i t i o n in w h i c h , in t h e p e r i o d of t h e b r e a k - u p
of antique society, notions about the other world, t h e substan­
t i a l i t y o f t h e s o u l , a n d a d i v i n e first c a u s e , a n d e v e n o f t h e
creation of the world, were developed. It was because Christian­
ity ' e n r i c h e d ' t h e s p o n t a n e o u s l y s h a p i n g r e l i g i o u s c o n s c i o u s n e s s
with v e r y i m p o r t a n t p r o p o s i t i o n s of t h e p r e c e d i n g idealist
p h i l o s o p h y t h a t i t b e c a m e a r e l i g i o n c a p a b l e o f p e r f o r m i n g its
function in m o r e developed social formations. T h e same, s e e m ­
ingly, applies to B u d d h i s m , M o h a m m e d a n i s m , and certain other
c o n t e m p o r a r y religions.
Study of the historically developing relation between idealism
a n d religion s e e m s to me a most pressing task for a scientific
h i s t o r y of religion as well as for t h e h i s t o r y of p h i l o s o p h y . T h e
point is not simply h o w s o m e o n e idealist relates to t h e d o m i n a n t
religious views; it is even m o r e essential w h a t r o l e his d o c t r i n e
plays in the evolution and modernisation of religion. Kant's
w o r k s w e r e put on the Index by the Vatican since they substan­
tiated t h e impossibility of t h e o r e t i c a l l y (i.e. scientifically) p r o v ­
ing t h e e x i s t e n c e of G o d . But it w a s just that side of K a n t ' s d o c ­
trine which had an i m m e n s e influence on Barth, N i e b u h r , Til­
lich, and other s p o k e s m e n of Protestant n e o - o r t h o d o x y , w h o ,
while rejecting rationalistic 'proofs' of the existence of God,
c a t e g o r i c a l l y insist t h a t f a i t h is i r r a t i o n a l , a n d b e c a u s e of t h a t it
grasps the divine presence. T h e idealist-agnostic critique of
theology in Kant's w o r k s has thus b e c o m e a main p r o p of
the theology of c o n t e m p o r a r y Protestantism.
T h e subjective aspect of idealists' attitude to religion must
not, of course, e s c a p e t h e investigator's attention, since t h e
o v e r w h e l m i n g m a s s o f i d e a l i s t s consciously s u p p o r t , c o n s o l i d a t e ,
and substantiate the religious outlook. F e u e r b a c h described
G e r m a n classical idealism as s p e c u l a t i v e theology, since it tried
to 'invest religion with reason' by m e a n s of speculative ar­
g u m e n t s . T h a t idealist p u r p o s e , i n his v i e w , u n d e r m i n e d t h e
religious view of t h e world since t h e e m o t i o n a l content of
r e l i g i o n w a s s u p p r e s s e d b y t h e r a t i o n a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f it.
But putting absolute reason in the place of God, and treating the
l a t t e r a s t h e i m m a n e n t e s s e n c e o f t h e w o r l d r a t h e r t h a n its
external cause, rationalist idealism passed from t h e positions of
t h e d o g m a t i c religious view to panlogism, from which it was
o n l y a s t e p t o p a n t h e i s m . T h e latter, F e u e r b a c h s u g g e s t e d , led
t o ' t h e o l o g i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m ' , w h i c h s o o n e r o r l a t e r t h r e w off t h e
vestments foreign to it and began to consider reason a h u m a n ,
and only a h u m a n , aptitude.

228
 T h e p i c t u r e o f t h e e v o l u t i o n o f t h e idealist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f
religion painted by F e u e r b a c h has a one-sided c h a r a c t e r , of
c o u r s e , b u t i t fixed o n e o f t h e r e a l t r e n d s i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t b o t h
of i d e a l i s m a n d of r e l i g i o u s c o n s c i o u s n e s s . R a t i o n a l i s t i d e a l i s m ,
in striving to c o n v e r t religion into a rational outlook on the
w o r l d , t h e r e b y r e v e a l e d its i r r a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r , despite its s p o k e s ­
m e n ' s intentions. T h i s idealism s o m e t i m e s b e c o m e s an ir­
religious view since it diverts attention from t h e special f o r m
e v e r y r e l i g i o u s d e n o m i n a t i o n t a k e s , a n d s e e s its r e a l s i g n i f i c a n c e
i n t h o s e f e a t u r e s o f its c o n t e n t t h a t o c c u r i n all r e l i g i o n s . But,
as M a r x s a i d in o n e of his e a r l y w o r k s , 'it is t h e g r e a t e s t ir­
r e l i g i o n ... t o d i v o r c e t h e g e n e r a l s p i r i t o f r e l i g i o n f r o m a c t u a l l y
existing religion' ( 1 7 1 : 2 0 0 ) . In t h a t w a y idealists' a t t e m p t s to
r e c o n c i l e religion with s c i e n c e often h a v e d e s t r u c t i v e c o n s e ­
q u e n c e s for religion that t h r o w d o u b t in general on t h e e x p e ­
diency of philosophical initiatives of that kind. T h i s makes
understandable the dispute between Neothomism, which endeav­
ours to substantiate religion 'rationalistically', and religious
( a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l ) i r r a t i o n a l i s m , w h i c h s t u b b o r n l y insists t h a t
religion a n d s c i e n c e , like t h e d i v i n e a n d t h e e a r t h l y , a r e a b s o ­
lutely opposed to o n e a n o t h e r , by v i r t u e of which a n y striving
t o a c c o r d t h e o n e with t h e other m e a n s essentially t o d e n y the
s u p r e m e truth of t h e revelation of God.
T h e duality of t h e idealist a t t i t u d e to religion, or r a t h e r to
the traditional, not intellectually refined religious views of n a t u r e
a n d m a n m u s t n o t b e e x p l a i n e d j u s t b y t h e theoretical c h a r a c t e r
o f idealist p h i l o s o p h i s i n g . I t n e g a t i v e l y r e f l e c t s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e
development of production, culture, and education inevitably
r e v e a l s t h e i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y of a s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n of n a t u r a l
and social p h e n o m e n a and the religious ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' of
t h e m . I d e a l i s m r u s h e s t o t h e aid o f i n t e r n a l l y split h u m a n
c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h e n t e r s i n t o a d i s p u t e w i t h itself b e c a u s e
it c a n n o t r e c o n c i l e reason and prejudice, irreligiosity and reli­
g i o s i t y . But s i n c e i d e a l i s m , just l i k e o r d i n a r y c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,
r e f l e c t s m a n ' s s o c i a l b e i n g , i t o n l y r e p r o d u c e s t h e s a m e split i n
h u m a n consciousness, or the religious self-alienation of man,
at t h e level of p h i l o s o p h i c a l a b s t r a c t i o n .
T h e idealist a p o l o g i a f o r r e l i g i o n , w i t h all its c o n s e q u e n c e s
u n d e s i r a b l e f o r i d e a l i s m , i s a n a l o g o u s t o t h e m o d e r n i s t efforts
to r e j u v e n a t e religious dogmatics. T h e modernists start from the
contradiction, obvious to everyone, between Holy Scripture on
the one h a n d and c o m m o n sense and science on the other, point­
ing o u t t h e n e e d f o r a ' s c i e n t i f i c ' , i.e. c r i t i c a l , p s y c h o l o g i c a l ,
a l l e g o r i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e C h r i s t i a n d o g m a s , G o s p e l le-

229
gends, etc. It is necessary, they suggest, to r e n e w religion, i.e.
to reject those of its ideas that a r e incompatible with science,
while preserving its most important content, viz., faith in God
and t h e divine o r d e r i n g of the world, which, in their view,
cannot be shattered by any scientific and socio-political progress.
T h e opponents of modernism, the so-called fundamentalists,
consider any concessions to the non-religious view of t h e world
to be an actual rejection of religion and descrediting of religious
faith and belief. In c o n d e m n i n g t h e modernists, despite their
sincere efforts to help religion, the fundamentalists point out
the disastrous consequences of this renovation for religious
consciousness, without noticing, however, that their own diehard
conservatism also u n d e r m i n e s t h e foundations of religion.
T h e disintegration of religious consciousness in modern times
is not, of course, the c o n s e q u e n c e of modernism or of funda­
mentalism; both only express this process, on t h e one hand, and
on the other a r e attempts to o v e r c o m e it, which a r e c o n ­
stantly being u n d e r t a k e n in capitalist society, especially in its
c o n t e m p o r a r y stage of development.
While idealism of a rationalist h u e is like modernism in its
dualist attitude to religion, irrationalist idealism greatly reminds
fundamentalism. T h e irrationality of n a t u r e , of h u m a n life, and
of k n o w l e d g e is the thesis by which t h e irrationalist idealist in
reality substantiates the fundamentalist conception, whose es­
s e n c e was aphoristicallу formulated by Tertullian at t h e dawn
of Christianity: Credo quia impossibile (I believe because it is
impossible).
T h e irrationalist philosopher w h o interprets scientific truth
as a conventional logical construction (in which he makes
c o m m o n cause with the neopositivist), e n d e a v o u r s to disclose
the really t r u e in the impossible and, while agreeing with science,
which discovers natural laws and patterns w h e r e , it seems to
the religious mind, t h e r e is the presence of the divine, lays it
down oracularly that t h e 'very absence (of G o d ) is a kind of
presence and (his) silence is a mysterious m o d e of speaking
to us' ( 2 2 3 : 3 4 1 ) . O n e must note, incidentally, that this way
of substantiating religious convictions by a r g u m e n t s that direct­
ly c o n t r a d i c t them was already known to mediaeval mystics.
T h e profound truth of t h e u n b r e a k a b l e connection of ideal­
ism and religion can thus only be fully grasped when t h e con­
tradictions of religious consciousness mentioned above a r e
understood as contradictions r e p r o d u c e d by idealist philosophy
in the realm of abstract thought. Subjectively an idealist phi­
losopher may be an irreligious person or even an atheist, but

230
objectively his philosophy serves religion though possibly not
as a four-square gospel-thing theologian would want.
T h e naive, unreasoning religiosity that the compilers of the
Bible had in mind when they affirmed that the poor in spirit
would enter the kingdom of heaven, has become a historical
anachronism. Contemporary idealism endeavours to save reli­
gion by cultivating a religious frame of mind, independent
of dogmas, or by demonstrating that there is no essential con­
tradiction between science and religion. T h e ' i n d e p e n d e n t '
attitude of the contemporary idealist toward Biblical texts
may seem sacrilegious to the guardians of religious dogma, and
very nearly atheism, but 'free-thinking', bourgeois idealist phi­
losophers in fact promote a galvanising of disintegrating reli­
gious consciousness incomparably m o r e than diehard dogmatic
theologians. 6

Lenin constantly stressed the objective link of idealism and

religion, which did not depend in principle on the subjective
orientations of the spokesmen of the idealist trend. Mach and
Avenarius were not religious men and did not set themselves
the task of substantiating religion theoretically, but that did
not in the least alter the real sense of their doctrine, which
was revealed in the frankly fideistic constructs of a considerable
number of their pupils and followers.
Idealism is the last refuge of the religious understanding of
the world. I also apply that to atheist idealists. But how are ir­
religious, and even more atheistic idealist positions possible?
Do they not contradict the essence of idealist philosophis­
ing? They do, of course, but the fact remains. T h e facts exist
independently of theory. And although investigation of them
makes it possible to delimit appearance from essence, it does
not lead to denial of the facts themselves.
Investigation has to disclose this contradiction and so con­
cretise scientific understanding of the complex relation ' i d e a l ­
ism-religion'. When Jean Paul Sartre, for example, maintained
that the point of departure of existentialism was the conviction
that there was no God, and consequently that nothing was
preordained but that everything stemmed from one's freedom
and responsibility, the Marxist researcher has to analyse this
and similar expressions as facts of a certain kind. Study indicates
that Sartre's atheistic conception is subjective in character; he
did not so much deny the existence of God as refused to recog­
nise His power over h u m a n freedom and over the fate of the
individual conditioned exclusively by this power. From Sartre's
angle the question of the existence or nonexistence of God could

231
not be answered scientifically because of the limited character
of the scientific data. Atheism, in his doctrine, is a rejection of
belief in God with all the consequences flowing from that.
In that understanding the atheist by no means asserts: 'I know
there is no God'; the formula of atheism is an a priori maxim
of initial human freedom insofar as it is grasped and affirmed
in fact.
One can conclude the following from Sartre's atheistic dec­
larations: atheisms are not alike. In denying the possibility of
scientific atheism, Sartre's doctrine thereby revealed points of
contact with Christian theology, which also considers atheism
as a revolt against God, a manifestation of self-will whose
source is the free will of the individual. T h e Protestant theolo­
gian David Roberts, who preached the need to create 'a new
and constructive form of Christian philosophy' (223:337), sug­
gested that Sartre's doctrine helped bring out the deep roots of
unbelief and so to overcome it together with atheistic existen­
tialism. In Roberts' view existentialism, irrespective of its reli­
gious or anti-religious form, 'should be of compelling interest
to the Christian thinker' since it
protests against those intellectual and social forces which are destroy­
ing freedom. It calls men away from stifling abstractions and automat­
ic conformity. It drives us back to the most basic, inner problems: what
it means to be a self, how we ought to use our freedom, how we can
find and keep the courage to face death (223:4).

From the standpoint of the theologian who dreams of infusing

new vitality into Christianity, existentialist subjectivism, the
irrationalist critique of 'objective philosophy', existentialism's
fight 'against all forms of rationalism' (223:6), in short every­
thing that is equally inherent in religious existentialists and
existential atheists, is vitally necessary to Christianity, which is
threatened most of all by social and scientific and technical
progress.
I have intentionally dwelt at such length on the relation of
idealism and religion since the diversity of idealism's forms, and
its evolution under the impact of the natural science and philo­
sophical (materialist) critique, has made this relation very
complex, contradictory, and ambiguous. Vulgar materialism
usually identifies idealism and the religious outlook, with the
result that its critique of idealism is oversimplified and the
latter's developing theoretical content is in fact ignored. T h e
philosophy of Marxism considers such a critique of idealism to
be unsatisfactory also because it loses sight of its concrete
historical content.

232
 Analysis of t h e relation of idealism a n d religion is also essen­
tial b e c a u s e i t h e l p s c o m p r e h e n d t h e s t r u g g l e o f m a t e r i a l i s m
and idealism on a b r o a d e r plane as one of the most important
p h e n o m e n a of the intellectual history of mankind. T h e material­
ist c r i t i q u e o f i d e a l i s m i s i n t e g r a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e c r i t i q u e
of religion, and e x p o s u r e of the latter inevitably strikes ideal­
i s m a c r u s h i n g b l o w . I t w a s n o t b y c h a n c e , o f c o u r s e , t h a t all
t h e outstanding materialists of t h e past w e r e primarily critics
of religion and theology. Demokritos, Epicurus, Lucretius,
Hobbes, Spinoza, the eighteenth-century F r e n c h materialists,
a n d F e u e r b a c h , all t h e s e b r i l l i a n t s p o k e s m e n o f p r e - M a r x i a n
materialism, considered it their main job to expose the primary
s o u r c e o f idealism, a n d t o d e m o n s t r a t e that this p h i l o s o p h y , for
all its o v e r t d i f f e r e n c e s f r o m r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s , w a s i n e s s e n c e
inspired by them. 7

Idealism thus necessarily supplements, substantiates, conti­

nues, and modernises t h e religious mystification of reality.
But for idealism, religion w o u l d not find t h e spiritual f o r c e in
itself t o h e l p i t a d a p t t o e a c h n e w h i s t o r i c a l a g e , a n d t o s u r v i v e
i n a n y c l i m a t e , e v e n o n e v e r y u n f a v o u r a b l e f o r it. T h e r e a s o n
for this vitality of religion must n o t be r e d u c e d just to t h e m a t e ­
r i a l c o n d i t i o n s t h a t g i v e r i s e t o it. U n l i k e s c i e n c e , w h i c h e l i m i ­
nates subjectivity, religion, as M i t r o k h i n rightly r e m a r k s , is fed
by this subjectivity, and t h e r e f o r e functions
as a s p e c i a l f o r m of e x p r e s s i o n of illusory s o c i a l e x p e r i e n c e , a t t i t u d e
to t h e world, 'feeling', as a m e a n s of p e o p l e s 'inner' a d a p t a t i o n of e m o ­
tions a n d will t o t h e o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e i r e x i s t e n c e ( 1 8 5 : 4 4 ) .

B u t t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n o f religion i n e a c h n e w h i s t o r i c a l a g e ,
a n d its d e f e n c e a g a i n s t s c i e n c e , h o s t i l e t o it, a r e l a r g e l y r e a l i s e d
consciously, a n d not only, m o r e o v e r , by those for w h o m reli­
gious p r e a c h i n g has b e c o m e their professional activity, but also
in particular by those w h o a r e not directly c o n n e c t e d with
a religious cult a n d a r e s o m e t i m e s even irreligious, yet n e v e r t h e ­
less h e l p r e l i g i o n b y t h e i r idealist s p e c u l a t i o n s .

Marx's philosophical materialism alone has shown the proletariat t h e

way o u t o f t h e s p i r i t u a l s l a v e r y i n w h i c h all o p p r e s s e d classes h a v e
hitherto languished,

Lenin wrote (147:28). Those remarkable words sum up the

h i s t o r y o f m a t e r i a l i s m a n d its m o s t i m p o r t a n t r e s u l t , w h o s e
significance goes far beyond the realm of philosophy.

233
 2. Idealism vs Materialism.
Materialism vs Idealism.
Results and Prospects

Diogenes Laertius wrote:

A r i s t o x e n e s in his Historical Notes affirms t h a t P l a t o w i s h e d to b u r n
all t h e w r i t i n g s o f D e m o c r i t u s t h a t h e c o u l d c o l l e c t , b u t t h a t A m y c l a s a n d
Clinias the P y p h a g o r e a n s prevented him, saying that t h e r e was no ad­
v a n t a g e i n d o i n g so, for a l r e a d y t h e b o o k s w e r e w i d e l y c i r c u l a t e d . A n d
t h e r e i s c l e a r e v i d e n c e for this i n t h e f a c t t h a t P l a t o , w h o m e n t i o n s
a l m o s t all t h e e a r l y p h i l o s o p h e r s , n e v e r o n c e a l l u d e s t o D e m o c r i t u s , n o t
even w h e r e it would be necessary to c o n t r o v e r t him, obviously b e c a u s e
he knew that he would h a v e to m a t c h himself against the p r i n c e of
philosophers (42:II, 449:450).

T h a t story is most likely a l e g e n d but, as often h a p p e n s in histo­

r y , t h e l e g e n d p o i n t s e l o q u e n t l y to a fact, viz. t h e s t r u g g l e of
idealism against materialism in t h e age of the e m e r g e n c e of
these trends.
P l a t o really n e v e r did m e n t i o n D e m o k r i t o s , w h o s e w o r k s
could not h a v e been u n k n o w n to him. Guessing apart, one must
n o t e that P l a t o w a g e d a direct polemic against 'the line of D e ­
m o k r i t o s ' . I n t h e d i a l o g u e Sophist t h e s t r u g g l e b e t w e e n t h e t w o
trends in philosophy was mentioned. T h e supporters of one of
them asserted
t h a t only t h e t h i n g s w h i c h c a n b e t o u c h e d o r h a n d l e d h a v e b e i n g ,
b e c a u s e they define being (reality) and body as one, and if a n y o n e
else s a y s t h a t w h a t is not a b o d y exists t h e y a l t o g e t h e r d e s p i s e h i m , a n d
will h e a r o f n o o t h e r view ( 2 0 9 : 3 9 8 ) .

That trend, whose spokesmen Plato called awful people,

was opposed by those w h o categorically c o n t e n d e d that
t r u e r e a l i t y c o n s i s t s o f c e r t a i n intelligible a n d i n c o r p o r e a l I d e a s ; t h e
bodies of the Materialists, which by them a r e m a i n t a i n e d to be the
v e r y t r u t h , t h e y b r e a k u p i n t o little bits b y t h e i r a r g u m e n t s , a n d affirm
t h e m t o b e , not b e i n g , but g e n e r a t i o n a n d m o t i o n ( i b i d . ) .

P l a t o directly c o u n t e r p o s e d idealism to materialism. Even at

that stage of philosophical development the struggle between
materialism and idealism e m e r g e d as a theoretical dispute. It was
a m a t t e r of basic j u d g m e n t s a n d t h e c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t followed
from t h e m , of t h e interpretation of facts, and of t h e sense of
concepts; arguments were opposed by counter-arguments. That
is t h e historical c o u r s e of t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of philosophical
t h o u g h t a n d of t h e p r o b l e m a t i c of philosophy. I stress the
theoretical character of the dispute between materialism and
i d e a l i s m a s a c o u n t e r w e i g h t t o all t h e v u l g a r n o t i o n s still e x i s t i n g
in our day that they express opposing moral stances. 8

234
 T h e d i s p u t e b e t w e e n materialists a n d idealists differs essential­
ly, o f c o u r s e , f r o m t h e n o r m a l scientific d i s c u s s i o n b e t w e e n , s a y ,
a d h e r e n t s of t h e c o r p u s c u l a r t h e o r y of light a n d t h e i r o p p o n e n t s
w h o developed the w a v e hypothesis. In that discussion between
physicists b o t h s i d e s w e r e t o s o m e e x t e n t r i g h t . B u t t h a t , a f t e r all,
is not t h e g e n e r a l r u l e e v e n for scientific discussions. O n e
must therefore not oppose philosophical dispute and discussions
a m o n g scientists absolutely to o n e a n o t h e r ; in the o n e and t h e
other t h e r e is d e f e n c e of definite theoretical views that a r e
treated by their supporters as true, or approximately so.
Inquiry and argumentation are the main philosophical weap­
on of t h e disputing parties; and, as the history of philosophy
shows, critical r e m a r k s and expressions a r e usually t a k e n into
a c c o u n t , if not by t h e c r e a t o r of a g i v e n t h e o r y , t h e n by his
successors. But there is no c o n v e r g e n c e of the opposing views;
realisation of the sense of the opposite party's views leads to
a deepening of the opposition between the main philosophical
trends. Counterviews and the development and further substan­
tiation of one's o w n point of view follow, a n d this n a t u r a l l y
brings out the incompatibility of materialism and idealism. In
short the dispute between these philosophical trends, which
differs f r o m o r d i n a r y discussion in constantly l e a d i n g to a d e e p ­
ening and sharpening of the contradictions, has nothing in
c o m m o n with t h e kind of discussion in which the parties speak
different l a n g u a g e s or simply do not listen to o n e a n o t h e r . In
o t h e r w o r d s this is not a fruitless or u n p r o m i s i n g dispute, al­
t h o u g h the parties do not r e a c h a g r e e m e n t . B e c a u s e of it t h e r e
i s a p r o s p e c t o f its u l t i m a t e r e s o l u t i o n .
T h e position of principle in the dispute between material­
ism a n d i d e a l i s m m a k e s a r e l a t i o n o f c o n t i n u i t y p o s s i b l e b e t w e e n
t h e s e o p p o s i t e s , h o w e v e r a s t o n i s h i n g t h a t i s a t first g l a n c e .
T h e point is not, of c o u r s e , that t h e materialist adopts idealist
views or t h e idealist materialist ones. S u c h an eclectic version
of 'inheritance' presents no interest for the history of philosophy
s i n c e it d o e s not signify a d e v e l o p m e n t b u t r a t h e r a d e g r a d a t i o n
of p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h o u g h t . I h a v e s o m e t h i n g else in m i n d , of
course. Let me recall that the fathers of M a r x i s m w e r e t r u e
heirs of Hegel's dialectical idealism, t h o u g h their doctrine m e a n t
a very consistent negation of Hegelian idealism. As C h a l o y a n
has rightly said:
It is a l s o i m p o s s i b l e to i m a g i n e t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of p h i l o s o p h y w i t h o u t
t h e s u c c e s s i v e link b e t w e e n m a t e r i a l i s m a n d idealism.... L e t w e n o t b e
understood wrongly. H e r e I h a v e in mind t h e philosophical views of
idealists i n all t h e i r s c o p e a s w h o l e p h i l o s o p h i c a l s y s t e m s , a n d n o t t h e
p r i n c i p l e itself of idealism a f f i r m i n g t h e p r i m a c y of t h e ideal ( 3 4 : 3 4 ) .

235
in other words, materialism does not ignore t h e 'rational k e r ­
nel' contained in certain idealist conceptions. As for idealism,
it c a n n o t help taking into a c c o u n t those materialist propositions
that h a v e b e c o m e general scientific truths. It 'recognises' them by
r e w o r k i n g them idealistically. Such is t h e attitude of idealism not
only to certain materialist propositions but also to a considerable
part of the conclusions of natural science. Recall how H e r b e r t
S p e n c e r 'recognised' the truth of a n u m b e r of the basic p r o p o ­
sitions of classical physics (as I mentioned in t h e preceding
chapter).
In § 1 of this c h a p t e r I examined materialism and idealism
as opposites within a specific form of social consciousness.
Now I shall try to disclose the opposition of their theoretical
foundations. My angle differs substantially from the view that
materialism and idealism a r e incompatible in the main as regards
ideology. I h a v e already shown above, on the c o n t r a r y , that the
opposition between them also exists within the context of one
and the s a m e bourgeois ideology, a fact that brings out partic­
ularly clearly the significance in principle of t h e theoretical
dispute between materialism and idealism.
T h e c h a r a c t e r of the idealist critique of materialism is
determined in certain respects by the contradictions inherent
in idealism. Objective idealism, on the one hand, and subjective
idealism, on the other, put forward different, but equally ideal­
ist views against materialist philosophy. Objective idealism
admits the existence of a supersensory reality, while subjective
idealism as a rule denies t h e existence of such. Let us e x a m i n e
the basic a r g u m e n t s of the two varieties of idealism.
From t h e standpoint of objective idealism materialism ille­
gitimately reduces reality to sense-perceived and (directly or
indirectly) observed reality, so denying the higher, s u p r a n a t u r a l
reality that is discovered either by intellectual intuition, or by
irrational vision, or finally by ' p u r e ' thought based on a priori
principles. Materialism is depicted as a limited empiricism that
clearly underestimates the highest cognitive potentials of the
h u m a n mind. Lenz, for example, w h o is close to Neothomism,
asserts:
Just as in the child's mental ontogenetic development interest is turned
first to external nature, and indeed to the question of what things are
made of, so it also is in mankind's phylogenetic development. It turns
to the graspable and sense-perceived, asking what their matter (sub­
stance) is and what their material cause (148:36).

T h e idealist is ready to admit only a historical justification for

materialism. As for t h e materialist philosophy of modern

236
t i m e s , i d e a l i s m t r e a t s it as i n t e l l e c t u a l infantilism.
T h e e v a l u a t i o n o f m a t e r i a l i s m b y a n o t h e r o b j e c t i v e idealist,
Paulsen, seems m o r e interesting to me. Materialism, he wrote,
is after all nothing else than making an absolute of physics by eliminat­
ing the spiritual or, consequently, allegedly reducing the spiritual to
physiological processes, or simply to chance, 'subjective' epiphenomena
of motions (202:394-395).

H e h a d i n m i n d , w h e n s p e a k i n g o f p h y s i c s , all t h e s c i e n c e s o f
n a t u r e . He therefore considered t h e reduction of t h e spiritual
to t h e physiological, ascribed by him to materialism, as a physical
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of r e a l i t y . M a t e r i a l i s m , c o n s e q u e n t l y , l a c k e d a
m e t a p h y s i c a l view o f t h e w o r l d . I n o t h e r w o r d s , m a t e r i a l i s m
r e j e c t e d t h e v i e w o f o b j e c t i v e idealism. P a u l s e n t h e r e f o r e a l s o
c l a i m e d t h a t m a t e r i a l i s m flourished in ' t h e l o w e r levels of s p i r i t ­
ual life' ( 2 0 2 : 3 9 5 ) . L i k e m o s t b o u r g e o i s p h i l o s o p h e r s o f t h e
b e g i n n i n g of t h e c e n t u r y , he h a d n o t t h e slightest i d e a of dialec-
tical m a t e r i a l i s m . T h e w h o l e of his a r g u m e n t in p r i n c i p l e
e x c l u d e d a d m i s s i o n of t h e possibility of a m a t e r i a l i s t p h i l o s o p h y
such as would disclose t h e wealth of t h e spiritual, starting from
a m a t e r i a l i s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g of social life. F o r h i m , m a t e r i a l i s m
w a s simply an a b s o l u t i s i n g of t h e scientific u n d e r s t a n d i n g of
nature. 9

It is n o t difficult to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e u n s o u n d n e s s of this
appraisal of materialism even in r e g a r d to mechanistic material­
ism; t h e l a t t e r a p p l i e d t h e m e t h o d s o f m e c h a n i c s t o p h e n o m e n a
t h a t m e c h a n i c s h a d n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h . Its s p o k e s m e n , u n l i k e
the natural philosophers of antiquity, w e r e interested in h u m a n
life, w h i l e t r e a t i n g n a t u r e ( w h i c h t h e y c o m p r e h e n d e d i n t h e
spirit of t h e s c i e n c e of t h e i r d a y ) as t h e n a t u r a l basis of m e n ' s
life, c r i t i c i s i n g t h e o l o g y a n d s p e c u l a t i v e m e t a p h y s i c s in t h a t
c o n n e c t i o n . E v e n a h i s t o r i a n of p h i l o s o p h y as r e m o t e f r o m
scientific o b j e c t i v i t y a s L a n g e w a s c o m p e l l e d t o a d m i t t h a t t h e
p r o b l e m of m a n w a s t h e c e n t r e of a t t e n t i o n of t h e m a t e r i a l i s t s
of m o d e r n t i m e s .
T h r o u g h o u t the history of materialism [he wrote] there runs the
definite defect that the cosmic questions little by little lose interest, while
the anthropological ones provoke disputes of ever greater fervour
(133:391).

