Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Various ships and craft were acquired or converted "by the U. S. Army
for the performance of special functions, and their procurement and oper
ships and craft form six main groups: (l) refrigerated vessels, (2) oil-
carrying vessels, (3) hospital ships, (4) amphibian craft and amphibian
vehicles, (5) landing craft, and (6) special fleets operated by the Signal
Refrigerated Vessels
and the Philippines, the humid heat made it impossible to transport fresh
foods without refrigeration. During the first few months of the war, when
most of the U. S. troops in the area were being staged in Australia, they
were provided with fresh meats, fruits, vegetables, and other perishable
the islands, which produced almost no subsistence except coconuts and fish,
the problem of moving perishables from Australia and New Zealand became
a matter of concern.
ships to SWPA, and the only refrigerated space normally available on ves
sels in transpacific service was the ship's icebox, which could carry only
- 394
enough supplies for the crew. Isolated bases could therefore expect few
"that plans be made to supplement the 'B1 ration with vitamin pills as
bases. "•*•
quate refrigerated space to give more than occasional relief from a diet
of canned rations and vitamin pills. To serve the needs of rapidly in
vessels for the local fleet. v.rhen the first of the Lakers, the City of
to one of our serious problems and when we get them all, we shall be able
this class and type that you can pass along to me will be like manna from
heaven." Twenty-one of these vessels arrived before the end of 1943, and
Long before that date, however, it was obvious that additional re
frigerated space must be found, not only for transportation but for stor
issued dally from these barges to the troops on shore. In February 1944
- 395
of 26^ cubic feet and 500 of 125 cubic feet. In the same month the Vice-
for transfer to the Southwest Pacific from other areas and that none of
the United States for his requirements. It became clear that the Chief
of Transportation must take prompt action to meet the needs already exist
ing and those which would develop with intensified operations later in 1944.
from both Australian and United States construction, had brought about "a
ply points, and he desired that each of 5 202-foot barges which were
March 1944 that approval had been given for supplying the theater with
space), the 5 large storage barges (250,000 cubic feet), and refrigeration
of 1,750,000 cubic feet. The barges from the United States were delivered
the theater between 20 August 1944 and 1 March 1945 (the remaining four
being canceled), and the 5 large barges (210-root, design 230) arrived
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"between 20 November and 27 December 1944.4
needs through June 1945. He predicted that 307,139 cubic feet of refriger
ated cargo would require movement from Australian ports northward during
each month of this period. Since most ships operating between Australia
and New Guinea had a turnaround in excess of 30 days and since about 20
cargo would require 1,452,841 cubic feet of reefer space per month in 1944
about 25 percent more per month during the f i r s t half of 1945. The reefer
space actually available, "based on absolute present ship turn around and
percentage laid up for repair, 11 was 419,007 cubic feet. G-eneral MacArthur
each with 12,000 cubic feet of reefer space, but pending their delivery
he required reefer space from other sources. On 4 May 1944 G-eneral Mac-
60,000 to 70,000 cubic feet each. Cn 4 July 1944 he complained that the
monthly capacity of the reefer ships available to him was only 280,000
provide 21 issues per month would require 990,000 cubic feet of reefer
feet of reefer space, was assigned in September to sail from San Francisco
- 397
OCT. proposed that the Contessa. the Cefalu. the British Columbia Express,
fully refrigerated vessels. Before the war they had been employed in the
fruit trade, and when they were converted in the theater to carry troops
eral MacArthur approved reconversion of the Contessa and the Oefalu. which
would increase their reefer space from 82,410 cubic feet to 327,886 cubic
he requested permission to send the Cefalu and the Contessa to San Fran
tralia the same work would require at least 16 weeks. "Seven Christmas
accomplished plus fact that labor is stretching all work to longest period
possible on every job they perfect." The request was granted on 18 Decem
ber 1944, but work on the Contessa was still in progress on 30 March 1945,
and in June 1945, after the reconversion of the Contessa had been completed,
it was planned to dispatch the Cefalu to San Francisco about 15 July 1945,^
the theater complained that "Heefer ships and barges are critically short
at this time and always have been. Our troops employed in combat opera
tions have without exception had to go for long periods without fresh
- S98
facilities were available to effect speedy discharge. He announced that
General Somervell announced an emergency plan for meeting the stated re
there, discharge the cargo in New Guinea, proceed to Australia, and pick
payment for the space taken by Army cargo in the New York - New Guinea
replied that direct supply from the United States was desired not for New
Guinea (as ASF had assumed) but only for the Philippines, and that no
shipping was available to move United States cargo from New Guinea to the
cargo from the United States for direct discharge in the Philippines dur
prompt, that it be made in New Guinea, and that compensation be made for
in Great Britain. Host reefers in the Pacific were in use by the Navy.
- 399
wide shortage of reefers, this could hardly "be done. ... The British
age. Any such action would mean that the requirements of the British
Isles for meats from Australia could not be made." The Refrigerated Ves
the available meats in Australia were being exported to the United King
dom, that refrigerated vessels were loading mutton and lamb in New Zealand
for a 12,000-mile voyage to the United Kingdom, and that diversion of New
Zealand meats for consumption in New Guinea would release reefers for ser
vice elsewhere.®
(l) that the steamer Clan McDonald would load at New York on 20 November
for .lev; Guinea discharge, (2) that no reefers were available for subse
quent direct shipment from the United States to Hew Guinea, (3) that
sidered before the "world reefer situation1' improved, and (4) that the
only solution of the problem was shipment from the east coast on British
ships (some of 350,000 cubic feet capacity) to Australia, from which the
On 15 November 1944 General MacArthur replied that the theater had only
- 400
normally under repair; that normal turnaround time to the Philippines
would be 60 days; that vessels of 350,000 cubic feet could not be accoat
modated in forward areas; and that the policy announced on 2 November
would confine the forward areas to four issues of perishables per month.
After further correspondence the Army abandoned its plans to make use of
Army had relied had appeared in port a month or more late, or not at all;
no firm schedules could be based on WSA-BMWT agreements; and the Army (as
and reefer barges in SWPA the reefer problem would be more or less solved;
as in the middle of 1942, the forces in New Guinea, the most unhealthful
rations and vitamin pills. As late as 27 September 1944 the theater was
reefer space each and 5 with 105,000 cubic feet each, making a total of
1,475,000 cubic feet. Reefer barges had began to arrive in August 1944,
but the first two Cl-M-AVls, the Glove Hitch and the Timber Hitch, were
- 401
delayed for unexplained reasons till February 1945.
Others followed, and after V-E Day ample reefer space became gradually
available. In August 1945 A3VESPAC had about 900,000 cubic feet of float
ing reefer space, and in September this total increased to about 1,700,000
cubic feet with the assignment of the Maya (200,000 cubic feet), the
Argentinean Reefer (175,000 cubic feet), the Crown Reefer (100,000 cubic
feet), and other arrivals. Considerably after V-J Day there arrived in
the theater three barges of a new type — BEL (Barge, Refrigerated, Large).
Each was 265 feet long, with 8 holds storing the equivalent of 64 carloads
plant producing 5 tons a day, and a unit making 10 gallons of ice cream
refrigerated equipment had been delayed until the most urgent need for
it was past.
Special floating equipment for carrying oil — that is, oil barges
and tankers — was not greatly needed by the Army in SWPA for intrathea
ter use before 1943. American oil was delivered either in drums, which
main Australian ports in which Navy and WSA tankers could discharge their
for bulk storage and were therefore supplied with oil in drums. During
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1943 these ports began to construct such facilities, but on a limited
scale. Large and permanent facilities were not desired, since the ports
would be decreasingly used after the center of combat moved to the Phil
tankers for direct discharge; in others the facilities were so small that
a large tanker could completely discharge its cargo only by visiting more
than one port. These conditions persisted through the New Guinea period
of the war and were repeated in the Philippines until permanent facilities
forward areas; and a need developed for small tankers, which did not re
quire deep-water ports and did not carry more than one port required, and
for oil barges, which could be carried as cargo in tows from Australia and
could deliver oil in very shallow ports or could be used to discharge tank
ers that could not enter such ports. Even after the reoccupation of Manila
such equipment was needed for delivering bulk oil from Manila to outlying
ports.
Of the oil barges the first were four 80-foot barges (SSS-H) con
received 13 85-foot bulk oil steel barges (SSS-G) from the same source,
and 37 more were delivered later. Prom the United States came 50 102
foot knockdown riveted oil barges (design 348), delivered between 29 De
cember 1943 and 25 March 1944, and 16 120-foot oil barges (design 231),
delivered between 19 January and July 1944. The 120 barges made part of
the huge tows from Australia to New Guinea and later from New Guinea to
the Philippines.
- 403
The Y tankers delivered to SWPA were technically designated as
tanker, liquid cargo, diesel, steel, and tanker, dry and liquid cargo,
diesel, steel, 162 feet. They were built for the Transportation Corps
30f x 13'6 M ), 294-A (182I6H x 30' x 14'), 294-AB (182'6» x 30' x 13'6»),
12
4 3 1 9 4 4 (cont.)
Aug - Y-13 286 Oct 25 Y-35 286
Aug - Y-14 286 Nov 11 Y-44 286
Aug - Y-15 286 Nov - Y-45 286
Hov 1 Y-6 294
Uov 4 Y-4 294 1 9 4 5
Nov 6 Y-7 294 Feb 9 Y-108 294-AC
ITov 8 Y-5 294 Mar 4 Y-109 294-AC
Nov 8 Y-18 286 Apr 18 Y-46 286
Nov 10 Y-3 294 Jul 2b Y-101 294-AB
Nov 10 Y-19 286 Jul 25 Y-103 294-AB
Dec 13 Y-20 286 Jul - Y-53 294-A
Dec 20 Y-8 294 Jul — Y-58 294-A
Jul - Y-59 294-A
1 9 4 4 Jul - Y-60 —
Jan 19 Y-21 286 Sep - Y-56 294-A
Feb 28 Y-9 294 Sep - Y-93 294-AB
Mar 6 Y-11 294 Sep - Y-100 294-AB
Apr 1 Y-10 294
damage in transit across the Pacific. The Y-5 was mistaken on one occa
sion for a submarine, since its decks were constantly awash. The Y-10,
arriving from the United States on 1 April 1944, required extensive re
pairs which, after "many costly and irritating delays," were finally com
pleted on 17 June. Most other tankers were laid up for repairs immedi
- 404
minor repairs; and in at least one instance (that of the Y-15) the crew
Macirthur reported that six of the thirteen Y tankers in the area vere
out of service for repairs, that the crews supplied with tankers were
inexperienced, that no spare parts were furnished with the tankers, and
and announced that the Navy would eventually send (chiefly for floating
storage) the Sakatonchee and the Seekonk (12,000 barrels each), 6 con
verted Liberties (65,000 barrels each), and 5 old tankers (50,000 barrels
each). The 1. V. Drennan arrived 25 May 1944 and the Zephyr 13 July 1944.
In the meantime General MacArthur had been obliged to use large over
for movements from the main Australian ports to Darwin, Port Moresby, and
and the lack of shore tankage in reoccupied ports required the use of
medium and small tankers to maintain the supply of bulk aviation gasoline,
or Navy medium and small tankers were fully occupied in distribution from
8K9954.O—50 28
month from Finschhafen and Hollandia to areas from 1,250 to 1,500 miles
and Land Forces in SWPA. Three commercial tankers were fully occupied in
moving stocks from the east coast of Australia to Darwin, Tort Moresby,
Milne Bay, and Finschhafen, General Mac Arthur urgently requested that
the Chief of Naval Operations assign to the theater four vessels of about
vice."^
months late, the last on 10 January 1945, and in such condition that they
MacArthur, with the concurrence of the Commander, Service Force, 7th Fleet,
renewed his request of 18 July for four shuttle tankers, by the lack of
16
1945 General MacArthur had acquired control over the allocation of ships
to the Seventh Fleet, Previously the Seventh Fleet had made requests for
had made requests for Army shipping directly to the War Department. Under
the new procedure all shipping requests of the Seventh Fleet were present
17
- 406
further complaint from the Army suggests that an adequate number of tankers
Hospital Shi-ps
medical personnel. Until late 1944 all patients returning to the United
All troop transports were normally equipped with facilities for the care
the troop units included medical personnel. Added space could be set
under the Hague Convention was the Mactan. which sailed from Manila for
Brisbane on 31 December 1941 with patients and other passengers but was
not employed for hospital use after its arrival in Australia. Two of the
Hew Guinea and the United States were began in the summer of 1943, it
became necessary to develop large Army hospitals in the New Guinea bases.
By December 1944 it had become a duty of the San Francisco Port of Embar
from that port for S W A , and transport surgeons on several troop vessels
arriving in the theater had been unwilling to carry the number of patients
- 407
prescribed "by SFPE. By January 1945 a large number of patients in Army-
to the United States, and others were arriving daily in these ports from
the Philippines.
being used for the movement of patients to the United States had inade
theater were crowded with mental patients who had to be held in hospitals
for "an unreasonable length of time." USAFJTE records showed that during
the past 6 months 11.5 percent of all casualties returned from SWPA to
dations. The Surgeon General, USA, pointed out that only 1 percent of the
troop space had been previously required to be equipped for mental patients,
ities would require "only the installation of bars across port holes, the
may be used to carry troops on outbound trips, it should not affect the
total troop lift of the vessels." The request was presented to V.rSA on 7
- 403
October, and the Chief of Transportation directed the same action on Army-
eral MacArthur that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had authorized the operation
of 1907. Twenty-one of the ships were to be operated by the Army and three
by the Navy. They were designed for "the evacuation by water to the con
tinental United States of those sick and wounded who may be expected to
tion1 of the sick and wounded)." Priorities for patients were set up
without regard to their status (Army, ITavy, Goast Guard, Marine Corps,
(l) all female patients, (2) litter patients, (3) hospital ambulant
(6) other mental patients, and (7) troop-class patients. Hospital ships
20
- 409
Actual arrival of hospital ships in SWPA was delayed many months,
partly "by what was considered to "be the superior urgency of the need in
Europe and North Africa. The first of the hospital ships to arrive in
SWPA were the three Navy-operated ships. The Comfort sailed from Los
Angeles for SWPA on 21 June 1944. On the same day General MacArthur re
29 June that no other hospital ship would be available before late August,
and suggested that General MacArthur retain the Comfort temporarily and
for current operations and continue to use other shipping for returning
patients to the United States. The Mercy became available for retention
in late August, and the Hox>e was assigned to General MacArthur1 s operation
first of the hospital ships to make the return voyage from SWPA was the
21
The Army hospital ship of the most extensive service in SWPA was
capacity 761 including 617 bed patients and 144 ambulatory patients).
Formerly the President Fillmore (built in 1920), used earlier in the war
a hospital ship at Tacoma, Its hull was painted white, with a green band
the whole length of the ship on each side; a huge red cross was painted
in the middle of each side and another on deck, with others on each side
- 410
of the funnel; and the whole vessel was equipped for conspicuous electri
cal illumination from sunset to sunrise. Its lifeboats and life rafts
were also painted white, with red crosses. Its complement consisted of
an operating crew of 121 civilians and the 212th Hospital Ship Complement
of 210. The Marigold sailed from Charleston 9 October 1944 and arrived
and Manila; and arrived at Los Angeles 12 May 1945. After undergoing re
pairs the vessel sailed from Los Angeles in July 1945, joined the Eo-pe
and Yokohama, and arrived at Los Angeles in December. The vessel sailed
ter was apparently the Emily H, H. Weder. which sailed from Charleston in
December 1944, operated locally in the theater, arrived back at Los Ange
les 31 July 1945, made another voyage to Leyte and Manila, and was decom
missioned at Los Angeles in November 1945. The third was probably the
Dogwood, which sailed from Charleston for the Philippines in May 1945.
