PDVSA

RISK ENGINEERING MANUAL

VOLUME 1

PDVSA N° TITULO

IR–S–15 STANDARD GUIDELINES FOR PIPELINES SYSTEMS

RISK ANALYSIS

1 MAR.04 Revisón normas conexas a la IR–S–02 19 L.T. E.V. Y.S.

0 NOV.98 ORIGINAL 20 L.T. O.A. J. J.

REV. FECHA DESCRIPCION PAG. REV. APROB. APROB.

APROB. León Velasco DATE MAR.04 APROB. Ramón Arias DATE MAR.04

E PDVSA, 1983 ESPECIALISTAS

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Index
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 OBJETIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1 American Petroleum Institute (API) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2 American Society Of Mechanical Engineer (ASME) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.3 Federal Construction Regulation (USA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.4 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.4 Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5 DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1 Consequence Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.2 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.3 Worst Credible Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.4 Hydrocarbon Piping Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.5 Protection Area of Public Works of the Hydrocarbon Pipings Systems . . 5
5.6 Maximum Security Protection Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.7 Safeguard Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.8 Controlled Protection Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.9 Safety Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.10 Right of Way . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6 PIPELINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.2 Characteristics of a Pipeline System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7 RISK ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1 Release Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2 Flow Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.3 Consequence Analysis Modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8 POPULATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1 Population Density . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.2 Pipeline Segmentation for QRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.3 Sensitive Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.4 Probit Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9 FAILURE MECHANISMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.1 Failure by External Mechanical Interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.2 Failure Data Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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10 POTENCIAL FOR IGNITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

11 PARAMETERS INFLUENCING ACCIDENT RATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.1 External Third Party Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.2 Corrosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11.3 Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11.4 Fatigue Loading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11.5 Other Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11.6 Pipeline Wall Thickness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
12 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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1 INTRODUCTION
Pipelines installations due to distinctive characteristics of their geographic
locations are particularly exposed to mechanical damages by some external
agents, as well as by potential failure of the material structures. The risk to third
parties, that such installations can present, depends on the type of product,
operation conditions (pressure, temperature), and type of failure in the material.
The criteria established in this guide are based on the consideration that the
design, construction, installation, operation, and maintenance of the equipment
are accomplished according to Petróleos de Venezuela S.A (PDVSA), standards
and procedures required for these installations.

2 OBJETIVE
This guide establishes the criteria that shall be applied in PDVSA pipelines and
asociated superficial equipment locations. The objective of this guide is to achieve
an appropriate level of protection to the persons and properties of third parties,
as well as to the surrounding environment against potential risks of catastrophic
events due to fire, explosion, and toxic release.

3 SCOPE
The scope of this standard covers pipelines used to transfer flammable or
combustible liquids, and/or flammable or toxic gases, in areas outside of process
facilities, warehouses, and distribution terminals. This section excludes
distribution systems for domestic and industrial gas in urban zones.
The requirements established by the laws, regulations, enactment’s, or current
official norms will prevail over all those established in this guide, except when this
guide exceed the requirements of those laws. In general, the guide is based on
technical application widely accepted in the industry at the national and
international level, for evaluating catastrophic risks in petroleum and
petrochemical installations, using PDVSA’s most up to date technology.
This guide shall be enforced for new PDVSA installations or expansions, and
major additions or modifications that are made to existing installations. Also, the
guide shall be utilized in the evaluation of the current risk level in existing
installations, with the objective of determining compliance with the risk tolerance
criteria established in PDVSA IR–S–02 document “Criterios para el Análisis
Cuantitativo de Riesgos”.
The present guide applies to pipelines that are installed above or under ground.
Excluded from it are marine pipelines, ground, air and marine transportation.
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4 REFERENCES
4.1 American Petroleum Institute (API)
RP 520 “Guide for Pressure Relieving and Depressurizing Systems”.
RP 750 “Management of Process Hazards”.
4.2 American Society Of Mechanical Engineer (ASME)
B31.4 “Liquid Transportation Systems for Hydrocarbons, Liquid
Petroleum Gas, Anhydrous Ammonia, and Alcohol”.
B 31.8 “Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems”.
4.3 Federal Construction Regulation (USA)
49 CFR Part 192 “Transportation of Natural Gas and Other Gases by Pipeline”.
49 CFR Part 193 “Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities: Federal Safety Standards”.
49 CFR Part 195 “Transportation of Hazardous Liquids by Pipeline”.
4.4 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
Code 58 “Storage and Handling of LPG”.
Code 59A “Std. for Production, Storage, and Handling of LNG”.
4.5 Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA)
IR–S–00 “Definiciones”.
IR–S–02 “Criterios para el Análisis Cuantitativo de Riesgos”.
IR–S–16 “Determinación de Zonas de Seguridad en Instalaciones
Industriales y Areas de Protección de Obra Pública”.
IR–M–01 “Separación entre Equipos e Instalaciones”.
IR–M–02 “Ubicación de Equipos e Instalaciones en Relación a
Terceros”.
90618.1.069 “Cruces de Autopistas y Ferroviarios”.
AK–212–O “Pipeline Trenching and Right of Way and Clean–Up”.
CPV–C–E–03000 “Ubicación del Gasoducto”.
CPV–C–E–04000 “Derechos de Paso y Desvío”.