O n e cannot, of course, a g r e e that interest in t h e problematic of

h u m a n life g r e w at t h e e x p e n s e of a loss of i n t e r e s t in n a t u r e
as a w h o l e . B u t it is t r u e t h a t it is t h e m a t e r i a l i s m of m o d e r n
times that played the leading role in t h e theoretical substantia­
t i o n of h u m a n i s m .
O n e o b j e c t i v e idealist t h u s sees a prescientific view in m a -

237
terialism, a n d a n o t h e r ascribes to it an e x t r a p o l a t i o n of a ' o n e ­
sided' n a t u r a l - s c i e n c e view to e v e r y t h i n g that exists. Both these
evaluations, in spite of t h e obvious difference, a r e similar in one
r e s p e c t , viz., m a t e r i a l i s m i s s a i d t o p a y t o o m u c h a t t e n t i o n t o
experience, is inordinately b o u n d up with the earthly, and
ignores the mystic and transcendental not f a t h o m a b l e by scien­
tific m e a n s . T h e o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s t a g r e e s w i t h m a t e r i a l i s m t h a t
n a t u r e , t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d , a n d t h e universum e x i s t i n d e p e n d ­
e n t l y o f human c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h o u g h t , a n d w i l l . B u t h e i n t e r ­
prets the spiritual as s u p e r h u m a n and supernatural.
S u b j e c t i v e idealism, u n l i k e objective, usually figures as idealist
empiricism and ascribes an unsubstantiated departure beyond
e x p e r i e n c e to materialism, and the assumption of a supersensory
reality. F r o m that angle materialism repeals the error of objec­
tive idealism, no m a t t e r h o w it interprets this allegedly supersen­
s o r y reality. M a t t e r , t h e s u b j e c t i v e idealist claims, is not an object
of s e n s e p e r c e p t i o n ; it is a s p e c u l a t i v e e s s e n c e w h o s e e x i s t e n c e
is not confirmed by the e v i d e n c e of e x p e r i e n c e .
Idealist e m p i r i c i s m c o u n t e r p o s e s t o t h e materialist u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g of objective reality a n o m i n a l i s t c r i t i q u e of c a t e g o r i e s ,
which are interpreted simply as collective names, symbols of
a sort, and g r a m m a t i c a l forms. An ontologisation of c o n c e p t s
and abstractions (causality, necessity, regularity, etc.) is ascribed
to materialism. It c o n s e q u e n t l y is presented as idealism. T h e
e x t r e m e e x p r e s s i o n of this allegedly realist position is t h e asser­
tion that t h e c o n c e p t of m a t t e r as reality i n d e p e n d e n t of a n y
e x p e r i e n c e in no w a y differs from t h e religious notion of G o d .
This sophism, long a g o expressed by Machists, has b e c o m e a
g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d positivist a r g u m e n t against m a t e r i a l i s m . 1 0

A p a r a d o x i c a l f e a t u r e of t h e latest subjective-idealist. a n d
agnostic critique of materialism is the appeal to everyday
experience and science. Both these forms of knowledge are
treated as i n c o m p a t i b l e with t h e materialist d o c t r i n e of objective
r e a l i t y a n d its r e f l e c t i o n i n c o n s c i o u s n e s s . M a t e r i a l i s m i s a c c u s e d
of ignoring m a n k i n d ' s e v e r y d a y e x p e r i e n c e and not being in
a c c o r d with science, which allegedly confirms t h e p h e n o m e n a l i s t
view of reality. Objective idealism opposes this subjective-idealist
a r g u m e n t a t i o n and rejects t h e subjectivist critique of material­
i s m , e n d e a v o u r i n g t o p r o v e t h a t its b a s i c f a u l t i s a n u n c r i t i c a l
attitude to e v e r y d a y e x p e r i e n c e , neglect of t h e specific n a t u r e
of the philosophical form of knowledge, and substitution of the
scientific d e s c r i p t i o n of reality for p h i l o s o p h y . It b e c o m e s
evident, h o w e v e r , that both subjective and objective idealism a r e
far from a correct understanding of the relation between every-

238
day e x p e r i e n c e and science. T h e y do not see what they a g r e e
on and in what, on the c o n t r a r y , they contradict each other.
Everyday, spontaneously formed e x p e r i e n c e says that t h e r e
is a world of p h e n o m e n a outside and independent of t h e mind
that is perceived by our sense organs, puts up a certain resist­
a n c e to our actions, discovers properties independent of our
mind and will that must be r e c k o n e d with in order to orientate
ourselves in t h e e n v i r o n m e n t and m a k e use of things for our
own ends, etc. E v e r y d a y e x p e r i e n c e is by no m e a n s evidence
that all p h e n o m e n a a r e perceivable by our senses. On t h e
c o n t r a r y , it follows from the content of this experience, enriched
in t h e c o u r s e of h u m a n life, that a host of p h e n o m e n a previously
u n k n o w n to us, later b e c o m e objects of our observation. T h a t
these p h e n o m e n a existed even when they had not been perceived
by us, t h e r e is not t h e least doubt for everyday experience. It
is open to facts u n k n o w n to it, and this essential c h a r a c t e r ­
istic of it is unacceptable in principle to subjective idealism,
which claims that the existence of something else independent
of e x p e r i e n c e in no way follows from t h e latter.
Objective idealism does not often dispute t h e subjectivist
interpretation of everyday experience, but asserts that supporters
of phenomenalism do not want to note the subjectivity of the
content of this experience. A fundamental underestimation of
everyday e x p e r i e n c e is thus characteristic of both versions of
idealism. This fault of idealism is revealed by t h e materialist
critique of it, which recognises that everyday e x p e r i e n c e has
a content whose objectivity is constantly being revealed by
inquiry and practical activity.
Lenin stressed that everyday experience, for all its 'naivety',
formed the solid foundation of materialist philosophy: 'material­
ism deliberately makes the " n a i v e " belief of mankind t h e foun­
dation of its theory of knowledge' (142:56). Science also starts
11

from facts that are constantly confirmed by life and are contained
in everyday experience. Does that mean that the materialist
philosopher and natural scientist treat everyday e x p e r i e n c e
uncritically? Of course not. T h e y analyse its content critically.
T h e data of everyday e x p e r i e n c e a r e not the result of inquiry,
but a r e formed from sense perceptions that mainly reflect man's
direct relation to t h e objects a r o u n d him. Everyday e x p e r i e n c e
establishes the existence of objects, some of their properties
and features, and so also t h e difference between the objective
and the subjective. Science often comes into conflict with everyday
experience, but t h e scientific dispute with it as a rule affects
matters in which t h e latter has no voice. F r o m t h e standpoint

239
of everyday experience, for instance, light is propagated 'instant­
ly'; that was also t h e conviction of physicists until they succeeded
in m e a s u r i n g its velocity. Science corrects everyday e x p e r i e n c e
but the corrections do not affect t h e basic world-outlook content
of t h e latter. Science sometimes throws doubts on the existence
of a p h e n o m e n o n about which t h e r e a r e notions in everyday
experience. Research may conclusively d e m o n s t r a t e that this
p h e n o m e n o n does not exist, but the proof itself establishes the
existence of other p h e n o m e n a outside and independent of the
mind. Science has discovered a host of p h e n o m e n a i n c o m p r e ­
hensible to everyday e x p e r i e n c e and so has not only confirmed
the truth of the concept 'objective reality' but also enormously
extended its content.
F r o m the standpoint of special scientific inquiry the data of
everyday e x p e r i e n c e a r e evidence which, like any evidence,
calls for comparison with other evidence, testing, and confirma­
tion. But the s a m e has to be said of the facts established by
research, i.e. those facts about which everyday, inevitably limit­
ed e x p e r i e n c e knows nothing. Nevertheless science c o m p a r e s
these 'superexperiential' facts discovered by research with the
' c r u d e ' data that ordinary e x p e r i e n c e disposes of. T h a t must not
be understood in t h e sense that the data of everyday e x p e r i e n c e
play t h e role of the criterion of reality. T h e point is r a t h e r that
scientific understanding of facts inaccessible to everyday e x p e ­
rience is usually achieved when it succeeds in finding the steps
that lead from the special results of research to everyday experi­
ence. T h e r e a r e quite a few conditions, Heisenberg pointed out,
when 'the possibility of a description in ordinary l a n g u a g e is also
a criterion for t h e d e g r e e of understanding reached in the field
concerned' (98:140).
O r d i n a r y language is t h e language of everyday experience,
which constantly confirms the materialist understanding of the
world. This everyday experience, consequently, also 'works' in
science when it is dealing with objects not c o m p r e h e n d e d by it.
And idealism, which has c o n c e r n e d itself for centuries with
discrediting everyday experience, has been compelled in the end
to r e - e x a m i n e its own position.
Idealist propositions h a v e usually been 'substantiated' in our
d a y by references to everyday experience. Idealism now often
gives itself a testimonial as t h e philosophy of immediate experi­
ence. As the American idealist philosopher Newell says: 'philo­
sophy must begin or take its starling-point in t h e c o m m o n
sense view of the world' ( 1 9 2 : 1 3 1 ) . This striving to base itself
on t h e evidence of o r d i n a r y consciousness, which used to be

240
treated as 'vulgar', illusory, and anti-philosophical, is partial
recognition by idealism of its own defeat. T h a t is also evidenced
by a n o t h e r tendency, viz., the striving to develop 'scientific
idealism', and a 'philosophy of science', i.e. to construct an ideal­
ist system of views by w a y of a c o r r e s p o n d i n g interpretation
of scientific data.
A traditional a r g u m e n t of the idealist critique of materialism
is to assert that m a t t e r is no m o r e t h a n t h e material formed by
immaterial, creative activity. In rejecting t h e rational tendencies
of the mechanistic explanation of p h e n o m e n a , idealism in fact
took over the vulnerable point of mechanism, a c c o r d i n g to
which motion was t h e result of e x t e r n a l action on a body. At
the time, while the supporters of mechanistic materialism
usually r e n o u n c e d this limited notion when speaking of n a t u r e
as a whole, idealism universalised it, separating motion from
matter and interpreting the latter as an essence inert by its
nature.
An outstanding contribution of e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y m e c h a n i s ­
tic materialism was to refute this idealist-mechanistic conception
and systematically to develop a scientific-philosophical proposi­
tion about t h e unity of motion and matter. Joseph Priestley, w h o
aspired to apply the principles of N e w t o n i a n m e c h a n i c s to
philosophy, went further t h a n N e w t o n , however, in his u n d e r ­
standing of matter. N e w t o n said that force of attraction was
also an attribute of matter, in addition to extension (which t h e
Cartesians considered its sole a t t r i b u t e ) . Newton treated r e p u l ­
sion, of course, as an external force acting on matter. Priestley,
however, suggested that repulsion was as inherent in matter as
attraction. 'I t h e r e f o r e define it [i.e. m a t t e r — Т . О . ] to be a
substance possessed of the property of extension, and of powers
of attraction or repulsion' (216:ii). Matter, he said, must not be
identified with density for the simple reason that it was not
necessary to multiply the n u m b e r of its attributes needlessly.
T h e differences in density or mass characteristics of various
substances could be wholly explained by action of the forces of
attraction and repulsion. Substances having a larger specific
gravity a r e formed as a result of p r e v a l e n c e of attraction over
repulsion. T h o s e properties of matter (inertia, impenetrability,
mass, etc.) which were indicated to substantiate the thesis of t h e
passivity of matter w e r e neither p r i m a r y nor immutable, a c c o r d ­
ing to Priestley. In that c o n n e c t i o n he voiced a n u m b e r of
profound philosophical and scientific propositions. He rejected
the assumption of indivisible, absolutely dense atoms, since such
a proposition multiplied the n u m b e r of premisses accepted

16-01603 241
w i t h o u t p r o o f . All e x t e n s i o n w a s d i v i s i b l e , ' t h i s s o l i d a t o m m u s t
b e divisible, a n d t h e r e f o r e h a v e p a r t s ' ( 2 1 6 : 1 2 ) . T h e e x i s t e n c e
of r e p u l s i o n t o g e t h e r with a t t r a c t i o n e x c l u d e d t h e possibility
o f a b s o l u t e d e n s i t y just a s a w h o l e w i t h o u t p a r t s .
N e w t o n , we recall, d e f e n d e d a thesis of t h e e x i s t e n c e of
absolutely solid primitive particles
incomparably h a r d e r than any porous bodies c o m p o u n d e d of them;
even so very h a r d as never to wear or break in pieces; no o r d i n a r y
power being able to divide what God himself made one in the first
creation. While the particles c o n t i n u e entire, they may compose bodies
of one and the s a m e n a t u r e and t e x t u r e in all ages; but should they
wear away, or b r e a k in pieces, the n a t u r e of things depending on them
would be c h a n g e d ( 1 9 3 : 5 4 1 ) .

T h a t view has a clearly metaphysical c h a r a c t e r .

Priestley c a m e close to the p r e s e n t - d a y notion of the possible
density of m a t t e r when he voiced the proposition that
all the solid matter in the solar system might be contained within a nut­
shell, there is so great a proportion of void space within the substance
of the most solid bodies ( 2 1 6 : 2 2 ) .
W h e n we r e m e m b e r that Locke reduced matter (bodies) to
density, these ideas u n d o u b t e d l y m a r k a significant a d v a n c e in
the d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e scientific and p h i l o s o p h i c a l u n d e r s t a n d ­
ing of the unity of motion a n d m a t t e r . 1 2

P r i e s t l e y w a s well a w a r e o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f his p r o p o s i ­
tions for refuting the theological a n d idealist notions d o m i n a n t
in h i s d a y .
I hope [he wrote] we shall not consider matter with that contempt and
disgust with which it has generally been t r e a t e d ; — t h e r e being nothing
in its real n a t u r e that can justify such sentiments respecting it ( 2 1 6 : 4 4 ) .
T h e subsequent d e v e l o p m e n t of science, and in particular of
physics, chemistry, and biology, enriched the materialist
understanding of nature by such discoveries and arguments
as neither Priestley nor o t h e r scientists of the eighteenth
c e n t u r y h a d e v e n t h e foggiest n o t i o n s a b o u t . M u c h i n t h e
mechanistic c o n c e p t i o n of the self-motion of matter n o w
a p p e a r s n a i v e , b u t its b a s i c m a t e r i a l i s t i d e a h a s b e c o m e e v e r
weightier and more convincing in our day.
M a t t e r h a s p r o v e d t o b e m u c h m o r e c o m p l e x , a n d its
motion incomparably m o r e diverse, than was imagined by eigh­
t e e n t h - c e n t u r y materialism. And that does not refute but c o n ­
f i r m s its m o s t i m p o r t a n t i d e a s . T h e i d e a l i s t n o t i o n o f t h e a b s o l u t e
o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n l i v i n g a n d ' d e a d ' m a t t e r h a s c o l l a p s e d . Its
unsoundness has been demonstrated by modern chemistry and
biology. But t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r e m i s s e s of this n o t i o n w e r e

242
refuted by the materialist philosophy of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.
T h e t h e o r y of relativity, which has shown that the energy
i n h e r e n t in m a t t e r is equivalent to its mass, has finally over­
t h r o w n t h e idealist conception of inert matter, a c c o r d i n g to
which the essence of m a t t e r consists in the resistance it
puts up to an effect. Discovery of intra-atomic energy, whose
existence was essentially indicated by Einstein's famous f o r m u ­
la, was evidence in practice of the truth of the materialist
view of m a t t e r and its forms of motion and their
interconversion. T h e fallacy of t h e absolute opposing of energy
to matter, on which Ostwald constructed his idealist n a t u r a l
philosophy, b e c a m e obvious. And the efforts, characteristic of
objective idealism, to treat life, in p a r t i c u l a r psychic p h e n o m e n a ,
as processes that w e r e only outwardly linked with physico-
chemical laws, but in no way determined by them, also
proved unsound. T h e advances of chemistry, biochemistry,
molecular biology, and genetics, and t h e discoveries of c y b e r n e ­
tics, which h a v e t h r o w n light on the general patterns of
the purposive b e h a v i o u r of living systems,—all this has con­
vincingly refuted t h e idealist conception of the absolute irreduci­
bility of the spiritual to material processes. But it is that
conception which forms one of the principal a r g u m e n t s of
idealism in our day too. For, since the theological and spe­
culative metaphysical notions of a s u p e r n a t u r a l , substantial
reality h a v e become obsolete, idealism has had to resort
m o r e and m o r e to an indirect substantiation of its initial
positions. In place of direct assertion of the primacy of
the spiritual it has quite often put a negative a r g u m e n t : viz.,
the spiritual is absolutely irreducible to the material.
Idealism has never gone in for a c o n c r e t e epistemological
exploration of the theoretical p r o c e d u r e of reduction. It
has also not investigated the question of the relation of this
cognitive p r o c e d u r e to objective processes. Does it describe
the latter to some extent, or is it a purely formal technique?
Reduction of the spiritual to t h e material is treated in an
oversimplified way, viz., as denial of the specific n a t u r e and even
reality of the spiritual. And materialism is correspondingly
defined as a d o c t r i n e that admits the reality only of m a t t e r . 13

But the theoretical p r o c e d u r e of reduction n e v e r eliminates the

reality of what is being reduced. Obviously nothing can be
reduced to something else without a residue. T h e failure of the
reductionist attempts m a d e by neopositivists is particularly indi­
cative in that respect. T h e y were ultimately compelled to

243
r e c o g n i s e t h a t t h e t h e o r e t i c a l , i n s p i t e o f its e m p i r i c a l o r i g i n , i s
n o t r e d u c i b l e , a t least fully, t o s e n s e d a t a . B u t t h a t d o e s n o t
belittle the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l significance of the p r o c e d u r e of
r e d u c t i o n i n r e s e a r c h , a l t h o u g h i t limits its o b j e c t i v e p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,
of c o u r s e , to definite c o n t e x t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e specific n a t u r e of
t h e p h e n o m e n a s t u d i e d , t h e i r level o f d e v e l o p m e n t , e t c . I t i s o n e
t h i n g to r e d u c e a p r o p e r t y like irritability i n h e r e n t in e v e r y ­
t h i n g living to c e r t a i n m a t e r i a l p r o c e s s e s a n d relations, a n d
a n o t h e r m a t t e r t o r e d u c e t h e o r e t i c a l t h i n k i n g t o its b a s i s . B u t
w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e b a s i s o f t h e o r e t i c a l t h o u g h t ? I t h a s a t least
three: the physiological process, social practice, a n d objective
r e a l i t y a s t h e o b j e c t o f t h i n k i n g . H e n c e i t i s c l e a r w h a t difficulties
a scientific a t t e m p t to r e d u c e the spiritual to t h e m a t e r i a l (within
c e r t a i n limits, o f c o u r s e ) c o m e s u p a g a i n s t . T h e s e d i f f i c u l t i e s
a r e literally life-savers for idealism.
R e d u c t i o n is possible as an o p e r a t i o n effected by t h e o r y only
insofar as t h e r e is a unity of w h a t is b e i n g r e d u c e d with w h a t
it is r e d u c e d to. U n i t y of t h e p s y c h i c a n d p h y s i o l o g i c a l , of t h e
ideal a n d t h e r e a l , t h e s u b j e c t i v e a n d t h e o b j e c t i v e , e n a b l e s t h e
o n e to be reduced to the other, but the process of d e v e l o p m e n t
as a result of which the psychic; ideal, a n d subjective arise
c o n s t i t u t e s t h e limit o f t h i s r e d u c t i o n . T h e d e v e l o p m e n t i s i r ­
reversible, so that the b o u n d a r y of possible reduction is inerad­
i c a b l e , just a s t h e d i a l e c t i c o f o p p o s i t e s ( i n c l u d i n g t h e i r i n t e r -
conversion) constantly reproduces the differences between
t h e m . S i n c e the spiritual a r o s e from t h e m a t e r i a l as a specific
p r o d u c t of the latter's d e v e l o p m e n t , it c a n n o t be wholly r e d u c e d
to t h e m a t e r i a l . But, in spite of idealists' beliefs, that in no w a y
p r o v e s t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f t h e s p i r i t u a l f r o m t h e m a t e r i a l , let
a l o n e the primacy of the spiritual.
It h a p p e n s that a p r i n c i p a l a r g u m e n t of c o n t e m p o r a r y i d e a l ­
ism is t u r n e d a g a i n s t itself, viz.. t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y of complete
reduction of the spiritual to the material ( w h e n , of course,
that impossibility is c o n c r e t e l y g r a s p e d a n d c o m p a r e d with
e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s p o s s i b l e a n d r e a l l y t a k e s p l a c e , i.e. t h e u n i t y
of the spiritual and material by virtue of which psychic processes
are governed by physiological, biochemical, and other laws),
is e v i d e n c e in f a v o u r of the materialist u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the
spiritual, in particular of the dialectical-materialist u n d e r s t a n d ­
i n g it.
Idealism's negative a r g u m e n t s ultimately proved as unsound
a s its ' p o s i t i v e ' o n e s , b u t o n e m u s t n o t , i n c i d e n t a l l y , e x a g g e r a t e
the difference b e t w e e n t h e m . F o r the thesis of the inertness of
m a t t e r was essentially a negative a r g u m e n t based mainly on t h e

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absence of concrete knowledge about the inner energy inherent
in m a t t e r .
N o t m o r e t h a n a h u n d r e d y e a r s a g o idealism still m a d e it
a r e q u i r e m e n t to r e c o g n i s e , realise, a n d fully a p p r e c i a t e t h e
initial reality a n d a b s o l u t e s o v e r e i g n t y of t h e s p i r i t u a l , a n d to
u n d e r s t a n d it as a r e a l i t y rising a b o v e all t h a t exists in t i m e a n d
s p a c e . Idealists r e p r o a c h e d m a t e r i a l i s t s with a n u n f o r g i v a b l e
belittling of t h e s p i r i t u a l , r a t i o n a l , a n d ideal. M a t e r i a l i s m , t h e y
said, killed r e a s o n , t r e a t i n g it as s o m e t h i n g t h a t w a s b o r n a n d
died t o g e t h e r with h u m a n flesh. R e a s o n did not k n o w d e a t h ,
they a r g u e d , b e c a u s e it had no r e l a t i o n with t h e f e a t u r e s of t h e
h u m a n individual that were peculiar to it alone. T h e brain was
s u r e l y only t h e seat of r e a s o n , w h i c h w a s essentially i n d e p e n d e n t
of a n y of its c o n v o l u t i o n s , t h e p r e s e n c e of p h o s p h o r u s in its
tissues, e t c .
I d e a l i s m , of c o u r s e oversimplified t h e m a t e r i a l i s t u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g of the s p i r i t u a l , or r a t h e r c o n s i d e r e d its most a d e q u a t e
expression the standpoint of vulgar materialism, which actually
did identify t h e p s y c h i c with t h e p h y s i o l o g i c a l . But m a t e r i a l i s t s
themselves opposed vulgar materialism, as we know. W h e n
F e u e r b a c h w a s criticising idealism, h e dissociated himself f r o m
vulgar materialism:
T h e mind or spirit is the highest in man, to be sure: it is the nobleness
of mankind, the feature that distinguishes them from animals: but the
human first is still not therefore the natural first, the first by nature.
On the contrary, the highest, the most perfect, is the last, the latest.
To make mind or spirit the beginning, the source or origin, is therefore
an inversion of the natural order (58:175).

P r e - M a r x i a n m a t e r i a l i s m must t h u s not be t r e a t e d as a
d o c t r i n e t h a t t u r n e d o u t t o b e totally u n a b l e t o g r a s p t h e specific
of t h e s p i r i t u a l . It m a d e an essential c o n t r i b u t i o n to u n d e r s t a n d ­
ing of t h e spiritual by its fight against mystification a n d idolising
of t h e l a t t e r , by its t h e o r y of effects a n d d o c t r i n e of t h e c o g n i t i v e
significance o f s e n s u o u s activity. T h a t m a t e r i a l i s m s h o w e d t h e
idealist n o t i o n s of w o r l d r e a s o n , w o r l d spirit, a n d w o r l d will to be
based essentially on n o t i o n s of h u m a n r e a s o n , c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,
a n d will that w e r e d i v o r c e d f r o m m a n , w h i c h m e a n t d e s t r u c t i o n
of t h e i r real c o n t e n t , o r i g i n a l i t y , a n d subjectivity. It was no
a c c i d e n t t h e r e f o r e that t h e fight of t h e m a t e r i a l i s t s of t h e s e v e n ­
teenth and eighteenth centuries against speculative metaphysics
d e v e l o p e d into a r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of h u m a n s e n s u a l i t y a n d m a n in
general.
F e u e r b a c h t r u l y c a u g h t t h e e s s e n c e of t h e basic idealist
a r g u m e n t , viz., that r e a s o n c a n n o t arise f r o m t h e i r r a t i o n a l ,

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and the purposive from a spontaneous, elemental material
process, the highest from the lowest, the spiritual from the
material. T h a t a r g u m e n t , to which Neothomism adduces fund­
amental i m p o r t a n c e , is essentially traditional in the history of
idealism. It is an ontological interpretation of the feature of the
process of cognition that M a r x defined by the following
aphorism: ' T h e a n a t o m y of man is a key to the anatomy of the
ape' ( 1 7 0 : 4 2 ) . But no one concludes from this truth that the
ape originated from man. Idealism, however, in fact, chooses
this false path of speculation. Against the facts Hegel claimed
that the 'highest organism ... presents us in general with a
universal type, and it is only in and from this type that we can
ascertain and explain the meaning of the undeveloped organism'
14
(88:357). T h e fact of a purposive relation in a certain field
of natural p h e n o m e n a was thus interpreted as discovery of the
highest spiritual instance that established it.
In our day science has compelled idealism to r e ­ e x a m i n e
its traditional conceptions, and sometimes even to reject them.
In that connection t h r e e tendencies take p r e f e r e n c e in c o n t e m ­
p o r a r y idealist philosophy. T h e first is a striving to preserve the
traditional ontological and natural philosophical domain, sup­
plementing and transforming it in the spirit of the r e q u i r e m e n t s
of modern science. T h i s tendency finds expression in Neothomist
philosophy.
T h e second tendency is associated with denial of ontology
and the possibility of a philosophical d o c t r i n e of the external
world in general. T h e third tendency consists in reducing the
subject­matter of philosophy to anthropological problems.
Analysis of all these tendencies brings out the general defeat
of idealism. Let me cite a few examples.
Neothomism, of course, cannot reject the thesis of the sub­
stantiality of the spirit, or the d o g m a of the creation of each
h u m a n soul by God. Yet it reconstructs its doctrine of the
psychic, including an admission in it of certain facts established
by science. T h e s e confirm only the materialist understanding
of the psychic, but Neothomism interprets them as compatible
with idealism. According to Z a r a g ü e t a Bengoechea, for instance,
the fact is that the processes that take place in it (the body—Т.О.) on
the one hand condition those of my consciousness, and on the other
hand are conditioned by it (266:106).
From this standpoint consciousness and physiological processes
form mutually interacting aspects of h u m a n life. But the N e o ­
thomist retains the traditional formula: ' T h e soul is the s u b ­
stantial form of a living, organised body', supplementing that by

246
a forced recognition that the n e r v o u s system 'conditions in t u r n
t h e c o u r s e o f m e n t a l activity' ( 2 6 6 : 1 1 3 ) . T h e s e r e s e r v a t i o n s
i l l u s t r a t e t h e a t t e m p t s o f N e o t h o m i s t s t o soften t h e spiritualist
c o n c e p t i o n , a n d t o ' a c c o r d ' i t with t h e f a c t s e s t a b l i s h e d b y
science. T h e c o n c o r d a n c e is purely verbal, of course, because
t h e r e c a n n o t be a r e a l l y scientific u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e p s y c h i c if
m a t e r i a l i s m is r e j e c t e d b e c a u s e it ' d o e s n o t a d m i t t h e s o u l , in
o r d e r not to recognise a consciousness distinct from the organism
and mental or psychic p h e n o m e n a that a r e irreducible to
corporeal or physiological ones' (266:111).
T h e idealist ' a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t ' o f scientific f a c t s s t a r t s
f r o m a false p r e m i s s a b o u t t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f t h e f u n d a m e n t a l
p r o p o s i t i o n s o f i d e a l i s m f r o m scientific k n o w l e d g e . T h e ' a g r e e ­
m e n t ' with s c i e n c e consists o n l y in an idealist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
o f its p r o p o s i t i o n s . N e o t h o m i s m r e g a r d s t h e a p p e a l t o scientific
d a t a as a m e a n s of i l l u s t r a t i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s
i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e s e facts. T h a t i s w h y , w h i l e a g r e e i n g
with s c i e n c e , w h i c h affirms t h a t m a t t e r g e n e r a t e s s u c h a specific
f o r m of its e x i s t e n c e as life in t h e c o u r s e of its e v o l u t i o n ,
t h e N e o t h o m i s t specifies: if t h a t is p l e a s i n g to G o d . W i t h t h a t
a p p r o a c h , t h e o r i g i n o f life, c o n s c i o u s n e s s , a n d t h o u g h t a r e
t r e a t e d a s g r e a t e r e v i d e n c e o f t h e o m n i p o t e n c e o f t h e divinity.
T h e French Neothomist Lelotte declared:
God gave (matter) the necessary virtualities so that, surrendered
to itself in special conditions of constitution, temperature, e t c , ... it
could become animated (139:19).

F o r c o n c l u s i o n s of that kind t h e r e is no n e e d , c l e a r l y , to go
i n t o t h e c o n t e n t of scientific d i s c o v e r i e s .
T h e Neothomist ascribes investigation of the processes of
divine creation to natural science. Darwinism, which was
c o n d e m n e d in t h e past as c o n t r a d i c t i n g Biblical t r u t h s , is n o w
r e c o g n i s e d as a w h o l l y l e g i t i m a t e h y p o t h e s i s w h i c h , in t h e
words of J a c q u e s Maritain,
presupposes the transcendent God as the first cause of evolution
—keeping in existence the things created and the spirit present in them,
moving them from above so that the higher forms can emerge
from the lower ones (163:25).

Idealist p r o p o s i t i o n s used t o b e cited a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h

lower forms were incapable of generating higher ones.
Neothomism makes the formula of creationism m o r e precise:
the h i g h e r c a n a r i s e f r o m t h e l o w e r b y will o f G o d .
W h e n D u n s Scotus asserted that matter acquired the faculty
of t h i n k i n g if G o d so willed it, t h a t s t a t e m e n t p a v e d t h e w a y to
materialism. But times h a v e changed, a n d in the twentieth

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century Neothomists grab at this argument to save idealism.
In contrast to the Neothomists, the supporters of subjectivist-
agnostic doctrines reduce ontological problems to logical ones, 15

or reject them altogether. Some suggest that they are essentially

pseudo-problems, others argue that they all passed out of the
competence of philosophy long ago and became the subject-
matter of special sciences.. This last argument is particularly
popular with those idealists who seek a way of excluding the
dilemma that constitutes the content of the basic philosophical
question. Those who take this approach claim that philosophy
does not dispose of methods of inquiry available in the special
sciences, and therefore cannot occupy itself with the extremely
special problem, i.e. the relation of the psychic to the physical.
T h a t line of argument clearly confuses two essentially different
things, viz., the philosophical, materialist or idealist answer to the
basic philosophical question and special study of the diversity,
forms, and levels of development of the psychic, which differ
qualitatively from each other, and presuppose study of the phy­
siology of higher nervous activity, including its pathological
states.
Materialism relies on special investigations, comprehending
them, drawing conclusions for itself, and at the same time
stimulating these inquiries without claiming to anticipate their
final results. But the materialist answer to the basic philosophical
question took shape historically as a theoretical comprehension
of social practice and everyday human experience. That is
why this answer became possible well before natural science
began to investigate the 'spiritual-material' relation.
Lenin differentiated the philosophical and special-science
understanding of space and time, matter, causality, etc. That
must be borne in mind too, when the psychophysical problem
and its separate aspects are tackled. Plekhanov cited the Neo­
kantian Lange, who claimed (in his History of Materialism,
p. 653) that 'materialism is constantly faced with the insur­
mountable obstacle of explaining how conscious sensation can
arise from material motion' (cited from 210:593). It will
readily be understood that Lange was demanding an answer
from materialism to problems facing the special sciences. T h e
materialist, when answering that kind of argument, of course
does not fail to stress that idealism is not able to explain the
origin of consciousness, while its discourse on the origin
of matter explains nothing. Without mitigating the significance
of this counter-argument, one must, all the same, point out
the difference in the standpoint of philosophical materialism

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from the a p p r o a c h of the natural sciences. P l e k h a n o v did just
that:
m a t e r i a l i s t s h a v e n e v e r p r o m i s e d t o a n s w e r this q u e s t i o n . T h e y a s s e r t
o n l y ... t h a t a p a r t f r o m s u b s t a n c e p o s s e s s i n g e x t e n s i o n t h e r e i s n o o t h e r
t h i n k i n g s u b s t a n c e a n d t h a t , like m o t i o n , c o n s c i o u s n e s s is a f u n c t i o n
of matter ( 2 1 0 : 5 9 3 ) .

L e t me refer f u r t h e r to L e n i n ' s posing of this vital question.

H e w a r n e d against c o n f u s i n g t h e initial materialist basic p r o p o s i ­
tion with t h e scientific s o l u t i o n o f t h e p s y c h o p h y s i c a l p r o b l e m ,
s i n c e i t still r e m a i n e d f o r s c i e n c e t o i n v e s t i g a t e a n d r e i n v e s t i g a t e

how matter, a p p a r e n t l y entirely devoid of sensation, is related to

matter which, though composed of the s a m e atoms (or electrons) is yet
e n d o w e d w i t h a w e l l - d e f i n e d f a c u l t y of s e n s a t i o n . M a t e r i a l i s m c l e a r l y
f o r m u l a t e s t h e a s yet u n s o l v e d p r o b l e m a n d t h e r e b y s t i m u l a t e s t h e
a t t e m p t t o s o l v e it, t o u n d e r t a k e f u r t h e r e x p e r i m e n t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n
(142:33).

