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“
The atomic bomb was more than a weapon of terrible destruction; it was a psychological weapon.
”
[1]
—Former U.S. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, 1947
The debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki concerns the United States’ atomic bombings
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 August and 9 August 1945 at the close of the Second World War (1939–45). The
role of the bombings in Japan's surrender and the U.S.'s ethical justification for them remains the subject of scholarly
and popular debate.
In 2005 in an overview of historiography about the matter, J. Samuel Walker wrote that "the controversy over the use
of the bomb seems certain to continue."[2] Walker noted that "The fundamental issue that has divided scholars over a
period of nearly four decades is whether the use of the bomb was necessary to achieve victory in the war in the
Pacific on terms satisfactory to the United States."[2]
Supporters of the bombings generally assert that they caused the Japanese surrender, preventing massive casualties
on both sides in the planned invasion of Japan: Kyūshū was to be invaded in October 1945 and Honshū five months
later. Those who oppose the bombings argue that it was simply an extension of the already fierce conventional
bombing campaign[3] and, therefore, militarily unnecessary,[4] inherently immoral, a war crime, or a form of state
terrorism.[5]
Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 2
Support
Preferable to invasion
“
There were those who considered that the atomic bomb should never have been used at all. I cannot associate myself with such ideas… I am
surprised that very worthy people—but people who in most cases had no intention of proceeding to the Japanese front themselves—should
”
adopt a position that rather than throw this bomb we should have sacrificed a million American and a quarter of a million British lives…
[6]
Winston Churchill, leader of the Opposition, in a speech to the British House of Commons, August 1945
In addition, millions of Japanese military and civilian casualties were expected.[10] An Air Force Association history
says, "Millions of women, old men, and boys and girls had been trained to resist by such means as attacking with
bamboo spears and strapping explosives to their bodies and throwing themselves under advancing tanks,"[11] and
also that "[t]he Japanese cabinet had approved a measure extending the draft to include men from ages fifteen to
sixty and
Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 3
The end of the war also liberated millions of laborers working in harsh conditions under a forced mobilization. In the
Dutch East Indies, there was a "forced mobilization of some 4 million—although some estimates are as high as 10
million—romusha (manual laborers)...About 270,000 romusha were sent to the Outer Islands and Japanese-held
territories in Southeast Asia, where they joined other Asians in performing wartime construction projects. At the end
of the war, only 52,000 were repatriated to Java."[17]
The firebombing of Tokyo had killed well over 100,000 people in Japan since February 1945, directly and indirectly.
Intensive conventional bombing would have continued or increased prior to an invasion. The submarine blockade
and the United States Army Air Forces's mining operation, Operation Starvation, had effectively cut off Japan's
imports. A complementary operation against Japan's railways was about to begin, isolating the cities of southern
Honshū from the food grown elsewhere in the Home Islands. "Immediately after the defeat, some estimated that
10 million people were likely to starve to death," noted historian Daikichi Irokawa.[18] Meanwhile, fighting
continued in The Philippines, New Guinea and Borneo, and offensives were scheduled for September in southern
China and Malaya. The Soviet invasion of Manchuria, had in the week before the surrender caused over 80,000
deaths.[19]
Philippine justice Delfin Jaranilla, member of the Tokyo tribunal, wrote in his judgment:
Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 4
"If a means is justified by an end, the use of the atomic bomb was justified for it brought Japan to her knees
and ended the horrible war. If the war had gone longer, without the use of the atomic bomb, how many
thousands and thousands of helpless men, women and children would have needlessly died and suffer ...?"[20]
Supporters of the bombings have emphasized the strategic significance of the targets. Hiroshima was used as
headquarters of the Fifth Division and the 2nd General Army, which commanded the defense of southern Japan with
40,000 military personnel in the city. Hiroshima was a communication center, an assembly area for troops, a storage
point and had several military factories as well.[19] [22] [23] Nagasaki was of great wartime importance because of its
wide-ranging industrial activity, including the production of ordnance, ships, military equipment, and other war
materials.[24]
An article published in the International Review of the Red Cross notes that, with respect to the "anti-city" or "blitz"
strategy, that "in examining these events in the light of international humanitarian law, it should be borne in mind
that during the Second World War there was no agreement, treaty, convention or any other instrument governing the
protection of the civilian population or civilian property."[25] The Blitz was not one of the charges against Hermann
