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International Politics and Security: Case #3

Is Religious and Ethnic Hatred a Sufficient


Explanation of Violent Civil War?

Craig Jeffries
A50038324
IRCO 410
3/17/09
“Ethnic and religious hatred is never a sufficient explanation of violent civil wars.”

Many people, including policymakers, and especially journalists believe that civil wars occur

because of long-held historic grievances between two or more ethnically and/or religiously diverse

groups. The following analysis will argue that this common justification for civil war onset is false and

misleading, and that while religious and ethnic hatred do play important roles in these conflicts, they are

not sufficient explanations for why these wars start. In attempting to support the claim highlighted above,

I will introduce alternative theories and justifications to help explain why rebel and insurgent leaders

chose to fight costly wars with central governments. Additionally, using the Philippines as a case study,

we are able to apply alternative explanations presented here regarding the causes of civil war.

If not religion or ethnic hatred, what are the root causes of civil wars?

Religious and/or ethnic hatred is not what pushes groups to fight, but is better understood as

functioning as a recruiting device, attracting fighters, motivated by the perceived benefits to be gained

from fighting the government. Rebel leaders—wanting to be foster a positive reputation for their

groups—will also use a religious and/or ethnic tone to sell their fight to potential financial backers in

hopes of securing essential funds needed to make war with the government feasible.

So if it not religion or ethnic hatred that causes civil war, what then makes civil wars likely? I will

argue that three core conditional aspects make civil wars more feasibly to rebel groups; these include: the

existence of grievances, opportunities to strike at the central government, and the presence of private

information problems, which negatively affect bargaining.

Grievances: Religious and ethnic grievances are no doubt important for understanding why civil wars

break out, but by themselves, these factors cannot explain why civil wars begin. Economic factors, such

as low income—measured on a per capita basis—are arguably the most important determinants for the

onset of civil war. Statistically-based studies have suggested that a low per capita income level is a proxy

for a weak state, which in the eyes of many rebel leaders make it ripe for rebellion (Fearon p.76).

When jobs are scarce, the opportunity costs for an individual joining a rebellion are much lower

than if the country was economically healthy. Somalia is a good example of this last point, for it is
arguably the most depressed economy in the world, where a job as an armed insurgent sadly pays more

than practically any of other profession. Yet Somalia is fairly religiously and ethnically homogenous. In

fact, James Fearon concludes that after controlling for per capita income, countries that have high levels

of ethnic and religious diversity have been no more likely to experience civil war than states that are more

homogeneous (Fearon p. 77). Other types of grievances that make civil conflict more likely—while not

seen as salient as per capita income—are discrimination, dominance of one ethnic groups, especially if it

is a minority group, and mid-levels of regression by the central governments.

Opportunity: Yet it is not mere grievances—religious and ethnic or otherwise— that makes civil wars

more likely. Even if rebels have the motivation to fight, they still might not be able to, due to lack of

opportunity. Paul Collier, another prominent scholar focusing on the determinants of civil war, states that

when rebellions appear to be financially feasible to the rebel leaders, civil wars will occur (P. Collier p.

14). Absence of this financial feasibility, disenchanted groups will remain on the sidelines holding onto

their grievances, unable to persuade governments to change policy.

Therefore, the conditions must be just right for conflict to be able to commence; otherwise rebel

leaders will chose not to battle government soldiers for fear of a quick and costly defeat, which would

negatively affect its future chances of successively achieving its desired preferences. Thus, for a rebel

group to be willing to engage a governmental foe in armed conflict, the following conditions must be

present: 1) the existence of a weak government; 2) rough terrain and a large population; 3) sufficient

financial inflows (made better if there is an ethnic diaspora living in the developed world).

Even though a rebel group is a financially viable fighting force, the central government will

almost always be stronger. There are many countries where there exists marginalize groups but no armed

conflict ensues; this may be because the groups lacked funds to fight, but it may also be that the central

governments are strong enough to have effective control over its territory and people. When this is the

case, the probability will significantly decrease that a rebel group will choose to fight. As rebel groups are

the weaker party when fighting against a national military, to reduce costs, a vast and rough terrain is
required to allow for retreat and resupply. Lastly, groups with support from large ethnic diaspora living in

the developed have a much easier time raising the funds needed to continue its fight.

Bargaining Problems: More often than not, a rebel group will be aware of the very high costs associated

with fighting the central government. Therefore, their strategy in winning concessions should be to seek a

peaceful settlement rather than wage a costly war. However, even if a rebel group is strong, it cannot just

simply approach a central government and demand concessions; for the government would not see an

advantage in giving out such benefits to a group that—in their estimation—is capability far weaker, and

may be bluffing when it suggests it is willing to fight for what it seeks. Therefore, it is the rebel group’s

interest to demonstrate to the government that it does have both the resolve and capability to achieve

victory. The rebel group does this be engaging the government in an armed conflict. By doing so the rebel

group is also achieving legitimacy to would-be fighters and supporters who agree with the group’s stated

reasons for fighting for concessions. Again, these justifications provided by a rebel organization may or

may not include religious or ethnic grievances, but if they do, they are included for the sole reason that

they are marketable to potential backers, be them financiers or foot soldiers.

