Ancient Philosophy 11 (1991)

©Mathesis Publications 85

Friendship, Self-Love, and Concern for Others

in Aristotle's Ethics

Dennis McKerlie

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics openly identifies Eu8aLI-lOVLa (eudaimonia) as

the ultimate goal for choice and action, but it is less clear whose eudaimonia we
should aim at. Should we, at least at the level of our most fundamental goals, aim
just at our own eudaimonia? Or should we have an equally fundamental concern
with the eudaimonia of other people?
Answers to this question amount to interpretations of the structure of Aristo-
tle' s ethical theory. One answer says that Aristotle gives to each agent the single
fundamental goal of making his or her own life realize eudaimonia. I will call
this view the 'egoistic eudaimonist' interpretation. The alternative interpretation
takes Aristotle to be an altruistic eudaimonist. He thinks that as weIl as aiming at
eudaimonia in our own lives we should also have as a fundamental aim that at
least some other people realize eudaimonia. This paper will argue for the second
way of understanding Aristotle.
Egoistic eudaimonism teIls me to subordinate all of n1y other goals to the basic
goal of living the best possible life myself. If achieving some other goal would
worsen my own life in terms of eudaimonia, I should not pursue the other goal.
Given Aristotle's view of the content of eudaimonia, egoistic eudaimonism does
not recommend selfishness in the ordinary sense. Aristotle does not think we
should fill our own lives with natural goods like wealth, honour, and pleasure.
Virtuous actions are more important factors in achieving eudaimonia. Living the
best possible life requires displaying the qualities of justice, courage, and friend-
ship in our relations with other people. And if virtuous actions are constituents of
eudaimonia, egoistic eudaimonism is compatible with the view that virtuous
aciions are worth performing for their own sake apart from any further desirable
consequences they might have for the agent.
Moreover, egoistic eudaimonism is also consistent with Aristotle' s view that
sometimes the desire that motivates the virtuous action must be concerned with
the good of another person. In a friendship we should help the friend, and we
should do this for the sake of the friend (NE 1155b29-31 and 1156b9-10). Egois-
tic eudaimonism is not a form of psychological egoism; it is a view about what
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our goals should be. It says that our ultimate goal should be eudaimonia in our
lives, and that we should ain1 at some other goal if it is a means to, or a con-
stituent of, our eudaimonia. But egoistic eudaimonism does not claim that all of
our desires are concemed with our own lives, so it allows us to desire subordinate
goals-for example, the good of another person-for that person's own sake.
Aristotle might believe that we must have certain motives, as well as act in cer-
tain ways, if we are to live in the best possible way ourselves. Perhaps having
these altruistic desires would be incompatible with always being conscious of our
ultimate goal of making our own lives better. In that case we might sometimes be
forced to ignore the fundamental goal in order to achieve it. But this complication
arises for other moral theories, and it is not a decisive objection against them. 1
Most commentators assume that Aristotle is an egoistic eudaimonist in the
sense that I have explained. They think that his moral theory simply tells us to
care about our own eudaimonia, and the things that we owe to other people are
included inside that basic goal in the form of the virtues. 2 It is unusual for writers
to argue explicitly for this interpretation of Aristotle. They see it as the obvious
way of understanding the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics. Book 1 says that
the chief good is eudaimonia and it explains eudaimonia itself as activity of the
soul in accordance with excellence. The other books give a detailed account of
eudaimonia by describing the different virtues. Book 1 chapter 7 suggests that
agents should organize all of their goals under some conception of eudaimonia or
living well. The goals that I aim at for their own sake will be constituents of my
conception of eudaimonia while my other goals will be means to eudaimonia or
its necessary conditions. If I act to achieve this complex system of goals it is my
own life that will realize eudaimonia. So it may seem to follow that Aristotle
thinks that people should have as their organizing aim achieving eudaimonia in
their own lives.
It might be suggested that Aristotle' s con1n1itment to egoistic eudaimonism
can be explained at a deeper level by his view of rationality. According to some
commentators Aristotle believes that a rational agent acts in the way that best

1 In Derek Parfit's terminology Aristotle's moral theory would be 'indireetly self-defeating' if it

were interpreted in this way (Parfit 1984, eh. 1).
2 Despite what I take to be widespread agreement among writers on Aristotle, c1ear statements of