Later ships were the St. Mini el. the Charles A. Stafford (ex Siboney).
the Chateau Thierry, the St. Olaf. and the Louis A. Milne, all of which
sailed for the theater in the summer of 1945; and the Acadia. the Al
gonquin^ the Ernestine Koranda. the Felix Riesenberg. the John L. Clem,
the Republic, the Seminole. and the Thistle. All these vessels had
- 411
Amphibian Graft and Vehicles
in water as well as on land, but the terms were often used interchangeab]
Both were designed not only to land personnel but to carry cargo all the
way between ships and shore dumps. The dumps might be located several
miles inland. Use of these craft and vehicles eliminated the unloading
and reloading that would otherwise have been necessary on the beach. In
a developed port, where ocean-going vessels could load and unload at pier
there was no requirement for amphibian craft and vehicles; but they great
expedited the cargo operations on hostile beaches, in ports that were onl;
slightly developed, and in ports that had been wrecked and dismantled by
the enemy. Amphibian vehicles, like other motor vehicles, were procured
on 10 September 1942, were to be classed with landing craft, and both were
and Navy research agencies, were in progress in 1942 and 1943, and re
sulted in five main types of amphibien craft and vehicles. The three
types of amphibian craft were the LVT — landing vehicle, tracked (un
(armored) —• called "water buffalo," more heavily armored than the' "alli
gator"; and the M29C — cargo carrier — called "weasel" and designed to
operate in rivers, swamps, and mud. These craft moved by means of endless
cleated or fluked tracks. The two types of amphibian vehicles were the
- 412
amphibian jeep — ^ t o n 4-x-4 amphibian truck — and the DIOT — 2§-ton
land by four or six wheels, all with driving power. The craft and vehi
cles had the following characteristics:24
Pas- Speed
Tvne TH«,«*.«^». Weight Cargo sen- Speed (land,
T£&e Dimensions (pounds) (pounds) gers (water) mph) Crew
M
LVT(l) 21«6«x9il0 x8»2" 16,900 4,500 20 4 knots 15 3
LVT(2) 26'l"xlO'8 M x8«l» 25,200 6,500 24 5.4 knots 25 3
LVT(3) 24'li"xLl'x8'5|w 28,000 8,000 24 5.2 knots 25 3
LVT(4) 26 l l"xl0 l 8"x8'2i-" 23,350 8,000 24 5.5 knots 15 3
LVT(A)(l) 26*l«xl0»8 M xl0'l« 32,800 1,000 24 5.4 knots 25 6
LVT(A)(2) 26 l l' l xl0«8 M xl0 l l M 38,000 2,000 24 5.2 knots 25 5
LVT(A)(4) 26'lWxl0'8 H xl0'l» 35,100 5,000 24 5.2 knots 15 5
M29C 15'9«x5»10i»x5«10j M 5,971 1,200 - 3-4 mph 26.4 1
Jeep 15'7"x5 ! 4 H 3,700 800 - 4.7 knots 50 1
SWPA were evidently employed by Navy and Marine Corps organizations. .Am
organizations. The TC amphibian truck company (T/E 55-37, 29 Apr 43) was
(T/O&E 55-177, 19 May 43) with 1 amphibian jeep; the TC service organiza
1943 SWPA had requested 150 ECJKWs, of which 25, procured for the 2d Engi
a t o r s and mechanics. On 20 March 1943 the theater ordered 500 DUKWs for
Engineers with those already arrived that the DUKW would be "a very useful
- 413
piece of equipment in the island areas and in conjunction with small ships.1'
The Chief of Transportation, USA3TB, reported on 20 May 1943 that the Navy
and the Amphibious Engineers were holding equipment in reserve for train
ing and tactical operation while the Transportation Corps was "trying to
Millingambi, a new landing point near Darwin, where shallow water required
movement of cargo from a ship lying 25 miles from shore. By the end of
1943 a total of 1,400 amphibian trucks had been ordered by SWPA, of which
50 had been received in the theater by the end of May 1943 and 1,220 had
W. Parry, Jr., and Rudolph C # Lehnau, Control Division, ASF, after an in
spection of the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific areas. They proposed
vided with 60 DUKWs (with spare underwater parts) besides 4 50-ton self-
5-ton truck cranes with oversize tires and 4-wheel drive, 1 fueling tank
truck and greasing outfit, 1 30-foot trailer and unit, and other equip
ment. It was believed that a DTJKW outfit transporting cargo from a ves
sel anchored one mile from shore to a dump three miles inland could make
the round trip with four tons in one hour, ^or loading and unloading,
- 414
with standardized interisland transports and standardized refrigerated
with "breaks in the reef through which vessels may enter, and "by virtue
to the slope of the beach and the distance from the beach where vessels
of varying sizes may anchor in safety, tfe know, therefore, that as the
campaign develops and we move from island to island, that we shall always
ship over a sandy coral beach, where no facilities of any kind exist.
transport materials for the construction of the docks. The same gener
ally is true with respect to building smaller docks for barges or light
ers. Besides the objection noted, permanent developments are undesir
able because the beachhead which might be important from a supply angle
based upon the nearest adjacent large Port. For example, the northern
ports of Australia are logically the water bases for the New Guinea cam
paign and for islands to the north and west, just as Noumea and Espiritu
Santo are logically the bases for the campaign in the Solomons, Gilberts,
envisage the movement of materials and supplies from the nearest large
water base to the advanced combat zones as quickly, safely, and with a
Guinea were still frightened by the "new and terrible monster of war"
that had appeared among them. It rolled along forest roads, moved with
out hesitation over logs and through mud, changed easily from land to
sea or sea to land operation, could carry troops with full equipment,
cross a river or a bay, and discharge without the two handlings that
otherwise would have been unavoidable. This notice was somewhat opti
mistic, for a DUZV, like other wheeled vehicles, could sink in mud or
- 415
sand and be stopped by a sufficiently large obstacle; but with its six-
wheel drive it could move under various conditions where ordinary trucks
were powerless. As late as October 1943, however, the use of DUKV/s in the
theater was still "in an experimental stage." Tactical use of the DUKVT
in assault landings was contemplated, and "the primary use of the Dukw,
DUKWs, would "give confidence in the value of this equipment." His pre
diction was evidently correct. Two amphibian truck companies (the 464th
?7
The procurement of landing ships and landing craft for Army use was
ber 1942 from SWPA for 38 "truck lighters" (design 289, BTL 826-831, 833
834, 839-852, 873-886), which were dispatched from San Francisco in Feb
ruary 1944; but these were among 207 Army hulls that had been taken over
by the Navy and completed as LCM(3)s. With this exception the Transpor
- 416
t a t i o n Corps was concerned with landing ships and landing craft mainly a s
signed for use in landings on hostile shores and not mainly for transpor
Their main use in SWPA was by the Navy Amphibian Force and by the
three Engineer amphibian brigades (the 2d, 3d, and 4th). Each brigade
required 540 LCV(P)s, 503 LCM(3)s, and 40 LCCs or LCS(S)s. The LCV(P)
1 30-ton tank; i t was designed chiefly for beaching tanks or motor vehi
cles. (Later the LCM(6) was produced, with 6 feet of added length and a
knot of added speed.) The LCC — landing craft, control — was a 56-foot
navigational craft for landing craft" and for traffic control and pre
LCS(S) — landing craft, support (small) — was a wooden boat 36' 8" long,
distances. Each brigade could land one Engineer triangular division with
- 417
?9
By 23 July 1943 500 LCV(P)s of the 1,620 required by the three bri
gades for 1943 had been delivered and 200 were en route; and 120 LCM(3)s
of the 1,509 required had been dispatched for the theater. The LCV(P)s
were shipped knocked down and were assembled by the 411th Base Shop Bat
talion at Cairns, Australia. The LCM(3)s required deck space that was
30
made during 1943 and 1944. In September 1943 the Quebec Conference allo
cated 540 LCV(P)s and 405 LCM(3)s for each of the three brigades for
under st'xLy in September. The LOT — landing craft, tank — was produced
American models were the LCT(5) — length 117'6", speed 8 knots, range
700 miles, crew 1 officer and 12 enlisted men, capacity 4 40-ton tanks
or 250 tons of general cargo; and the LCT(6) — length 120'4", speed 7
knots, range 700 miles, crew 1 officer and 11 enlisted men, capacity as
for LCT(5). The LCCs originally called for were not available; on 30
November 1943 the requirement for command and navigation boats was stated
for each brip^de. The requirement for LCM(3)s was raised from 1,509 to
- 418
time, on 6 October 1943, General MacArthur reported that the LCV(P), be
cause of Mits inability to operate over long exposed water routes invar
iably encountered and its small pay load," was not suited for extensive
use in SVfPA; and he reduced his requirement from 1,620 to 1,000, the
eliminated 620 to be replaced by LCTs (63 LCTs for each 270 LCV(P)s) or
by LCMs (4 LCMs for each LCT not furnished). On 28 January 1944 General
MacArthur reported that the LCS(S) was too lightly armored to serve
effectively "in restricted waters to locate and destroy enemy barges and
These craft — landing craft, support (large) — were 158'5" long, with
a crew of 5 officers and 68 enlisted men, and were designed "to provide
fire support for landing operations and to intercept and destroy inter
island barge traffic." Most of these requested changes were made in the
course of 1944. 31
brigade equipment were used by the TC. The theater admitted in October
1943 that LCMs were assigned for lightering of cargo when other cargo-
thur requested 24 LCTs "for USASOS and other Army requirements" (besides
the LCTs requested for the three brigades). On 28 February 1944 he re
quested 212 LCMs for USASOS, of which 12 were for the 4 Engineer ports
were for the Transportation Corps for use by Q^ boat companies and by
- 419
projected harbor-craft companies. Landing craft were not assigned as
32
ships had "immobilized" supplies and troops in the South Pacific and in
tional directives to the end that such as can be spared without prejudice
redeploying Troops across the Pacific and in moving forward Troops and
supplies from the South Pacific and the Rear Areas of the Southwest Pac
ific." General MaArthur replied on 11 April that assault ships and craft
were being used "to the fullest extent possible for movement of personnel
and cargo from rear to combat areas," and that later he might be able to
use more LSTs and LSMs "for logistic purposes." These were comparatively
large oceangoing vessels, the LSM (landing ship, medium) being 2031 6"
long and the LST (landing ship, tank) 328• long. Both were designed for
landing waterproofed tanks or vehicles over a ramp but could be used for
further on 12 April that 20 LSTs had been working for some time as a task
group "to displace forward heavy equipment and troops," that it would be
augmented with other LSTs and with LSMs as they were released from oper
ations, that LCTs not required at rear ports for loading and unloading
- 420
large ships were being "displaced forward to perform similar duties in
Philippine ports," and that LCIs (landing craft, infantry, 158' 5fn long,
with accommodations to carry 6 officers and 182 enlisted men for 48 hours)
With. V-J Day all assault vessels "became surplus except as noncombat
use for them might "be found. On 20 November 1945 General MacArthur re
LCMs and LCV(P)s. He was informed in reply that the Navy had title to
all such vessels, that a number (not yet determined) of LCM(6)s and LCV(P)s
would be needed for training Engineers in Zone of Interior, and that ves
sels surplus to Army needs in the theater should be turned over to the
Navy Department. Use was found for some of the vessels as cargo and per
LCIs; in June the Navy transferred 9 LCTs and 2 LCIs to the Army, which
was assembling crews for "amphibious" vessels received from the Navy; and
vessels, of which 57 would be landing ships and craft (44 LCTs, 11 LSTs,
and 2 LCIs). 3 4
Special Fleets
tal ships could be described as the fleet of the Medical Corps. Probably
889954 0—50 29
the largest fleet of the kind was operated by the Air Corps, consisting
A little more can be learned about the Signal Corps fleet, manned
units. Small schooners and oceangoing lighters were equipped with radio
ities were being installed ashore, and for use as stand-by or emergency
1944, though not officially authorized before January 1945, The Transpor
tation Corps provided crews for the vessels of this fleet; the Signal
Corps directed where and when the vessels would move. The part of the
fleet that served in the Leyte invasion included the PCBs (Patrol Craft
Escorts (Rescue)) 848, 849, and 850, the FP-47, and the Apache. The
for Chemical Warfare operation, was converted as a press ship for war
One of the Cl-M-AVls, the Spindle Eye, was converted to a "news trans
of a vessel for the use of war correspondents, with a press room, broad
- 422
that either a Baltic coaster or a C1-M-AV1 might "be converted for such
use; "but General MacArthur replied that neither would be of shallow enough
the signal equipment to "be procured and installed by the Chief Signal Of
ficer, ASF, in accordance with plans and specifications furnished "by SWPA.
ings, 2 film recorders, 108 new typewriters, and other equipment. The
crew included 35 Signal Corps technicians, 3 Navy radar men, and 45 mer
chant mariners, in addition to a basic ATS crew. Designed for use in re
porting the invasion of Japan, the Spindle Eye sailed from Seattle for
Tokyo 16 September 1945 and remained in service in the theater till April
1946. 36
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Notes on Chapter VII
5. (1) Rad, CinC SWPA to CG ASF, 2 Apr 44, Cm-In 1452 ( 3 Apr 4 4 ) .
In OCT 563.5 SWPA. (2) Rad, same to same, 4 May 44, Cm-In 2798 (4 May 4 4 ) .
In OCT 461.1 SWPA. (3) Rad, same to same, 4 J u l 44, Cm-In 2667 (4 J u l 4 4 ) .
Same f i l e .
6. (1) Rad, CG ASF to CinC APPAC, 22 Sep 44, Cm-Out 35124. Same
f i l e . (2) Rad, Chief, Water Div, OCT ASF (Col R. M. Hicks), to CinC SWPA,
28 Oct 44. In OCT 564 SWPA. (3) Rad, CinC SWPA to CG ASF, 2 Nov 44.
Same f i l e . (4) Rad, same to same, 28 Nov 44. Same f i l e . (5) Rad, same
to same, 7 Dec 44. Same f i l e . (6) Rad, Chief, Water Div, OCT ASF,to CG
USASOS, 18 Dec 44. Same f i l e . (?) Rad, CG USASOS to CofT ASF, 30 Mar 4 5 .
Same f i l e . (8) Rad, CinC SWPA to CG ASF, 23 Jun 4 5 . Same f i l e . Accord
ing to HTC Hq., Sep 1945, p . 7, the Contessa was again dispatched for San
Francisco on 20 Sep 45; i t s c h i l l e d compartments did not maintain a suf
f i c i e n t l y low temperature for operations in the t r o p i c s .
7. (1) Memo, ACofS G-4 GHQ SWPA (Brig Gen L. J . Whitlock) for CofS
GHQ SWPA, 28 Aug 44, sub: Logistic Estimate, Musketeer Operations. In
ASF Planning Div f i l e , Musketeer Operations. (2) Rad, CinC SWPA.to CG ASF,
20 Sep 44, Cm-In 19529 (21 Sep 4 4 ) . In OCT 563.5 SWPA. (3) Rad, CG ASF
to CinC SWPA, 23 Sep 44, Cm-Out 36436 (23 Sep 4 4 ) . Same f i l e . (4) Rad,
CG USASOS to WD, 5 Oct 44, Cm-In 5041 (5 Oct 4 4 ) . Same f i l e .
8. ( l ) Memo, Chief, Water Div, OCT ASF (Col R. M. Hicks), for Refrig
erated Vessel Subcommittee, J o i n t Military Transportation Committee, 12
Oct 44, sub: Shipment of P e r i s h a b l e s to ACCUMULATION. Same f i l e . (2)
Memo, Chief, Ocean Traffic Br, Water Div, OCT ASF (Lt Col Arthur G. Syran),
for Plans Div, ASF, 28 Oct 44, sub: Shipment of P e r i s h a b l e s to Southwest
P a c i f i c Area. Same f i l e .
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9. (1) Had, Planning Div ASF to CinC SWPA, 2 Nov 44, Cm-Out 56141
(2 Nov 4 4 ) . Same f i l e . (2) Rad, CinC SWPA to CG.ASF, 15 Nov 44, Cm-In
14229 (15 NOT 4 4 ) . Same f i l e . (3) Ltr, Chief, Ocean Traffic Br, Water
Div, OCT ASP (Col Arthur G. Syran), to Maj Raymond E. Veith, Hq, Hampton
Roads Port of Embarkation, 3 Jan 45. In OCT HB f i l e , Ocean Transporta
tion - Refrigeration. According to HTC Hq, Jan 1945, p . 10, the Clan
McDonald arrived i n the theater 13 Jan 45 and was s t i l l discharging cargo
at Hollandia at the end. of the month; reefer compartments on the Turrlalba.
which was receiving cargo from the Clan McDonald, had "broken down.
10. ( l ) Memo, Director of Plans and Operations, ASF (Maj Gen LeRoy
Lutes), for Deputy CofS GHQ, SWPA (Brig Gen R. J. Marshall), 27 Sep 44,
sub: Supply Problems i n Southwest Pacific Area. In ASF Planning Div, 12a
day f i l e , SWPA. Also to be delivered by the end of 1944 were the 1,008
portable reefer u n i t s of 26f cubic feet and the 500 units of 125 cubic
feet ordered nearly a year before. (2) 1st ind, Executive, Adm. Div, OCT
ASF (J&t Col A. H. Harder), to CG AAF, 23 Sep 44, on an unidentified l t r .
In OCT 565.4 SWPA. This l e t t e r announced that delivery of the Cl-M-AVls
would begin in Oct 1944. Delay was attributed to "the c r i t i c a l nature of
e l e c t r i c a l and refrigerator machinery." (3) Utilization of Vessels Em
ployed by U. S. Army in the Supply of Theaters from United States, 16-31
Aug 44, prepared by Control Div, OCT ASF, 10 Sep 44. In OCT HB, organiza
t i o n a l f i l e , Water Div - Vessel Utilization Kpt. This asserts that there
existed in Aug 1944 "a c r i t i c a l shortage of reefer ships and other refrig
erated cargo space to satisfy overall needs of a l l the theaters. . . . The
problem cannot be alleviated, in the near future, by new construction or
conversion, due to the scarcity of refrigerating equipment."
14. ( l ) Rad ( d r a f t ) , CofT ASF to CinC SWPA, 11 Nov 43, Cm-Out 4619
(12 Nov 43). In OCT 565.4 SWPA. (2) App _37_. this volume.
15. (1) Rad, CinC SWPA to CG ASF, 14 Feb 44, Cm-In 9747 (14 Feb 44).
In OCT 565.4 SWPA. (2) Rad, same to same, 18 Jul 44, Cm-In 14830 (18 Jul
44). In OCT 561.1 SWPA.
16. Rad, same to same, 24 Jan 45, Cm-In 24878 (25 Jan 45). Same
file.
17. Joint Army and Navy Supply and Shipping Conference, 1-6 May 45.
Notes in OCT HB f i l e , SWPA - Shipping.
- 425
18. HTC HOL, Dec 1944, pp. 9-10; Jan 1945, p. 9.
19. (l) Ltr, Asst AG USAFIE to TAG, 24 Aug 43, sub: Evacuation of
Psychotic Cases to United States. (2) Memo, Operations Br, AGO, to Sur
geon General USA, 2 Sep 43, same sub. (3) Memo, Chief, Overseas Troop Br,
Movements Div, OCT ASF (Lt Col Donald E. Farr), for Chief, Water Div, OCT
ASF, 18 Sep 43, same sub. (4) 2d ind on same, Farr to TAG, 15 Oct 43.
(5) Memo, Chief, Water Div, OCT ASF (Col H. M. Hicks), to Director of Al
locations and Assignments, WSA, 7 Oct 43. (6) Ltr, U. S. Maritime Com
mission (H. L. Vickery) to OCT ASF, 23 Dec 43, sub: Hospital Spaces on
Vessels Converted to Carry Troops. All in OCT 632 SWPA (clear file).
20. Ltr, CofT ASF to CinC SWPA, 29 Jan 44, sub: Hospital Ships. In
21. (l) Had, CinC SWPA to CG ASF, 21 Jun 44, Cm-In 17321 (21 Jun 44).
