Professional Documents
Culture Documents
In accordance with the Court’s Memorandum Opinion, the National Indian Gaming
Commission (“NIGC”) has set forth, fully and in detail, the records that it maintains and the
records that it searched in response to Plaintiff’s FOIA request. In response, Plaintiff has not
identified any record system likely to contain responsive documents that was not searched.
I. The Declarations of Regina Ann McCoy Demonstrate that NIGC Has Conducted an
Adequate Search
As the Court is aware, declarations submitted during the initial briefing on NIGC’s
motion for summary judgment detailed the manner in which NIGC conducted the FOIA search in
this case:
When a [FOIA] search request reaches the top of the queue in its track, the FOIA
Office generates search taskers which are sent out to the appropriate locations
within the NIGC. . . . When the [Sloan FOIA] request reached the front of the
processing queue, [the FOIA Officer] prepared search taskers for the information
sought. . . . The FOIA Office sent search taskers to the Office of General Counsel,
the Commissioners, the Office of Congressional and Public Affairs, the
Enforcement Division, the Contracts Division, and the regional and satellite
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offices. . . . When the search responses came back, the FOIA Office sorted
through them for responsive documents.
Declaration of Regina Ann McCoy, ¶¶ 16-18 (Sept. 12, 2005) (attached to NIGC’s Motion for
The FOIA Office sent search requests to the Office of General Counsel, the
Commissioners, the Office of Congressional and Public Affairs, the Enforcement
Division, the Contracts Division, and the regional and satellite offices. . . . Each
search request had the Sloan [FOIA] request letter appended to it. . . . [The files]
were searched using the names provided in the Sloan [FOIA request] letter. . . .
The search taskers specifically provide: “While conducting your records search,
please be certain to include a review of any electronic records (e.g., ‘email’) that
may be responsive to this request.” This search included all offices and files
reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents and responsive materials.
. . . NIGC employees submitted to the FOIA office electronic records, faxes, and
emails as well as paper documents in response to the search request.
Supplemental Declaration of Regina Ann McCoy, ¶¶ 5-7 (Nov. 4, 2005) (attached to NIGC’s
The Court found that these descriptions left “no question of [NIGC’s] good faith or that it
performed a wide-ranging search into all NIGC offices.” Mem. Op. at 5. The Court found,
however, a single important omission: “The difficulty is that ‘NIGC employees are asked to
search all files they consider likely to contain relevant material when given a FOIA search
request.’” Id. (quoting Supp. McCoy Decl.) (emphasis in original). As a result, the two initial
declarations did not contain the required “reasonable detail . . . as to what methods were used by
the NIGC employees to identify and search for records likely to contain relevant material.” Id.
Specifically, because multiple individuals had conducted searches, the Court could not tell
NIGC presented the Third Declaration of Regina Ann McCoy which provided, in detail
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and with specificity, the information that the Court identified as lacking in the initial
declarations. See Third Declaration of Regina Ann McCoy, ¶¶ 10-28 (attached to NIGC’s
Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 18). Specifically, the declaration details
the various records that NIGC maintains and describes which were searched and why. See id.;
Mem. in Support of Defs. Renewed Mot’n for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 18, at 2-6.
In response, Plaintiff has not identified any records that were likely to contain responsive
documents. Instead, Plaintiff presents a series of meritless arguments that seek to impose
Plaintiff first contends that “Ms. McCoy’s declaration does not disclose what she told the
‘search taskers’ to provide to her.” Pl. Br. at 3. This contention is meritless. First, as is clear
from the declaration provisions quoted in block above, “search taskers” are not people who can
be given oral instructions; they are documents that contain written instructions. Second, the
written instructions contained in these search taskers is demonstrated in the declarations: The
taskers attached the Sloan FOIA request, instructed recipients to search for responsive
documents, and reminded recipients to search electronic files in addition to paper files. Thus, it
is the very text drafted and submitted by Plaintiff (text which specifically listed individuals and
entities and sought any records concerning them) that was provided to all searchers and it was
that text that formed the instruction to search. This is nearly identical to the search that was
approved by this Court in Gallace v. Dep’t of Agriculture, 273 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2003).
See id. at 55 (“The FOIA Officer sent written memoranda and [the FOIA request] letter to [other
agency employees] asking them to search for responsive documents . . . .”); see also Hunt v.
United States Marine Corps, 935 F. Supp. 46, 50 (D.D.C. 1996) (“Defendants demonstrated
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through the [agency declaration] that they performed a comprehensive search for all the
requested documents by directing plaintiff’s requests to the four agency offices reasonably
expected to hold the responsive information.”). It is difficult to conceive of how NIGC could
provide more specificity into what documents were searched for, other than describing each of
the thousands of documents searched and stating how each one does or does not contain a name
from the FOIA request. Such onerous documentation is not required. See Gallace, 273 F. Supp.