the egoistie eudaimonist interpretation are diffieult to find. Often eommentators do not explieitly
answer the specifie question that I have asked about the strueture of Aristotle' s ethieal theory. Some-
times they reserve the name 'egoism' for the view that our desires aetually are foeused exclusively on
our own lives, and this obseures the faet that they do understand the Nicomachean Ethics in the way
that I have deseribed. W.D. Ross is explieit and sueeinet: 'It is at his own eudaimonia, we are told,
that man aims and should aim' (Ross 1949, 230). W.F.R. Hardie seems to agree with Ross about the
Aristotelian view of what our goal should be, and he argues that Aristotle is not eommitted to psyeho-
logieal egoism (Hardie 1980, 325-328). Interpretations that begin with the deseription of eudaimonia
in book 1 and treat the other books as a diseussion of problems internal to Aristotle' s aeeount of
human well-being sometimes take it for granted that Aristotle's view has the egoistie eudaimonist
strueture. I think that this is true of lohn Cooper (Cooper 1975). In the ease of writers who diseuss
friendship Charles Kahn' s view that Aristotle believes in the logicalor rational priority of egoism
over altruism is an example of the egoistie eudaimonist interpretation (Kahn 1981, 23).
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.prornotes his own good. 3 Practical rationality consists in discovering the correct
conception of our own good and choosing the actions that will further it. If Aris-
totle understands rationality in this way, then by adopting a moral theory with the
structure of egoistic eudaimonism he can show that it is rational for us to act
ethically.
It is undeniable that Aristotle' s goal is to describe the best possible life and that
book 1 is his preliminary sketch of the best life. I think, however, that book 1
does not settle the question of what we are to do with the description once we
have it. We should use it in planning our own lives, and in so far as my own life
is in question my ultimate goal will simply be to make it an example of the best
kind of life. In many places in book 1 Aristotle clearly is thinking about an agent
who is aiming at eudaimonia in his own life. 4 This emphasis is understandable
even if Aristotle is not an egoistic eudaimonist. In book 1 Aristotle is trying to
characterize human good or well-being in general, and it is simplest for hirn to
consider the case of agents choosing between riyal candidates like pleasure, hon-
our, and virtue in their own lives. But book 1 does not explicitly say that the final
goal of all my practical thinking should be my own eudaimonia. Perhaps Aristo-
tle believes that I should consider my own eudaimonia when my own life is in
question, and that I am also obligated to make the good of others-their eudai-
monia-a fundamental aim. Eudaimonia would still be the ultimate goal of all
my actions, but I would not always be aiming at my own eudaimonia.
In fact there are some signs in book 1 that Aristotle is not taking egoistic eudai-
monism for granted. In NE i 2 he says that realizing the chief good for astate is a
greater achievement than realizing it for an individual (1 094b7-11). This passage
considers the possibility of an agent who self-consciously chooses as a funda-
mental goal something other than making his own life as good as it can be, and
Aristotle does not think he is unreasonable in making this choice. Perhaps Aristo-
tle thinks that the person who achieves this broader goal thereby makes his own
life as good as it can be, so that the passage can be reconciled with egoistic eudai-
monism. But it still shows that book 1 is not exclusively concemed with agents
who are considering their own eudaimonia.
If book 1 does not decide the question about the structure of Aristotle' s ethical
theory, we must look at the discussions of the virtues for an answer. Since the
egoistic eudaimonist interpretation agrees that a good person will perform virtu-

3 Aeeording to Cooper reasoning about action should start from a eoneeption of human flourish-
ing, and he deseribes the reasoning indifferently as praetieal reasoning or moral reasoning (Cooper
1975, 76-88). Although Cooper does not emphasize the point, the agent in his examples is eoneerned
with his own flourishing. T.H. Irwin also thinks that for Aristotle rational ageney is eoneerned with
the good of the agent (Irwin 1988, eh. 15 and eh. 16-see for example 336-339).
4 For example, at 1097a34-1097b6 Aristotle says that we never ehoose eudaimonia for the sake
of anything else. But there would be no absurdity in my ehoosing that someone else should aehieve
eudaimonia in order that I should get pleasure. What is uneontroversial is that we do not ehoose
eudaimonia for ourselves for the sake of some other good for ourselves. Here Aristotle is thinking
about people eoneerned with reaehing eudaimonia themsel ves.
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ous actions that benefit other people, it is not clear what kind of evidence we
should be looking for. There will be evidence if Aristotle tries to explain why vir-
tuous actions are noble and must be performed. Both interpretations attribute a
teleological moral view to Aristotle: we are told to aim at a certain goal, and to
decide which actions to perform by reference to that goal. So the relationship of
an action to that goal will explain why the action should be performed. In the
case of justice, if Aristotle is an egoistic eudaimonist we would expect hirn to say
that a just action is noble and should be performed because of the contribution
that the action would make to eudaimonia in the agent' s life. If he were to say
instead that the action is noble because of its effects on other lives, it would be
evidence that he is not an egoistic eudaimonist. At least if he were an egoistic
eudain10nist he could not think that the property that makes the action fine and
noble also constitutes the reason why I should perform the action. 5
Unfortunately it is not clear that the Nicomachean Ethics attempts to give some
further explanation of the nobility of virtuous actions. Sometimes it seems that
Aristotle sees virtuous actions as having an intrinsic value that is not explained
by their connection to eudaimonia-rather, it is their intrinsic value that explains
why they contribute to our eudaimonia when we perform them. I think that Aris-
totle does believe that just actions are noble because of their effect on other peo-
pIe, but rather than pursuing this argument I shall discuss friendship. Friendship
is a special case among the virtues because Aristotle does think it necessary to
defend its claim to be an essential ingredient of the best life. His explanation of
the value of friendship might reveal something about the structure of his moral
theory. I shall argue that it shows that he is not an egoistic eudaimomist.
Aristotle says that in the friendship of virtue we have a concern for another
person that is like the concern that we have for ourselves. This view is expressed
by his metaphor 'a friend is another self' (1166a31-32, 1170b7-8), and it plays a
cmcial role in his defense of the value of friendship. I shall argue that he means
that in this kind of friendship we should feel a concern for another person that
does not differ importantly in its nature from the concern we feel for ourselves. If
Aristotle thinks of friendship and self-Iove as virtual equivalents, it seems that he
would also believe that we should care about the friend' s realizing eudaimonia in
much the same way that we care about realizing it ourselves. So the friend' s
eudaimonia should be almost as fundamental a goal as our own eudaimonia.
Supporters of the egoistic eudaimonist interpretation will reply that the view of
friends as other selves is really Aristotle' s way of reconciling egoistic eudai-

