The Modernization of the Chinese Navy:

Implications for Southeast Asia

Craig Jeffries
University of California, San Diego
Graduate School of International Relations
and Pacific Studies
June 2010
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

I. Introduction

Since the mid 1990s China has sought to modernize its navy so as to better

respond to the challenges affecting its national interests. After the Taiwan Strait Crisis in

1995-96, the importance of this mission was further pressed into the daily thinking of the

top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Having witnessed first-hand the

overwhelming naval force that the U.S. could deploy, during the crisis, officials in Beijing

began to rethink their current investment strategy of its navy. Consequently, China’s

People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) began a serious modernization effort.

Today, the result of this modernization effort is that China now possesses the

largest navy of any Asian country. In the past ten years, China has deployed ten new

classes of naval vessels, expanded their submarine force to include 8 nuclear submarines,

and has built a naval base on the southern island of Hainan that can house it submarines

and allows direct access to the South China Sea (SCS).1 These developments have come

as the result of the PLAN’s new focus on ‚far-sea defense‛, which places less emphasis on

Taiwan and more toward external power projection. One of the areas where China’s naval

modernization is to play an important role in the future is Southeast Asia, specifically

within the SCS and around the Strait of Malacca. Consequently, this paper will focus on

1
“Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2009, p. 22 &
p. 49
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

the implications of China’s naval modernization and new ‚far-sea defense‛ strategy for

states in Southeast Asia, with a particular emphasis on the Philippines, Singapore and Viet

Nam.

This paper first examines the evolution of the PLAN’s structure, roles and

capabilities. The second section discusses in detail the driving factors behind Beijing’s

naval modernization in Southeast Asia. The third section focuses on how particular states

in Southeast Asia have reacted to China’s naval expansion. In particular, the Philippines

and Viet Nam have concerns over China’s intentions in the SCS maritime dispute over the

Spratly and Paracel island-chains; while Singapore is concerned that China’s naval

modernization will upset the regional balance of power vis-à-vis the U.S. navy. This paper

concludes by attempting to undress Beijing’s intentions in the Southeast Asian maritime

sphere, and the meaning of its policy of ‚far-sea defense‛. The question of whether PLAN

modernization poses a legitimate threat to regional states will also be raised.

II. Evolution of the PLAN: Overview of the Structure, Roles and Capabilities of China’s Navy

With its origins dating back to the beginning of the People’s Republic of China

(PRC), the Chinese navy was established in 1950 after Mao Zedong declared that the
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

country needed to build a powerful navy in order to keep out imperial aggressors.2 In the

mid-1950s China built up its naval capabilities by adding vessels purchased from

Moscow. During this time the navy was split into three organizational divisions based on

geographic location: a North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet and South Sea Fleet. In the late-

1950s China began producing primitive indigenous naval vessels with the help of its newly

established commercial shipbuilding industry.3

The PLAN was mostly spared from the devastating effects of the Great Leap

Forward and the Cultural Revolution, as the PLA ground forces had the responsibility of

enforcing Mao’s edicts during these campaigns. However, naval modernization was

severely disrupted with the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, with Moscow withdrawing all of its

financial and technical support. Consequently, Beijing had to develop its naval forces on

its own and began to establish numerous national naval research centers to facilitate its

domestic naval innovation and production capacity. The result was the development of

first generation vessels, including the first nuclear-powered submarine—produced mostly

as a result of reversed engineering Soviet versions.4

2
“People’s Liberation Navy – History”, Global Security, accessed at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-history.htm
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

The 1970s began the ‚golden era‛ of naval modernization, when the PLAN’s budget

represented about 20 percent of overall annual military spending. During this decade

China dramatically expanded its arsenal by building up its submarine force and adding

several new types of surface vessels. In the 1980s, naval modernization dropped off

somewhat due to across-the-board cuts in the PLA budget due to Deng Xiaoping’s new

emphasis on economic development. Yet, during this decade and continuing into the

1990s, the PLAN reformed its officer training techniques seeking to ‚professionalize‛ the

service.5

Historically, the PLAN’s roles have been to protect the coastline of the Chinese

mainland and immediate littoral sphere. And the fact that China’s navy was a ‚brown-

water‛ navy limited its roles to primarily coastal defense. As Deng Xiaoping took over

leadership he shifted the nation’s resources away from the military and to the economic

sector further weakening the navy’s ability to project it force further afield. Throughout the

1980s and the 1990s the limited resources that were going to the navy were for

investment in capabilities that would assist in the reclamation of Taiwan. For example, in

the 1990s CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin turned down a request from Admiral Liu

Huaqing’s to build an aircraft carrier because Jiang saw little value of such an asset in a

5
Ibid.
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

confrontation with Taiwan, particularity considering the enormous cost developing such a

vessel would entail.6 As many naval analysts have pointed out, China’s military and

political leaders remained obsessed with Taiwan.