The materialist understanding of the 'spiritual-material'

relation thus indicates, in general form of course, the real
d i r e c t i o n of fruitful special investigation in this field, while
t h e idealist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of this relation yields s c i e n c e n o t h i n g
and, moreover, eliminates the p r o b l e m . Positivism and other
subjectivist-agnostic doctrines that counterpose natural science
to the 'speculative ontology' (and 'natural philosophy') of
materialism, clearly do not perceive the philosophical content
and significance of the question, which they declare with such
ease to be exclusively one of natural science.
Existentialism, in c o n t r a s t to o t h e r c o n t e m p o r a r y idealist
d o c t r i n e s , h o l d s t h a t all o b j e c t s o f p o s s i b l e k n o w l e d g e c o n s t i t u t e
the i n d i s p u t a b l e d o m a i n of scientific i n q u i r y p r o p e r , s i n c e
they are studied independently of the existence of the h u m a n
individual. P h i l o s o p h y is not, in g e n e r a l , k n o w l e d g e of objects,
a n d materialism in essence betrays philosophy if only reality,
i n d e p e n d e n t o f h u m a n s u b j e c t i v i t y , i n t e r e s t s it. F r o m t h e a n g l e
of existentialism t h e r e is a special reality, by no m e a n s s u p e r s e n ­
sory yet i n a c c e s s i b l e in p r i n c i p l e to s c i e n c e , as well as a s p e c i a l
k i n d o f k n o w l e d g e w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d s t o i t a n d t h a t l o s e s its
authenticity and truth as soon as it acquires an impersonal,
s c i e n t i f i c f o r m . T h i s r e a l i t y i s t h e s p i r i t u a l life o f t h e h u m a n
i n d i v i d u a l ; a n d k n o w l e d g e o f it, w h i c h i s i n s e p a r a b l e f r o m
e x p e r i e n c e o f life itself, d i f f e r s r a d i c a l l y f r o m a n y s c i e n t i f i c
k n o w l e d g e b y v i r t u e o f its d i r e c t n e s s a n d s u b j e c t i v i t y . S c i e n c e
s e e k s t h e r e a s o n s f o r o b s e r v e d f a c t s , i.e. t r i e s t o g r a s p w h a t l i e s
behind them. Science builds hypotheses, and explains the k n o w n
by a s s u m i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e of s o m e t h i n g else, t h e u n k n o w n .

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W h e n applied to h u m a n spiritual life this a p p r o a c h c r e a t e s an
impression of e x p l a n a t i o n but in effect yields n o t h i n g for u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g it. F u r t h e r m o r e , it eliminates h u m a n life's absolute
difference from all o t h e r objects of science, i.e. its s u b j e c ­
tivity.
Existentialism t h u s asserts that m a n ' s spiritual life is only
a d e q u a t e l y g r a s p e d by philosophy, or r a t h e r only by existen­
tialism, which c o m p r e h e n d s the e x p e r i e n c e of life itself without
going beyond it a n d without a p p e a l i n g to s o m e t h i n g else.
Materialism, existentialists claim, e x a m i n e s spiritual life by t h e
m e t h o d of science, a n a l y s i n g its relation to t h e e x t e r n a l
world, without p e r c e i v i n g its self-sufficing c h a r a c t e r . But
spiritual life, precisely b e c a u s e of its spirituality, individuality,
and subjectivity, differs c a r d i n a l l y from e v e r y t h i n g that exists;
it c a n n o t b e c o m e an object or the s u b j e c t - m a t t e r of inquiry
(i.e. e x a m i n a t i o n from o u t s i d e ) w i t h o u t losing its a u t h e n t i c i t y .
16

Existentialism ascribes an o r g a n i c i n c a p a c i t y to materialism

to g r a s p m a n ' s e x i s t e n c e precisely as t h e spiritual life of an
inimitable, u n i q u e being existing between life and d e a t h . To
investigate the material d e p e n d e n c e of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e s ,
decisions, a n d actions is to c o n v e r t subjective acts into s o m e t h i n g
i n d e p e n d e n t of m a n , to c o n v e r t m a n himself, a c c o r d i n g to the
existentialist's idea, into the c o n s e q u e n c e of s o m e n o n - h u m a n
o t h e r . Materialism, existentialists claim, is a denial of the h u m a n
p e r s o n a l i t y , i.e. of e x i s t e n c e , freedom, s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n and
u n i q u e n e s s . Only r e c o g n i t i o n , in fact, of t h e self-positing
subjectivity of the h u m a n Ego, and the i n d e p e n d e n c e of its
e x p e r i e n c e s , decisions, and actions from external conditions,
m a k e s it possible to p r e s e r v e f r e e d o m and h u m a n i t y . Materialism
is d e c l a r e d to be philosophy of a l i e n a t i o n , and even the specific
form of alienation of the individual b r o u g h t about by m a t e r i a l
p r o d u c t i o n , scientific and e n g i n e e r i n g p r a c t i c e , etc. In that
c o n n e c t i o n existentialism clearly fails to think about how h u m a n
subjectivity is possible, in g e n e r a l , without the firm foundation
c r e a t e d by the d e v e l o p m e n t of social p r o d u c t i o n , which is at the
s a m e time d e v e l o p m e n t of the h u m a n personality. And h o w , on
the o t h e r h a n d , d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e h u m a n p e r s o n a l i t y and
subjectivity o c c u r r e d o v e r the t h o u s a n d s of y e a r s of the exist­
e n c e of civilisation in c o n d i t i o n s of p r o g r e s s i n g e n s l a v e m e n t of
the individual by t h e e l e m e n t a l forces of t h e social process?
Existentialists a r e least of all c a p a b l e of u n d e r s t a n d i n g the
history of h u m a n i t y , and s o m e of t h e m a r e inclined to
c o n s i d e r materialist ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' t h e s o u r c e of h u m a n i t y ' s
tribulations.

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 A historical, philosophical analysis of this accusation shows
that its main points are a development of the notorious
idealist doctrine of free will that took shape in E u r o p e a n
mediaeval philosophy under the direct influence of Christian
theology. Indeterminists claim that the freedom of the will
implies its independence from motives. T h e determinist inter­
pretation of acts of will is treated as incompatible with
recognition of the subject of responsibility. T h e opponents
of determinism endeavour to prove that it subordinates the
human personality on the whole to circumstances independent
of it, rules out the possibility of choice, and so on. P r e - M a r x i a n
materialism, one of whose outstanding achievements was substan­
tiation of determinism, brilliantly showed the bankruptcy of
the idealist conception of free will; only the will's dependence
on definite, in particular, moral motives made the h u m a n
personality the subject of responsibility.
T h e development of science, and in particular of h u m a n
physiology and psychology, reinforced the materialist critique
of indeterminism. Ultimately, idealists, too, at least the most
significant of them, became supporters of determinism, which
they interpreted idealistically of course.
Dilthey, who rejected causal investigation of spiritual life
(and that means of acts of will as well), and who declared
subjective idealism to be the 'idealism of freedom', was com­
pelled, however, to recognise that materialism was the philo­
sophy of humanism, in spite of its opponents' claims:
The naturalist ideal, as it was expressed by Ludwig Feuerbach in the
outcome of a long cultural development, the free man who discerns
the phantom of his wish in God, immortality, and the invisible
order of things, has exercised a powerful influence on political ideas,
literature, and poetry (41:107).

This admission by an idealist is very symptomatic. Idealism

is conscious that opposing of the individual's spiritual life
to his bodily, sensuous life serves real humanism as little as the
religious counterposing of the immortal soul to the mortal, and
of course sinful, body. Existentialism is to some extent free of
this dualism of soul and body that is essentially foreign to
humanism, but it cannot rid itself of the defects of idealism
without rejecting its principal propositions. And the old idealist
opposing of the spiritual to the material is revived in the
existentialist metaphysical (in all senses of the term) counterpos­
ing of subjectivity to 'soulless' objectivity, identified without
grounds with the sphere of alienation. Subjectivist intolerance
of the objective ultimately proves to be intolerance as well of

251
the h u m a n personality, to which absolutely everything is at­
t r i b u t e d as guilt, since t h e sole s o u r c e of h u m a n a c t i o n s is
declared to be the self-positing freedom of the individual
h u m a n e x i s t e n c e . T h e e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i s well a w a r e , o f c o u r s e ,
t h a t this f r e e d o m is p o w e r l e s s in t h e face of an objectivity that it
d o e s not w a n t to r e c k o n with. T h e realisation of f r e e d o m
t h e r e f o r e p r o v e s t o b e d e f e a t , yet t h e r e i s n o o t h e r w a y , t h e
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t c l a i m s . I n t h a t s e n s e his f i g h t a g a i n s t f a t a l i s m i s
highly inconsistent a n d essentially hopeless.
T h e philosophy of Marxism, which brings together a material­
ist e x p l a n a t i o n o f n a t u r e a n d a m a t e r i a l i s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g
of history, indicates a f u n d a m e n t a l l y different w a y of tackling
the problem. M a r x wrote, characterising the development of
h u m a n f r e e d o m in c o n n e c t i o n with the real historical p r o c e s s
a n d its n a t u r a l r e s u l t , i.e. t h e c o m m u n i s t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f
social relations, that f r e e d o m in the d o m a i n of material p r o d u c ­
t i o n , h o w e v e r h i g h a level o f d e v e l o p m e n t i t h a s r e a c h e d ,
can only consist in socialised man, the associated producers, rationally
regulating their i n t e r c h a n g e with N a t u r e , bringing it u n d e r their
c o m m o n control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces
of N a t u r e ; and achieving this with the least e x p e n d i t u r e of energy
and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their h u m a n
n a t u r e . But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond
it begins that development of h u m a n energy which is an end in itself,
the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only
with this realm of necessity as its basis (167:III, 8 2 0 ) .

T h a t proposition is a most i m p o r t a n t h u m a n i s t conclusion from

t h e m a t e r i a l i s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f s o c i a l life. T h e d i s p u t e o v e r
h u m a n i s m , w h i c h h a s lasted f o r c e n t u r i e s b e t w e e n m a t e r i a l i s m
and idealism, and between science and religion, has been finally
resolved in favour of materialism and materialistically thinking
science. Materialism, atheism, and science constitute the real
basis of the h u m a n i s t o u t l o o k ; they free h u m a n i s m f r o m
s u p e r f i c i a l , c o n s o l i n g i l l u s i o n s w h o s e s o u r c e i s r e l i g i o u s belief
a n d its i r r e l i g i o u s s u r r o g a t e s , a n d o p e n u p t o m a n k i n d a p e r ­
s p e c t i v e of u n l i m i t e d a n d a l l - r o u n d p r o g r e s s . It is a m a t t e r ,
of c o u r s e , of Marxist dialectical materialism.
Let me sum up. Idealism has been compelled to e x a m i n e
the a r g u m e n t s it a d v a n c e s against materialism. T h e latter is
accused of clinging to e v e r y d a y e x p e r i e n c e , of being uncritical
o f s c i e n c e , o f not g r a s p i n g t h e t r u e s e n s e o f r e l i g i o n , a n d o f
being foreign to genuine h u m a n i s m . By revising these accusa­
t i o n s i d e a l i s m e n d e a v o u r s t o a s s i m i l a t e i n its o w n i n t e r e s t s
t h e point of view t h a t it criticises. But the 'assimilation'
p r o v e s in fact to be an idealist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of e v e r y d a y

252
e x p e r i e n c e and science, and a new attempt to reconcile reason
and faith.
T h e i m p o t e n c e of this idealist critique in the main, decisive
point does not, of course, rule out the presence of rational
elements in it that the history of philosophy has no right
to ignore. T h e idealist critique of the mechanistic materialism
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries pointed out the
latter's actual limitations, despite t h e fact that it lacked u n d e r ­
standing of the historical progressiveness of mechanism. Idealism
r e p r o a c h e d metaphysical materialism, not without g r o u n d s , of
not seeing the relation of purposefulness in n a t u r e , a l t h o u g h
the idealist universalisation of it served as an apology for the
religious view of n a t u r e .17

Lenin wrote that the s u p p o r t e r s of 'physical' idealism of the

late nineteenth and the early twentieth century criticised the
actual faults of t h e metaphysical, mechanistic materialism that
prevailed then in natural science.
They combated metaphysical (in Engels', and not the positivist, i.e.
Humean, sense of the word) materialism and its one-sided 'mechanism',
and in so doing threw out the baby with the bath-water. Denying the
immutability of the elements and of the properties of matter known
hitherto, they ended by denying matter, i.e. the objective reality of the
physical world... Insisting on the approximate and relative character of
our knowledge, they ended by denying the object independent of the
mind, reflected approximately-correctly and relatively-truthfully by the
mind (142:242-243).

He brought out the flimsiness of the philosophical c o n c l u ­

sions d r a w n by idealism from the facts established by it. T h e
idealist critique of the s h o r t c o m i n g s of a certain historical
form of materialism inevitably lacked a p r o p e r orientation;
it c a m e forward as a critique of materialism in general t h o u g h
in fact it was directed only against the shortcomings of individual
materialist doctrines. T h e illusions of the idealist critique were
natural; they expressed the radical opposition of the main
philosophical trends.
Idealism thus sometimes pointed out shortcomings that w e r e
actually inherent in materialism, d r a w b a c k s that it o v e r c a m e
in the course of further philosophical development. T h e
d o c t r i n e that idealism considered already refuted b e c a m e m o r e
and m o r e well founded. T h a t proved a s o u r c e of the crisis of
idealist philosophy, the a r g u m e n t s of which against materialism
were ultimately turned against itself. Idealism, which accused
materialism of denying the transcendent, and of uncritical
reliance on sense perceptions, has been compelled partly to
reject these s a m e accusations and partly to soften t h e m with

253
n u m e r o u s reservations, since the advances of science and the
increasing e x p e r i e n c e of mankind h a v e confirmed t h e materialist
'heresy'. H e n c e , too, idealism's p a r a d o x i c a l and at the same
time law-governed renunciation of idealism, which I h a v e
already noted above, and which proved to be only a c h a n g e
of its form. T h a t m a d e it possible to consider c o n t e m p o r a r y
idealism a utopian attempt to c r e a t e an anti-materialist system of
views free of the defects of idealism. 18

By maximally limiting the field of discredited idealist

philosophy, c o n t e m p o r a r y idealists recognise that it has proved
b a n k r u p t , and seek new ways of substantiating their outlook.
T h e following a r g u m e n t has been advanced in recent decades
as the main one: idealism is not the sole alternative to material­
ism. Spiritualism on the o n e hand, and 'realism' on the other,
a r e now declared m o r e serious, promising o p p o n e n t s of m a t e ­
rialism. Both these doctrines a r e considered, of c o u r s e , to be
different in principle from idealism.
Spiritualism coincides with objective idealism in its initial
propositions and can be treated as one of its main versions.
In a certain sense objective idealism is a spiritualistic outlook
in general. But the pantheistic tendency often opposes this
essential definition of it, smoothing over the spiritualist opposing
of the spiritual to the material. Attempts to divide spiritualism
from idealism boil down in the end to a negation of this pan­
theistic tendency.
As for 'realism', this t e r m often serves (as Lenin noted)
to gloss over the radical opposition of the main philosophical
trends. Neothomists, and a d h e r e n t s of H a r t m a n n ' s 'new ontol­
ogy', and followers of neorealism, an epistemological variety
of idealist philosophy, call themselves realists. Neothomist
'realism' consists in recognising that sense-perceived reality
exists independently of h u m a n consciousness; its first principle,
however, is declared to be divine reason. In this connection
Egorov noted that ' M a r i t a i n acknowledges the reality of the
external world, but then adds that the world a r o u n d us is
independent only of man and is completely d e p e n d e n t on God'
(46:12).
H a r t m a n n ' s 'realism', while lacking theistic tones, boils down
primarily to stating that the material and the spiritual a r e
not primordial but derivative realities within an a l l - e m b r a c ­
ing being. Not only the spiritual, but also the material, a r e
thus regarded as s e c o n d a r y , and being is opposed to both.
It will readily be understood that the assumption of a
primordial neutral being is a speculative-idealist premiss;

254
b e i n g d o e s n o t e x i s t i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f its d e t e r m i n a c y .
N e o r e a l i s m s e p a r a t e s itself f r o m s u b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m i n r e c ­
ognising a reality existing outside and i n d e p e n d e n t of c o n ­
sciousness. But the f u r t h e r definition of this reality is based
on wiping out the difference between the subjective and the
objective, the psychic and the physical, which leads in the
end to idealist conclusions. T h e c o n t e m p o r a r y student of n e o ­
r e a l i s m , H i l l , d e c l a r e d , c o m p a r i n g this c u r r e n t , w i t h p r e c e d i n g
idealist t h e o r i e s , t h a t p o l e m i c i s e d a g a i n s t t h e s e p a r a t e v e r ­
sions of idealism:
F a r m o r e devastating for idealism was the determined attack from
the outside, e a r l y in the twentieth c e n t u r y , by a s t r o n g realist m o v e m e n t
that deliberately denied nearly all of the basic tenets of idealism
(100:79).

In another place, however, he affirmed something contrary:

H a v i n g c o m p l a i n e d t h a t t h e idealists' a s s i m i l a t i o n o f o b j e c t s t o e x p e r i e n c e
u n d e r m i n e d t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f o b j e c t s , t h e n e w realists p r o c e e d e d t o
a s s i m i l a t e e x p e r i e n c e s t o o b j e c t s , with s u r p r i s i n g l y s i m i l a r results.... N o
matter h o w m u c h the n e w realist writes of the i n d e p e n d e n c e of the
object, he c a n n o t be quite convincing while m a k i n g objects a n d ex­
periences even temporarily identical, or aspects of one a n o t h e r
(100:122).

These statements must be treated as evidence of the unsound­

ness of an idealism t h a t claims to n e g a t e idealism r a t h e r t h a n
as e x a m p l e s of a c o n t r a d i c t i o n in t h e e x p o s i t i o n .
While the idealist a r g u m e n t s against materialism h a v e been
discredited by the progressive development of knowledge,
the materialist critique of idealism has m o r e and m o r e revealed
its s c i e n t i f i c , t h e o r e t i c a l i m p o r t a n c e . T h e c o u r s e o f d e v e l o p ­
ment of knowledge confirms the correctness of the materialist
analysis of idealism's c o m p r o m i s e position in the great dispute
between science and religion. Recognition of the point that
idealism is always in covert, if n o t o p e n , opposition to s c i e n c e ,
is winning m o r e and m o r e supporters. Idealism's claim to
e x p l o r e a special d o m a i n of w h a t exists, allegedly inaccessible
to science, is being discredited by the actual d e v e l o p m e n t
o f scientific k n o w l e d g e . T h e c o n c e p t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y t h a t
counterposes science does hot, of course, r e m a i n fixed; it
evolves a n d is revised since science not only cognises w h a t
was d e c l a r e d to be u n a t t a i n a b l e by scientific m e a n s b u t also
discovers 'curious' p h e n o m e n a of a sort whose existence could
not h a v e b e e n a n t i c i p a t e d b y t h e m o s t s u b t l e i m a g i n a t i o n .
T h e materialist critique of idealism has compelled t h e
latter's a d h e r e n t s t o a c k n o w l e d g e c e r t a i n facts a n d scientific

255
truths. T h e fight between the different idealist currents has
been caused to a considerable extent by the materialist critique
of idealism. Idealism has evolved from frank supranaturalism
and direct support of the religious outlook to an idealist
assimilation of naturalism, and to a 'realism' and philosophising
irreligious in form. But this trend in its evolution comes
up against opposing tendencies generated by idealist philosoph­
ising. Idealism is constantly turning back, i.e. returning from
irreligiosity to supranaturalism and mysticism. Besides, m o d e r n ­
ised mysticism was often passed off as related to science
and as an outlook possessing deep scientific roots. T h u s Radlov
claimed in an article 'Mysticism in Contemporary Philosophy',
that the mysticism of the early twentieth century 'differed
from earlier forms in not being in the least hostile to science'
(219:63). F u r t h e r m o r e , he discovered even 'a reverence of
mystical philosophy for science' (ibid.) T h a t redressing of
mysticism is not only evidence of its real bankruptcy but is
also an attempt to resurrect it by mystifying scientific data.
T h e idealist philosophy of each historical epoch thus pres­
ents a picture of a sort of cycle, the different elements
of which are reflected in separate idealist doctrines. Depending
on the historical conditions, idealism shifts the logical accents,
alters the argumentation and approach to problems, formulating
its postulates and conclusions in a different fashion. Sometimes
it comes forward with a claim to real scientific knowledge,
criticising science for an alleged lack of scientific character.
At other times it claims superscientific knowledge, condemning
the scientific view of the world as a viewpoint of semblance.
Idealism often advances tasks of creating a scientific
philosophy and even makes a certain positive contribution to
the epistemological analysis of the fact of scientific knowledge.
In other cases it strives, on the contrary, to show that science
has nothing to give either philosophy or art and religion, and
that philosophy's acceptance of scientific criteria signifies a
repudiation of itself. Whatever all the differences of these
notions and approaches, they have something in common, and
that is the counterposing of philosophy to the scientific picture
of the world, an opposition whose inevitable form is a closed
philosophic system.
It seems at first glance that the closed character or 'com­
pleteness' of a system is associated simply with an anti-dialectical
understanding of the systematic character of knowledge and
consequently has no relation to the opposition between materi­
alism and idealism. A claim to create a complete system of

256
knowledge was peculiar both to natural science and materialist
p h i l o s o p h y f o r c e n t u r i e s . I n t h a t c a s e , h o w e v e r , i t w a s n o t just
a m a t t e r of a t e n d e n c y t h a t collided with an o p p o s i n g one
t h a t p a r t i a l l y n e u t r a l i s e d it, b u t c o n c e r n e d t h e m a i n , d e t e r m i n a n t
f e a t u r e of t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a philosophical d o c t r i n e that was
inseparable, as c a n readily be s h o w n , from the essence of
idealism. Fichte a n d Hegel were dialecticians but they created
closed, c o m p l e t e systems of philosophical k n o w l e d g e , c o u n t e r ­
p o s i n g p h i l o s o p h y t o 'finite' s c i e n c e .
T h e idealist u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n of scientific k n o w l e d g e , w h a t e v e r
form of e x p r e s s i o n it takes, inevitably leads to a c o u n t e r p o s i n g
of philosophy—'absolute s c i e n c e ' — t o special, 'relative' sciences.
T h a t is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c not only of rationalist idealism b u t also
o f idealist e m p i r i c i s m . R e c a l l M a c h ' s c l a i m t h a t t h e ' e l e m e n t s '
of e v e r y t h i n g that exists c o m p r i s e sensations. E v e n if o n e
ignores the subjectivist interpretation of sensations, in this case,
too (since it retains the claim that the elements of everything
that exists a r e perceived sensuously) t h e r e is an absolutising of
empiricism which, by virtue of that, is always c o u n t e r p o s e d to
i n c o m p l e t e s c i e n t i f i c k n o w l e d g e . T h e h a r m f u l n e s s o f this
c o u n t e r p o s i n g is particularly obvious in M a c h , w h o was not
only a physicist b u t also a p h i l o s o p h e r w h o a r g u e d that
e v e r y t h i n g t h a t really existed was a c o m p l e x of sensations,
T h e discovery of atoms, or r a t h e r the experimental proof
o f t h e i r e x i s t e n c e , w h i c h d i r e c t l y r e f u t e d h i s idealist e m p i r i c i s m ,
c a u s e d t h e f o l l o w i n g v e r y i n d i c a t i v e r e a c t i o n o n his p a r t :
if belief in the reality of atoms is so essential for you [physicists],
then I disavow the physical mode of thinking, and do not want to be
a real physicist (156:11).
This frank admission is an interesting illustration of the natural
i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f t h e b a n k r u p t c y o f idealist p h i l o s o p h y .
Idealism inevitably makes an absolute of the separate features
of c o g n i t i o n , w h i c h is a c o n s e q u e n c e of d e n i a l of t h e m a t e r i a l i s t
tenet of reflection. T h e metaphysical materialist usually inter­
prets the relative truth attained as absolute truth since a dialect­
ical u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e p r o c e s s o f c o g n i t i o n i s f o r e i g n t o h i m .
Yet the metaphysical materialist, w h o sees in p h i l o s o p h y only
a r e f l e c t i o n of r e a l i t y , w h i c h is r i c h e r a n d f u l l e r of c o n t e n t
t h a n a n y k n o w l e d g e o f it, i s n o t i n c l i n e d t o t r e a t p h i l o s o p h y a s
e x h a u s t i v e k n o w l e d g e or u n d e r s t a n d i n g of reality. But denial of
t h e p r i n c i p l e o f r e f l e c t i o n , i.e. t h e i d e a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f c o g n i ­
tion, entails an illusion of t h e possibility of c o m p l e t i n g a system
of k n o w l e d g e .
E n g e l s criticised t h e i n c o n s i s t e n t materialist D ü h r i n g for

17-01603 257
trying to create a completed philosophical system, evaluating
these attempts as clear concessions to idealist speculation. Of
Dühring he wrote:
W h a t h e i s d e a l i n g w i t h a r e t h e r e f o r e principles, f o r m a l t e n e t s d e r i v e d
f r o m thought a n d n o t f r o m t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d , w h i c h a r e t o b e a p p l i e d
to nature and the realm of man, and to which therefore nature
and man have to conform (50:45).

Engels considered such an understanding of philosophical

tenets (1) idealist a n d (2) metaphysical. In contradistinction
to idealism, materialism affirmed that
it is n o t n a t u r e and t h e r e a l m of h u m a n i t y w h i c h c o n f o r m to t h e s e
p r i n c i p l e s , b u t t h e p r i n c i p l e s a r e o n l y valid i n s o far a s t h e y a r e
in c o n f o r m i t y with n a t u r e a n d history. T h a t is the only materialistic
conception of the matter, and H e r r Dühring's c o n t r a r y conception is
idealistic, m a k e s t h i n g s s t a n d c o m p l e t e l y o n t h e i r h e a d s ( 5 0 : 4 6 ) .

M a t e r i a l i s m , c o n s e q u e n t l y , is a system of views w h o s e e p i s t e m o l ­
ogical basis posits the possibility of an infinite i n c r e a s e of
k n o w l e d g e t h r o u g h ever fuller and d e e p e r reflection of reality.
F r o m the s t a n d p o i n t of idealism the p r i n c i p l e of the infinite
d e v e l o p m e n t of k n o w l e d g e is i n c o m p a t i b l e with the n a t u r e
of p h i l o s o p h y ; it is a c c e p t a b l e only in t h e special s c i e n c e s .
T h e materialist, while denying the counterposing of philosophy
to science, naturally does not accept the theoretical conclu­
sions associated with that. Materialism has therefore developed
historically as an open system of philosophical knowledge;
its c a p a c i t y t o p e r c e i v e n e w s c i e n t i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n a n d t o g r a s p
n e w historical e x p e r i e n c e is constantly g r o w i n g . A r e w a r d i n g
task of the history of p h i l o s o p h y is a c o m p a r a t i v e i n q u i r y
into the various historical f o r m s of materialism.
Engels wrote:
With each e p o c h - m a k i n g discovery even in the s p h e r e of natural
s c i e n c e i t h a s t o c h a n g e its f o r m ; a n d a f t e r h i s t o r y a l s o w a s s u b j e c t e d t o
materialistic t r e a t m e n t , a new a v e n u e of development has opened here
too ( 5 2 : 3 4 9 ) .

C h a n g e in the f o r m of materialism is not r e d u c i b l e to a n e w

f o r m u l a t i o n o r r e t h i n k i n g o f its c o n t e n t ; p r e v i o u s l y u n k n o w n
facts b e c o m e the subject of discussion, s o m e t h i n g n e w is added
to t h e p r o b l e m a t i c , a n d old questions a r e posed in a n e w way.
In short, materialism develops; the materialist understanding
of reality b e c o m e s m o r e profound, m o r e concrete, better
grounded, and new perspectives and new fields of inquiry are
o p e n e d u p t o it.
T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of materialist philosophy is similar in
p r i n c i p l e t o t h a t o f all s c i e n t i f i c k n o w l e d g e . J u s t a s i n t h e

258
sciences there a r e propositions in it that sum up the centuries-
old history of knowledge. These fundamentals of materialism
can be as little refuted by subsequent philosophical development
as the natural-science principle of the impossibility of perpetuum
mobile. Only a subjective idealist can assume that the progress
of science or philosophy can lead to denial of objective reality.
As Fedoseev has written:
We would be inveterate dogmatists if we did not see the relativity
of many of the concrete propositions of philosophy and did not under­
stand the necessity to develop and refine them. But we would fall into
relativism and ultimately into idealism if we assumed that the develop­
ment of philosophy presupposed denial of its basic, firm principles
(55:12).

Development of materialist philosophy in organic connection

with the advances of the sciences of nature and society
characterises this main trend in a specific way. Idealism, of
course, also does not remain an invariant system of views;
it cannot help reacting to the advances of the sciences, which
compel it to re-examine its propositions, allowing for and ideal­
istically interpreting previously unknown facts. But the changes
that idealist philosophy undergoes correspond to its essence;
idealism adapts itself to the new intellectual atmosphere and
changing historical conditions. Insofar as it mystifies reality
it cannot find an adequate philosophical expression of the
advances of science and social practice. T h e counterposing of
philosophising to scientific inquiry greatly limits its possibilities
for assimilating scientific advances. But idealism cannot reject
this opposition, which essentially stems from the idealist answer
to the basic philosophical question and from recognition of
another reality allegedly inaccessible to science.
Idealism is compelled to meet the challenge of science and
it does so by way of an ever more flexible, cautious, science­
like formulation of its propositions. Contemporary subjective
idealism can declare, for example, that only madmen doubt the
existence of an external world. T h a t does not mean, however,
it then adds, that an external world really exists. Such a perfect­
ing of the idealist argumentation, it goes without saying, has
little in common with the onward development of philosophical
knowledge that takes place in the history of materialism. And
if Hegel, say, surpassed his idealist predecessors, that was
only because his idealism had a dialectical character.
Lenin noted the identity in principle of the main fallacies
inherent in this doctrine when comparing the most developed
idealist doctrines with the original historical forms of idealism:

259
 P r i m i t i v e idealism; t h e u n i v e r s a l ( c o n c e p t , i d e a ) i s a p a r t i c u l a r
being. T h i s a p p e a r s wild, m o n s t r o u s l y ( m o r e a c c u r a t e l y , c h i l d i s h l y )
stupid. But is not m o d e r n idealism, K ant, Hegel, t h e idea of God,
o f t h e s a m e n a t u r e (absolutely o f t h e s a m e n a t u r e ) ? T a b l e s , c h a i r s ,
a n d t h e ideas o f t a b l e a n d c h a i r ; t h e w o r l d a n d t h e i d e a o f t h e w o r l d
( G o d ) ; thing and ' n o u m e n ' , the u n k n o w a b l e 'Thing­in­itself'; the con­
n e c t i o n o f t h e e a r t h a n d t h e s u n , n a t u r e i n g e n e r a l — a n d law λ ό γ ο ς [lo­
g o s ] , G o d . T h e d i c h o t o m y o f h u m a n k n o w l e d g e a n d t h e possibility o f
idealism ( = r e l i g i o n ) a r e g i v e n a l r e a d y i n the f i r s t , e l e m e n t a r y
abstraction ('house' in general and particular houses) (144:370).