5 DEFINITIONS
The definitions applicable to this guide can be found in the PDVSA IR–S–00
document “Definiciones”. Also additional definitions include:
5.1 Consequence Evaluation
The analysis of a location specific incident sequence usually involving a fire,
explosion, or release of toxic material. Consequence descriptions may be
qualitative or quantitative estimates of the effects of an incident in terms of factors
such as health impacts, economic loss, and environmental damage.
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5.2 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

The process of hazard identification, followed by numerical evaluation of incident
consequences and frequencies, and their combination into an overall measure of
risk. Used by PDVSA to assess societal risk and individual risk to third parties and
individual risk to workers.

5.3 Worst Credible Case

An estimate of the consequences of the most sever incident considered plausible
or reasonably believable. This technique is used for estimated maximum loss
(EML) determination or contingency planning scenarios.

5.4 Hydrocarbon Piping Systems

It is the group of facilities made up of pipes, plants and stations, the purpose of
which is to transfer hydrocarbons from one or several supply sources to one or
several distribution systems, or to interconnect several supply sources.

5.5 Protection Area of Public Works of the Hydrocarbon Pipings

Systems
It is the area located within the 200 meters, measured in horizontal projection, at
both sides of the pipe starting at the external pipes that the make up the system,
which has been established by Presidential Decree–Law, with the purpose of
providing an adequate security and protection to the facilities of said system.
Each 200 meter zone contiguous to the facilities that make up the Hydrocarbon
Piping Systems is divided into three: Maximum Security Protection Zone;
Safeguard Zone, and Controlled Protection Zone.

5.6 Maximum Security Protection Zone

Within the 200 meters that make up the Protection Area of Public Works,
Maximum Security Protection Zone are established at both sides of the
Hydrocarbon Piping Systems, with an extension of 15 meters, in the case of a
surface system, and 6 meters if it is an underground system. The zone extension
shall be measured in horizontal projection, starting at the external pipes that make
up the systems, as well as at the sides where said pipes begin and end. Neither
occupation nor use of land is allowed on these zone, except that necessary for the
operation and maintenance of the system. Likewise, the traffic of machinery or
agricultural equipment on the zone is banned.
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5.7 Safeguard Zone

Adjacent the Maximum Security Protection Zone, and on both sides of the
Hydrocarbon Piping Systems, there are Safeguard Zone with a 15 meter
extension, measured at the horizontal projection, starting on the outer boundary
of the above mentioned Maximum Security Protection Zone. At these zone only
the agricultural explotation of vegetables and fruits, as well as ornament and
reforestation plants is allowed, as long as no heavy machinery is used to perform
said activities.

5.8 Controlled Protection Zone

Adjacent to the Safeguard Zone, and at each side of the Hydrocarbon Piping
Systems, there are Controlled Protection Zone with a 170 meter extension at the
site where the system is above ground, and 179 where it is buried, measured in
horizontal projection starting at outer boundary of the Safeguard Zone. At these
strips only activities related to the use of explosives are banned, unless an
authorization is requested and obtained in writing from the Ministry of Energy and
Mines and PDVSA.

5.9 Safety Zone

It is the land zone adjacent to the facilities of PDVSA. It is of variable extension,
susceptible to modification, and after estabishing its width and functioning regime,
it shall contribute to improve physical safety of facilities, protection to third
persons, and to private and public goods.

5.10 Right of Way

It is a contract established between PDVSA and the owner of the land over which
hydrocarbon transmission pipes are located. The contract guarantes circulation
of machinery and equipment required for the operation and maintenance of the
facilities.

