International Politics and Security: Case #2

The World’s Bully:

A Nuclear North Korea

Craig Jeffries
A50038324
IRCO 410
2/14/09
Introduction

This case is a good example of an information problem, where both sides are not sure

about each other’s intentions or incentives to misrepresent those intentions. However, this case

also shows some signs of being a commitment problem. For example, nuclear weapons

acquisition is in itself an object that affects military strength; therefore it is hard for each side to

accept each other’s commitments as credible for fear of losing relative power in future

bargaining arrangementsi.

Actors and their Preferences

The preferences of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush (and as I will argue, Barrack

Obama) appear to be consistent; they are in rank order: 1) a nuclear-free Korean peninsula; 2)

avoiding war in East Asia; and 3) appeasing domestic actors who have a stake in the North

Korean crisis. Conversely, Kim Jong-Il’s preferences are: 1) to remain in power and retain

control over his most salient constituency, the military— by developing his economy through

foreign aid and access to international loans; and 2) avoid war with the United States.

North Korea’s Desire to Obtain Nuclear Weapons and its Behavior Since 1993

North Korea has stated that its nuclear weapons are for defensive purposes, needed in

response to the U.S.-South Korea security pact. However, scholars point to an alternative

justification; this being that North Korea seeks nuclear weapons to use them as a bargaining

chip in order to receive benefits via negotiationsii. I find this a compelling assumption due to the

fact that it is Kim Jong-Il’s best strategy for gaining the financial benefits needed to pay off his

military constituency, and consequently stay in power. Using Sagan’s “domestic model”

approach, I would argue that the acquisition of such weapons is central to Kim Jong-Il’s ability
to placate his security forces. Kim—like all dictators of the world—relies upon his security

apparatus to keep him in power; and by acquiring nuclear weapons, he is showing his military

that he intends to keep them strong and employediii.

Kim Jong-Il’s strategy since 1993 in pursuit of nuclear weapons appears to be rational

when looking at his preferences. In order to maintain absolute political control over his state, he

has made the case to his military constituency that the regime’s safety was being jeopardized by

foreign enemies; and to defend against such a danger, a nuclear deterrent was required. Kim’s

message most likely resonated with this security-minded constituency because they saw how the

U.S. dealt with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which lacked a nuclear deterrent.

By agreeing to negotiate with U.S. while hiding his true peaceful intentions, Kim was

able to both avoid war and keep his regime alive—through payments of fuel oil, food and other

financial benefits. By negotiating, Kim Jong-Il was also buying time to build up his nuclear

arsenal, which would then increase his future bargaining position. To hold the attention of

Washington policymakers— so that it could continue to extract concessions— Pyongyang

periodically showed that it was still a threat by testing nuclear weapons, launching missiles, and

booting out weapons inspectors.

Explaining U.S. behavior in response to North Korea

The U.S. in response, pursued a two-track policy to North Korea, which sought to deter

Kim Jong-Il from gaining nuclear weapons, while at the same time actively engaging his regime

in hopes that Pyongyang could be persuaded to abandon its nuclear ambitions.

The Clinton administration’s legacy with regard to North Korea is the 1994 Agreed

Framework, which essentially froze Pyongyang’s nuclear program in exchange for the U.S.
supplying Kim’s regime with fuel oil, light-water reactors and a non-aggression pledgeiv. Clinton

defends his efforts saying that if the Framework were not in place; North Korea would have a far

greater arsenal than it does todayv. However, many in the U.S., particular hawkish Congressional

Republicans, saw this as a form of appeasement, saying that Clinton was rewarding the bad

behavior of a tyrannical dictatorship. Clinton eventually had to pay attention to his Republicans

opponents, as they won the 1994 midterm elections, subsequently gaining a majority in both

chambers of congress, enabling them to block funds needed to uphold Clinton’s commitments to

North Korea.

Bush continued Clinton’s approach of engagement and deterrence setting up the six-

party talks to limit Kim’s ability to blackmail the U.S. Victor Cha, suggests that Bush’s main

policy toward Pyongyang was to test Kim Jong-Il’s commitment to live up to past agreementsvi.

Additionally, Bush was not sure what Kim’s true intentions regarding the acquisition of nuclear

weapons were; and being a rational actor, sought to avoid a costly military conflict. Thus, he

pursued a peaceful multilateral engagement policy rather than acquiescing to his more hawkish

advisors, advocating regime change and military strikes on an admitted nuclear power, which

may or may not actually use such weapons.

