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The ConstitutionalStructureof
InternationalSocietyand theNature
ofFundamentalInstitutions
Reus-Smit
Christian
thistheory
thearticleillustrates through a comparison ofancientGreekandmodem
practices.3
institutional
To fullyunderstand theinstitutionaldimensionof international politicswe must
addresstwointerrelated questions:Whydo statescreatecertainsortsofinstitutions,
andhowdo theseinstitutions affectstatebehavior? The first
questionconcernsform,
thesecondefficacy. Mostresearchon international institutionsconcentrates on the
latterquestion,withneoliberalsmarshaling a powerfulargument thatinternational
regimesmatter, and thatwithoutsuchinstitutions contemporary relationsbetween
stateswouldbe verydifferent.4 By comparison, thequestionofinstitutional formhas
receivedlittlesustained Thismeansthatthebasicinstitutional
attention.5 practicesof
internationalsocietieshave gone unexplained, and we have fewinsightsintothe
sourcesofinstitutionalinnovationandthelimitsofinstitutional adaptation inparticu-
larhistoricalcontexts.Beginning fromtheassumption thatinternational institutions
exertan important influenceon relationsbetweenstates,thisarticletakesup the
neglected form.Itseekstoexplainthenatureoffundamental
questionofinstitutional
andwhytheyvaryfromone societyofstatesto another.
institutions In theprocessit
clarifies
thenormative foundations ofinternationalsocieties,sovereignty, andlegiti-
matestatehood, anditemphasizestheculturalandhistorical contingency ofinstitu-
tionalrationality.
Defined
FundamentalInstitutions
Existing Explanations
Neorealism
have minimalinfluence
believethat"institutions
Since neorealists on statebehav-
ior;"10theyhavedevotedlittlesystematicattention basic institutional
to explaining
Theysimplyarguethatthepossibility
practices. andnatureofinstitutional coopera-
tionbetweenstatesareheavilyconditioned by theprevailing distribution
of power
and configurationof interests. cooperationis consideredmostlikely
Institutional
underconditionsof hegemony, whena dominant statecan createand enforcethe
system,and dominant
rulesof theinternational statestendto createand maintain
thatfurther
institutions andmaximizetheirpower.
theirinterests 11As an explanation
9. Rawls 1955.
10. Mearsheimer 7.
1994/95,
11. See ibid.,13; andGilpin1981.
Structure
Constitutional Society 559
ofInternational
regimes
Issue-specific
e.g.,GAYT,NPT
Fundamentalinstitutions
e.g.,multilateralism,
law
international
structures
Constitutional
metavalues legitimate
defining
statehood stateaction
andrightful
Neoliberalism
In contrast neoliberalsholdthatinternational
to neorealists, exerta sig-
institutions
nificantinfluenceon international relations,enablingstates,as rationalactors,to
solve cooperationproblemsand realizegoals thatautonomyand self-helpcannot
provide.15Withoutdenyingthe anarchicalnatureof theinternational system,the
self-interestednatureof states,or theimportance of power,theyarguethatinstitu-
tions"facilitateagreements byraisinganticipated costsofviolatingothers'property
rights,by alteringtransaction coststhrough clustering of issues,and by providing
reliableinformation to members." 16The natureof particular theycon-
institutions,
tend,is determined bytheconfiguration ofstateinterests andthestrategic dilemmas
posed by cooperationin different issue areas.17Whileneoliberalsconcentrate on
or "regimes,"severalscholarshaverecently
institutions,
issue-specific usedrational-
istinsightsto explainthenatureanddevelopment of fundamental institutions,
with
Lisa Martin'sworkon multilateralism beingemblematic.18
Martinassumes"thatstatesareself-interested andturntomultilateralism onlyifit
servestheirpurposes,whateverthesemightbe."19Afteridentifying fourtypesof
cooperation problemsencountered by states-collaboration, coordination,suasion,
and assurance-she examineswhenit is rationalforstatesto choose multilateral
solutionsto each problem.Herinquiryreveals,however, that"at thisabstractlevel
of analysistheoutcomesremainindeterminate. Multiplefeasiblesolutionsexistfor
each problem."20 In short,rationalchoicetheoryalone cannotpredictwhenstates
will constructmultilateralinstitutionsto solvecooperation problems.To overcome
Constructivism
Constructivists
arguethatsocialinstitutionsexerta deepconstitutive influenceonthe
identities
and,in turn,interestsof actors."Cultural-institutional contexts,"Peter
Katzenstein writes,"do notmerelyconstrain actorsbychangingtheincentives that
shapebehavior.Theydo notsimplyregulatebehavior.Theyalso helpto constitute
theveryactorswhoseconducttheyseekto regulate."23 International it
institutions,
follows,definetheidentities
of sovereignstates.24 Understanding howinternational
institutions is crucial,constructivists
shapestateidentity hold,becausesocialidenti-
tiesinform theinterests
thatmotivate stateaction."Actorsdo nothavea 'portfolio'
ofintereststhattheycarryaroundindependent ofsocialcontext;insteadtheydefine
in theprocessof defining
interests situations. . .. Sometimessituations are unprec-
edentedin ourexperience.... Moreoftentheyhaveroutinequalitiesin whichwe
assignmeaningson thebasis of institutionally 25 Employingthese
definedroles."
