1

―At the most basic level, New York is investing enormous sums in a system that does not deliver
what it promises.‖1

New York‘s juvenile justice system is broken and in urgent need of comprehensive reform. The current
system fails youth, communities, facility, staff, and state and local governments.

Disproportionately high numbers of youth of color are sent into the system each year where many
experience serious civil rights violations and do not receive adequate or needed treatment.2

Youth who are placed in the system leave with a much higher chance of reoffending. 3 High levels
of recidivism leave communities at risk and result in increased long-term state and local
government spending on incarceration and mental health crisis services.

There has been an increase in serious workplace violence against staff at state and privately run
facilities between 2007-2009.4

State and local governments cannot afford to continue to send youth into placements at
continually escalating costs.

For reform to be successful, change must not be made in isolation. A wide-ranging series of reforms are
needed to truly remedy and better the system.

To achieve meaningful reform, at minimum, the Legislature should take legislative and budgetary action
to achieve the following systematic improvements:

1. Change the family court placement standard to stop the unnecessary placement or detention of
youth who commit nonviolent, low-level, misdemeanor offenses;

2. Increase the use of community-based alternative to detention and residential placement

programs;

3. Create a funding stream to incentivize the creation of community-based alternative to detention

and residential placement programs by local governments;

4. Provide funding for placements into privately-run residential juvenile justice facilities outside of
the foster care block grant;

5. Close underutilized state-run juvenile justice facilities;

6. Reduce the time required for notice given prior to the closure of state-run juvenile justice facilities
from 12 months to 90 days;

7. Require the State to consider adaptive reuse of juvenile justice facilities it seeks to close;

8. Increase staff and staff training at juvenile justice facilities;

1
Governor David Paterson’s Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice Charting a New Course a Blue Print for Transforming
Juvenile Justice in New York State, December 2009, at page 15
2
Id at page 27.
3
Id at page 14.
4
See Assemblyman Rory Lancman, Employee Safety in the NYS Juvenile Justice System, available online at:
http://assembly.state.ny.us/member_files/025/20100517/index.pdf.

2
 9. Increase the availability of comprehensive education, mental health and substance abuse
treatment services in juvenile justice facilities.

10. Create a mechanism for meaningful, independent juvenile justice oversight; and

11. Reinvest savings from facility closures into improving the juvenile justice system and fostering
economic development in the communities where closed facilities are located.

Senate Democrats Support Governor Cuomo’s Plan for Juvenile Justice Reform 5

In his proposed budget for State Fiscal Year (SFY) 2011- 2012, Governor Cuomo proposed a series of
historic reforms to New York‘s juvenile justice system, including:

Establishing a funding stream to incentivize the creation and use of community-based alternative
to detention and residential placement programs by local governments;

Closing underutilized juvenile justice facilities and reinvesting savings from facility closures into
the local communities; and

Increasing staff and the availability of comprehensive education, mental health and substance
abuse treatment services at three state-run juvenile justice facilities.

Senate Democrats Will Work with Governor Cuomo on System Redesign

The Senate Democratic Conference applauds and supports Governor Cuomo‘s bold steps to achieve
juvenile justice reform. Many of the Governor‘s proposed reforms have been proposed and advanced by
the Senate Democratic Conference, and we look forward to working with him and with other members of
the Legislature and the public to assure reform and redesign this year.

In addition to his proposed reforms, the Senate Democratic Conference urges the Governor to consider
additional measures to further the goal of meaningful and comprehensive juvenile justice reform. These
recommendations include:

1. Legislation to change the family court placement standard for residential placement to avoid
unnecessary and costly placements of low-risk youth;

2. Increased staff and educational, mental health and substance abuse services at all juvenile justice
facilities instead of only at 3 facilities;

3. Increased staff training at all juvenile justice facilities;

4. Fund privately-run residential placement outside of the foster care block grant;

5. A reduction in required notice prior to the closure of state-run juvenile justice facilities: from 12
months to 90 days; and

5
Executive budget proposal for SFY 2011-2012 available online at : http://www.budget.state.ny.us/.

3
 6. Independent juvenile justice oversight.

Savings from Systemic Reform

Once fully implemented, the Senate Democratic Conference’s plan for reform and redesign of the
juvenile system will result in annualized savings of $124 million, with $33 million in savings to the State
and $91 million in savings to county governments and the City of New York.

Governor Andrew M. Cuomo proposed $22 million in savings from the closure of underutilized state-run
juvenile justice facilities as part of his proposed budget for SFY 2011-2012.6

The Senate Democratic Conference supports legislation to avoid the unnecessary placement of youth into
costly residential juvenile justice facilities. Such legislation could result in an additional $102 million in
annual savings to State and local governments.

In 2007, more than 50% of youth in privately and state-run non-secure and limited-secure
facilities were adjudicated to have committed a misdemeanor. 7 Based on the current population
of privately-run and limited-secure state facilities, if 50% of youth placed on misdemeanor
offenses could be diverted into community based alternative programs, an estimated 510 youth
could be diverted from placement (110 diverted state facilities and 400 from privately run-
facilities).

Detention in residential juvenile justice facilities costs $210,000-$275,000 annually per child. In
comparison, community providers can provide placement at a cost of $5,000 - $17,000 annually
per child.8 This equates to an average savings of $200,000 annually for every child diverted from
residential placement into community-based alternatives.

6
Id.
7
Governor David Paterson’s Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice, supra note 1 at page 23
8
See: Governor of New York Andrew M. Cuomo, 2011 State of the State Address (January 5, 2011) (transcript available through
the Times Herald-Record; available online at:
http://www.recordonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20110106/NEWS/110109868); Press Release, Office of the New York
City Mayor, Mayor Bloomberg Proposes Overhaul of the New York State Juvenile Justice System to Improve Public Safety, Break
the Cycle of Crime and Save the Taxpayers Millions (December 21, 2010) available online at:
http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2f1c701c789a0/index.jsp?pageID=mayor_press_relea
se&catID=1194&doc_name=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom%2Fhtml%2F2010b%2Fpr520-
10.html&cc=unused1978&rc=1194&ndi=1; Interview by Brian Lehrer with Jeremy Travis, President of John Jay College of
Criminal Justice, City of New York and Chair of Governor David A. Paterson’s Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice, (Jan.
7, 2011) audio available online at: http://www.wnyc.org/articles/its-free-country/2011/jan/07/cuomos-juvenile-justice-
overhaul/; Citizens’ Committee for Children (CCC) Inside Out: Youth Experience Inside New York’s Juvenile Justice System,
December, 2009 available online at http://www,cccnewyork.org/publications/CCCjuvenilejusticereport2009.pdf; David Mark
Greaves Upstate Economy Built of Incarcerating Young People and Adults, Our Time Press, March 26, 2010; The Justice Policy
Institute. The Costs of Confinement: Why Good Juvenile Justice Policies Make Good Fiscal Sense, (May, 2009) available online:
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/09_05_REP_CostsOfConfinement_JJ_PS.pdf ; David Paterson’s Task Force on
Transforming Juvenile Justice, supra note 1 ; Fight Crime Invest in Kids Getting Juvenile Justice Right: Proven Interventions will
Cut Crime and Save Money (2007) available online at:
http://www.fightcrime.org/sites/default/files/reports/NY%20JJ%20report.pdf.
May 2009. Available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/09_05_REP_CostsOfConfinement_JJ_PS.pdf;