Göring, commander of the Luftwaffe, at the Nuremberg Trials.[26]
On 30 June 2007, Japan's defense minister Fumio Kyuma said the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan by the United
States during World War II was an inevitable way to end the war. Kyuma said "I now have come to accept in my
mind that in order to end the war, it could not be helped (Shikata ga nai) that an atomic bomb was dropped on
Nagasaki and that countless numbers of people suffered great tragedy." Kyuma, who is from Nagasaki, said the
bombing caused great suffering in the city, but he does not resent the U.S. because it prevented the Soviet Union
from entering the war with Japan.[27] Kyuma's comments were similar to those made by Emperor Hirohito when, in
his first ever press conference given in Tokyo in 1975, he was asked what he thought of the bombing of Hiroshima,
and answered: "It's very regrettable that nuclear bombs were dropped and I feel sorry for the citizens of Hiroshima
but it couldn't be helped (Shikata ga nai) because that happened in wartime."[28]
Nagasaki mayor Tomihisa Taue protested against Kyuma, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe apologized over Kyuma's
remark to Hiroshima A-bomb survivors.[29] In the wake of the outrage provoked by his statements, Kyuma had to
resign on 3 July.[30]
Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 5
In early July, on his way to Potsdam, Truman had re-examined the decision to use the bomb. In the end, Truman
made the decision to drop the atomic bombs on Japan. His stated intention in ordering the bombings was to bring
about a quick resolution of the war by inflicting destruction, and instilling fear of further destruction, that was
sufficient to cause Japan to surrender.[31]
In his speech to the Japanese people presenting his reasons for surrender, the emperor referred specifically to the
atomic bombs, stating that if they continued to fight it would result in "...an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the
Japanese nation..."[32] In his Rescript to the Soldiers and Sailors, delivered on 17 August, he focused however on the
impact of the Soviet invasion, omitting any reference to the atomic bombings.
in the war against Japan rather than the atom bombs did more to hasten the surrender."[42] Prime Minister Suzuki
also declared that the entry of the USSR into the war made "the continuance of the war impossible."[43] Upon
hearing news of the event from Foreign Minister Togo, Suzuki immediately said, "Let us end the war," and agreed to
finally convene an emergency meeting of the Supreme Council to end the war. The official British history, The War
Against Japan, also writes that the Soviet declaration of war "brought home to all members of the Supreme Council
the realization that the last hope of a negotiated peace had gone and there was no alternative but to accept the Allied
terms sooner or later."
The "one condition" faction, led by Togo, seized on the bombing as decisive justification of surrender. Kōichi Kido,
one of Emperor Hirohito's closest advisers, stated: "We of the peace party were assisted by the atomic bomb in our
endeavor to end the war." Hisatsune Sakomizu, the chief Cabinet secretary in 1945, called the bombing "a golden
opportunity given by heaven for Japan to end the war."[44]
Opposition
Fundamentally immoral
On 8 August 1945, Albert Camus addressed the bombing of Hiroshima
in an editorial in the French newspaper Combat:
"Mechanized civilization has just reached the ultimate
stage of barbarism. In a near future, we will have to
choose between mass suicide and intelligent use of
scientific conquests[...] This can no longer be simply a
prayer; it must become an order which goes upward from
the peoples to the governments, an order to make a
definitive choice between hell and reason."[45]
A number of scientists who worked on the bomb were against its use. Led by Dr. James Franck, seven scientists
submitted a report to the Interim Committee (which advised the President) in May 1945, saying:
"If the United States were to be the first to release this new means of indiscriminate destruction upon
mankind, she would sacrifice public support throughout the world, precipitate the race for armaments,
and prejudice the possibility of reaching an international agreement on the future control of such
weapons."[47]
Mark Selden writes, "Perhaps the most trenchant contemporary critique of the American moral position on the bomb
and the scales of justice in the war was voiced by the Indian jurist Radhabinod Pal, a dissenting voice at the Tokyo
War Crimes Tribunal, who balked at accepting the uniqueness of Japanese war crimes. Recalling Kaiser Wilhelm II's
account of his duty to bring World War I to a swift end—"everything must be put to fire and sword; men, women
and children and old men must be slaughtered and not a tree or house be left standing." Pal observed:
"This policy of indiscriminate murder to shorten the war was considered to be a crime. In the Pacific war
under our consideration, if there was anything approaching what is indicated in the above letter of the
German Emperor, it is the decision coming from the Allied powers to use the bomb. Future generations
will judge this dire decision...If any indiscriminate destruction of civilian life and property is still illegal
in warfare, then, in the Pacific War, this decision to use the atom bomb is the only near approach to the
directives of the German Emperor during the first World War and of the Nazi leaders during the second
World War."