According to Michael Mazarr, Bush’s tough rhetoric—used to mollify his hawkish

domestic constituents—with North Korea was never backed up with tough action, leading

Pyongyang to conclude that it could continue to extract concessions while also continuing to

expand its nuclear arsenalvii. In fact, both administrations appear to have capitulated to Kim

Jong-Il. Every time North Korea threatened non-cooperation, Washington’s engagement strategy

resulted in paying off Pyongyang with fuel, food and outright financial benefits, while also

shielding them from attack. In return, Washington received empty promises to denuclearize,
demonstrating that the relationship was plagued by commitment problems. Clinton and Bush

were also unsure whether Kim Jong-Il was withholding private information about his intentions;

specifically whether he viewed his weapons capability as a vehicle for profit or a way to cause

nuclear havoc. Thus, U.S. policy resulted in cautious diplomacy with Washington eventually

paying off Pyongyang to behave.

Evolution of the Crisis during Obama’s First Term

President Obama has proclaimed that the “most urgent threat to the security of America

and the world” is the spread of nuclear weaponsviii. Thus, he has signaled his desire to continue

the six-party talks to try to persuade North Korea to give up its arsenal. President Obama’s

options, however, seem to be the same as his predecessors. First, he can continue to negotiate, in

hopes of persuading North Korea to denuclearize. This strategy would continue to be

handicapped by information and commitment problems. However, as both parties learn more

about each other’s intentions over time, the two sides could eventually come to an agreement,

which would reassemble a long-term self-enforcing economic development for denuclearization

pact. The problem with this solution however, is that it would signal to the world that the U.S.

can be blackmail if faced with a nuclear-armed enemy.

A second option would be to end negotiations with Kim Jong-Il and impose sanctions, or

more dramatically, strike at suspected nuclear sites. The sanctions approach would probably be

ineffective as North Korea’s economy is not developed enough for sanctions to have a pinching

effect; additionally, Kim has shown his apathy toward his countrymen by allowing over a million

people to die during the mid-90’s famine. Launching military strikes seems unlikely due to the

extremely large costs associated with a war against a small and threaten nuclear state, not to
mention the displeasure this would cause the people who put Obama in the White House.

Therefore, it is safe to assume that Obama will continue negotiations with Pyongyang.

Conclusion: What would an outcome look like?

As the two sides are essentially bargaining over an issue that is itself a source of power

and prestige, a problem of how each side can credibly commit to any agreement will always

exist. In this case, Washington cannot credibly commit that it would not attack a non-nuclear

North Korea; while Kim Jong-Il’s regime cannot credibly commit that it would actually give up

its valuable security deterrent, which produces vast benefits at the negotiating table. This last

point demonstrates that this case is also about information problems. Ultimately, the U.S. is not

sure whether Kim Jong-Il wants nuclear weapons to serve as a military deterrent or as a

bargaining tool to extract concessions; therefore a cautious engagement strategy is likely to

continue.

Kim’s strategy of using nuclear weapons as a bargaining tool—while hiding his peaceful

intentions—has allowed him to achieve his most important goals: avoiding war with the U.S.,

and remaining in power by placating his military constituency with the benefits received through

concessions gained in negotiations. Kim Jong-Il knows that the U.S. has a limited set of effective

options for dealing with his regime, as well as being cognizant of the fact that Washington views

an attack on his regime to be an extremely costly strategy. Therefore, Kim will probably

conclude that his stratagem of blackmail via negotiation will continue to reap benefits while also

containing the costs of war.

North Korea has shown that its word is not worth much; therefore the U.S. must induce

North Korea to act as a responsible international actor and give up its nuclear weapons. The U.S.
has to show what benefits a non-North Korea could receive. Offering a long-term self-enforcing

economic development for denuclearization partnership seems to be the best strategy. As this

settlement runs its course, both parties will be able to learn more about each other’s intentions,

subsequently reducing the probability of war and leading to more effective bargaining.

Reference Notes
i
Powell, Robert. P.194
ii
Carpenter, Ted Galen p.71-73
iii
Sagan, Scott p. 73
iv
Cirincione, Joseph p. 247
v
Clinton William J. p. 828
vi
Cha, Victor D. p. 106
vii
Mazarr, Michael J. p. 94
viii
Obama, Barack p.8

Bibliography
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Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 39-100.

Cha, Victor. ""Winning Asia"." Foreign Affairs (November/December 2007): 103-107.

Cirincione, Joseph. "Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction." Washington, DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2002. 241-253.

Clinton, William J. "My Life." New York: Alfred a. Knopf, 2004. 591, 602-03, 608, 624-25, 828.

Mazarr, Michael J. ""The Long Road to Pyongyang"." Foreign Affairs (September/October 2007): 75-94.

Obama, Barack. "Renewing American Leadership." Foreign Affairs (July/August 2007): 8-9.

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