(2) Had, CG ASF to CinC SWPA, 29 Jun 44, Cm-Out 58030. (3) Had, same to
same, 5 Jul 44, Cm-Out 60711. (4) Had, CNO to Com 7th Fit, 8 Oct 44, Cm-
In 7679 (8 Oct 44). (5) Had, CG ASF to CinC SWPA, 9 Oct 44. All in OCT
565.4 SWPA. (6) Had, CG USASOS to WD, 3 Dec 44, Cm-In 3397 (4 Dec 44).
22. (l) Fact Sheet on U. S. Army Hospital Ship "Marigold," 1944, pre
pared by Office of Technical Information, OCT ASF. In OCT HB file, Ocean
of origin not named, 16 Feb 45, sub: U. S. Army Hospital Ships. In OCT
HB file, Ocean Transportation - Vessels - Hospital Ships. (3) HTC Hq., Apr
Jul 46.
23. (l) Had, CG ASF to CinC SWPA, 16 May 45, Cm-Out 83409. In OCT
565.4 SWPA. (2) Article in New York Times. 29 May 45, p. 2, dtd Washing
ton, 28 May 45, sub: "Increase Capacity of Hospital Fleet." Clipping in
OCT HB file, Ocean Transportation - Vessels - Hospital Ships. (3) HTC Hq,
Feb 1945, pp. 10-11; Jun 1945, p. 8; Jul 1945, p. 8; Aug 1945, p. 8; Nov
1945, p. 13; Dec 1945, p. 11; Jan 1946, pp. 17-18; Feb 1946, p. 15; Mar
1946, p. 15; Apr 1946, p. 10. (4) Charles, op., cit,., pp. 332, 334-335,
24. (l) ONI 226 - Allied Landing Craft and Ships, 7 Apr 44, and Sup
plement 1, undtd. In OCT HB, Topical File - Navy. Includes photographs
and diagrams. The LVT(3) and LVT(4) discharged by a stern ramp. ^2)
Article in New York Times. 15 May 44, by Hanson W. Baldwin, sub: Our Am
phibious Fleet. Clipping in OCT HB, Ocean Transportation - Vessels
Landing Craft.
25. (1) Memo, Chief, Landing Craft Br, Planning Div, OCT ASF (Lt
Cmdr G. B. Taylor), for ACofT for Operations, 5 Feb 43, sub: 2j Ton Dutatf.
In OCT HB, V/ylie file, Amphibian Vehicles. (2) Memo, ACofT for Operations
(Brig Gen Robert H. Wylie) for ACofT for Personnel and Trailing, 16 Mar 43,
- 426
ft 1 * T ° n ^ k " 1 0 1 1 8 Trucks for SWPA. Same f i l e . (3) Ltr, CofT USABTE
U3rig Gen Thomas B. Wilson) to ACofT for Operations, 20 May 4 3 . In OCT
HB f i l e , SWPA - Shipping. (4) Report on Status of Floating Equipment
for Southwest P a c i f i c Theater, 10 Apr 44, prepared by D i s t r i b u t i o n Sec,
Stock Control Br, Requirements Div, OCT ASF. In Water Transport Service
Div, Harbor Boat Sec, OCT. Omitted from l a t e r r e p o r t s as not a TC item.
L a t e r f i g u r e s from other sources have not been found.
28. (1) Memo, ACofS OPD GSUSA (Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy) for G-3, G-4,
CG- SOS, and CG AGF, 14 Sep 42, sub: Amphibious Craft, Recommendations and
Supply of. In OCT HB, Topical F i l e - Navy - Landing Craft. I t developed
from l a t e r correspondence that "amphibious c r a f t " included a l l ships and
c r a f t designed for use in combat landing operations but did not include
amphibious v e h i c l e s . (2) Floating Equipment S t a t u s , Southwest Pacific
Area, 29 Feb 44, c i t e d i n n. 2 5 ( 4 ) . (3) Report of Army Small Boat Construc
t i o n , 1 J u l 4 0 - 3 1 May 45, dtd 18 May 45. In OCT HB, Organizational F i l e
- Water Div - Small Boats.
- 427
33. (1) Had, JCS to CinC SWPA and CinC POA, 7 Apr 45, Cm-In 7012 (8
Apr 45). In OCT H3, v/ylie file, Radios - Ships for Pacific Theaters.
(2) Had, CinC SWPA to COMINCH, 11 Apr 45, Cm-In 15364 (17 Apr 45). Same
file. (3) Had, CinC SWPA to WD, 12 Apr 45, Cm-In 10802 (12 Apr 45). In
34. (1) Rad, CinC AFPAC to CG ASF, 20 Nov 45, Cm-In 60924 (20 Nov
45). (2) Rad (draft), Chief, Requirements & Distribution Div, OCT ASF
(lit Col James M. Clow), to CinC AFPAC, 21 Nov 45. (3) Rad, CG AFWESPAC
to CG ASP, 9 Jan 46, Cm-In 1934 (10 Jan 46). All in OCT 560 SWPA. (4)
HTC Hq, Mar 1346, pp. 6-7, 15, 23; Jun 1946, p. 15; Sep 1946, p. 2.
formerly Chief, Overseas Operating 3r, Operations Div, OCT ASF, 10 Apr
36. (l) Rad, CinC SWPA to CG ASF, 22 May 45, Cm-In 21194. (2) Rad,
CG ASF to CinC SWPA, 23 May 45, Cm-Cut 87006. (3) Rad, CinC SWPA to C5
ASF, 12 Jun 45, Cm-In 11626 (12 Jun 45). U ) Rad, Projected Logistics
Sec, Logistics Grp, OPD GSUSA, to CinC SWPA, 15 Jun 45, Cm-Out 17928.
(5) Disposition form, Chief, Projected Logistics Sec, Logistics Grp (Col
Keith if. Barney), to CG ASF, 11 Jul 45. All in OCT 561.1 SWPA. (6) Army
- 428
CHAPTER VIII
of the U. S. Army in the Southwest Pacific Area was moved through ports,
within ports, and by water between ports. A full account of the hundreds
Army, and to port characteristics that had a bearing on Army use of the
ports. Australian, New Guinea, and Philippine ports formed three groups
ferent dates is less easily found than might be expected. A main source
west Pacific on their first assignment, might visit several ports but not
have occasion to remain long enough in any one to obtain a thorough under
the Transportation Corps could not entirely compensate for their usual lack
were interviewed by intelligence officers of the Army and the Navy in San
Francisco. Late in the war the Office of the Chief of Transportation, AST,
- 429
such interviews and reports, with accompanying photographs and maps. This
chapter and to some extent the following are based in large part upon such
Southwest Pacific*
Ports in
had been limited* Being in the Australian Zone of Interior, these ports
could be described as hosts of the U. S. Army. They were used by the Army
as the most available centers for the staging of personnel and the pro
curement, storage, maintenance, and issue of equipment and supplies for
after it became possible to use the ports of New Guinea, and declined
still more after the Philippines became the main zone of combat*
Melbourne (Base 4), Adelaide (Base 5), Perth, or more accurately Freman
tle (Base 6), and Sydney (Base 7) # Bases 5 and 6 were discontinued early
in 1943, Base 5 was reestablished at Cairns during the same year, and
through Darwin, Adelaide, and Perth, was very small, and Army traffic
through Melbourne was not heavy at any time after the summer of 1942.
Bases had been established in these four ports at a time when the Nether
lands East Indies were expected to be the main center of combat and when
- 430
Australia itself was threatened with invasion. By the middle of 1942 it
was obvious that these ports were not well suited for the support of New
Sydney was the largest port and the largest city in Australia. The
bay, which was reached through an entrance a mile wide and at least 80
feet deep. On 29 April 1942 the port had 177 ship berths, of which 44
were directly connected with railways and most were provided with electric
cranes, the largest of which could lift 150 tons. On or adjacent to the
wharves was covered storage space totaling 4,119,000 square feet. Other
warehouse space was available at the end of a barge route 15 miles up the
the Army was assigned two marginal wharves for its exclusive use, the low-
water depths were 31 and 33 feet. Sydney was the main industrial and com
ters of most shipping firms and agents, and the port best equipped for
Brisbane, a much smaller port than Sydney, had the advantage of lying
515 miles nearer New Guinea. The city and port were situated on the Bris
bane River, 15 miles from the sea. The width and depth of the river, which
long, with a draft of 26 or 27 feet. In 1942 the port had 50 wharves, all
marginal (the longest 1,728 feet long), providing 28 berths (of which 14
- 431
had railway connections) for large vessels "but a"ble to accommodate only
13 or 14 oceangoing vessels at one time. -*t that period the heaviest cranes
could handle 10 tons; by March 1943 the Army had added 1 50-ton crane and
2 15-ton cranes. The Army leased Brett's Wharf (with three Liberty "berths)
and Pinkenba Wharf (with one Liberty and one smaller berth), and on 5 July
1943 began operation of the Bulimba Boat Yard, across the river from Brett1s
Wharf, to assemble barges and repair small craft. As late as May 1943
only 1 drydock, capable of handling vessels up to 300 feet long, was avail
space had been widely scattered at the beginning of the war, when Japanese
bombing seemed imminent. The coastwise railway changed gauge at the Bris
Townsvilie, much smaller and more poorly equipped than Brisbane, was
785 miles nearer to New Guinea, and in consequence the Army used its limited
facilities to the utmost. Anchorages were from 2 to 6 miles from shore and
dredged channel with a minimum depth of 27 feet at low water and a minimum
the two piers (2,450 and 500 feet long) to receive vessels with a draft of
28 feet. The six berths were provided with rail connections, were equipped
with lifting gear able to handle 20 tons, and were adjacent to 112,010
square feet of inclosed storage space. Only small repairs were possible
Cairns, still closer to New Guinea, had been used before the war as
an outlet for the sugar trade of northern Queensland, but its facilities
- 432
had teen little developed. In 1943 the heavy demands of New Guinea, ex
Base 5 at Cairns. The port lay at the mouth of the Barron River, with
side marginal wharves with rail connections. In August 1943 the water
beside the berths had been deepened to about 30 feet. An Army machine
shop could handle minor repairs, and divers were available for minor under
water operations. A Naval dock and base were under construction a mile
up the river.^
berths for 2 Liberties), Mackay (berthing space for 2 Liberties), and Bowen
(coaling port). North of Cairns were Cooktown (sawmill town with 12 feet
anchorage where Liberties could unload into lighters), and Thursday Island
and Horn Island (with decrepit jetties receiving occasional cargo for an
air depot).
north and east of Australia were necessarily made by water. In New Guinea
and the numerous surrounding islands there were no railroads and, as late
- 433
as May 1943, only about 600 miles of surfaced road. At the "beginning of
the war the main ports which had fallen into Allied hands by 1943 had the
following import capacities in terms of ship tons daily: Milne Bay 2,500,
Port Moresby 1,500, Buna 1,000, Morobe 250, Salamaua 100, and Madang 100.
At most points the only means of getting supplies ashore was by lighters.
and the building of roads. This development would require barges, dredges,
apparatus, and other equipment. The climate would require tropical cloth
and would cause nearly all equipment to deteriorate rapidly from rust, rot,
tween transportation and engineering operations. The land masses were rug
and coral reefs. Terrain suitable for airfields or even for storehouses
might not be found close to shore. The best sites for airfields were
cess to inland installations required the clearing of jungles and the build
Some of the streams could be crossed only by rock or concrete fords, impass
able during rains; others required bridges on piles, heavy enough to with
- 434
stand sudden floods. Coral formed a satisfactory material for surfacing
with heavy tractors and rollers. Gravel and sand were usually available,
and could "be supplemented with crushed "boulders if crushing equipment was
at hand. For heavy traffic these materials might be bound with a thin
could be made of poles bound with vines and thatched with sago leaves or
kunai grass, which harbored vermin and were combustible. Buildings with
thin concrete were constructed when materials were obtainable. Local tim
ber was suitable for most purposes when sawmills could be set up. The
standard pier or wharf was a pile structure 30 feet wide and 330 feet long,
usually parallel to the beach and connected with it at each end by approaches
30 feet wide. Standard sets of materials for such a dock were shipped to
coral bottom without difficulty. Engineer units were also called upon to
build jetties for small ships, earth and rock fills as landing points, and
and the desired speed could be obtained only by "the application of horse
power through heavy mechanical equipment."8
Papua (under Australian control) and of all the small ships supplying the
coast from Merauke to Milne Bay. The port was entered through a narrow
- 435
landlocked harbor with an anchorage area of 5 square miles, 5 to 10 fathoms
deep and able to hold about 50 vessels. Minimum depth at the docks was 28
causeway 250 feet long and 25 feet wide and a T pier at the end, 330 feet
long and 30 feet wide, with wooden planks on piles, A Liberty, overhang
ing, could discharge at each end of the pier, with smaller vessels inside
the T. The Australians had also two small jetties, where barges were dis
charged by hand. In October and November 1942 the 96th Engineers General
land from the Australian dock. The island, half a mile from shore, was
half a mile long and a quarter of a mile wide and was free from reefs. A
causeway was constructed from shore with 60,000 yards of dirt and gravel.
The main dock, with 30 feet of water available, was formed by a planked
wharf 320 feet long, resting on 6 wooden barges (each 251 x 60 1 ) anchored
toons. A smaller dock, for lighters, was adjacent. Between Tatana Island
and the main Australian dock was a dock for petroleum products, with a
Army activity in Port Moresby was begun in April 1942 by the Engineers,
building airfields and roads, and the Air Corps. At the height of the
sels discharged with their own gear, and a few small Australian vessels
served as substitutes for barges. The first barges and tugs arrived in
August 1942 and were used at first to move cargo to a point 12 miles up
the narrow, shallow, crooked channel of the Vanapa River, to a 50-foot pier,
ginpole, into trucks and moved to the Xenosia Horona airstrip, 30 miles
by air from Port Moresby. Supply dumps were scattered in the hills from
3 to 25 miles from Port Moresby; the roads were poor till 1944; most cargo
was stored in the open; and lack of storage space at the waterfront, com
bined with shortage of trucks, limited the rate of unloading and crowded
the harbor with vessels and craft awaiting their turn at the discharge
docks. In March 1943 about 400 Australian and 177 American trucks were
were only about 12 barges or lighters, none powered; and the supply of
wire, rope, nets, slings, and other unloading equipment was chronically
short. Turnaround for ships from Townsville to Port Moresby was from 11
The operations of the port were most critically important during 1942,
when 125 vessels were worked during the period from May to November in
by the Japanese, who expected to secure them intact for their own use and
later were unable to inflict any great damage. Cordial relations existed
between the U. S. Army and the Australian forces, who originally carried
the whole burden of operations at Port Moresby. After 1942 the military
use of the port steadily declined. Drydock facilities were entirely lack
ing; only minor repairs could be made, by small machine shops; and only
Milne Bay. 10 miles wide and 35 miles long, at the eastern extremity
8X9934 ()—r»0—
of New Guinea, was approached from the open sea "by a difficult and danger
ous channel among coral reefs. At the beginning of the war it had only
one small jetty, where luggers of not more than seven feet of draft loaded
copra. The only roads were native trails; most of the hinterland was mud
and swamp. The only supplies procurable locally were fresh fruits; every
The first American troops arrived in Milne Bay in July 1942 and assisted
the Australians* The first wharves were made of empty oil drums connected
with stringers and covered with planks. Only jeeps, with four-wheel drive,
were able to move through the mud. Cargo was stacked in the open. Aus
tralian and American forces, with 1,200 Papuan natives, began at once, in
A Japanese attack in the last week of August 1942 ended with the almost
strip. By the end of 1942 there were three docks, unloading most of the
KPM ships and small British vessels. Barges and other small boats began
miles west (10 docks); and Waga Waga, 10 miles across the bay from Ahioma
and not accessible by land (2 docks). There was also an oil jetty. Base
Most of the docks were in water 35 or 40 feet deep. A typical dock (the
tenth dock at Ahioma) was formed by a planked platform on piles, 400 feet
long and 25 feet wide, 100 feet from shore, parallel to it, and connected
with it at each end and in the center by ramps wide enough to permit pas
sage of two trucks, so that trucks entered and left the facility without
- 438
turning around. Apparently no storage space was provided on any of the
wharves; trucks shuttled the cargoes to storehouses and open dumps, usually
several miles from shore, and speed of unloading was limited by availabil
ity of trucks. Since each service had its own storage area, the cargoes
were segregated at the piers according to the services for which they were
destined. The trucks were assigned on 5 December 1943 to a Base Motor Pool
under the Base Service Commander, and on 23 February 1944 the pool was desig
available; but a year later some of these deficiencies had been remedied
refrigerated space, and tanks and hose for supplying fresh water to berthed
ships.
need for them was greater; and as the Army proceeded farther and farther
to the northwest along the New Guinea coast, Milne Bay was left too far in
the rear to give the most efficient support to combat forces. Milne Bay
Australia and later from the United States were transferred from Liberty
ships and other large vessels to smaller vessels for movement to Oro Bay,
Lae, and intervening coasts. Its main usefulness ended when the port of
- 439
of the piers at Milne Bay were becoming unserviceable, partly by disinte
lisions with inexpertly handled Liberty ships; and the declining volume of
traffic did not warrant extensive repairs. The last U. S. Army forces
withdrew from Milne Bay on 14 October 1945, leaving its facilities to the
Australians.