4
 The cost of placement into state run facilities is split 50%-50% between the State and the placing
county.9 The cost of placement into privately run facilities is funded 100% out of the foster care
block grant. Therefore, any reduction in placement into privately run facilities creates a 100%
local savings. 10

Based on the current funding formulas, the total anticipated savings from reduction in placement at state
run facilities is shared equally between the State and the localities, while 100% of the projected savings
from reductions in private placements would be achieved by the localities.

This would amount to an additional $11 million in State savings and $91 million of savings to county
governments and the City of New York. Coupled with the savings the Executive anticipates from facility
closures, a total annualized savings of $124 million dollars is possible.

Senate Democrats also support Governor Cuomo’s plan to reinvest in communities

impacted by facility closure to develop alternative economic strategies and new jobs.

In December 2010 Mayor Bloomberg unveiled a plan for reform of the State‘s juvenile justice system. As
part of his plan the Mayor requested the State11:

Allow localities to operate all juvenile services;

Allow for more expeditious closing of state-run facilities;

Provides localities the authority to immediately begin working with youth in local non-secure
facilities;

Set a rate structure that will free up resources to fund local facilities and community-based
programs;

Allow for a community-based approach to juvenile justice; and

Provide New York City with the flexibility to change levels of supervision and services based on the
progress of the youths in the facilities.12

Senate Democrats are encouraged by the attention of both Governor Cuomo and Mayor
Bloomberg to systemic reform and redesign of the juvenile justices system, and look
forward to working with both leaders to achieve real reform for youth, communities and
taxpayers.

9
According to Executive Law § 529, the placing count" is the county in which the court that placed the child is located. New
York City for these purposes is classified as a single county; the Family Court that has jurisdiction to place the youth, is the Court
in the jurisdiction for which the offense the youth allegedly committed took place
10
Executive Law § 529 and Social Services Law 153K(2)(a).
11
Press Release, Office of the New York City Mayor, supra note 8.

5
 JUVENILE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK STATE

The Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) oversees New York‘s juvenile justice system including
youth detention and residential placement. 13 Youth between ages 7 and 16 are placed in the juvenile
justice system if they have been adjudicated to be either juvenile delinquents or juvenile offenders -
meaning they have been found by a court to have committed certain acts which, if committed by an adult,
would constitute a crime. 14

As of January 2011 there were approximately 1,900 youth in residential juvenile justice placements
throughout the State.15 Some residential juvenile justice facilities are directly operated by OCFS (state-
run facilities), other facilities are licensed by OCFS but are operated by privately run voluntary agencies
(privately run facilities). Of these 1900 youth, 633 reside in state-run OCFS operated facilities, while the
remainder are placed into privately run facilities.16 As of December 2010, around 400, or approximately
two-thirds of the youth placed in state run facilities, were from New York City. 17

OCFS currently runs 20 juvenile justice facilities throughout the State, and employ approximately 1,900
workers. 18 Juvenile justice facilities are classified as secure (most restrictive), limited-secure (less
restrictive), or non-secure (least restrictive). As of January 2011, there were five secure, six limited-
secure, and nine non-secure state run juvenile justice facilities in the New York, with a total capacity of
1,090 beds. 19 Prior to the closure of two state-run facilities in January 19, 2011, the vacancy rate for state-
run juvenile justice facilities was over 50%.20 Following the January 19 closures, there remained 457
vacant beds – a vacancy rate of 40%.

This examination of juvenile justice in New York State will cover endemic, system-wide problems,
incidents which manifest those problems, and will provide recommendations for measures that should be
taken at all levels of government to address what is commonly described as a ―system in crisis.‖ A system
that is failing in the performance of its mandate, while costing the taxpayers of New York State more each
year.

13
Please note that “detention” and “residential placement” are two different things. The term “detention” refers to the period
when youth are held following an arrest up until the time of the dispositional hearing where potential placements are
considered; See Executive Law § 502 (3), Family Court Act § 301.2(3). “Residential placement” refers to out-of-the-home
residential placements made by Family Court at dispositional hearings, after a youth has been adjudicated to be a juvenile
delinquent or a juvenile offender ;Cf Executive Law §§ 504-a, 507-c, 508 and 516 and Family Court Act § 301.2 (10).
14
The definition of juvenile delinquent is codified in Family Court Act § 301.2(1) the definition of juvenile offender is codified in
Penal Law § 10.00(18); to better understand how youth move from the court system to the juvenile justice system please see
the attached “Flowchart of New York State’s Juvenile Delinquency System” Governor David Paterson’s Task Force on
Transforming Juvenile Justice, supra note 1, at page 21 attachment 2.
15
Michael Virtanen, Union’s Andrew Cuomo Wrong on Juvenile Justice, The Troy Record, January 9, 2011, available online at:
http://www.troyrecord.com/articles/2011/01/09/news/doc4d29df2adfcb8071967209.txt
16
See OCFS information provided on state run juvenile justice facility placement data as of January 19, 2011: attachment K.
17
Press Release, Office of the New York City Mayor, Mayor Bloomberg Proposes Overhaul of the New York State Juvenile Justice
System to Improve Public Safety, Break the Cycle of Crime and Save the Taxpayers Millions (December 21, 2010) available online
at:
http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2f1c701c789a0/index.jsp?pageID=mayor_press_relea
se&catID=1194&doc_name=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom%2Fhtml%2F2010b%2Fpr520-
10.html&cc=unused1978&rc=1194&ndi=1
18
Michael Virtanen, supra note 15.
19
See OCFS information provided on state run juvenile justice facility placement data as of January 19, 2011; supra note: 16.
Also see: December 2010 map of Occupancy Rates for New York’s Juvenile Justice System available online: at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2010/juvenile_justice_facilities_occupancy_map.pdf attachment L.
20
Id.