While Taiwan is still an important feature in the PLAN’s overall strategy today, it is

no longer the sole focus—or even the most salient driver—of Beijing’s current naval

modernization efforts. As Nan Li points out when discussing China’s ‚new historic

missions‛, externalization is the PLA’s new focus with the PLAN being the primary military

branch to execute this strategy.7 This new external strategy referred to as ‚far-sea defense‛

has particularly focused its efforts south toward the SCS and other areas of Southeast

Asia. Li also notes that this strategic shift has become acutely noticeable under the

leadership of Hu Jintao, as Hu has been consumed by thinking of a way to secure China’s

energy supplies passing through maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca.8

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in its annual report to Congress on China’s

military power suggests that the China’s navy now has three core missions, which are: 1)

resist seaborne aggression; 2) protect national sovereignty; and 3) safeguard maritime

rights.9 With this new focus on external and far-reaching goals, China will need to pour

6
Li, Nan, “Scanning the Horizon for ‘New Historical Missions’”, Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, April 2010, p. 21
7
Ibid., p. 19
8
Ibid, p. 21
9
“Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2009, p. 11
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

greater investments into its navy with increases in training and equipment; yet, some

Chinese publicly worry that such an expansion in its naval capabilities will alarm regional

states resulting in an naval arms race and a possible confrontation.10 This concerned

seems to be merited as Robert Kaplan believes that in the twenty-first China will project its

hard power through its navy.11 Similarly, Richard Bitzinger feels that China’s naval

modernization allows Beijing to grow its hard power capabilities so as to complement its

already strong soft power—economic and diplomatic.12 The most recent Chinese defense

white paper seems to correspond with these views as it stresses the need for ‚the navy to

gradually develop its capabilities of conducting cooperation in distant waters and

countering non-traditional security threats‛.13 As we will see in the next section, most of the

new missions assigned to the PLAN will take place in the SCS; consequently the South

Sea Fleet has received the most attention in recent years, as evidenced by Beijing shifting

its largest destroyers to the fleet’s headquarters in Zhanjiang, Guangdong province, as

well as developing an underground submarine base on Hainan island.14

To meet the challenges proposed under the new ‚far-sea defense‛ strategy the

PLAN has produced and purchased modern naval equipment with the goal of

10
Ibid, p. 22 & p. 18
11
Kaplan, Robert, “The Geography of Chinese Power”, Foreign Affairs, May-June 2010, pp. 19-27
12
Bitzinger, Richard, “China: Expansion of Military Power in the Asia-Pacific”, A presentation to the Singapore Ministry of Defence, March 9,
2010
13
“China’s National Defence in 2008”, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China”, January 2009, p. 31
14
“China: Beijing Strengthens its Claims in the SCS”, Stratfor, May 12, 2009
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

transforming its current ‚brown-water‛ navy into the much sought after ‚blue-water‛

variant. Recent estimates by the U.S. DoD state that the PLAN maintains about 260 vessels

including 75 principal combatants, around 60 submarines—four of which are nuclear-

powered and can carry long-range ballistic missiles—and 55 medium to large

amphibious ships.15

Defense analysts primarily point to the expansion of China’s submarine fleet—the

world’s second largest—as being the most worrying trend for both the U.S. naval fleet and

regional navies.16 Robert Kaplan suggests that current Chinese naval modernization does

not mean buying ships across the board but rather focusing on select areas to excel in,

such as submarines. Thus, Beijing favors quality over quality for its submarine fleet buying

conventional diesel and electric-powered submarines from Russia while building new and

sophisticated classes of nuclear-attack and ballistic-capable submarines domestically

with the help of the robust Chinese commercial shipbuilding industry.17 Focusing on

developing its submarine fleet makes sense because these are the only vessels in the

PLAN fleet to have nuclear attack capability and are agile and stealthy enough to pose a

credible threat to enemy vessels. China’s current submarine force includes two nuclear-

15
“Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2009, p. 48
16
Trevethan, Sidney, ‚The PLAN Submarine Force‛, Federation of American Scientists, May 2004
17
Kaplan, Robert, “The Geography of Chinese Power”, Foreign Affairs, May-June 2010, p. 26
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

powered attack submarines (Shang-093) and two nuclear-powered ballistic missile

submarines (Jin-094) along with 53 diesel or electric-powered submarines.18

The PLAN is also investing in upgrading its sea-detection technology, which

includes over-the-horizon backscatter radars, over-the-horizon surface wave radars,

electro-optical satellites and seabed sonar networks.19 These sea-detection systems are

meant to increase the PLAN’s ability to identify intrusions into its sphere of influence by

foreign navies and will prove to be quite useful to China while it seeks to protect its

interests within the first-island chain.