Pro Bay. 211 miles from Milne Bay, was entered by a channel from half
to three quarters of a mile wide and from 6 to 8 fathoms deep. The bay
available port for the support of the Buna-Gona campaign, being some 15
miles from Buna Village. Fishing boats, luggers, and other small craft
began to operate toward Oro Bay from Milne Bay in October 1942, moving only
at night, picking their way through reefs and mud flats, and landing food,
supplies, and equipment in small bays and inlets, to be carried to the com
the KPM vessel Karsik on 14 December, the KPM vessel Jaoara on 20 December,
and the KPM vessel Bantam on 24 December, Tanks, jeeps, pontoons, ammu
nition, and other supplies and equipment were landed on barges in the dark,
and the jeeps were instantly employed to move supplies over jungle trails.
inland from Oro Bay as far as Dobodura Airstrip, Considerably more than
50 air raids during the first 6 months of operations failed to destroy any
vehicles. Building of wharves was begun in the middle of 1943, and 8 docks
had been completed by 1 August 1943, Dock H was able to accommodate one
- 440
Liberty ship; the others received cargo from trawlers and targes. A
machine shop was established in a 102-foot steel barge, which served also
was quartered in huts built on piles in the swamp. Dock I was completed,
in weight, * pier, pipelines, and storage tanks for oil tankers were com
peak total of 133,055 weight tons, the largest wharf had been formed — a
wooden structure on piles, 1,500 feet long, having 4 connections with shore
and able to berth 4 Liberties at the same time. Eventually the port was
barges, tow motors, slings, bridles, and other equipment. Most of these
available in the port area, and all cargo was trucked to storehouses and
dumps from 5 to 20 miles distant. Heavy rains washed bridges away and
flooded supply dumps. By April 1945 the wharves, like those of Milne Bay,
were in great need of repairs. Already the port was far in the rear of
the combat forces, now centered in Luzon. All U. S. forces had withdrawn
Lae was less a harbor than an unsheltered beach on the open sea, with
deep water a quarter of a mile from shore. An anchorage area a mile long
and 300 yards wide was unprotected. O?he 9th Australian Division landed
- 441
the next day by U. S. paratroopers and the 7th Australian Division; and
ment of the Base Port Command, consisting of Lt. Frank D. Persons and 15
enlisted men, had arrived on an LST on 15 September, and the main body of
the 23d Port Headquarters arrived with Maj. John S. Fahnestock on 19 Sep
tember. The only facilities on hand were two rickety jetties, unable to
support a truck, and a trail through the mud. The first cargo was brought
in by LSTs and discharged on the beach during the nights between eleven
o'clock and four, usually in heavy rain, and was trucked to Nadzab during
the day. Small ships were later discharged by DUKWs, LCMs, and lighters.
floating crane was towed in to clear the harbor, and the first vessel of
considerable size to visit Lae, the Barbara C.. arrived soon after with a
into sectional units, loaded them with Quartermaster and Engineer equip
ment (some units carrying 300 weight tons), installed a Murray Tregartha
motor on each unit, and brought the assemblage under its own power to Lae,
where the cargo was discharged and the units were moored into place to
make the first pontoon dock successfully operated in New Guinea. This
1944 another was assembled at Lae. In May 1944 a severe storm broke the
second facility adrift from its moorings and separated it into sections,
but these were salvaged and reassembled, and the dock was put back into
- 442
Engineers on 19 December 1943 but was destroyed on 10 June 1944 by a sub
floating structure, which was washed away by a storm on 5 August 1944 but
was replaced before the end of the month. A small ship jetty and a series
jf dolphins were nearly destroyed by a storm in July 1944. With these and
came possible to work more than five or six large ships at a time, and
cargo handling was made difficult at all times by heavy swells from the
sea.
The principal mission of the Port Command was not, like that of other
New Guinea bases, to supply forward areas but to support the Air Corps
other items were moved continuously day and night directly from the docks
to the Air Corps dumps over the longest truck haul in Hew Guinea. The
tages the port handled a quantity of cargo far in excess of its estimated
capacity, and in June 1944 was exceeded in the Southwest Pacific Area only
tralian reoccupation of Lae was delayed till August 1945, and the last
12
consisted of three ports — Finsch Harbor, entered from the north and in
mak Bay, a long, narrow inlet entered from the east and lying south of
Finsch Harbor; and Dreger Harbor, an anchorage still farther south, pro
- 443
tected from the open sea "by islands. The 9th Australian Division landed
telberg, some miles inland, on 25 November; and the first service troops
A small amount of cargo was handled in October, but the first dock,
in Dreger Harbor in November. The first TO unit (the 608th Port Co.)
arrived 17 November. A pontoon unit towed from Lae was installed in Dreger
were interrupted by more than 100 air-raid warnings in January 1944 and 90
in February, which caused little direct damage but much loss of time. By
July 1944 the 3 ports had a total of 12 Liberty docks and 2 small-ship docks,
The largest number of vessels berthed at one time was 35. In the first 2
months of operation, before docks were available, cargo had been unloaded
by LSTs and LCTs; and extensive use continued to be made of barges, landing
33 LCVPs, and 50 DUKWs was operated day and night. In March 1944 no float
ing heavy-lift equipment was available, but in July 1944 there were 2
floating cranes (35 tons and 50 tons) and in January 1945 there were 3.
In July 1944 the ports possessed 2 small drydocks of 15-ton capacity and
a 1,000-ton Navy drydock; these were still on hand in April 1945. Other
machine shop, two repair shops on 250-foot barges, and a number of small
- 444
portable refrigerator units. In January 1945 there were 19 5-ton cater
pillar cranes and 1 20-ton caterpillar crane, a fuel barge, and 2 water
barges, but no refrigerated barges. Before April 1944 the 3 ports were
not connected by land, and cargo and personnel were moved between them
on barges and LCMs. In that month a system of roads was begun by the Engi
neers, joining storage areas scattered along the coast for a distance of
25 miles. Steep mountains hemmed in the narrow plain behind the beach and
prevented expansion inland. The coral base of this plain permitted good
hardstandings, but heavy rains from April to November damaged roads, de
house in July 1944. The supply of trucks was never more than adequate,
from the dock areas. A decline in volume of traffic handled began in Decem
ber 1944; by April 1945 the wooden wharves were in need of repair; and
through 1945. The last U. S. Army forces, except a small caretaking unit,
withdrew from Finschhafen on 30 April 1946, leaving the port to the Austra
13
cludes two protected anchorages, Imbi Bay and Challenger Cove. A third pro
miles west of Eumboldt Bay by water and 42 miles from Hollandia by road,
could accommodate two large tankers, and comprised the gasoline and fuel
14
oil storage facility for Hollandia and Sentani Airfield. In the whole
area the mountains descended steeply almost to the beach; storage areas
near the docks required leveling with bulldozers; the nearest flat area
of considerable extent, used by all the services for open storage, was a
former coconut plantation, 8 miles inland; the airfield was 26 miles from
Hollandia; and trucks were hampered by tortuous roads, steep grades, and
was decided after aerial reconnaissance, and "a real effort was made to
keep the supplies out of the mud"; but it was learned, too late to change
the plan, that several of the dump locations were on the tops of mountains*
Hollandia had been developed, however, as the chief Hew Guinea base for
mounting the invasion and supply of the Philippines. Studies of the facil
ities and personnel required for the establishment of a major supply base,
port, and staging area for 80,000 troops were begun early in March 1944 by
April; and on 6 April 1944 the Sixth Army decided to organize a TC task
force "to accompany combat troops for the first time in the history of the
Southwest Pacific Area." The force was attached to I Corps, forming the
Shea, with Lt. Cols. Harold C. Nervick and Webster V, Clark as Assistant
A beach landing against enemy fire was made on 22 April 1944; the 532d
Engineer Shore and Boat Regiment, with LCTs allocated by the Navy, was
- 446
placed under the operational control of the Task Force five days later;
cargo was discharged by LCTs, LCMs, and LCVs; and congested beaches were
gradually cleared as storage areas and roads were constructed. The Task
Force was disbanded on 7 June 1944, when Base G was established with several
officers of the former Task Force assigned to the Base Port Command.
Liberty docks (a pontoon dock and 4 wooden wharves and approaches on piles),
Bay) was never able to berth more than 8 deep-sea vessels at one time. It
was equipped by January 1945 with 85 harbor vessels and craft, a number
that had fallen to 52 by September 1945. The first repair ship in SWPA,
the William Pitch, manned by the 801st Army Marine Ship Repair Co., arrived
at Hollandia in August 1944, and was followed by the James M. Davis, manned
by the 805th AMSR Co.; both vessels were transferred to the Philippines in
space did not exceed 43,000 cubic feet in the port area, and little had been
and the early stages of the Philippine campaign. From September to Decem
ber 1944 the harbor was crowded with vessels awaiting call forward to Tac
loban and Lingayen Gulf. Vast quantities of equipment and supplies were
- 447
to an almost kaleidoscopic turnover of TC units. Volume of traffic began
to decline in January 1S45; and thereafter, till the "base was inactivated
ment and supplies needed "by the Army were forwarded to the Philippines as
fast as they could "be received; other materiel was reported to the Foreign
April 1945, "It appears that all hands agree that it was a mistake to have
that they could go forward as rapidly from New Guinea as was the actual
15
case, they would never have put such a large establishment at Hollandia.
Biak. fringed with reefs and islets, was the largest of the Schouten
Islands, off the north coast of New Guinea near its western extremity.
Army facilities were located at the village of Sorido (on the southeast
shore of the island) and on the adjacent islets of Owi and Mios Woendi.
The weather was described as "much more livable" than that on the main
land of New Guinea, the temperature rising in December (the middle of sum
mer) only to about( 124°//and being lowered almost every evening by rains.
The incidence of malaria and dysentery was not high. Invasion of Biak by
Allied forces began in May 1944, and the island had not been entirely
cleared of Japanese at the end of the year, after months of bitter fight
ing; but sufficient control was secured within three months of landing to
operations had been previously handled by the 542d Engineer Boat and Shore
- 448
The earliest port facilities, established on Owi Island while fight
ing was in progress on the shore of Biak, included a Liberty dock, a jetty
for "barges, and approaches for landing craft, No anchorage was possible
rough water; and the dock and jetty were damaged by a storm in November
miles long, with anchorage inside the lagoon and on a wide shelf outside
its entrance, and with an ample level area on shore, having a coral base
and good coral roads. On 1 February 1945 the port facilities of Base H
included 5 Liberty docks (one of which was at Ovi and one at Mios Woendi),
barges, a water barge, 80,000 cubic feet of refrigerated space, and water
804th AMSE Co., arrived in October 1944 and departed for the Philippines
10 February 1945. At the beginning of 1945 the port still lacked covered
storage space and was inadequately supplied with cranes and lighters.
As the only USASOS base between Hollandia and Tacloban, Biak shared
in the mounting and supply of the forces invading the Philippines; and its
to Biak. The peak of Army cargo traffic at Biak was reached in February
1945, after traffic in all other New Guinea ports had begun to decline.
The last TC units at Biak were inactivated on 25 January 1946, and the
base was discontinued 20 April 1946, after its facilities and supplies had
- 449
16
of others discharged and loaded small amounts of Army cargo. On the south
stationed from early 1942 till the middle of 1944 to protect Torres Strait
On the north coast were Buna, controlled "by the Australians, a few miles
north of Oro Bay, with a one-way entrance among reefs, one Liberty dock,
mand, April-September 1943, for the initial jump-off of tha 41st Division
large floating dock, two small wooden docks, and anchorage for six or eigh
vessels in early 1945; Aitape, about 100 miles east of Holl&ndia, an open
loaded and unloaded by landing craft and DUKWs; the Wakde Islands, west of
islands with an airstrip on the former, anchorage for one Liberty ship, on
small wooden dock, two subsurface oil tanks, and six small repair units in
August 1944; Maffin Bay or Sarmi, a few miles west of Vfakde, an open road
stead v/ith anchorage for four or five ships, where cargo was discharged in
a few miles west of 3iak (operated by the 1463d Engineer Boat Maintenance
Co.) with discharge at anchorage into landing craft and DUKWs, subject to
long interruptions by rough weather; and Sansapor, near the western extren
- 450
ity of New Guinea, with all vessels discharging in the stream to Middle
jacent to New Guinea on the east was Bell Beli, on Goodenough Island,
as the location of Base C. In September 1944 the port was entered through
a wide channel "between reefs inaccurately marked with buoys; the bay pro
docks and a small-ship dock, a 30-ton floating crane and several cranes
on shore, and a dirt road leading into the jungle. Northwest of New Guinea
on the route to the Philippines, were the island and port of Morotai, with
floating dock) in April 1945, several jetties, good roads, ample covered
storage close to the docks, 26 cranes, 14 LCTs, 14 LCMs, and other equip
ment, the port being in charge of the 93d Division under the Eighth Army.17
The ports of New Guinea, with the exception of Port Moresby, were
little more than temporary creations of the Allied forces, and most of
them were destined to disappear when no longer needed for military oper
ations. The Philippine ports, on the other hand, had been fairly well
7,083 islands and extending 1,152 miles north and south and 688 miles east
islands had an area greater than 1,000 square miles. Only in Luzon did
18
- 451
Cebu — were deemed sufficient for most needs of the Army. If the K-l
(Mindanao) operations had not been canceled, one or more additional ports
in the southern islands would probably have served the Army on a large
scale.
Tacloban was only one of a series of adjacent ports used by the Army
on the east coast of Leyte. facing San Pedro Bay. This nearly square bay,
with Leyte forming the west shore and Samar the east and north shores,
communicated at the northwest corner with the Samar Sea through a narrow
tides. On the south the bay opened into Leyte Gulf. The ports, listed
the entrance to the strait; White Beach; Red Beach; Violet Beach, at the
south of the bay. The highway connecting these ports was 25 or 30 miles
was the beach of Abuyog. Behind the sand and coral beaches were heavy
woods and dense jungles. All these ports formed a single system, con
trolled by the Port Command, Base K, and the aggregate was sometimes loosely
vessels. Navigation was impeded by shoals, reefs, and wrecks, which were
were frequent in spite of these precautions. No part of the bay was pro
tected from heavy swells. All the ports were too shallow for convenient
operation.
- 452
harbor only 2,000 feet wide and with about 19 feet of water at the docks,
approached from the anchorage area by a buoyed channel 4 miles long and
about 27 feet deep. As late as February 1945, before dredging was under
taken, it was impossible for Liberty ships to reach Tacloban without pre
liminary partial unloading in the stream to reduce their draft to 18 feet.
to half a mile from shore at White Beach, Red Beach, and Violet Beach. At
all times a large part of the cargo handled by Base K was moved by LCTs,
LCMs, LCVPs, and DUXWs. The Port Command, Base K, which began operations
on 22 October 1944, 2 days after the first assault, struggled with these
Tacloban was slowed by 56 air raids in 4 days; there were 203 air alerts
during the first 42 days of operation; and suicidal attacks from planes
crashing into vessels caused not only considerable casualties and damage
but much loss of time. Three typhoons during the first 3 months led to
further loss of time. A total of more than 33 inches of rain during the
areas were so far from shore that DUEWs were obliged to move abnormally
889954 O—50 31
DUKWs, 3 reefer barges, and other equipment. The repair ships Daluth
(802d Army Marine Ship Repair Co.) and James B. Houston and the 1111th
and 1112th TC Fort Marine Maintenance Companies reduced rapidly the back
congestion of the first three months, when Leyte contained the only Army
port north of Biak, was relieved; but the Port Command, Base K, was still
19
Port installations used by the TJ. S. Army were scattered along the
south and east shores of Lingayen Gulf. Luzon, for a distance of about 60
miles# Listed from south to north these installations included Red Beach
at Lingayen; Blue Beach at Dagupan (Sub-Base 2), at the mouth of the Dagu
pan River; White Beach No. 1 at San Fabian (Headquarters, Port Command,
till 21 April 1945); White Beach No. 2 (Sub-Base l); White Beach No. 3 at
April 1945), 30 miles north of San Fabian. All these ports were unprotecte
water8 about half a mile from shore and discharged into landing craft, DUEW
and lighters.
By March 1945 one pier had been completed at San Fernando with 24
feet of water alongside, and by July 1945 the same port was provided with
- 454
a pontoon wharf in 45 feet of water. Various docks and jetties received
cargo from the landing craft and lighters. Special difficulty was ex
perienced at Dagupan, where the mouth of the river was partly obstructed
"by a bar and the main dock was located some distance up the river. All
Beach No. 2, 110 miles from Manila, a rail jetty 750 feet long was com
and smaller rail equipment directly on the tracks from barges. The most
harbor (San Fernando Bay) and a south harbor were separated by San Fernando
Point, the whole of which was occupied by Army storage areas and service
without dredging, but the north harbor offered partial protection to smal
ler vessels. Both harbors and their beaches were littered with Japanese
wrecks* The first Port Command personnel landed in Lingayen Gulf at Daga
pan on 11 January 1945, two days after the initial assault. The Transpor
tation Corps unloaded cargo with DUKWs and alligators, the Engineers (544th
Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, relieved 4 March 1945) with LCMs and
LCVPs, and the Navy with LSTs and LCTs. Operations were slowed by air
raids averaging one a day, muddy roads, shortage of trucks, lifting equip
ment, and spare parts, and lack of drydock facilities. These conditions
Base M was not deemed necessary. Its utility decreased as the port of
Manila became available for Army use; and by 31 May 1946, with the inacti
vation of the 669th Medium Port, the port operations of the Army in Lin
gayen Gulf had decreased to very small volume in anticipation of the closing
- 455
of Base U.20
miles from Manila, was nearly intact when occupied without assault on 7
April 1945. Two sunken ships were removed from the harbor; and repairs
August the last of 5 additional Liberty piers was completed; these accom
when the first Liberty ship was docked at Batangas, and to a large extent
thereafter, cargo was discharged on the beach by LCTs, LCMs, and DUKWs*
A large number of LCMs were removed when the 592d Engineer Boat and Shore
sels was available not far from shore. The usual difficulties connected
with air alerts, mud, and shortage of equipment did not appear on a large
scale; but unloading was repeatedly affected by rough water and abnormal
tides. The port was decreasingly used after the middle of 1945, but it
was designated as the location for plants assembling knocked-down LCMs and
steel barges.
The port of Cebu* at Cebu City, occupied the southwest shore of Bohol
Strait, separating the island of Cebu from Mactan Island. Its peacetime
a railway; 3 finger piers projecting from the marginal wharf, having covered
alongside; the Hoa Hin Shipyard on Mactan Island, equipped to build and
repair small vessels; and anchorage for an unlimited number of large ships.
The adjacent country was fairly high and well drained. Shellfire and bomb
ings had damaged the city and the railway extensively, sunk 13 ships and
- 456
barges in the harbor, unroofed the warehouses on the piers, and left 18
bomb craters, from 12 to 50 feet in diameter, on the piers and the wharf.