5 Troels Engberg-Pedersen believes that an action is noble if it shares certain natural goods
equally between different people (Engberg-Pedersen 1983, part 1 ch. 2). It is not clear whether he
draws the conclusion that Aristotle is not an egoistic eudaimonist. He says (117-118) that the criterion
for deciding what to do is the greatest good of the community, and that a virtuous person will act
according to this criterion even if it means sacrificing his personal advantage. But Engberg-Pedersen
does not make it clear whether the virtuous person only forsakes his advantage with respect to the nat-
ural goods, or whether he is also ready--even if Aristotle believes that the occasion can never arise-
to sacrifice his own advantage with respect to eudaimonia itself in order to benefit the community.
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.monism and friendship. In the friendship of virtue we care about another person
in a way that does indeed reserrlble our concern for ourselves, but this is because
our self-concern has been extended to include the friend. As a result the good of
the friend becomes apart of our own good. The metaphor does not say that con-
cern for another person can be as in1portant for morality and rationality as self-
concern; it says that if self-concern is properly understood it will be found to
include the kind of friendship that Aristotle describes. If Aristotle thinks that in
friendship the good of others is included in our own good, and friendship can be
used as a model for our relations with other people in general, then the view of
friends as other selves would help to show how egoistic eudaimonism can
accommodate the kind of other-regarding concern that is part of the virtues. 6
How can the friend's eudaimonia be included in my own eudaimonia? The
activities in the friend' s life that constitute eudaimonia will not be literally the
same as the activities that constitute eudaimonia in my life. 7 One simple explana-
tion is that for Aristotle eudaimonia requires success in achieving our most
important goals. If we form this kind of friendship one of our most important
goals is that the friend should live weIl. So my friend must realize eudaimonia if
I an1 to realize eudaimonia myself. If we care in enough ways about the friend,
his success is indispensable to our own success. In that sense the friend's eudai-
monia can become apart of our own eudaimonia, or at least a necessary condi-
tion of our achieving eudaimonia. 8
Nevertheless, I shall argue that even this sophisticated version of egoistic
eudaimonism misinterprets Aristotle. The connection that it draws between the
friend' s eudaimonia and our own is not what Aristotle is thinking of when he
calls the friend another self. There is a different literal truth behind his metaphor,
and it is a truth incompatible with egoistic eudaimonism.

6 Ross seems to interpret Aristotle in this way (Ross 1949,230-232). 'Aristotle's theory here is
an attempt to break down the antithesis between egoisnl and altruism by showing that the egoism of a
good man has just the same characteristics as altruism.' Ross thinks that Aristotle appeals to the view
that in friendship our interests are extended to include another person. 'EIsewhere Aristotle seems to
follow a better way, by suggesting that the self is not a static thing but capable of indefinite extension.
When he speaks of men's treating their friends as "other selves" or as "parts of themselves," he is
pointing to the fact that a man may so extend his interests that the welfare of another may beconle as
direct an object of interest to hirn as his own welfare. ' Irwin agrees that Aristotle' s basic idea is that
friendship involves an extension of our self-concern to include another person (lrwin 1988, 391-393).
And he sees this view of friendship as a crucial part of Aristotle's general project of rationally justify-
ing the moral virtues by showing that they are included in the fullest realization of our own good (ch.
18).
7 Aristotle does think that the virtuous activity of one friend can stimulate the other to similar
achievements (1170a6-13), and he believes that friends should share in discussion and thought
(I 170b 10-14). But he does not seem to think that the virtuous activities of friends will typically be
collaborative: two people jointly writing a book, or cooperating to achieve some political goal.
8 Irwin describes a different way in which the friend's good could be included in my own good
(Irwin 1988, 391-395). Rational agency is a prominent part of my good, and in this kind of friendship
my choices and actions will influence the virtuous actions of the friend, thereby increasing the scope
of my own rational agency.
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Aristotle argues for the value of the friendship of virtue in NE ix 9 (I will take
for granted his distinction between the friendship of virtue and the other kinds of
friendship and his initial characterization of the friendship of virtue in NE viii 3,
4, and 5). Two other parts of the discussion of friendship are clearly important for
the questions I have asked: book 9 chapter 4, where Aristotle compares friend-
ship and self-concern; and book 9 chapter 8, where Aristotle asks whether the
virtuous person loves hirnself more than anyone else.
Chapter 4 begins with Aristotle saying 'friendly relations with one' s neigh-
bours, and the marks by which friendships are defined, seem to have proceeded
from a man's relation to hirnself' (1166al-3 [Ross trans.], see also 1168b5-6).
This remark might mean that friendship originates in self-concern, and some
con1mentators have understood it in that way.9 Since egoistic eudaimonism is not
a theory about psychological motivation, it does not need to claim that friendship
has psychological roots in self-concern. But if Aristotle does make the psycho-
logical claim, it would give some support to the egoistic eudaimonist interpreta-
tion of his ethical theory.
However, chapter 4 does not defend any view about the psychological origin of
friendship. It lists five defining characteristics of friendship-wishing and doing
what is good for the sake of the friend, wishing the friend to exist for the friend' s
sake, living with and being like the friend, and rejoicing and grieving in sympa-
thy with the joys and sorrows of the friend-and then says that they are also
found in a man' s relation to hirnself, or at least in the good man' s relation to him-
self (1166al0-33). Aristotle does not argue that self-concern motivates friend-
ship. His point is that these characteristics are regarded as defining friendship
because they characterize a man's relation to hirnself (1166a29-33). To treat
someone as a friend is to treat that person as you would treat yourself. This claim
no more implies that friendship has roots in self-concern than it implies that self-
concern has roots in friendship.
W.F.R. Hardie calls the arguments in chapter 4 'queer sounding' (Hardie 1980,
324). It does sound strange to say that a person sympathizes with hirnself over his
misfortunes, or enjoys his own company. The chapter reads oddly because it
describes the good man's relation to hirnself in the language that is ordinarily
used to describe the relationship between two different people. This unusual way
of talking is forced on Aristotle by his claim that the distinguishing characteris-
tics of friendship can also be found in self-concern. But it might nevertheless be
significant. If Aristotle were trying to connect friendship with self-concern, we
would expect hirn to do the opposite, to transfer the language appropriate to self-
concern to the case of friendship. l-Iis willingness to describe self-Iove in inter-
personal terms suggests that he does not see a fundamental difference between