Selden mentions another critique of the nuclear bombing, which he says the U.S. government effectively suppressed
for twenty-five years, as worth mention. On 11 August 1945, the Japanese government filed an official protest over
the atomic bombing to the U.S. State Department through the Swiss Legation in Tokyo, observing that:
"Combatant and noncombatant men and women, old and young, are massacred without discrimination
by the atmospheric pressure of the explosion, as well as by the radiating heat which result therefrom.
Consequently there is involved a bomb having the most cruel effects humanity has ever known. . . . The
bombs in question, used by the Americans, by their cruelty and by their terrorizing effects, surpass by
far gas or any other arm, the use of which is prohibited. Japanese protests against U.S. desecration of
international principles of war paired the use of the atomic bomb with the earlier firebombing, which
massacred old people, women and children, destroying and burning down Shinto and Buddhist temples,
schools, hospitals, living quarters, etc. . . . They now use this new bomb, having an uncontrollable and
cruel effect much greater than any other arms or projectiles ever used to date. This constitutes a new
crime against humanity and civilization."[48]
Selden concludes that despite the war crimes committed by the Empire of Japan, nevertheless, "the Japanese protest
correctly pointed to U.S. violations of internationally accepted principles of war with respect to the wholesale
destruction of populations."[48]
In 1963 the bombings were the subject of a judicial review in Ryuichi Shimoda et al. v. The State.[49] On the 22nd
anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the District Court of Tokyo declined to rule on the legality of nuclear
weapons in general, but found that "the attacks upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused such severe and indiscriminate
suffering that they did violate the most basic legal principles governing the conduct of war."[50]
In the opinion of the court, the act of dropping an atomic bomb on cities was at the time governed by international
law found in the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare of 1907 and the Hague Draft Rules of Air Warfare of
1922–1923[51] and was therefore illegal.[52]
As the first military use of nuclear weapons, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki represent to some the crossing
of a crucial barrier. Peter Kuznick, director of the Nuclear Studies Institute at American University, wrote of
President Truman:
Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 9
”He knew he was beginning the process of annihilation of the species. It was not just a war crime; it was
a crime against humanity."[53]
Takashi Hiraoka, mayor of Hiroshima, upholding nuclear disarmament, said in a hearing to The Hague International
Court of Justice (ICJ):
"It is clear that the use of nuclear weapons, which cause indiscriminate mass murder that leaves [effects
on] survivors for decades, is a violation of international law".[54] [55]
Iccho Itoh, the mayor of Nagasaki, declared in the same hearing:
"It is said that the descendants of the atomic bomb survivors will have to be monitored for several
generations to clarify the genetic impact, which means that the descendants will live in anxiety for
[decades] to come. [...] with their colossal power and capacity for slaughter and destruction, nuclear
weapons make no distinction between combatants and non-combatants or between military installations
and civilian communities [...] The use of nuclear weapons [...] therefore is a manifest infraction of
international law."[54]
Although bombings do not meet the definition of genocide, some consider that this definition is too strict, and that
these bombings do represent a genocide.[56] [57] For example, University of Chicago historian Bruce Cumings states
there is a consensus among historians to Martin Sherwin's statement, that "the Nagasaki bomb was gratuitous at best
and genocidal at worst."[58]
The scholar R. J. Rummel instead extends the definition of genocide to what he calls democide, and includes the
major part of deaths from the atom bombings in these. His definition of democide includes not only genocide, but
also an excessive killing of civilians in war, to the extent that this is against the agreed rules for warfare; he argues
that indeed the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were war crimes, and thus democide[59] . Rummel quotes
among others an official protest from the US government in 1938 to Japan, for its bombing of Chinese cities:
"The bombing of non-combatant populations violated international and humanitarian laws."