When the Port Command took over the port from the 542d Engineer Boat and
Shore Regiment in June 1945, many of these damages had already been repaired.
landing place for DUKWs. The Army did not take over the railway. By the
end of 1945 the port was able to berth 9 Liberty ships at a time, but Army
need for it« services had nearly ended. The Army continued its use of the
ports in which no USASOS base was established were used by the Army in
1945. Zamboanga, Mindanao, when observed in March 1945, was able to berth
roadstead was only partly protected. The port, operated by the 543d Engi
neer Boat and Shore Regiment, was handling 500 tons a day. No repair facil
ities were available. Roads and buildings had been greatly damaged, but
30,000 feet of covered storage space was usable, and a water line to the
Cotobato, was being operated at the end of May 1945 by elements of the 533d
and 543d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiments and other troops. Discharge was
entirely amphibious. Plans were made to move all but a skeleton force, as
Bay on the north coast, better connected by highway with Davao than Parang
532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, could accommodate with difficulty
one Liberty ship at its single wharf. It handled about 650 tons a day,
- 457
almost entirely with DUKWs and LCMs, and could safely anchor about 25
large vessels. Iloilo, on the south side of Panay, had concrete wharves
on "both sides of a channel "between an island and the main shore, able to
wharf outside the river able to accommodate one Liberty ship. Anchorage
room and covered storage were ample. San Jose, Mindoro, and the adjacent
Red, White, and Blue Beaches within 14 miles of San Jose, were operated by
elements of the 532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, Anchorage was un
modate 3 Liberty ships at one time and permit discharge of 1,500 tons a day.
Oil and fresh water were available at a jetty. Use was made of 14 miles of
the 36 miles of track belonging to the narrow-gauge San Jose Railroad, which
moved 9,800 tons of Army cargo during March 1945. Other facilities were de
veloped at San Jose to supply 30,000 or 35,000 troops and to deliver supplies
and Cuyu) from 108 to 128 miles distant. All these ports of the southern
Philippines were under control of the Eighth Army and were operated only
temporarily for Army use while Japanese forces were cleared from the islands.
Plans to establish Base Q, in Palawan and Base T in Mindanao were not carried
into full effect, and little Army development of the ports was found neces
sary.
23
supply points for Samar and received small amounts of Army cargo. Two
other ports — Mariveles, at the tip of the Bataan Peninsula, less than 3
miles from Corregidor and 35 miles by water from Manila, and Subic Bay
- 458
(site of the Naval installation of Olongapo), at the western base of the
Ports in Okinawa
the southwest coast of the island. Before Naha was cleared of enemy forces,
Bay (anchorage for 316 vessels), and at Hagushi Beaches (anchorage for 186
vessels) ; and discharge at these points continued for some time after 7
June 1945, when operation of Naha was "begun. Harbor facilities at ITaha
had "been greatly damaged, a number of wrecks impeded navigation, and un
buried Japanese tainted the atmosphere. Action was taken at once to dredge
the channel to the inner harbor, raise and tow away the sunken vessels, and
vessel docked at Naha in 1945 was the C1-M-AY1 vessel Spar Hitch, which
dry land, roads washed out, tents and frame buildings blown away; and in
those undertaken in other StfPA ports. The harbor bottom was hard coral
began discharge at the main pier on 17 January 1946 and 8 days later com
pleted unloading of its cargo of 2,899 long tons, which could not have
operation "by the end of April. The USAT Republic, which arrived 19 June
1946, was too large to enter the inner harbor; but care and ingenuity made
it possible to dock the USAT David 0. Shanks. 489 feet long, on 28 July
1946, and the tanker C-4 (Puenta Hills). 525 feet long, a few days later.25
Manila, the main port used by the Army in the Southwest Pacific Area,
had been extensively developed by the Army and the Navy during some forty
years before the war. Within a few months after its reoccupation by the
Army at the end of January 1945 the volume of its Army activities far ex
ceeded that of any other port in the area. The needs and capacities of
Manila dictated the rate at which the Army activity of other ports was re
duced and discontinued. After V-J Day the activities of the Army in the
former Southwest Pacific Area were increasingly directed from Manila, and
Manila Bay, consisted of three parts — the Pasig River, as far as Jones
the entrance to the river; and South Harbor, the shore immediately south
of the entrance. North Harbor and South Harbor were naturally open to
storms sweeping across the bay, but each was protected for its whole length
separated from the shore by a shallow channel; and at the entrance of the
- 460
river, on the south side, was Engineer Island, the northern terminal of
the south breakwater, separated from shore by a channel that gave direct
communication between the river and South Harbor. Considerably south of
South Harbor, protected by a hook-shaped peninsula, was Oavite, a Uaval
base used to a minor degree by the Army. Complementary to Manila i t s e l f
were Mariveles and Subic Bay.
- 461
at Naples, Marseille, and Cherbourg, he predicted that the job at Manila
nese exceeded any accomplished "by the Germans. An estimated 300 ships
(an estimate later raised to 500) were resting on the bottom of Manila
Bay and the Pasig Hiver, some with upper decks protruding, others visible
only to divers* Some of the ships were in layers, one above another.
Wrecks ranged from barges sunk in the river to one 18,000-ton liner in
the bay. The entrance to South Harbor, between two breakwaters, was blocked
by two ships sunk bow to bow; the entrance to the river was obstructed by
sunken freighters; and the channel behind Engineer Island, connecting South
Harbor with the river, was closed by 21 sunken ships chained bow to stern.
The piers and wharves were lined with sunken craft. The harbor and the
shore were strewn with mines. Every one of the piers and wharves was badly
damaged, all the cargo sheds were unroofed and mangled, and Pier 7 was
and river had not been dredged since 1941. Streets, highways, and railways
were bombed to pieces, and movement was impeded by bomb craters filled with
muddy water. Most of the larger buildings in Itfanila were twisted skeletons
in mounds of rubble. Oil tanks and water reservoirs were destroyed, the
main pipe of the municipal water system was cut in several places, and city
spare parts, lumber, and almost everything else capable of any kind of use
1945, much of the city was still in possession of the Japanese, and the
south across the Pasig River and destroying all bridges, the Japanese
made a last stand in the Intrarauros area, from which they were eliminated,
block by block, with shellfire, bombs, and bayonets. In the process almost
every building in this oldest part of the city was damaged or destroyed.
Until 11 March all military personnel in Manila was under orders to carry
arms and helmet when outside company areas as a protection against snipers.
On 11 March the curfew was changed from 2000 hours to 2300 hours, and the
craft were cleared out with hand grenades and flame throwers by the 129th
Infantry, 37th Division. The collection and burial of dead Japanese was
completed long before the harbor and bay had been cleared of mines, and
When the Port Command arrived at Manila almost the only materiel on
hand that could be used for port operations was a quantity of rope, wire,
and blocks for making slings and nets. The only typewriters available
were brought in by civilians who had hidden them from the Japanese. Civil
ian carpenters made desks, filing cabinets, and messing facilities from
scraps of lumber. Candles and Coleman lanterns were used in the offices of
that date the lack of electricity had confined harbor operations to the
in -orogress as late as July 1945, after most of the necessary signal towers,
blinkers, and other guiding lights were in operation. By the end of March
and T>iers had been installed; previously messages had been delivered by
- 463
walking*
March 1945, followed on the same day by the first convoy of large ships —
the George Gershwin, the George W. Tucker, the Stephen W. Gambrill. the
Fred W. GaTbraith. the E. G. Hall, the Harry Barber, the Frank Evers.
the Frank G. Hewitt, the Delazon Smith, the Henry Barnard, and the A. B.
Hammond, "bringing general Army cargo as well as food and clothing for civil
ian relief. These supplies were required, among other purposes, for build
ing up the strength of Filipino employees who had nearly starved during the
Japanese occupation and were obliged to walk as far as eight miles a day to
and from their work. Cargo operations were rapidly accelerated while re
storation of the port was continued with the removal, salvaging, or demoli
tion of wrecks, the surveying, buoying, and dredging of the bay and river,
the repair and enlargement of piers and pier facilities, the clearing of
debris and rubble from wharves, streets, and storage areas, the repair and
city water system was restored, and in July 1945 several piers were piped
for water. As late as May the only watering facility had been a point on
the Pasig River where a single barge of 308-ton capacity received water for
during October 1945 the water ship Andrea., of the American President Line,
extinguishers and the first fire boat became available in May. Improvements
in the port of Manila were continued after V-J Lay and were destined to be
- 464
the work'of years.
1 30-ton crane, 15 barges, 8 tugs, and 10 LCMs. During the next 12 months
the Port Command had available the lighterage equipment listed in Appendix
debris, and four years' accumulation of silt in the undredged harbor and
when the wharves and piers themselves had been bombed and dynamited. At
the end of March 1945 a total of 535 pieces of lighterage equipment was on
hand, of which 296 were serviceable. Eleven months later 462 pieces (241
questions: (l) To what extent was Manila under Army operation prepared to
receive oceangoing vessels? (2) Were its maintenance and repair facilities
adequate?
of less than 1,000 deadweight tons. North Harbor, however, was designed
ered to the docks; and the Pasig River could not admit large ships. Figures
for cargo discharged in the stream and cargo discharged directly at the
docks are not available; but it is clear that a large proportion of cargo
continued to be lightered and that during the first few months of operation,
reported by OCT, "SWPA personnel who had worked all the way from Australia
as
- 4S5
by lightering cargo or discharging into landing craft or DUKWs until facil
ities could "be developed for ship to shore discharge, were forced to con
With regard to the second question, many of the landing craft and DUKWs
used at Manila had suffered from hard use and lack of maintenance in the
campaigns of New Guinea, Leyte, and Lingayen G-ulf "before arriving at Manila.
They were primarily combat equipment, for which little demand existed out
side the Army and the Navy; and the expense of repairing those that wore
out seemed decreasingly justified after V-J Day, when the volume of military
sonnel were established at Manila soon after its reoccmpation. The repair
ship W. J. Connors, with the 804th Army Marine Ship Repair Co., arrived at
Manila on 19 March 1945, and when it departed in September 1945 was replaced
by the repair ship William F. Fitch (801st AMSR Co.), which continued oper
ations till 25 May 1946. The repair ship J. E. G-orman (803d AMSR Co.)
arrived 23 April 1945 and operated till the end of December 1945; and other
repair ships came later. A 1,000-ton Navy drydock was received in April
1945 and was still on hand in August 1946, with another drydock received
from Tacloban in June 1946. ^he 1113th Port Marine ^Maintenance Co. began
work at Santa Mesa Shipyard on 25 April 1945 and remained in Manila till
4 October; the shipyard reverted to its owner, the Luzon Stevedoring Co.,
had been totally destroyed by the Japanese, was begun 30 May 1945; and
Army operation continued till return of the island to civilian control in.
August 1946. Navotas Shipyard began operation for the Army 18 August 1945
- 466
and was inactivated 15 December 1945. All these facilities, and others,
were unable to keep up with current demands, and the proportion of dead-
During July, August, and September 1945 the following items of shore
mobile crane 11 12 12
tractor crane 6 5
roustabout crane 9 8
hyster crane 1
crane master — 3
lumber hyster 2 7 17
fork lift 102 196 186
tow motor 80 108 97
gravity roller conveyor 1049 977 872
tractor 9 15 12
warehouse trailer 76 218 219
low-bed trailer _ 5 5
hand truck - 313 332
bulldozer — 2 2
Trucks were controlled by the Base Motor Command, coordinate with the
Fort Command*
The peak of Army operations at Manila came in November 1945, when the
main emphasis was placed on the most rapid possible return of Army person
nel to the United States; the peak of cargo-handling had already passed.
Release of port real estate and other facilities to civilians was well
under way before the end of December; civilian employees were increasingly
restoring the port to a peacetime status, with the U. S. Army and the
- 467
civilian authorities in a relation similar to that which had existed be
fore the war, was taken when the Philippine Commonwealth Government restuned
control of pilotage service on 29 June 1946. In August 1946 the Army still
retained 5 piers.
Command. In the first few months the Port Command was so closely associated
with the 4th Engineer Special Brigade that Brig. Gen. Henry Hatchings, Jr.,
Commanding General, 4th ESB, served also as Commanding General, Port Command,
from 6 to 20 April 1945. The 544th and 594th Engineer Boat and Shore Regi
ments remained under operational control of the Port Command till June 1945,
and other elements of the 4th ESB remained in Manila till August. In the
initial assault on Manila and at all times thereafter the Navy operated in
- 468
Notes on Chapter VIII
2. (1) HTC .Australia, I, 88, 90. (2) Bad, GHQ, SWPA to TAG, 29 Apr
42, Cm-In 7768 (29 Apr 42). In OCT 565-900 SWPA. (3) Memo, Chief, Over
seas Supply Div, SFPE (Col Abbott Boone), for CG SFPE, 11 Feb 43, sub: lg
port of Visit to Pacific Bases. In OCT HB file, POA. (4) Australian Re
port, unsgd, evidently prepared by SOS, Jan 1943. In AS! Planning Div,
S. Gorlinsfci for G-4, GSUSA, undtd. Atchd to note dtd 14 Jan 42. In
AST Planning Div file, la-1 Joint Supply Program (SWP&SPA) IV, (5) Aus
tralian Report, cited in n. 2(4). (6) Lapham Rpt. (7) Information from
Mariners, Rpt No. 132, compiled by Theater Grp, Collectidn Unit, Military
Intelligence Div, 20 Dec 43. In OCT EB file, SWPA - Ports & Facilities.
4. (1) Rad, GHQ SWPA to TAG, cited in n. 2(2). (2) Henning Rpt,
cited in n. 3(4). (3) Boone Rpt, cited in n. 2(3). (4) Australian Rpt,
cited in n. 2(4). (5) Information from Mariners, Bpt No. 94, compiled by
5. (1) Boone Bpt, cited in n. 2(3). (2) Lapham Rpt. (3) Undtd,
unsgd rpt on harbor facilities of Cairns, secured from John Lindberg, Chief
for chiefs of services, 30 May 43, sub: Summary of Operations. In ASF Plan
ning Div file, Projected Operations in S. Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, New
Guinea, Marshall Is., Caroline Is. (17). (2) Extracts from Remarks by Maj
8. Bpt No. 51, ASF Board, SWPA, by Col G. B. Troland, undtd (filed
5 Jun 44), sub: Notes on Army Engineer Operations in SWPA. In OCT 319.1
SWPA.
9. (1) HTC Hq, Supplement, 1942, pp. 1-4. (2) Boone Rpt, cited in
S89954O—50 32
n. 2(3). (3) Lapham Rpt, pp. 27-29. (4) Information from Mariners, No.
In OCT HB file, SWPA - New Guinea - Miscellaneous. Contains rpt from Mas
ter of SS Cape Newenham on Port Mores"by, visited 1-15 Jul 43. (5) Infor
mation from Mariners, No. 119, compiled by Theater Grp, Collection Unit,
Military Intelligence Service, 23 Nov 43. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Ports &
Chief, Domestic Br, Collection Unit, Military Intelligence Div, 9 Feb 44,
sub: Information from Mariners - Port Moresby, serial 2978. In OCT HB file,
Garlinghouse Rpt, cited in n. 3(8). (8) Memo, Chief, Overseas Supply Div,
SFPE (Col Abbott Boone), for CG USASOS, 5 Dec 42, sub: Supplementary Report
10. (1) HTC Hq., Supplement, 1942, pp. 4-6. (2) HTC New Guinea, 1942
44, pp. 10-22; 1945, pp. 4-8. (3) Milne Bay, New Guinea, as a Base from July
1942 to June 1944. Atchd to History of Base Section 7, April 1942 - October
from Chief Officer, William B. Allison, who visited Milne Bay 26 Jun - 7 Jul
43. (5) Rpt, MI Officer, SFPE (Maj Martin S. Mitau), to Chief, Domestic Br,
Collection Unit, Military Intelligence Service, serial 2726, 10 Dec 43, sub:
Kresser, Chief Mate, SS Cape Grieg, who visited Waga Waga 26 Aug 43. (6)
Undtd, unsgd rpt on harbor facilities secured from 1st Lt George F. Cassill,
formerly Cargo Security Officer, SS James K. Kelly, who visited Milne Bay
Intelligence Service. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Ports & Facilities. (7) Rpt,
Unit, Military Intelligence Div, 9 Feb 44, sub: Information from Mariners -
Milne Bay, serial 2977. In OCT HB file, SWPA - New Guinea - Miscellaneous.
visited Milne Bay 3 Oct 43. (8) Excerpt from boarding rpt, District Intel
ligence Office, 12th Naval Dist, San Francisco, 12 Oct 43, based on inter
view with an officer of the USAT Fred C. Ainsworth* Same file. (9) Infor
mation from Mariners, No. 104, compiled by Theater Grp, Collection Unit,
from Chief Officer, MV Torrens. (10) Extract from rpt, Cargo Security
Officer, SS Ben T. Osborne. which was at Milne Bay 18 Nov - 5 Dec 43. Same
Officer, Port Command, Milne Bay, 20 Mar 44, sub: Operations of the Base A
Army Transportation Journal. Vol I, No. 4 (May 1945), pp. 8-9, 34. (12)
Positive Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 1 (11 Aug 44), 4 (31 Aug 44), and 6
(26 Sep 44), issued by OCT. In OCT HB file, SWPA - New Guinea, Pos. Intell.