III. Strategic Goals of Chinese Naval Modernization in Southeast Asia

PLAN’s current modernization has not come as a result from the desire to

overwhelm Taiwan; rather, Beijing has modernized its navy to achieve other goals, such

as protecting vital sea lanes of communication (SLC), leveraging its naval capabilities to

secure its maritime rights and interests in the SCS, to improve China’s international image

by using the navy in global operations and humanitarian missions, and finally to establish

a new sphere of influence to counter current U.S. naval superiority in the region.

a) Securing Sea-lanes vital to China’s Economic Growth

18
O’Rourke, Ronald, “China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities”, Congressional Research Service, December 23, 2009
19
Ibid.
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

History illustrates that rising economic powers possess strong navies with

examples being the Portuguese, Spanish and British empires, the Dutch global

commercial empire and current American hegemony; all were global sea powers

possessing ‚blue-water‛ navies. China, seeing itself as a rising global power and perhaps

a current regional power feels that it must have a navy that is commensurate to its

economic power. China’s rapid economic expansion, primarily export-driven, necessarily

requires a strong navy in order to protect the vital SLCs where most of its commodities

pass through. Additionally, to sustain its economic growth, China has relied on imports of

raw materials and natural resources, which are primarily transported by sea.20 With China

being the world’s second largest importer of oil with 78 percent of these imports coming

from the Middle East and Africa, China must ensure that these resources receive safe

passage through the pirate-infested waters in the Straits of Malacca and Lombok.21

Currently, China must rely on the U.S. navy to protect these sea lanes and the commercial

ships that pass through them. Consequently, Beijing is desperately trying to strengthen its

naval capabilities in order to break this reliance.

20
Pehrson, Christopher J., “String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral”, Strategic Studies Institute,
July 2006, p. 5
21
“Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2009, p. 3
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

One attempt to mitigate the risks associated to these SLCs is the so-called ‚string

of pearls‛ strategy that Beijing may or may not be implicitly pursuing. According to

Christopher Pehrson of the Strategic Studies Institute, the ‚string of pearls‛ strategy is the

aggregation of China’s efforts to increase its geopolitical influence by increasing its

access to ports and airfields abroad, developing diplomatic relations and modernizing its

military that extends from the SCS through the Strait of Malacca and onto the Arabian

Gulf.22

b) Leveraging PLAN’s capabilities in the SCS Territorial Dispute

CCP Secretary Hu Jintao has stressed the need for China to develop a ‚powerful

people’s navy‛ to uphold China’s maritime rights and interests.23 Within the SCS, Beijing

claims two island chains, the Spratlys and the Paracels—both are within waters

potentially rich in natural gas and oil deposits, and are prime fishing grounds.

Consequently, many nations have competing territorial claims with Beijing in these

waters. Currently Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Viet Nam all claim portions

of the Spratly island-chain, while Viet Nam disputes the ownerships of the Paracels with

China. As China sees these island-chains as archipelagic extensions of the Chinese

22
Pehrson, Christopher J., “String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral”, Strategic Studies Institute,
July 2006, p. 1
23
“Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2009, p. 17
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

landmass, Chinese naval officials have produced aggressive strategies to assert Beijing’s

control of the contested areas via the deployment of its navy—a force that is

overwhelming superior relative to other claimants.24

Even as China has publicly stated that it would prefer to solve the SCS territorial

dispute diplomatically it is building up its naval capabilities to ensure that it has the upper

hand in these negotiations. Thus, we see the PLAN being used as a political tool in China’s

coercive diplomacy in the SCS. In the past, China employed its navy in aggressive moves

to displace Vietnamese forces from the disputed island-chains. The first incident was in

1974 when the Chinese defeated the Vietnamese to take control over the entire Paracel

island-chain, with a second episode occurring in 1988 when the Chinese navy

overwhelmed a united Vietnamese force, displacing it from a cluster of islands in the

Spratly-chain.25 Additionally, Chinese naval forces took control of Mischief Island in the

Spratly-chain after a battle with the Philippine navy, and have in recent years built up the

island to serve its naval expansion.26 More recently, China established the Sansha city

administration on Hainan in 2007 to regulate all activities on the Paracel and Spratly

island-chains. While in 2009, China dispatched its navy to enforce a unilateral fishing ban

24
Kaplan, Robert, “The Geography of Chinese Power”, Foreign Affairs, May-June 2010, p. 24
25
Percival, Bronson, “The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in the New Century, p. 84
26
Ibid, p. 84
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

it imposed in the SCS. The ban took effect from May 16-August 1 during the height of the

Vietnamese fishing season resulting in numerous incidents—some fatal—with

Vietnamese fishermen.27

While the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC) agreement signed

by all SCS claimants in 2002 diffused much of the tension by calling for claimants to

restrain themselves from taking unilateral actions such as military build-ups on disputed

islands or any new construction, China’s current naval modernization alarms many in the

region, and will no doubt allow China to gain the upper hand in any final negotiations

focusing on final status issues to maritime dispute.28 For example, China’s Sanya naval

base on Hainan Island, equipped with an underground submarine facility—a secret until