21. Ibid.,112.
22. Ruggie1993a,29.
23. Katzenstein1996,22.
24. WendtandDuvall 1989,60.
25. Wendt1992,398.
Organization
562 International
1996;Katzenstein
26. See ibid;Finnemore 1995;and
1996;Klotz1995a,b;KoslowskiandKratochwil
Ruggie1993a.
andWeber1996;Jackson1990;Onuf1991;Ruggie
27. See Ashley1988;Bartelson1995;Biersteker
1983;Ruggie1993b;Weber1995;Wendt1992;WendtandDuvall 1989.
28. Wendt1992,412.
29. WendtandDuvall 1989,61.
30. Jackson1990,36.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.,35.
33. Ruggie1993b,151.
34. Ruggie1983,275.
35. Ruggie1993a,21.
Constitutional
Structure Society 563
ofInternational
concludingthatmultilateralism
institutions, "is a genericinstitutional formin the
modemstatesystem."36
To explaintheincreaseddensityof multilateral after1945, several
institutions
have advanceda "secondimage" argument
constructivists abouttheinstitutional
impactof Americanhegemony.37 TheyarguethattheUnitedStates'identity as a
liberaldemocracy directlyinfluenced thepoliciesWashington employedto structure
thepostwarinternational order.AccordingtoAnne-Marie Burley, Americanpolicy-
makersbelievedthatthedomesticreforms of theNew Deal wouldonlysucceedif
compatibleregulatory institutionsexistedat theinternational level. Consequently,
theysetaboutconstructing multilateralinstitutionsthatembodiedthesamearchitec-
as thoseoftheNewDeal regulatory
turalprinciples state.38Theidentity oftheworld's
mostpowerful stateis thusconsidered a crucialfactor intheproliferation ofmultilat-
after1945.In Ruggie'swords,itwas "American
eralinstitutions hegemony thatwas
decisiveafterWorldWarII, notmerely Americanhegemony."39
Theseconstructivist arguments suffer fromtwoweaknesses.First,theconnection
Ruggiedrawsbetweenterritoriality, property rights,andmultilateralism sitsuncom-
fortablywiththeinstitutional historiesof boththemodemand ancientGreeksys-
tems.In thefirst150 yearsafterWestphalia-theso-calledage of absolutism-the
Europeanstatesystemdevelopedrelatively fewgenuinemultilateral institutions.As
I laterexplain,multilateralism "took off"duringthe nineteenth century, notthe
seventeenth.Ruggie'sargument is furthercontradicted bythepreviously statedfact
thatthecity-states of ancientGreecepracticedarbitration, notmultilateralism, to
stabilizeterritorial
property rights.Second,althoughBurleyprovidesa compelling
explanation forwhyAmericanpolicymakers were "ideologically"inclinedtoward
multilateralformsof international governance, and whytheUnitedStatesplayed
sucha catalyticrolein theirpost-1945proliferation, herargument impliesthatthe
architectural
principles advancedbytheUnitedStateswerenewtothecommunity of
states.American policymakers, however, elaborated institutional
principles thatwere
firstembracedandimplemented bythegreatpowersalmosta century earlier.