He also considers excess deaths of civilians in firestorms caused by conventional means, such as in Tokyo, as acts of
democide.
In 1967, Noam Chomsky described the atomic bombings as "among the most unspeakable crimes in history".
Chomsky pointed to the complicity of the American people in the bombings, referring to the bitter experiences they
had undergone prior to the event as the cause for their acceptance of its legitimacy.[60] [61]
In 2007, a group of intellectuals in Hiroshima established an unofficial body called International Peoples’ Tribunal
on the Dropping of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On July 16, 2007, it delivered its verdict, stating:
"The Tribunal finds that the nature of damage caused by the atomic bombs can be described as
indiscriminative extermination of all life forms or inflicting unnecessary pain to the survivors".
About the legality and the morality of the action, the unofficial tribunal found:
"The (- - -) use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was illegal in the light of the principles and
rules of International Humanitarian Law applicable in armed conflicts, since the bombing of both cities, made
civilians the object of attack, using nuclear weapons that were incapable of distinguishing between civilians
and military targets and consequently, caused unnecessary suffering to the civilian survivors".[62]
Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 10
Militarily unnecessary
The 1946 United States Strategic Bombing Survey, written by Paul Nitze, concluded that the atomic bombs had been
unnecessary to the winning of the war. After reviewing numerous documents, and interviewing hundreds of Japanese
civilian and military leaders after Japan surrendered, Nitze reported:
Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving
Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all
probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not
been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or
contemplated.[63] [64]
This conclusion assumed that a conventional fire-bombing attack would have continued, with ever-increasing
numbers of B-29s, and a greater level of destruction to Japan's cities and population.[65] One of Nitze's most
influential sources was Prince Fumimaro Konoe, who responded to a question asking whether Japan would have
surrendered if the atomic bombs had not been dropped by saying that resistance would have continued through
November or December, 1945.[66]
Historians, such as Bernstein, Hasegawa, and Newman, have criticized Nitze for drawing a conclusion that, they say,
went far beyond what the available evidence warranted, in order to promote the reputation of the Air Force at the
expense of the Army and Navy.[67] [68] [69]
Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote in his memoir The White House Years:
In 1945 Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our
government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were
a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. During his recitation of the relevant
facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first
on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely
unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by
the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save
American lives.[70] [71]
Other U.S. military officers who disagreed with the necessity of the bombings include General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur,[72] [73] Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy (the Chief of Staff to the President), Brigadier General Carter
Clarke (the military intelligence officer who prepared intercepted Japanese cables for U.S. officials),[71] and Fleet
Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.[74]
"The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace. The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely
military point of view, in the defeat of Japan." Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the
U.S. Pacific Fleet.[64]
"The use of [the atomic bombs] at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against
Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and
the successful bombing with conventional weapons... The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future
are frightening. My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard
common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be
won by destroying women and children." Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to President
Truman.[75]
Historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's research has led him to conclude that the atomic bombings themselves were not even
the principal reason for capitulation. Instead, he contends, it was the swift and devastating Soviet victories in
Manchuria that forced the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945,[76] though the War Council did not know the
extent of the losses to the Soviets in China at that time.
Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 11
State terrorism
Historical accounts indicate that the decision to use the atomic bombs was made in order to provoke an early
surrender of Japan by use of an awe-inspiring power. These observations have caused some commentators to state
that the incident was an act of "war terrorism". Michael Walzer wrote, "... And, finally, there is war terrorism: the
effort to kill civilians in such large numbers that their government is forced to surrender. Hiroshima seems to me the
classic case."[77] This type of claim eventually prompted historian Robert P. Newman, a supporter of the bombings,
to argue that the practice of terrorism is justified in some cases.[78]
Certain scholars and historians have characterized the atomic bombings of Japan as a form of state terrorism. This
interpretation centers around a definition of terrorism as the targeting of innocents to achieve a political goal. As
Frances V. Harbour points out, the meeting of the Target Committee in Los Alamos on 10 and 11 May 1945
suggested targeting the large population centers of Kyoto or Hiroshima for a "psychological effect" and to make "the
initial use sufficiently spectacular for the importance of the weapon to be internationally recognized."[79] [80] As
such, Professor Harbour suggests the goal was to create terror for political ends both in and beyond Japan.[80]
However, Burleigh Taylor Wilkins has written that it stretches the meaning of "terrorism" to include wartime
acts.[81]
Some historians have argued that while the first bomb might
have been required to achieve Japanese surrender, dropping the
second constituted a needless barbarism. However, the record
shows otherwise. American officials believed more than one
bomb would be necessary because they assumed Japanese
hard-liners would minimize the first explosion or attempt to
explain it away as some sort of natural catastrophe, which is
precisely what they did. In the three days between the bombings,
the Japanese minister of war, for instance, refused even to admit
that the Hiroshima bomb was atomic. A few hours after The black marker indicates "ground zero" of the
Nagasaki, he told the cabinet that "the Americans appeared to Nagasaki atomic bomb explosion.
have one hundred atomic bombs . . . they could drop three per
day. The next target might well be Tokyo."[40]
One day before the bombing of Nagasaki, the Emperor notified Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo of his desire to
"insure a prompt ending of hostilities". Togo wrote in his memoir that the Emperor "warned [him] that since we
could no longer continue the struggle, now that a weapon of this devastating power was used against us, we should
not let slip the opportunity [to end the war] by engaging in attempts to gain more favorable conditions."[91] The
Emperor then requested Togo to communicate his wishes to the Prime Minister.
Impact on surrender
On the question of what role the bombings played in Japan's surrender, there are varied opinions, ranging from the
bombings being the deciding factor, to the bombs being a minor factor, to the entire question being unknowable.[96]
That the bombings were the decisive factor in ended the war was the mainstream position in the United States from
1945 through the 1960s, and is termed by some the "traditionalist" view, or pejoratively as the "patriotic
orthodoxy."[97]
Others argue that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria was instead primary or decisive.[98] [99] [100] [101] In the US, this
view has been particularly advanced by Robert Pape and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, and found convincing by some,[102]
[103]
while criticized by others.[104] [105] [106]
In Japanese writing about the surrender, the Soviet entry into the war is considered the primary reason or equal with
the atomic bombs in many accounts,[107] while others, such as the work of Sadao Asada, give primacy to the atomic
bombings, particularly their impact on the emperor.[108] The primacy of the Soviet entry as a reason for surrender is
a long-standing view in the Japanese left, and has appeared in some Japanese junior high school textbooks.[108]
The argument about the Soviet role in Japan's surrender is connected to the argument about the Soviet role in
America's decision to drop the bomb:[99] both emphasize the importance of the Soviet Union, while the former
argues that Japan surrendered to the US out of fear of the Soviet Union, and the latter argues that the US dropped the
bombs to intimidate the Soviet Union.