2009—has caused alarm in places like Hanoi, Manila and Singapore. This new installation

gives China instant access to the SCS, allowing it to deploy its submarines and surface

vessels to the disputed island-chains within a short time-frame. Additionally, China has

built an air base on Woody Island in its occupied Paracel island-chain, allowing its Su-30

MKK fighters to refuel and resume missions in the SCS.29

27
Thayer, Carlyle A., “Recent Developments in the SCS: Implications for Peace, Stability and Cooperation in the Region”, paper presented to the
International Workshop on ‘The SCS: Cooperation for Regional Security and Development’ co-organized by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
and the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association, Hanoi, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, November 26-28, 2009
28
McIndoe, Alastair, “Tensions Growing in SCS; Philippines, Malaysia, China Act to Stake Claim on Disputed Islands”, The Straits Times, March
18, 2009
29
Bitzinger, Richard, “China: Expansion of Military Power in the Asia-Pacific”, A presentation to the Singapore Ministry of Defence, March 9,
2010
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

c) Improving China’s International Image using PLAN in Global Operations and

Humanitarian Missions

Another example of using the PLAN to achieve political gains is Beijing’s

deployment in December 2008 of two PLAN destroyers to Gulf of Aden, off the East African

Coast to defend its commercial vessels from attack from pirates.30 Not only does soft-

power projection demonstrates Beijing’s commitment to participating in global

cooperation but it also signals to regional navies that China’s navy now has the capability

to deploy further afield. China’s strategy appears to have worked when in April 2009 the

Chinese naval group came to the rescue of the Philippine chemical tanker M/T Stolt

Strength who had 23 Filipino sailors aboard.31 Five other vessels flying the Philippines’ flag

were also escorted out of the Gulf of Aden. As a result, the PLAN task force made a port-

call to Manila in April 2010 at the invitation of the Philippine Navy.32 Beijing has hailed its

African excursion as a success demonstrating China’s commitment to being a

responsible international player seeking to maintain peace and security.

In addition to deploying its navy on anti-piracy missions, Beijing has also publicly

declared its desire to use its navy for humanitarian purposes. Having seen the

effectiveness of the American, Indian and Japanese navies’ response to the 2004

30
O’Rourke, Ronald, “China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities”, Congressional Research Service, December 23, 2009
31
“China’s Escort Mission in the Gulf of Aden to Make Five-Day Port Call in Manila”, BBC News, April 11, 2010
32
Ibid.
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

Southeast Asian Tsunami, China’s perception of the using the navy in such a capacity has

changed. As a result, naval planners have revived Liu Huaqing’s dream of developing an

indigenous aircraft carrier, as a carrier could serve multiple purposes for China within

Southeast Asia. For example, not only would a carrier be the focal point for providing relief

support during a humanitarian incident but it would also provide air-cover for Chinese

submarines and surface vessels deployed around the SCS disputed island-chains, and

allow China to project its naval power in the Strait of Malacca to protect Chinese

commercial vessels, not to mention serving as a great boost to China’s prestige as a

world power.33

d) Establishing a New Sphere of Influence to Counter Current U.S. Naval

Superiority in the Region

Latent within PLAN’s current modernization is the desire for Beijing to develop its

naval capabilities to a level in which it can limit the effectiveness of the U.S. navy within

the first-island chain that runs from Japan down to the Philippines and throughout the

SCS. Not only is such a desire influenced by the issue of Taiwan, but also by Beijing’s

preference to free up the waters to its south. As such, specific efforts have been taken by

the PLAN to develop its capabilities to set up a ‚sea control zone‛ within the first-island

33
O’Rourke, Ronald, “China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities”, Congressional Research Service, December 23,
2009
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

chain, and a ‚sea contest zone‛ out to the second island chain.34 Actions taken within the

‚sea contest zone‛ would include the PLAN deploying its submarines throughout the first-

island chain with backup from surface vessels and land-based anti-ship missiles.35

Chinese officials made their preference of reducing U.S. naval involvement in the SCS

clear when it told two visiting Obama administration officials that it would not tolerate any

American interference in the SCS, stressing that the SCS was now part of China’s ‚core

interest‛ of sovereignty issues similar to the issues of Taiwan and Tibet.36 Beijing’s warning

was most likely taken quite seriously by the Americans given the USS Impeccable’s

harassment by Chinese naval and civilian vessels the prior year while it was conducting a

submarine detection exercise in the SCS.37

Determining how Beijing will use its navy in the future will be difficult for both the

U.S. and other regional states. However, Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes attempt to

predict the deployment strategies of Chinese submarines. They argued that China could

opt to follow the U.S. model of open-ocean patrol strategy, where its submarines would

patrol as far out as the Indian and Eastern Pacific on a regular basis. Alternatively, Beijing

could adopt the Soviet model, which stresses a bastion strategy, where Chinese

34
Ding, Arthur, “China’s Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles”, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore, January 8, 2008
35
Yoshihar, Toshi and James R. Holmes, “China’s New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent” Joint-Forces Quarterly, 3rd Quarter 2008, p. 36
36
Wong, Edward, “Chinese Military Seeks to Extend its Naval Power”, New York Times, April 23, 2010
37
Doronila, Amando, “SCS Standoff:, Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 18, 2009
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

submarines would deploy within the first-island chain in reach of its naval bases.38

Obviously, the bastion strategy would impact Southeast Asia the greatest, as most of the

Chinese south sea fleet would remain in the SCS. Based on its current capabilities it

seems that this is the strategy that Beijing currently favors.