9 Ross says 'The most interesting part of the discussion [of friendship] is that in which Aristotle
propounds the view that friendship is based on the love of the good man for hirnself' (Ross 1949,
231). Hardie agrees that chapter 4 argues for this view (Hardie 1980,324). Ju1ia Annas (1977, 540)
and Kahn (1981, 21 and 22-23) say that the chapter attempts to derive friendship from self-10ve,
although they also give a different account of the purpose of the chapter.
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.our love for ourselves and our friendship for another person.
Chapter 4 helps to explain the parallel that Aristotle frequently draws between
friendship and self-concern. It justifies the comparison by saying that self-con-
cern and friendship independently have the important characteristics that Aristo-
tle lists. The explanation does not imply that self-concern is involved in
friendship at some deeper level. Rather it suggests that our concern for another
person can be primitive rather than derived, in the way that self-concern itself
is. 10 Just as the psychological dependence of friendship on self-Iove would not
establish the egoistic eudaimonist interpretation, the psychological independence
of friendship does not refute it. Aristotle could think that our desire for the
friend's good is utterly free of self-concern, and still be an egoistic eudaimonist
when it comes to his ethical theory. But chapter 4 does treat friendship as a rela-
tionship between different people that can share the most important characteris-
tics of self-concern. This way of thinking of friendship would be odd on the part
of someone who believed that reason uniquely picks out my own life as the fun-
damental object for my concern.
If we are not convinced that book 1 imposes the egoistic eudaimonist structure
on the rest of the Nicomachean Ethics, defenders of the egoistic eudaimonist
interpretation will appeal to book 9 chapter 8 to support their view. There Aristo-
tle asks whether the good man should love himself more than he loves anyone
else. Characteristically he gives reasons for answering 'yes' and reasons for
answering 'no' and then bases his own answer on a distinction.
In one way the good man does not love himself most. He does not take the
largest share of money, pleasure, honour, and the other natural goods. In another
way he does love himself most. He assigns to himself the largest share of noble
actions. He may stand aside to let someone else act courageously, but he only
does this if it is better to stand aside than not to, so really he is doing the noblest
thing after all (1169a32-34). And since he is a good man, he values noble action
more than those other goods.
Apparently Aristotle is saying that in the most important sense the virtuous
person does love himself most. His examples show that he thinks the good man
always acts in the way that would make his own life stand best with respect to
eudaimonia. Even if he chooses to die for the sake of others, he obtains a great
prize for himself by doing so (1169a18-26), so there is no loss in terms of his
own eudaimonia. These are the claims we would expect an egoistic eudaimonist

10 Annas thinks that the philosophical point of the comparison between friendship and self-Iove
is to emphasize that the desires involved in friendship are purely other-directed (Annas 1977, 542-
544). In the case of self-concem I desire my own good for my own sake; if friendship is like self-con-
cern then I desire the friend' s good for the friend' s sake. Kahn (1981, 29) agrees that this is the main
idea in the chapter. Annas points out that in chapter 4 Aristotle does not argue that friendship really is
like self-concem in this respect, and she thinks that this is something that Aristotle simply takes for
granted-in her view, justifiably-throughout the discusssion of friendship in book 9 (543). I will
suggest that in chapter 9 Aristotle does try to explain how friendship can be said to be fundamentally
like self-concern.
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to make.
Nonetheless, I think that the actions required by Aristotle's moral theory would
not always do most to further the agent' s eudaimonia, so that there is a problem
for egoistic eudaimonism. Aristotle reHes on this definitional point: given a
choice between actions the good man will always choose the noblest action. But
choosing the noblest action is not necessarily assigning to myself the largest
share in noble action. In a battle I might have a choice between an act of courage
that would sacrifice my life and cowardly, or at least less than brave, behaviour
that would bring me safely horne. The second choice might enable me to do
many noble things in the rest of my life, including intellectual achievements that
would outweigh the missed opportunity to display courage. My life as a whole
would be nobler if I were less noble than I could be now. I think Aristotle would
say that I should fight, even though this choice seems to make my own life worse
in terms of eudaimonia. 11 To avoid this conclusion we must argue that Aristotle
thinks that avoiding the battle is the right choice, or claim that fighting and dying
would make my life stand better with respect to eudaimonia. The first alternative
is implausible in itself and it is hard to see how the second could succeed, given
Aristotle' s view that intellectual virtue has more value than ethical virtue. Aristo-
tle also believes that eudaimonia requires a complete life (book 1 chs. 7, 9, 10),
and death in battle prevents me from fully satisfying that condition. If I would
live a complete life by passing up this chance to act bravely, and ifthat life would
be filled with many acts of moral and intellectual virtue, nothing in what the
Nicomachean Ethics says about eudaimonia explains why one decision to avoid
courage should spoil the value of my life as a whole.
If Aristotle is an altruistic eudaimonist, he would have no difficulty reaching
the conclusion that I should fight. It would make my own life stand worse with
respect to eudaimonia, but its consequences for the eudaimonia of other people
would make it the best thing to do. So it will be much easier for Aristotle' s view
to account for our ordinary judgments about how we should act if it has the altru-
istic eudaimonist structure. This is a reason for hoping that the altruistic eudai-
monist interpretation is correcl.
Nevertheless, chapter 8 shows that Aristotle himself refuses to admit that
someone might end up worse off in terms of eudaimonia by acting virtuously,
and his view needs to be explained. Egoistic eudaimonism could explain
his unwillingness, but chapter 8 does not prove that Aristotle is an egoistic
eudaimonist.
Chapter 8 concludes that in the most important way the good man cares more
about himself than anyone else. This conclusion is not equivalent to egoistic
eudaimonism. Egoistic eudaimonism gives to each person the single fundamental
goal of realizing eudaimonia in his own life. It says that our concern for other
people should be included within a more fundamental concern with living in the
best possible way ourselves. Chapter 8 only says that it is reasonable that we