Alternatively, a weak rebel group has the incentive to misrepresent its private information about

is capabilities and resolve, hoping that the government will believe them and provide concessions. This

situation, however, is less likely because a weak rebel group will almost certainly make the internal

calculation that its strength hinders the likeliness of success against a governmental foe should the latter

actually chose to fight. The government is also vulnerable to bargaining problems associated with

asymmetrical information. For the central government will also have an incentive to misrepresent its

resolve and capabilities. This is especially so if the government faces more than one rebel group. In this

case, a government may actually prefer to peacefully settle with one group, granting it concessions;

however, when other rebel groups are watching, the government must show resolve, demonstrating to

others that cannot be blackmailed into providing concessions, thus it choose war.
Empirical Analysis: The Philippines

The Philippines is an excellent modern case of civil conflict, where religious and ethnic

grievances appear to the casual observer to be the underlying causes of the outbreak of violence.

However, by analyzing each actor’s preferences and strategies, we are able to unmask these

ethnic/religious justifications, revealing the true reasons rebel groups chose to fight. Having the

knowledge that civil wars are more likely to occur when grievances, opportunity and bargaining problems

are all present, will can see why rebel groups in the Philippines have chosen to strike at the government.

The Philippines exhibits several of the conditions likely to lead to civil war: a low per capita

income ($3,400 in 2009i), a dominant religious group (Catholics make up 80% of the population), mid-

levels of regression by the central government evidenced by President Ferdinand Marco’s declaration of

material law in 1972, a weak government due to political assassinations and numerous political coups that

took place throughout the 20th century. Governance is made difficult for the country, due to its large

population of 96 million people and possessing one of the toughest terrains in the world—made up of

thousands of mountainous islands. Additionally, having one of the highest rates of official remittances, it

is safe to assume that a fair number of individuals within this diaspora sympathize with rebel groups and

have sent money back to finance the group’s activities.

Increasing the chances of civil conflict even further is the fact that there are multiple insurgent

groups that are concurrently at odds with the government in Manila. Two notable groups are Abu Sayyaf

and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Both have stated that they want an independent Muslim

homeland on the southern island of Mindanao. Although both groups espouse religious convictions, and

proclaim that their fight against Manila is to win independence for their Muslim region, what these groups

really seek is something much less. By using religion to politicize their campaign, MILF was able to

generate the financial conditions that it made it feasible for them to demonstrate their capabilities and

resolve in battling the government. As a result, MILF won greater autonomy, successfully showing the

government that a military strategy to suppress it engendered costs that were too high. However, Manila

was cognizant that MILF— while being the largest—was not its only separatist foe. Thus, policymakers
had to tread a fine line when granting concessions to each of the rebel groups that opposed there policies,

so as not to create the impression that they are easily malleable to violent tactics.

It appears though that Manila has failed in this regard, as both MILF and Abu Sayaaf have seen

that the central government in Manila, unable to militarily squash the an older foe, the Moro National

Liberation Front (MNLF), eventually caved into that group’s demands, granting greater autonomy to the

majority Muslim southern island of Mindanao. Consequently, both Abu Sayyaf and MILF have pursued a

strategy of waging war with Manila in hopes of gaining concessions as well. However, the two groups are

perceived differently. While MILF is seen by many in the south as a committed group, dedicated to

winning greater concessions for their Muslim supporters in Mindanao, Abu Sayyaf is treated more as a

violent criminal organization, involved in drug smuggling and kidnapping for ransom. The latter may

have had to pursue this strategy because it was unable to win over the support of the local population or

successfully compete for the financial resources that have regularly gone instead to the much larger

MILF. Therefore, Abu Sayaaf has not only resorted to blatant criminality to finance its group, but it has

also increased its religious tone, hoping to gain funds and support from individuals attracted to the global

Islamic extremism ideological brand advocated by groups like al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah.

Conclusion

Even though rebel groups paint their struggle as one fought over religious and/or ethnic

grievances, these justifications are never sufficient explanations on their own to explain why civil wars

occur. It is true that grievances must exist for civil wars to occur. But it is false to say that the only

grievances that matter are religious or ethnic hatred. In fact, statistic research has shown that low GDP per

capita is the most important factor causing civil wars. Yet this factor alone does not cause civil wars; as it

must be coupled with the opportunity to strike at the government. For this to happen, a rebel group must

feel that it is able to defeat the much stronger national army. To do this, a rebel group must be financially

viable. To attract financial resources, rebel leaders sometimes increase religious and ethnic rhetoric in

order to stir up supporters attracted to such justifications. Finally, even though grievances are present to
motivate, and finances are obtain to provide opportunity, a violent civil conflict will not occur unless both

sides, the rebels and the government, experience bargaining failures. These failings are attributed to

private information held by each side in an attempt to misrepresent each other’s resolve and capabilities.

When bargaining failures occur, what follows is a test of resolve and capability. This test is referred to as

a civil war.

i
Data is measured at purchasing power parity, and was retrieved from the 2008 CIA World Factbook, accessed at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rp.html on March 15, 2009.

"CIA World Factbook 2008." CIA.gov. 15 March 2009 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-


world-factbook/geos/rp.html>.

Collier, Paul. "Economic Causes of Civil Conflcts and their Implications for Policy." World Bank (April
2006): 1-26.

Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler and Dominic Rohner. "Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war."
Oxford Economic Papers 61 (2009): 1-27.

Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." American Political Science
Review (February 2003): 75-90.

Smith, Dan. Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive
Conflict Management, August 2004.

Stewart, Frances. "Root Causes of Violent Conflict in Developing Countries." British Medical Journal (9
February 2002): 342-345.

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