Given the strategic rationale provided above for PLAN modernization and its new

roles in the SCS the challenge for Beijing remains how to sooth regional fears of a

powerful and ambitious Chinese navy. To those perceptions we now turn.

IV. Strategic Implications of Chinese Naval Modernization for Southeast Asian States

As a result of China’s naval modernization some states in Southeast Asia have

been seeking to boost their sea-defense capabilities. The Philippines, Singapore and Viet

Nam have all undertaken efforts to acquire more advanced naval vessels and

technologies to counter the PLAN’s current dominance in the waters of Southeast Asia.

However, the three states’ efforts at modernizing their fleets vary quite markedly in degree.

One explanation for this variation may be that two of the three states enjoy formal defense

agreements with the U.S. (the Philippines and Singapore) while one does not (Viet Nam).

38
Yoshihar, Toshi and James R. Holmes, “China’s New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent” Joint-Forces Quarterly, 3rd Quarter 2008, p.
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

Also of note is Singapore’s vastly superior ship-building industry relative to the other two

states, as well as its easier access to financial resources.

Philippines

While Manila has shown some signs of trying to boast its naval capabilities to

respond to the challenge it faces from China in the SCS dispute, the consensus is that the

Philippine navy is vastly inferior to its Chinese counterpart. Former naval vice-commander

Amable Tolentino publicly indentified his country’s navy as being inferior to other SCS

claimant’s navies and not capable to defend Manila’s maritime rights if forced to do so,

noting that the flagship of the Philippine navy is a World War II-era escort destroyer.39

The Philippine navy consists of only one fleet and possesses the capability to

defend its immediate coastal waters. The majority of the fleet consists of World War II-era

surface vessels of small-to-medium size, which lack missile firing capabilities and anti-

submarine weapons (ASW). Additionally, the fleet does not include any submarines.40 Yet,

Manila has committed itself to the modernization of its navy aiming for a more ‚credible‛

force by 2017; however, recent signs of procurement failures and accusations of

39
Gale, Bruce, “China’s Move Impacts on Manila Politics”, The Straits Times, March 25, 2009
40
“Philippine Navy, Global Security accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/phillipines/navy.htm
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

corruption have led some to doubt the government’s ability to achieve this goal.41

Recently, Manila has suggested that it is the process of purchasing two multi-role

naval vessels from either Singapore or South Korea.42 When this acquisition will be

finalized or what is meant by a ‚multi-role‛ vessel is unclear. What is clear is that if such a

purchase went through along with several more ambitious acquisitions, the Philippine

navy would still largely be outgunned by the Chinese navy, as the former’s fleet at the

moment includes only one frigate, 14 corvettes, 47 patrol gunboats and 58 amphibious

naval craft—a force that clearly lacks the ability to deploy far from the coast.43

Within the Spratly island-chain, Manila claims nine islands in what it calls the

‚Kalayaan group‛, as well as in the Scarborough Shoal, which is close to a busy shipping

lane.44 In 1995, China and the Philippines participated in a loud diplomatic spat over

China’s construction on islands in the Mischief Reef. This incident led to a severe strain in

relations between Beijing and Manila, with the latter losing faith in the former’s

commitment to solve the dispute in an amicable and fair way. In February 2009, the

Philippine congress passed the ‚Archipelagic Baselines Act‛. Signed into law by President

41
Ibid.
42
“DND Rushing Acquisition of Naval Vessels”, The Philippine Star, May 16, 2010
43
“Philippine Navy Equipment”, Global Security, accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/phillipines/navy-equipment.htm
44
McIndoe, Alastair, “Tensions Growing in SCS; Philippines, Malaysia, China act to Stake Claim on Disputed Islands”, The Straits Times, March
18, 2009
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo the law affirms Manila’s territorial claims in the Spratlys.45

Beijing’s response to this action was to send a naval vessel to the disputed area in a show

of force that Filipino politicians described as ‚gunboat diplomacy‛.46

Singapore

Unlike the Philippines, Singapore maintains a modest navy capable of

posing as a moderate deterrent to Chinese aggression. The Singaporean navy is

comprised of six French and indigenously-built frigates, six missile corvettes capable of

defending against submarine attack, 12 patrol vessels equipped with ASW, four Swedish-

designed mine countermeasure vessels and four landing ship tanks. In addition to these

surface vessels, Singapore possesses six submarines all bought from Sweden.47 The

Singaporean navy is deployed primarily in an escort capacity to protect commercial

vessels passing through the pirate-infested Strait of Malacca.