Constructivists
correctlyfocuson how primary shapestateiden-
social institutions
in
tity, turn basic
influencing institutional They
practices. have paid atten-
insufficient
to thediscursive
tion,however, mechanisms thatlinkintersubjectiveideasoflegiti-
36. Ibid.,24.
37. Burley1993.Burley'sargument is echoedinRuggie1993a,andfurtherdevelopedinRuggie1996.
followBurleyandRuggieinintegrating
Notall constructivists domesticsourcesofstateidentity
intotheir
explanatoryframeworks.Mostnotably, inhiscommitment tosystemic Wendtexplicitly
theorizing, brackets
domestic,or "corporate," sourcesof stateidentity, on theconstitutive
focusingentirely roleof interna-
Wendt1994,385.
tionalsocialinteraction;
38. Burley1993,125.
39. Ruggie1993a,31.
Organization
564 International
matestatehoodandrightful offundamental
stateactiontotheconstitution institutions.
Drawingon theinsightsof communicative actiontheory, theworkof
particularly
Habermas,andreflecting
Juirgen on thediscursivepracticessurroundinginstitutional
productionandreproduction intheancientGreekandmodernsocietiesofstates,the
following accountoffundamental
constructivist
sectionoutlinesan alternative insti-
tutions.
Construction
Actionand Institutional
Communicative
Whenstatesformulate, maintain,and redefinetheinstitutional norms,rules,and
principles cooperation
international
thatfacilitate theyengageina processofcommu-
nicativeaction.Thatis, theydebatehowlegitimate statesshould,or shouldnot,act.
Theorists ofcommunicative actionofferthreeinsights relevanttounderstanding the
practicaldiscoursethatsurrounds internationalinstitutionalconstruction.Thesein-
sights,Habermasinsists,are "notconcerned withwhatrational, reasonable,or cor-
rectargumentation is, butwithhow people,dumbas theyare,actuallyargue."40
First,"a communicatively achievedagreement mustbe based in theend on rea-
sons."41 Partieshave to justifytheparticular principlestheyadvocate,debatere-
volvesaroundthemeritsof particular reasons,and stableagreements, resultingin
legitimate rulesofconduct, reston thosereasonsdeemedtocarrythemost
ultimately
weight.Second,notall reasonshave equal standing;onlythosethatresonatewith
preexisting,mutually recognizedhigherordervaluesare consideredvalid. "In the
contextof communicative action,"Habermasargues,"onlythosepersonscountas
responsible who,as membersof a communicative community, can orienttheirac-
tionsto intersubjectivelyrecognizedvalidityclaims."42Third,thereasonsthatcarry
thegreatest weightinpracticaldiscoursearethosethatappealtodeep-rooted, collec-
tivelysharedideas thatdefinewhatconstitutes a legitimatesocial agent.43
Identity
valuesrepresent thecoreof the"lifeworld," the "storehouseof unquestioned cul-
turalgivensfromwhichthoseparticipating in communication drawagreed-upon
patterns foruse intheirinterpretive
ofinterpretation Theseinsights
efforts."44 under-
girdthediscussionthatfollows,informing myargument aboutthesocialidentity of
thestate,thedeep metavaluesthatstructure international societies,andthemecha-
nismsbywhichtheseconstitute basicinstitutionalpractices.
40. Habermas1984,27.
41. Ibid.,17.
42. Ibid.,14.
43. Connolly1993,190-91.
44. Habermas1991,136.
Structure
Constitutional Society 565
ofInternational
45. Wendt1994,385.
46. McCall andSimmons1966,69.
47. Strang1996,22.
566 International
Organization
Structures
Constitutional
To facilitatesystematic comparison acrosshistorical societiesofstates,I conceptual-
ize thecomplexesof values thatdefinestateidentity as constitutional structures.