11 My doubts are shared by Hardie 1980,329-331 aod Cooper 1975,173-174025.

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.should care less about other people than we care about ourselves. It does not sug-
gest that our concern for others should be rationally subordinated to our concern
for ourselves. The chapter' s conclusion is compatible with its also being true that
we are required to have a concern for other people and their lives independently
of our concern with living weIl ourselves.
One aspect of the chapter even counts against the egoistic eudaimonist inter-
pretation. When he first explains the case for thinking that the good man will care
most about hirnself, Aristotle says that the good man should care more about a
friend than about other people in general, and that he stands to hirnself in the rela-
tions which constitute friendship even more closely than he stands in those rela-
tions to anyone else (1168b 1-6). It is appropriate for hirn to care most about
hirnself because in a sense he is his own best friend (1168b9-1 0). If Aristotle
believed that our ultimate concern is just the quality of our own lives, we would
not expect hirn to defend the reasonableness of caring most about ourselves by
appealing to the analogy between self-concern and friendship. His use of the
comparison suggests that he does not see a difference in principle between our
concern for ourselves and friendship for another person.
Chapter 8 does prove that Aristotle believes that virtuous actions will always
make the agent' s life stand better with respect to eudaimonia. My claim is that
this belief by itself does not make hirn an egoistic eudaimonist. The crucial ques-
tion is why he believes that acting virtuously and acting in our own best interest
coincide. If he were an egoistic eudaimonist, he would also think that the fact that
an action would contribute to the agent' s eudaimonia makes it the right action for
that person to perform. Chapter 8 does not justify attributing this view to Aristo-
tle, and there is a simpler way of explaining what he says. Whatever Aristotle
may think about the source of the value of a virtuous action, he believes that by
perforn1ing the action we add value to our own lives. So acting virtuously will
make the agent' s life stand better in terms of eudaimonia in one respect. Chapter
8 can be interpreted as showing us that Aristotle makes the stronger assumption
(I think mistakenly) that the value of performing the virtuous action will always
be sufficient to outweigh any bad consequences that it might have for the agent.
So he is led to his conclusion that all things considered acting virtuously will
bring the agent closer to eudaimonia. But this explanation of the conclusion does
not involve a commitment to egoistic eudaimonism. It is compatible with his
moral theory having the structure of altruistic eudaimonism.
Chapter 4 and chapter 8 are consistent with its being true that we should have a
direct concern with the lives of other people, and some things in the chapters sug-
gest this view. But they do not establish it. For the strongest case against the ego-
istic eudaimonist interpretation we must consider Aristotle' s defense of the value
of friendship in book 9 chapter 9.
In NE ix 9 Aristotle argues that we need friends to achieve eudaimonia. He
gives several arguments for this conclusion. Most mention particular ways in
which the good man will be better off if he has friends. With friends he can do
some noble things that he could not otherwise do, namely, those actions which
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are noble, or nobler, because they are a matter of helping one's friends (1169al0-
13). Aristotle thinks that virtuous friends are a stimulus to sustained achievement
(1170a4-7). He also thinks that we shall improve in excellence through the com-
pany of those who are themselves excellent (1170aI1-13). So with friends the
good man will be more likely to fill his life with activity in accordance with
excellence.
A puzzling argument (1169b30-1170a4) says that the good man will fulfill his
goal of contemplating noble actions if he contemplates the noble actions of a
friend, and it adds that this is an easier thing to do than contemplating one' s own
actions. Discussion of this argument has concentrated on the idea that we can
understand virtuous conduct better if we study it in someone other than our-
selves. 12 What is n10re important for my purposes is the suggestion that the
friend' s actions count as though they were my own actions: 'he chooses to con-
template worthy actions and actions that are his own, and the actions of a good
man who is the friend have both these qualities' (1170a2-4). This passage resem-
bles the view that adefender of the egoistic eudaimonist interpretation would
attribute to Aristotle: the actions that constitute eudaimonia in the friend' s life
also count towards my own eudaimonia. But Aristotle does not say enough to
make his meaning clear, and he does not see it as his most important argument.
All the arguments contend that the good man will have a better life hirnself if
he has friends. That is what we would expect of arguments intended to show that
friends are essential for realizing eudaimonia. But it also fits the egoistic eudai-
monist interpretation. Friendship~ven the friendship of virtue-is defended as
a way of making one' s own life match the description of eudaimonia.
The final argument in chapter 9 is remarkable for its length and complexity. In
the text it runs from 1170a13 to 1170b19, and it is unusual because it is set out as
aseries of syllogisms. The argument has been severely criticized by most com-
n1entators. They find it convoluted and repetitive, but they also have more seri-
ous objections. Like the other arguments in chapter 9, the argument is supposed
to show that we need friends to reach eudaimonia. But at a crucial stage it
appeals to the thought that a friend is another self (1170b7-8). Perhaps this is true
in the friendship of virtue, but it only becomes true after the friendship has been
formed. And since this step is needed to reach the conclusion, the argument could
only show that someone who already has friends needs those friends in order to
achieve eudaimonia. The argument would not give reasons for someone without
friends to form friendships, but it may seem that this is what a defense of friend-
ship must do. 13
Despite its faults the argument is important for understanding Aristotle' s view
of friendship. I think that it shows us what he means by calling a friend another

12 Cooper (1980, 321-324) thinks that this argument is one of the strongest in Aristotle' s defense
of friendship.
13 Cooper is one of the fiercest critics (Cooper 1980, 317-320n8). He thinks that the argument is
ruined by this difficulty.
 95