Singapore wants to ensure that its commerce continues to flow uninterrupted

through the port of Singapore—arguably the world’s busiest port. Former Singaporean

leader Lee Kuan Yew voiced his concern saying that China’s naval modernization causes

45
Bitzinger, Richard, “China: Expansion of Military Power in the Asia-Pacific”, A presentation to the Singapore Ministry of Defence, March 9,
2010
46
Gale, Bruce, “China’s Move Impacts on Manila Politics”, The Straits Times, March 25, 2009
47
Republic of Singapore, Ministry of Defence, “Assets”, accessed at
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings/navy/assets.html
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

concern within the region and particularly in Singapore, and pleaded to the U.S. to retain

its regional naval presence, suggesting that the ''U.S. core interest requires that it remains

the superior power on the Pacific,'' and ''to give up this position would diminish America's

role throughout the world.''48 The desire of Singapore to maintain the regional balance of

power was also demonstrated by the series of joint naval exercises it has conducted with

regional navies in the past couple of years. For instance, in 2009 Singapore and India

brought corvettes, destroyers, frigates and submarines from both navies to the SCS in a

continuation of their annual bilateral naval exercise.49 Singapore and the U.S. in their

fifteenth joint exercise under the Singapore-U.S. Cooperation Afloat Readiness and

Training (CARAT) for the first time jointly deployed their own submarine forces in a

submarine tracking exercise in the SCS.50 Finally, in September 2009, Singapore and

Australia conducted a joint-naval exercise named ‚Singaroo‛ in the SCS where the two

navies focused on maritime surveillance, air defense and anti-submarine warfare.51 In

addition to the working with the navies listed above, Singapore has also sought

cooperation with China, specifically in the area of anti-piracy where both states stand to

48
Wong, Edward, “Chinese Military Seeks to Extend its Naval Power”, New York Times, April 23, 2010
49
“Singapore, India Conduct Naval Exercise”, Republic of Singapore, Ministry of Defence, April 2, 2009, accessed at
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2009/apr/02apr09_nr.html
50
Singapore, US Deploy Submarines in War Games”, Bernama Malaysian News Agency, June 8, 2009
51
‚Singapore, Australia Navies Conduct Joint Maritime Exercise‛, Xinhua News Service, September 19, 2009
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

mutually-gain from increased coordination. In a conference with the U.S. and the UK,

China and Singapore agreed that the most effective way to deter piracy was for its navies

to jointly work together by sharing intelligence.52 Yet, these words have yet to be translated

into any real cooperation between the two navies.

Viet Nam

PLAN modernization is viewed as the greatest external threat to Viet Nam. Lacking

the capabilities of the Singaporean navy and the security arrangements that both

Singapore and the Philippines have with the U.S., Viet Nam’s ability to defend its interests

in the SCS are severely threatened by an increasingly modern and confident Chinese

navy. As the Vietnamese military is primarily a land-based force, the task of upgrading its

naval capabilities in a quick and effective way present a huge hurdle to Hanoi. Yet, during

the last two years, Viet Nam has aggressively sought to build its naval forces to a level that

it feels can act as a modest deterrent to China in the SCS. Specific efforts have been the

purchase of six diesel-electric submarines from Russia worth around $2 billion.53 In

addition, Hanoi has ordered frigates, missile boats and 12 SU-30MK2 multi-role flanker

52
Chow, Jermyn, “Sharing of Data will Help Combat Piracy; Navies Urged to Build Trust and Be Proactive in Sharing Information”, The Straits
Times, May 14, 2009
53
Wong, Edward, “Vietnam Enlists Allies to Stave Off China’s Reach”, New York Times, February 5, 2010
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

fighter jets from Moscow, as well as asking for Russian assistance in building a submarine

base, a request that was accepted by Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Seryukov. 54

Viet Nam’s recent spending spree also includes orders for three DHC-6 series 400

amphibious aircraft from Canada capable of patrolling the SCS, as well as new short-

range ballistic missile systems from Israel that will significantly increase Viet Nam’s ability

to hit moving enemy ships in the SCS.55 Yet, military expert and Viet Nam scholar Carlyle

Thayer questions the ability of the inexperienced Vietnamese navy to use these new

weapons effectively, suggesting that not only does Hanoi have to ensure that its provides

the requisite financial resources to ensure that these assets are combat ready but it also

must make certain that the currently untested naval personnel receive adequate training

to use these modern technologies.56

Viet Nam and China have long been at odds over sovereignty issues in the SCS

with China defeating the Vietnamese in 1974 taking control over the entire Paracel island-

chain. In 1988 the two countries fought again over Johnson Reef in the Spratly island-

chain with 60 causalities on both sides. More recently, China has been dispatching bigger

and more modern naval vessels to the SCS to assert control over the islands. These acts

54
“Vietnam Asks Russia to Help Build Submarine Base”, Associated Press, March 25, 2010, accessed at
http://beta.thehindu.com/news/international/article304542.ece?css=print
55
Karniol, Robert, “Vietnam Bolstering Spratlys Firepower”, The Straits Times, May 10, 2010
56
Thayer, Carlyle, “Background Briefing: Vietnam’s Submarine Force”, December 29, 2009
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

of coercive diplomacy have been the stick that accompany Beijing’s carrot of offering

joint-exploration rights to Viet Nam—an offer that Hanoi has resisted, suggesting that any

deal on the SCS must include all the disputants, thus reducing China’s bargaining

leverage.