Constitutional structures are coherent ensembles of intersubjective prin-
beliefs,
ciples,andnorms thatperform two functions inordering international societies:they
definewhat constitutes a legitimateactor, entitledto all therights and privileges of
statehood;and theydefinethebasic parametersof rightful stateaction.Theyare
"constitutional" becausetheyare systemsof basic principles thatdefineand shape
international polities,andtheyare "structures" becausethey"limitandmoldagents
andagenciesandpointtheminwaysthattendtowarda commonqualityofoutcomes
eventhoughtheefforts and aimsof agentsand agenciesvary."48 As Figure2 illus-
constitutional
trates, structures can be saidtoincorporate threeintersubjective norma-
tiveelements:a hegemonicbeliefaboutthemoralpurposeof centralized, autono-
mouspoliticalorganization; an organizing principleof sovereignty; and a normof
pureprocedural justice.
Hegemonicbeliefsaboutthemoralpurposeofthestaterepresent thecoreofthis
normative complex,providing thejustificatoryfoundations fortheprinciple ofsover-
eigntyand theprevailing normof pureprocedural justice.The termpurposerefers
heretothereasonsthathistorical agentsholdforconstructing andmaintaining autono-
mouspoliticalunits.Suchpurposesare"moral"becausetheyalwaysentaila concep-
tionoftheindividual orsocial"good" servedbyautonomous politicalorganizations.
Werefertothemoralpurposeofthe"state"becausesuchrationales areofa different
category to themoralpurposesof suzerainorheteronomous formsofpoliticalorga-
nization.Finally,thesebeliefsarehegemonic, notbecausetheyaretheonlyconcep-
tionsof themoralpurposeof thestatepropagated in a givenculturalandhistorical
context, butbecause,in a narrowsense,theyareembraced bythedominant coalition
of statesand,in a broadersense,theyconstitute theprevailing, sociallysanctioned
forsovereign
justification Againstthesehegemonic
rights. beliefs,alternativeconcep-
tionsof themoralpurposeof thestatehave historically assumedan oppositional
quality,theirproponents oftendecrying thewayinwhichprevailing beliefscondition
admissiontointernational societyandshapeitsbasicinstitutional practices.49
48. Waltz1979,74.
49. Notehow therevolutionary statesof Franceand theUnitedStateschallengedthedynasticprin-
ciplesofabsolutist societyin theeighteenth
international century;howthemajorAsianstateschallenged,
"standard
thenaccepted,theliberal-constitutionalist ofcivilization" earlymoderninterna-
thatstructured
tionalsocietyin thelatenineteenth
century; how theSovietUnionand SouthAfricabuckedagainstthe
sameduringtheCold War,subsequently embracing theyopposedfordecadesto gain
theveryprinciples
effectiveentryto contemporary internationalsociety.See Gilbert1951; Gong 1984; Klotz 1995; and
KoslowskiandKratochwil 1995.
Constitutional
Structure Society 567
ofInternational
Moral purpose
ofthestate
Organizing Normofprocedural
of
principle justice
sovereignty
FIGURE 2. Theconstitutive
structure society
ofinternational
50. Ruggie1983,274.
51. Thomson1994,151.
52. Rawls 1972,86.
Organization
568 International
Structures
Constitutional DesignandAction
and Institutional
societiesofsovereign
Historically, stateshaveevolveddifferent struc-
constitutional
tures,andthishasled themtodevelopdistinctive fundamental As domi-
institutions.
nantconceptions ofthemoralpurposeofthestatehavevaried,so toohavesystemic
normsofprocedural justice.Animatedbydifferent norms,stateshaveadopteddiffer-
practices.The ancientGreekinstitution
entinstitutional ofarbitrationservedessen-
tiallythesamefunction as themoderninstitutionofmultilateralism,
withbothbeing
employedto solve collaboration as well as coordination
problemsbetweenstates.
ofancientGreecewereconcerned
Thisis notto saythatthecity-states withthesame
substantiveissuesas modernstates,onlythattheyfacedthesamespectrum ofcoop-
erationproblems, weredesignedtoaddresstheseproblems.