·self. When we understand Aristotle's parallel between self-concern and friend-

ship we will see that he is an altruistic, not an egoistic, eudaimonist.
Surprisingly, almost all of the argument describes how the good man stands to
hirnself. It makes a long series of claims about the kind of life that he lives and
his attitude to his own life. Life is good and pleasant in itself and so it is good and
pleasant for hirn (1170aI9-22). Life for a person consists in thinking and perceiv-
ing (1170aI6-17). Someone who perceives or thinks will be aware that he per-
ceives or thinks (1170a29-32), and will consequently be aware that he exists
(1170a32-1170b 1). This second-order awareness is pleasant because it is seeing
something good, life, present in oneself (1170b 1-3). If life is desirable for the
good man, and if he stands to his friend as he stands to hirnself, the existence of
his friend will be desirable for hirn in much the same way that his own existence
is (1170b3-8). His own existence is desirable because he is aware of his goodness
(1170b8-10), so he must also perceive his friend's goodness, and this requires
thinking and talking and living with the friend (1170b 10-14). And if the exis-
tence of the friend is desirable for the good man, then he needs to have friends to
achieve eudaimonia (1170b 17-19).
This sumnlary suggests that the argument takes for granted that the friend is
another self. Then it draws the conclusion that a truth about self-concern-that
the good man values his own existence-will also be a truth about friendship-
the good man values the existence of the friend. However, I think that the argu-
ment does not just assurne that a friend counts as another self. It is intended to
make this view of friendship plausible, to explain how it is true that the good man
cares about his friend' s existence in virtually the same way that he cares about
his own existence. It does this by giving an explanation of the good man' s self-
concern. The elements in the explanation can also be found in his relation to his
friend. If his self-concern and his friendship have the same basis, we can under-
stand why Aristotle says that he cares about his friend in the way that he cares
about hirnself.
The explanation of self-concern is provided by Aristotle's elaborate descrip-
tion of the good man' s attitude to his own life. His awareness that he is alive is
pleasant because life---especially the kind of life that he lives-is good, so that
he is perceiving something good present in hirnself (1170b 1-3). Existence is
pleasant and good for a good man because he is pleased at the awareness of what
is good in itself (1170b4-5). Aristotle is more explicit after he has already drawn
the conclusion at 1170b7-8 that the good man cares about his friend's existence
in the way that he cares about his own existence: his own existence is desirable
because he perceives his own goodness (1170b8-9).
The good man' s concern for hirnself depends on his awareness of the goodness
of his thoughts and perceptions. The same is true of his concern for his friend.
The friend's life also consists in the activities of thinking and perceiving. Since
the friend is good these activities will contain goodness. By living with the friend
he will be aware of the goodness of the friend' s thoughts and perceptions. This
awareness is of course very different from his consciousness of his own thoughts
96

and perceptions, but Aristotle uses the same word (auvuLa8avEa8uL) for both
(1170b4-5, 1170b10-11 ).14 His concern for the friend is bound up with his aware-
ness of the goodness of his friend's thoughts and perceptions. So there is a sense
in which his self-concern and his friendship have the same basis. That is why it is
appropriate to call the friend another self and to say that the good man cares
about his friend' s existence in almost the same way that he cares about his own
existence.
Aristotle does not say that he will explain why the good man stands to his
friend as he stands to hirnself. But he does give the account of the good man's
self-Iove that I have described. The details in the account-for example, the
introduction of the second-order awareness that one is thinking and perceiving-
are not needed to draw the conclusion at 1170b7-8 that the existence of the friend
is desirable for the good man. According to Ross' s analysis of the argument' s
structure, the conclusion follows from two premises: the good man finds his own
existence desirable, and the good man stands to his friend as he stands to hirnself
(Smith and Ross 1925, note to 1170b 19). Ross thinks that the second premise is
supplied by book 9 chapter 4, and that nothing in this argument supports it. Aris-
totle was in a position to assert the first premise as early as 1170a25-27, on the
strength of the claim that life is good and pleasant and especially so for a good
person. If Aristotle is trying to convince us that the good man can be said to stand
to his friend as he stands to hirnself, then there is a reason for hirn to say as much
as he does about self-concern. 15
The most striking thing in the argument is the strength of Aristotle's prelimi-
nary conclusion at 1170b7-8: 'as his own being is desirable for each man, so
(Ku8aTTEp; OÜTW), or almost so (TTupUTTATlalws), is that of the friend'. It could
mean that the good man values the friend's existence to almost the same extent
that he values his own existence, or that he values the friend's existence in almost
the same way or manner in which he values his own existence. I think that Aris-
totle believes that the parallel holds in both respects. In chapter 4 the parallel
between friendship and self-Iove was explained in terms of the two having com-
nl0n characteristics. The argument in chapter 9 gives a deeper explanation. Both
self-Iove and friendship centre on recognizing goodness in the activities which
constitute one' s own, or another person' s, life. If friendship and self-Iove are the
same at this deeper level, then there is a literal truth behind the metaphor that
compares our concern for a friend to our concern for ourselves. The argument

14 W.F.R. Hardie thinks that the argument collapses because we cannot be aware of the friend's
thoughts and perceptions in the same way that we are aware of our own thoughts and perceptions
(Hardie 1980, 331-332n7). But the argument does not need to claim that the nature of the awareness
is literally the same.
15 The introduction of the second-order awareness is necessary if the argument is to show that
the good man must live with his friend (I 170b 10-12). Living together is required to have the right
kind of awareness of the friend' s thoughts and perceptions. But I 170b 10-12 is a corollary of the argu-
ment, and it is unlikely that the argument takes the course it does before 1170b8 merely in order to
prove it.
 97

completes the project begun in chapter 4. But Aristotle's project is not to derive
friendship from self-concern, or to justify friendship on the basis of self-concern,
it is to persuade us to think of friendship as an equal to self-concern.
If I am right about the importance of 117Gb7-8, and how it should be under-
stood, then we should reject the egoistic eudaimonist interpretation of Aristotle' s
ethical view. It is true that like the other arguments in chapter 9 this argument
reaches the conclusion that our own lives will be better if we have friends. In that
respect the argument fits egoistic eudaimonism. But the ideas that the argument
uses to reach that conclusion clash with egoistic eudaimonism. The key to the
argument is the thought that the friend is another self. Aristotle does not say that
a friend is another self because we care so deeply about the friend's good that his
achieving eudaimonia becomes essential to achieving eudaimonia ourselves. The
argument does not take the supreme importance of self-Iove for granted and
place friendship inside self-concern. It analyzes self-concern to justify treating
friendship as its equivalent. Aristotle claims that in a friendship I have a concern
for another life that is like my concern for my own life, and he supports this claim
by explaining both self-concern and friendship in terms of the recognition of
goodness in thoughts and perceptions. I6 The friendship is as fundamental as self-
concern because it rests on the same basis as my self-concern. If friendship is like
self-concern, then I should not care about the friend's life because of what it con-
tributes to my own life. I should care about it for its own sake in the way that I
care about my own life. And I should care about the friend's eudaimonia in the
way that I care about my own eudaimonia. If Aristotle thinks of friendship in this
way, then his ethical theory would not give people the single fundamental goal of
making their own lives as good as they can be. I7