Bull. (13) Rpt, ACofT for Operations, ASF (Brig Gen Robert H. Wylie),
addressee unnamed, undtd, sub: Notes on Trip from Washington to POA and
SWPA, 19 March to 22 April 1945, pp. 15-16. In OCT HB, Wylie file, Pacific
- 470
Reports of Visits. (14) Notes of interview with Lt Col R. C. Marshall,
formerly Executive Officer, Port Command, Milne Bay, 25 Aug 44. In OCT
11. (1) HTC New Guinea, 1942-44, pp. 23-32; 1945, pp. 9-13. (2)
Unit, Military Intelligence Div, 30 Nov 43. In OCT HB file, SWPA - New
rpt of 12th Naval Dist, 30 Nov 43, "based on interview with officers of SS
(31 Aug 44), 6 (26 Sep 44), and 18 (27 Mar 45), issued by OCT. In OCT HB
file, SWPA - New Guinea - Pos. Intell. Bull. (5) apt, Maj Mark C. Collarino,
Overseas Operations Br, Planning Div, OCT, to ACofT for Operations, ASP,
1 May 45, sub: Notes on Trip from Washington to POA and SWPA, 19 March to
Moffatt, formerly Port Commander, Oro Bay, 18 Mar 49, and notes by him on
12. (1) HTC New Guinea, 1942-44, pp. 33-41; 1945, pp. 14-17. (2)
Base at Lae until March 1944. In SSUSA KD file, 780-18^ (3) USASOS Mil
itary History, pp. 71-73. (4) Rpt, MI Officer, SITE (Maj Martin S. Mitau),
Dec 43, serial 2727, sub; Information from Mariners. In OCT HB file, SWPA
Chief Mate, SS Cape Grieg, at Lae 20 Oct 43. (5) Positive Intelligence
Bulletin No. 8, issued by OCT, 18 Oct 44. In OCT HB file, SWPA - New Gui
nea - Pos. Intell. Bull. (6) "All Ashore at Lae," by Maj William P. Bell.
In Army Transportation Journal* Vol I, No. 2 (Mar 1945), pp. 27, 39.
13. (1) HTC New Guinea, 1942-44, pp. 42-50; 1945, pp. 18-24. (2) HTC
Hq, Apr 1946, p. 41. (3) USASOS Military History, p. 73. (4) Finschhafen,
New Guinea, since Activation 1943 until April 1944. In SSUSA HD file,
780-19. (5) Rpt, Cargo Security Officer, James M. ^oodhue (2d Lt Charles
Mar 44, sub: Intelligence Report, In OCT HB file, SWPA - Shipping. (6)
Positive Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 4 (31 Aug 44), 8 (18 Oct 44), and 18
(27 Mar 45), compiled by OCT. In OCT HB file, SWPA - New Guinea - Pos.
14. The first four sentences of the paragraph above were written by
in this study.
15. (1) HTC New Guinea, 1942-44, pp. 51-58; 1945, pp. 25-52. (2)
file 780-21. (3) Positive Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 1 (11 Aug 44), 5
(8 Sep 44), 8 (18 Oct 44), 10 (13 Nov 44), 14 (9 Jan 45), 18 (27 Mar 45),
issued by OCT. In OCT HB file, SWPA - New Guinea - Pos. Intell. Bull.
(4) Wylie rpt, pp. 13-14, cited in n. 10(13). (5) Interview with Col
- 471
Russell V. Perry, formerly Port Commander, Hollandia, 16 May 49, and notes
"by him on a draft of this paragraph. (6) Memo, Deputy Director, Storage
Div, ASF (Col William C. Crosby), for Director of Supply, AS!, 12 Dec 44,
sub: Report on Trip to Pacific Ocean Area and Southwest Pacific Area, par
16. (1) HTC New Guinea, 1942-44, pp. 59-65; 1945, pp. 53-61, (2)
Positive Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 6 (26 Sep 44), 9 (31 Oct 44), 12 (7
Dec 44), 16 (15 Feb 45), and 19 (ll Apr 45), issued by OCT, In OCT HB
17. (1) Extracts from Boarding Report of 12th Naval Dist, 29 Dec 43,
Mariners, No, 131, compiled by Theater Grp, Collection Unit, Military In
telligence Div, 18 Dec 43, Same file* (3) Information from Mariners, No,
Serra. boarded at SFPE, 25 Oct 43. In OCT HB file, SWPA - New Guinea
Miscellaneous, (5) Rpt, Maj Herbert H, Naught on, addressee unnamed, on
Morotai, Apr 1945, Ref 6 to HTC Hq., Apr 1945, For identification see HTC
Hq, Apr 1945, p, 4. (6) Positive Intelligence Bulletins Nos, 5 (8 Sep 44),
6 (26 Sep 44), 9 (31 Oct 44), 10 (13 Nov 44), 16 (15 Feb 45), 18 (27 Mar
45), 19 (11 Apr 45), issued by OCT, In OCT HB file, SWPA - ^ew Guinea -
Pos. Intell. Bull. (7) HTC Hq, Mar 1945, p. 10. (8) Interview with Lt Col
Foreign Economic Sec, Strategic Logistic Br, Planning Div, ASF, 6 Mar 45.
19. (1) HTC Philippine Islands, Oct 1944 - Jan 1945, pp. 1-4; Feb
1945, p, 3; Mar 1945, pp. 2-6; May 1945, p, 11; Jun 1945, p, 13. (2) Pos
itive Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 16 (15 Feb 45), 17 (l Mar 45), 21 (18
May 45), issued by OCT. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Philippines - Pos, Intell.
Bull.
20. (1) HTC Philippine Islands, Oct 1944 - Jan 1945, pp. 12-15; Mar
1945, p. 6; Apr 1945, p. 15; May 1945, pp. 8-10. (2) Positive Intelli
gence Bulletins Nos. 21 (18 May 45), 25 (7 Jul 45), issued by OCT. In
21. (1) HTO Philippine Islands, May 1945, pp. 14-16; Jun 1945, pp.
16-17; Jul 1945, pp. 9-10; Aag 1945, p. 12; Sep 1945, p. 12; Dec 1945, p.
28. (2) Positive Intelligence Bulletin No. 22 (26 May 45), issued by OCT.
with Col Russell 7. Perry, formerly Port Commander, Batangas, 16 May 49.
- 472
22. (1) HTC Philippine Islands, Jun 1945, pp. 18-19; Jul 1945, pp.
11-12; Aug 1945, p. 14; Sep 1945, p. 14; Oct 1945, p. 14; Dec 1945, pp.
29-32. (2) Rpt, Maj Herbert H. Naughton, addressee unnamed, on Cebu, -Apr
1945. Ref 8 to HTC Hi, Apr 1945. For identification see HTO Hq, Apr 1945,
p. 4. (3) Positive Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 24 (23 Jun 45) and 26 (25
Jail 45), issued by OCT. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Philippines - Pos. Intell.
Bull.
23. (1) Rpts "by Maj Herbert H. Naughton, addressee unnamed, Apr 1945,
Apr 1945. lor authorship and date see HTC Hq, Apr 1945, p. 4. (2) Pos
itive Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 21 (18 May 45), 25 (7 Jul 45), issued by
24. (1) HTC Hq, Jan 1946, pp. 14-16. (2) Positive Intelligence Bul
letins Nos. 18 (27 Mar 45), 21 (18 May 45), issued by OCT. In OCT HB file,
caused by two typhoons later in the year accounts for the absence of ocean
going vessels on and after 16 September.
through 1945. In OCT HB file, Okinawa. (2) HTC Hq, Jan 1946, p. 49; Apr
1946, p. 40: Jun 1946, p. 33; Aug 1946, p. 33. (3) Positive Intelligence
Bulletins Nos. 26 (25 Jul 45), 27 (9 Aug 45), issued by OCT ASF. In OCT HB
26. (1) HTC Philippine Islands, Mar 1945, pp. 10-24; Apr 1945, pp.
2-10; May 1945, pp. 1-7; Jun 1945, pp. 1-9; Jul 1945, pp. 1-3; Aug 1945,
pp. 1-5; Sep 1945, px>. 1-5; Oct 1945, pp. 1-6; Nov 1945, pp. 1-10; Dec
1945, pp. 1-11. (2) HTC Hq, Jan 1946, pp. 34-40; Apr 1946, pp. 21-28; May
1946, p. 18; Jun 1946, p. 21; Jul 1946, pp. 17, 21; Aug 1946, pp. 27, 29.
(3) MOVCJS, issued by Water Div, OCT ASP, Apr 1945. In OCT HB, organizational
file, Water Div, Vessel Utilization Rpt. (4) M300 Sunken Craft Block
Manila Bay," article in New York Times. 15 Mar 45. Atchd to ltr, Execu
tive Asst, OCT ASP (C. C. Wardlow), to CG USASOS. In OCT HB file, SWPA
Correspondence - Australia. (5) Monthly History for March 1945 from Office
25, issued by OCT ASF, 7 Jul 45. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Philippines - Pos.
Intell. Bull.
- 473
CHAPTER IX
miles "between Melbourne and Naha. (2) More than half of these ports were
virtually creations of the U. S. Army and the U. S. Navy. (3) Only three
and Manila — were well adapted to receive large oceangoing vessels directly
and tugs, landing craft (LSTs, LCTs, LCMs, LCVPs), and amphibian craft and
excessive distances from the shore line, entailing excessive road construc
tion and excessive turnaround for trucks and DUKWs. (?) Heat and humidity,
and exhaustion and illness of port personnel* (8) All these facts required
operate and maintain the equipment. (9) The quantities of equipment and
port personnel made available were not regarded as sufficient. (10) Be
cause of these conditions the Southwest Pacific Area could not discharge
- 47-1
Port Equipment
duced by American industry for use in all theaters. The need for large
CG, USAPIA, that shipment would be made in late March and early April of
ers, 15 cranes, and 63 fork lifts. Similar requests were made by the Army
almost continuously till the end of the war. Equipment was needed also by
the Australian Government, which pointed out on 8 November 1942 that "water
in the turnabout of Lend Lease vessels must continue unless adequate mechan
lift trucks, and 40 tractors and trailers, and noted in its requisition
that "owing to wharf and shed surfaces we stress necessity for rubber wheels,
5 ton cranes) in crowded sheds with columns spaced usually less than 20 feet
decided that it could not divert these items from Army and Navy use, but
Australian equipment was inadequate; but in New Guinea and the Philip
pines, when the U. S. Army arrived, there was virtually no equipment what
ever, and enormous requisitions were made upon the United States.
- 475
late in the war the Army was unable to use the largest and heaviest equip
crawler crane weighing 282,000 pounds and able to lift 100 tons. The thea
ter replied that this crane was too heavy to be supported by existing or
another without almost complete disassembly, and that loads greater than 60
tons could be lifted by using together two floating cranes of 60-ton capa
ing crane. In April 1945 the heaviest floating crane available in the
theater, of 100-ton capacity, was in use by the Navy for clearing Manila
Harbor. Delivery of the 150-ton crane was delayed till November 1945.
steadily at work)
3 barges per hatch for barges of 100 feet or less, lj barges per hatch
for barges more than 100 feet long (able to discharge 2 hatches simul
taneously) , or 9 barges of over 100 feet for a standard 5-hatch Lib
erty ship
At least 3 DUKWs per hatch and 15 per Liberty ship, but preferably, if
4 harbor tugs for each 5-hatch unit discharging into other than self-
crane (to be used, while not placing the crane, to dock vessels)
- 478
dumps are at dock or when local sorting is done there), or 10 for
craft slot and 5 for the dumps), or 5 (at the dumps) for stream dis
charge "by DUKWs
2 20-ton low-bed trailers and 1 16-ton low-bed trailer for each 5-hatch
unit (to move exceedingly heavy cargo and cases too large to fit stand
ard 6-x-6 trucks), and 1 standard prime mover for each low-bed trailer
under T/0 10-500, for each 5-hatch unit (experience in SWPA having
the ship, 1 for the dump cranes), and 3 complete sets for stream dis
charge not by DUKWs (1 for the ship, 1 for the shore-side handling
cranes, 1 for the dump cranes), special sets for particularly heavy
article
the dump), and 3 600-foot lengths for stream discharge not by DUKWs
(200 feet for the holds, 200 feet for the shore, and 200 for the dump)
7 fork-lift trucks for each Liberty berth, LCT (standing on the cargo
ships' business, and for ready access for the purpose of supervision"
deadlined equipment, which in some ports might total from a quarter to more
- 477
than three quarters of all that was on hand. Even the mininum require
ment for equipment was rarely available in ports of SWPA. ±Jvery port pre
duration of contemplated Army use of the port. Every port was constantly
subject to the danger that part of its equipment and personnel, however
port of which the needs were still more desperate; and most port commanders
ability to perform their assigned tasks. The Army was obliged to operate
sufficient equipment and personnel. Each port required a new and different
exercise of ingenuity.
Cargo-Handling Personnel
Both military and local civilian personnel were employed to load and
for reasons to be set forth later, most port cargo was handled by civilians;
in Hew Guinea almost all was handled by the Army; and in the Philippines
The number of processes and the number and types of personnel required
depended on whether the ship was worked in the stream or in a dock and
whether dumps and storehouses were located at the shore or some distance
- 478
inland. Various combinations of the following processes were necessary:
(1) transferring cargo from the ship (a) into trucks, railroad cars,
(2) moving cargo from the ship in the stream to a dock, jetty, or
carrier
(5) moving cargo from wharf, jetty, or beach to inland dumps or store
houses by means of trucks, railroad cars, animal-drawn vehicles, or
(6) moving cargo from the ship to inland dumps or storehouses by means
dump, or other source of cargo on land and ending with the ship
have been planned, coordinated, and controlled by the base port commander,
and the necessary equipment and personnel could have been assigned to him;
but after 1 January 1944 his control was usually limited to processes (l)
(4) and (6) and the reverse of these processes, process (5) and the reverse
being controlled by the base motor commander, and process (7) and the re
nate and supervise the operations of the port commander, the motor com
mander, and the service commander. The theater replied that a standard
- 479
supply control system in all bases was not desired, and that each base
must solve the problem as the "base commander thought best. At Hollandia
in late 1944 the base G-4 held a regular daily conference with the port
coramander, the motor officer, and the chief officer of each service; the
port commander stated what motor transport he expected to need during the
next twenty-four hours, and effort was made to adjust all movements be
tween ship and dump with minimum waste of time and labor. A similar sys
tem was in effect at Oro Bay. Former port commanders of both these typical
New Guinea ports are of opinion that the system worked satisfactorily and
2a
Military -personnel
handling
Army marine repair ship companies, operating repair shops on (l) Army
marine repair ships, with ship and gans operated by a Coast Guard crew,
and (2) repair barges, not self-propelled, operated by the Army marine
- 480
port companies; not to be provided in a station with fewer than 3
port companies
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, GSUSA, recommended to the War Plans Division
ary War Plans Division concurred in this recommendation, but quoted the
Australian Embassy to the effect that the Australian Government would not
admit a negro unit to Australia and that a white port battalion should be
created. General Somervell accepted this condition but G-3, GSUSA, did
not. USAPIA had indicated that Australian authorities did not seriously
object to negro labor battalions, and urged that these be sent if no other
labor was available. Plans were made by 6 February 1942 to dispatch the
- 481
tions be sent to Australia, to supply key men capable of supervising fill
Australia, the Chief of Staff, USAFIA, reported that USAFIA was "in sad
need of all the S.O.S. troops which we have asked for, such as depot com
labor" and was trying to obtain labor from the Netherlands Bast Indies and
G-4, USAFIA, that the "stevedore and dock labor situation" was "deplorable"
and that inexperienced U. S. combat troops ana Australian soldier units de
tailed to the docks had not been found satisfactory. He therefore urged that
On 1 July 1942 Gen. Arthur R. Wilson, after his return to the United
whether port battalions should be sent from the United States. In obedi
he had prepared the cables and the plans for the use of these battalions,
years old) could furnish all necessary dock labor and that the two U. S.
and 925 enlisted men, and a provisional port battalion of 58 officers and 882
- 482
enlisted men) should be disbanded to furnish replacements for other units.
General Wilson asserted that General Barnes had not conferred with "a
forming the War Department that colored units would be acceptable in Aus
mutiny," developing when negroes were seen in the company of white women.
The 394th Port Battalion Cl9 officers, 925 enlisted men), colored, had
unit nor any other negro port organization was thereafter stationed in
Australia. On the other hand, no racial troubles were reported from New
both the Plans Division, SOS, and the Operations Division, G-SUSA, were
"practically all available units" were "earmarked for BOLERO," which had
ment one truck regiment, white (less two battalions), and one port labor
battalion, white; for second priority, one port labor battalion and one
truck battalion, both white; for third priority, one truck battalion,
white, and two Aviation truck companies; and for fourth priority one truck
the opinion of. the Plans Division, "The fundamental cause of the serious
shortage of service units is the inadequacy of the troop unit basis for
- 483
Division and the Plans Division in regard to the ratio of service troops
to combat troops,
described "by USASOS as "most acute." Two white port battalions had been
opposition from Australian labor and the Australian Government and partly
because all units dispatched to the theater were more urgently needed in
Hew Guinea.