6
Savings from Systemic Reform

Once fully implemented, the Senate Democratic Conference’s plan for reform of the
juvenile system will result in annualized savings of $124 million, with $33 million in
savings to the State and $91 million in savings to county governments and the City of New
York.

Governor Andrew M. Cuomo proposed $22 million in savings from the closure of underutilized state-run
juvenile justice facilities as part of his proposed budget for SFY 2011-2012.21

The Senate Democratic Conference supports legislation to avoid the unnecessary placement of youth into
costly residential juvenile justice facilities. Such legislation could result in an additional $102 million in
annual savings to State and local governments.

In 2007, more than 50% of youth in privately run non-secure and state limited-secure facilities were
adjudicated to have committed a misdemeanor.22 Based on the current population of privately-run and
limited-secure state facilities, if 50% of youth placed on misdemeanor offenses could be diverted into
community based alternative programs, an estimated 510 youth could be diverted from placement (110
diverted state facilities and 400 from privately run- facilities).

Detention in residential juvenile justice facilities costs $210,000-$275,000 annually per child. In
comparison, community providers can provide placement at a cost of $5,000 - $17,000 annually per
child. 23 This equates to an average savings of $200,000 annually for every child diverted from
residential placement into community-based alternatives.

The cost of placement into state run facilities is split 50%-50% between the State and the placing county. 24
The cost of placement into privately run facilities is funded 100% out of the foster care block grant.
Therefore, any reduction in placement into privately run facilities creates a 100% local savings. 25

Based on the current funding formulas, the total anticipated savings from reduction in placement at state
run facilities is shared equally between the State and the localities, while 100% of the projected savings
from reductions in private placements would be achieved by the localities.

21
See the Executive Budget proposal for SFY 2011-2012 supra note 5.
22
Governor David Paterson’s Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice, supra note 1 at page 23
23
See: Governor of New York Andrew M. Cuomo, 2011 State of the State Address (January 5, 2011) (transcript available
through the Times Herald-Record; available online at:
http://www.recordonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20110106/NEWS/110109868); Press Release, Office of the New York
City Mayor, supra note 7; Interview by Brian Lehrer with Jeremy Travis, President of John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City of
New York and Chair of Governor David A. Paterson’s Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice, (Jan. 7, 2011) audio available
online at: http://www.wnyc.org/articles/its-free-country/2011/jan/07/cuomos-juvenile-justice-overhaul/; Citizens’ Committee
for Children (CCC) Inside Out: Youth Experience Inside New York’s Juvenile Justice System, December, 2009 available online at
http://www,cccnewyork.org/publications/CCCjuvenilejusticereport2009.pdf; David Mark Greaves Upstate Economy Built of
Incarcerating Young People and Adults, Our Time Press, March 26, 2010; The Justice Policy Institute. The Costs of Confinement:
Why Good Juvenile Justice Policies Make Good Fiscal Sense, (May, 2009) available online:
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/09_05_REP_CostsOfConfinement_JJ_PS.pdf ; David Paterson’s Task Force on
Transforming Juvenile Justice, supra note 1; Fight Crime Invest in Kids Getting Juvenile Justice Right: Proven Interventions will
Cut Crime and Save Money (2007) available online at:
http://www.fightcrime.org/sites/default/files/reports/NY%20JJ%20report.pdf.
May 2009. Available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/09_05_REP_CostsOfConfinement_JJ_PS.pdf;
24
According to Executive Law sec. 529, the "placing county" is the county in which the court that placed the child is located.
New York City for these purposes is classified as a single county; the Family Court that has jurisdiction to place the youth, is the
Court in the jurisdiction for which the offense the youth allegedly committed took place
25
Id and Social Services Law 153K(2)(a).

7
This would amount to an additional $11 million in State savings and $91 million of savings
to county governments and the City of New York. Coupled with the savings the Executive
anticipates from facility closures, a total annualized savings of $124 million dollars is
possible.

Examples of Cost Effective Community – Based Alternative Programs Evaluated as Part of the Cost Saving
Analysis

Aggression Replacement Training (ART): Designed for youth who exhibit aggressive tendencies and
anti-social behavior and are therefore considered to be at a high risk of reoffending, ART is a 10-week,
30-hour intervention administered to groups of 8 to 12 youth who have committed an offense. ART
has been found to reduce recidivism after 18 months by up to 24%, (averaging around 7%) and has
$11.66 benefits per $1 cost.26 The benefit for the New York State taxpayer is $7,988 per
program participant.27

Functional Family Therapy (FFT): FFT is a multi-level 8 to 12 week program that seeks to address
family dysfunction, acknowledging that in the long run, removing the youth from his or her family
and community may not fix the root problem behind the behavior. The FFT program can lower
recidivism by up to 38% (averaging around 16%), and has $10.69 in benefits for each dollar of
cost when administered by trained therapists.28 The savings for the New York State
taxpayer is $17,016 per program participant. Placement of just 15% of eligible youth
in this alternative would save $1,531,440 per year.29

Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC): MTFC is an alternative to group homes and
detention facilities for youth. Rather than place youth into a group setting, each foster family has one
youth at a time, which allows them to tailor programming to the youth‘s specific needs. MTFC has
been shown to reduce recidivism rates for youth by 22% on average, and has a cost-benefit ratio
of $10.88 in benefits for every dollar spent.30 The total savings to the New York State
taxpayer is $23,600 per program participant. Placement of just 15% of youth in this
alternative would save $1,062,000 per year.31

26
The Justice Policy Institute supra note 8.
27
Governor David Paterson’s Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice, supra note 1 at page 90.
28
The Justice Policy Institute supra note 8.
29
Governor David Paterson’s Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice, supra note 1 at page 90.
30
The Justice Policy Institute supra, note 8.
31
Governor David Paterson’s Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice, supra note 1 at page 90.