T h e diversity of the versions of idealism, which sometimes

s e e m s unlimited, is in fact limited w h e n , of c o u r s e , we h a v e in
mind the c o n t e n t a n d not t h e m o d e of exposition of this d o c t r i n e .
A superficial g l a n c e at the history of idealism mainly c a t c h e s
the differences and disagreements, but inquiry shows that even
the most d e v e l o p e d idealist d o c t r i n e s essentially r e p e a t the old
fallacies, which, h o w e v e r , a r e 'developed', modified, variously
substantiated, interpreted, comprehended, and formulated.
T h e classical writers of idealist p h i l o s o p h y , while criticising
their predecessors (often very thoroughly), were usually
c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e y h a d fully s u c c e e d e d i n o v e r c o m i n g t h e
latter's fallacies; in fact, h o w e v e r , t h e y r e f u t e d o n e m o d e or
a n o t h e r of substantiating idealism, and certain conclusions,
posing of problems, and assumptions by no means obligatory
or n e c e s s a r y for idealist p h i l o s o p h y . As for t h e basic idealist
conviction, which Lenin pointed out, they gave it a n e w form,
i.e. b r o u g h t i t i n t o a c c o r d w i t h n e w s o c i a l n e e d s , h i s t o r i c a l
experience, etc.
C o n t e m p o r a r y i d e a l i s t p h i l o s o p h y i s u s u a l l y a w a r e t h a t its
s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r p r i m i t i v e , ' a r c h a i c ' i d e a l i s m , l i k e its i n d e p e n ­
d e n c e o f it, i s v e r y , v e r y r e l a t i v e . W h e n c o n t e m p o r a r y b o u r g e o i s
p h i l o s o p h e r s c o m p a r e t h e latest idealist s y s t e m s w i t h the d o c t r i ­
nes of Plato a n d Aristotle, they often c o n c l u d e that neither the
classical writers of idealism n o r their successors h a v e a d v a n c e d
f u n d a m e n t a l l y n e w p r o b l e m s or o v e r c o m e the fallacies of these
great thinkers. Skvortsov noted the symptomatic character of
this c o n c l u s i o n w h e n he p o i n t e d out t h a t it h a d b e c o m e
a c o m m o n conviction a m o n g bourgeois philosophers that the
history of philosophy was a s u m total of additions to, notes
on and annotations of Plato (247:88).
W h a t does that conviction reflect? On t h e o n e h a n d s o m e t h i n g
t h a t really c h a r a c t e r i s e s t h e a t t i t u d e o f m o s t E u r o p e a n idealist
s c h o o l s to Plato, a n d on t h e o t h e r h a n d t h e crisis of idealism,
w h i c h h a s failed t o c o p e with t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s a l r e a d y
r e v e a l e d i n t h e first i d e a l i s t s y s t e m . I t i s v e r y i n d i c a t i v e t h a t

260
t h e reduction of the historical c o u r s e of philosophy to a constant
revival of Platonism is directly associated with denial of progress
in philosophy.
Philosophical thought [Karl Jaspers wrote] also does not have the
character of a progressive process, like science. We know much more,
for a certainty, than Hippocrates, the Greek doctor. We can hardly say
that we are further than Plato (113:9).
T h e idealists of o u r day ( t h o u g h they do not consider
themselves idealists) thus affirm that philosophy is incapable
of rising a b o v e its past. T h e irrationalist G e r h a r d K r ü g e r ,
went even f u r t h e r t h a n J a s p e r s , interpreting all philosophical
doctrines as versions of Platonism. 'Philosophy,' he wrote,
'seen historically, is Platonism' ( 1 2 7 : 2 8 2 ) . He was arguing
about philosophy in general, ignoring t h e opposition of idealism
and materialism. T h e 'line of Plato', however, in no way
characterises the development of materialist philosophy, which
had already c o m e forward in antiquity as its denial.
S o m e philosophers substantiate the thesis mentioned above
by analysing t h e latest philosophic doctrines that b e a r the
distinct impress of our times. Heidegger's pupil K u h n e n d e a v ­
o u r e d to p r o v e that Plato was the father of existentialism, writ­
ing:
As Plato, the pupil of Socrates showed, man, shaken by the exhaustion
of the customs and laws handed down by his ancestors, and astounded
by the impossibility to understand the sense-perceived world from
itself, asks (when philosophising) about true being as the basis of
all that exists...
To express it in modern language, the question of being is at the
same time one of the sense of being (129:11-12).

K u h n undoubtedly modernised Plato, particularly w h e n he at­

tempted to express the views peculiar to his philosophy in
' m o d e r n ' , or r a t h e r existentialist, language. But doesn't that
interpretation of Plato show that modernisation of Platonism
is o n e of the sources of m o d e r n idealist philosophy, existentialist
philosophy i n c l u d e d ?
19

Idealism c a n n o t , in fact, rise above its past. T h a t points

to the incompatibility of idealism and science, to which a kow­
towing before the achievements of the past is foreign. But
materialism, like science, is integrally linked with the present
and at the s a m e time strives to t h e future. A high a p p r e c i a ­
tion of the achievements of previous materialist philosophy
does not prevent spokesmen of c o n t e m p o r a r y philosophical
materialism from being fully conscious of the root faults of
the doctrines of their predecessors.

261
 Each new age in the history of man thus deepens the
opposition between idealism and science further and further,
and thereby the opposition between the scientifically philoso­
phical, materialist outlook on the world and idealism. T h e
latter is an alienated form of the philosophical assimilation
of reality, while materialism is the negation of that philosoph­
ical form of alienation.
How then to sum up? Materialism, which is depicted by the
overwhelming majority of contemporary bourgeois philosophers
as a naive, long refuted doctrine incompatible with high philo­
sophical culture, has in fact defeated its sophisticated opponent.
I say 'in fact', because idealism predominates on the surface
of bourgeois society. But materialism lives and develops in
the sciences of nature, forming its inalienable foundation. T h e
main direction of the fight against materialism is now formed
by the idealist interpretation of scientific data, in which not
only are idealist philosophers engaged but also some natural
scientists who prove to be prisoners of idealist speculations. 20

Idealist conclusions are therefore not simply introduced into

science from outside, but express real contradictions of the
development of knowledge in the conditions of contemporary
bourgeois society. Nevertheless the materialist doctrine of the
materiality of the world has been victorious over the idealist
conception of the secondary, contingent c h a r a c t e r of nature.
T h e idealist doctrine of the dependence of sense-perceived
reality on the mode of its perception has been defeated in the
struggle against the materialist theory of reflection (especially
the dialectical-materialist o n e ) . Historical materialism has
revealed the bankruptcy of the idealist interpretation of history.
And what is no less important, materialism has won in science
where absolute epistemological relativism, the agnosticism
related to the latter, and sometimes even theories of a specul­
ative metaphysical cast were counterposed to it.
Such are the results. What about the prospects? They are
obvious from the analysis made.

3. The Dialectical-Materialist Critique

of Idealism. The Epistemological Roots
of Idealist Fallacies

P r e - M a r x i a n materialism disclosed the main features of the

idealist mystification of reality and of cognition of it, but
could not explain the reasons for idealism's existence, or its

262
historical necessity a n d p l a c e in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of k n o w l e d g e .
In fact it i g n o r e d t h e essential point t h a t cognition ideally
t r a n s f o r m e d t h e m a t e r i a l w o r l d into systems of a b s t r a c t i o n s .
T h e subjective, active aspect of k n o w i n g , which idealism fixes
and at t h e s a m e t i m e mystifies, also r e m a i n e d outside t h e
field of view of p r e - M a r x i a n materialist philosophy. Idealism
s e e m e d to it to be simply n o n s e n s e . At best it c a u g h t idealism's
c o n n e c t i o n with t h e religious outlook, but t h a t was n a t u r a l l y not
sufficient to c r e a t e a scientific historical p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p ­
tion, w h i c h p r e s u m e d analysis of idealism as a p h e n o m e n o n
of the history of k n o w l e d g e .
T h e p h i l o s o p h y of M a r x i s m not only wages an u n c o m p r o m i s ­
ing struggle against idealism b u t also specially studies its
historical and epistemological c o n d i t i o n i n g , and its social,
t h e o r e t i c a l , a n d psychological s o u r c e s a n d o r g a n i c link with
t h e real c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , difficulties, a n d p r o b l e m s of d e v e l o p i n g
k n o w l e d g e ( a n d not just of philosophical k n o w l e d g e , of
course). 21

F r o m t h a t point of view idealism is not simply an e p i p h e n o m ­

e n o n of t h e socio-historical process, a g r o u n d l e s s fallacy, or
d e l i b e r a t e mystification. Dialectical m a t e r i a l i s m does not t h r o w
idealist p r o p o s i t i o n s o v e r b o a r d , but analyses t h e m in essence,
a n d revises those t h a t c o n t a i n r a t i o n a l e l e m e n t s , i m p o r t a n t
a s s u m p t i o n s a n d guesses, a n d pose i m p o r t a n t questions. L e n i n
c o n s i d e r e d a c r i t i q u e of idealism t h a t m e r e l y rejected idealist
a r g u m e n t s a v u l g a r materialist one.
P l e k h a n o v [he w r o t e ] criticises Kantianism (and agnosticism in g e n e r a l )
m o r e from a vulgar-materialistic s t a n d p o i n t than from a dialectical-
materialistic standpoint, insofar as he merely rejects their views a limine,
but does not correct them (as Hegel c o r r e c t e d K a n t ) , d e e p e n i n g ,
generalising and e x t e n d i n g them, s h o w i n g the conneсtiоn and
t r a n s i t i о n s o f each and every concept ( 1 4 4 : 1 7 9 ) .

A scientific c r i t i q u e of idealism is its demystification, study

of t h e c o n t e n t of an idealist d o c t r i n e that is essentially
i n d e p e n d e n t of it. R e c o g n i t i o n of t h e richness of idealism's
c o n t e n t differs radically f r o m t h e simplified view t h a t it is
i n c o m p a t i b l e with inquiry c r o w n e d b y real discoveries. T h e 22

logic of t h a t a r g u m e n t is as follows: fallacy n e v e r leads

t o t r u t h . S u c h a n a r g u m e n t i g n o r e s t h e r e a l historical, p s y c h o ­
logical, a n d epistemological p r o b l e m a n d r e p r e s e n t s a n a t t e m p t
to get r o u n d t h e c o m p l i c a t e d question of the c o n t r a d i c t o r y
d e v e l o p m e n t of k n o w l e d g e by m e a n s of g e n e r a l p h r a s e s .
T h e history of s c i e n c e p r o v i d e s t h o u s a n d s of e x a m p l e s of
how, in fact, false ideas h a v e h e l p e d in t h e c o u r s e of

263
scientific development to discover new phenomena and laws. T h e
theory of phlogiston helped chemistry emancipate itself from
alchemism. T h e fruitless attempts to create perpetual motion
promoted discovery of the law of the conservation of energy.
A dialectical understanding of the 'truth-error' relation­
ship is needed even more in research in the history of philosophy
than in natural science. Lenin wrote that 'Leibnitz through
theology arrived at the principle of the inseparable (and univer­
sal, absolute) connection of matter and motion' (144:377).
A metaphysically thinking person does not, of course, under­
stand how the philosopher arrived at the truth through theology.
Theology leads away from truth. But Leibniz was not a
theologian of course in spite of his essentially theological fal­
lacies. T h e object of his inquiry was not religious dogmas but real
problems of philosophy and natural science. Creationism put him
on the scent of the idea of the unity of the world. T h e profound
idea of the link of motion and matter seemed a necessary
conclusion to him from the theological conception of a single
(created) universe. But he endeavoured to substantiate this
idea by an investigation of the facts.
It was not by chance, of course, that dialectical logic
arose in the womb of German classical idealism. Fichte,
Schelling, and Hegel were dialecticians not in spite of their
idealist convictions; at that time a materialist dialectics as
a philosophical science was in general impossible. While,
as Engels put it, 'the relation of idealist dialectics to rational
dialectics is the same as ... that of the phlogistic theory to
the theory of Lavoisier' (51:49), i.e. to a scientific understanding
of heat, an unscientific form of dialectics necessarily preceded
its scientific one. It is naive to suggest that a scientific system of
views can arise immediately, in ready-made form. An idealist
theory proves, in certain historical conditions, to be the pre­
history of the scientific solution of a problem.
A dialectical-materialist analysis of idealist fallacies does not
boil down, of course, to bringing out the richness of their
content. If one limited oneself to that, one would not get
a historical analysis of those errors but a glossing over of
idealism's hostility to the scientific outlook on the world. It is
therefore important to show that when idealism expresses an
essentially correct idea, it inevitably distorts its content, passing
it off as confirmation of its basic fallacy. Let me cite Schelling
as an example: when criticising mechanistic natural philosophy
and counterposing a dialectical understanding of nature to it, he
interpreted it in a spirit of mysticism.

264
 As soon as we trespass in the held of organic nature, all mechanical
linking of cause and effect ceases for us [he wrote]. Every organic
product exists for itself, and its existence does not depend on any
other existence (239:690).

In reality the animate does not exist outside mechanical

relations, but includes them; the animate, of course, does not
possess absolute autonomy. Schelling was clearly mistaken when
he claimed that life, as a specific organisation, 'produces itself
and originates from itself' (ibid.) He criticised mechanism,
rejecting this historically progressive view of nature in the name
of idealism. But his idealist natural philosophy had a dialectical
character. That gave Asmus grounds for the following conclu­
sion:
Schelling's basically idealist view of nature played a positive role;
it limited the mechanism predominant in eighteenth-century natural
science and led to the concept of a universal connection of the
things and phenomena of nature (10:269).

The rational ideas, and posing of problems and surmises,

that any idealist theory contains are inevitably deformed by
its basic anti-scientific trend. They can be revealed by a materia­
list reworking of the false that, however, contains some elements
of the true, rather than by a direct delimitation of the true and
the false.
The dialectical-materialist critique of idealism differs qual­
itatively from any other critique of idealist philosophy in
being a theoretical, historical, sociological, psychological, and
epistemological inquiry into this specific form of social con­
sciousness. I cannot, naturally, examine all the aspects and
special problems of this inquiry here; for the present work the
most important direction of the critique of idealism is explora­
tion of its epistemological sources.
Every idealist fallacy has epistemological roots, i.e. has
a profound character and differs in that from a simple
logical mistake whose cause is a breach of the rules of logic. 23

There is no sense, of course, in speaking of the epistemological

roots of a true statement, since it includes something more,
namely an adequate reflection of reality. It is therefore not
legitimate to pose the question of the epistemological roots
of materialist philosophy, even though the fallacies inherent
in certain historical forms of materialism have their epistemolog­
ical roots.
T h e critique of separate idealist conceptions, for example,
the theory of innate ideas or conventionalism, includes analysis
of their specific epistemological sources. But the basic sense

265
of the d o c t r i n e of the epistemological roots of idealism develop­
ed by Lenin consists in investigation of the very possibility
of idealism as such. T h i s possibility is i m m a n e n t in the process,
s t r u c t u r e , and elementary forms of cognition. T h e point, c o n s e ­
quently, is to e x a m i n e idealism as a system of fallacies that
has taken shape and developed in the course of cognition
and not s o m e w h e r e on its periphery. T h a t is the first point.
Secondly, Lenin posed the question of the epistemological
characteristics of idealist speculation.
T h e possibility of idealism already existed in the first
e l e m e n t a r y abstraction, i.e. the singling out of t h e general.
T h e general exists in an isolated way only as an abstraction,
a concept, a collective n a m e . In objective reality t h e r e is no
general without the p a r t i c u l a r and the individual. T h e indivi­
dual and s e p a r a t e a r e general precisely in this, their universal
definiteness. T h e p a r t i c u l a r is also a form of the universal.
To single out the general is to c o u n t e r p o s e it to the particular
and the individual, since that separates it from them, a c o u n t e r ­
posing that comes about t h r o u g h the linguistic (sign) form
of any knowledge. L a n g u a g e fixes the general, a word expresses
the general, but as a sign it does not depend on the things
that it signifies. This relative i n d e p e n d e n c e of the concept,
word, and language in general is manifested in the pos­
sibilities of word formation a c c o r d i n g to the rules of g r a m m a r .
Hobbes claimed that the word 'perfection' arose from the word
'imperfection' by discarding the prefix 'im'. W h e t h e r or not he
was right, it is clear that the possibility of forming new words
can be realised independently of the real objects to which
they should be related. T h e r e a r e therefore words that signify
what does not in fact exist.
T h e word 'idea', as I have already said, signified 'form,
kind' in Greek. Plato spoke of the form of things, i.e. of how
they looked, and how they differed from other things. But be­
cause manу things had sоmething inherent in с о m m о n , in spite of
individual differences, the word 'kind' was also used to distin­
guish whole classes of p h e n o m e n a : tables, horses, etc. Plato
said: a kind was preserved as something in c o m m o n ( o r identity)
in spite of each representative of a kind being mortal. T h e
properties of a kind were interpreted as opposed to those of
the c o n s t i t u e n t individuals. T h e individuals w e r e sensuously
perceived, c o r p o r e a l , mortal, imperfect p h e n o m e n a ; form or
kind was supersensory, incorporeal, eternal, perfect essence.
I must stress that a one-sided interpretation of the process
of transition from perceptions of individual things to concepts

266
also leads to this idealist ontology. If t h e r e is a concept of tree
in man's consciousness as some essence common to countless
single trees, but at the same time different from these individual
things because of its generality, one may ask which comes
first, the single trees before their common essence or the latter
before the single trees. T h a t was roughly the course of Plato's
thought, which supposed that only the existence of the idea
of a tree enabled a person who saw one to say 'That is a tree'.
Sense perception was characterised as recognising things
according to the ideas in a person's mind. But where
did the ideas come from? T h e y did not come from anywhere,
Plato suggested, rejecting the sensualist understanding of eide
and counterposing a mystical pseudoexplanation to it based
on mythology.
He did not just draw a line between the general and the
individual, the single and the many, the concept and the thing,
but also counterposed them absolutely. T h e general, severed
from single things, was transformed into their essence, which
was thought of as being outside them. T h e essence was primary:
it generated all single things. T h e object whose properties were
generalised in the concept (idea) was treated as the conse­
quence of its own properties transformed into an ideal essence.
Thus, an idealist system of views arose on the basis of an
ontological interpretation of the concept.
Aristotle correctly remarked that Plato's theory of ideas
was associated with investigation of the essence of concepts. 24

T h a t remark indicates that he was already posing the question

of the epistemological roots of idealism, and that is why his
critique of Plato's idealism was one of idealism in general.
But in his time the question of the relationship of the general
and the individual could only be posed in a very general,
abstract form.
T h e dispute about universals in mediaeval scholasticism, when
we abstract the theological pseudoproblems, was a continuation
of the discussion between Aristotle and Plato. Mediaeval
nominalism was an attempt to correct the inconsistency of
Aristotle's critique of the Platonic doctrine of the primacy of
ideas. From the standpoint of nominalism things were primary
as regards general concepts regarded as collective nouns. T h a t
posing of the question was not yet a denial of idealism in
general, but was a denial of one of the versions of idealist
philosophising.
T h e mediaeval nominalists considered single things the result
of divine creation. Only the materialist nominalism of modern

267
times, in the person of T h o m a s Hobbes, r e a c h e d t h e conclusion
that single things ( o r bodies) w e r e the sole reality. L o c k e
developed the s a m e point of view, t h o u g h inconsistently. Both
of these materialists interpreted the general only as a p h e n o ­
m e n o n of consciousness, a m o d e of uniting sense perceptions
that related to individual objects. In opposition to rationalism,
w h i c h substantiated the objectivity of the g e n e r a l , L o c k e said:
'general and universal belong not to the real existence of things;
but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, m a d e
b y i t f o r its o w n u s e ' ( 1 5 2 : 3 3 0 ) .
T h e empiricist materialists supposed that idealism (they had
i n m i n d its r a t i o n a l i s t v e r s i o n ) w a s i n e v i t a b l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h
recognition of the objective reality of the general. But Berkeley
h a d a l r e a d y c o n s t r u c t e d a n o m i n a l i s t system of idealism in
which such concepts as 'matter' and 'substance' were no more
than names, because there were no universal essences but only
individual sensations and combinations of same, which formed
w h a t w e r e called t h i n g s . B u t t h e ' t h i n g ' o r ' b o d y ' a s s u c h did
not exist. T h e flimsiness of Berkeley's subjective idealism did
n o t r u l e o u t this false d o c t r i n e ' s distorting the real r e l a t i o n
between abstractions and the p h e n o m e n a from which they were
drawn.
Matter as such [ E n g e l s w r o t e ] is a p u r e c r e a t i o n of thought a n d an
abstraction. We leave out of a c c o u n t the qualitative differences of
things in lumping them together as corporeally existing things under
the c o n c e p t m a t t e r ( 5 1 : 2 5 5 )

It did not follow from that, h o w e v e r , he stressed, that 'fruit

as such' existed and that real apples, pears, and cherries were
only modification of them. Metal as such, gas as such, chemical
c o m p o u n d s a s s u c h did not exist, a c c o r d i n g t o h i m , s i n c e t h e
general could only be separated from the particular and individ­
ual m e n t a l l y , by w a y of a b s t r a c t i o n ( i b i d . ) .
T h e various forms of idealism thus have their epistemological
s o u r c e in a l a w - g o v e r n e d splitting of k n o w l e d g e , a c o n t r a d i c ­
tion between the rational a n d sensory, the theoretical and e m ­
pirical. Idealist philosophising is a c o n s e q u e n c e of an u n r e s t r a i n e d
abstracting which, not conforming to the nature of objects,
oversteps the measure of abstraction, so to speak, and ultimately
replaces the objects by abstractions.
Is it s u r p r i s i n g [ K a r l M a r x w r o t e ] t h a t , if y o u let d r o p little by
little all t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e i n d i v i d u a l i t y of a h o u s e , l e a v i n g o u t
first of all t h e m a t e r i a l s of w h i c h it is c o m p o s e d , t h e n t h e f o r m
t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s it, y o u e n d up w i t h n o t h i n g b u t a b o d y ; t h a t , if y o u
l e a v e o u t o f a c c o u n t t h e limits o f t h i s b o d y , y o u s o o n h a v e n o t h i n g
b u t a s p a c e — t h a t if, f i n a l l y , y o u l e a v e o u t o f a c c o u n t t h e d i m e n s i o n s

268
 of this space, there is absolutely nothing left but pure quantity, the
logical category? If we abstract thus from every subject all the alleged
accidents, animate or inanimate, men or things, we are right in saying
that in the final abstraction, the only substance left is the logical
categories (175:98-99).

T h e reduction, not limited by any bounds whatever and

therefore an illegitimate reduction, of all sense-perceived reality
to logical determinations, is often comprehended as a continuous
penetration into the essence of phenomena. By breaking away
from reality a philosopher preserves the illusion of an ever
closer approximation to it. T h a t is how the real possibility
of idealism a r i s e s .
25

Subjectivism is thus the main epistemological source of both

subjective and objective idealism. Subjectivity, as a capacity
for abstract thinking, for creating and operating with signs,
and for oversimplification of the real picture of things in
order to know them better, is a necessary cognitive and creative
capacity of man without which no intellectual activity what­
soever is possible. Subjectivism, however—its negative aspect,
the possibility of which can never be excluded—consists in
ignoring the need to reflect objective reality and in neglect
of the epistemological imperative that any really cogitative
thinking must willy-nilly observe. Transformation of necessary
and fruitful subjectivity into subjectivism and 'subjective
blindness' (in Lenin's expression ( 1 4 4 : 3 6 1 ) ) . Such is the
main path of the forming of the idealist outlook on the world.
Objective idealism absolutises the relative independence of
theoretical thinking from empirical data. T h a t is not only how
apriorism arises but also how the notion of the possibility
of supersensory knowledge, and a conviction of the existence of
transcendent reality comes about. T h a t relative independence
of the theoretical from the empirical, however, includes the
possibility of subjective idealism, which supposes that knowledge
creates the object of knowing, which becomes the object of
sense perception as a result of this usually unconscious creative
act. Such are the epistemological roots of Neokantian subjective
idealism and neopositivist conventionalism.
Unlike the other varieties of subjective idealism phenomenal­
ism is epistemologically rooted in a subjectivist interpretation
of the content of sense perceptions. This interpretation fixes
the fact that subjectivity, the inherent form of sense percep­
tions, cannot help affecting their content. T h e form and
content of sense perceptions are not absolutely opposed to one
another, of course, but the dialectic of this opposition does

269
not eliminate the real difference between them. Underestimation
of this difference constitutes the real possibility of idealism.
Idealist empiricism c o u n t e r p o s e s the sensuous to the abstract,
by which means the objective forms of universality are cognised.
T h i s opposition leads to a subjectivist interpretation not only
of the content of the abstract concepts but also of the sensations
themselves. Subjective idealism of an empiricist h u e often poses
as epistemological naturalism, which denies the reality of the
supersensory a n d affirms that only sensations exist a n d that
which they form. T h e epistemological s o u r c e of this subjective-
idealist c o n c e p t i o n is a real f e a t u r e of cognition, n a m e l y that
sense data a r e really what is given and a r e not p r o d u c e d
in the course of cognition, and in that sense must be taken
as the starting point. 2 6

Since the sense organs witness to the existence and inherent

properties of objects but do not prove their existence, awareness
of the difference between the evidence and proof constitutes an
i m p o r t a n t stage in the r o a d from naive realism to a scientific,
materialist view of t h e w o r l d . But t h e criteria of this delimitation
a r e not c o n t a i n e d in c o n s c i o u s n e s s , a n d t h a t fact also f o r m s o n e
of the epistemological sources of subjective idealism, which
asserts that the d i v i d i n g line b e t w e e n s e n s a t i o n s a n d t h i n g s is
nothing other than that between s o m e sensations and others.
T h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l roots o f idealism c o m e t o light, c o n s e ­
q u e n t l y , not only in the s t r u c t u r e of cognitive activity but also
in the c o u r s e of the d e v e l o p m e n t of k n o w l e d g e , by virtue of
w h i c h the possibility of idealist mystification of reality is
constantly r e p r o d u c e d . In that case idealism g r o w s from distor­
tions, a n d the absolutising of the truth or a particle of truth
that is a result of t h e cognitive process. T h a t also, in p a r t i c u l a r ,
e x p l a i n s w h y idealism often exists as a parasite on the real
a d v a n c e s of s c i e n c e , w h i c h gives it a s e m b l a n c e of scientific
character.
Lenin criticised P l e k h a n o v for ignoring the link b e t w e e n
M a c h i s m and the revolution in physics, stressing that such an
a p p r o a c h to idealism contradicted the spirit of the philosophy
of M a r x i s m . His c o m m e n t has g e n e r a l methodological signi­
ficance.

H u m a n knowledge [Lenin wrote] is not (or does not follow) a straight

line, but a c u r v e , w h i c h e n d l e s s l y a p p r o x i m a t e s a s e r i e s of c i r c l e s , a s p i ­
ral. A n y f r a g m e n t , s e g m e n t , s e c t i o n o f this c u r v e c a n b e t r a n s f o r m e d
( t r a n s f o r m e d o n e - s i d e d l y ) i n t o a n i n d e p e n d e n t , c o m p l e t e , s t r a i g h t line,
w h i c h t h e n (if o n e d o e s n o t s e e t h e w o o d for t h e t r e e s ) l e a d s i n t o t h e
q u a g m i r e , into clerical obscurantism ( w h e r e it is anchored by
t h e class i n t e r e s t s o f t h e r u l i n g classes) ( 1 4 4 : 3 6 1 ) .

270
Idealism, he stressed, grows from t h e living t r e e of fruitbearing,
true, powerful h u m a n knowledge. It is not just a fallacy but
fallacious knowledge, a misinterpreting of the facts of objective
reality and of consciousness, a distorted understanding of k n o w l ­
edge, and consequently of t h e particles of truth t h a t one ideal­
ist or a n o t h e r sometimes discovers. To bring out t h e epistemo­
logical roots of t h e idealist conception m e a n s to explicate t h e
particle of t r u t h that it contains. Lenin's doctrine of t h e epis­
temological roots of idealism, A.D. A l e x a n d r o v wrote, pointed
out
the general path of consistently scientific struggle against idealism in
science. This path consists in distinctly bringing out those features of a
theory that idealism illegitimately exaggerates and, thereby, having put
these features in their proper place and given them a true explanation,
to undercut the very root of idealist interpretations (3:41).

T h a t posing of the problem distinguishes the Marxist critique of

idealism in principle from t h e positivist denial of certain idealist
doctrines.
Neopositivism, in particular the o r d i n a r y language philo­
sophy, criticises objective idealism as empty philosophising and
the purest verbalism g e n e r a t e d by t h e structural features of or­
dinary language, its inevitable imperfections, and other causes
that h a v e no direct relation to t h e content of knowledge. Let
me dwell, in this connection, on R o u g i e r ' s book Metaphysics
and Language.
Like other neopositivists, Rougier distinguished the p r i m a r y
and the s e c o n d a r y language. T h e first consists of statements,
i.e. sentences that do not contain logical terms and can t h e r e ­
fore be called 'atomic'. T h e y express sense data and the words
comprising t h e m relate directly to objects. Atomic sentences
therefore do not require verification, and t h e ' p r i m a r y langua­
ge' formed from them is simply a language of facts, i n c o m p a ­
tible with 'idealist' fallacies. T h e 'secondary language' is a n ­
other matter, consisting of 'molecular' sentences built up from
sentences of the p r i m a r y language connected by logical con­
stants. Molecular sentences also include concepts of value (true,
false), quantifiers (all, s e v e r a l ) , modal concepts (necessary,
c h a n c e , possible), etc. N a t u r e does not k n o w negation, or in­
compatibility, or alternative expressed by the disjunctive or, by
a hypothetical j u d g e m e n t that includes if; t h e r e a r e no classes
in it, no quantifiers one, all, several, n o r modalities such as
probable, possible, etc. Such terms as 'sense', 'meaning', ' t r u e ' ,
'false' relate only to words and not to things. In n a t u r e t h e r e
a r e single facts; sentences of the 'secondary language' a r e

271
t h e r e f o r e not expressions a b o u t facts. T h e s e n t e n c e 'a b e i n g is
m o r t a l or i m m o r t a l ' c o n t a i n s n o t h i n g e x c e p t a t a u t o l o g y ('a
being is m o r t a l ' ) , since the question of the existence of an im­
m o r t a l b e i n g is n o t discussable. T h e s e n t e n c e 'the w o r l d is finite
or infinite' is not an expression of even partial k n o w l e d g e of the
w o r l d since the very possibility of this or d e p e n d s solely on t h e
s y n t a c t i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e l a n g u a g e , i.e. h a s n o r e l a t i o n t o a n y
authentic or problematical knowledge.
W h i l e natural science formulates empirically verifiable sen­
tences, p h i l o s o p h y (insofar as it d o e s not a d o p t the principles
of neopositivism) is c o n c e r n e d with the purest verbalism (ac­
cording to R o u g i e r ) ; by not delimiting 'primary' and 'secon­
d a r y ' l a n g u a g e s , it c o n f u s e s different linguistic systems, levels
(for example, formal and physical), properties of n a m e s and
properties of objects, a n d so on. As a c o n s e q u e n c e p s e u d o p r o b ­
lems, pseudoconcepts, a n d pseudostatements arise. T h e m e ­
t a p h y s i c i a n , for e x a m p l e , a s c r i b e s the p r o p e r t i e s of objects to
classes, w h i c h a r e specific linguistic f o r m a t i o n s a n d no m o r e .
A c l a s s [ R o u g i e r e x p l a i n e d ] , by v i r t u e of t h e t h e o r y of t y p e s , h a s n o n e
of t h e a t t r i b u t e s of t h e i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e it: t h e c l a s s of m o r t a l s
is not m o r t a l , t h e c l a s s of s o u n d s is not s o n o r o u s , t h e c l a s s of c o l o u r s is
not c o l o u r e d , the class of n u m b e r s is not a w h o l e n u m b e r ( 2 2 8 : 2 0 1 ) .