Still others have argued that war-weary Japan would likely have surrendered regardless, due to a collapse of the
economy, lack of army, food, and industrial materials, threat of internal revolution, and talk of surrender since earlier
in the year, while others find this unlikely, arguing that Japan may well have, or likely would have, put up a spirited
resistance.[97]
More cautiously, historians such as Hasegawa and Asada argue that there was no single decisive external factor in
the decision to surrender, the atomic bombings, Soviet invasion, weakened condition of Japan, and threats of internal
unrest being contributing considerations, with the ultimate decision to surrender being a personal decision by the
emperor, influenced by the peace-seeking wing of the Japanese political elite.[109] [108]
A further traditional view, expressed by Japanese officials in interviews with Americans, is that the impact of the
bombings is unknowable. Some have accepted this view, while others dismiss it as evasive and pandering.[103] Any
analysis, however, cannot exclude the fact that the Emperor's speech to his nation initially announcing surrender
specifically referred to the atomic bombings as a primary reason for ending resistance: "The enemy, moreover, has
begun to employ a new most cruel bomb, the power which to do damage is indeed incalculable, taking toll of many
innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, it would only result in the ultimate collapse and obliteration of the
Japanese nation . . . but would lead also to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are
We to save millions of Our subjects, or ourselves, to atone before the hallowed spirits of our Imperial ancestors?
This is the reason We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the joint declaration of the Powers."[110]
Atomic diplomacy
A further argument, discussed under the rubric of "atomic diplomacy" and advanced in a 1965 book of that name by
Gar Alperovitz, is that the bombings had as primary purpose to intimidate the Soviet Union, being the opening shots
of the Cold War.[111] Along these lines some argue that the US raced the Soviet Union and hoped to drop the bombs
and receive surrender from Japan before a Soviet entry into the Pacific war.
Others argue that such considerations played little or no role, the US being instead concerned with the defeat of
Japan, and in fact that the US desired and appreciated the Soviet entry into the Pacific war, as it hastened the
surrender of Japan.[112]
Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 14
Further reading
External links
• Reflections of a Far East Prisoner of War on the use of the atomic bombs [113]
• Annotated bibliography on the decision to use the atomic bombs on Japan [114]—The Alsos Digital Library for
Nuclear Issues
• Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb [115] by Michael D. Pearlman U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-1352
• "The Obliteration of Hiroshima" [116], Stephen R. Shalom (from New Politics, vol. 6, no. 1 (new series), whole
no. 21, Summer 1996)
• Hiroshima: the 'White Man's Bomb' revisited: Dropping the Bomb on Japan was the final act of a bitter race war
in the Pacific. [117] by Mick Hume, Spiked, 2 August 2005. Abridged version of a 1995 article in Living Marxism.
• Yuki Tanaka and Richard Falk, "The Atomic Bombing, The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal and the Shimoda Case:
Lessons for Anti-Nuclear Legal Movements," The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 44-3-09, 2 November 2009 [118].
• Record of private talk between Winston Churchill and Generalissimo Stalin after the Plenary Session on 17 July
1945 at Potsdam [119]
• The Enola Gay Controversy - About - Overview [120]
• International Peoples’ Tribunal on the Dropping of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki [121]
• Hiroshima (book)
References
[1] "Least Abhorrent Choice" (http:/ / www. time. com/ time/ magazine/ article/ 0,9171,886289,00. html), Time magazine, 3 February 1947
[2] Walker, J. Samuel (April 2005). "Recent Literature on Truman's Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground". Diplomatic History
29 (2): 334. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.2005.00476.x.
[3] Ward Wilson. The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima. International Security, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Spring
2007), pp. 162–179
[4] The Collins Encyclopedia of Military History, Dupuy & Dupuy, BCA 1994, page 1308
[5] Stohl, Michael (1988). "National Interest and State terrorism" (http:/ / books. google. com/ ?id=R60c_2nCcnYC& pg=PA279). The Politics of
terrorism. CRC Press. p. 279. ISBN 9780824778149. .