16 In explaining the argument in chapter 9, Irwin also suggests that it is Aristotle's view that it is
reasonable for me to regard someone else as another self because I can have the same reasons for lov-
ing that person as I have for loving myself (lrwin 1988, 395-397-it is not clear why Irwin thinks the
reasonableness of this attitude needs to be defended, since he has already argued on 393-395 that
regarding someone as another self provides me with additional opportunites for rational agency and
self-realization). When Aristotle makes this strong claim I think it is appropriate to wonder whether
the argument really is operating in the context of the view that my own good is the primary rational
object for my concern.
17 Kahn also tries to find an interpretation of the argument in chapter 9 that would justify the
importance that Aristotle gives to it (Kahn 1981, 30-40). He thinks that 'another self should be read
literally (34). Since vous, or the activity ofvous, is identical in different people, I am in a sense loving
myself (or at least apart of myself) when I love this principle in the friend (37-39). As Kahn admits,
there is no textual evidence that Aristotle is appealing to this metaphysical view when he argues for
the value offriendship (34). Kahn thinks that the argument in chapter 9 needs to establish some literal
sense in which the friend's virtue counts as mine (33-34), and he thinks that this in turn requires
breaking down or at least weakening the ordinary distinction between the self and some other person
(39). I have suggested that the argument works in a different way. It does not attack the distinction
between one person and another, it undermines the view that self-love is categorically more important
than love for another person. There is no need for Aristotle to claim that the friend's virtue really is
mine; his argument contends instead that my love for the friend's virtue (the basis of the friendship)
has the same significance as my love for my own virtue (the basis for my self-love). Aristotle under-
stands 'a friend is another self as a metaphor, and part of the literal truth that the metaphor expresses
98

My interpretation has focused on the preliminary conclusion at 1170b7-8, not

on Aristotle' s final conclusion that I must have friends to achieve eudaimonia
myself. I think we should concede to the critics that Aristotle moves to his final
conclusion too quickly. The argument talks about what a friendship is like once it
has been fonned, so it will be difficult to prove that someone who does without
friends is incapable of achieving eudaimonia. Even if the argument finds value in
friendship, it is not clear why someone who lacks that particular value n1ust fall
short of eudaimonia. Nevertheless, there is an important sense in which the argu-
ment is a defense of friendship. Scepticism about the value of relationships with
other people is usually based on the assumption that our primary concern should
only be with our own lives. Given that view, friendship will seem to require a
justification in terms of self-interest. Aristotle rejects this view. He argues that
love for another person can be like the concern that we have for ourselves.
He would deny that self-concern is uniquely rational in a way that love for
another person fails to be, and this removes the reason for questioning the value
of friendship.
The argument gives no weight to the fact that in self-concern the thoughts and
perceptions are one' s own while in friendship they are the thoughts and percep-
tions of someone else. When Aristotle describes self-concern in chapters 4, 8,
and 9 he says very little about identity itself. He stresses relations which can hold
between a person and himself-like the love of goodness in thoughts and percep-
tions-but which can also hold between different people in the case of friend-
ship. Aristotle may think that identity has some intrinsic importance apart from
its connection with these other relations. But he does not think it is important
enough to make self-Iove different in principle from friendship.
Aristotle' s introduction to the argument hints that it will give us a new way of
understanding the value of friendship: 'If we look deeper into the nature of
things, a virtuous friend seems to be naturally desirable for a virtuous man'
(1170a14). I have emphasized what the argument reveals about the relationship
between friendship and self-concern, but Aristotle also intends the argument to
explain the special way in which friendship adds value to our own lives. Appar-
ently Aristotle means that it is because friendship involves seeing someone else
as another self that it will make our own lives better. The friendship contains
activities that we share with the friend, and in the course of these activities we
will come to know, admire, and love the virtuous character of the friend. Because
the friend is virtuous, and because we think of the friend as another self (we love
the friend for the friend' s sake, on the grounds of virtue), the activities that
involve appreciating the friend's excellence will themselves be valuable and they
will add value to our own lives. I think that Aristotle is trying to explain the dif-
ference between the value of friendship and the value of the other virtues. Unlike
virtues such as courage and temperance, friendship has value because it is the
appropriate response to the value located in a different person.

is that for the virtuous person concern for the friend has virtually the same status as self-concern.
 99

If Aristotle is an altruistic eudaimonist, he thinks that we should have a direct