8
Summary Findings: A System in Crisis

New York’s Juvenile Justice System is Ineffective. ―A successful juvenile justice system
keeps the public safe and helps young people become healthy, productive, law abiding citizens. New
York‘s system does neither.‖32 In his State of the State address Governor Cuomo cited recidivism
rates for youth leaving New York‘s juvenile justice system in the ninetieth percentile. 33 Indeed,
New York has one of the highest recidivism rates for residential juvenile justice placements in the
country. Studies have shown that 75% percent of youth formerly placed in the juvenile justice
system were rearrested within 3 years, and that 89% of males and 81% of females formerly placed in
the juvenile justice system were rearrested sometime before their 28th birthday.34

New York’s Juvenile Justice System is made up of a Disproportionate Number of

Youth of Color. In 2007, five out of six (83%) youth placed in the juvenile justice system were
either African American or Latino, while African American and Latinos made up just 44% of the
State‘s total youth population.35 Additionally, in 2007 93.5% of New York City youth placed in the
juvenile justice system were children of color. 36

Youth in New York’s Juvenile Justice System Experience Abuses, Civil Rights
Violations and Inadequate Treatment and Services. In August of 2009, following more
than a year of investigation, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a letter to Governor David
A. Paterson citing serious abuses and civil rights violations relating to use of force and inadequate
mental health treatment at four state-run juvenile justice facilities.37 DOJ found an alarming
number of serious injuries suffered by youth at the facilities, including ―concussions, broken or
knocked out teeth, and spiral fractures.‖ 38 DOJ additionally reported that staff at the investigated
facilities ―consistently used a high degree of force to gain control in nearly any type of situation‖ and
―routinely used uncontrolled, unsafe application of force, departing both from generally accepted
standards and OCFS policy,‖ observing that ―[a] nything from sneaking an extra cookie to initiating
a fistfight may result in a full prone restraint with hand cuffs.‖ 39 DOJ further found that at all four
facilities the majority of mental health evaluations conducted on youth did not meet basic
professional standards that medication was administered inappropriately to youth and that there
was insufficient substance abuse treatment services. 40

New York’s Juvenile Justice System is Costly to State and Local Governments. The
cost of placing children in detention or state-run residential placement is roughly split between the
state and the counties and the City of New York. The State reimburses counties and the City of New
York for 49% of the cost to place youth into detention. 41 The counties and the City of New York
reimburse the State 50% of the cost to place youth in state run residential juvenile justice

32
Governor David Paterson’s Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice, supra note 1at pages 14 and 33.
33
Governor of New York Andrew M. Cuomo, 2011 State of the State Address, supra note 8.
34
Governor David Paterson’s Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice, supra note 1at page 14.
35
Id at page 27.
36
Id.
37
Letter from Loretta King, Acting Assistant Attorney General, the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division to the
Honorable David A. Paterson, Governor (August 14, 2009) at page 2. Available online at:
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/NY_juvenile_facilities_findlet_08-14-2009.pdf.
37
Human Rights Watch, American Civil Liberties Union Custody and Control: Conditions of Confinement in New York’s Juvenile
Prison for Girls, Sept. 24, 2006, at pages 63-71; available online at:
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/racialjustice/custodycontrol20060925.pdf
38
Letter from Loretta King, supra note 37.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Executive Law § 530.

9
 facilities.42 Placement of youth in privately run juvenile justice residential placements is funded out
of the foster care block grant. which is a capped appropriation the State provides to counties and the
City if New York to cover its share of foster care costs. 43 As of the end of 2009, the average cost to
hold a child in detention or an OCFS residential placement for 12 months was approximately
$210,000.00. By 2011, the cost has risen to approximately $270,000. 44 In contrast, placing youth
in alternatives to detention or alternatives to residential placement for 12 months cost on average
$5,000.00 - $17,000.00 annually.45

New York’s Juvenile Justice System is Broken. In September 2008 Governor David A.
Paterson announced the creation of the Task Force on Transforming the Juvenile Justice system.
In December 2009, the Task Force issued its report entitled: ―Charting a New Course: a Blue Print
for Transforming Juvenile Justice in New York State.‖ The Task Force found that New York‘s
juvenile justice system is in urgent need of reform.46 In an article on the Task Force‘s report the
New York Times stated: ―New York‘s system of juvenile prisons is broken, with young people
battling mental illness or addiction held alongside violent offenders in abysmal facilities where they
receive little counseling, can be physically abused and rarely get even a basic education‖47

New York’s Juvenile Justice System is Marred by Scandal. As described in more detail
below, in recent years several scandals have exposed flaws in the existing juvenile justice system.
Tragically, many of these scandals have resulted in severe injury and death to citizens, staff and
youth.

42
Executive Law §529.
43
Id and Social Services Law 153K(2)(a).
44
Interview by Brian Lehrer with Jeremy Travis, President of John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City of New York and Chair of
Governor David A. Paterson’s Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice, supra note 1.
45
Supra note 8.
46
Governor David Paterson’s Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice, supra note 1.
47
Nicholas Confessore New York Finds Extreme Crisis in Youth Prisons The New York Times, December 14, 2009; available
online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/14/nyregion/14juvenile.html?_r=1&hp.

10
Recent Incidents

Numerous incidents in recent years have sparked public scrutiny of New York‘s Juvenile Justice system.
Rather than isolated cases, they are—as investigations conducted by agencies at all levels of government
indicate—manifestations of serious systemic problems. Below are a few examples of high-profile cases at
public and private facilities:

State- Run Facilities

2006 Death of Youth.48 In November 2006 a 15-year-old resident of Tyron Boys Residential
Facility died of cardiac arrest following a full prone restraint involving two staff members. The
medical examiner in the case ruled his death a homicide, noting that the child died from a cardiac
arrhythmia to which the stress of the incident contributed.

2008 Death of Staff Member. 49 In July 2008 a 60-year-old male Youth Division Aide (YDA) at
Tyron was struck in the head with a piece of wood by a 16-year-old resident. One week following
the assault, the YDA suffered a seizure and a stroke. A month later, the aide lapsed into a coma, and
died the following week. Following an autopsy, the medical examiner in the case ruled that the YDA
died of natural causes unrelated to the assault. Despite the medical examiners findings, the aide‘s
family continued to believe that the death was related to the assault. The Civil Service Employees
Association (CSEA), one of the Unions representing OCFS facility employees, linked the assault to
facility staff reductions and agency policies aimed at reducing restraints of youth in Tyron, which
were implemented in January of 2008.

2009 Arrest of a YDA. 50 42 year-old YDA at Tyron was charged on August 24, 2009 with assault in
the third degree in connection with a restraint of a youth in the facility earlier that month. The
youth was hospitalized for his injuries following the restraint. Two other residents were also
charged in connection with the incident. The charges were filed against the aide on the same day as
the DOJ letter became public.

OCFS “Social” Scandal. On May 24, 2010, the New York Post ran a story by Fred Dicker entitled
―Hooker and Teen at Juvie Jail ‗Orgy‘.‖ The story detailed allegations that a ―social‖ was held at the
OCFS Goshen secure facility for boys in December of 2009, and residents of the facility could invite
individuals from the public to attend the event. The report also alleged that a facility surveillance
video showed lap dances and oral sex provided to one of the residents by a 15 year-old minor and
possibly ―other sex acts,‖ performed by young prostitutes hired by residents of the facility. The
article further alleged that state workers used a state vehicle and were paid overtime to pick up the
alleged young prostitutes and transport them to the OCFS facility.

