Equal Protection of The Law resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering efforts of Distinction between aliens and
fforts of Distinction between aliens and citizens:
People vs Cayat
Facts: The accused Cayat, a member of a non-Christian tribe
was prosecuted for violation of an act which prohibits
possession of an intoxicating liquor other than the so-called
native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have
been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of
Act 1639.
Accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act; that it is
discriminatory and denies equal protection of the laws, violative
of the due process clause of the constitution and an improper
exercise of police power.
Issue: W/N the Act violates the guaranty of equal protection of
the laws.
Held: Guaranty of Equal protection of the laws is not violated by
a legislation based on reasonable classification and the
classification to reasonable:
1. Must rest of substantial distinctions
2. Must be germane to the purposes of the law
3. Must not be limited to existing conditions only
4. Must apply equally to all members
Act satisfied these requirements.
Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in
non-christian tribes.
The Act was designed to insure peace and order in and among
non-chsitian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral
and intellectual growth and eventually hasten their equalization
and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers . Free
use of intoxicating liquors by non-christian tribes have often
Saile, Barbara Mae DJ. (1D)
the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.
The law is not limited to existing conditions. It is intended to
apply as long as those conditions exist.
Finally, the act applies equally to all members of the class.
Itchong vs Hernandez
Facts: RA 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business”
was passed to protect citizen and country from alien retailer. It
prohibits persons not citizens of the Phil and associations,
partnerships or corporations not wholly owned by citizens of the
Phil from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade. In
effect, the law nationalizes the retail trade business.
Petitioners in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents attacks the constitutionality of the law contending that
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives them of the liberty and property without due process
of law.
Issue: W/N the act was violative the guaranty of equal
protection of the laws.
Held: The equal protection clause does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The problem sought to be remedied by the law is the controlling
and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the
nation’s economy. (Law enacted in interest of national economic
survival and security) Such predominance may endanger the
national interest; freedom of trade is curtailed and free
enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
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1. Alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his
birth or his adopted country.
2. Alien resident never really makes a genuine
contribution to national income and wealth. No
patriotic desire to help bolster the nation’s economy.
3. Alien resident’s interest in this country is merely
transient and temporary.
The difference in alien aims and purposes are sufficient basis for
distinction. The power of the legislature to make distinctions and
classification among persons is not curtailed or denied by the
equal protection of the laws clause. A law can be violative of the
constitutional limitation only when the classification is without
reasonable basis. The classification in the case at bar is actual,
real and reasonable. The difference in status between citizens
and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the
exercise of police power. Sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the
occupation regulated.
Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho
Facts: Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was
employed in Manila prays that the city ordinance which requires
aliens to secure a mayor’s permit and paying the 50 pesos
permit’s fee before they can earn a means of livelihood be
declared null and void on the ground that it is arbitrary,
oppressive and unreasonable being applied only to aliens and
therefore violated the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Constitution.
Issue: W/N the ordinance is violative of the equal protection
clause.
Atty. Carlos Medina
Held: The ordinance failed to consider valid substantial
differences in situation among individual aliens who are required
to pay it. The equal protection clause does not forbid
classification but the classification should be based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the
subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50 is
being collected from every employed alien, casual or
permanent, part-time or full-time, lowly employee or highly paid
executive.
Dumlao vs COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Dumlao is a former governor of Nueva Vizcaya
who has filed his COC for said position of governor in the
forthcoming elections. He questions the constitutionality of sec
4 of BP Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal
protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. The
said provision disqualifies any retired elective provincial, city or
municipal and those who shall have been 65 years old at the
commencement of the term of office from running for the same
elective local office from which he retired.
Issue: W/N the said provision should be declared null and void
Held: The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are
based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be
treated and regulated differently from another class. Employees
65 yrs old have been validly classified from younger employees.
In respect of election, to require that candidates should not be
more than 65 at the time they assume office may or may not be
a reasonable classification. Persons more than 65 may also be
good elective officials. In the case of retirees, it may or may not
be a reasonable classification as well. A 65-year old retiree could
be a good local official like one, aged 65 who is not a retiree. But
in this case, there is reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective
local official who has retired from office from running for the
Saile, Barbara Mae DJ. (1D)
same office from which he had retired. The tiredness of the
retiree from government work is present and that the retired
employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for
the same government work.
The purpose of the law is to allow emergence of younger blood
in local government. The classification being pursuant to that
purpose, it cannot be considered invalid.
Moreover, to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
and equivocal breach. It is also within the competence of the
Legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to
become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable as in
this case.
Goesart vs Cleary
Facts: A Michigan statute required that all bartenders hold
licenses in cities with populations greater than 50,000, but the
statute also stated that a woman could not be issued a license
unless she was "the wife or daughter of the male owner" of a
liquor establishment. Two female bartenders challenged the
law, requesting an injunction against its enforcement, on the
ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Issue: W/N in denying female bartenders access to licenses, the
Michigan law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
Held: NO. The Constitution "does not preclude the States from
drawing a sharp line between the sexes" or "to reflect
sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it
requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards."
The Court found that the Michigan legislature, in enacting the
statute, could have determined that allowing women to bartend
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could "give rise to moral and social problems against which it
may devise preventive measures."
Ormoc Sugar Central vs Ormoc City
Facts: An ordinance was passed imposing a municipal tax of 1%
on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the
Ormoc Sugar Company Inc in Ormoc City.
Issue: W/N the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative
of the equal protection clause.
Held: The equal protection clause applies only to persons or
things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of legislation where:
1. It is based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences.
2. These are germane to the purpose of the law
3. The classification applies not only to present conditions
but also to future conditions which are substantially
identical to those of the present
4. The classification applies only to those who belong to
the same class.
The questioned ordinance does not meet the requisites for it
taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the
Ormoc Sugar Company Inc and none other. The classification to
be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future
conditions as well. But since the ordinance expressly mentions
only Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc, the taxing ordinance
cannot be applied even if another similar company is set up.
Basco vs PAGCOR
Facts: Petitioners prays that the Phil. Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter-PD 1869 be annulled on the
ground that it is contrary to moral, public policy and order and
Atty. Carlos Medina
because it violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR-conducted gaming,
while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.
Issue: W/N PD 1869 should be declared null and void
Held: NO. A statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption
must be indulged in favour of its constitutionality. One who
attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its
invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt.
Regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one
corporate entity-PAGCOR, was proved to be beneficial not just
rd
to the government but to society in general. (PAGCOR is the 3
largest source of government revenue next to BIR and BOC)
There is no valid ground to sustain petitioner’s contention that
PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause. The equal
protection clause does not prohibit the Legislature form
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not require
situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in
law as though they were the same. Just how legalizing gambling
conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not
clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some
gambling conditions are legalized under certain conditions while
others are prohibited does not render the applicable laws, PD
1869 for one, unconstitutional.
Republic vs Sandiganbayan
Facts: The Landoil Group of Companies spearheaded by then
Congressman Jose De Venecia Jr. was able to obtain foreign
loans syndicated by various banks amounting to $120M. These
foreign loans were guaranteed by PHILGUARANTEE. Landoil
Group of Companies was unable to seasonably service these
Saile, Barbara Mae DJ. (1D)
foreign loans and this compelled PHILGUARANTEE to assume its
obligation as guarantor.
After the EDSA Revolution, Pres. Cory Aquino created the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) under EO
1. Case No. 0020 for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting,
Restitution and Damages was one of the cases filed to recover
the illegal wealth of the Marcoses, subordinates and close
associates.
The De Venecia group of companies and PHILGUARANTEE were
then sequestered by the petitioner through the PCGG.
Nothwithstanding the filing of Case No. 0020, an investigation
was conducted and this culminated the signing of a Deed of
Assignment whereby certain obligations were assumed by de
Venecia and his group and in reciprocity, petitioner agreed to
cause the dismissal of the complaint in civil case 0020 against de
Venecia and his group of co-signors.
The court likewise dismissed the Expanded Complaint against
the private respondents( Marcos, Bondoc etc..)
Petitioner argues that the respondent court committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the case against De Venecia’s
co-defendants on 2 grounds 1) removal of an indispensable
party (De Venecia) from the Expanded Complaint and lack of
Cause of action
Issue: W/N the subject Deed of Assignment justifies the
dismissal of Civil Case 0020 against Bondoc and company and
against the Marcoses.
Held: Yes. The complaint against De Venecia and Bondoc and
company are inseparable. Petitioner’s investigation showed that