andthattheirinstitutions
The crucialdifference betweenthetwo societiesof stateslay in theircontrasting
53. Ibid.,3.
Constitutional ofInternational
Structure Society 569
54. DiMaggioandPowell1991,11.
55. Heller1987,239.
Organization
570 International
ComparingtheAncientGreekand
ModernSocietiesofStates
56. Skinner1978,xii.
57. Ibid.,xii-xiii.
58. Wight1977,23.
Constitutional
Structure Society 571
ofInternational
59. Arendt1958,56.
572 International
Organization
The AncientGreekSocietyofStates
Structure
TheAncientGreekConstitutional
Aristotle'sethicalandpoliticalwritings providea usefulstarting pointfora discus-
sionofancientGreekviewsaboutthemoralpurposeofthestate.Aristotle holdsthat
idealhumanagents-whohe insistsarealwaysmale-combinereasonwithaction.61
The politicalimplications of thisbecomeclear onlyif we recognizethatforthe
ancientGreeksthegreatest expressionof reasonwas the "perception of good and
The rationalpursuitofjusticethrough
evil,just and unjust."62 actionwas deemed
possibleonlywithina particular sortof politicalcommunity-the polis. To begin
with,justicewas considered aninherently becauseonecannotactjustly
socialvirtue,
without treatingtheneedsandinterests ofothersequallyandfairly. Furthermore, the
pursuit ofjusticewas inextricably linkedto speech,thearticulationofmoralclaims
withina widerpublicpoliticaldiscourse.63 The questforjusticewas thusthought to
be an inherently andmeninherently
politicalactivity, politicalbeings.Thepoliswas
in turnconsideredthepreeminent formof humanorganization, because,Aristotle
claims,"in thestate,thegood aimedat is justice;and thatmeanswhatis forthe
60. Ruggie1993a,14.
61. 1962,17.
Aristotle
62. Aristotle
1981,60.
63. Ibid.
Constitutional
Structure Society 573
ofInternational
64. Ibid.,207.
65. See Humphreys 1983; Humphreys 1988;Maio 1983;Garner1987; Ober 1989;
1985;Humphreys
andOsborne1985.
66. Maio 1983,40.
67. Ostwald1986;andSealey 1987.
68. Humphreys 1983,248.
69. Ibid.
70. Humphreys 1985,313.
71. Hansen1992,16.
Organization
574 International
Arbitration
Interstate
The city-statespracticed interstate forwelloverfivehundred
arbitration years,with
documented cases stretching fromthesixthtothefirst centuriesB.C.E..7 Literaryand
historicalmaterials, in additionto extantinscriptions, recordthe detailsof some
eightycases,themajority ofwhichoccurredaftertheriseofthenewcivicideology
inthefifthcentury.75 brought
The institution together two,occasionallythree, parties
andan arbitrator, thelatterchargedwithadjudicating thecase anddetermining repa-
rations,whereappropriate. Two examplestestify to boththehistorical longevityof
thepracticeand therangeof issuesit encompassed.Herodotusdescribesan early
fifth
century B.C.E. disputebetweenAthensandMytileneoverthecolonyofSigeum,
whichtheformer hadseizedfromthelatterandrecolonized. He writesthatthe"war
betweenMytileneandAthenswas brought to an endbyPeriander, whowas invited
bybothpartiesto actas arbitrator; thecondition thathe proposedwas thateach side
shouldretainwhatit at themomentpossessed.In thisway Sigeumpassedintothe
powerofAthens."76 The secondcase, datedaround220 B.C.E., involvedtheregula-
tionof a varietyof relationsbetweenCnossosandTylissus.The decisionbyArgos
establishedrulesgoverning calendars,sacrifices,
property, and even "breachesof
Thepracticeofarbitration
hospitality."77 thusbridgedthetraumas ofthePeloponne-
sianWar,providing a mechanism forthesuccessful settlement ofa widespectrum of
issuesbetweenstrong andweakstatesalike.