6 PIPELINES

6.1 General
6.1.1 The decision to install pipelines underground or aboveground shall be
accompanied by a risk analysis of each particular situation based upon the
requirements established in this guideline. When third parties are involved,
considerations in PDVSA document IR–M–02 must be addressed.
6.1.2 Underground pipelines shall be installed according to the minimum established
depths in documents PDVSA AK–212–O and PDVSA 90618.1.069.
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6.1.3 To protect the piping systems against the intervention of third parties, the following
areas should be defined, according to PDVSA document IR–S–16:
– Maximum Security Protection Zone.
– Safeguard Zone.
– Controlled Protection Zone.
These areas shall be established by Decree – law in conformity with “Ley
Orgánica para la Ordenación del Territorio”.
Likewise, a Right of Way Zone shall be built to allow the operation and
maintenance of the piping system.
6.1.4 The zone mentioned in Paragraph 6.1.3 do not offer protection to third parties.
To this purpose it is necessary to establish a “Safety Zone”, which shall be
determined for each particular case, based on a quantitative risk analysis, which
will define the pipe installation, based on the requirements mentioned in this
document, with the purpose of obtain a “Acceptable Risk” level, as it is established
in the risk criteria of PDVSA Document IR–S–02.
6.1.5 The placing of block valves shall be provided according to the ASME B31.4 and
ASME B31.8 standards, but also must take into account the proximity to
population and/or sensitive resources, and the acceptable or reducible risk level
(see Section 7.3 for additional details).

6.2 Characteristics of a Pipeline System

A pipeline system usually contains many or all of the following elements:
S Pumps or compressors.
S Buried pipes (underground pipelines).
S Above ground pipelines.
S Booster pumps or compressor stations.
S Isolation valves (manually, remote, or automatically activated).
S Relief valve (thermal or other types).
S Pipebridges or other supports.
S Control systems.
S Leak detection systems.
S Pig launchers/receivers.

7 RISK ANALYSIS
When pipeline accidents occur, they can result in property loss, fatalities, and
severe environmental damage. Typical causes of failure of buried pipelines
include material failure by corrosion and/or erosion, overpressurization and
ruptures/penetrations due to excavation or other causes.
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In all PDVSA pipeline installations in which a risk to external third parties exists,
a Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) shall be performed. Where appropriate, the
QRA shall include events involving thermal radiation, overpressure, toxic vapor
dispersion, and environmental effects as part of the evaluation.
The “Safety Zone” shall be defined in such as way that the thermal radiation, the
overpressure levels and/or the toxic dispersion reached along the pipe, will not
offer a risk higher than the “Acceptable Risk”, for population settlements,
highways and property of third parties in general, according to the allowance
criteria established in PDVSA Document IR–S–02.
In existing installations where the creation of short term secure zones at the
property limit is not possible for compliance with a minimum risk level, the risk level
established using the PDVSA tolerance criteria must be mitigated to achieve a risk
as low as practicable. In this particular case, extreme measures shall be taken to
prevent incidents through mitigation, especially for critical equipment that
presents high risk to third parties. Also, measures shall be taken to plan for
evacuation of third parties that can be potentially exposed.
The level of risk analysis required will depend on the issue that needs a Maximum
Safety Zone to be evaluated. If the issue is to determine the required separation
distance for the pipeline to another installation such as plants wells, power lines,
etc., then a Consequence Evaluation should be performed taking into account the
probable causes of the release. For third party societal or individual risk
determination, a QRA using a range of hole sizes (1/4”, 1” and full – bore)
representing a corrosion pit, a puncture leak and a major breakshould be
performed.
.

7.1 Release Scenarios

According to the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) (Ref. 1, pg 47)
failures on pipelines occur in three broad categories:
S Failures caused by external mechanical interference.
S Failures caused by corrosion defects.
S Failures caused by miscellaneous factors such as pipe material defects,
natural hazards or operator error.