2d at 60 (“The affidavit[] need not ‘set forth with meticulous documentation the details of an
epic search for the requested records.’”) (quoting Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir.
1982)).
Plaintiff next contends that the declarations do not adequately describe the electronic
searches conducted. Plaintiff concedes that NIGC conducted electronic searches using “the
names of individuals and entities in CREW’s FOIA request.” Pl. Br. at 4. This is all that is
required. Plaintiff cites no authority for the purported requirement that NIGC “provide what
Boolean operators” were used or otherwise detail the computer science of electronic searches.
Pl. Br. at 5. Searching electronic documents for specified key words is an elementary computer
function, and one that does not require a detailed technical explanation. Cf. Schrecker v. United
States Dep’t of Justice, 217 F. Supp. 2d 29, 33 (D.D.C. 2002) (“An agency’s affidavits need not
be precise but they must provide basic information on what records were searched, by whom,
Finally, Plaintiff criticizes NIGC for not searching a database that did not exist at the time
of the search. Pl. Br. at 5. But, Plaintiff admits, as it must, that FOIA sensibly does not require
the search of a database that does not exist at the time of the search. Id.
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***
The submitted declarations make clear that NIGC engaged in “a good faith effort to
conduct a search for the requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to
produce the information requested.” Oglesby v. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir.
1990). The D.C. Circuit has held that “a search need not be perfect, only adequate, and adequacy
is measured by the reasonableness of the effort in light of the specific request.” See Meeropol v.
Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1986). “[I]n the absence of countervailing evidence or
apparent inconsistency of proof, affidavits that explain in reasonable detail the scope and method
of the search conducted by the agency will suffice to demonstrate compliance with the
obligations imposed by the FOIA.” Perry, 684 F.2d at 127. NIGC has met this burden, and thus,
II. NIGC’s Adherence to the Privacy Act Does Not Render Its Search Inadequate
Plaintiff’s assertion that NIGC’s Contracts Division did not conduct a search is incorrect. Pl. Br.
at 6. To the contrary, “[t]he Contracts Division conducted electronic searches (including e-mail)
of the Sloan request by name of the entities and tribes listed in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the search
request.” Third McCoy Decl., ¶ 24. Likewise, “[t]he Division of Enforcement conducted
electronic searches (including e-mail) of the Sloan request by name of the individuals, entities,
and tribes listed in paragraphs 2 and 3 with the exception of the Phoenix office for the Southwest
region.” Id., ¶ 26. It was only two of NIGC’s many file systems that were not searched due to
the fact that no Privacy Act waivers were submitted. Second, contrary to Plaintiff’s implication
(see Pl. Br. at 7), NIGC is not withholding any documents on the basis of the Privacy Act. The
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issue here is the adequacy of the search, not the status of specific documents under FOIA.
Third, Plaintiff misunderstands the relationship between FOIA and the Privacy Act. The
Privacy Act prohibits the disclosure of personally identifiable records if those records are
retrieved from a system of records in which the record is retrieved based on an individual’s name
or other personal identifier. 5 U.S.C. § 552a. Management Contract individual background files
(from the Contracts Division) and individual background investigation files (from the
Enforcement Division) clearly fall within the protection of the Privacy Act. Moreover, while the
Privacy Act does not prevent disclosure where it is “required” by FOIA (5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2)),
the Privacy Act does apply where the records fall under a FOIA exemption. See, e.g., Dep’t of
Defense v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 502 (1994); United States Dep’t of the Navy v. FLRA, 975 F.2d
348, 354-56 (7th Cir. 1992). NIGC individual investigatory files are law enforcement documents
which, in the absence of a waiver, are exempt from FOIA under Exemption 7(C) because their
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). See Melius v. NIGC, Cv. No. 98-2210 (TFH), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17537, at *14-15 (holding that NIGC’s individual background files are law enforcement
document subject to Exemption 7(C), and that in the absence of a waiver, disclosure of an
enforcement investigatory reports . . . have a presumptive privacy interest in keeping their names
undisclosed”); see also Fourth Declaration of Regina Ann McCoy, ¶¶ 5, 7 (attached hereto).
The law enforcement documents at issue are clearly protected by Exemption 7(C) and
Exemption 6. The respective tests for Exemptions 7(C) and 6 are described in NIGC’s initial
memorandum, docket no. 5, at 12-17. As the Court found in Melius, the personal privacy
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interests in the information at issue is substantial. See also, e.g., United States Dep’t of Justice v.
Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989) (for purposes of
FOIA, “privacy encompass[es] the individual’s control of information concerning his or her
person”); id. at 780 (FBI “rap sheet” protected by Exemption 7(C)); Dep’t of Defense v. FLRA,
510 U.S. 487, 502 (1994) (personal addresses are protected by Exemption 6).1 There is no
countervailing public interest in disclosure because the information would not inform the public
about “the conduct of the agency that has possession of the requested records.” Reporters
Committee, 489 U.S. at 773. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held “as a categorical matter that a
third party’s request for law enforcement records or information about a private citizen can
reasonably be expected to invade that citizen’s privacy, and that when the request seeks no
‘official information’ about a Government agency, but merely records that the Government
acknowledging that such law enforcement investigatory records exist would violate the
“presumptive privacy interest” as it would reveal that the specified individuals were “mentioned
in law enforcement investigatory reports.” Melius, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17537, at *14-15; see
also Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (upholding the FBI’s decision, pursuant to
Exemption 7(C), to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of law enforcement records on a
particular individual in response to a FOIA request). Thus, NIGC’s policy of declining to search
individual investigatory files in the absence of a Privacy Act waiver is an appropriate application
1
The specific personal information included in these files is detailed in paragraphs 4
through 7 of the Fourth Declaration of Regina Ann McCoy.
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of the Privacy Act, and does not render the search in this case inadequate.
regarding the two records systems at issue. See Fourth Declaration of Regina Ann McCoy.
NIGC has conducted an electronic search of the Contracts Division’s individual background files
and found no responsive documents. Id. ¶ 14. NIGC has determined that the Enforcement
Division’s individual background investigation files, which are background files on applicants to
key employee or primary management official positions, are not reasonably likely to contain
responsive documents. Id. ¶¶ 9, 12. The public figures named by Plaintiff are Congressmen,
Washington lobbyists, and political strategists (see Compl. ¶¶ 15-25), and are not likely to be
working as blackjack dealers, bingo callers, or other employees of Indian casinos. See Fourth
McCoy Decl. ¶¶ 9-10, 12-13. The agency’s determination in this matter is reasonable and its
search is adequate. See Weisberg v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485-89
Plaintiff’s renewed request for discovery is baseless. See Minute Entry (July 17, 2006)
(denying Plaintiff’s oral motion for discovery). As Plaintiff concedes, “discovery in FOIA cases
is the exception and not the rule.” Pl. Br. at 8. Indeed, “discovery in a FOIA action is generally
inappropriate.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Export-Import Bank, 108 F. Supp. 2d 19, 25 (D.D.C.
2000); accord Allen v. U.S. Secret Service, 335 F. Supp. 2d 95, 100 (D.D.C. 2004) (discovery
generally inappropriate in FOIA case); Wheeler v. CIA, 271 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (D.D.C. 2003)
State, 100 F. Supp. 2d 10, 28 (D.D.C. 2000) (“Discovery is to be sparingly granted in FOIA
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actions.”); see also Comment to LCvR 16.2(b) (FOIA cases exempt from requirements of
LcvR 16.3 “because they are actions that typically do not require discovery”).
As the Court recognized when ruling on Plaintiff’s oral motion, this case does not fall
into the small category of FOIA cases where discovery is warranted, a fact that is confirmed by
the cases cited by Plaintiff. In Judicial Watch v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 34 F. Supp.
2d 28 (D.D.C. 1998), “the illegal destruction of documents and the illegal removal of documents
from [the agency’s] custody in knowing violation of the FOIA and the orders of this Court” led to
“closely supervised” discovery in order to determine the identities of the individuals who had
removed the documents and/or were in possession of the documents, in order to determine to
whom the court’s order would apply. Id. at 29, 46. In Long v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 10
F. Supp. 2d 205 (N.D.N.Y. 1998), discovery was permitted because a material conflict in agency
affidavits brought “into question good faith on the part of” the agency. Id. at 210.
and the Court has already found that “there is no question of [NIGC’s] good faith.” Mem. Op.
at 5. The Court’s conclusion is consistent with D.C. Circuit law. An agency’s FOIA declarations
are to be “accorded a presumption of good faith.” SafeCard Servs. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir.
1981)); accord Kay v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 976 F. Supp. 23, 33 (D.D.C. 1997).
And, this presumption of good faith “cannot be rebutted by ‘purely speculative claims about the
existence and discoverability of other documents.’” SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1200. Because
Plaintiff has presented no rebuttal to the assumption of good faith, discovery is unwarranted. See
Summers v. United States Dept. of Justice, 733 F. Supp. 443, 443 (D.D.C. 1991) (denying
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons as well as the reasons set forth in NIGC’s previous memoranda,
PETER D. KEISLER
Assistant Attorney General
KENNETH L. WAINSTEIN
United States Attorney
/s/
ELIZABETH J. SHAPIRO (Bar No. 418925)
Assistant Branch Director
JEFFREY M. SMITH (Bar No. 467936)
ALEXANDER K. HAAS (CA Bar 220932)
Trial Attorneys, Federal Programs Branch
Of Counsel: United States Department of Justice
Andrea Lord 20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Staff Attorney Washington, D.C. 20001
National Indian Gaming Commission Tel: (202) 514-5751/ (202)307-3937
Fax: (202) 616-8470
Counsel for Defendant
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