In that way philosophical categories arise that h a v e no empiri­

cal c o n t e n t , since they a r e d r a w n f r o m the l a n g u a g e a n d not
from things. All philosophical categories, Rougier suggested,
which take their beginning from Parmenides, Plato, and Aris­
totle, a r e fictions w i t h o u t c o n t e n t . H e classed t h e c o n c e p t s o f
m a t t e r , essence, etc., as such fictions.
T h e r e is no n e e d to d e m o n s t r a t e that this kind of c r i t i q u e
of s p e c u l a t i v e philosophising has a nominalist a n d subjectivist
c h a r a c t e r ; its t h e o r e t i c a l p r e m i s s i s t h e n e o p o s i t i v i s t c o n c e p t i o n
of p h i l o s o p h y as an activity w h o s e sole goal is to clarify the
sense of sentences. Dialectical materialism, in rejecting the n e o ­
positivist r e d u c t i o n of philosophical p r o b l e m s to p s e u d o p r o b ­
lems, also in this c a s e treats t h e fallacy of idealism ( n e o p o s i ­
tivism) as m e a n i n g f u l , with definite historical, psychological,
theoretical, and epistemological roots.
F r a n c i s B a c o n h a d a l r e a d y in his d o c t r i n e of idols criticised
scholastic verbalism, which reproduced certain features of
idealist speculation in g e n e r a l in c a r i c a t u r e f o r m . T h i s s p e c u ­
lative v e r b a l i s m also exists in o u r d a y in idealist p h i l o s o p h y . A n d
Rougier was basically right w h e n he pointed out that Heideg­
ger's w o r d - s p i n n i n g c r e a t e d an illusion of s o m e o t h e r reality
discovered by just this philosopher, a n d that t h e differences

272
between das Seiende, das Seiend, das Seiend-sein, die
S e i e n d h e i t , Unseiendes, Unsein, das Dasein, das Sosein,
a n d das A n d e r s s e i n , did n o t c o r r e s p o n d t o a c t u a l l y e x i s t ­
ing differences (see 2 2 8 : 1 9 2 ) . L a n g u a g e is the form of exist­
e n c e o f t h o u g h t ; its u n i t y w i t h , c o n t e n t h a s a c o n t r a d i c t o r y c h a ­
racter, if only b e c a u s e w o r d s express merely the general. W o r d s
and s e n t e n c e s a r e t h e r e f o r e possible that h a v e only an imagi­
nary content. On the other hand, knowledge does not always
find adequate expression in language, whose development is
stimulated precisely by the need for such adequate expression.
T h e epistemological roots of idealism can therefore be b r o u g h t
to light not only in sense p e r c e p t i o n s , t h i n k i n g , a n d in t h e p r o ­
cess of cognition, b u t also in t h e l a n g u a g e s p h e r e of h u m a n a c ­
t i v i t y , w h i c h i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d b y r e l a t i v e i n d e p e n d e n c e , specific
structure, and patterns of functioning and development. One
c a n a g r e e with F r a e n k e l a n d B a r - H i l l e l , w h o m a i n t a i n e d , f r o m
a special l o g i c o - m a t h e m a t i c a l study, that a n y l a n g u a g e is

vague and exposed to misunderstanding, even symbolic language (since

m a t h e m a t i c a l and logical symbols rest on ordinary language for their
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ) . H e n c e mathematical l a n g u a g e is ambiguous and d e ­
fective; mathematical thought, while strict a n d uniform in itself, is sub­
ject to obscurity a n d e r r o r when transferred from one person to a n o ­
ther by m e a n s of speaking or writing ( 6 4 : 2 1 3 ) .

In contrast to R o u g i e r ' s neopositivist a r g u m e n t s , this c o n c r e t e

critical c o m m e n t a b o u t the n a t u r e of a n y l a n g u a g e contains no
subjectivist-agnostic conclusions.
R o u g i e r ' s e r r o r was not that he linked a critique of philo­
sophical fallacies with analysis of language, but r a t h e r that he
r e d u c e d philosophical p r o b l e m s to linguistic m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s .
As B e r t r a n d Russell correctly pointed out, the s p o k e s m e n of
o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e philosophy considered the very e n d e a v o u r
to understand the world to be an old-fashioned whimsy. F r o m
that angle any philosophical view a b o u t the reality a r o u n d m a n
was no m o r e than a g a m e of words.
Neopositivism, which has m a d e a valuable critique of spe­
culative verbalism in several respects, has ultimately proved to
b e itself i n t h r a l l t o v e r b a l i s m , s i n c e i t e n d e a v o u r e d t o r e d u c e ,
the content of philosophical doctrines to the words in which
t h e y w e r e m e r e l y set o u t . R o u g i e r t r e a t e d t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e
linguistic r o o t s of ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' in precisely that spirit; e v e r y ­
thing boiled d o w n to i n c o m p r e h e n s i o n of the n a t u r e of language,
uncritical w o r d - u s e , etc. T h e social c o n d i t i o n i n g of philo­
sophical e r r o r s was not taken into account. So, it c a m e about,

18-01603 273
the difference between G e r m a n and French philosophy was
d e t e r m i n e d by linguistic differences. 2 7

T h e philosophy of Marxism has put an end to the ignoring,

a l i e n t o s c i e n c e , o f s u c h p h e n o m e n a a s social c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,
w h i c h i s c o n d i t i o n e d b y social b e i n g , r e f l e c t s t h e l a t t e r , a n d
c o n s e q u e n t l y c a n n o t b e e x p l a i n e d f r o m itself. T h a n k s t o t h e
materialist conception of history philosophical c o m p r e h e n s i o n
of the w o r l d has b e e n u n d e r s t o o d for t h e first t i m e as a s o c i o -
historical process. T h e e x i s t e n c e of idealist fallacies, which w a s
explained o n c e again by misconceptions, has been scientifically
explained by investigating the content and development of so­
cial c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h reflects historically d e t e r m i n e d s o ­
cial r e l a t i o n s c o n n e c t e d with p r i v a t e o w n e r s h i p of t h e m e a n s of
p r o d u c t i o n , class antitheses, etc.
T h e doctrine of the epistemological roots of idealism brings
o u t t h e possibility o f t h e r i s e o f t h i s d i s t o r t e d r e f l e c t i o n o f r e a ­
lity. I t d o e s n o t e x p l a i n , a n d i s n o t m e a n t t o e x p l a i n , t h e causes
of the e x i s t e n c e of idealism. A sociological investigation of p h i ­
losophical knowledge is necessary to elucidate them; and the
basis of such an i n q u i r y c a n only be the materialist c o n c e p t i o n
of history. T h e communist transformation of social relations
will n o t e l i m i n a t e t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l r o o t s o f i d e a l i s m b u t i t
will l i q u i d a t e t h e s o c i o e c o n o m i c s o u r c e s o f t h e i d e a l i s t m y s t i f i c ­
a t i o n o f r e a l i t y . A l i e n a t e d l a b o u r will d i s a p p e a r a n d c o n s e ­
quently the alienation of n a t u r e too. And the m o r e society c o n ­
s c i o u s l y g u i d e s its d e v e l o p m e n t , t h e m o r e , E n g e l s s a i d ,
will m e n not o n l y feel but also k n o w t h e i r o n e n e s s with n a t u r e , a n d
t h e m o r e i m p o s s i b l e will b e c o m e t h e s e n s e l e s s a n d u n n a t u r a l idea o f
a c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n m i n d a n d m a t t e r , m a n a n d n a t u r e , soul a n d b o d y ,
s u c h a s a r o s e a f t e r t h e d e c l i n e o f classical a n t i q u i t y i n E u r o p e a n d
o b t a i n e d its highest e l a b o r a t i o n in C h r i s t i a n i t y ( 5 1 : 1 8 1 ) .

Idealism is not e t e r n a l ; this specific type of s y s t e m a t i c e r r o r s

will b e c o m e t h e h i s t o r i c a l p a s t , j u s t l i k e t h e r e l i g i o u s ' a s s i m i l a ­
t i o n ' o f t h e w o r l d . T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f k n o w l e d g e will n o t , o f
c o u r s e , e l i m i n a t e e r r o r s a n d m i s c o n c e p t i o n s b u t i t will b e q u i t e
c a p a b l e of eliminating a world outlook based on fallacies ( a n d
to some extent is already doing so n o w ) .

4. T h e Dialectical-Materialist Critique
of Idealism. T h e Principle of the Partisanship
of Philosophy

Philosophical propositions, both t r u e and false, h a v e a sensi­

ble c h a r a c t e r , in spite of the claims of neopositivists. U n d e r

274
'sense' we m e a n the content of a statement. T h e r e is no sense
without a statement, i.e. without t h e subject's ideas or e x p e r i ­
ences definitely formulated in the ordinary or an artificial langua­
ge. But t h e r e is no sense as well without content, i.e. without
what refers to the object.
T h e preceding section was devoted to exploring the episte­
mological sense of idealist e r r o r s . H e r e I want to go into t h e
question of t h e social sense of philosophical propositions. T h a t
aspect of idealist philosophising undoubtedly has a p a r a m o u n t
place in the dialectical-materialist critique of i d e a l i s m . 28

Before M a r x philosophical propositions w e r e appraised only

as t r u e or false. While stressing the fundamental significance
of that appraisal, which meets t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of scientific
c h a r a c t e r , we still consider it unsatisfactory. T h e point is not
just (and not so m u c h ) that many philosophical propositions
c a n n o t in general be evaluated by that two-point system, since
they formulate definite hypotheses or substantiate certain social
needs, but mainly, it would seem, that philosophical ideas and
doctrines a r e powerful spiritual factors of social development.
T h e founders of M a r x i s m considered it necessary in principle
to introduce a differentiation which did not exist before t h e m ,
between progressive and r e a c t i o n a r y philosophical conceptions,
stressing its concrete, historical c h a r a c t e r , since one and the
same conception m a y play an essentially different social role as a
c o n s e q u e n c e of a c h a n g e in the c h a r a c t e r of social development.
M a r x and Engels were the first to begin treating the develop­
ment of philosophy in connection with the historically deter­
mined s t r u c t u r e of society, the struggle of classes, and t h e t r a n ­
sition from one social formation to a n o t h e r . In particular, they
established the existence of bourgeois philosophy; they called
the philosophical doctrine they developed the philosophy of
the proletariat. This fundamentally new a p p r o a c h to the a n a ­
lysis of philosophical doctrines is o n e of the most i m p o r t a n t p r o ­
positions of historical materialism.
Marxism d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e scientific flimsiness of the idealist
conception of philosophical knowledge standing above history,
explored the historical roots of t h e metaphysical opposing of
philosophy to social practice, and substantiated the principle of
the partisanship of philosophy as a scientific methodological
principle of the study of its c h a n g i n g social content. T h a n k s to
the Marxist history of philosophy it b e c a m e u n d e r s t a n d a b l e ,
for the first time, that the traditional conception of a philosophy
being above a n y party allegiance was a fallacy that could only
be properly u n d e r s t o o d as a reflection of historically transient

275
features of the d e v e l o p m e n t of philosophy, an unscientific re­
flection, without d o u b t , since it did not d r a w a line b e t w e e n t h e
a p p e a r a n c e or semblance and the essence of philosophic k n o w ­
ledge.
If philosophers w e r e c o n v i n c e d for centuries that their
d o c t r i n e s w e r e a b o v e p a r t y , o n e m a y well ask w h a t did t h e y h a v e
in mind? Doesn't the term 'above party' indicate (indirectly, of
c o u r s e ) s o m e essential feature of philosophy that has n o t h i n g
in c o m m o n , h o w e v e r , with being a b o v e party? Doesn't it turn
o u t , t h u s , t h a t this t e r m ( a n d t h e c o n t e n t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h it) i s
an i n a d e q u a t e characterisation of the real status of philosophy?
T h e idea of p h i l o s o p h y being a b o v e p a r t y , which w a s d e ­
f e n d e d by t h e g r e a t p h i l o s o p h e r s , c a n n o t s i m p l y be a fiction
without content, although the idea undoubtedly concealed hy­
pocrisy, servility, s u b o r d i n a t i o n to political reaction, a n d in­
difference to the sufferings and struggle of the oppressed and
exploited. T h e conception of philosophy being above party, in
short, deserves e x p l o r a t i o n as a p h e n o m e n o n of social c o n ­
s c i o u s n e s s ; this false idea is m o r e t h a n s i m p l y p r e j u d i c e or a s e ­
mantic misunderstanding.
P h i l o s o p h y a r o s e a s t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e ; its d i s t i n g u i s h i n g
f e a t u r e was 'uselessness', the r e a s o n s for w h i c h lay both in t h e
u n d e v e l o p e d c h a r a c t e r of theory a n d the limited c h a r a c t e r of
social practice. It was often t h e r e f o r e c h a r a c t e r i s e d as k n o w ­
ledge for the s a k e of k n o w l e d g e , a n d n o t for the s a k e of a n y t h i n g
u s e f u l . A r i s t o t l e s a i d o f it: ' a l l t h e s c i e n c e s , i n d e e d , a r e m o r e n e ­
c e s s a r y t h a n this, b u t n o n e i s b e t t e r ' ( 8 : 5 0 1 ) . T h e f o r m i n g o f
that a t t i t u d e to k n o w l e d g e w a s an i m p o r t a n t l a n d m a r k in m a n ­
k i n d ' s intellectual d e v e l o p m e n t . D e n i a l of a link b e t w e e n p h i l o ­
sophy and non-philosophical needs and interests was clearly a
s o u r c e o f t h e i d e a l i s t n o t i o n o f its b e i n g a b o v e p a r t y .
We k n o w , h o w e v e r , that G r e e k philosophers often took an
active part in the political struggle of their time. T h e y usually
remained, however, theoreticians w h о e n d e a v о u r e d nоt so m u c h
to c o p e with c e r t a i n c u r r e n t political p r o b l e m s as to d e v e l o p a
definite social-political ideal. T h a t stance, not directly linked
with topics of the day, s e e m e d a b o v e party since it differed f r o m
the particular positions of the separate factions of the ruling
class.
Aristotle w a s an ideologist of the ruling class of a s l a v e - o w n i n g
society. He belonged to the M a c e d o n i a n party, but the special
i n t e r e s t s o f t h e p a r t y c o u l d n o t find r e f l e c t i o n i n h i s p h i l o s o p h y .
T h e interests of any o n e class, for e x a m p l e the bourgeoisie, find
reflection in t h e political activity of several parties, t h e differences

276
between which a r e s e c o n d a r y , as a rule, despite the fact that
they m a y c a r r y on a fierce struggle for p o w e r with one another
to implement their private political ends. And the fact that a phi­
losopher reflecting the radical interests of that class rises above
its s e p a r a t e factions seems on the surface to be a rejection of
parly position. But if he, on the c o n t r a r y , is a representative of
one of these factions, that gives g r o u n d s for asserting that, as a
spokesman of it, he is not, strictly speaking, a philosopher, since
a philosopher as the c r e a t o r of a philosophical doctrine c a n n o t
be an a d h e r e n t or opponent, for e x a m p l e , of the c o r n laws
defended by the T o r i e s in the early nineteenth c e n t u r y . 29

If the d o c t r i n e of the Eleatics about being, for example, or

the P y t h a g o r e a n theory of n u m b e r s , was independent of the
political line that supporters of those doctrines pursued, state­
ment of the fact can suggest the idea that philosophers' socio­
political views are only outwardly related to their basic t e a c h ­
ing, and that these views o c c u r in general insofar as the phi­
losopher remains a person, yields to the influence of various
circumstances, and adopts an 'unphilosophic' stance.
According to Hegel philosophy was above party because the
'absolute spirit' philosophised in t h e form of a h u m a n . T h a t
may a p p e a r a kind of ontological justification of the idea of the
above-party c h a r a c t e r of philosophy, but closer analysis inci­
dentally shows, r a t h e r that it substantiates something else, viz.,
the need for a scientifically objective investigation excluding
subjective arbitrariness. ' T o that end,' Hegel wrote, 'there is
required an effort to keep back the incessant impertinence of
our own fancies and private opinions' ( 8 6 : 2 9 4 ) . Observance
of that requirement, however, does not in the least exclude a
social direction of philosophy. Hegel himself also understood
that to some extent, in spite of his absolutising of philosophical
consciousness. He ridiculed, for e x a m p l e , the d e m a n d that 'the
historian should p r o c e e d with impartiality' ( 8 7 : 2 7 7 ) . In par­
ticular, that r e q u i r e m e n t (he wrote) was
often and especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is
insisted there should be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion,
just as a judge should have no special sympathy for one of the con­
tending parties. In the case of the judge it is at the same time assumed
that he would administer his office ill and foolishly, if he had not an
interest, and an exclusive interest in justice, if he had not that for his
aim and one sole aim, or if he declined to judge at all. This requirement
which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for justice;
and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective par­
tiality. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian,
this self-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear, and
rejects both kinds of interest (87:277).

277
 Hegel c o u n t e r p o s e d r e a l partiality, which p r o c e e d s from a n d
is guided by t h e objective, to t h e a r b i t r a r y will of t h e subject,
'subjective partiality'. H e t h u s distinguished b e t w e e n p e r s o n a l
a n d social interests. A g e n u i n e s c h o l a r is always a b o v e a n y p e r ­
sonal interests; he dismisses t h e m , i g n o r i n g t h e m for the s a k e of
t h e interests of t h e m a t t e r . But the s a m e s c h o l a r c a n n o t , a n d in
essence d o e s not, wish to be a b o v e social interests; he is c o n ­
sciously guided by t h e m to t h e e x t e n t t h a t he is a w a r e of t h e m
a n d recognises t h e i r necessity.
Bourgeois s c h o l a r s as a rule t r e a t the idea of t h e partiality or
p a r t i s a n s h i p of philosophy (and of t h e social s c i e n c e s in g e n e ­
ral) as s o m e t h i n g foreign to science, imposed on it from outside.
T h e fact that this idea h a d a l r e a d y been e x p r e s s e d by Hegel,
and to s o m e e x t e n t by o t h e r o u t s t a n d i n g t h i n k e r s , too, is usually
passed over in silence. T h e idea of partiality is t h u s passed off
as an ' i n v e n t i o n ' of M a r x i s m t h a t b r e a k s c o m p l e t e l y with the
traditions of science. T h e Marxist d o c t r i n e of t h e p a r t i s a n s h i p
of p h i l o s o p h y is in fact a theoretical g r a s p i n g of t h e c o u r s e of
the history of philosophy that could not be m a d e by p r e - M a r ­
xian p h i l o s o p h e r s , p r i m a r i l y b e c a u s e they all c l u n g to an ideal­
ist u n d e r s t a n d i n g of history. T h e y m a d e social being d e p e n d e n t
upon social consciousness. T h e question of the reflection of t h e
socio-historical process in philosophical c o n s c i o u s n e s s was e x ­
c l u d e d in fact from scientific e x a m i n a t i o n . 30

T h e f a t h e r s of M a r x i s m e x p l o r e d t h e historical c o u r s e of
t h e m o u l d i n g of b o u r g e o i s philosophy as a reflection of the f o r m ­
ing of the capitalist social system, a n d of the struggle of the
b o u r g e o i s i e and the w h o l e third estate against t h e d o m i n a n t
feudal relations a n d the religious ideology that c o r r e s p o n d e d
to t h e m . T h e materialist c o n c e p t i o n of history not only inter­
preted the d e v e l o p m e n t of philosophical ideas in a new way but
also s h o w e d how t h e b o u r g e o i s c h a r a c t e r of t h e social t r a n s f o r ­
m a t i o n s c o n d i t i o n e d the idealist c o n c e p t i o n of the a b o v e - p a r t y
c h a r a c t e r of philosophy.
T h e b o u r g e o i s r e v o l u t i o n s signified victory of t h e new social
system o v e r feudal provincialism, s e p a r a t i s m , p a r t i c u l a r i s m ,
c o r p o r a t i o n s , caste privileges, etc. T h e f o r m a t i o n of n a t i o n s in
the m o d e r n sense, t h e liquidation of feudal exclusiveness, t h e
p r o g r e s s i n g d e v e l o p m e n t of e c o n o m i c relations, t h e f o r m i n g of
centralised states, a n d t h e f o u n d i n g of b o u r g e o i s - d e m o c r a t i c
institutions all h a d t h e i r ideological e x p r e s s i o n in t h e b o u r g e o i s
idea of t h e common good as t h e m o r a l basis of t h e g o a l - o r i e n t ­
ed c o m m u n i t y of p e o p l e . In e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y b o u r g e o i s i d e o ­
logy this idea w a s f o r m u l a t e d as an a x i o m a t i c a l l y o b v i o u s c o n -

278
viction that the common, highest interests of the nation were
higher than any particular, vested interests of either separate
members of society or of big social groups and classes. T h e
general national upsurge, and bourgeois-democratic illusions,
undoubtedly encouraged not only bourgeois politicians but also
spokesmen of the then proletariat to categorically counterpose
the idea of the unity of the nation to the idea of partisanship.
During the Great French Revolution the proletariat of Rheims
sent the spinner Jean-Baptiste Armonville to the Convention;
he preached 'anarchy and agrarian law' at meetings of the peo­
ple, for which bourgeois contemporaries called him, no less, the
'ringleader of the Rheims rabble'. This proletarian of the eigh­
teenth century accused the bourgeoisie of 'unwise partiality',
opposing it by a striving for the 'common good' and 'ardent
patriotism' that did not suffer any partisanship that infringed
the validity of fraternity and rational freedom, encroaching on
reason, fairness, and justice (see 134; cited from the Russian
translation of 1925, pp. 24, 2 7 ) .
Such was the historical situation that gave the idea of impar­
tiality an anti-feudal sense, so veiling its bourgeois content,
incompatible with the interests of the working people. T h e
same anti-feudal edge and enlightenment illusions about the real
essence of the bourgeois reforms strengthened the appearance
of being above party inherent in philosophy. T h e convictions
of bourgeois philosophers associated with that appearance
were not hypocrisy but fallacy, were the ideological form in
which the bourgeoisie understood its historically limited goals
as having world-historical importance.
T h e founders of bourgeois philosophy proclaimed, as a coun­
ter to the mediaeval tradition, that the sole principle that philo­
sophy and science should conform to was that of truth indepen­
dent of any authority. Any view, belief, or moral, political, re­
ligious, and other considerations and interests should reverence
the truth because there was nothing higher than it. T h e cult of
truth, which was shared equally by rationalists and adherents
of empiricism, was directly realised as the principle of being
above party, but was essentially the party position of the prog­
ressive bourgeoisie. 'Impartiality' meant, then, denial of feudal
partiality. But since the party c h a r a c t e r of this denial could
not be realised from the stance of the politically still undivided
third estate, it took the illusory form of a denial of partiality
in general. J o n a t h a n Swift wrote: 'I meddle not the least with
any Party, but write without Passion, Prejudice, or Ill-will
against any Man or N u m b e r of Men what-soever' (253:277).

279
But the bourgeoisie of that time was really fighting for science
against religion, for progress against feudal reaction, for truth
against what had been proclaimed as truth only because it ac­
c o r d e d with a u t h o r i t y , t r a d i t i o n a n d p o w e r (lay o r c l e r i c a l ) .
T h e ideologists of the bourgeoisie c o n d e m n e d partiality from
the standpoint of an u n c o n s c i o u s partiality as a manifestation
of selfishness, subjectivity, a n d p a r t i c u l a r i s m , which w e r e c o m ­
pletely i n c o m p a t i b l e with the u n c o n d i t i o n a l universality of
truth. 3 2
L e n i n disclosed t h e d e e p social roots of this historically
inevitable a n d progressive 'impartiality' in his article ' T h e S o ­
cialist P a r t y a n d N o n - P a r t y R e v o l u t i o n i s m ' , i n w h i c h h e d e ­
monstrated that the bourgeois revolution, insofar as it was over­
t h r o w i n g the feudal system a n d ' t h e r e b y p u t t i n g into effect t h e
d e m a n d s o f all t h e c l a s s e s o f b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y ' , i n e v i t a b l y r e ­
v e a l e d itself ' i n t h e ' ' p o p u l a r " , a t first g l a n c e n o n - c l a s s , n a t u r e
o f t h e s t r u g g l e o f all c l a s s e s o f a b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y a g a i n s t a u t o ­
c r a c y a n d feudalism' ( 1 4 6 : 7 6 ) . T h e specific f e a t u r e of a b o u r ­
geois revolution, he explained, was that the whole social m o v e ­
ment acquired an appearance of non-partisanship.
T h e u r g e for a ' h u m a n ' , civilised life, (he u r g e to o r g a n i s e in d e f e n c e
of h u m a n dignity, for one's rights as man a n d citizen, takes hold of e v e ­
r y o n e , u n i t e s all classes, v a s t l y o u t g r o w s all p a r t y b o u n d s a n d s h a k e s
u p p e o p l e w h o a s yet a r e v e r y far f r o m b e i n g a b l e t o rise t o p a r t y a l l e ­
giance (146:77).

T h i s specific f e a t u r e o f a b o u r g e o i s r e v o l u t i o n e m e r g e s all t h e
m o r e in philosophy as an a p p e a r a n c e of impartiality since phi­
losophy is r e m o v e d from the e c o n o m i c basis of society m o r e
than any other form of social consciousness.
T h e consolidation of the capitalist system gave bourgeois
philosophy a conservative, protective character, with the con­
s e q u e n c e that the ideal of impartiality, which h a d previously
been directly aimed against feudal reaction, was now opposed
to the class d e m a n d s of the proletariat, which w e r e morally c o n ­
d e m n e d as a c o r p o r a t e position incompatible with the interests
of society as a whole. T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of capitalist society's a n ­
tagonistic c o n t r a d i c t i o n s necessarily alters the specific, histori­
cal content of the a p p e a r a n c e of impartiality. Let me cite an
example. In the mid-nineteenth century Comte, the founder of
'sober', 'scientific', positivist p h i l o s o p h y , c o n v i n c e d the F r e n c h
proletariat that
t r u e h a p p i n e s s h a s n o n e c e s s a r y c o n n e c t i o n with w e a l t h ; t h a t i t d e p e n d s
far m o r e o n f r e e p l a y b e i n g g i v e n t o t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l , m o r a l , a n d social
q u a l i t i e s . . . T h e y will c e a s e t o a s p i r e t o t h e e n j o y m e n t s o f w e a l t h a n d
power (37:418-419).

280
This example shows that bourgeois 'impartiality', a form of
struggle against reactionary forces and traditions historically
inevitable in the age of the assault on feudalism, has naturally
been transformed into the hypocrisy of a semi-official or non-
official apology for capitalism. It was to that kind of 'impartiali­
ty' that Lenin's profound, wrathful words referred when he
said:
the non-party principle in bourgeois society is merely a hypocritical,
disguised, passive expression of adherence to the party of the well-fed,
of the rulers, of the exploiters (146:79).33

T h e principle of the partiality of philosophy, like that of any

social knowledge, is thus a necessary conclusion from the mate­
rialist understanding of social consciousness. Attempts to iso­
late philosophy from other forms of social consciousness as a
special domain of pure, uninterested contemplation do not stand
up to criticism. An appearance of impartiality is essentially in­
herent in all forms of prevailing bourgeois ideology. T h e bour­
geois legal consciousness is an illusory consciousness of the na­
tural justice and fairness of the relations existing between la­
bour and capital, since they are of a 'voluntary' character.
Application of one yardstick to unequal people is perceived by
the man of capitalist society as the principle of equality of all
citizens before the law. Marxism exposed the semblance of law
being above party, showing that it was the will of the dominant
class raised to a law. T h e character of this law is determined in
no small degree by the resistance put up by the exploited to the
exploiting class. That, too, helps preserve the illusion that the
law prevailing in bourgeois society expresses the interests of all.
An appearance of being above party is likewise inherent in
bourgeois morality; it proclaims its copybook maxims to be
eternal, invariant norms of interpersonal relations. But the ac­
tual interpersonal relations in bourgeois society are directly
opposed to the generally proclaimed and substantiated maxims.
And these actual, unwritten morals have a class, party character
by virtue of which man's attitude to man in the conditions of cap­
italist society is largely determined by what class or social
group an individual belongs to.
Religion has an appearance, even greater than philosophy, of
being impartial under the capitalist system. The struggling clas­
ses usually profess the same religion, and they acquire a seem­
ing unity in it, and religion precisely aspires to it in order to re­
concile the opposing classes, whose struggle under advanced
capitalism usually lacks a religious disguise. But 'above-party'
religion inculcates submissiveness and patience in the oppres-

281
sed and exploited; it also gives their protest against the d o m i n a n t
social relations a mitigated, conformist c h a r a c t e r . T h e M a r x i a n
critique of bourgeois philosophy, bourgeois religion, bourgeois
law, etc., is above all an unmasking of its intrinsic a p p e a r a n c e
of being a b o v e class and above party, which is g e n e r a t e d not
only by t h e history of capitalist production but also by the inner
objective patterns of its functioning. T h e Marxist theory of class
struggle scientifically explains why bourgeois ideology prea­
ches t h e idea of impartiality, and why socialist ideology is a n e ­
gation of this false idea, which reflects only a p p e a r a n c e .
Lenin wrote:
The most purposeful, most comprehensive and specific expression of
the political struggle of classes is the struggle of parties. The non-party
principle means indifference to the struggle of parties... Hence, in pra­
ctice, indifference to the struggle does not at all mean standing aloof
from the struggle, abstaining from it, or being neutral. Indifference is
tacit support of the strong, of those who rule (146:79).

And he drew a conclusion of immense principled significance,

to wit, impartiality is a bourgeois idea, partisanship a socialist
one.
Bourgeois philosophers often express the opinion that phi­
losophy differs from other forms of knowledge in its disinterest­
edness in coping with practical tasks, its striving in the realm of
p u r e theory, u n c o n n e c t e d with practice and the stormy worldly
sea, and in intellectual i n d e p e n d e n c e from e v e r y t h i n g that is
acknowledged and sanctified by every kind of authority. In
the 1840s the Young Hegelian M a x Stirner formulated this
philosophical illusion as follows: 'A philosopher is only such
who sees heaven in the world, the heavenly in the earthly,
and the divine in the worldly, and proves or d e m o n s t r a t e s it'
( 2 5 0 : 8 7 ) . In The German Ideology M a r x and Engels ridiculed
this illusion of alienated philosophical consciousness, which
in effect reconciled itself with all that exists, since the latter
was claimed to be foreign to philosophy. Stirner was a lower
middle-class ideologist, and his notion of the unworldly essence
of philosophy reflected in a way the indefinite position of that
class g r o u p .
In our day attempts of that kind to understand philosophy
as thinking remote from everything that affects in o n e way or
other non-philosophical consciousness, a r e no less c o m m o n
than in the last century. T h e Belgian philosopher Flam, for
instance, starting from the thesis that philosophical thought was
universal and that it existed only as 'free t h o u g h t ' and was iden­
tical in essence with it, concluded that

282
 philosophy should serve no one, neither theology nor science, and not
a social movement. To demand that a philosopher serve a social move­
ment is to make him cease to be a philosopher (61:167).
T h e s e statements clearly illustrate t h e irreconcilable opposition
between t h e philosophy of Marxism a n d bourgeois, illusorily
impartial p h i l o s o p h y .
34

Bourgeois critics of t h e idea of the partisanship of social

knowledge treat t h e p a r t y position in t h e r e a l m of theory as bias,
prejudice, a predilection for dogma, an incapacity for i n d e p e n ­
dent tackling of questions and critical analysis of one's own con­
victions, and absence of a readiness to learn from the different­
ly minded, to listen to the a r g u m e n t s of the opposite side, and to
evaluate the state of affairs calmly and without bias. P a r t i s a n ­
ship is depicted as an obsession a m o u n t i n g sometimes to fanatic­
ism, as a conviction whose premiss is disagreement with all pos­
sible opponents, but at the same time as a constant readiness to
a g r e e with their assertions w h e n they themselves repudiate
them. Many bourgeois philosophers, sociologists, or simply spe­
cialists in t h e 'critique' of M a r x i s m , claim that all matters a r e
decided in a d v a n c e for t h e partisan person, and that all his con­
victions a r e no m o r e than suggestions from outside, because
such a person has no intellectual or moral i n d e p e n d e n c e .
T h e bourgeois critic of partisanship, of course, claims that
it is inherent only in Marxism. And that evaluation of Marxism
as a doctrine that ignores truth for the sake of partisanship is
fobbed off as impartial and unbiassed. T h e r e is no need to d e ­
monstrate that such an interpretation of M a r x i s m is highly p a r ­
tial, and precisely in the bourgeois sense, i.e. foreign to objecti­
vity. Marxism and, consequently, the philosophy of Marxism
adopt a partisan position since they do not lay claim to the role
of arbiter in the historical battle between the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie, and c o m e out directly on the side of the working
class and all w h o a r e oppressed and exploited. This partisan p o ­
sition is naturally evaluated by the apologists of capitalism as
prejudice and subjectivity, since that is how the bourgeoisie
appraises the class d e m a n d s of t h e proletariat.
In theory the bourgeois ideologist usually finds a c o u n t e r ­
balance to partisanship in objectivism understood as alien to a
subjective a p p r o a c h to the investigative task. But objectivism,
interpreted as a denial of partisanship, has nothing in c o m m o n
with real scientific objectivity. It is a one-sided and therefore
subjectivist statement of definite objective tendencies but at the
s a m e time an ignoring of the opposite tendencies whose action
alters the course of the process t h a t the objectivist claims to be

283
giving a rigorously scientific description of. T h e objectivist con­
sequently ignores such a supremely essential c o m p o n e n t of the
socio-historical process as the subjective factor. As Chagin
correctly notes, the latter is
the forces of consciousness that man, social groups, classes, nations,
and parties put into action. These forces of consciousness are trans­
formed in the course of practice into material forces and affect the rea­
lity around man through practice, altering and transforming it (33:3).