7.2 Flow Dynamics

The extent of potential hazards from pipeline failures depends on many factors
including:
1. Type of product, contents, temperature, pressure, phase and pumping
capacity,
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2. Release geometry (i.e. guillotine rupture vs. a small hole), release

orientation (i.e. top, bottom, side), the depth of the pipe, and inclination /
terrain (slope),
3. Accident detection time,
4. Surrounding medium (i.e., soil, air, or water), and
5. Atmospheric conditions.
These factors are key in determining the flow dynamics, and any subsequent
consequences.
7.2.1 Liquid Flow
For liquid pipelines a spill release quantity needs to be established. It is necessary
to have an available release rate, or the orifice size to allow calculation of a release
rate. Knowing the release duration or assuming a value will allow calculation of
the ultimate spill mass. The degree of calculation necessary is determined by the
input required for the model being used. If the flow rate and duration of the release
are all that are needed for the model, no additional calculations are be required.
In the case that only the orifice size and pressure are available, it will be necessary
to calculate the associated flow rate based on the estimated orifice size and
repeat the procedure until the desired flow rate or duration is found (Ref. 1).
A large pressure drop caused by a complete rupture of a pipeline carrying a
liquefied gas will result in two–phase flow. A small pressure drop caused by a
puncture (small hole) of a pipeline carrying a subcooled liquid (pipe pressure
exceeds liquid bubble point) will result in liquid flow driven by the pressure
difference between the source and the surroundings. If the leak is detected and
isolated, the isolated pipe section pressure will decay with time as the liquid is
discharged. When the pressure reaches the bubble point pressure two–phase
flow will occur.
Liquid compressibility is important for high pressure pipelines. The change in
liquid volume (compressibility effects on density), and elastic contraction of the
pipe are important factors to consider when the inventory of the pipe and as a
result the release duration. For pipelines segments in mountainous terrain, the
liquid hydrostatic head must be taken into account in determining the maximum
flow from a rupture location. Omitting the hydrostatic head will result in seriously
understanding the release rate.
7.2.2 Gaseous Flow
For high pressure gas pipeline, there are three periods that need to be considered
in characterization of the release. There is an initial depressurization to an
intermediate pressure fed by the line–pack inventory. This release is sudden and
results in a vapor puff. This is followed by a continuous release until the
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compressor is shut down (and/or isolation valves are closed). The steady–state
continuous flow will be determined by the compressor performance characteristic
and the pipeline resistance between the compressor and the break. In no case
can the flow exceed the maximum capacity of the compressor. The final phase
involves depressurization to atmospheric pressure. The duration of the final
depressurization phase will depend on the length of the pipeline between isolation
points, which defines the inventory. (see Section 7.3 for analysis of isolation). The
same situation is encountered with liquid pipelines in mountainous terrain where
a significant hydraulic gradient exists.

7.3 Consequence Analysis Modeling

Pipeline presents some unique applications for consequence analysis.
Underground pipeline incidents pose the potential for cratering. A review of
several gas pipelines accidents investigated by National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) indicates that, for gas pipelines with operating pressures above
600 psig, a one–inch diameter hole will blow away the overburden above the
pipeline, resulting in the formation of a crater that may allow the gas to escape as
a unobstructed free jet. Therefore an assumption can be made that a puncture or
rupture of pipeline would result in removal of the overburden.
For buried pipeline corrosion hole releases (i.e. < 1/4” diameter holes), the release
will migrate to the surface without producing a crater. The migration path of the
gas to the surface depends on various local terrain features (soil composition,
surface covering, etc.), and will vary along the pipeline route.”
In the event of an underground pipeline release where the line pressure is
sufficient to cause a crater to form, several things need to be considered. The first
is the orientation of the jet, and the second is the size of the crater. These two
parameters will determine whether the gas will enter the atmosphere as an
unobstructed free jet.
The orientation of the jet depends on the ratio of the hole area to the pipe cross
sectional area. For small ratios (< 0.2), the more vertical the jet orientation. The
larger the ratio, the more horizontal (typically 10 degree from horizontal) the jet.
For vertical jets, the crater will not obstruct the jet, and the release can be modeled
as a free jet. For large hole areas (especially 100% releases), a 10 degree
orientation should be assumed, and modeled by using a low momentum release
model or by lowering the exit velocity used in a jet model.
Once the crater is formed, material will continue to be released from the ruptured
pipeline. Depending on the type and size of the line and the pressure, the material
can disperse in any one of several ways ranging from shooting straight ahead at
the end of the rupture to being sprayed upward after a line puncture from drilling
equipment. In addition, the crater or some other obstruction may absorb the
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momentum of the jet release, causing it to entrain less air and increase its overall
dispersion hazard.
There is no single acknowledged approach for determining the size of a crater.
If one has estimated that the momentum of the initial discharge is sufficient to
remove the overburden, then one approach is to select several crater sizes and
test their effects on exit velocity and ultimate hazard distances. One can then use
the crater diameter which produces the set of maximum hazard distances as a
conservative estimate (Ref. 1).
Aboveground pipelines can be addressed in the same manner as piping systems
in facility based assessments, with the recognition that the diking and grading
commonly found in facilities is unlikely to be present. There will also frequently be
a much longer length of line to empty even after pumps are shut down and valves
are closed.
An important parameter in the characterization of the hazard zones associated
with a gas pipeline release is the variable escape rate of gas from the rupture,
puncture or corrosion pit. A larger release will quickly depressure the line, and as
the line pressure declines, the mass flow out of the opening will also be reduced.
Studies have been performed to determine how fast this happens, and show that
after a very short time (on the order of seconds) the outflow will drop to the normal
flow rate that can be sustained by the capacity of the installed compression
equipment. The duration of the initial release is determined by the time it takes for
the pressure wave to travel from the release location to the upstream compressor
or emergency shutdown ESD valve and back. The initial release is short and can
be characterized with a puff model. The next stage involves a continuous release
until shutdown and isolation of the pipeline segment is achieved. This release is
characterizes as a steady state jet.
The effect of having emergency shutdown (ESD) valves installed along the
pipeline is to define the allowable mass available (defined by distance between
closed ESD valves) for final blowdown. The closer the valve spacing, the less
mass available for release and the faster the pressure in the pipeline decreases.
The value of the ESD valves is to limit the time during which the blowdown rate
occurs once the valves are closed. Hence, the release at this point needs to be
characterized as a blowdown of a fixed mass of material.
Determining the appropriate spacing for ESD valves is an analysis unto itself. It
is ultimately based on the pipeline release duration that one is willing to accept at
a particular location along the pipeline route. For examples, the acceptable
release duration may be higher for less populated areas. The total release
duration will be comprised of the initial puff, the time for leak detection/isolation,
and the final blowdown. The two key time period assumptions are the leak
detection interval and the time requirement for final blowdown. The valve spacing
analysis should consider the most probable large hole size, coupled with a range
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of tolerable release duration assumptions. The spacing interval evaluation needs