Private Facilities

48
Teen’s Death at Tryon Ruled Homicide, Reforms Demanded, The North Country Gazette, February 21, 2007; Cassi Feldman
State Facilities’ Use of Force is Scrutinized After a Death, The New York Times, March 4, 2007.
49
Tryon Aide Dies After Assaults by Youths, The North Country Gazette, August, 27 2008; J. Jude Hazard Tryon Aide in Assault
Dies The Daily Gazette, August, 28, 2008; Michael Anich Family Wants Second Autopsy, The Leader –Herald, September 4, 2008;
Hallisey, supra note 36.
50
Michael Anich Fight at Tryon leads to Arrest, The Leader- Herald August 27, 2009; Jason Subik Injury, Arrests Follow Brawl at
Tryon Center, The Daily Gazette August 26, 2009.

11
 Attempted Murder. 51 On January 31, 2009, then 14-year-old Tyquan Rivera shot Rochester Police
Officer Anthony DiPonzio in the back of the head while AWOL from a privately run juvenile justice
facility. Officer DiPonzio was critically injured, but survived the shooting. Rivera was tried as a
juvenile offender due to his age. He was found guilty of attempted murder and assault, and received
the maximum sentence of three and one half to ten years in prison.

Renee Greco. 52 24-year-old Renee Greco, a youth aide working at a privately run group home
overseeing juvenile delinquents and offenders, was killed by two youth at the facility in June 2009.
On the night she was killed, Ms. Greco was the only employee on duty at the six-bed facility.
According to the police reports and testimony given at trial, Robert Thousand, a youth placed at the
facility, threw a blanket over Ms. Greco‘s head while she played cards with other residents of the
home. Another resident, Anthony Allen proceeded to bludgeon Ms. Greco over the head several
times with a table leg containing a protruding screw. Thousand pled guilty to first-degree
manslaughter and was sentenced to 20 years in prison; Anthony Allen was convicted of second-
degree murder and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison.

51
Rachael Barnhart, Boy, 14, Arrested in Officer Shooting, WHAM ABC 13 (February 3, 2009) available online: at
http://www.13wham.com/news/local/story/Boy-14-Arrested-in-Officer-Shooting/mwZ2fNGXu0m0zt3rkjCLfg.cspx; Tyquan
Rivera Found Guilty of Attempted Murder and Assault, WHAM ABC 13 (September 3, 2009) available online at:
http://www.13wham.com/news/local/story/Tyquan-Rivera-Found-Guilty-of-Attempted-
Murder/scuQVWy_0E61RryCKW50eg.cspx.
52
Denise Jewell Gee and Thomas J. Prohaska, Slain Employee Planned to Quit Group Home Over Safety Fears, The Buffalo News
(June 11, 2009) available online at: http://www.buffalonews.com/incoming/article158784.ece; Thomas J. Prohaska, Group
home worker killer accomplice gets 20 years, The Buffalo News (December 22, 2010) available online at:
http://www.buffalonews.com/city/police-courts/courts/article291224.ece; Brittany Milazzo, Murder trial starts on Greco’s
birthday, Lockport Union-Sun Journal (September 10, 2010) available online at:
http://lockportjournal.com/crime/x1899099952/Murder-trial-starts-on-Greco-s-birthday; Thomas J. Prohaska, Allen gets 25 to
life in murder of group home worker, The Buffalo News (December 11, 2010).

12
Recent Reports, Findings and Forums

The U.S. Department of Justice Investigation and Settlement with New York State

The federal Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) provides the Department of Justice
(DOJ) with the authority to investigate and take appropriate action to enforce the Constitutional and
federal statutory rights of youth in juvenile justice facilities throughout the United States. 53 The federal
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (VCLEA) makes it unlawful for any government charged
with the responsibility of overseeing incarcerated juveniles to engage in a pattern of conduct or practice
that violates the constitutional or federal statutory rights of such juveniles. 54 After more than a yearlong
investigation, DOJ found violations of civil rights and constitutional standards of care at the following
four state-run juvenile justice facilities55:

The Lansing Residential Center: a non-secure facility serving female youth located in Lansing,
New York;

The Louis Gossett Jr. Residential Center: a limited-secure facility serving male youth located in
Lansing, New York;

The Tyron Residential Center: a limited-secure facility serving male youth located in Johnstown,
New York; and

The Tryon Girls Residential Center: a secure facility serving female youth located in Johnstown,
New York.56

Significant findings made by the DOJ included 57:

Excessive use of force by staff against youth;

Inappropriate and dangerous use of physical restraints on youth, resulting in an alarming number
of physical injuries including concussions and broken bones;

Failure to adequately investigate abuses, or to take corrective action against staff who have acted
inappropriately;

Inadequate mental health care, substance abuse and treatment services;

Insufficient treatment planning; and

Inappropriate medication practices, including the failure to properly monitor the administration
of medication to youth, as well as the side effects of such medication.

Pursuant to CRIPA and VCLEA the Attorney General of the United States had the authority to bring an
action in federal district court to compel New York to remedy any violations of Constitutional standards
or federal law at the four facilities and to achieve any other equitable relief.58

53
See: 42 USC § 1997 et seq (PL 96-247).
54
42 USC § 14141.
55
Letter from Loretta King, Acting Assistant Attorney General, the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division to the
Honorable David A. Paterson, Governor (August 14, 2009) at page 2. Available online at:
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/NY_juvenile_facilities_findlet_08-14-2009.pdf.
56
Note: Tryon Girls also serves as a reception center.
57
Letter for Loretta King, supra note 37.
58
See 42 U.S.C §§ 1997, 1997a, 1997b, 14141.

13
DOJ broke its findings into two categories – ―Protection from Harm‖ and ―Mental Health Care‖ – and
required New York to take immediate remedial actions in both areas. 59

From August 2009 to July 2010, New York State engaged in settlement negotiations with DOJ in an
attempt to avoid litigation. In July 2010 DOJ filed a Complaint, Joint Motion to Enter Settlement
Agreement, and a proposed Order Entering Settlement Agreement with the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of New York. Later that month the Federal Court accepted the agreement. The
settlement agreement relates solely to the four facilities investigated by DOJ, 60 and the State has until
June 2012 to come into full compliance with the terms of the agreement.61 Details of the settlement
agreement include:

Protection from Harm 62

Restraints: New York shall mandate that youth not be subject to undue restraints.

o New York must to create or modify policies, procedures and practices to ensure that
restraints be limited to exceptional circumstances, and used only in instances where:

 Physical intervention is necessary to protect the youth or others; or

 The youth is trying to escape from the facility.

o Staff must be trained to provide the minimum amount of physical control during
restraints.

o New York is required to create or modify policies, procedures and practices regarding
performing restraints on youth who are at heightened risk of physical harm from
restraints.

o New York must prohibit the use of chemical agents (i.e. pepper spray) or psychotropic
medications as a form of restraint.