USASOS, that the Transportation Corps was able to furnish port battalions,
which "will normally be colored," for duty in SWPA, and suggested that the
Army coordinate its requirements with the Navy, whose construction battalions
time the only U. S. port units actually in the theater were the 387th and
warrant officers, and 870 enlisted men), and the 2d, 22d, and 23d Ports of
several increments. To the 387th and 394th Port Battalions the 373d, the
489th, and the 491st had been added by June 1943; the 495th arrived in Sep
tember, the 496th and the 503d in November, and the 506th before the end
- 484
of the year; the 493d was en route at that time. With rapidly expanding
lighterage and small-boat operations the need for military units to carry
warrant officers, and 142 enlisted men. The 316th through the 325th QM
available in the theater and were assigned to the technical control of the
at Milne Bay, the 320th, 321st, and 322d at Port Moresby, and the remain
ing three (temporarily) at Townsville.11
of traffic in the ports. In March 1943, when as yet only two U. S. Army
port battalions were available in SWPA, an observer from San Francisco re
marked that supervisors, foremen, and pier superintendents were "wanted
desperately," that young officers who knew how to operate pier terminals
and load and unload ships were lacking, that "the crying need in this country
Guinea could not be carried on without labor to unload cargo and haul it
away, and that commanders who would not permit their combat troops to handle
were slow to recognize the fact that service troops should go ahead of, or
at least accompany, combat troops into new «ro«-," He reported that the
889954O—50 33
Navy had furnished more and "better service units to SWPA than the Army-
had and that in many bases the Army had been "somewhat dependent11 on Navy
port and construction units* He found port officers overworked, and recom
mended relief for those who had worked too long without rest. In Mpy 1943
Lt. Cols. Alfred VI# Parry, Jr., and Rudolph G. Lehnau, from the Control
Division, ASF, reported that at nearly every place visited by them in SWPA
"the general complaint of officers was the lack of service personnel, re
ties on service units would immediately remedy the situation." They dis
or that 50 percent of the dock labor be done by soldiers. They noted "a
boat operation, etc." They found that "too long a tour of duty on these
tropical islands" tended to "burn out the men," and they recommended a
the theater that service troops were "barely adequate for present and pro
operations, or morale," but that more TC units were "needed for efficient
_ AftA
operation." Shortage was attributed to lack of available shipping space
theater to operate DUKWs had not made efficient use of this new type of
troops" at every point that he visited in SWPA, and reported with satis
faction that GHQ, had recently lowered priorities on combat units in favor
13
in the troop basis for 1944 (among them 6 port battalions, strength 5,664).
conclusion rather than to insist on service units that will simply help to
make life a little more pleasant. Strong agitation is underway in the War
Department regarding economy in the use of forces and all requests for
General Somervell and preceding ASP visitors from the United States reported
Chief of Staff, USAFIA, had been emphatic in their requests for service
troops. On the other hand, Gen. Arthur H. Wilson had perceived so little
need for service troops that he had recommended the disbanding of the port
- 487
"battalions already in the theater; and 15 months later the unidentified
echelon in SWPA that prepared a report for General Somervell did not take
the occasion to represent the theater's need for service troops as urgent
or desperate. The theater, for reasons not stated, had preferred to con
tinue giving shipment priority to combat troops, which when received were
the requisition submitted later in the month by the theater, suggests that
SWPA could have obtained more TC troops by giving them sufficient priority.
10 0}l boat companies (a number sufficient not only to replace turnover but
need for a total of 5,200 men in such units by the end of 1943 and for
5,100 additional men during 1944, besides 1,800 replacements for 1944. On
1 September 1943 ASF reported that no replacements for the boat companies
would be available before December, since no provision had been made for
training such personnel in the United States; that four additional port
battalions (besides the 373d, 387th, 394th, 489th, and 491st, already in
the theater) would be available for SWPA by the end of the year; and that
if other forces were considered necessary the theater should submit the
ber ASP received an inquiry from the General Staff asking whether the 4,400
- 483
December, and was informed that 1,622 of the required total had already
been supplied and that the Military Personnel Division, ASF, stated that
ities for this personnel were lacking; the Training Division, ASF, mentioned
that the personnel required was not included in the current troop basis and
training facilities; but GSUSA was expected to direct the action necessary
1943 the theater reported that "urgent need" still existed for all labor
that the shortage of port battalions was "particularly acute," that the
units, and that this procedure could not be continued. On 13 December ASF
the boat-company replacements requested for 1943 and that of the 11 port
battalions requested for 1943 eight were in the theater or en route and
15
changes in the port personnel situation after 1943. & table compiled in
- 483
By the end of 1944, as shown in Appendix 41, the following 58 organiza
852d
is probable that other port organizations had arrived in the theater before
the end of 1944. Evidently the number of port organizations in the theater
always been and still are below the desired number based on War Department
in the past, the principal one being the employment of combat troops for
labor details. This feature is common in this theater at all bases and
and hatch and hold foremen, and to augment the companies with combat troopsi
"not required for operational purposes at the time," to work under super
- 490
1944, and required from two to three months. On completion of training a
company was augmented by 300 combat troops. Under the "expansion scheme"
each port company supplied more than twice the normal number of technicians
During the first nine months of 1945, as shown by Appendix 41, the
number of port units in SWPA was greatly increased, not only by arrivals
from the United States but by transfers from the South Pacific Area and
time the Army employed Filipino labor on a large scale for port operations.
of five hatch gangs each, to enable one company to work a five-hatch vessel
1 ft
After V-J Day the volume of cargo-handling did not decline abruptly.
Japan and Korea or back to the United States. Departure of port units from
scale; and most of the units remaining were inactivated in the theater
that many port units were activated in the theater, with personnel assembled
from whatever sources were available, and that port units were augmented
with combat troops. These conditions required the theater to provide train
ing in port operations. Such training became extensive during 1943. The
- 491
course of study was made up of classes in water operations, stowage, rig
ging, types of ships, air, rail, and motor transportation, Army administra
trol, transportation logistics, and troop movements; but the course in gen
eral was described as "a "broad training ... with an emphasis on water trans
had been graduated from the TC course and commissioned as second lieuten
ants. Special courses for enlisted men were established in various ports
turnover within port units was expected to result in almost complete replace
ment of personnel within many units after V-J Day. A Training Division was
1945 and was discontinued on 2 January 1946, when its functions were trans
trine, prepared and reviewed materials for the organization and training
During the first week in October 1945 a course in port operations for newly
port divisions, the essentials of stevedoring and use of gear, and a tour
of port facilities. The 2d Major Port Harbor Craft School was activated
at Manila 5 October 1945 to train deck crews, engine crews, and mechanics
on the concrete barge BCL 3065, consisted of one week of class work and
after which date all replacement personnel in harbor craft companies was
- 492
trained "on the job." T h e T r a a 8 i t A c c ( m n t i n g Brajlch S c h o o l f o p
booking lists, filling out cargo tallies, prevention of pilferage, and re
cognition of service color markings. By the end of October 1945 the Mater
ial Handling Equipment Division school for forklift operators had trained
of single platoons to ports remote from those in which their companies were
stationed* The theater reported on 13 January 1943 that a need was already
equipped and organized as to enable one unit to perform the various supply
and service functions peculiar to any one service". This need was ulti
platoons, companies, and battalions. From this table the theater could
suggests that the theater made no use of these units before the middle of
- 493
1944, and that they were always outnumbered "by earlier types of units.
particular units, and these comments are not consistent. In March 1943
one observer remarked that the actual strength of the 394th Port Battalion
at Port Moresby was reduced to about 300 by "sickness and jail#" The men,
around the clock. A ship's officer who visited Port Moresby found each
shift under a white captain, with a negro lieutenant and a negro sergeant
assigned to each gang, The sergeants worked in the holds and "appeared
to know their business*" The officer was informed that the enlisted men
were discouraged by rumors (later proved correct) that they would be kept
ported in January 1944 that discipline and supervision were excellent, that
the men worked steadily, efficiently, and cheerfully, and that they seemed
to take considerable pride in their work. At Milne Bay the same observer
with little interest in their work. At Oro Bay he noted that on ships dis
were unable to control the men," who ignored suggestions from the ship's
officers and the cargo security officer. This observer commented as follows:
- 494
tropical disease. Cargo handling is heavy and monotonous work, and is
are idling and slacking on the jot). There is ... more or less continuous
petty pilferage of cargo ond ship's property. The military police make
little serious effort to prevent this and only blatant and obvious offenses
are likely to be reported by them. They are far more interested in gossip
ing with crew members and in getting hand-outs from the galley. Officers
find threats of discipline and court martial ineffective, for, they say,
there is a general feeling that no punishment can be much worse than regu
lar duty under these conditions. Recreational facilities in the island
ports are limited, especially for colored soldiers, and a work schedule of
into the off hours, leaves little or no time for recreation or for anything
but sleeping and eating. Most discouraging of all for those who have been
stationed in this area for a year or more is the expressed policy of the
present high command which gives them no hope of being relieved before the
end of the war, and their knowledge of the situation precludes any optimism
on this subject.^-a
With regard to these charges a former port commander of Oro Bay re
marks that they appear to rest on limited observation and hasty general
been found. Pilferage was not completely absent from this or any other
port. A few of the insufficient number of military police were lax and
according to their history and background. It was not true, however, that
T
was lacking. ith regard to the two port units at Oro Bay referred to
above, the master of the Lewis Dyche, after several days in that port,
described the work of the 387th ana 491st Port Battalions as "excellent"
and above "many ports back in the States. The amount of tonnage handled
as well as the careful way of handling compares with any port in the
States. n2Vo
being obtained from the labor troops available.11 In a single base some
operations might have more labor than they needed while others were short.
The unit's officers frequently feel they have completed their responsibil
ities when they deliver their men to the dock or warehouse. Likewise the
supervise and order about strange men. ... There is the almost universal
stated they are completely lacking in morals. They just won't work. Pun
ishment means nothing. Their officers are afraid of them, etc. My obser
vation would indicate that these complaints are only too well founded.
get the maximum out of these troops. No where did I see any attempt made
No where did I see the men even told of their daily production or the pro
duction of the gang on the next dock. Daily posting of production figures,
painted thermometers, showing output, take little effort. But the results
may be astounding, particularly if the leading gang gets a few extra priv
ileges or maybe an extra case of beer a month. ... We should not have to
use such appeals on soldiers* But these men are not soldiers, they are
November 1944 reported that the men "worked long hours, efficiently, and
to Tacloban found the 6O8th Port Company "tired and worn out." At least
80 percent of the stevedores were combat troops "who had been returned
from Luzon for a rest at Tacloban." These men, supervised by and mingled
with a port company, seemed "tired, weary, and inexperienced in the busi
ness of handling cargo The combat troops worked with interest for
a day or two because of the novelty of the job, but slacked off later and
openly griped that they were not being given a fair deal."23 These cita
tions, like those that precede, suggest that ports and units varied among
avoided*
- 496
The assignment of port units to, and their transfer from, particular
ports occurred with such frequency, and available' records of such movements
joined to lack of information regarding the uses actually made of the three
port headquarters (2d, 22d, and 23d) and the five port detachments (A, B,
work really done by each unit in each port, make it virtually impossible
cargo in the Southwest Pacific Area, and concerning the pilferage of such
cargo by both civilian and military labor, is derived entirely from American
dents observed by cargo security officers and masters of vessels, with their
Staff, stated the policy that as few service troops as possible should be
- 497
sent to Australia. He directed the Commanding General, USAFIA, to use
local labor "to the fullest extent possible" for stevedoring and all other
24
This policy of the United States Army toward Australian labor was continued
throughout the war. In New Guinea, on the other hand, most stevedoring
necessarily was done by troops, for the native population was sparse and
the Australian Army assigned several of its units for such work. In the
Philippines the ports were operated by both civilians and service troops.
lian labor standards "to the extent compatible with United States laws and
but was assured by the Commonwealth C-overnment that the labor requirements
which formulated a "register control system" for stevedores and dock workers,
1943 more than 4,000 members of the Federation went on strike at Sydney in
to one observer there had been several occasions before March 1943 when
- 493
authorities at Canberra, receiving a complaint from the Waterfront Workers
corrective action.
The U. S. Army did not employ Australian labor directly "but dealt
with Australian stevedoring firms, which secured laborers from the unions.
8,700 to 12,500. They worked in gangs that differed in size from port to
dock labor was "old, tired and physically unfit." Its rate of performance
was estimated in March 1943 at 6 or 8 weight tons per gang per hour (a gang
per gang-hour, and the Army did not expect this rate to be exceeded by
tons per hour, and in June 1944 Col. Thomas G. Plant, formerly Chief Trans
portation Officer, USASOS, declared that the average had fallen from 9 in
was not due entirely to their age or debility. They were described as
_ A QQ —
threatened with invasion they were not entirely unwilling to exert them
selves; but after the Battle of the Coral Sea the Hsocial-gains-must-be
did not increase the efficiency of labor. Stevedores would not work in
the rain but drew pay for standing by. On 12 October 1942 the stevedores
left the Francis Lewis in Sydney Harbor because of rain* Two days later
the stevedores agreed to work in the rain if the Army would provide boots,
oilskins, and hatch tents. The Army promised these, but officials of the
union vetoed the agreement. Enlisted men went aboard the vessel and dis
work and those under which the soldiers of Australia were fighting at the
moment. "^7
This "Battle of Sydney" had no lasting effect, and the use of American
handle other special cargoes. As late as September 1945, when the William
alleged that the cargo was infested with mites and demanded extra pay for
handling it. The Army refused; the stevedores struck for 7 days, and all
7essels in the port were delayed; the stevedores returned to work for half
a day and struck again for 5 days in objection to the use of mechanical
- 500
Indonesian seamen were on strike. These and other strikes and walkouts
required the use of combat troops, American and Australian, on the docks,
certain vessels was imperative, the Army held a passenger train in readi
Wages for dock labor were set by a single contract for all of Aus
tralia, modified from port to port to suit local conditions. The basic
wage was from 65 to 75 cents an hour, but it had little meaning because
much of the work was done on overtime, premium, and penalty rates. In
October 1943 the hours from 8 A.M. to 5 P*M. were considered as ordinary
A.M. ss. extra overtime. Australian law required any vessel arriving in
Australia to be worked around the clock, with the result that a vessel
often so defined by the workmen who unloaded them. One effect of the high
wages resulting from this system was that workers often took vacations of
shoremen at Townsville about 100 were always absent. In 1945 the Director
wharf laborers had become accustomed to working at double and triple rates
29
- 501
Workers were not actually at work during all the hours for which
they were paid. As already mentioned, they did not work in the rain.
They waited in the morning until the gang was complete, one man who missed
a streetcar delayed 15 or 20 men who were idle till he arrived, and work
15 minutes was allowed in the morning and i*a the afternoon, but usually
an hour elapsed before the last man returned. Another break in working
hours was required by the "tea-o.w The men quit work for lunch about
11:45 and returned about 1:15, and at the end of the shift they left from
time of a shift was about 5 hours. Workers slept on the job, especially
On one occasion the slowness of workers loading the Fred C. Ainsworth forced
patients consigned to the ship for return to the United States to wait in
ambulances on the dock as long as four hours, and when only five or ten
minutes1 work remained, all longshoremen went ashore for their "smoke-o"
standing guard in the sun over a cargo on a Townsville dock was baited by
eight dock workers resting in the shade with such remarks as "You are a
G-~ E — bloody fool- to be in the Army for $50 when you could be home safe
and sound in the shipyards and make lots of money." In spite of these and
other taunting remarks the sentry "kept a firm grip on his temper." Amer
ican officers walking the streets of Townsville alone at night were beaten
- 5 0 2
and middle-class Australians there was alleged to be "a concert of inter
Army personnel was not authorized to protect itself against the insolence
agreement with the Australian Government that military labor would not be
used on the waterfront if civilian labor was "available and willing." The
Federation had also inquired of Mr. Harry Bridges whether the 385th QJ4
32
dictate where and how the unit would be used. No evidence is found that
this or any other American unit was employed in Australia without consent
absolutely necessary," but suggested that much greater use should be made
- 503
of service troops to speed turnaround. Lieutenant Colonel Lehnau reported
informally on 22 May 1943 that the labor situation was "as bad and worse
than the reports indicate" and that General MacArthur had refrained from
using port "battalions "by request of the Commonwealth Government. The Army
was obliged to keep "a delicate balance" in its joint use of Australian
resources and facilities, and to "hold itself on a tight rein" in its rela
the reasons for this policy is found; but it may be pointed out that the
theater was unable to obtain sufficient port troops even for New Guinea
ports, and that the operation of such troops in the Australian Zone of
and employed in the Army's repair and assembly plant there or as crews for
laborers from the Netherlands Uar>t Indies, but evidently this plan was not
carried out.
The Papuan natives, however, gave "loyal support and wholehearted cooper
ation" to the Allied forces, carrying heavy loads of supplies and ammunition
- 504
from the beach, loading barges for shipment, helping to build roads and
men — a £abo. (hatch foreman), a checker, 7 antiguos (men with more than
modernos, and the size of a gang could be changed when necessary. The hatch
gangs working a vessel were controlled by a capataz. and the checkers were
supervised by a head checker. A capataz was paid from 120 to 220 pesos a
month, a cabo 3.25 pesos a day, an antigao 2.25 pesos a day, and a mo demo
1.75 pesos a day. This pay scale was maintained by the Army during the
responsibilities. The stevedores had been idle since the end of 1941 and
1945, 60.3 percent of the port laborers employed by the Army worked less
than a week and some worked only 1 day or less. The Army offered a bonus
of 10 pounds of rice to every man who worked every day in the week, and the
number of men working 7 full days increased from 241 for the week ending 20
January 1945, before the bonus was offered, to 487 for the following week,
when the bonus was in effect. At Manila, in March, the men walked several
miles to and from work and stayed on the job 12 hours a day. Two meals of
rice and canned fish were provided for each shift. The men worked on Sun
days and holidays without overtime pay. It was noticed that the men handled
cargo with great care, and on their own initiative would sew up torn bags
ply was threatened by owners of rice fields, who normally provided housing,
- 505
rations, and credit for seasonal workers. To keep the manpower required
for operating the port, the Army planned to provide tents, cots, "blankets,
some 12,000 civilian stevedores and dock workers at Manila went on strike.
which included not only stevedores but mechanics, drivers, and others.
for work on Sundays and holidays and at night, and a doubling of normal
wages. They were joined in the strike by 100 employees of Santa Ana Ship-
with troops and offered a 20-percent increase in pay, with time and a half
for hours above 40 a week and for Sundays and holidays. These terms were
rejected. On 12 February the Army turned over the work of unloading and
in wages, and the strike ended on 14 February. Thereafter the Army dealt
37
through the Luzon Stevedoring Company and did not hire stevedores directly.