Engels criticised 'that self-complacent "objectivity" which sees

no further than its nose and precisely for that reason a m o u n t s
to the most n a r r o w - m i n d e d subjectivity' ( 1 8 0 : 3 2 7 ) . Lenin
subjected Struve's objectivism to systematic criticism; the latter
flirted with Marxism and depicted it as a doctrine of insuperable
tendencies of social development that c a m e about i n d e p e n d e n ­
tly of the activity of people, classes, parties, etc. Objective his­
torical necessity, Lenin explained, rejecting Struve's 'object­
ivism' existed, changed and was realised by the activity of clas­
ses and parties and to the extent of their social activity. T h e
realisation of historical necessity is not an u n a m b i g u o u s p r o ­
cess; its c h a r a c t e r is conditioned by what class is 'managing' it.
T h u s bourgeois objectivism, by its social content, turns to be
sophisticated bourgeois partisanship, and theoretically a ver­
sion of the fatalistic conception of the course of history that
ignores the dialectical interpenetration of subjective and o b ­
jective internally inherent in it.
M a r x , c h a r a c t e r i s i n g the views of R i c a r d o , stressed that the
outstanding economist was a conscious defender of the interests
of the bourgeoisie. But since he defended the real needs of so­
cial development his partisan position did not in the least con­
tradict the aspiration for truth natural to any g e n u i n e scholar.
And Marx noted that R i c a r d o ' s inquiries were distinguished by
'scientific impartiality and love of truth' (see 167:1, 4 1 2 ) . A
contradiction between partisanship and scientific objectivity
arises only when the scholar scorns the real needs of social d e ­
velopment; in that case, however, he also betrays scientific
objectivity. T h e g e n u i n e scientist and investigator adopts a
definite partisan position not in spite of his research activity or
irrespective of it, but precisely because he consistently develops
the truths established by him. In his r e m e m b r a n c e s of M a r x ,
Paul L a f a r g u e c h a r a c t e r i s e d the latter's path to proletarian
partisanship as follows:
He did not come to the Communist standpoint through sentimental
considerations, although he had a profound sympathy for the suffer­
ings of the working class, but through study of history and political

284
 economy; he claimed that any impartial spirit who was not influenced
by private interests and not blinded by class prejudices must necessarily
come to such conclusions (131:11).

Proletarian, C o m m u n i s t partisanship was thus integrally

l i n k e d , f o r M a r x , w i t h tireless s e a r c h for t r u t h , a n d with a most
resolute rejection of bourgeois dogmas, ordinary notions, and
prejudices.
T h e r e a l e x p l o r e r o f t h e social p r o c e s s , p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e o f
his i n q u i r y , is a w a r e of t h e n e e d f o r a definite s t a n d in t h e fight
b e t w e e n p r o g r e s s i v e a n d r e a c t i o n a r y social f o r c e s . I t w a s t h a t ,
seemingly, that Engels had in mind when he pointed out that
M a r x i s m w a s w i n n i n g s u p p o r t e r s 'in e v e r y c o u n t r y w h i c h c o n ­
tains on the o n e h a n d proletarians and on the other u n d a u n t e d
scientific t h e o r e t i c i a n s ' ( 5 0 : 1 3 ) .
It seems particularly shocking for the upholders of hypocri­
tical b o u r g e o i s ' i m p a r t i a l i t y ' t h a t M a r x i s m r e g a r d s p h i l o s o p h y
(this s p e c u l a t i v e s c i e n c e ! ) a s p a r t i s a n a n d criticises c o n t e m p o ­
r a r y idealist d o c t r i n e s a s s u p p o r t i n g t h e c a p i t a l i s t s y s t e m . B o ­
c h e ń s k i , w h o s n u b b e d d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m literally a s a d i a ­
bolical d e l u s i o n , n e v e r t h e l e s s c l a i m e d t h a t ' t h e p h i l o s o p h e r
will feel e v e n less t h e n e e d for v i c t o r y in a c o n t e s t . . . He is a l w a y s
p r e p a r e d t o a b a n d o n his o w n v i e w s i f h e finds t h a t t h e o t h e r
p e r s o n ' s i d e a s a r e m o r e c o r r e c t ' ( 1 7 : 1 7 8 ) . But b e i n g c o n ­
s c i o u s , s e e m i n g l y , t h a t s u c h a n u n c t i o u s a r g u m e n t was t o o c o n ­
t r a d i c t o r y t o t h e facts, h e t a c k e d o n : 'Of c o u r s e , w e a r e all m e n '
( i b i d . ) . T h e p h i l o s o p h e r ' s social position was t h u s e x p l a i n e d
simply as h u m a n weakness. T h a t i m a g i n a r y indifference to the
s t r u g g l e of classes in b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y signified s u p p o r t of t h e
d o m i n a n t e x p l o i t i n g class. A n d t h e m o r e a b o u r g e o i s p h i l o s o ­
p h e r s h a r e s t h e illusion of i n d e s t r u c t i b i l i t y of capitalist r e l a ­
tions, t h e f u r t h e r his p h i l o s o p h y is f r o m s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l reality
a n d its v i o l e n t a n d often t r a g i c collisions. 35

H o w e v e r s u r p r i s i n g it is at first g l a n c e , t h e illusory n o t i o n
of t h e e t e r n a l c h a r a c t e r of c a p i t a l i s m still s u r v i v e s in t h e
c o n s c i o u s n e s s of a c o n s i d e r a b l e mass of p e o p l e in b o u r g e o i s
s o c i e t y , i n c l u d i n g its ideologists. But c a p i t a l i s t r e a l i t y c o n s ­
tantly dispels the illusion. In t h e m i d d l e of t h e n i n e t e e n t h
c e n t u r y t h e m o s t f a r - s e e i n g b o u r g e o i s ideologists w e r e a l r e a d y
faced with a n e e d t o c o n c e r n t h e m s e l v e s with c o m p r e h e n d ­
ing class a n t a g o n i s m s instead o f s i m p l y i g n o r i n g t h e m . A l o n g s i d e
t h e t r a d i t i o n a l n o t i o n s of p h i l o s o p h y b e i n g a b o v e p a r t y a
n e w c o n c e p t i o n w a s t a k i n g s h a p e , viz., t h a t t h e r e c o u l d n o t
b e i m p a r t i a l j u d g e m e n t s o n m a t t e r s t h a t affected t h e i n t e r e s t s
of p e o p l e .

285
 If the proposition of the square of the hypotenuse [Taine wrote] had
shocked out mental habits, we would very quickly have refuted it. If we
had a need to believe that crocodiles were gods, a temple would be rais­
ed to them tomorrow on the Place du Carrousel (254:290).

T h o s e words were not only recognition of the d e p e n d e n c e of

a certain kind of j u d g e m e n t on h u m a n needs but also a rela­
tivist-subjectivist denial of the possibility of objective truth in
j u d g m e n t s of that kind. T h i n k e r s who claimed that philosophy
was above party supposed that any manifestation of partisan­
ship in it meant rejection of a selfless search for t r u t h . T h a t was
precisely how T a i n e interpreted partisanship, with the differen­
ce only that he excluded the possibility of impartial social know­
ledge; philosophers in general did not differ much from other
people, they had the same passions, beliefs, and subjective p r e ­
dispositions. ' T h e i r opinions a r e sentiments, their beliefs pas­
sions, their faith is their life' ( 2 5 4 : 2 0 8 ) .
So, while disputing the traditional conception of philosophy
being above party, he s h a r e d the notions of its s u p p o r t e r s about
the consequences of partisanship, which seemed to him to be
disastrous. T h e subsequent development of bourgeois philo­
sophy in conditions of s h a r p e n i n g class struggle e n c o u r a g e d a
consolidation of this tendency to recognise the partisanship of
philosophy and a striving to link philosophy directly with b o u r ­
geois politics. T a i n e ' s c o n t e m p o r a r y Nietzsche, for whom a
presentiment of the future bitterness of class battles was cha­
racteristic, derided the traditional notion of speculative philo­
sophising, which had no marked effect on m a n k i n d ' s history.
How I understand the philosopher—as a terrible explosive, endangering
everything—how my concept of the philosopher is worlds removed from
any concept that would include even a Kant, not tо speak of academic
'ruminants' and other professors of philosophy—this essay gives inesti­
mable information about that... (196:281).

Bourgeois philosophers of the pre-imperialist age openly a c ­

knowledged through Nietzsche that the struggle of philosophic­
al ideas was not some sort of show that could be watched with
dispassionate gaze; willy-nilly, consciously or unconsciously,
we w e r e involved in it.
E v e r y o n e takes a stance in the struggle of ideologies either
for or against, but the philosopher differs indeed from the n o n -
philosopher in ideologically substantiating, formulating, and
defending a definite social position. Man accepts that water
consists of hydrogen and oxygen, and not of o t h e r elements,
without protest or approval, simply as fact. But he is far from
indifferent to what philosophy says about the material and im-

286
material, about body and soul, about the world a r o u n d us, about
the future of the h u m a n r a c e , and even a b o u t its past. 'Objecti­
vity and objectivism must not be confused', the F r e n c h i r r a ­
tionalist B o u t r o u x declared ( 2 2 : 4 2 7 ) . His words were close
to Nietzsche's statements, and at the s a m e time went further.
He opposed objectivity to objectivism. His critique of objectiv­
ism was very far from scientism and was aimed, moreover,
against it. Objectivism, he claimed, was the realm of scientific
research, which eliminated m a n ' s relation to the object even
when the object was m a n himself. Objectivity, in contrast, was
alien to science and formed a specific a c h i e v e m e n t of philo­
sophy, which included the h u m a n relation to the object of k n o w ­
ledge in all its judgements. Philosophical objectivity thus c a m e
close to ' n a t u r a l ' h u m a n subjectivity, which was opposed to the
soulless objectivism of scientific knowledge. So a revision of the
traditional conception of the a b o v e - p a r t y c h a r a c t e r of philoso­
phy began.
It was not so far from B o u t r o u x to existentialism, which
defines scientific truths as impersonal, and philosophy as an in­
terested, personal view of things, above all of h u m a n reality.
Heidegger, for instance, t h o u g h he did n o t speak of the a b o v e -
party n a t u r e of philosophy, a r g u e d a b o u t the 'mood of thinking'
which was fully reserved in p u r e speculation, free of sensuous
urges or interests.
It often seems [he wrote] from outside as if thought were completely
free of any mood by virtue of its rational notions and calculations. But
both the coldness of computation and the prosaic sobriety of a project
are a characteristic of certainty. Not only that; even the reason that
holds itself to be free of all influences of passion is disposed as such to
confidence in the logico-mathematical judiciousness of its principles
and rules (95:43).

While Heidegger confined himself to recognition of the de­

p e n d e n c e of thinking on subjective factors independent of it,
Jaspers went further. In his Autobiography he claimed that
it was politics that helped deepen philosophical understanding:
'only with my emotional development by politics did my philo­
sophy c o m e to full consciousness' ( 1 1 2 : 5 7 ) . And, generalising
the conclusion d r a w n from his own intellectual biography, he
categorically declared: ' T h e r e is no philosophy without politics
and without political conclusions ( 1 1 2 : 5 6 ) .
A third major spokesman of existentialism, J e a n - P a u l S a r t r e ,
tried to grasp the opposition of the main philosophical trends
on the social plane.
A feature of idealism that particularly offends revolutionaries [he

287
 wrote] is the tendency to represent the changes of the world as govern­
ed by ideas, or better still as changes in ideas (237:210).
In contrast to idealism, materialism was an 'active weapon' in
Sartre's conviction. T h a t was not, he declared, a whim of in­
tellectuals or a mistake of philosophers; 'today materialism is
the philosophy of the proletariat to the exact extent that the
proletariat is revolutionary' ( 2 3 7 : 1 7 4 ) . S a r t r e , incidentally,
did not link the revolutionary significance of materialism with
the objective truth contained in it; it was 'the sole myth (my
italics—Т.О.) that meets revolutionary d e m a n d s ' ( 2 3 7 : 1 7 5 ) .
We can thus state that the idealist conception of philosophy
being above party has been revised to s o m e extent by bourgeois
philosophers themselves, w h o a r g u e m o r e and m o r e often in
our day about the inevitable 'involvement' of philosophy. Isn't
that evidence that they a r e coming close to recognition and
understanding of the correctness of the M a r x i a n conception?
Of course not. Even those who directly link philosophy with
politics by no means consider themselves bourgeois philosoph­
ers, i.e. they suppose they a r e outside parties. T h e i r vulgar,
subjectivist interpretation of the partisanship of philosophy is
d r a w n from the bourgeois idealist sociology of knowledge.
T h e sociology of knowledge, which has taken shape under
the undoubted influence of historical materialism, but at the
same time in struggle against it, rejects the traditional r e q u i r e ­
ment of a radical elimination of a value orientation from the
science of society, which was systematically substantiated by
W e b e r back at the beginning of this c e n t u r y . This r e q u i r e m e n t
36

is now explained as out-of-date, impracticable, and even d a n ­

gerous; it both disorientates and ideologically disarms sociolo­
gy. G u n n a r Myrdal, for instance, wrote:
There is no way of studying social reality other than from the stand­
point of human ideals. A 'disinterested social science' has never existed
and, for logical reasons, cannot exist. The value connotation of our
main concepts represents our interest in a matter, gives direction to
our thoughts and significance to our inferences. It poses the questions
without which there are no answers (188:1).

Bourgeois sociology is also beginning to recognise such quite

banal truths as that objectivity and neutrality a r e not the s a m e
thing. But the whole point is that a value orientation or 'feeling
of fidelity' is mainly characterised as a p r o p e r t y inherent in the
personality of the r e s e a r c h e r . T h e question of the social inter­
ests that got expression in sociological or philosophical theories
is left out of a c c o u n t as before.
Ideology has b e c o m e a subject of special study for c o n t e m -

288
porary bourgeois philosophers and sociologists. Its significance
is stressed in every way, and the ideological intentions of so­
cial research are being disclosed by sociologists, Some see in
them an unavoidable evil, the ineradicable presence of a sub­
jective, human element. Others are ready to examine ideolo­
gical intentions, as well, as something positive, at least in cer­
tain conditions. But no contemporary bourgeois researcher con­
siders himself an ideologist. None of them, as will readily be un­
derstood, considers himself a bourgeois theoretician. This half­
way stance shows that bourgeois thinkers are incapable of end­
ing the myth of the above-party character of philosophy and
social knowledge in general. Such is the nature of bourgeois
partisanship; it cannot help donning the toga of impartiality. A
vague consciousness that bourgeois partisanship is essentially
antipeople finds expression in that fact. T h e bourgeois ideolo­
gist inevitably counterposes partisanship and scientific charac­
ter to one another. This theoretical position reflects the real
antithesis between bourgeois partisanship and scientism. Marx­
ian partisanship, on the contrary, is distinguished by its const­
ant link with scientism. In substantiating the principle of parti­
sanship Marx wrote as follows:
But when a man seeks to accommodate science to a viewpoint which
is derived not from science itself (however erroneous it may be) but
from outside, from alien, external interests, then I call him 'base'
(176:119).
Bourgeois vulgarisers of the Marxist principle of partisanship
of course do not understand that statement of Marx's. They
see in it—retreat from the principle of partisanship and so de­
monstrate their incapacity to understand this great scientific
principle.
Exploration of the phenomenon of the partisanship of
philosophy does not, of course, boil down to bringing out its
social content and direction; in that respect, as I stressed above,
philosophy does not differ from other forms of social conscious­
ness. But philosophy is a specific form of cognition. As for its
content, it relates, as we know, not only to social but also to
natural reality, and that, in particular, determines its special
place in the system of sciences of nature on the one hand and
of society on the other.
When a philosopher expresses his opinion on social and po­
litical matters, his party position does not differ in principle
from that of the sociologist, historian, or economist. Philo­
sophical judgements, it is true, have a more general, abstract
character than those of the economist or historian, but this
19-01603 289
difference cannot be taken into consideration in this case al­
though it presents a possibility of interpreting philosophers'
socio-political statements in different ways. T h e point that in­
terests me here is something else. Since epistemological and on­
tological conceptions form the most important content of phi­
losophy, the point is the following: how far are the socio-politic­
al ideas expressed by philosophers connected with their ontolo­
gical and epistemological conceptions? Do they include (of
course implicitly) a certain social bias?
One needs to specify immediately that there cannot be an
unambiguous answer to these questions, since the degree of de­
pendence of some opinion on others differs. Plato's social uto­
pia theoretically comprehended a certain historical experience.
It would be a d e p a r t u r e from materialism to consider it simply
as a theoretical inference from the doctrine of transcendent
ideas. But it would be no less mistaken to ignore the real link
of the Platonic theory of the state with the doctrine of immu­
table ideas of justice, truth, and the beautiful, which, accord­
ing to Plato, determined this-worldly life. T h e ideal state about
which Plato wrote was conceived as the happy outcome of
mankind's misadventures through the establishment of a perfect
social set-up. T h e doctrine of transcendent ideas substantiated
and justified this social ideal.
T h e attempt to establish a unity between Berkeley's econom­
ic views and his philosophy was hardly crowned with success.
But his economic and philosophical views obviously had cer­
tain common features that stemmed from his empirical nomi­
nalism. That was displayed, for example, in his theory of mo­
ney.
Materialists and idealists, rationalists and empiricists devel­
oped a theory of natural law. T h e divergences in the views of
Hobbes and Rousseau, Spinoza and Locke on the origin and
essence of the state (they were all, we know, supporters of the
theory of natural l a w ) , a r e irreducible to philosophical disag­
reements between them. It is evidence simply that philosoph­
ers' socio-political conceptions must not be regarded as logical
inferences from their doctrines of the world and knowledge.
It would be even more mistaken to try and deduce the ontolo­
gical and epistemological views of philosophers from their so­
cio-political convictions. Something else is required in order
to understand the relation between these views: though not di­
rectly connected they supplement one another in some way
within the context of a single philosophical theory, materialist
or idealist, rationalist or empiricist.

290
 The philosophical doctrine of elements (water, air, fire, and
earth) arose in antiquity and existed until the end of the eigh­
teenth century. It would be a concession to vulgar sociologism to
regard that conception as a reflection of social being and a his­
torically determined social structure. And that does not apply
just to the doctrine of elements; epistemological and ontologic­
al ideas in general directly lack social colouring. An inference
that philosophy is above party, however, does not follow from
that fact, but rather a scientific understanding of the role of in-
terpretation in bringing out the social sense (partisanship) of
philosophical ideas.
Locke claimed (not without grounds) that the theory of in­
nate ideas served tyranny (see 152:55, 5 6 ) . With Plato it
substantiated natural inequality between people, i.e. had an
aristocratic character. Locke was not right, however, since he
spoke of the social tendency of the theory without allowing for
the possibility of another interpretation, a possibility that had
already come to light in his day. According to Descartes' doc­
trine, the original ideas of human reason, from which the whole
aggregate of theoretical knowledge could be deduced, were
equally inborn in all people and constituted what was usually
called common sense (bon sens), and no one, of course, com­
plained of a deficiency of it. This interpretation had an essen­
tially democratic character. Locke's doctrine of experience,
according to which there were no innate ideas (which was the
philosophical antithesis of Descartes' doctrine) expressed the
same bourgeois-democratic tendency in the social respect. In
the doctrine of the French eighteenth-century materialists sen­
sualism philosophically substantiated a bourgeois-humanist out­
look. But that same materialist sensualism was the philosophical
basis of the Utopian communism of Mably, Dezamy, and their
followers.
Seventeenth-century rationalism, which proclaimed human
reason an all-powerful capacity for knowing, had an essential­
ly anti-theological and (in those historical conditions) an un­
doubtedly anti-feudal character, in spite of the inconsistency of
its outstanding spokesmen, who endeavoured to employ a ratio­
nalist epistemology to solve theological problems. The empiric­
al materialists who polemicised against the rationalists, deve­
loped the same anti-theological, anti-feudal social programme,
but the idealist interpretation of empiricism in Berkeley's
philosophy was substantiation of a compromise with feudal
ideology.
Kant tried to reconcile rationalism with empiricism, a stance

291
that made it possible, as his doctrine showed, to develop a
bourgeois-democratic outlook. But Fichte's rationalism pro­
moted the same task even better.
Feuerbach's materialist anthropologism was a doctrine of
the natural equality of all men and a radically democratic de­
nial of feudal ideological prejudices. The Marxian denial of
anthropologism, i.e. its understanding of human essence as an
aggregate of historically determined social relations, is a phi­
losophical substantiation of the objective need for class struggle
in order to achieve real social equality.
Carlyle's doctrine of 'heroes' and the 'mob' was an ideology
of feudal-romantic reaction. The Young Hegelians, who con­
tinued that doctrine, interpreted it in the spirit of bourgeois ra­
dicalism. The Russian Populists (members of the People's Free­
dom Party) turned this doctrine into a revolutionary call to the
lower middle-class intelligentsia: viz., to become heroes so as to
awaken and lead the people.
T h e r e is no need to multiply examples to illusrate that the
social sense of epistemological and ontological ideas are inse­
parable from their interpretation, an interpretation, moreover,
that links them with certain socio-political propositions. Only
on that condition does any philosophical proposition acquire
social content in the context of one system of views or another,
and in that sense becomes a party point of view.
So far I have talked of partisanship as a social position in
theory or a certain interpretation of epistemological and onto­
logical ideas. A third aspect specially characterising philosophy
is the consistent following and defence of a principled line, and
unswerving adherence to the main principles of a philosoph­
ical theory, whether materialist or idealist. From that point of
view it presupposes a clear demarcation of mutually exclusive
trends, a consistent counterposing of the defended trend to the
opposite one, a distinct consciousness of the unprincipled cha­
racter (and hopelessness) of combining materialism and ideal­
ism, and struggle against attempts to reconcile these main phi­
losophical trends. That determines one of the most important
aspects of the dialectical-materialist critique of eclecticism and
all possible attempts to transcend the allegedly obsolete anti­
thesis of materialism and idealism.
Marx had already, in 1843, i.e. when he had just reached the
position of dialectical materialism, profoundly realised the
fundamental flimsiness of the doctrines that laid claim to the
'highest' synthesis, i.e. the uniting of mutually exclusive pro­
positions. From these positions he criticised the late Schelling:

292
 To the French romantics and mystics he cries: 'I, the union of philo­
sophy and theology', to the French materialists: 'I, the union of flesh
and idea', to the French sceptics: 'I, the destroyer of dogmatism' (172:
:350).

Lenin, highly valuing this partisan philosophical position of the

young Marx, stressed:
this refusal to recognise the hybrid projects for reconciling materialism
and idealism constitutes the great merit of Marx, who moved forward
along a sharply-defined philosophical road (142:317).

I have already referred to philosophical eclecticism above;

in the light of the Marxist doctrine of the partisanship of phi­
losophy, it makes a claim to a position of impartiality in the
struggle of the main trends. Eclecticism, which is not, of course,
a view above party, is always ready to see one-sidedness, an in­
capacity for ideological communication and dogmatism in phi­
losophical partisanship, consistency, and adherence to princi­
ple. But the antithesis between materialism and idealism differs
radically from the opposition of one-sided views actually oc­
curring in science and philosophy. In the dispute between deter­
minist and indeterminist metaphysicians, for instance, both par­
ties defended one-sided views. The former argued that necessity
was universal and freedom impossible; the latter substantiated
the existence of undetermined freedom. These one-sided con­
ceptions were overcome by a dialectical posing of the problem,
which brought out the unity of freedom and determination.
The rationalist and empiricist philosophical doctrines were
the same one-sided antithesis. We are now well aware what the
rationalists were right in, and what their opponents. The one­
sided antithesis between epistemological rationalism and empi­
ricist epistemology was not removed, however, by reconciling
them, but by a new understanding of the relation of the theore­
tical and empirical. T h e point of departure for overcoming this
one-sided antithesis was a dialectical development of material­
ist sensualism.
The antithesis of materialism and idealism differs in prin­
ciple from that kind of opposition. To employ Marx's words
characterising the relation of mutually exclusive opposites, one
can say that materialism and idealism
do not need each other, they do not supplement each other. The one
does not have in its own bosom the longing for, the need for, the anti­
cipation of the other (168:88).

This antithesis thus embraces the whole aggregate of philosoph­

ical questions. The materialist does not enrich but, on the con-

293
trary, impoverishes his doctrine when he includes idealist pro­
positions in it. The idealist does not overcome his basic fallacy
by adopting separate materialist propositions (as Mach did).
The fact that materialism and idealism usually discuss one and
the same philosophical problems does not mitigate the contra­
diction existing between them but on the contrary increases it.
This antithesis of the main philosophical trends is further
strengthened by there being no third road, at least for consistent
philosophers.
T h e genius of M a r x and Engels [Lenin wrote] lies precisely in the
fact that during a very long period, nearly half a century, they develop­
ed materialism, further advanced one fundamental trend in philo­
sophy ( 1 4 2 : 3 1 5 ) .

This consistency, branded as one-sidedness by eclectics, is the

genuine road of scientific research.
Those who take fallacy for truth of course reproach their
opponents who reject their fallacy with one-sidedness, intole­
rance and incommunicability. Those who defend the truth also
happen to fad into errors, of course, but that is not evidence of
compromise. The demarcation of opposing views, a clear de­
limitation of different points of view, consistent following of
principle, and the impermissibility of mixing and confusing
views that do not agree with one another, all these are require­
ments of rigorous scientific character and at the same time
Marxist demands of philosophy's partisanship.
T h e counterposing of partisanship and scientism so c h a r a c ­
teristic of bourgeois writers expresses the basic features of bour­
geois ideology, which by its very nature is unscientific. And
when a bourgeois ideologist talks of the unscientific character
of any ideology, he is only making a norm of the essence of his
own ideology. That is typical subjectivism. The philosophy of
Marxism substantiates the principle of the unity of partisanship
and scientific character. 'The more ruthlessly and disinterested­
ly science proceeds,' Engels said, 'the more it finds itself in har­
mony with the interests and aspirations of the workers' (52 :
:376).
Philosophy cannot be treated as partly partisan or partisan
in the part of it devoted to social matters. The partisanship of
philosophy is its social inspiration and the specific historical
trend that determines its whole content and manifests itself in
the posing and solution of all problems. A desire to pursue the
principle of partisanship in philosophy is quite insufficient; a
deep understanding of its social and epistemological content,
and of the specific method of its scientific application in various

294
fields o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l k n o w l e d g e ( a n d n o t just p h i l o s o p h i c a l )
is also required. As is stated in t h e P r o g r a m m e of the C P S U
(1986):
S o c i a l i s m h a s g i v e n S o v i e t s o c i e t y ' s i n t e l l e c t u a l a n d c u l t u r a l life a
scientific w o r l d o u t l o o k b a s e d o n M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m , w h i c h i s a n i n ­
tegral a n d h a r m o n i o u s system of philosophical, economic and socio­
p o l i t i c a l v i e w s . T h e P a r t y c o n s i d e r s i t its m o s t i m p o r t a n t d u t y t o c o n ­
tinue creatively developing Marxist-Leninist theory of studying a n d
generalising new p h e n o m e n a in Soviet society, taking into a c c o u n t
t h e e x p e r i e n c e of o t h e r c o u n t r i e s of the socialist c o m m u n i t y a n d
the world communist, working-class, national liberation and democratic
movements and analysing the progress in the natural, technical and
social sciences (217 : 5 6 ) .

S t r e n g t h e n i n g of the unity of various sciences presupposes a

profound mastering of the Marxist-Leninist dialectical-mate­
rialist m e t h o d o l o g y of scientific t h o u g h t , t h e sole reliable i n s t r u ­
m e n t for cognising society a n d n a t u r e . All that directly witnes­
ses to t h e g r o w i n g role of t h e p h i l o s o p h y of M a r x i s m in t h e
system of t h e sciences of n a t u r e a n d society.
 CONCLUSION

T h e course of the history of philosophy, often likened to a com­

edy of errors, wandering in a labyrinth, and an anarchy of
systems, forms one of the most important dimensions of man's
intellectual progress. The quests for a correct outlook on the
world and the tragic delusions and misconceptions, and diver­
gences of philosophical doctrines, and their polarisation into
mutually exclusive trends, the battle of the trends, which is some­
times perceived as a permanent philosophical scandal, are
not just the searches, torments, and delusions of individual
philosophers but are the spiritual drama of all humanity, and
he who pictures it as a farce seemingly interprets the tragic so­
lely as idola theatri.
The antinomies into which philosophy falls, the crises that
rock it, the retreats and withdrawals, the following of a beaten
path, including that of errors already committed in the past,
the rejection of real philosophical discoveries for the sake of
long-refused fallacies persistently taken for truth—do these just
characterise philosophy? Philosophy is the spiritual image of
mankind, and its achievements and mishaps constitute the most
vital content of man's intellectual biography.
The specific feature of philosophy is theoretical comprehen­
sion of universal human experience and the whole aggregate
of knowledge so as to create an integral conception of the world.
T h e difficulties on the way of philosophical comprehension of
reality are constantly increasing because the treasury of human
experience and knowledge is being constantly enriched. The
theoretical results of philosophical exploration are quite mo­
dest, in particular when compared with those of natural science.
The fight between philosophical doctrines that throws doubts
on the possibility of getting agreement even on elementary mat-

296
ters, evokes a sceptical attitude among non-philosopher special­
ists to a science so unlike the others whose fruitful results are
generally recognised. But philosophy, though it does not prom­
ise very much and yields even less (as it seems to some), pos­
sesses amazing attractive force, as even philosophising dilettantes
cannot help recognising who suggest to abolish it as practi­
cally useless; as Engels remarked, philosophy teaches how to
think theoretically. In fact, in order to think about a separate
subject, certain general notions are needed. The greater the
aggregate of subjects the more general still the notions needed
to understand it. As Lenin pointed out:
anybody who tackles partial problems without having previously settled
general problems, will inevitably and at every step 'come up against'
those general problems without himself realising it (140:489).
In short, the broader the field of phenomena to which cognis­
ing thought turns, the broader the concepts needed for it. But
theoretical thinking does not deal simply with phenomena that
can be described, counted, etc., but with patterns whose univer­
sality is not limited by empirically established boundaries in
space and time.
Philosophical thought is thus an obligatory premiss of theore­
tical knowledge. To avoid oversimplification this must not be
understood in the sense that only someone who has studied phi­
losophy will become a theoretically thinking subject. People
think logically even when they have no notion of logic as a
science. Maybe they mastered the elements of logic at school in
mathematics lessons, in study of their native tongue, or in some
other unconscious way. It is unlikely that anyone would infer
from this that study of logic does not foster development of
theoretical thinking. The same applies even more to philoso­
phy. The high appraisal of philosophical knowledge in the form­
ing of theoretical thought, in particular of its most developed
forms, directly indicates the outstanding significance, perhaps
still not adequately appreciated, of the scientific history of phi­
losophy which, as a scientific, theoretical summing-up of all
philosophical knowledge, is capable of playing an essentially
incomparable role in developing an individual capacity for
theoretical thought. One of the basic tasks of this discipline is
therefore to create a rational system of the creative mastery of
the inexhaustible wealth of philosophical knowledge, and to
explore the patterns governing the contradictory unity of this
knowledge.
The countless number of philosophical conceptions, theories,
tendencies, and trends puzzles not only the novice but also spe-

297
cialist p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o a r e t r y i n g t o c o m p r e h e n d this d i v e r s e
k n o w l e d g e i d e o l o g i c a l l y . I n q u i r i e s d e v o t e d t o t h e specific n a t u r e
of philosophical knowledge, the n a t u r e of philosophical p r o b ­
lems, the basic philosophical question, a n d t h e main philo­
s o p h i c a l t r e n d s , etc., a r e c a l l e d u p o n t o s e r v e t h a t e n d . T h i s
kind of inquiry allows, it seems, to t a k e t h e g r o u n d from u n d e r
the irrationalist conception of the a n a r c h y of philosophical sys­
t e m s , w h i c h , s t r a n g e as it s e e m s at first g l a n c e , is r o o t e d in t h e
prejudices of e v e r y d a y consciousness. It is b e c o m i n g evident
t h a t t h e s t r u g g l e o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r e n d s i s q u i t e fruitful a n d
p r o m i s i n g ; i d e a l i s m h a s a l r e a d y s u f f e r e d d e f e a t as a s y s t e m of
views. D e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e d i a l e c t i c a l - m a t e r i a l i s t o u t l o o k o n t h e
world is at the same time comprehension and critical mastery
of t h e h i s t o r y of p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h o u g h t , in w h i c h , it is my d e e p ­
est c o n v i c t i o n , t h e r e a r e n o t r i v i a l p a g e s .
T h e task o f a M a r x i s t t h e o r e t i c a l s u m m i n g - u p o f t h e c o u r s e
of t h e h i s t o r y of p h i l o s o p h y is n o t e x h a u s t e d by s t u d y of t h e
m a i n t r e n d s in p h i l o s o p h y . T h a t is only t h e b e g i n n i n g of a g r e a t
work that must be continued by research devoted to the histor­
ical c o u r s e o f c h a n g e i n t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r o f p h i l o s o p h y , t h e
specific f o r m s o f t h e c o n t i n u i t y a n d p r o g r e s s i v e d e v e l o p m e n t o f
philosophical knowledge, and the moulding and development
of a scientific, p h i l o s o p h i c a l o u t l o o k on t h e w o r l d . I h o p e t h a t
t h e s e v e r y i m p o r t a n t t h e o r e t i c a l p r o b l e m s o f t h e scientific h i s ­
t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y will b e t h e s u b j e c t o f s p e c i a l n e w m o n o ­
graphs.