Use of Force: Under the agreement, New York is required to create or modify policies, procedures
and practices that require staff to use the least amount of force necessary to protect the safety of
staff and other youth.

Mental Health Services63

The State is required to provide adequate and appropriate mental health care and treatment to youth
consistent with generally accepted professional standards as follows:

New York must provide an integrated, adequate, appropriate and effective behavioral treatment
program at facilities.

New York must provide any youth experiencing a mental health crisis with prompt and adequate
mental health services appropriate to the situation.

New York shall require that youth mental health needs are timely identified and that youth who
have mental health needs be provided adequate mental health services.

59
Letter from Loretta King, supra note 37.
60
See Joint Motion to Enter Settlement Agreement U.S v. N. Y. available online at:
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/agreement-07142010.pdf attachment G.
61
Id.
62
Id at pages 5-8.
63
Id at pages 10-18.

14
 New York shall require that the prescription and monitoring of the safety and appropriateness of
all psychotropic medication use is consistent with generally accepted professional standards.

New York shall create or modify policies requiring staff to complete competency-based training
on psychotropic medications and psychiatric disabilities.

New York must create or modify, and implement policies or procedures that ensure that all youth
who have a suspected history of substance abuse are provided with adequate prevention
education, and all youth who are known to have current substance abuse problems are provided
adequate treatment.

New York shall require that youth being treated for either mental health or substance abuse issues
have a transition plan in place prior to discharge from the facility.

Master Action Plan (MAP) 64

Within 60 days of the entry by the Court of the settlement agreement, New York was required to submit
to DOJ a Master Action Plan (MAP), which would specify the time frame for which the State would
come into compliance with each required remedial action. 65 New York‘s MAP was approved by DOJ on
December 14, 2010.66

Oversight67

The settlement agreement has various elements of oversight, including the appointment of two
independent monitors to oversee New York‘s compliance with the agreement. DOJ and the Court will
also monitor the State‘s compliance with the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement also
requires OCFS exercise additional oversight over the applicable facilities.

64
Id at pages 22-23.
65
Id.
66
See approved MAP available at: http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/rehab/DOJ_settlement/Master%20Action%20Plan%2012-
14.pdf
67
Joint Motion to Enter Settlement Agreement U.S v. N. Y. supra note 60 at pages 19-22.

15
Governor Paterson’s Taskforce on Transforming Juvenile Justice

On December 14, 2009, the Governor‘s Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice issued a report
entitled: ―Charting a New Course: a Blue Print for Transforming Juvenile Justice in New York State.‖ The
Task Force was charged with looking at how to move the State toward a juvenile justice system that
―promotes public safety, holds youth accountable for their actions, and produces positive outcomes for
youth and their families.‖68 The Task Force was made up of 32 members representing various state and
local government, labor and advocacy organizations. The report found that New York‘s juvenile justice
system ―is in nothing short of a crisis‖ and is in ―urgent‖ need of system-wide reform.69

The report makes several recommendations for legislative, budgetary and policy reforms, including70:

A reduction in the use of institutional placements by reserving such placements for youth who
pose ―a significant risk to public safety;‖

The development of a standard process to accurately assess youth risk and needs;

The downsizing and closure underutilized facilities;

A reinvestment in savings from facility closures into communities that are home to the highest
number of youth in the juvenile justice system;

The development funding and expansion of community-based alternative to residential

placement and detention services – particularly evidence based programs;

The placement youth in the systems closest to their homes;

The reduction of the disproportionate representation of youth of color in institutional placement;

The assurance that all children in custody of either state or privately-run facilities are safe;

An increase in staff and staff training in both state and private juvenile justice facilities;

The funding and provision of educational and mental health services;

Comprehensive reentry preparation that begins when youth are placed into the system;

Reimbursement to counties for 50% of the cost of placement of youth into privately run facilities,
instead of reimbursement of such placements through the foster care block grant;

The thorough investigation of allegations of abuse and staff misconduct; and

The establishment of an external oversight body to monitor and report on the State‘s juvenile
justice practices.

68 Governor David Paterson’s Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice, supra note 1 at page 11.
69
Id at page 6.
70
See Governor David Paterson’s Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice, supra note 1.

16
Inspector General and Tompkins County District Attorney Report

In 2006 the State of New York Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and the Office of the Tompkins
County District Attorney issued a comprehensive report on conditions inside the Louis Gossett Jr.
residential center.71 The report followed an extensive investigation and concluded that there was a ―near
total breakdown‖ in the staffing of entities tasked with overseeing and preventing abuse at the facilities. 72
The report also highlighted serious deficiencies in the mental health and substance abuse services, staffing
and resources, employee training and the preparation of incident reports. 73

Senator Young’s Juvenile Justice Task Force

On June 24, 2009 Senator Cathy Young announced the creation of the Special Legislative Task Force on
―Fixing the Broken New York Juvenile Justice System.‖ The Task force was created to ―address a growing
concern by community members, youth facility staff and law enforcement officials who cited the closure of
14 youth facilities and reporting centers throughout the state, along with newly implemented policies set
forth by the New York State Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS), as the reason for a rise in
youth violence.‖74 Membership in this task force included Senators Young, George Maziarz, Dale Volker,
Joseph Robach, Michael Nozzolio, Hugh Farley, Martin Golden, Elizabeth O‘C Little and John Bonacic.75

Senator Montgomery’s Round Table on Juvenile Justice Reform

In November 2009 Senator Velmanette Montgomery held a roundtable discussion on the topic of juvenile
justice reform. The event was co-sponsored by Senators Tom Duane, Ruth Hassell-Thompson, Shirley
Huntley, Diane Savino, and Eric Schneiderman. The purpose of the roundtable was to begin a dialogue
regarding juvenile justice issues and to discuss legislative, budgetary and policy solutions to prevent
juvenile delinquency and promote positive outcomes for at-risk youth. Participants in the roundtable
included a variety of juvenile justice stakeholders from around the state as well as national experts.