De Venecia was not a crony of Marcos,he obtained the loans in
the regular and ordinary course of business. It ought to follow
then that the complaint against the respondents Bondoc and
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company for extending said guarantees can no longer be
pursued because petitioner relied on the theory of conspiracy.
Petitioner has further precluded itself from pursuing its
complaint not only against De Venecia but also against Bondoc
and company when it dropped its cause of action in its Expanded
Complaint by signing the Deed of Assignment.
The dismissal of the Complaint against Bondoc and company is
compelled by the equal protection clause of the Constitution. De
Venecia and respondents Bondoc and company are similarly
situated. Bondoc, et, al were included in the complaint only
because they allegedly gave unwarranted favors to De Venecia
in guaranteeing foreign loans. When petitioner admitted that no
undue favour was granted to De Venecia in the grant of such
guaranty facilities and dismissed its complaint against him,
petitioner cannot avoid its duty of dismissing its complaint
against Bondoc and company. To give a more favoured
treatment to De Venecia when the parties are equally situated is
to indulge in invidious discrimination.
Himagan vs People
Facts: Petitioner, a policeman was implicated in a murder and an
attempted murder case.
Trial court issued an Order suspending petitioner until the
termination of his case on the basis of RA 6975 (DILG Act).
Petitioner relying on the Civil Service Decree filed a motion to lift
the order saying that his suspension should be limited to 90 days
only because as a member of the PNP, he is covered by the Civil
Service Law. An imposition of preventive suspension for over 90
days would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal
protection.
Issue: W/N petitioner’s suspension until the termination of his
case constitutes a violation of his right to equal protection.
Atty. Carlos Medina
Held: NO. The imposition of a preventive suspension for over
90 days does not violate the suspended policeman’s right to
equal protection of the laws. The reason why members of the
PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application
of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that
policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be
used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them. The
distinction is based on real and reasonable considerations
related to a proper legislative purpose. It is neither
unreasonable, capricious or unfounded.
Almonte vs Vasquez
Facts: Petitioner was formerly a Commissioner of the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB). The subpoena duces
tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his
investigation of an anonymous letter (employee of EIIB and a
concerned citizen) alleging that funds representing savings from
unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed.
Petitioners were ordered by the Ombudsman to produce all
docs relating to the Personal services funds.
Petitioners contend that there is a violation of their right to
equal protection of the laws. They complain that “in all forum
and tribunals...the aggrieved parties...can only hale respondents
via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their
identities fully disclosed, “ while in proceedings before the Office
of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an
investigation.
Issue: W/N there is a violation of petitioner’s right to equal
protection of the laws.
Held: No. There can be no objection to the Ombudsman
proceedings because this is provided in the Constitution itself.
In permitting the filing of complaints in “any form and manner”,
Saile, Barbara Mae DJ. (1D)
the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-
known reticence of the people which keep them from
complaining against official wrongdoings. The Office of the
Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and
prosecutor agencies of the government because those subject to
its jurisdiction are public officials who, through influence, can
quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On the
other hand complainants are more often than not poor and
simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers. This is a sufficient
basis for the differential treatment of complaints filed with the
Ombudsman.
Telebap vs COMELEC
Facts: The Omnibus Election Code prohibits mass media from
selling or donating print space and airtime to the candidates and
requires that COMELEC instead to procure print space and
airtime for allocation to the candidates. While Section 90 of the
law requires the Comelec to procure print space which should
be paid for, Section 92 of the act states that airtime shall be
procured by the COMELEC free of charge.
Petitioners complain that the law singles out radio and television
stations to provide free airtime. They contend that newspapers
and magazines are not similarly required.
Issue: W/N Section 92 of BP Blg. 881 denies them the equal
protection of the law.
Held: The petitioner’s contention has no basis.
There are important differences between broadcast media and
print media that justify their differential treatment:
1. Physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum shows
that need to allocate broadcast frequencies to those
wishing to use them.
Constitutional Law II
2. Government spends public funds for the allocation and
regulation of the broadcast industry which it does not
do in the case of print media
3. The freedom of tv and radio broadcasting is somewhat
lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to
newspaper and media.
(purpose of the law: prevent the moneyed candidates from
monopolizing the media advertising to the disadvantage of
candidates with lesser resources)
Tiu vs CA
Facts: EO No 97-A limits the grant and enjoyment of the tax and
duty incentives to the business enterprises and residents within
the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). It
has therefore excluded the City of Olongapo and the
Municipality of Subic in Zambales from enjoying the benefits
granted by the law.
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the EO for allegedly
being violative of their right to equal protection of the laws.
Issue: W/N the EO is constitutional.
Held: YES. Said Order is not violative of the equal protection
clause, neither is it discriminatory. There exists real and