[6] Foreign News: Loyal Opposition (http:/ / www. time. com/ time/ magazine/ article/ 0,9171,792342,00. html), TIME magazine, August 27,
1945
[7] (Hasegawa 2005, pp. 298–299)
[8] Giangreco, Dennis M. (1998-02-16). "Transcript of "Operation Downfall [U.S. invasion of Japan]: US Plans and Japanese
Counter-Measures"" (http:/ / www. mtholyoke. edu/ acad/ intrel/ giangrec. htm). Beyond Bushido: Recent Work in Japanese Military History. .
Retrieved 2008-03-16.
[9] Frank, Downfall, p. 135–7.
[10] Paulin, Joseph H. (May 2007). ""America’s Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb on Japan"" (http:/ / etd. lsu. edu/ docs/ available/
etd-04102007-145400/ unrestricted/ PaulinThesisFinal. pdf) (PDF). Louisiana State University. . Retrieved 2008-08-27.
[11] "The Mission" (http:/ / www. afa. org/ new_root/ enolagay/ mission. asp). The Smithsonian and the Enola Gay. U.S. Air Force Association. .
Retrieved 2008-03-16.
[12] Correll, John T. (1994-03-15). ""The Smithsonian and the Enola Gay"" (http:/ / www. afa. org/ media/ enolagay/ 03-001. asp). U.S. Air
Force Association. . Retrieved 2008-03-16.
[13] The only existing original copy of this general order was found by Jack Edwards after the war, in the ruins of the Kinkaseki prisoner of war
camp. (Edwards References Page 260)
[14] Giangreco, Dennis M. & Moore, Kathryn, " Are New Purple Hearts Being Manufactured to Meet the Demand? (http:/ / hnn. us/ articles/
1801. html)"; History News Network (December 1, 2003), Retrieved December 4, 2006.
[15] Murphey, Dwight D. (January–February 1996). "Book Review: Truman and the Hiroshima Cult [by Newman, Robert P. 1995]" (http:/ /
dwightmurphey-collectedwritings. info/ BkRev-Newman-Hiroshima-wpage. htm). Conservative Review. pp. 32–36. . Retrieved 2008-03-16.
[16] Rising, Gerry (2001-11-08). "Book review: Downfall [by Richard B. Frank, 1999]" (http:/ / www. acsu. buffalo. edu/ ~insrisg/ bookmarks/
bk01/ 1108downfall. htm). ArtVoice of Buffalo. . Retrieved 2008-03-16.
[17] Library of Congress, 1992, "Indonesia: World War II and the Struggle For Independence, 1942–50; The Japanese Occupation, 1942–45"
(http:/ / lcweb2. loc. gov/ cgi-bin/ query/ r?frd/ cstdy:@field(DOCID+ id0029)) Access date: 9 February 2007.
[18] Frank, Downfall, p. 351; citing Irokawa, The Age of Hirohito: In Search of Modern Japan (1995), p. 37.
[19] Hanson, Victor Davis (2005-08-05). ""60 Years Later: Considering Hiroshima"" (http:/ / www. nationalreview. com/ hanson/
hanson200508050714. asp). National Review. . Retrieved 2008-03-24.
Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 16
[56] Frey, Robert S. (2004). The Genocidal Temptation: Auschwitz, Hiroshima, Rwanda and Beyond. University Press of America.
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htm). The New York Review of Books. . Retrieved 19 February 2009. "And, quite properly, he turns the question back to us: To what extent
are the British or American people responsible for the vicious terror bombings of civilians, perfected as a technique of warfare by the Western
democracies and reaching their culmination in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, surely among the most unspeakable crimes in history. To an
undergraduate in 1945–46—to anyone whose political and moral consciousness had been formed by the horrors of the 1930s, by the war in
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[66] Gentile, 2000, p. 116. (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=ileEUxbAizAC& pg=PA116)
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Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 18
B. In this respect Kyoto has the advantage of the people being more highly intelligent and hence better able to
appreciate the significance of the weapon. Hiroshima has the advantage of being such a size and with possible
focussing from nearby mountains that a large fraction of the city may be destroyed. The Emperor's palace in Tokyo
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