Pilferage
Property of the United States Army and of its personnel was constantly
- 506
tried to safeguard cargo for which they were responsible, but pilferage
and unarmed, uere unable to protect cargo, end the Army wc.s obliged to
equipped as maintenance and repair shops hod been "thoroughly and effi
ciently rifled"; all the tool kits had been opened; rust scratches showed
that some of the tool chests had been open for several days, r-nd new
scratches end freshly split v/ood indicated that others had been ran
sacked more recently, suggesting that the trucks hr.d been pillaged by
cigarette butts were found in the trucks; and stolen items included flash
chisels, pliers, and leather gloves. Fo guards hr.d been pieced on the
that "every effort" was made by the Army to reduce this pilferage, but
gurrds were needed for Army property; and that a loss of from Ig- to 2 per
cent must be expected Min those classes of supplies which r-xe susceptible
constant"; Australian labor would stop work or strike when prmed guards
articles worth fifty pounds would be punished with a fine of from three
- 507
to ten shillings.38
trucks and rail cars. Theft was encouraged "by lack of supervision, lack
of accurate tally sheets and failure to check tally sheets, lack of check
(l) All losses were to be reported to provost marshals, who should act
promptly and if necessary should call upon the Australian military police,
the civilian police, and the customs officials. (2) Civilians should be
were often added after a load was dispatched and were removed before it
supplies from the wharf or the ship to be picked up by small boats. (5)
during unloading. (6) Broken packages and cases (perhaps broken inten
(7) Employees should eat outside their place of employment and not take
lunch baskets or lunch boxes into the warehouse or the ship. Otherwise
- 508
the baskets or boxes should be kept in a locked enclosure away from sup
were not enforced. In October 1943 the transit depot area at Sydney was
inclosed with barbed wire, outer windows were covered with wire netting,
and four sentry boxes were installed; but these were manned by civilians
who were not closely supervised and did not wear arm bands or other marks
cipline" was not good, particularly in smaller units of the Army. Unduly
hand tools, stencil outfits, and mess outfits, which the Quartermaster,
USASOS, believed were finding their way into the "black market." On 1
November 1943 the Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, reported that pil
ferage of Air Force supplies was "very serious." By this time the Chief
officers aboard all vessels carrying a thousand tons or more of Army cargo
Smet, 10 October 1943, noted that military police guarding the wharves
were armed only with wooden billies because the Federal Waterside Workers
firearms. The cargo security officer on the Fred 0. Ainsworth, which un
- 509
dock and in the vessel. The cargo security officer did not see anyone
told the informant that he already had his Christinas dinner hanging in
his refrigerator, a ham and three ducks which he had gotten from some ship,
A number of sacks of salvaged shoes were being loaded on the vessel but
were first opened on the pier and the better ones retained by the workers.
This was all done in the open and no attempt was made to stop this pilfer
ing. These longshoremen seemed to have the idea that anything they han
dled was their property. The effects of all dead, plainly marked as such,
were broken into and everything of value taken, including buttons and
insignia.4^
tically continuous," and the sale of stolen Army property was said to be
from action under the civil code against members guilty of pilfering, and
the presence of the cargo security officer, when cases of secret radar
- 510
until the soldiers guarding these cases were disarmed. The cargo security
officer protested but was informed by the superintendent of the Water Di
vision "that it was necessary for the time being to comply with these
and searching of Australian laborers as they left the ships or the wharves
would have produced a strike, and this, when U. S. Army labor was not
The cargo security officer on the James D. Doty, which visited Bris
bane and Cairns in November and December 1943, reported that a watch was
Australian stevedores were suspected, but the Union declined to give their
names, the civilian police declined to investigate (on the grounds that
"their presence aboard the vessel would precipitate a strike"), the two
men disappeared, and no search for them was made. No military police
"were available at any time" during the unloading. Transit sheds and
ian court escaped with a light fine. Crates were broken open in the un
guarded holds, stevedores carried away what they wanted in their clothes,
and empty crates were smashed and removed unnoticed in the dunnage. Men
was better managed than that of Brisbane; armed military police were
43
- 511
PillagingftivesBad Name to Queensland,M the Brisbane Sunday Mail stated
with jungle rations intended for Hew Guinea, each container broken open
broke and the contents were drained into cans. Men often became drunk
when working on liquor cargoes, and one entire gang had to be paid off
because too drunk to continue unloading a ship. Razor blades, candy, and
clothing were favorite objects of theft. The cargoes of single ships suf
that all persons convicted of pillaging should be jailed and that the
Army had recently formed a special guard to go into the holds as soon as
they were opened and to watch Army cargo closely until it was safely loaded
rate."44
that the original directive had not been enforced, that the waterside
workers "appear to have won the day," and that "strong action by military
and civilian authorities alike" was required. The subject was "being
- 512
was reported; but It is not clear that any new or effective action was
ever taken, or could have been taken, while the Army remained in Australia.45
no means was found of "arousing in the average EM any real feeling against
Ships visiting these ports must recognize this attitude and take the neces
sary precautions."^
Lingayen Gulf and Manila in the spring of 1945. In March 1945 a cargo
man and four naval gunners who had pilfered cargo in their possession and
who said that stevedores of the 310th Port Company had given them 3^ tons
a pound for sugar, $10 to $15 for cigarette lighters, and 50 cents to $1
a can for canned goods, and would barter their possessions for stolen
- 513
that they were not relieved of responsibility by the inaction of other
officers; and never to agree that even "a legitimately "broken case of
were provided on ships, and the use of Filipino Scouts as guards was "not
holds to break cartons of beer or candy and consume as much as they wanted.
Checkers on shipboard freely gave cases of beer to EUKW crews and recorded
the beer as "lost." The act of pilfering was "regarded as a joke rather
than a crime." The Filipinos, unlike the Americans, were inclined to break
into any boxes that they thought might contain rations, and often, being
unable to read the markings on boxes, would steal goods that were useless
. 47
carton.
it was believed that gangs of armed thieves, called "snipers," were mingl
ing unrecognized with depot employees who feared to report them; and the
were made throughout 1946. In October of that year, for instance, the
Provost Marshal arrested 210 persons, nearly all for theft of government
The only available statistics of volume of Army cargo loaded and un
- 514
loaded in ports of SWPA are tabulated in Appendices 42-46. Scattered
figures of earlier date than 1944 are found for a few ports, but are of
(1) The total tonnage of Army cargo handled in all ports of SWPA
varied little between February 1944 and January 1945, averaging less than
800,000 tons a month. The total exceeded 900,000 tons during each month
from February 1945 through October 1945, and exceeded 1,000,000 tons a
month during June, July, and August 1945, reaching a peak of 1,368,303
tons in August 1945. The total declined steadily after October 1945 ex
cept for a slight rally in January 1946. The first month in which the
total was less than that for February 1944 was December 1945. In February
1946 the total fell for the first time to less than half the total for
February 1944.
in March 1944 and thereafter exceeded 200,000 tons only in April 1944 and
May 1945. It first fell below 100,000 tons in January and April 1945, and
remained below that total in all months subsequent to August 1945. Total
tonnage handled in New Guinea reached a peak of 693,111 tons in August 1944,
exceeded 500,000 tons in each month from March through December 1944, fell
abruptly in January and February 1945, remained without much change through
August 1945, fell again with extreme abruptness in September 1945, and
dwindled to 4,049 tons in April 1946. It exceeded the total tonnage handled
in Australia through August 1945, but in all except two months thereafter
Okinawa reached a peak of more than a million tons in July and August 1945,
- 515
and exceeded the comMned total of New Guinea and Australia in every month
(3) Milne Bay was the port handling the largest quantity of Army cargo
ber 1944), Leyte (December 1944 - January 1945), Lingayen Gulf (February
- March 1945), and Manila (April 1945 - June 1946). The low position of
list of ports, indicating the earliest and the latest of the three- single
(5) Separate figures for discharge and loading show that by May 1945
loading exceeded discharge in each of the Australian and New Guinea ports.
Gebu, and Lingayen in November 1945, at Manila and Batangas in May 1946,
cussed in the final chapter of this study. Comparable figures for number
not available.
- 516
i^otes on Chapter IX
4 . (1) Memo, ACofS G-4 GSUSA for ACofS W?D GSUSA, 5 Jan 42, sub:
Lack of Labor for Loading and Unloading at X. In GSUSA G-4, Transportation
3 r f i l e , 000.900 A u s t r a l i a , Vol I . (2) Memo, ACofS G-4 GSUSA for ACofS
G-3 GSUSA, 26 Jan 42, sub: Dispatch of Port B a t t a l i o n to A u s t r a l i a . Same
f i l e . (3) Memo, Chief, Planning Br, G-4 GSUSA (Col W. M. Goodman), for
Asst Executive for Operations, Supply Br, Transportation Br, and Construc
t i o n Br, G-4 GSUSA, 6 Feb 42, sub: Movement of 394th (#1 Bn ( P o r t ) . In OCT
HB f i l e , SWPA - Shipping. (4) Memo, ACofS G-4 GSUSA for ACofS G-3 GSUSA,
7 Peb 42, sub: Radio from Melbourne r e Colored Labor B a t t a l i o n s . In GSUSA
G-4, Transportation Br f i l e , 000.900 A u s t r a l i a , Vol I .
O1
889954 0—50 34 '
the following QM units: 1 Bn, Truck; 4 Light Maintenance Companies; 1
head Companies; 3 Port Headquarters; and 1 Port Bn. Barnes Rpt, p. 30.
6. (l) Memo, Chief, Supply Br, 0-4 GSUSA (Col H. B. Holmes, Jr), for
ACofS Cx-4 GSUSA, 12 Feb 42, sub: Tables of Organization for X. In OCT HB
to ACofS G-4 GSUSA, 26 Feb 42. In OCT 563.5 Statistical Data. (3) Memo,
CofTS USAFIA (Col Thomas B. Wilson) for ACofS G-4 USAFIA, 24 Apr 42. Ilef
7. (l) HTC Hq, supplement, 1942, p. 2. (2) Memo, Brig Gen Arthur R.
Wilson, formerly ACofS G-4 USAFIA for CG SOS, 1 Jul 42, sub: Report on Aus
tralia, pp. 4, 11, 12. In OCT HB file, POA - Inspection Trips. (3) Memo,
Chief, Planning Br, Plans Div, SOS (Col L. D. Flory), for Chief, Plans
6 Jul 42, sub: Present and Projected Strengths of Central and Southwest
8. Memo, same for same, 24 Jul 42, sub: Service Units for Australia.
Same file.
10. (l) Rad, CG SOS to CG USASOS, 7 Dec 42. In OCT KB file, SWPA
Miscellaneous. (2) Rad, OG SWPA to WD, 20 Dec 42, Cm-In 8976 (21 Dec 42).
In OCT 319.2 - 378.5 SWPA. (3) Memo, Chief, Training Div, OCT ASP, for
ACofS, Operations, SOS, 15 Jan 43, sub: Monthly Report on Service Units.
11. (1) HTC Hq, Jan-Jun 1943, p. 7. (2) USASOS GO 6, 24 Jan 43, sub:
Activation of Units. Ref 8 to HTC Hq, Jan-Jun 1943. (3) Memo, Deputy
Director of Operations, ASP (Brig Gen F. A. Heileman), for ACofS G-4 GSUSA,
1 Sep 43, sub: G-4 Periodic Report, USAFFE, for Quarter Ending 30 June
1943, SPOPP 319.1 (14 Aug 43). In ASF Planning Div, 13b day file - SWPA.
12. (l) Rpt, Lewis Lapham, SFPE, addressee unnamed, 6 Mar 43, pp. 20,
29. Atchd to memo, Lt Col Raymond C. Stone for Chief, Control Div, ASF,
13 May 43. In CCT KB file, POA - Inspection Trips. (2) Rpt, Supt of ATS,
SFPE (Col Jv H. Mellom), to ACofT for Operations, 26 May 43, sub: Report
Pacific Areas by Colonel J. H. Mellom, TC, from March 28 to May 21, 1943.
In OCT HB file, POA - Inspection Trips. (3) Rpt, Lt Cols Alfred W. Parry
and Rudolph G. Lehnau, Control Div, ASF, for Chief, Control Div, ASF, 12
May 43, sub: Report on Inspection Trip, Southwest Pacific Area and South
- 518
13
;L ^ Somervel;i
- questionnaire, questions 73, 74, 196, 202. (2)
* n o . CG ASF for CofS ASP, 3 Oct 43. In ASF Planning Div file, Report of
does not explicitly state that port battalions cannot shorten the war and
are of no use except Mto make life a little more pleasant." No evidence
is found that any previous request of SWPA for service troops had not been
"stringently scrutinized."
15. (1) Memo, Deputy Director of Operations, ASP, for ACofS G-4 GSUSA,
1 Sep 43, cited in n. 11(3). (2) Ltr, TAG to CG USAFFE, 17 Sep 43, sub:
G-4 Periodic Report, United States Army Forces in the Far East, for Quar
ter Ending 30 June 1943, AG 319.1 (8 Sep 43). In ASF Planning Div file,
12c G-4 Reports - SWPA. (3) Memo for File 8a, SWPA, sgd A. W. Yereance,
Maj, 03, 23 Sep 43, sub: QM Boat Companies and TC Composite Companies
(T/0 55-500) for SWPA. Same file. (4) Rpt, G-4 USASOS, addressee not
named, undtd, sub: G-4 Periodic Report, United States Army Services of Sup
ply, Quarter Ending 30 September 1943. Atchd to Ltr, AG USAFFE to ACofS
G-4 GSUSA, 20 Oct 43, sub: G-4 Periodic Reports. Same file.
17. Memo, ACofS G-4 GHQ, SV/PA (Brig Gen L. J. Unit lock) for CofS GEi
Planning Div file, Musketeer Operations. (2') Manual for Use in Computing
44, cited in n. 2.
19. Ibid., Jul 1943 - Feb 1944, pp. 12-14; Jul 1945, pp. 6-8; Oct
20. G-4 Periodic Report, quarter Ending December 31, 1942 (except Air
Corps Technical Supply), unsgd, addressee not named, 13 Jan 43. In ASF
Planning Div file, 12c G-4 Reports - SV/PA. It is not clear whether the
21. (l) Lapham Rot, p. 28. (2) Information from Mariners, Rpt No.
Plb (1) Interview with Lt Col Carroll K. Moffatt, formerly Port Com
inander/oro Bay, 23 May 49. (2) Ltr, CO, Base B, USASOS (Col M. C. Lat
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timore), to officers and men of the 387th and 491st Port Bns, 18 Feb 44.
23. Positive Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 17 (l Mar 45) and 21 (18 May
45), issued by OCT. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Philippines - Pos. Intell. Ball.
24. Memo, Chief, Supply Br, G-4 GSUSA for ACofS G-4 GSUSA, 12 Feb 42,
cited in n. 6(l).
80. (3) Memo, CofTS USAFIA (Col Thomas B. Wilson) for ACofS G-4 USAFIA, 24
Apr 42. Ref ll(a) to HTC Australia, Vol I. (4) "U. S.t Australian Soldiers
Take Stevedore Duties during Strike." Clipping from Wire Service Bulletin,
8 Apr 43. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Clippings & Releases. This strike was
26. (1) Lapham Rpt. (2) Mellom Hpt, cited in n. 12(2). According to
Notes of interview with Col Thomas G. Plant, formerly CTO USASOS, 16 Jun
44. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Miscellaneous. (4) Parry and Lehnau Bpt, p.
6, cited in n. 12(3).
27. (l) Garlinghouse Rpt, cited in n. 21(3). (2) lapham Rpt. (3)
SFPE (1st Lt Thomas William Sullivan, Jr), addressee unnamed, 9 Dec 43,
1943 and Ending 27 November 1943. In OCT 319.1 SWPA. (4) Rpt, Boarding
Officer, District Intelligence Office, 12th Naval Dist (Lt (jg) V. J. King),
addressee unnamed, 2 Jul 43, sub: Boarding Report of the MS Cape Flattery.
& facilities.
29. (l) Lapham Rpt. (2) Somervell questionnaire. (3) HTC Australia,
IV, 14.
30. (l) Lapham Rpt. (2) Plant interview, cited in n. 26(3). (3)
31. (1) Sullivan Rpt, cited in n. 27(3). (2) King Rpt, cited in n.
32. Ltr, CG SFPE to CofTS SOS, 18 Jul 42, sub: 385th Quart;ermaster
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y ehnau cited in n
33a. Memo, Chief, Supply Br, G«-4 GSUSA, for ACofS G-4 GSUSA, 12 Feb
34. (l) Somervell questionnaire, questions 74, 196. (2) HTC New Gui
nea, 1942-44, p. 26.
36. Ibid., Oct 1944 - Jan 1945, p. 3; Mar 1945, pp. 18-19; May 1945,
P. 10.
38. (1) HTC Australia, I, 80-81. (2) Memo, CO, 704th Ordnance Co,
APO 924 (1st Lt Allen F. Jones), to Capt Johnson, Air Force Supply,
18 Jul 42. In OCT 401-451 SWPA. (3) Memo, Chief, Overseas Supply Div,
SFPil (Col Abbott Boone), for CG SFPE, 11 3Peb 43, sub: Keport of Visit to
39. Ltr, CG USASOS to CGs, US Advanced Base and Base Sees 3 and 7,
and COs, Base Sees 1, 2, and 4, 14 Mar 43, sub: Pilfering of U. S. Army
40. (l) HTC Australia, II, 133. (2) Somervell questionnaire, question
14. (3) 1st Ind, Chief, Control Div, OCT ASF (Lt Col Luketf.Finlay), to
41. (l) Information from Mariners, No. 132, prepared by Theater Grp,
42. (1) Garlinghouse Rpt, cited inn. 21(3). (2) Interview with Lt
SFPE (1st Lt J. V. Hamilton), addressee not nsjned, 7 Jan 44, sub: Report
44. Sxcerpt from 3risbane Sunday Mail, 4 Jun 44. Ref 12-b to HTC
45 (1) Memo, CTO USASOS to G-4 USASOS, 30 Jul 44, sub: Pilfering of
U. S. Army Supplies. In HTC Hq, Jul 1944. (2) HTC Hq, Aug 1944-, p. 6.
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47. (l) Technical Intelligence Kpt No. 236, prepared by Intelligence
Br, Intelligence and Security Div, NOPE, 21 Apr 45, sub: Anti-Filferage
Intelligence fipt Ho. 396, 8 May 45, sub: Pilferage at Manila. Both in
48. HTC Hq, Oct 1945, p. 16; Dec 1945, p. 5; Oct 1946, p. 40.
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