The institution was structured
of arbitration bythesamediscursive normof pure
procedural justicethatinformed legal practiceswithinthe city-states. Arbitrators
ruledwithout reference toa bodyofcodifiedinterstate law,theabsenceofwhichhas
longbeennoted.78 The city-states
certainlyconcludeda largenumber oftreaties,
but
theseseldomenshrined generalprinciplesof international conduct.79 The systemof
80. Raeder1912,264.
81. The mostpowerfulstates,includingSpartaand Athens,wereseldomcalled on to arbitrate;
see
NiebuhrTod 1913,96.
82. Ibid.,132.
83. Donnelly1989,1.
84. Westermann 1907,199
85. Ibid.,208-209.
86. NiebuhrTod1913,186.
Organization
576 International
leagues,littleevidencesuggeststhatdecisionsconsistently favoredtheirinterests;
andarbitration was stillpracticedacrossleagues.87
Thucydides'History ofthePeloponnesianWartestifies tothenormative universal-
ityofthediscursive normofpureprocedural justiceandthepracticeofarbitration in
theancientGreeksocietyof states.Arbitration clearlyfailedto prevent theonsetof
thewarin431 B.C.E., butthroughout theHistory thepracticeappearsas an important
leitmotif,withstatesmeasuring therighteousness of theirpositions,and themoral
bankruptcy oftheiropponents', accordingto theirwillingness, or reluctance, to en-
Nowhereis thismoreapparentthanin theAthenians'frequent
gage in arbitration.
attempts to defendthemorality oftheirstand.In concluding thecity'sdefenseinthe
crucialDebateat Sparta,theydeclaretheirwillingness to settleoutstanding disputes
through aligningthemselves
arbitration, withthenormative principles ofthesociety
ofstates.88
Acknowledging theveracityofAthenian appeals,theSpartanking,Archi-
damus,respondsthatitis "therightthingto do sincetheAthenians themselves are
preparedto submitto arbitration, andwhenone partyoffers thisitis quiteillegalto
attackhimfirst, as thoughhe was definitely in thewrong."89Sadly,Sthenelaidis
successfully swaystheassembly, claimingthattheAthenians deservetobe punished
twofold, for"thoughtheywereoncegood,theyhavenowturned bad." 90Sometime
later,on theeve of thewar,Periclesseeksto bolsterAthenianunityandjustifythe
city'sstand.Again,thecity'swillingness to submititsclaimstoarbitration is usedto
assertitsrighteousness. Periclesdeclaresthatthe"Spartanshave neveronce asked
forarbitration,norhave theyacceptedour offersto submitto it. .. . Whenone's
equals,beforeresorting makeclaimson theirneighbors
to arbitration, andputthose
claimsintheformofcommands, itwouldbe slavishtogiveintothem,howeverbig
orhoweversmallsuchclaimsmaybe."91 Further references toarbitration as theway
civilizedstatessettletheirdisputesdottheremainder ofThucydides' History, andit
is notsurprisingthatthepracticewas reinstituted afterthewar,persisting longafter
thecity-statesyieldedtheirindependence toPhillipofMacedonandlatertheRoman
Senate.92
ModernInternationalSociety
TheModernConstitutional
Structure
Duringtheeighteenth a profound
century, ideologicalrevolutionerodedthenorma-
societyofstates.93
oftheabsolutist
tivefoundations economic,andpoliti-
Scientific,
87. Phillipson1911,90.
88. Thucydides1972,82.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.,86.
91. Ibid.,119.
92. Ralston1929,167-68.
themoralpurposeof theabsolutiststateare discussedin Bodin 1967;
93. The ideas thatconstituted
practicesof theabsolutist
Collins1989; and Kantorowicz1957.On theinstitutional societyof statessee
De Callieres1983;andHamiltonandLanghorne1995.
Constitutional
Structure Society 577
ofInternational
94. Hume1978,1-90.
95. Smith1976,8,477.
96. Rousseau1988,88.
97. LaqueurandRubin1979,119.
98. Cook andStevenson1983,62.
Organization
578 International
99. Holsti1991,145.
100. Thomson1962, 323. The powerand representative natureof theseparliamentaryinstitutions
variedfromone statetoanother,butas David Kaiserargues,"by 1914everyEuropeangovernment hadto
maintain a workingmajority inordertocarryon theessentialbusinessofthe
withinan electedparliament
state";Kaiser1990,275-76.