substantive distinctions between the circumstances obtaining
inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby justifying
a valid and reasonable classification.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not
absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from another. The classification must also be
germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those
belonging to the same class.
Atty. Carlos Medina
Purpose of the law:
 To accelerate the conversion of military
reservations into productive uses.
The government intends to develop the former Subic military
base from its status quo ante as an abandoned naval facility into
a self-sustaining industrial and commercial zone, particularly for
big foreign and local investors to use as operational bases for
their businesses and industries. The reason for the seeming bias
for big investors is that they can pour huge investments to spur
economic growth in the country and to generate employment
opportunities for the Filipinos. (germane to the purpose of the
law)
Substantial differences exist between the big investors who are
being lured in the so-called “secured area” and the present
business operators outside the area. Business activities outside
the secured area are not likely to have any impact in achieving
the purpose of the law. It is also easier to manage and monitor
activities within the secured area which is already fenced off to
prevent fraudulent importation of merchandise or smuggling.
(substantial differences)
Classification applies equally to all the resident individuals and
businesses within the secured area.
The equal protection guarantee does not require territorial
uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual and material
differences between territories, there is no violation of the
constitutional clause.
People vs Jalosjos
Facts: Accused-appellant is a full-fledged member of Congress
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for
statutory rape (2 counts) and acts of lasciviousness (6 counts) is
pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion that he be
Saile, Barbara Mae DJ. (1D)
allowed to fully-discharge the duties of a congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite having been convicted in the first instance of a non-
bailable offense. His primary argument is the mandate of the
sovereign will.
Accused-appellant claim that re-election to public office gives
priority to any other right or interest, including the police power
of the state.
Issue: W/N being a congressman can be considered a substantial
differentiation which removes the accused-appellant from the
same class as all persons validly confined under law.
Held: No. One rationale behind confinement, whether pending
appeal or after final conviction, is public defense. A person
charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice.
The Constitution guarantees: “ x x x nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of laws.” All persons similarly
situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly
in prison. Election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest
and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and
apply equally to all those belonging to the same class.
People vs Dela Piedra
Facts: Accussed-appellant questions her conviction for illegal
recruitment in large scale. She claimed that she was denied the
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equal protection of the laws because although the evidence
shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out application forms and
even received the vicim’s payment, appellant was the only one
charged. Alejandro, remained scot-free. Appellant concludes
that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of
regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a
zamboanguena, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga
City.
Issue: W/N the prosecution is guilty of discriminating against
appellant in convicting her.
Held: No. The prosecution of one guilty person while others
equally guilty are not prosecuted is not, by itself, a denial of the
equal protection of the laws.
The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the
prosecution’s sound assessment whether the evidence before it
can justify a reasonable belief that a person has committed an
offense. The presumption is that the prosecuting officers
regularly performed their duties and this presumption can be
overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere
speculation. Appellant has not presented any evidence to
overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that appellant,
a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime, while a
Zamboanguena, the guilty party in appellant’s eyes, was not, is
insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers
denied appellant equal protection of the laws.
International School Alliance of Educators vs Quisumbing
Facts: Private respondent International school is a domestic
educational institution established primarily for dependents of
foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.
School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its
faculty, classifying the same into foreign-hires and local-hires.
Atty. Carlos Medina
School grants foreign-hires benefits not accorder local-hires
(transportation, housing, travel allowance) and are also paid a
salary rate 25% more than local hires. School justifies the
difference on 2 significant economic disadvantages foreign-hired
have to endure: 1) dislocation factor and 2) limited tenure.

Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification is

discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to
foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

Issue: W/N the difference in salary violates equal protection.

Held: Yes. The state has the right and duty to regulate the
relations between labor and capital. Equal pay for equal work.
Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill,
effort and responsibility under similar conditions should be paid
similar salaries. This rule applies to the school. There is no
evidence that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or
effectively than the local hires.

While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-

hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the
prejudice of local hires.

Saile, Barbara Mae DJ. (1D) Constitutional Law II Atty. Carlos Medina