to incorporate a cost/benefit analysis of the potential averted loss
(consequences), the valve installation cost, and scenario frequency for different
valve spacing alternatives.

8 POPULATION
8.1 Population Density
Population densities, also known as exposed population, are an important part of
a QRA for many reasons. A particular reason is that density is used to determine
the number of people affected by a given incident in a specific hazard area.
Population data can be available from different sources in different forms. Some
examples of data along sources a specified pipeline route are census reports,
detailed maps, zoning data, aerial or satellite photographs, videotapes of the
pipeline, or actual inspection of the pipeline by the analyst conducting the QRA.
(For information in how to obtain data see Section 4, Ref. 1).
In some case in the absence of specific population data, default categories can
be used. Representative densities can be assigned based on the actual data for
specific routes. In cases where densities are being assigned based on visual
inspections or with the aid of maps or aerial photographs, the categories should
be defined in terms of commercial and industrial development as well. For
example, ”suburban” might be expanded to include mixed commercial/residential
areas or moderately dense industrial areas.
The values presented in Table 1 shall only be referential. For specific siting and
QRA evaluations, the actual population location and density shall be used.

TABLE 1. REPRESENTATIVE DEFAULT POPULATION DENSITIES

Designation Density Description

Remote 20 people/sq mile non–metropolitan area with scattered
housing; farms
Rural 100 people/sq mile small village or town; recreations areas
Suburban 1,000 people/sq mile typical suburbs; mixed use areas
Urban 3,000 people/sq mile small city; densely populated suburbs;
congested commercial areas
Extremely High 10,000 people/sq mile very dense city area
The population density around the pipeline route can be averaged or can be
subdivided within any number of segments with a separate population density for
each individual segment. (See Section 3.3 on Ref. 1, for further discussion of route
segmentation). The pipeline route is defined as a corridor, and its width is often
called a bandwidth. As in here used, the bandwidth is twice the maximum
downwind hazard distance for the material released. When looking at the
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population distribution along a route, the analyst must consider the full bandwidth
of concern and how the population density varies over this distance. If there is an
unpopulated area to one side of the pipeline route, the density should be obtained
for the populated side only and an adjustment should be made on the other side.
However, this does not mean that the unpopulated areas along should be
completely ignored. There may also some other type of concerns that need to be
addressed and evaluated.