101. See Ward1795;andvonMartens1795.
102. Gilbert1951.
103. By one count,between1648 and 1814 Europeanstatesconcludedonly127 multilateral treaties,
less thanone per year.In theperiodbetween1814 and 1914,however,thefigure jumpedto 817; see
Mostecky1965.See also Murphy1994;andHill 1991,90.
Structure
Constitutional Society 579
ofInternational
Foundation.TheHague
The Hague Conferences werea crucialwatershed in theinfluence ofthelegislative
normof pureprocedural justiceon thebasic institutional practicesof international
society,forthereEuropeanstatesfirstcollectively endorsedthebasic institutional
practicesofmultilateralismandcontractual internationallaw.TheConcertofEurope
regular
hadinstitutionalized meetings ofthegreatpowers,butthesegatherings lacked
theuniversalistandlegislativeidealsthatinspiredtheHague Conferences. Initially
convenedtostemtheeconomically debilitatingandmilitarilydestabilizingarmsrace
betweentheEuropeanpowers,theywereexplicitly intendedto enabletherelatively
smallcommunity of recognizedsovereignstatesto formulate general,reciprocally
of
bindingrules international conduct.Diplomacy, assertedthepresident oftheFirst
Hague Conference, "is no longer merely an art in which personal abilityplaysan
exclusivepart;itstendency is to becomea sciencewhichshallhave fixedrulesfor
settlingdisputes... and it cannotbe disputedthatgreatprogresswill have been
madeifdiplomacysucceedsin establishing in thisConference someoftherulesof
whichI havejust spoken."104 In openingtheSecondHague Conference, theDutch
ministerofforeign affairsdeclaredthatsuchconferences were"convokedtodiscuss
rulesofinternationallaw andtogivethemprecision." 105To thisend,delegatesatthe
twoconferences formulated an extensivenewbodyofinternational laws governing
theconductofwarandthenatureanduse ofarmaments.
Theyalso movedto establisha judicialinstitution to interpretinternationallaw
and to adjudicatedisputesbetweenstates.The FirstHague Conference established
thePermanent CourtofArbitration, a bodythenconsisting oflittlemorethana listof
nominated arbitratorsfromwhichdisputing partiescould selecta tribunal to settle
Accordingto theconference's
theirdifferences. ThirdCommission, responsible for
draftingtheConvention forthePacificSettlement ofInternational Disputes,the"far-
therlaw progresses, and themoreit entersintothe societyof nations,themore
appearswovenintothestructure
clearlyarbitration ofthatsociety."106Reflecting the
canonsappliedto domesticcourts,thenewcourt'srolewas explicitly
jurisdictional
restricted
to theinterpretation of law,understood principallyas codified,reciprocal
104. Scott1917,9.
105. Ibid.,195.
106. Ibid.,55.
580 International
Organization
Versailles
Construction:
In 1919,afterfouryearsofunprecedented violenceandsuffering, theworld'sleaders
convenedat thePalace ofVersailles to constructa new, more peaceful international
order.109The basic institutionalframework established under the Covenant of the
on
League of Nationsbuilt the institutional pursued
initiatives at The Hague and
reflecteda consensusonbasicarchitectural principlesamong the key members ofthe
winning coalition-Britain, France, and theUnited States-not the hegemony of a
singlepower. The earliest drafts of the Covenant-Britain's Phillimore Report of
March 1918, and theJuly1918 draftby theAmericandiplomatColonel Edward
House-envisageda generalconference ofstatesandaninternational court,thesame
structurelateradvocatedbytheFrenchatVersailles. I Thisbasicinstitutional
10 frame-
workwas eventuallyaugmented by theadditionof an executivecouncilof great
powers.Firstadvocatedin a December1918 draftby GeneralJanSmuts,thestruc-
tureof a conference,a council,and a judicialsystemfoundexpression in all subse-
quentBritishandAmericandrafts.111 Thesedrafts differed,however, overthenature
ofthejudicialinstitution to be created,withtheBritishfavoring a permanent court,
andWoodrowWilsonproposing a loosersystemoftribunals. 112Immediately priorto
theopeningoftheParisConference, theBritishandAmericandelegations agreedon
a singledraftcovenant-theHurst-Miller draft-which incorporated London'svision
ofa permanent judicialcourtandprovidedthebasisforall future negotiations. 113
Holdingregularconferences of stateshadbeenon theagendasincetheendofthe
SecondHagueConference. In 1907,ElihuRoot,theU.S. secretary of state,toldthe
107. Ibid.,55.
108. Bozeman1960,84.
are Miller1928; Marburg1932; Baker1923;
109. The classic workson theParisPeace Conference
Lloyd George 1938; House and Seymour1921; Nicolson 1919; Duggan 1919; and Schwarzenberger
1936.
110. Baker1923,67-88, 152-62.
111. Ibid.,94-99.
112. Ibid.,117-43.
113. Ibid.,144-51.
Structure
Constitutional Society 581
ofInternational
thesamewords.Finally,thecourt'srolein interpreting
invirtually
jurisdiction codi-
law was madeabundantly
fiedinternational clearinitsstatute,
whichdirected judges
to applyinternational
conventions, internationalcustom"as evidenceof a general
practiceacceptedas law," "generalprinciplesof law recognizedby civilizedna-
tions,"andthe"judicialdecisionsandteachings ofthemosthighlyqualifiedpubli-
cistsof thevariousnations,as a subsidiary
meansforthedetermination of rulesof
law."119Each ofthesesourceswas thought toprovideevidenceofreciprocal accords
betweenstates,theessenceofmoderncontractual international
law.
Renovation:
San Francisco
Despiteclaimsthatidealisticfaithin multilateralism and international law contrib-
utedto theoutbreakof WorldWarII, thearchitects of thepost-1945international
orderdid notabandontheseinstitutional commitments. The new orderwas again
constructed aroundthebasic andbynowfamiliar architecturalprinciples laid down
atThe Hague:thatthereshouldbe a regularorpermanent conference ofstatesbased
on theprinciple ofmultilateralism, andthatthereshouldbe an international judicial
bodyto interpret contractual internationallaw. Upheldby theAtlanticCharter, the
Dumbarton Oaks Conference, andtheYaltaAgreements, theseprinciples weregiven
newlifethrough a substantialprocessofrenovation.
Negotiators attheSan FranciscoConference substantially
strengthened theperma-
nentconference of states,a move explicitlydesignedto facilitateand encourage
peace through international law. In comparisonto thelargelyreactiverole of the
League's assembly, theCharter oftheUnitedNationsgrantstheGeneralAssemblya
quasi-legislative role.In fulfillingtheorganization'sprimary purposeof solvingin-
ternationaldisputes"in conformity withtheprinciplesofjusticeand international
law (Article1)," theGeneralAssemblyis authorized to "initiatestudiesand make
recommendations forthepurposesof ... promoting international cooperation in the
politicalfieldandencouraging theprogressive development ofinternational law and
"120 It does thisin two ways.First,accordingto NagendraSingh,
its codification.
former president oftheInternational CourtofJustice, theGeneralAssemblyis em-
poweredtoadoptgenerallegalconventions, conveneinternationalconferences which
thenproducesuchconventions, The lastof these,Rosalyn
and pass resolutions.121
Higginsargues,arenotnecessarily binding, butwhentheyembodygeneralrulesof
conducttheybecomean important sourceofcustomary internationallaw.122 Second,
in 1947 the GeneralAssemblyestablishedtheInternational Law Commissionto
prepare"draftconventions on subjectswhichhave notyetbeenregulatedinterna-
tionallaw orinregardtowhichthelaw hasnotyetbeensufficiently developed,"and
to codify"international law in fieldswheretherealreadyhas been extensivestate
119. Wheeler-BennettandFanshawe1929,53.
120. Brownlie1983,2, 5.
121. Singh1993,392-93.
122. Higgins1963,5.
Constitutional
Structure
ofInternational
Society 583
Conclusion
125. Nardin1983,9.
126. Ibid.,19.
127. Wight1977,33.
128. Buzan 1993,349.
Structure
Constitutional Society 585
ofInternational
References