NOTES
1
T h e stance adopted by Heisenberg on this question was more correct;
in spite of his idealist fallacies, he was a w a r e of the law-governed nature
and fruitfulness of the struggle between materialism and idealism. He affirmed,
for example, that 'the struggle for primacy of form, image, and idea on the
one side over matter and material being, on the other side, or on the contrary,
of matter over the image, and consequently the struggle between idealism and
materialism, has always set human thought in motion again and again in the
history of philosophy' (97:228).
2
In another place, Planck said that 'exact science can never do without reality
in the metaphysical sense' (208:23). T h e term 'metaphysical' sounds ambigu­
ous, since it is a matter of sense-perceived reality. But if we allow for the fact
that neopositivists treat materialism as 'metaphysics', it becomes evident
against whom his proposition was directed.
3
Robespierre considered atheism an anti-democratic doctrine, and tried to
create a rationalist religious cult of the Supreme Being before whom all were
equal. 'Atheism is aristocratic,' he said. ' T h e idea of a S u p r e m e Being who

298
keeps watch over oppressed i n n o c e n c e and punishes t r i u m p h a n t c r i m e , is wholly
o f t h e p e o p l e ' ( 2 2 4 : 1 2 0 ; 1 1 : 2 1 5 ) . I t i s w o r t h n o t i n g t h a t this d i c t u m d o e s not
differ m u c h f r o m V o l t a i r e ' s a p h o r i s m a b o u t t h e p o l i c e f u n c t i o n s o f r e l i g i o n ,
but has an opposite ideological sense: from Robespierre's standpoint religion
was needed not in o r d e r to c u r b the 'lower orders' but in order to ensure
e q u a l i t y o f all c i t i z e n s b e f o r e t h e h i g h e s t l a w .
4
D e m o k r i t o s e x p l a i n e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e specific g r a v i t y o f s u b s t a n c e s
k n o w n f r o m e v e r y d a y e x p e r i e n c e b y t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e ' q u a n t i t y ' o f void i n
the spaces between the atoms that formed the substances. Heavy bodies con­
t a i n e d less void t h a n l i g h t o n e s , w h i c h w e r e d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y a l o w e r d e n s i t y .
N e w t o n , w h o a d o p t e d t h e a t o m i s t i c h y p o t h e s i s a n d defined m a s s o r d e n s i t y a s
the q u a n t i t y of m a t t e r , in essence s h a r e d D e m o k r i t o s ' view. O n e must n o t e that
m o d e r n physical notions of t h e superdense state of a substance a r e not so re­
m o t e f r o m D e m o k r i t o s ' idea a b o u t c o m b i n a t i o n s o f t h e d e n s e (full) a n d t h e
empty (immaterial) that formed the whole diversity of the world's p h e n o ­
mena.
5
J e a n - P a u l S a r t r e , correctly stressing the h u m a n i t a r i a n sense of the atheistic
o u t l o o k , a p p r e c i a t e d t h e social c o n t e n t o f m a t e r i a l i s t p h i l o s o p h y i n t h a t c o n ­
nection, as follows: 'I find it linked to the r e v o l u t i o n a r y outlook. E p i c u r u s ,
t h e f i r s t o n e w h o w a n t e d definitely t o rid m e n o f t h e i r f e a r s a n d c h a i n s , the
first o n e w h o w a n t e d to abolish servitude in his estate, was a materialist'
(237:173-174).
6
An e l o q u e n t e x a m p l e of t h i s s o p h i s t i c a t e d j u s t i f i c a t i o n of r e l i g i o n is t h e
'critical realism' of S a n t a v a n a , of w h o m Morris C o h e n wrote: ' H e discards
theologic dogmas as to God's existence as superstitions but retains those va­
l u e s o f c o n v e n t i o n a l r i t u a l a n d belief w h i c h m a k e o f r e l i g i o n a p o e t r y o f social
c o n d u c t , a h e i g h t e n i n g of t h e s p i r i t in w h i c h t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s of t h e ideals
o f o u r c o m m o n life e x p r e s s e s itself. R e l i g i o n , f o r S a n t a y a n a , s e r v e s t o l i b e r a t e
man from worldliness' (36:254).
7
P h i l o s o p h y , D i d e r o t s a i d , w a s i n c o m p a t i b l e b y definition w i t h r e l i g i o n .
Although that thesis oversimplified the c o n t r a d i c t o r y relation between these
p h e n o m e n a , its r e a l s e n s e c o n s i s t e d , o f c o u r s e , i n t h e a f f i r m a t i o n t h a t t r u e
philosophy, such as Diderot n a t u r a l l y considered materialism, was a denial of
o r d i n a r y r e l i g i o u s c o n s c i o u s n e s s . ' S i r e ' , h e w r o t e 'if y o u w a n t p r i e s t s , y o u d o
not w a n t philosophers, a n d if y o u w a n t philosophers y o u do not w a n t priests;
for the first being by profession friends of reason a n d p r o m o t e r s of knowledge,
a n d the latter, enemies of reason a n d f o m e n t e r s of i g n o r a n c e , if t h e f o r m e r do
g o o d , t h e l a t t e r d o evil; a n d y o u d o n o t w a n t g o o d a n d evil a t t h e s a m e t i m e '
(40:33).

8
T h e i d e o l o g i c a l i d e a u n d e r l y i n g t h e s e v u l g a r n o t i o n s w a s o n c e e x p r e s s e d with
laudable frankness by the American statesman and militant anti-Communist,
J o h n F o s t e r D u l l e s , w h o w r o t e : ' W e shall n o t q u a l i f y f o r s u r v i v a l i f w e b e c o m e
a nation of materialists' (43:240). T h e point c o n c e r n e d m a i n t e n a n c e of the
c a p i t a l i s t status quo. D u l l e s t h e r e f o r e , at t h e s a m e t i m e , c r i t i c i s e d ' s o m e of t h e
idealists w h o w a n t a b e t t e r w o r l d ' ( 4 3 : 1 6 5 ) .
T h e A m e r i c a n political scientist B u r n s called for use of police m e a s u r e s
against s u p p o r t e r s of materialism, to w h o m he lyingly a t t r i b u t e d 'a cynical
c o n t e m p t for h u m a n n a t u r e , a denial t h a t mortals a r e ever p r o m p t e d by noble
i m p u l s e s ' ( 2 5 : 7 4 - 7 5 ) , T h a t d e s c r i p t i o n (sic!) o f m a t e r i a l i s m w a s i n t e n d e d t o
i n t i m i d a t e all o p p o n e n t s o f t h e r e l i g i o u s - i d e a l i s t w o r l d o u t l o o k d o m i n a n t i n
bourgeois society.

299
9
K a r l M a r x noted the inadequacy of the materialism of the natural sciences
in p a r t i c u l a r w h e n it tried to interpret social p h e n o m e n a : ' T h e w e a k points
in t h e abstract materialism of n a t u r a l science, a materialism that excludes
h i s t o r y a n d its p r o c e s s , a r e a t o n c e e v i d e n t f r o m t h e a b s t r a c t a n d i d e o l o g i c a l
c o n c e p t i o n s o f its s p o k e s m e n , w h e n e v e r t h e y v e n t u r e b e y o n d t h e b o u n d s o f
their own speciality' (167:I, 3 5 2 ) . Lenin, too, w r o t e a b o u t these w e a k points
of n a t u r a l - s c i e n c e m a t e r i a l i s m in Materialism and Empirio-criticism, when
c h a r a c t e r i s i n g the ideological position of Ernst H a e c k e l (see 1 4 2 : 3 2 7 - 3 3 1 ) .

10
Acton declares that 'materialism, by asserting the reality of material sub­
s t a n c e s b e y o n d s e n s e - e x p e r i e n c e , a l l o w s a l s o t h e possibility o f a G o d t h a t
transcends sense-experience too. P h e n o m e n a l i s m excludes God but a p p e a r s
committed to some sort of idealism. Materialism excludes phenomenalism but
o n l y a t t h e e x p e n s e o f m a k i n g G o d a p p e a r a possibility' ( 2 : 2 3 ) . A c c o r d i n g
t o h i m , t h e r e i s n o t m o r e c o n s i s t e n t a n t i - t h e o l o g i c a l p h i l o s o p h y , a f t e r all,
t h a n idealism of a p h e n o m e n a l i s t h u e . W h e n it c o m e s to solipsism, of c o u r s e ,
this p o i n t o f v i e w c a n b e d e c l a r e d t h e m o s t c o n s i s t e n t a t h e i s m . B u t
s u b j e c t i v e idealists a r g u e t h a t t h e y a r e n o t solipsists. T h e s u b j e c t i v e - i d e a l i s t
interpretation of nature, therefore, as the example of Berkeley a n d many
o t h e r s u p p o r t e r s o f p h e n o m e n a l i s m p r o v e d , fully d o v e t a i l s w i t h t h e o l o g i c a l
conclusions.

11
M a x B o r n w r o t e , as r e g a r d s t h e objects of physics, which a r e also objects
perceived in everyday experience: 'The unsophisticated mind is convinced that
they a r e not arbitrary products of the mind, but impressions of an external
world on the mind. I c a n n o t see any a r g u m e n t for a b a n d o n i n g this convic­
t i o n i n t h e scientific s p h e r e ' ( 2 1 : 5 0 ) .

12
P h i l o s o p h i c a l r e v i s i o n i s m , w h i c h lays c l a i m t o a n e w , d e e p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g
o f e s t a b l i s h e d f a c t s , i n effect d i c t o r t s t h e m . H a v e m a n n , f o r i n s t a n c e , c h a r a c ­
t e r i s e d M a r x i s t m a t e r i a l i s m as (sic!) a d e n i a l of m a t e r i a l i s m . 'It is o n l y a
variety of objective idealism,' he declares, 'and m o r e o v e r an inconsistent,
superficial, primitive, a n d vulgarised form of objective idealism' ( 8 3 : 3 0 ) .
W h a t i s this v e r y h a r s h c o n c l u s i o n b a s e d o n ? M e c h a n i s t i c m a t e r i a l i s m , h e
said, treated t h e laws of n a t u r e as a b s o l u t e a n d sovereign, which not only
d e t e r m i n e d b u t p r e d e t e r m i n e d all p h e n o m e n a . H e o b v i o u s l y f o r g o t t h a t
e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y n a t u r a l science also treated the laws of n a t u r e in r o u g h l y
t h e s a m e w a y . W h y t h e n did h e n o t c o n s i d e r i t a l s o t o b e i d e a l i s t ? H e
e n d e a v o u r e d to p r o v e that mechanistic materialism counterposed the laws
o f n a t u r e t o n a t u r e , i.e. i n t e r p r e t e d t h e m a s s o m e t h i n g s u p e r n a t u r a l , a
conclusion that is a clear s t r e t c h i n g of the point, an insolvent attempt to
d e p i c t t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l - m a t e r i a l i s t w o r l d o u t l o o k a s s p e c u l a t i v e idealist
metaphysics.

13
'Philosophers w h o recognise only the existence of material things a n d bodies
[ C h r i s t i a n v o n W o l f s a i d ] a r e c a l l e d m a t e r i a l i s t s ' ( s e e Das Fischer Lexikon.
Philosophie, F r a n k f u r t - o n - M a i n , 1 9 6 7 , p . 1 5 6 ) . T h i s p o i n t o f v i e w i s a c c e p t e d
b y m a n y c o n t e m p o r a r y idealists, w h o t h u s a s c r i b e a d e n i a l o f t h e r e a l i t y o f t h e
spiritual a n d ideal to m a t e r i a l i s m .

14
T h i s s a m e thesis was repeated by p r a g m a t i s m a h u n d r e d y e a r s after Hegel.
William J a m e s opposed the materialists proposition of the origin of the higher
f r o m t h e l o w e r , i n s p i t e o f its a l r e a d y h a v i n g a c q u i r e d g e n e r a l scientific s i g ­
nificance. He wrote that materialism was characterised by explaining 'higher
p h e n o m e n a by lower ones, a n d leaving the destinies of the w o r l d at t h e m e r c y

300
o f its b l i n d e r p a r t s a n d f o r c e s ' ( 1 1 1 : 9 2 - 9 3 ) . F r o m t h e a n g l e o f J a m e s ' ' r a d i c a l
e m p i r i c i s m ' t h e ' b l i n d ' , i.e. i n a n i m a t e , p r o c e s s e s o f n a t u r e w e r e b r o u g h t a b o u t
b y ' h i g h e r p h e n o m e n a ' l i k e m i n d a n d will.

15
Cassirer interpreted t h e principal ontological thesis of rationalist idealism
in a p u r e l y epistemological way: ' T h e proposition t h a t b e i n g is a " p r o d u c t "
of thought... contains no pointer of any sort to some physical or metaphysical
c a u s a l r e l a t i o n , b u t m e r e l y signifies a p u r e l y f u n c t i o n a l c o n n e c t i o n , a r e l a t i o n
of the h i g h e r a n d l o w e r in t h e validity of definite j u d g m e n t s ' ( 3 1 : 3 9 6 ) . In
o t h e r w o r d s , h e s u g g e s t e d t r e a t i n g t h e idealist a n s w e r t o t h e b a s i c p h i l o ­
sophical question as a j u d g m e n t defining the category 'being' a n d not being
itself, i n r e l a t i o n t o w h i c h t h e r e c o u l d n o t b e k n o w l e d g e a s s o o n a s i t w a s
thought of as existing outside thinking. Conceivable being or the category
'being' is created by thinking. That conclusion, w h i c h discards the ontological
a s p e c t of t h e b a s i c p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n , is a s u b j e c t i v e - i d e a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a ­
t i o n of its e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l a s p e c t .

16
This point of view was very impressively expressed by the Russian religious
existentialist Berdyaev: ' T h e principal attribute of philosophy is that t h e r e
is no o b j e c t of k n o w i n g in it. S e n s e is d i s c l o s e d o n l y w h e n I l o o k i n w a r d l y , i.e.
into t h e spirit, a n d w h e n t h e r e is no objectivity or materiality for me. All that
is an object for me lacks sense' (14:9). He frankly expressed t h e t r u e
e s s e n c e o f i d e a l i s m , a n d its hostility t o scientific k n o w l e d g e .

17
I.T. F r o l o v c o r r e c t l y r e m a r k s : ' H i s t o r i c a l l y t h e m a t t e r d e v e l o p e d i n s u c h
a way t h a t t h e p r o b l e m of purposiveness was discussed on the positive p l a n e
m a i n l y i n t h e c o n t e x t o f idealist p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s , w h i l e m a t e r i a l i s m
— i n its m e c h a n i s t i c f o r m — f o r t h e m o s t p a r t o n l y r e a c t e d n e g a t i v e l y t o t h e
existing teleological interpretation of this problem, without occasionally
e x a m i n i n g t h e o b j e c t i v e f a c t s b e h i n d it. B u t i t w a s p r e c i s e l y i n t h e c o n t e x t
of materialist philosophical conceptions that approaches were formulated that
m a d e it possible to elucidate t h e real causes for t h e p h e n o m e n a t r e a t e d as
purposive' (69:36-37).

18
Let me cite e x a m p l e s s h o w i n g h o w c o n t e m p o r a r y idealism e n d e a v o u r s to
benefit f r o m t h e m a t e r i a l i s t c r i t i q u e o f its b a s i c p r o p o s i t i o n s . L o m b a r d i , o n e
of the continuers of Italian Neohegelianism, hurled the following sardonic
tirade at idealism: ' T h e reality that idealism speaks to us a b o u t is o n e that
r a i s e s itself r a t h e r like B a r o n M ü n c h h a u s e n , w h o g o t h i m s e l f o u t o f a s w a m p
by pulling on his hair, but with t h e difference t h a t t h e r e is no s w a m p for
idealism, n o r hair, a n d not even a flesh-and-bone cavalier w h o must save
himself from t h e s w a m p ' ( 1 5 3 : 1 9 8 ) . T h a t pillorying c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n i d e n ­
tifies i d e a l i s m w i t h s u b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m a n d , f u r t h e r m o r e , w i t h solipsism. S u c h
a l i m i t e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e e s s e n c e of i d e a l i s m m a k e s it p o s s i b l e to
interpret objective idealism as a non-idealist philosophy. B e h i n d t h e
difference between these principal versions of idealism is hidden the identity
o f t h e i r s t a r t i n g p o i n t , viz., a n i d e a l i s t a n s w e r t o t h e b a s i c p h i l o s o p h i c a l
question.

19
O n e o f t h e f i r s t i n v e s t i g a t o r s o f e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , J o h a n n e s Pfeiffer, for w h o m
e x i s t e n t i a l i s m t h a t c r i t i c i s e d ' t h e spirit o f a b s t r a c t i o n ' w a s a n e g a t i o n o f i d e a l ­
ism, w r o t e : ' T h e d a n g e r o f i d e a l i s m i s i l l u s i v e n e s s : m a n a s p u r e r a t i o n a l
b e i n g , a s t h e r e a l m o f r e a l i s a t i o n o f t h e i d e a , i s f e n c e d off f r o m t h e l a t e n t ,
original s o u r c e of his existence' ( 2 0 5 : 1 6 - 1 7 ) . T h e f u n d a m e n t a l original
s o u r c e of h u m a n existence of which existentialists speak is not, of course,

301
 a negation of idealism. By stressing the finiteness of m a n a n d t h e subjectivity
of individual experiences, existentialism only counterposes an irrational
form of idealism that is c o m b i n e d with the assertion that real h u m a n exis­
t e n c e i s o n l y p o s s i b l e i n t h i s w o r l d t o its r a t i o n a l i s t f o r m . I d e a l i s m t h u s n e v e r
r i s e s to a c r i t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of its o w n e s s e n c e .

2 0
T h e e m i n e n t neurophysiologist a n d Nobel Prize w i n n e r , J o h n Eccles, for
i n s t a n c e , said t h a t t h e r e i s a n i n e v i t a b l e a n t i n o m y b e t w e e n t h e ' d e m o c r a t i c
c o m m u n i t y ' o f t h e b i l l i o n s o f n e r v e cells t h a t f o r m t h e h u m a n b r a i n , a n d
the individual personality that is revealed in the experience and self-cons­
ciousness of every person. This antinomy, he suggested, was unresolvable by
scientific r e s e a r c h . A n d , a s t h o u g h h e h a d f o r g o t t e n t h a t t h e s c i e n t i s t h a s n o
r i g h t t o a p p e a l t o t h e s u p e r n a t u r a l , i.e. t o r e s o r t t o a n u n s c i e n t i f i c a r g u m e n t , h e
a r r i v e d a t t h e r e l i g i o u s c o n c e p t o f t h e s o u l a n d r e c o g n i t i o n o f its s p e c i a l
c r e a t i o n b y G o d (see 4 4 : 4 3 ; a n d 4 5 cited f r o m 2 5 9 : 9 7 ) . E c c l e s c h a r a c t e r ­
ised his fideist p o s i t i o n as a p h i l o s o p h y of t h e living i n d i v i d u a l . O n e s h o u l d
n o t b e s u r p r i s e d t h a t N e o t h o m i s m p r o p a g a n d i s e s his v i e w s a s c o n f i r m i n g
T h o m i s t philosophy (see 2 5 9 : 9 4 - 9 7 ) .

21
T h e f l i m s i n e s s o f t h e simplified v i e w o f t h e e s s e n c e o f i d e a l i s m s o m e t i m e s
met in Marxist p o p u l a r l i t e r a t u r e is t h e r e f o r e obvious. Boguslavsky, a u t h o r
of a p a m p h l e t on t h e b a s i c q u e s t i o n of p h i l o s o p h y , w r o t e : ' T h e i d e a l i s t s '
a r g u m e n t s lead t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e s o l e p e r s o n e x i s t i n g i n t h e w o r l d
i s I , a n d t h a t all o t h e r p e o p l e a n d n a t u r e a r e o n l y m y s e n s a t i o n s . C l e a r l y ,
the person w h o asserts that he a l o n e exists on the e a r t h can h a r d l y be consid­
e r e d n o r m a l . I t i s useless t o listen t o h i m ' ( 1 8 : 1 3 ) . B o g u s l a v s k y ' s m i s t a k e
w a s n o t s i m p l y t h a t h e r e d u c e d all idealist d o c t r i n e s t o solipsism w i p i n g o u t
the essential differences b e t w e e n the varieties of idealism. F o r him idealism
w a s a p s y c h i c a n o m a l y . But i n t h a t c a s e m a t e r i a l i s m ' s s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t
idealist p h i l o s o p h y a p p e a r s s t r a n g e a t least. D o s e r i o u s p e o p l e d i s p u t e w i t h
madmen?

22
O n e m u s t a l s o b e a r i n m i n d t h a t t h e r i c h n e s s o f t h e c o n t e n t o f idealist e r r o r s
a n d fallacies does not simply consist in t h e i r h a v i n g elements of t r u t h , distorted
a n d a b s o l u t i s e d by i d e a l i s m . It is d u e as well to t h e fact t h a t i d e a l i s m , as a
f o r m o f s o c i a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , r e f l e c t s h i s t o r i c a l l y definite social b e i n g . I n
t h a t sense religious fallacies, too, as F e u e r b a c h s h o w e d , a r e rich in c o n t e n t
in s p i t e of t h e i r not i n c l u d i n g e l e m e n t s of a t r u e r e f l e c t i o n of r e a l i t y .

23
S o m e twenty or thirty years ago many Marxist historians of philosophy
( a n d n o t j u s t h i s t o r i a n s o f p h i l o s o p h y ) b e l i e v e d t h a t c l a s s i c a l idealist
d o c t r i n e s t h a t d i s c l o s e d a n d a t t h e s a m e t i m e mystified t r u t h o f c o u r s e h a d
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l r o o t s . But t h e latest idealist d o c t r i n e s , w h i c h h a v e a n
epigonistic c h a r a c t e r as a rule, lack any epistemological roots a n d a r e only
a mystified e x p r e s s i o n of t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e b o u r g e o i s i e , in w h i c h t h e r e is
n o n e w k n o w l e d g e w h a t s o e v e r a b o u t r e a l i t y . I o v c h u k c o r r e c t l y o p p o s e d this
anti-dialectical tendency, stressing that 'valuable posings of questions are
to be f o u n d in c o n t e m p o r a r y bourgeois philosophical a n d sociological
doctrines, for e x a m p l e the question of the " l a n g u a g e of science" a m o n g
i n d i v i d u a l positivists o r t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e f a t e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l a m o n g
c e r t a i n e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s like S a r t r e , a b o u t t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f m a t h e m a t i c a l
m e t h o d s i n s o c i o l o g i c a l i n q u i r i e s i n W e s t e r n e m p i r i c a l s o c i o l o g y , e t c . ...But
in the m a i n — i n general theoretical conclusions, in understanding of the
p r o f o u n d laws of c o n t e m p o r a r y social d e v e l o p m e n t and p a t h s of social
p r o g r e s s , a n d i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f t h e latest a d v a n c e s o f

302
 s c i e n c e — n o t o n e b o u r g e o i s philosophical a n d sociological c u r r e n t c a n give
a t r u e , scientific, a n d c o n s i s t e n t a n s w e r t o t h e r o o t p r o b l e m s o f o u r a g e '
(108:172).

24
M o t r o s h i l o v a , O g u r t s o v , T u r o v s k y , a n d P o t e m k i n , c i t i n g this t h o u g h t o f
A r i s t o t l e ' s , m a d e t h e f o l l o w i n g v a l u a b l e c o m m e n t i n t h e i r e n t r y i n t h e Phi-
losophical Encyclopaedia: ' T h e e s s e n c e of t h i n g s is i d e a l l y d o u b l e d in f a c t
in knowledge, floating a w a y ever further from the direct sense image of the
object a n d from c o n c r e t e reality. Objectively this m e a n s that the universal
law of n a t u r e , i n c o n c e i v a b l e o u t s i d e its d e v e l o p m e n t , is n o t itself a t h i n g
a m o n g things. C a u s e , source of motion, law a r e no longer perceived simply
as a " f o r m " directly m e r g i n g with a given special motion, but as an ideal
principle abstracted from c o r p o r e a l motion. It is only manifested t h r o u g h
m a t e r i a l m o t i o n b u t is not identifiable with s o m e special m a t e r i a l s p h e r e '
( 1 8 6 : 4 0 3 ) . T h u s w e s e e t h a t P l a t o , w h e n i n q u i r i n g into ( a n d a t t h e s a m e
time mystifying) the real process of cognition, revealed the dialectical
opposition between theoretical a n d emprical knowledge, interpreting the p r e ­
conditions of this opposition idealistically, r e p r e s e n t i n g it as absolute.

25
E n g e l s w r o t e a p r o p o s o f t h i s : ' F i r s t o f all o n e m a k e s s e n s u o u s t h i n g s i n t o
abstractions a n d then o n e w a n t s to k n o w them t h r o u g h t h e senses, to see
t i m e a n d smell s p a c e . T h e e m p i r i c i s t b e c o m e s s o s t e e p e d i n t h e h a b i t o f e m p i r i ­
c a l e x p e r i e n c e , t h a t h e b e l i e v e s t h a t h e i s still i n t h e f i e l d o f s e n s u o u s e x p e r i ­
ence w h e n he is o p e r a t i n g with abstractions ( 5 1 : 2 3 5 ) . Empiricism, too, can
thus p r o v e to be in t h e p o w e r of idealist illusions, s i n c e it is not a w a r e of t h e
sense a n d m e a n i n g of abstraction.

26
S e r z h a n t o v c o r r e c t l y s t r e s s e d this e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f e a t u r e o f idealist e m p i r i ­
cism: 'Idealism arises from a naturalist a p p r o a c h to sensations, w h e n the
l a t t e r a r e t r e a t e d e x a c t l y a s t h e y a r e d i r e c t l y g i v e n t o us, a n d t h e y a r e g i v e n
t o u s o n l y a s o u r i n n e r e x p e r i e n c e s . I d e a l i s m t a k e s this a s p e c t o f s e n s a t i o n s
in isolation from the object a n d from t h e n e r v o u s s u b s t r a t u m , a n d conceives
it as some immaterial substance' (244:89-90).

27
Rougier wrote: ' G e r m a n expresses t h e mobile aspects of reality, be it the
p r o c e s s e s o f n a t u r e o r t h e f l u x o f c o n s c i o u s life b e t t e r t h a n F r e n c h , for
e x a m p l e , b y v i r t u e o f t h e f u n d a m e n t a l r o l e i t a s s i g n s t o verbs.... I t h a s a v o c a ­
t i o n for a p h i l o s o p h y o f b e c o m i n g ' ( 2 2 8 : 1 9 1 ) . S u c h a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e
d i a l e c t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n i n G e r m a n y is, t o p u t i t mildly, v e r b a l i s m ;
i t d o e s n o t e x p l a i n w h y , for e x a m p l e , H e g e l ' s d i a l e c t i c a l i d e a l i s m a r o s e i n
the early nineteenth century, or what relation it h a d to the epochal events
a n d scientific a d v a n c e s o f h i s t i m e a n d t o t h e p r e c e d i n g p h i l o s o p h y ( a n d n o t
just G e r m a n philosophy, of c o u r s e ) .

26
Bourgeois critics of M a r x i s m depict this feature of the Marxist analysis of
i d e a l i s m i n a d i s t o r t e d w a y . M a r x i s t s , says A c t o n , f o r e x a m p l e , ' t h i n k t h a t
idealism is a dishonest view' ( 2 : 2 4 ) . But M a r x i s m , as Engels noted, in principle
rejects an ethical appraisal of the opposition between the materialist and
idealist o u t l o o k s , p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t a n a p p r a i s a l o f t h a t k i n d i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
o f t h e b o u r g e o i s P h i l i s t i n e . A c t o n f u r t h e r c l a i m e d t h a t ' L e n i n dismisses p h e ­
nomenalism on the g r o u n d that it is dangerous to communism' (2:203). Lenin,
of course, rejected p h e n o m e n a l i s m as a false t h e o r y clearly c o n t r a d i c t i n g
t h e f a c t s t h a t w a s a b o v e all d a n g e r o u s f o r s c i e n c e . B u t A c t o n c o n v e n i e n t l y
kept silent about that.

303
 29
It is q u i t e a different m a t t e r , h o w e v e r , w h e n the root opposition of class
i n t e r e s t s i s b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d , w h i c h c o m e s t o light i n t h e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n
t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y o f t h e w o r k i n g class a n d b o u r g e o i s p a r t i e s . T h i s o p ­
position—the conscious expression of the antagonistic contradiction between
t h e m a i n classes of b o u r g e o i s society—is ideologically c o m p r e h e n d e d by
Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Garaudy's claim that the Communist Party's
p h i l o s o p h y ' c a n n o t , i n p r i n c i p l e , b e e i t h e r idealist o r m a t e r i a l i s t , r e l i g i o u s
or atheist' (71:284) is t h e r e f o r e a r e n e g a d e apostasy f r o m M a r x i s m , a revi­
sionist transition to b o u r g e o i s positions.
30
P r e - M a r x i a n philosophers, it is t r u e , often spoke a b o u t t h e vast influence of
philosophy on relations between people, the state system, etc. S o m e of them
even treated philosophy, which they considered the most a d e q u a t e expression
o f h u m a n r e a s o n , a s t h e d r i v i n g f o r c e o f s o c i a l p r o g r e s s . B u t a belief i n its
a b o v e - p a r t y c h a r a c t e r got a l o n g alright with both recognition a n d denial of
its o u t s t a n d i n g r o l e i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f s o c i e t y . T h e m a i n p o i n t t o this
conviction was denial of t h e fact that class interests w e r e reflected in philo­
sophical views.
31
H e r e is a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e x a m p l e . Leibniz, t h e ideologist of t h e p r e - r e v o l u t i o n ­
a r y G e r m a n b o u r g e o i s i e , w h o s e d o c t r i n e r e f l e c t e d its s t r i v i n g f o r a c o m p ­
romise with the feudal classes, c o n d e m n e d t h e antithesis b e t w e e n the
haves and havenots and, citing the Gospels, substantiated the idea of
c o m m u n i t y of p r o p e r t y . 'Leibniz,' Deborin w r o t e in this connection, 'was
convinced that community of property was the starting point of the develop­
m e n t of h u m a n i t y , a n d believed that history would lead to a system based on
community of property' (39:107). It must not be thought that Leibniz
s h a r e d the views of utopian c o m m u n i s t s on this matter. T h i s p r e a c h i n g
of the community of property, as Deborin showed, quite obviously expressed
t h e s t r e n g t h o f his d e n i a l o f f e u d a l o w n e r s h i p , w h i c h r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e
b o u r g e o i s ideologist was very far f r o m u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h a t c o n s e q u e n c e s the
bourgeois reorganisation of society would lead to.