8.2 Pipeline Segmentation for QRA

There are several variables that are considered when analyzing a pipeline route
(population density terrain, accident rate, meteorological conditions, activities
along the right of way pipeline or waterway, etc.). Depending on the amount of
information available for the QRA, these variables are very rarely constant over
the whole pipeline route. An example of this is population density. Most moderate
to long pipeline routes travel through areas of very high density such as urban and
suburban areas, as well as areas of low density such as rural and remote areas.
In all these cases, the changes in population density along the pipeline route
normally need to be addressed in the QRA, in order to obtain a close calculation
of the risk. Another important variable is elevation variability, especially for liquid
pipelines, due to the effect on release rate (see Section 7.3).
Segments is based on the relationship between one set of conditions and the
continuous changing of area conditions. In many cases a basic assumption for a
pipeline segment is that all factors are constant. When one or more factors
change, a new segment needs to be created. The level of change in a pipelines
segmentation would have a significant effect on the final risk calculation.
Generally, the incident scenarios do not change along the route except for special
locations. Thus, the consequence modeling results will remain the same unless
there is a major change in relative humidity, atmospheric temperature, terrain or
wind speed along the pipeline route. However, the parameters that will influence
the definition of pipelines segments are the population density and the
accident/release frequency. The magnitude of the consequence associated with
a release in the middle of a large urban area versus a release in a sparsely
populated rural area, or a change in pipeline design parameters would cause a
portion of the pipeline route to have a different incident rate than the previous
segment.

8.3 Sensitive Population

Sensitive populations or special case population shall be addressed. It cannot be
assumed that all humans have the same response to exposures of a hazardous
material. It is undertook that some portions of a given population would be more
sensitive than others to a special type of hazardous condition. In areas where this
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is likely to occur the analysis should considerate segments of pipeline routes that
are close to facilities such as hospitals, nursing homes and schools. These
populations represent both sensitive receptors and individuals who cannot easily
be evacuated from a building.

8.4 Probit Relationship

Endpoint criteria specify the degree of hazard, to which vulnerable resources can
be exposed. Endpoint criteria are typically expressed in terms of “cut–off” levels
irrespective of exposure time, such as radiation intensity (kW/m2) or toxicity
concentration (ppm). However, use of “hazard dose” (the intensity of the hazard
and the exposure duration) is a better method of assessing human injury impacts.
The relationship that combines the percentage of exposed population affected,
hazard level, and exposure time is know as the probit analysis. Probit equations
have been developed for thermal radiation, explosion overpressure and several
toxic chemicals, and are presented in standard PDVSA IR–S–02.
When available, probit endpoint criteria shall be used to conduct pipeline QRAs.

9 FAILURE MECHANISMS
As indicated in Section 7 of this guideline, general pipeline failure modes include:
S External and internal corrosion.
S External mechanical interference.
S Failures caused by miscellaneous factors such as construction/material
defects, natural hazards or operator error.
Most pipeline failures are due to external interference.

9.1 Failure by External Mechanical Interference

Failures caused by third party external mechanical interference include such
causes as:
S Being damaged by excavators or other equipment in use by other utility or
construction companies.
S Damage following derailments on railroads or truck impact.
S Hot tap in error by other utilities.
S Damage during deep plowing by farmers.
The type of failure generally caused by third party mechanical interference is a
puncture or split of the pipe or a gouge severely reducing the wall thickness of the
pipe. Failure can be immediate or may occur some time later by fatigue. This type
of incident is likely to have severe consequences. When flammable substances
are released as a result of immediate failure due to external mechanical
interference, a high probability of ignition is likely as a result of the presence of
ignition sources on the equipment causing the incident. (Ref. 1, pg 48)
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9.2 Failure Data Base

Being consistent with PDVSA document IR–S–02, the failure data base to be
adopted by PDVSA for piping systems is based on Oil & Gas Producers
Association (OGP) and the Oil Companies European Organization for
Environmental, Health and Safety (CONCAWE)

TABLE 2. PIPELINE FAILURE FREQUENCY

Frequency Hole Size Probability

(1/meter x year) Gas Pipelines
Nominal Gas* Oil** Big Medium Small
Diameter
6” or less 1,212E–06 0,179 0,374 0,446
6–8” 1,200E–06
8–10” 9,693E–07 1,200E–06 0,160 0,340 0,500
12–14” 9,010E–07 7,700E–07 0,145 0,297 0,559
16–18” 7,643E–07 5,300E–07 0,138 0,285 0,577
20–22” 7,581E–07 4,200E–07 0,131 0,270 0,598
24–28” 3,418E–07 2,100E–07 0,109 0,236 0,655
28–30” 2,100E–07
30–34” 1,168E–07 2,400E–07 0,128 0,287 0,585
36” o > 1,174E–07 2,400E–07 0,101 0,212 0,688
Hole Size Probability
Average
Big Medium Small
0,136 0,288 0,576
* Ref. 3 and 4
** Ref. 5