Despite the rapid buildup of Vietnamese naval capabilities through its recent arms

purchases, the 2009 Viet Nam defense white paper points out Hanoi’s desire to settle the

SCS dispute with China in a peaceful and diplomatic way on the basis of international

law.57 China’s diplomats have stated the same desire in public but have been

concurrently beefing up its naval capabilities to ensure it maintains the upper hand in the

SCS vis-à-vis other claimants. Vietnamese officials feel they have the right to do the same

and have been expanding their naval capabilities not only with recent purchases but also

by establishing a marine militia unit dedicated to protecting Viet Nam’s sovereignty and

entering into a formal defense cooperation agreement with Singapore.58

V. Conclusion

China’s current naval modernization is no longer singularly-driven by the desire to

retake the island of Taiwan—a goal that consumed Chinese naval thinkers for nearly fifty

57
von Kospoth, Nicolas, “Vietnam Releases White Paper on Defence”, December 10, 2009, accessed at
http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/466/
58
Ibid.
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

years. Rather, the PLAN’s recent modernization is meant to complement Beijing’s new

naval strategy of ‚far-sea defense‛ focusing on the externalization of its naval forces. This

strategy, pushed by the top Chinese leadership, places less emphasis on preparing the

navy to retake Taiwan and more emphasis—and more investment—toward protecting

Chinese interests further from the mainland, such as protecting China’s SLCs, needed to

be safeguarded for the sake of China’s economic survive. Externalization also sees the

PLAN employed to the SCS in an attempt to leverage Beijing’s coercive diplomacy so as

to secure its maritime rights and interests in the disputed Paracel and Spratly island-

chains. Along with using the navy to project hard power, Beijing also recognizes the utility

of the navy to improve China’s international image during global operations and

humanitarian missions. It must also be recognized that China’s current naval

modernization is being undertaken with the ultimate goal of breaking U.S. naval

dominance in the Western Pacific generally, and within Southeast Asia specifically.

Knowing the drivers of China’s naval modernization however, is not enough to

gauge its wider intentions for use in Southeast Asia. Whether this modernization presents

a legitimate threat to regional states is still up for debate. Analysts like Robert Kaplan

suggest that the buildup of the China’s navy may not be for actual use but more likely for a
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

show of force to deter other states from acting against Chinese interests.59 Yet, it is clear

that the navies in the region are growing concerned and have adjusted their own

capabilities in response, as evidenced by the three Southeast Asian states covered in this

paper. Additionally, whether these responses constitute a naval arms race is also

debatable. But some Chinese naval officials are concerned about recent improvements to

Southeast Asian navies with Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo suggesting that some are ‚seeking to

dominate the southern seas‛, and thus pose a threat to China. He singled out Viet Nam

because of the latter’s purchase of Russian submarines.60 Yet, others within the Chinese

defense establishment have sought to play down China’s naval modernization and the

implications for Southeast Asia. Senior Colonel Chen Zhou, a researcher at the PLA

Academy of Military Services, and a contributor to China’s defense white paper has said

that the Chinese navy will never be a threat to the region because its only purpose is to

maintain Chinese maritime rights and regional sovereignty, and does not wish to emulate

the U.S. navy, whose power projection is global.61

While, this statement may carry some level of truth, the fact that China is

specifically developing its naval capabilities to project power further out to sea in order to

59
Kaplan, Robert, “The Geography of Chinese Power”, Foreign Affairs, May-June 2010, p. 26
60
“China Concerned by ASEAN Subs-Admiral”, RIA Novosti, February 27, 2010
61
“China Exclusive: Chinese Navy Build-Up No Threat to ASEAN Countries: Experts”, Xinhua News Service, March 31, 2010
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

ensure that its national interests are secure presents real challenges for countries like the

Philippines, Singapore and Viet Nam. Singapore, whose economy depends on the

smooth passage of vessels within the Strait of Malacca and the SCS, desires a peaceful

environment, ultimately desiring the continuation of U.S. naval hegemony in the region.