Assemblyman Lancman’s Report on Workplace Safety

In May, 2010 Assemblyman Rory Lancman, Chair of the Assembly Subcommittee on Workplace Safety,
issued a report entitled ―Employee Safety in the NYS Juvenile Justice System.‖ The report made the
following findings: 76

Workers compensation and indemnity claims for employees of the state-run juvenile justice
system for ―assaults and violent acts by persons‖ increased by 42% from SFY 2007-2008 to SFY
2008- 2009;

OCFS is required to finalize a workplace violence prevention (WVP) plan that includes facility-
specific risk assessments. OCFS delayed the completion of the plan which delayed critical safety
training for workers and other protections;

Interviews with OCFS employees indicated an increase in injuries to staff that resulted from
youth-on–youth and youth-on–staff violence;

71
See: State of New York Office of the Inspector General and Office of the Tompkins County District Attorney Report of the Louis
Gossett Jr. Residential Center, November, 2006, available at:
http://www.ig.state.ny.us/pdfs/Report%20on%20the%20Louis%20Gossett%20Jr%20Residential%20Center.pdf
72
Id at page 86.
73
Id
74
Press Release, Catherine Young Senator Young Announces Task Force on Juvenile Justice Reform (June 24, 2009) available at:
http://www.nysenate.gov/press-release/senator-young-announces-task-force-juvenile-justice-reform.
75
Id.
76
Assemblyman Rory Lancman, supra note 4 at page 20.

17
 OCFS lacks adequate support for staff who have been injured by youth in the workplace;

Youth being placed into state-run facilities require a higher level of supervision and services as
compared to youth diverted into community-based programs. OCFS staff lacks the training and
tools necessary to provide this level of supervision and services.

New Developments for 2011

Governor Cuomo’s Plan for Reform

During his first days in office, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo visited the nearly empty Tyron boys facility
located in Johnstown, NY. 77 Disgusted by the sight of State employees paid to oversee an empty facility,
the newly elected Governor called for the repeal Executive Law § 501 (15),78 stating, "[I] t is ridiculous,
with a $9 billion deficit, we're paying 30 staff people to baby-sit an empty building." 79

Governor Cuomo addressed the need for juvenile justice reform in his first State of the State address.
Some described the Governor‘s calls for reform as ―the most impassioned part of the State of the State,‖
and the portion of the address where he ―drew the most applause.‖ 80

In his address, the new Governor discussed how young people placed in juvenile justice facilities receive
treatment that has been proven to be ineffective, citing a recidivism rate in the 90th percentile. 81 The
Governor discussed how many obvious flaws within New York‘s juvenile justice systems have not been
fixed, in the name of saving jobs in upstate areas.82 Stating specifically:

I understand, I understand, the importance of keeping jobs. I understand the importance

of keeping jobs especially in upstate New York. I also understand that, that does not
justify the burden on the taxpayer and the violation of civil rights of the young person
who is in a program that they don't need where they're not being treated hundreds of
miles from their home just to save state jobs. An incarceration program is not an
employment program. If people need jobs, let's get people jobs. Don't put other people
in prison to give some people jobs. Don't put other people in juvenile justice facilities to
give some people jobs. That's not what this State is all about and that has to end this
session. 83

Governor Cuomo’s Plan for Juvenile Justice Reform 84

In his proposed budget for State Fiscal Year (SFY) 2011- 2012, Governor Cuomo proposed a series of
reforms to New York‘s juvenile justice system, including:

77
The Daily News, Editorial, Andrew Cuomo has found appalling waste and featherbedding in state juvenile justice system, The
Daily News, November 26, 2010 available online at:http://www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2010/11/26/2010-11-
26_cuomos_reform_school.html#ixzz1B3s8pZCh
78
Add citation
79
Id.
80
Interview by Brian Lehrer with Jeremy Travis, President of John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City of New York and Chair of
Governor David A. Paterson’s Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice, supra note 1; Michael Virtanen supra note 15.
81
Governor of New York Andrew M. Cuomo, 2011 State of the State Address, supra note 8.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Executive budget proposal for SFY 2011-2012 supra note 5.

18
 Establishing a funding stream to incentivize the creation and use of community-based alternative
to detention and residential placement programs by local governments;

Closing underutilized juvenile justice facilities and reinvesting savings from facility closures into
the local communities; and

Increasing staff and the availability of comprehensive education, mental health and substance
abuse treatment services at three state-run juvenile justice facilities.

Establishing a Funding Stream to Incentivize the Creation and Use of Community-Based Alternative to
Detention and Residential Placement Programs by Local Governments

Governor Cuomo‘s proposed budget for SFY 2011-2012 seeks to increase the use of community-based
alternative to detention and alternative to residential placement programs through the creation of a
―treatment and supervision program for juveniles.‖ Such program would provide counties and the City of
New York with 62% reimbursement up to the amount of funds appropriated, to support the creation
and/or development of evidence-supported, community-based alternative programs to keep youth out of
costly detention or residential placements. The Executive proposes to fund this program with $ $31.4
million in SFY 2011-2012. If enacted, this will amount to a nearly $26 million increase of funds available
for community-based alternative to detention and residential placement programs from SFY 2010-11.
The Executive proposes to increase funding for the Treatment and Supervision Program for Juveniles to
$48.3 million in out years.

The Executive proposed budget for SFY 2011-2012 would also incentivize local governments‘ use of
community-based alternatives to detention by changing the funding formula for reimbursement by the
State to counties and the City of New York for the cost of youth detention. The SFY 2011-2012 Executive
budget proposes Article VII language to eliminate the requirement that the State reimburse counties and
the City of New York 49% of the cost of juvenile detention services effective July 1, 2011. This would result
in a savings to the State of $23 million in 2011-12 and $51 million in 2012-13. The Executive budget
further proposes a $15 million capped appropriation to reimburse localities for juvenile detention. Funds
from this appropriation will reimburse localities 50% of local detention cost (up to the amounts
appropriated) for high-risk youth who pose a risk to public safety. Localities will not be reimbursed for
cost associated with the detention of low-risk youth. The Executive also advances proposals to create risk
assessment tools for all localities to determine when youth detention is appropriate.

Close Underutilized Facilities and Reinvest Savings

The Executive budget proposes the closure or downsizing of an unspecified number of state-run
residential juvenile justice facilities to address declining population within the system. This proposal
would reduce capacity by 376 beds (from 1,209 to 833), and would eliminate 371 annual salaried
positions, resulting in State savings of $22 million in SFY 2011-12 and $22 million in SFY 2012-13. The
Executive proposes Article VII language to eliminate the 12-month notice period required prior to the
closure or downsizing of any state-run juvenile justice facility, allowing unused facilities to close more
quickly.