9.2.1 Surface Equipment

Some types of pipeline equipment (such as pig launchers and receivers) are
always located aboveground. Failure rates such equipment have been reported
by Canada’s Energy Resources Conservation Board [ERCB 1990]. The reported
rate for full–bore ruptures is 8.12 x 10–5 failures/equipment piece/year, and the
reported rate for “leaks” is 2.95 x 10–4 failures/equipment piece/year.
Based on these data, the failure rates for surface equipment are expected to be
as follows:

TABLE 3. SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE RATES (PER PIECES/YEAR)

Hole Size <1/4 inch ¼ to 1 inch 1 inch to full
rupture
Expected failure rate 1.65x10 –4 1.30x10 –4 8.12x10 –5
/pieces/year /pieces/year /pieces/year
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In some instances, other types of pipeline equipment might be located

aboveground (e.g., block valves and blowdown valves). In these cases the failure
data to use is the specified in PDVSA document IR–S–02.

10 POTENCIAL FOR IGNITION

The potential for ignition of a flammable material should be considered. Also, the
timing of ignition, immediately or after a flammable cloud has formed and started
to disperse, must also be considerate. Immediate ignition probabilities are
generally a function of material properties, the size of the release, and the nature
of the incident, and are assigned considering these parameters, historical data,
and engineering judgment. Immediate ignition may produce a pool fire, flame jet,
fireball, or any other type of fire depending on the nature of the release. But,
generalized approaches are needed for delayed ignition because the exact
location of the release, and therefore the locations of the ignition sources which
may be encountered, cannot be determined in advance and specified in the
analysis .
In the delayed ignition there are other factors to take into account. In delayed
ignition probabilities can be determined as a function of the cloud area or the
location. In general, as the size of the cloud increases, the probability of delayed
ignition decreases. This is due to that the cloud has already encountered an
ignition source and ignited before dispersing over a larger area.
In a spill incident, it is very likely that, if a cloud does not ignite immediately, it would
encountering several ignition sources along its route. In this case the probability
of ignition would be given as a function of the cloud location and the ignition
sources present in the area. Ignition sources can be classified as follows:
S Open flames.
S Electrical sources.
S Hot surfaces.
S Impact effects.
S Automobiles and other moving sources.
The ignition probabilities recommended for the petrochemical industry are the
same indicated in PDVSA document IR–S–02 ”Criterios para el Análisis
Cuantitativo de Riesgos”, Annex, Section A.4.

11 PARAMETERS INFLUENCING ACCIDENT RATES

11.1 External Third Party Activities
Failures due to third party interference can occur because the third party is
unaware of the presence of the pipeline. Alternatively, the pipeline protection at
the scene of a repair, excavation, or other activity may be so inadequate that an
incident occurs.
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Pipeline failures by third party activity shall be reduced by ensuring that members
of the public, landowners and utilities are always aware of the location of the
pipeline to provide adequate protection to the pipeline in areas where the risks
appear high. Generally, it would be expected that the rate per mile of third party
incidents shall be higher in populated areas. The installation operators shall put
in place procedures to ensure the safety of the people in a populated area
including the public awareness campaigns and increased wall thickness which
some pipeline standards require in populated areas.
Pipelines crossing other utility service lines (e.g., water/gas mains, phone lines,
etc.) have an increased potential for third party incidents. Pipelines shall always
have adequate protection (i.e., physical monitoring, shielding) in these cases so
that work on the services will not cause damage to the pipeline.
New installations must be located at a site of suitable size, topography, and
configuration so that the facility can be designed to minimize the hazards to third
parties and offsite property resulting from leaks and spills of product at the site.
In selecting a site each operator shall determine all site–related characteristics
which could jeopardize the integrity and security of the facility. A site must provide
ease of access so that personnel, equipment, and materials from offsite locations
can reach the site for fire fighting or controlling spill associated hazards or for
evacuation of personnel (Ref. 6).

