c







 
 

á Ê John Stuart Mill (á
á


a Ê ntellectual heir of utilitarian movement
b Ê ccepts the following
i Ê individual psychological hedonism
á Ê sole motive of an action is an individualǯs desire for
happiness
2 Ê descriptive (actual
ii Ê universal ethical hedonism
á Ê greatest happiness of the greatest number
2 Ê normative (ought to be
iii Ê pparent gaps
á Ê f each individual is motivated by own happiness,
personal actions do not promote interests of society
2 Ê
escriptive fact that people desire their own
happiness does not imply that people ought to act in
accordance with this desire
 Ê Sanctions: inducements to action which give binding
force to moral rules
a Ê ooted in moral rules being acknowledged
and obeyed by virtue of anticipated pleasures
and pains
b Ê wo kinds
i Ê ternal: control peopleǯs actions
through fear of pain and propensity
for pleasure
á Ê ear, social disapproval,
imprisonment
2 Ê resence of which not taken as
true sense of moral obligation
ii Ê nternal: sanction must come from
within
á Ê eeling of pleasure when moral
law is obeyed
2 Ê eeling of pain when disobeyed
 Ê Mill is able to reconcile the
psychological theory that
people desire their own
happiness that one ought to act
to serve the public good
c Ê o direct proof of any first principle or ultimate end is possible;
problem of proof is in reality reduced to rational assent
2 Ê Jeremy Bentham
a Ê bject of morality is the promotion of happiness of the maimum
members of society
b Ê appiness: favorable balance of pleasures and pains
c Ê ood: actions that increase pleasure; bad: actions that increase
pain
d Ê ublic good = object of legislator
e Ê edonistic calculus = measures pleasures and pains / good and
bad legislation through factors like intensity, duration and etent
f Ê ll significant differences among pleasures are quantitative
 Ê
efending Utilitarianism
a Ê larify doctrine
i Ê eposition of misrepresentation and the principle itself
ii Ê pposition of those who fail to associate utility with
pleasure and pain
b Ê
octrine of utility
i Ê reed holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend
to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the
reverse of happiness
ii Ê erms
á Ê appiness
2 Ê Unhappiness
c Ê Utility is a Dzswinishdz doctrine
i Ê Supposition that life has no higher end than pleasure Ȃ
likened to a swine
á Ê ccusation supposes humans to be capable of no
pleasures ecept thise of which swine are capable
2 Ê umans have faculties more clevated than animal
appetites
 Ê Some kinds of pleasure are more valuable than the
others
d Ê Superiority of different kinds of pleasures is determined by those
who have eperienced both kinds
i Ê ompetent judges prefer pleasures of higher faculties
ii Ê uality over quantity
iii Ê ew humans would consent to be changed into any of the
lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of the
beastǯs pleasures
iv Ê Being whose capacities of enjoyment are low, has the
greatest chance of having them fully satisfied
v Ê Better be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied
e Ê bandoning higher pleasures for the lower  no opportunities,
incapable Best final judges: those have tested the entire spectrum
of pleasures
i Ê emptation postpones them to the lower pleasures
f Ê estating 
i Ê ith reference to and for the sake of which all others are
desirable, the ultimate end is an eistence eempt as far as
 possible from pain and as rich as possible in enjoyments,
both in quality and quantity
gÊ laim: utilitarianism is invalid  happiness cannot be attained
through a realistic description of happiness
i Ê aggeration: happy life is impossible
á Ê nly if happiness means a continuity of highly
pleasurable ecitement
2 Ê appiness means moments made up of few and
transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a
decided predominance of active over the passive
hÊ laim: Utilitarianism is incompatible with the acts of personal
sacrifice which are revered in hristian culture
i Ê romotion of general happiness > denial of individual
happiness
á Ê he power of sacrificing their greatest good for the
2 Ê good of others
 Ê Sacrifice in itself is a good
ii Ê ence not to be misinterpreted that happiness of one <
than the other
á Ê ot agentǯs own happiness but all of concerned
2 Ê Jesusǯ utility: to do as one would be done by, and to
love oneǯs neighbor as oneself
iÊ  is not essential as a motive for conduct, but is essential as the
rule by which conduct is judged and sanctioned ( sychological
question of motivation | ethical question of obligation
i Ê Moral evaluation is directed to actions, and how they affect
general happiness
ii Ê Misapprehension of utilitarianism: to speak only of actions
done from motive of duty
iii Ê reat majority of good actions are intended not for the
benefit of the world, but for that of individuals
iv Ê Multiplication of happiness is the object of virtue
jÊ Ultimate sanction
i Ê t arises, in fact, whenever a person is called on to adopt a
standard
kÊ Dzeeling for humanitydz which provides the ultimate sanction of the
principle of utility  internal sanction
i Ê ot bound by eternal sanction
ii Ê nternal sanction: feeling of pain
iii Ê f connected with pure idea of duty: onscience

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á Ê no other morality of other kind has no hold but
through eternal sanctions
2 Ê Meanwhile feelings eist as part of human nature
lÊ Dzeeling for humanitydz is inborn or acquired  powerful force and
sound basis for utilitarian morality
i Ê nce general happiness is recognized as the ethical
standard, this will constitute the strength of utilitarian
morality
m Ê rigin and nature of  may serve as a fitting conclusion to his
eposition of the