32
Benjamin F r a n k l i n , t h e ideologist of t h e A m e r i c a n b o u r g e o i s revolution,
said i n a p a p e r ' S t a n d i n g Q u e r i e s f o r t h e J u n t o ' t h a t o n l y t h o s e c o u l d b e
m e m b e r s of it w h o positively a n s w e r e d the following question: ' D o you love
t r u t h f o r t r u t h ' s s a k e , a n d will y o u e n d e a v o u r i m p a r t i a l l y t o find a n d r e c e i v e
it yourself and c o m m u n i c a t e it to others?' ( 6 6 : 2 5 9 ) . T h i s conception of
'truth for truth's s a k e ' h a d n o t h i n g in c o m m o n with a c o n t e m p l a t i v e attitude
to r e a l i t y ; it w a s a m a t t e r of f i g h t i n g t h e s u p e r s t i t i o n s e n s l a v i n g m a n , of
mastering the elemental forces of n a t u r e , of a rational r e - o r d e r i n g of h u m a n
life. F o r b o u r g e o i s i d e o l o g i s t a s t r i v i n g f o r t r u t h a n d u n i v e r s a l j u s t i c e
c o i n c i d e s w i t h t h e t a s k of a b o u r g e o i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s .
33
I m u s t s t r e s s t h a t i t w a s just i n t h a t a g e , w h e n b o u r g e o i s ' i m p a r t i a l i t y '
was converted into a hypocritical phrase, that the spokesmen of revolutionary
d e m o c r a c y began m o r e a n d m o r e resolutely to express the conviction that
philosophy could not adopt a n e u t r a l position on radical social problems.
T h e A r m e n i a n revolutionary d e m o c r a t N a l b a n d i a n , for instance, wrote:
'Man lacks shelter, m a n has no bread, m a n is unclad a n d barefooted, n a t u r e
d e m a n d s its o w n . T o find a s i m p l e , n a t u r a l p a t h , t o s e a r c h f o r g e n u i n e , h u m a n ,
r a t i o n a l m e a n s for m a n t o get shelter, h a v e b r e a d , c o v e r his n a k e d n e s s , a n d
satisfy h i s n a t u r a l n e e d s — t h a t i s t h e e s s e n c e o f p h i l o s o p h y ' ( 1 8 9 : 4 6 0 ) . T h a t
p a r t i s a n a p p r o a c h to philosophy did not t a k e s h a p e in a v a c u u m of c o u r s e ;
it was a d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e h u m a n i s t ideas of t h e bourgeois e n l i g h t e n m e n t
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

304
34
Let m e recall i n this connection h o w M a r x and Engels c h a r a c t e r i s e idealist
philosophy and its social stance: T h e alteration of consciousness divorced
from actual r e l a t i o n s — a pursuit followed by philosophers as a profession,
i.e., as a business—is itself a p r o d u c t of existing relations a n d inseparable
from them. This i m a g i n a r y rising above the world is t h e ideological expression
of the impotence of philosophers in face of the world' (178:379).

35
H e i n r i c h R o m b a c h tried to show t h a t this distancing of philosophy from
socio-political reality was particularly characteristic of o u r time: philosophy
'no longer speaks outwardly, but only talks to itself; it is by specialists for spe­
cialists' ( 2 2 6 : 3 5 0 ) . T h e philosopher, he wrote further, 'is neither a profession­
al politician n o r even a t e a c h e r , a n d not a theologian, j u d g e or doctor'
(ibid.). F r o m t h a t b a n a l statement of t h e professionalisation of philosophical
activity, however, he d r e w a sweeping conclusion: ' H e is i m p o r t a n t only for
himself and lives in his t h o u g h t s like a h e r m i t in his cell' ( i b i d ) . H o w is this
a p p a r e n t l y n e u t r a l position to be explained in the age of struggle of two social
systems a n d a d e e p e n i n g of antagonistic contradictions in capitalist countries?
C a n it be that R o m b a c h ' s s t a n c e was quite untypical? N o , he expressed one
of t h e m a i n tendencies in bourgeois philosophers' evaluation of philosophy's
place in m o d e r n social affairs. This interpretation of it as alien to transient
socio-political cataclysms was an attempt to p r o v e that the philosophical
conception of t h e world was recognition of it as it is, that t h e aspiration to
c h a n g e the world (even if it was quite justified) went beyond the c o m p e t e n c e
of philosophy, which could neither s u b s t a n t i a t e this striving nor p r o v e its
insolvency. O n e must n o t e that this point of view is often expressed by bour­
geois philosophers w h o acknowledge that bourgeois values h a v e been discred­
ited but do not see t h e way out of the crisis of bourgeois society. And when
Gilbert Ryle, for instance, called philosophers people who a r e 'philosophers'
philosophers' ( 2 3 3 : 4 ) , he was t h e r e b y expressing not only a conviction in
r e g a r d to the i n d e p e n d e n c e of philosophy from o t h e r forms of knowledge but
also disappointment in it.

36
Weber, stating that 'the various systems of values of the world a r e in unresolv­
able conflict with one a n o t h e r ' ( 2 6 1 : 5 4 5 ) , believed that it was that fact
which m a d e it impossible to combine scientific objectivity of t h e r e s e a r c h e r
with any value orientation whatsoever. An orientation of this kind did not,
it is true, e x c l u d e t h e possibility of 'discussion of the means to an end firmly
stated in a d v a n c e ' (ibid.), but in t h a t case science was no m o r e t h a n an intel­
lectual t e c h n i q u e . Real inquiry rose above its end results a n d must t h e r e f o r e
be ready for any unexpected conclusions. W e b e r ' s a r g u m e n t was a systemat­
ic development of t h e traditional conception of t h e inquirer's neutrality.
But neutrality and objectivity a r e far from coincident concepts, and disin­
terestedness is an attitude to reality of a kind that psychologically excludes
e x p l o r a t o r y activity.

20-01603
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P r o c h a , M i l a n . M e t a p h y s i c u n d M a r x i s m u s . Akten des XIV. I n t e r n a -
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314
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2 2 0
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2 2 1
Rickert, Heinrich. Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis (Mohr Verlag,
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2 2 2
Roback, A.A. Behaviorism and Psychology (University Bookstore,
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223
R o b e r t s , D a v i d E. Existentialism and Religious Belief (OUP, New
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2 2 4
Robespierre, Maximilien. Œvres, recueilliés et annotées par A. Vermorel
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2 2 5
Rocquain, Felix. L'ésprit révolutionaire avant la révolution 1715­1789
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2 2 6
Rombach, H e i n r i c h . Substanz, System, Struktur, Vol. I (Freiburg
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227
R o s e n t h a l , M . M . T h e Marxist T h e o r y of K n o w l e d g e . In: M.M. Rosenthal
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228
Rougier, Louis. La métaphysique et le langage (Flammarion, Paris,
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229
Rousseau, J.J. Discours sur le rétablissement des sciences et des arts à
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230
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231
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232
R u s s e l l , B e r t r a n d . The Will to Doubt (Philosophical Library, New
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233
R y l e , G i l b e r t . I n t r o d u c t i o n to A . J . A y e r et al. ( E d s . ) . The Revolution
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234
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235
S a r t r e , J e a n ­ P a u l . L'être et le néant (Gailimard, Paris, 1943).
236
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237
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238
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239
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240
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2 4 1
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2 4 2
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243
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245
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246
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248
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249
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250
S t i r n e r , M a x . Der Einzige und sein Eigentum (Berlin, 1911).
251
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 NAME INDEX

Abdildin, Z h . — 1 3 3 C a m u s , A . — 7 , 17, 129

Acton, H.B.—300, 303 Carlyle, T h . — 2 9 2
Agrippa —106 C a r n a p , R . — 6 2 , 63, 67, 209
A i n e s i d e m o s of K n o s s u s — 106 C a s s i r e r , E . — 1 0 0 , 136, 3 0 1
Aleksandrov, A.D.—271 Castelli, E . — 9 3
Ambartsumian, V.A.—133 Chagin, B.A.—284
A n a x i m a n d e r of Miletos—223 Chaloyan, V.K.—235
Andronikos of Rhodes—157, 211 C h e s t e r t o n , G . K . — 116
Anisimov, A . F . — 5 2 Cohen, M.R.—299
Anokhin, P.K.—97 Collins, A . — 1 7 2
A r i s t o t l e — 1 3 , 3 2 , 4 6 , 1 5 1 , 157, 1 6 1 , Comte, A.—204, 280
189, 2 1 1 , 2 1 2 , 2 6 7 , 2 7 2 , 2 7 6 Condillac, E.B. d e — 7 7
Armonville, J.B.—279 Copernicus, N.—60
Artsimovich, L.A.—17 Copleston, F.C.—166
Asmus, V.F.—265 C r o c e , В. —141
Avenarius, R.—231

Darwin, Ch.—139
Baader, F. X. v o n — 1 3 5 Deborin, A.M.—304
Bacon, F . — 1 2 3 , 163, 212, 272 Demokritos—58, 61, 93, 223, 227,
Bar-Hillel, Y . — 2 7 3 233-34, 299
Barth, K.—228 D e s c a r t e s , R . — 2 4 , 4 5 , 4 8 , 109, 148,
B a y l e , P . — 1 0 9 , 110 152, 1 6 3 - 6 6 , 172, 1 8 1 , 195, 212
Berdyaev, N.A.—301 Dézamy, T h . — 2 9 1
B e r g s o n , H . — 8 5 , 145, 197 Diderot, D . — 5 5 , 61, 218, 220, 299
B e r k e l e y , G . — 3 1 , 7 7 , 9 7 - 1 0 0 , 148, Dietzgen, J . — 5 7
205, 268, 291 D i l t h e y , W . — 1 4 4 , 146, 147, 2 5 1
B o c h e ń s k i , J . — 1 4 1 , 199 Diogenes Laertius-—143, 157, 234
Bogdanov, A.A.—85 D u B o i s - R e y m o n d , E . — 115
Bondi, H . — 1 3 3 Dühring, K.E.—257
Born, M.—126, 300 Duns Scotus, J . — 2 4 7
Broglie, L. d e — 1 3 7 Durkheim, E.—222
B r u n o , G . — 6 0 , 197
Boutroux, E.—287
Buhr, M.—17 Eccles, G . C . — 3 0 2
Burke, V.—212 Eckhart, M.—211
Burns, E . M c N . — 2 9 9 Egorov, A.G.—254
Bykhovsky, B . E . — 1 3 6 , 163, 212 Ehrlich, W.—202, 203

317
Eicken, H. von—134 H o b b e s , T h . — 4 7 , 1 6 8 - 6 9 , 172, 1 8 1 ,
Engels, F . — 2 0 , 2 1 , 29, 30, 33, 36-38, 212, 233, 266, 268, 290
4 3 , 50, 55, 58, 59, 68, 70, 72, 88, Holbach, P .H.D.—61, 217-20
108, 109, 116, 129, 1 3 1 , 133, 154, Horn, J.H.—96
1 6 1 , 1 6 3 , 168, 169, 1 8 3 , 184, 196, H u m e , D . — 9 4 , 100, 1 0 1 , 110-13, 172
199-201, 207, 212, 257, 258, 264, H u s s e r l , E . — 2 7 , 2 8 , 188
268, 274, 275, 282-85, 294, 297, Huxley, Т . Н . — 1 1 5 , 208
303, 305
E p i c u r u s — 1 6 8 , 223, 224, 233
Erigena (Eriugena), J.S.—161 Ilichev, L . F . — 1 7
Iovchuk, M.T.—302
Irrlitz, G . — 1 7
F e d o s e y e v , P . N . — 6 9 , 136, 2 5 9
F e u e r b a c h , L . — 4 1 , 4 2 , 1 8 3 , 186, 2 0 1 ,
219, 224, 228, 229, 233, 245, 2 5 1 , James, W.—82, 83, 300
292 Jaspers, K . — 1 2 8 , 193-95, 213, 261,
F i c h t e , J . G . — 4 0 , 4 2 , 7 8 , 138, 148, 287
182, 2 5 7 , 2 6 4 , 2 9 2
Flam, L.—282
Flew, A . — 8 3 K a n t , I . — 2 2 , 2 4 , 4 0 , 7 8 , 1 1 2 - 1 4 , 116,
Fraenkel, A.—273 136, 137, 152, 1 7 3 - 8 2 , 193, 195,
France, A.—137 212, 228, 291
Franklin, В.—304 K a z y u t i n s k y , V . V . — 133
Frolov, I .Т.—301 Kedrov, B.M.—73
K i e r k e g a a r d , S . A . — 1 9 2 , 197
Klaus, G.—50
Galilei, G . — 3 2 , 66 Konstantinov, F.V.— 31
G a s s e n d i , P . — 168, 2 1 2 K o p n i n , P . V . — 103, 2 1 9
Gautier, I.—210 K o z i n g , A . — 10, 7 8
G e l l e n , A . — 17 Kraft, V . — 1 3 3 , 210
G e u l i n c x , A.— 39 Krüger, G.—261
G i l y a r o v , A . N . — 145 Kubitsky, A . V . — 2 1 1
Goethe, J.W. von—80 Kuhn, H.—261
Gogol, N . V . — 2 1 7 K u z n e t s o v , I . V . — 6 5 , 135
G o r g i a s — 104
Gott, V.S.—65
G u é r o u l l , M . — 8 7 , 135, 142 L a Met t r i e , J . O . d e — 6 1 , 7 2
Landau, L.D.—67
Lange, F.A.—237, 248
H a e c k e l , E . — 115, 3 0 0 Lafargue, P .—284
Hartmann, N.—254 L e i b n i z , G . W . v o n — 1 3 , 14, 7 6 , 7 7 ,
Havemann, R.—300 9 4 , 148, 166, 2 6 4 , 3 0 4
H e g e l , G . W . F . — 1 4 , 15, 17, 3 8 , 3 9 , Leisegang, H.—64, 214
4 1 - 4 3 , 75, 79-80, 82, 88, 94, 95, Lektorsky, V.A.—91
104, 156, 1 6 1 , 1 8 2 - 1 8 4 , 199, 2 0 0 , Lelotte, F . — 2 4 7
2 1 1 , 213, 219, 220, 235, 246, 257, Lenin, V . I . — 2 1 , 23, 43, 57, 69, 85,
259, 264, 277, 278 8 9 , 9 2 - 9 7 , 109, 126, 1 3 1 , 136, 149-
H e i d e g g e r , M . — 8 6 , 102, 1 8 7 - 9 3 , 2 6 1 , 5 1 , 160, 184, 2 1 6 , 2 2 1 , 2 3 1 , 2 3 3 ,
272, 287 239, 248, 249, 253, 254, 259, 263,
Heinemann, F.—140 264, 266, 270, 280-82, 284, 293,
Heisenberg, W . — 1 3 1 , 240, 298 294, 297, 300
Helvetius, C . - A . — 9 3 , 214, 218, 220 Lenz, J.—236
H e r a c l i t u s — 5 8 , 86, 2 1 1 , 2 2 3 Lewes, G . H . — 2 0 8
Hill, T h . E . — 2 5 5 Lewis, J . — 1 2 6
Hippocrates—61 Ley, H . — 2 1 1

318
 Lifschitz, Е . — 6 7 P l a n c k , M . — 1 7 , 127, 2 1 6 , 2 9 8
Locke, J . — 1 5 6 , 170­72, 242, 268, P l a t o — 2 7 , 3 5 , 9 3 ­ 9 4 , 135, 157, 1 6 1 ,
290, 291 209, 227, 234, 260, 266, 267, 272,
Lombardi, F.—301 290, 291
Lucretius—233 P l e k h a n o v , G . V . — 5 2 , 6 1 , 149, 152,
Lyakhovetsky, L.—39, 53 248, 249
P o p p e r , K . R . — 7 3 , 123
Potemkin, A.V.—9, 303
Mably, G.B. d e — 2 9 1 Pratt, J.B.—101
M a c h , E . — 1 2 7 , 150, 1 5 1 , 2 0 6 , 208, P r i e s t l e y , J . — 160, 172, 2 4 1 , 2 4 2
231, 294 Proucha, M.—207
Maine de Biran, M.F.P.—148 Pythagoras—209
Maire, G.—144
Maistre, J. d e — 2 0 5
M a l e b r a n c h e , N . d e — 3 9 , 109, 164, Radlov, E.L.—256
212 Reichenbach, H . — 1 3 7 , 210
Mamardashvili, M.K .—43 Ricardo, D.—225, 284
Marcel, G.—195 Rickert, H . — 2 5
Maritain, J . — 1 9 4 , 247 Roback, A.—83
Markov, M.A.—54 Roberts, D.E.—232
M a r x , K . — 3 0 , 32, 33, 38, 39, 45, Robespierre, M.—298
5 2 , 7 5 , 107, 129, 164, 169, 183, R o b i n e t , J . ­ B . — 133, 197
199, 2 0 1 , 2 2 0 , 2 2 5 ­ 2 7 , 2 2 9 , 246, Rombach, H.—305
252, 268, 275, 282, 284, 289, 292, Rougier, L.—212, 271­73, 303
2 9 3 , 300, 305 R o u s s e a u , J . ­ J . — 138, 2 1 8 ­ 2 0 , 290
Meerovsky, B.V.—160 Russell, В . — 3 1 , 2 1 5 , 2 7 3
Melyukhin, S.T.—71 Ryle, G . — 8 3
Mitin, M . B . — 2 9
Mitrokhin, L.N.—233
S a n t a y a n a , G . — 1 1 8 , 299
Motroshilova, N.V.—303
S a r t r e , J . ­ P . — 2 8 , 120, 2 3 1 , 287, 299
Muñoz­Alonso, A.—134
Scheler, M.—51
M ü n z e r , T h . — 1 5 4 , 196, 211
Schelling, F . W . J . — 2 6 , 40, 84, 148,
Myrdal, G.—288
182, 2 6 4 , 2 6 5 , 2 9 2
Schopenhauer, A.—13, 55, 8 1 , 135,
Nalbandian, M.L.—304 186, 192, 197
N a r s k y , I . S . — 5 5 , 137 Schuppe, W.—103
Newell, J . D . — 2 4 0 Schwarz, Th.—135
Newton, I.—66, 212, 241, 242 Sciacca, M.F.—46
Niebuhr, R.—228 Serzhantov, V.F.—303
N i e t z s c h e , F , — 8 2 , 86, 117, 186, 187, Shinkaruk, V.I.—52
192, 197, 2 8 6 Shklovsky, I.S.—56
Shvyrev, V.S.—91
Skvortsov, L.V.—213, 260
Ogurtsov, A.P.—303 Socrates—86
Ortega у Gasset, J . — 1 9 , 2 1 3 S p e n c e r , H . — 2 0 4 , 205, 236
O s t w a l d , W . — 8 4 , 135, 2 4 3 S p i n o z a , B . — 3 8 , 4 8 , 130, 165­167,
172, 195, 197, 2 0 9 , 2 2 4 , 233, 290
Stirner, M.—282
Parmenides—272 Struve, P.—284
Paulsen, F . — 1 8 4 , 185, 2 1 1 , 237 Sukhov, A.D.—134
Pavlov, Т . — 9 9 Svidersky, V.I.—55
Petrovic, G.—8 Swift, J . — 2 1 5 , 2 7 9
Pfeiffer, J . — 3 0 1
Pisarev, D.I.—53 Taine, H.—286

319
Tertullian—230
T h a l e s — 5 8 , 209
Thomas Aquinas—161
Tillich, P . — 2 2 8
Timiryazev, K.A.—121
T o l a n d , J . — 6 1 , 132, 160,
Turovsky, M.—303
Tyukhtin, V.—39, 53
Voltaire, F.M.A.—299
Watson, J.—135
Weber, M.—305
Weiss, A . F . — 1 3 5
Windelband, W.—185
Wisdom, J.O.—121
Wittgenstein, L.—214
Wolf, C h . v o n — 1 7 5 , 3 0 0
166, 172 Wundt, W . — 2 0 1 , 202
X e n o p h a n e s of K o l o p h o n — 2 2 2
Zaragüeta Bengoechea, J.—246
Zelmanov, A.L.—67
Zeno—104
 SUBJECT INDEX

and the principle of t h e unity of the

world—62, 73-74
and the psychophysical p r o b l e m —
20, 42, 56, 58, 59, 6 1 , 89, 248,
249
and the subject-matter of philo­
sophy—9-12, 20-22, 33
Abstract and c o n c r e t e — 3 1 , 3 2 Being—46
A g n o s t i c i s m — 1 1 4 , 115, 1 2 1 , 128, 174, as negation of the e x i s t e n t — 1 9 1
179 phenomenological—188
and s u b j e c t i v e idealism ( s e e also and existence (see Conscious-
Materialism)—63, 124-25 ness)—190
positivist—72, 122-23, 126-27 and reality—47
A l i e n a t i o n — 7 , 191, 250, 2 5 1 , 274 a n d t h e e x i s t e n t — 1 8 8 , 189, 192
Anthropologism (philosophical an­
t h r o p o l o g y ) — 12, 13, 14, 148, 292
A p p e a r a n c e — 9 4 , 279, 280, 281 C a t e g o r i e s — 2 3 , 266
a n d e s s e n c e — 9 4 , 107 as s t a g e s in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of
A t h e i s m — 1 3 , 108, 2 1 9 - 2 2 0 knowledge—23
and existentialism—231 c r i t i q u e o f t h e idealist i n t e r p r e ­
tation—113-14
Consciousness ( m i n d ) — 2 4 , 30, 4 1 ,
Basic p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n — 1 0 , 1 1 , 119
19, 2 3 , 2 9 - 3 1 , 3 3 , 3 9 , 4 3 , 4 9 - 5 0 , dialectical-materialist understan­
9 7 , 128, 1 5 3 ding of—57, 9 1 , 274
as a p r o b l e m of t h e h i s t o r y of intentionalism—27
philosophy—6-7, 20, 33 moral—178
converted forms—83 ordinary—58
dialectical-materialist a n s w e r — 5 6 , primitive—33-34, 222
5 7 , 7 7 - 7 8 , 80, 8 1 , 8 3 - 8 5 , 8 8 a n d b e i n g — 3 8 , 188
epistemological and ontological and self-knowledge (see M a t t e r ) —
aspects—87-89, 92, 104, 3 0 1 24
epistemological necessity o f — 1 1 ,
2 2 , 36, 4 0
genesis o f — 3 6 , 45 Deism—152
and religion—36-37 . Determinism (causality) —172, 223
a n d t h e initial t h e o r e t i c a l c o n c e p t — and indeterminism—251
36-37, 4 1 , 42, 45-47, 49 D i a l e c t i c s — 3 8 , 109, 2 6 4

321
 and metaphysics—199 Intuitionism—12, 13
Dogmatism-23
epistemological —129-131
D u a l i s m — 1 5 2 , 197 K n o w a b i l i t y o f t h e w o r l d — 8 7 , 104
of being and consciousness-188 and the principle of reflection—95
philosophical (see a l s o E c l e c t i - o p p o s i n g p o s i t i o n s of m a t e r i a l i s m
c i s m ) — 5 6 , 153 a n d i d e a l i s m — 8 8 - 9 0 , 103, 2 5 7 -
58
Knowledge—68
Eclecticism, philosophical—150, 292,
as a specific f o r m of r e f l e c t i o n —
293
9 0 - 9 6 , 101
a n d d u a l i s m — 1 5 2 , 153
as a s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l p r o c e s s — 8 8 ,
and historical a p p r o a c h to philo­
274
sophy—151
the absolute and relative i n — 1 3 0
E m p i r i c i s m — 1 2 , 14, 66, 6 8 , 9 7 , 113,
idealist understanding of—96,
1 4 1 , 144, 2 6 9 , 2 7 0 , 2 9 1 , 2 9 3
101, 113-14
Epistemological and ontological—23,
unity of the epistemological and
97, 291
ontological — 6 5 , 90
E p i s l e m o l o g y — 2 4 , 88, 9 1 , 9 3 , 9 8 ,
and language—273
291
and philosophy—16, 71
c r i t i q u e of s c e p t i c i s m (see a l s o
a n d s c i e n c e — 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 , 125, 2 6 3
Knowledge)—129
a n d t h e u n k n o w a b l e — 1 1 3 - 1 6 , 130,
Existentialism (see also Atheism:
204
B e i n g ) — 7 , 12, 2 8 , 1 1 9 - 2 1 , 146,
187-95, 207, 2 3 1 , 2 4 9 - 5 1 , 2 6 1 ,
287
Linguistic analysis, philosophy of—
8 3 , 84, 9 0 , 148
Hylozoism—13, 55, 59, 60

Material and spiritual (ideal) — 1 9 ,

I d e a l i s m — 1 3 , 14, 3 5 , 4 3 , 4 7 , 86, 140, 54-56, 88
148, 149, 2 0 0 , 2 1 9 , 2 6 6 , 2 7 4 dialectical-materialist understan­
dialectical—303 ding o f — 5 6 , 57, 82, 98-100, 245
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l — 6 6 , 90 idealist u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f — 3 1 , 4 2 ,
objective—57, 78 243-45, 254
rationalist — 8 1 , 228, 248 M a t e r i a l i s m — 7 2 - 7 4 , 154
spiritualistic—225, 254 as e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l antithesis of
s u b j e c t i v e — 2 9 , 78, 85, 269 i d e a l i s m — 8 9 , 90, 93, 96, 99,
vulgar—82 103, 104, 142
a n d m e t a p h y s i c s — 1 6 0 , 172, 182, as an o p e n s y s t e m of p h i l o s o p h i c a l
183, 197, 2 0 2 knowledge—257
and religion—75, 227-28, 232 anthropological—42
a n d s c i e n c e — 7 6 , 8 1 , 121, 2 4 1 , d i a l e c t i c a l a n d h i s t o r i c a l — 5 , 6, 10,
242-43, 246, 247, 255, 256, 73, 207, 218-19, 252
259, 261, 270 historical forms—13, 184, 2 3 7 ,
and the theory of reflection (see 241-43
a l s o Materialism; P a n t h e i s m ) — mechanistic—167-69, 237, 241,
94-98, 257, 270 242
Idealist d o c t r i n e s — 1 5 4 - 5 5 metaphysical—59, 98-99, 167,
divergence and polarisation—148- 258
49, 259-60 natural scientific—236-37
I r r a t i o n a l ism (see also Rationa- primitive s p o n t a n e o u s — 7 4 , 75
l i s m ) — 1 3 , 8 1 , 118, 123, 128, v u l g a r — 2 9 , 8 2 , 84, 2 3 2
144, 147, 153, 185, 197, 2 2 9 , and agnosticism-115-17
2 3 0 , 261 and i d e a l i s m — 1 5 , 35, 75-77, 87,

322
 1 4 1 , 148, 152, 2 0 0 , 2 0 2 , 2 0 3 , and t h e basic q u e s t i o n — 7 , 8, 52,
215, 216, 219, 234-38, 243, 246, 67
2 5 1 , 253-54, 255, 259, 2 6 1 , a n d m a t e r i a l i s m — 6 5 , 127, 128, 2 0 5 ,
262, 265, 275, 293 208, 216, 238
and metaphysical sistems—159-60, a n d s c e p t i c i s m — 1 2 1 , 122, 124
166, 167, 172, 1 8 3 , 197 N e o r e a l i s m — 9 0 , 197, 2 5 4
and religion—74, 75, 224, 227, N e o t h o m i s m — 1 2 , 134, 1 4 7 - 4 8 , 187,
228, 232 194, 197, 229, 246-48, 254,
a n d social p o s i t i o n ( s e e a l s o N e - 302
opositivism: Positivism)—220 N o m i n a l i s m — 1 7 1 , 267
Man, philosophical problem of (see
also A n t h r o p o l o g i s m ) — 8 - 1 1
Matter—207, 238, 241, 242-43 Objectivism and subjectivism (see also
and consciousness (mind) — 5 6 , 57, Partisanship) — 8 6
91 Ontology—290, 291
and motion—158, 242, 264 and m e t a p h y s i c s — 1 8 7 - 8 9 , 192,
and substance—58 193
and thought—61
M e c h a n i s m (see also Materialism) —
13, 168 P a n t h e i s m — 8 0 , 154, 165, 2 2 2
M e t a p h y s i c s — 1 5 6 - 5 8 , 195-97 a n d i d e a l i s m — 7 9 , 80, 2 5 4
as a m e t h o d — 1 5 6 , 199 materialist and idealist—39
as a s y s t e m — 1 5 6 , 159, 167, 198, Partisanship in philosophy—290, 291
199, 2 0 1 , 2 0 2 ideological f u n c t i o n — 2 8 8 - 9 3
dualist—164, 173-74 and the 'above party' conception
idealist—181, 186-95, 197, 2 0 0 as a f a l l a c y — 2 7 5 - 7 8 , 2 8 5 - 8 8
transcendental—173-81 and bourgeois ' n o n - p a r t i s a n s h i p ' —
a n d k n o w l e d g e — 9 2 , 130 279-83, 284
a n d p h y s i c s ( s e e also Dialectics; and objectivism—283, 286
Idealism; Materialism; N e o p o s i - a n d scientific objectivity—284,
tivism; Ontology; Phenome- 294
nalism; Philosophic System; Phenomenalism—13, 27
Positivism) — 1 6 4 , 167, 185 epistemological roots of—269
and r e l i g i o n — 9 1 , 178, 194-95 and essentialism—173
Morality and materialism—238, 239
a n d r e l i g i o n — 1 7 8 , 180 and metaphysics—173, 202
Phenomenology—188
d e m a r c a t i o n of subject and ob­
Natural phylosophy—60, 243 ject—27
G r e e k — 5 8 , 86 and ontology-187-88
idealist—265 P h i l o s o p h i c a l S y s t e m — 1 6 , 4 5 - 4 6 , 146,
materialist—58, 7 1 , 72, 200 256
Naturalism—12, 222-24, 270 a n t i m e t a p h y s i c a l — 169, 170
Necessity—256-57, 258-59 form and c o n t e n t — 3 7 - 3 9 , 45, 160-
and c h a n c e — 2 2 3 6 1 , 166
and freedom— 251, 252 metaphysical —109, 156, 173,
historical—283 198
Neokantianism—25, 100, 184, a n d m e t h o d — 1 5 6 , 162, 163
269 ' P h i l o s o p h y of t h e H i s t o r y of P h i l o ­
N e o p o s i t i v i s m — 1 2 , 2 6 , 126, 1 4 7 - 4 8 , s o p h y ' — 1 5 , 16, 1 4 1 , 2 0 2
215, 243-44, 269 ' P h i l o s o p h y of L i f e ' — 8 1 , 144, 146,
c r i t i q u e of m e t a p h y s i c s — 1 6 9 , 170, 185-87
173, 2 0 9 , 2 1 0 P o s i t i v i s m — 7 3 , 144, 2 4 9
critique of objective idealism—63, critique of objective i d e a l i s m — 2 0 5 ,
270-73 206

323
 and materialism—73, 205, 206 a n d i r r a t i o n a l i s m — 1 4 4 , 154, 187
and speculative metaphysics—184, Reflection
185, 2 0 2 - 2 0 4 , 2 0 6 , 2 0 8 as an epistemological principle—
P r a g m a t i s m — 2 4 6 , 300 88, 9 1 , 97, 98-101
as a u n i v e r s a l p r o p e r t y of m a t ­
ter-92
R a t i o n a l i s m — 1 2 , 14, 1 8 1 , 2 0 0 , 2 9 1 , and delusion—91, 263-66, 270-71,
293 273, 274
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 ОБЩЕСТВЕННО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ ЛИТЕРАТУРА
Теодор Ильич Ойзерман
ГЛАВНЫЕ ФИЛОСОФСКИЕ НАПРАВЛЕНИЯ

На английском языке

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