11.2 Corrosion
An installation shall not be constructed, repaired, replaced, or significantly altered
until a qualified personnel reviews the applicable design drawings and material
specifications from a corrosion control viewpoint and determines that the material
involved will not impair the safety or reliability of the component or any associated
components. The repair, replacement, or significant alteration of components
must be reviewed only if the action to be taken involves a change in the original
material’s specification.
Buried pipe shall be coated to resist external corrosion, and provided with a
cathodic protection system. Each exposed component that is subject to
atmospheric corrosive attack shall be protected from atmospheric corrosion by a
material that has been designed and selected to resist the corrosive atmosphere
involved or by suitable coating or jacketing.
Cathodic protection systems are designed to reduce the likelyhood of external
corrosions. To work effectively, regular readings of pipe to soil potentials should
be carried out to ensure that rapid corrosion is not taking place locally. Particular
areas prone to corrosion are where other metallic services pass close to a pipeline
and could interfere with the workings of the cathodic protection system, leading
to accelerated corrosion. In these areas local bonding should be undertaken and
the conditions monitored. Other areas prone to corrosion are in areas where the
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pipeline is shielded from the cathodic protection currents. Cases with corrosion
where pipelines pass within steel sleeves (at crossings) have been so severe that
some international pipeline codes now preclude the use of steel sleeves.

11.3 Maintenance
High maintenance standards shall be required to ensure that a pipeline operates
safely. The as–built condition of a pipeline shall be able to be maintained almost
indefinitely by high quality maintenance. Regular inspection of the cathodic
protection system shall ensure good installation condition.
A preventive maintenance program shall be in place which includes a schedule
of written procedures for regular testing and inspection of facility systems and
equipment. Each component in service, including its support system, shall be
maintained in a condition that is compatible with its operation or safety purpose
by repair, replacement, or other means. Safety and fire protection equipment shall
be tested or inspected at intervals not exceeding 6 months. Maintenance activities
on fire control equipment shall be scheduled so that a minimum of equipment is
taken out of service at any one time and fire protection is not compromised. (Ref.
7).

11.4 Fatigue Loading

Pipelines shall be designed, built and maintained to the latest international
standards. Consequently, their life should ultimately be determined by the fatigue
life of the pipe material. Studies can be undertaken to estimate the factors which
determine the fatigue life of pipelines. Wide cycle variations in pressure can lead
to failure by fatigue after many years of such conditions. Such pressure swings
are seen in gas distributions systems where the pressure within the pipeline
system varies over each day.

11.5 Other Factors

In densely populated areas pipelines shall be protected by installing them in zones
where the likelyhood of failure by external mechanical incidents is reduced.
Pipelines shall be laid sufficiently far apart to allow access for maintenance and
that the access for emergency vehicles shall not be hindered by valve pits or short
aboveground sections.
Where possible the use of aboveground sections of pipework, including pipe
bridges shall be used, this has the advantage that inspection and maintenance
against corrosion is easier. While aboveground sections are clearly visible to third
parties they are also vulnerable to damage from secondary accidents, for
example, those involving road vehicles, particularly where the pipeline runs along
a road.
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11.6 Pipeline Wall Thickness

The European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group has published statistics showing
the relationship between pipe wall thickness and the likelyhood of incidents
involving a gas release due to external interference. This data shows that the
likelyhood of pipeline failure decreases as the pipe wall thickness increases, for
the range of thickness typically in service. Since most incidents are related to
either puncture owing to third party interference or corrosion it is expected that
puncture is less likely and corrosion defects will reveal themselves less quickly
with thicker wall pipe. This is the bases for the “class location” adjustment factors
applied in 49 CFR 192.101 (US DOT), for Natural Gas Pipelines.

12 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES
1. American Institute of Chemical Engineers “Guidelines for Chemical
Transportation Risk Analysis”. New York, 1995.
2. Ejecutivo Nacional de la República de Venezuela “Ley Orgánica para la
Ordenación del Territorio”.
3. European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group. “Gas Pipeline Incidents: A
Report of the European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group.” Pipe and
Pipelines International, 1970–1988.
4. Jones, D.J.; “An Analysis of Repazable Incidents for Natural Gas
Transmission and Gathering Lines – 1970 through June 1984”. American
Gas Association; NG–18, Report No. 158, 1986.
5. Lees Frank.; “Failure of oil pipelines in Western Europe 1975–80” from
CONCAWE, Loss Prevention in the process industries, Second Edition,
Volume 2, 1996.