As part of the Executive budget, the Governor pledged a $10 million economic transformation package to
be administered by the Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC) for communities where juvenile
justice facility closures would occur.

19
Increase Staff and the Availability of Comprehensive, Education, Mental Health and Substance Abuse
Treatment Services in Juvenile Justice Facilities

The SFY 2011-12 Executive budget provides an additional $13.5 million for improvements in medical,
mental health and direct care services in three state-run facilities. This proposal would also increase staff
to youth ratios, adding 414 staff positions.

The Senate Democratic Conference applauds Governor Cuomo‘s bold steps to achieve juvenile justice
reform. Indeed, many of the Governor‘s proposed reforms have been proposed and advanced by the
Senate Democratic Conference.

In addition to his proposed reforms, the Senate Democratic Conference urges the Governor to consider
additional measures to further the goal of meaningful and comprehensive juvenile justice reform. These
recommendations include:

7. Legislation to change the family court placement standard for residential placement to avoid
unnecessary and costly placements of low-risk youth;

8. Increased staff and educational, mental health and substance abuse services at all juvenile justice
facilities instead of only at 3 facilities;

9. Increased staff training at all juvenile justice facilities;

10. Fund privately-run residential placement outside of the foster care block grant;

11. A reduction in required notice prior to the closure of state-run juvenile justice facilities: from 12
months to 90 days; and

12. Independent juvenile justice oversight.

Mayor Bloomberg’s Plan for Reform

In December 2010 Mayor Bloomberg unveiled a plan for reform of the State‘s juvenile justice system. As
part of his plan the Mayor requested the State:

Allow localities to operate all juvenile services;

Allow for more expeditious closing of state-run facilities;

Provides localities the authority to immediately begin working with youth in local non-secure
facilities;

Set a rate structure that will free up resources to fund local facilities and community-based
programs;

Allow for a community-based approach to juvenile justice; and

Provide New York City with the flexibility to change levels of supervision and services based on the
progress of the youths in the facilities.85

85
Press Release, Office of the New York City Mayor, supra note 8.

20
Legislative History - Bills that passed the Senate under the former Democratic Majority

In response to DOJ‘s findings and the recommendations of Governor Paterson‘s Task Force on
transforming juvenile justice, the Senate Democratic Conference passed a package of juvenile justice
reform legislation in 2010. Many of the bills were not acted upon by the Assembly. Additionally, the bills
in the package were controversial in the Senate and were passed on party line votes.

In passing its reform package, the Senate Democratic conference specifically focused on legislation to
change the family court placement standard for non-violent youth, establish funding streams for
community based alternative to detention and residential placement programs, and create an oversight
entity for the juvenile justice system. Many of the bills passed by the Senate in its reform package were
also advanced by the Senate as Article VII for the SFY 2010-11 budget, but were not accepted by either the
Assembly or the Executive.

S.6709-C (Montgomery)/A. 10449-C (Lentol) (2009):

Reduction in Juvenile Justice Placements/Change in Family Court Placement Standard86

This bill would amend the Family Court Act to provide that the Family Court shall not place youth into a
residential setting in a juvenile delinquency dispositional hearing unless the court determines:

Conditional discharge or probation would not be appropriate;

Placement of the youth is consistent with the need for the protection of the community and the best
interests of the youth; and that

Placement is needed as no available alternatives to placement could adequately mitigate the need
for protection of the community.

The legislation further provided that the Court must order a disposition that specifically meets the needs
and best interest of the youth as well as the protection of the community.

The bill purposefully excluded juvenile delinquents who were charged as ―designated felons‖ (those
adjudicated having of committing acts which would constitute more serious or violent felonies if they were
committed by an adult). 87

S.6711-B (Montgomery)/A.10253-A (Scarborough) (2009)88

Redirect New York

This legislation would provide that counties and the City of New York could receive 65% prospective
reimbursement for spending on alternatives to detention and alternative to residential placement
programs; such reimbursement would be subject to appropriation. In order to receive funding, counties
and the City of New York would be required to submit an annual plan to OCFS detailing anticipated
programming and spending for community-based alternatives to residential placement and alternatives to
detention programs. If OCFS approves the plan, the county or the City of New York would receive funding
prospectively, within the amounts appropriated, to cover the costs of such alternative to detention and
alternatives to residential placement programs.

S.6877 (Parker)/A.3323-B (Clark) (2009); Veto memo 681 of 2010

Office of the Child Advocate

86
This legislation is active in the 2011 session - see S.66- Montgomery (2011).
87
The definition of “designated felony” is listed Family Court Act § 301.2(8).
88
Note: this bill is active in the 2011 session – see S.64 (Montgomery).

21
This legislation created the State Office of the Child Advocate under the Executive branch, charged with
the oversight of policies and practice relating to youth residing in state funded juvenile justice placements
overseen by OCFS.

The Child Advocate, whose appointment required Senate confirmation, was required to examine,
evaluate, and report to the Governor and the Legislature on issues facing children in the juvenile justice
system and their families; advocate for statutory, regulatory or policy changes aimed at improving
outcomes and services; and monitor the implementation of policies and regulations that may be
applicable to the legal rights of children in the juvenile justice system. Under the bill, the Child Advocate
could be removed from his or her office if he or she willfully failed to carry out the duties and
responsibilities of the Office.

Additionally, the bill eliminated the existing office of the Ombudsman under OCFS, which is the current
entity charged with juvenile justice oversight.

Governor Paterson vetoed the bill, citing both cost and technical reasons. The Senate considered
additional legislation on juvenile justice oversight (See S.6474C- Montgomery/ A.10155A- Aubry (2009) –
advanced to third calendar reading), which would have provided the Correctional Association, an entity
outside of the Executive branch, with oversight authority over the juvenile justice system. The Executive
also issued a program bill that included provisions for juvenile justice oversight that was not acted on by
either house (See: S.8091- Montgomery 2010).

22
Conclusion

It could not be clearer, New York‘s juvenile justice system is broken and in dire need of total reform. New
York‘s juvenile justice system fails youth, local communities, facility, staff, and state and local
governments. Comprehensive reforms are needed to truly address the inherent dysfunction within the
system. Several problems within the juvenile justice system are interconnected, focusing on one specific
crisis area within the system and avoiding the others is an insincere and ineffective approach to reform.
Indeed, addressing one area and not another will not improve the lot of the State‘s juvenile justice system.
If proper steps are taken to ensure appropriate, comprehensive change, reform to New York‘s juvenile
justice system will result in safe communities, greater protections and enhanced outcomes for youth, a
safe work place for staff and significant state and local savings.

23