Pro-regime change (Mubarak goes now.
) Anti-regime change (Mubarak stays til autumn)
Bring a reasonable (counter-)prop about Mubarak
standing down now and giving interim control to
the neutral and awesome army to prevent chaos.
Mubarak cannot hold on
1. Govt needs tacit acceptance. Can’t force people
to go to work. Mubarak relied on fear and
repression to attain this acceptance. The
fear’s gone, so even if he remains
nominally president there’s no support for
his govt.
2. Govt lost monopoly on violence and therefore
needs to go. The army has been unwilling to
use violence. Security forces have been
unable to use it effectively. Protesters
loot. People formed vigilante anti-crime
brigades.
3. Holding on means losing vital U.S. aid. U.S. is
doing review of billions military aid that’s
vital to the Mubarak regime as it ‘bribes’
the crucial support of the army. Will
withdraw in case of (excessive) violence
by Mubarak. Any holding on to power
will require violent repression.
4. Waiting until Autumn is bad. Mubarak has
banned opposition parties, imprisoned
rival candidates, cracked down on
opposition funding, and rigged elections.
Waiting gives him time to do just that and
put someone from his camp in power.
Situation post-Mubarak will be nicer.
1. No Backlash. Mubarak has no real power
base or supporters, he is a divide-and-rule
dictator based in the largely neutral and
still-popular army. Islam binds people, see
protesters for- and against stopping for
prayer in Cairo protests.
2. Extremism. People resort to extremism and
terrorism if they see no legitimate way to
express feelings. See rise in domestic
terrorism in Egypt, rise in Egyptian
recruits Al Qaida. Mubarak’s repression
caused more extremism. With democracy,
people have legitimate avenue for feelings
and will not be extremist.
If the pro-regime change side doesn’t do
something reasonable in the interim period, score
the cheap points quickly there.
Mubarak can hold on.
1. Mubarak has support. Working, older,
middle class, ‘tough on crime’, hates
chaos, memory of 70s violence. Willing to
accept repression for security. Still
supports him; see recent clashes between
pro- and anti-Mubarak people.
2. Holding your breath longer. Can’t protest for
months. Once protests stop as Mubarak
clings on, things will be relatively quiet,
can repress/imprison minority that’s really
adamant about those few months.
3. The protests are actually quite small. At peak
few hundred thousand. That’s under 5%
of Cairo’s population. Similar protests
that were successful (Kiev, Ukraine;
Tbilisi, Georgia; Tunis) had one-third of
the population there at peak. Most days,
Cairo’s protests were comparable to
London student protests.
4. Waiting until Autumn is good. Hasty
elections disadvantage legitimate but
unorganised protesters versus existing
well-organised Islamist groups.
International focus and pressure on Egypt
makes sure it will be fair.
Situation post-Mubarak will be worse.
1. Backlash. After revolutionary regime change,
tends to be a violent backlash against
previous govt supporters. French rev,
Russian rev. But also in Ukraine after the
Orange rev. Opposing fronts are young
urban unemployed (protesters) vs older
rural employed (Mubarak). Need the latter
for economy.
2. Extremism. Protests are unorganised, no
clear leadership. Only existing structures
post-Mubarak is Muslim Brotherhood,
will grow, as they are only stable factor
and people flee to stable factors in chaos.
Leads to Islamic extremism.
 3. Democracy can work. After dictator falls,
nationalist ‘for Egypt’ coalition and
consensus politics. Criteria for that
happening: (1) no ethnic/religious
stratification (Yes: 90% of Egypt is ‘just
Muslim’), and (2) strong military holding
violence back (Yes: military neutral and
popular), (3) not an oil/resource
economy. Example: South Africa post-
apartheid and ANC consensus, Japan
post-WW2 and LDP consensus.
Counterexamples like Iraq or African
countries do not fit criteria.
4. Economy. Main problem is unemployment;
Mubarak clique controls economy, need
to bribe govt officials for everything.
Getting rid of clique will enable
prosperity. International investment and
FDI possible once evil govt that demands
a cut is gone.
5. Copts. The Coptic minority (10-20% of
population) was repressed during
Mubarak regime, no religious freedom,
second class citizens, no government
positions. Coalitions of different groups
necessary for new democratic govt,
enables Copts to have real influence and
emancipate.
Regional politics
1. Egypt re-engages in finding solution for Israel.
Currently Egypt is ‘outcast’ in
negotiations on Israel, as it is the only
country with a peace treaty and seen as
traitor to Arab cause. Important partner
for negotiations as they can bridge the
West/Arab/Israel polarisation. But
Mubarak is seen as too pro-Israel in Arab
world to carry legitimacy there. Second, a
less repressive regime would be willing to
open borders with Gaza: Mubarak is too
afraid of the destabilising effects of
opening borders with Gaza for aid.
2. Egyptian democratization will spread around.
Tunesia spread to Egypt, Egypt will
spread democracy even further as people
are inspired and lose fear. Self-reinforcing
thing in the region: can help each other.
3. Democracy will not work. After dictator falls
people retreat to existing social structures
in general as society disintegrates. These
based on rigid structures do not change
like religion. Example: Iraq and ethnic
parties. Democracy based on
religious/ethnic factions does not work,
recipe for disaster, see Iraq. In Egypt,
factions are the rural/urban divide, and
religious structures (Copts, Islam). Will
have Iraq-like situation with violence.
4. Cannot deliver on economy. Mubarak is not
‘evil’ on economy. New govt won’t be
able to do much better. Still corruption,
still problem of young urban
unemployment. Freedom doesn’t
magically create jobs.
5. Copts. The Coptic minority (10-20% of
population) supports Mubarak, Coptic
pope issued statement supporting him.
Mubarak is secular dictator keeping
ethnic/religious tensions under control.
Coptic minority will be repressed under
new regime as there is no dictator keeping
Islamist tendencies under control. New
govt will have to strike deal with Islamists
and allow more Islamism, even if not
totally Islamist.
Regional politics
1. Egypt closes the Arab front on Israel. Israel
likes Mubarak, stable security partner, esp.
for Gaza. New Egypt govt will have to
cater to widespread radical anti-Israel
sentiment, either directly or through
concessions to radical Islamists in
coalition government. Triggers Israeli
security reflex, then less willing to do
concessions on security/control of
occupied territories. Egyptian re-
engagement with panarab cause reinforces
other countries in radical antizionism.
Conclusion: polarisation, war, no peace.
2. No spread, and if it spreads, it’s bad. 1. Won’t
spread to oil-Arab countries because they
bribe population with oil money.
2. Syria/Jordan revolutions will be violent
because they lack Egypt’s indept. army.