The Philippines and Viet Nam have been quite alarmed by China’s naval modernization

because it directly decreases their own bargaining leverage relative to China, as their

substandard navies leave them vulnerable. While Manila seems to be relying on the

assistance of the U.S. navy to police the SCS, Hanoi—lacking the U.S. defense agreement

the Philippine navy enjoys—has taken serious efforts to boast its naval capabilities by

buying vessels from abroad. Whether these investments will be needed is ultimately up to

how Beijing will utilize its more robust navy in the future within the waters of Southeast

Asia.
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

Sources of Reference

‚Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009‛, Office
of the Secretary of Defense, March 2009, pp. 1-66

Bitzinger, Richard, ‚China: Expansion of Military Power in the Asia-Pacific‛, A presentation

to the Singapore Ministry of Defence, March 9, 2010

‚China: Beijing Strengthens its Claims in the South China Sea‛, Stratfor, May 12, 2009

‚China Concerned by ASEAN Subs-Admiral‛, RIA Novosti, February 27, 2010

‚China’s Escort Mission in Gulf of Aden to Make Five-Day Port Call to Manila‛, BBC News,
April 11, 2010

‚China Exclusive: Chinese Navy Build-Up No Threat to ASEAN Countries: Experts‛, Xinhua
News Service, March 31, 2010

‚China’s National Defence in 2008‛, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s
Republic of China, January 2009, pp. 1-104

Chow, Jermyn, ‚Sharing of Data will Help Combat Piracy; Navies Urged to Built Trust and
be Proactive in Sharing Information‛, The Straits Times, May 14, 2009

Ding, Arthur, ‚China’s Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles‛, S. Rajaratnam School
of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, January 8,
2008

‚DND Rushing Acquisition of Naval Vessels‛, The Philippine Star, May 16, 2010

Doronila, Amando, ‚South China Standoff‛, Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 18, 2009

Gale, Bruce, ‚China’s Move Impacts on Manila Politics‛, The Straits Times, March 25, 2009

Kaplan, Robert, ‚The Geography of Chinese Power‛, Foreign Affairs, May-June 2010, pp.
19-27

Karniol, Robert, ‚Vietnam Bolstering Spratlys Firepower‛, The Straits Times, May 10, 2010
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

Li, Nan, ‚Scanning the Horizon for ‘New Historic Missions’‛, Proceedings, U.S. Naval
Institute, April 2010, pp. 18-23

McIndoe, Alastair, ‚Tensions Growing in South China Sea; Philippines, Malaysia, China Act
to Stake Claim on Disputed Islands‛, The Straits Times, March 18, 2009

O’Rourke, Ronald, ‚China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities‛,
Congressional Research Service, December 23, 2009

Pehrson, Christopher J., ‚String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenges of China’s Rising Power
Across the Asian Littoral‛ Strategic Studies Institute, July 2006, pp. 1-30

Percival, Bronson, ‚The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in the New
Century‛, Praeger Security International, Westport, CT, 2007, pp. 83-85

‚People’s Liberation Navy – History‛, Global Security, accessed at

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-history.htm

‚Philippine Navy‛, Global Security, accessed at

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/phillipines/navy.htm

‚Philippine Navy Equipment‛, Global Security, accessed at

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/phillipines/navy-equipment.htm

Republic of Singapore, Ministry of Defence, ‚Assets‛, accessed at

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings/navy/assets.html

‚Singapore, Australia Navies Conduct Joint Maritime Exercise‛, Xinhua News Service,
September 18, 2009

‚Singapore, India Conduct Naval Exercise‛, Republic of Singapore Ministry of Defence,

April 2, 2009, accessed at
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2009/apr/02apr09_nr.html

‚Singapore, US Deploy Submarines in War Games‛, Bernama, The Malaysian News

Agency, June 8, 2009

Thayer, Carlyle A., ‚Background Briefing: Vietnam’s Submarine Force‛, December 29, 2009
Craig Jeffries IRGN 490A: Rise of China
A50038324 June 2010

‘’ ‘’ , ‚Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Implications for Peace,

Stability and Cooperation in the Region‛, paper presented to the International
Workshop on ‘The South China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Security and
Development’ co-organized by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and the
Vietnam Lawyers’ Association, Hanoi, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, November 26-
28, 2009

Trevethan, Sid, ‚The PLAN Submarine Force, Federation of American Scientists, May 2004,
accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/row/plan/subs.pdf

‚Vietnam Asks Russia to Help Build Submarine Base‛, Associated Press, March 25, 2010,
accessed at
http://beta.thehindu.com/news/international/article304542.ece?css=print

von Kospoth, Nicolas, ‚Vietnam Releases White Paper on Defence‛, December 10, 2009,
accessed at http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/466/

Wong, Edward, ‚Chinese Military Seeks to Extend its Naval Power‛, New York Times, April
23, 2010

‘’ ‘’ , ‚Vietnam Enlists Allies to Stave off China’s Reach‛, New York Times,
February 5, 2010

Yoshihara, Toshi and James R. Holmes, ‚China’s New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent‛, Joint-
Forces Quarterly, 3 Quarter 2008, pp. 31-38
rd