concern with some other people's reaching eudaimonia. But this conclusion is
compatible with many different moral theories. One possibility is that Aristotle
thinks we should be equally and impartially concerned with everyone's reaching
eudaimonia in the way that utilitarianism teIls us to be impartially concerned
about people' s happiness. The discussion of friendship counts against this possi-
bility. It says that we care most about ourselves, but we should care almost as
much about the friend, because we are related to the friend in ways that are sig-
nificantly like the ways in which we are related to ourselves. Aristotle seems to
make the degree of our concern for a person depend on the nature of our relation-
ship with that person. I suggest that his moral theory is an example of what mod-
ern writers have called 'self-referential altruism'. We should care about our close
friends almost as much as ourselves, but it is appropriate that we should be less
concerned for fellow citizens with whom we have 110 closer relationship. Aristo-
tle might think that we should be even less concerned with people who are more
remote. 18
If self-Iove and friendship are both responses to the goodness of the person
loved, it might seem that we should be equally and impartially concerned with
goodness wherever it is found. But for Aristotle there are two aspects to friend-
ship: the goodness of the person who is loved, and the closeness of the lover to
that person that allows hirn to be aware of this goodness. Aristotle consistently
emphasizes that friends must live together and not just be well-disposed towards
one another from a distance (1157b17-24, 1170bl0-14). He believes that the
closeness, as weIl as the mutual recognition of goodness, is indispensable to
friendship. Perhaps his view is that our concern for another person should depend
on the existence of the friendship and not just on the goodness that prompts the
friendship. Then there could still be a justifiable difference between our attitude
to a friend and our attitude to someone else, equally good, with whom we had no
closer relationship.19
I have made two claims: the negative claim that Aristotle is not an egoistic
eudaimonist, and the positive claim that his moral theory is best understood as a
version of self-referential altruism. The second claim would be more persuasive

18 Kahn is sympathetic to the view that Aristotle is a self-referential altruist (Kahn 1981, 20). But
part of what Kahn means by this is that my concern for certain people will be psychologically
explained by the fact that they stand in a specific relationship to me (25). I am suggesting that Aristo-
tle is a self-referential altruist in a different sense. His moral theory is self-referentially altruistic in
virtue of the goals that it teIls us to have. Aristotle does not believe in the rational priority of egoism
to altruism (23). He thinks instead that I should care most about myself, but I should also care inde-
pendently and almost as much about my friends. Aristotle thinks this because he believes that love
should be based on relations that hold most strongly in the intrapersonal case but can also hold to a
significant degree between friends.
19 Aquinas believes that charity involves this kind of graduated concern (Summa Theologiae
2a2ae.26). He thinks that this is so partly because the intensity of the love that constitutes charity
varies with the closeness of the lover to the person loved (article 7). He even suggests that the self-
referential aspect of charity will persist in heaven (article 13).
100

if there were evidence of self-referential altruism in Aristotle' s accounts of the

other virtues. 20 But I think that the lack of additional evidence can be explained.
In the case of many of the virtues Aristotle' s description does not emphasize their
other-regarding aspect, if he thinks that they are in fact other-regarding. In the
case of justice, even if Aristotle is an altruistic eudaimonist I think it is under-
standable that he recognizes a kind of justice in which particular relationships
with particular people are irrelevant to deciding what it would be just to do. And
Aristotle' s view seems to be that the virtues of friendship and justice shade into
one another (book 8 chapter 9). Returning to the discussion of friendship, there is
another way in which books 8 and 9 suggest self-referential altruism. In describ-
ing friendships and family relationships, Aristotle takes very seriously the obliga-
tions that are ordinarily thought to be part of these relationships. Aristotle would
regard insulting or mistreating a parent as a serious wrong. He also thinks that the
strength of the obligation varies with the nature of the relationship. Book 9 chap-
ter 2 includes a rare example of Aristotle discussing a difficult moral choice
between conflicting duties, and Aristotle says that we should help one of our par-
ents rather than someone who has done us a great service in the past, if we cannot
help them both (1164b27-1165a2). The discussion of friendship pictures the ethi-
cal life as containing many specific responsibilities owed to particular people,
where the responsibilities depend on the relationships we have with those people.
Perhaps Aristotle' s views could be acccounted for without supposing that his
moral theory involves self-referential altruism at its deepest level, but when Aris-
totle discusses these particular obligations he does not suggest that they should
be explained in terms of some other more fundamental kind of moral concern.
I have used the discussion of friendship to argue against the egoistic eudai-
monist interpretation of Aristotle. His defense of the value of friendship centres on
the idea that the friend is another self. The idea implies that, as a consequence of
the friendship, the quality of the friend' s life is almost as important for our reaching
eudaimonia as the quality of our own lives. Egoistic eudaimonism can accommo-
date this much. It can agree that in the friendship of virtue the friend' s eudaimo-
nia is virtually apart of our own eudaimonia. But the argument in chapter 9 gives
the idea that the friend is another self an even deeper n1eaning. The argument
explains self-Iove in terms of recognizing goodness in thoughts and perceptions,
and it points out that this relation also underlies the friendship of virtue. It is not
just that concern for our own eudaimonia involves caring about the friend' s life.
We should care about the friend in virtually the same way, and for the same rea-
sons, that we should care about ourselves. This view conflicts with the claim that
at the most fundamental level we only have reason to care about our own lives.
I have argued that we should question the familiar view that the Nicomachean

20 J think that there is evidence for the first claim outside the discussion of friendship, although I
will not try to develop these arguments. Aristotle believes that politics aims at eudaimonia for the cit-
izens in general, and the Nicomachean Ethics treats politics as the master art (book 1 chapter 2).
Given his theory of politics, and his view of the relationship between politics and ethics, is it likely
that Aristotle' s theory of ethics would take the form of egoistic eudaimonism?
 101

Ethics begins with the idea that we should aim at our own eudaimonia and gives us
reason to act virtuously by including virtuous actions in our own eudaimonia. Aris-
totle does indeed believe that acting virtuously will make our own lives realize
eudaimonia. But I have argued that it will not always be true that, all things con-
sidered, a virtuous action benefits the agent. And for many virtues I think that the
connection with the agent' s eudaimonia is not what makes it true that the virtuous
action should be perfonned-for example, a just action will be noble because of its
effects on other lives besides our own. If this is the case then altruistic eudaimonism
makes Aristotle' s views about ethics consistent. He can say that in these cases we
should perfonn the virtuous action for the reasons that make it true that it should
be performed. Aristotle can make these claims because he does not think that rea-
son picks out our own eudaimonia as our only fundamental goal. We can have
the same kind of reasons for caring about another person's good that we have for
caring about our own good, and Aristotle's moral theory acknowledges it. 21 ,22
The University of Calgary

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Annas, J. 1977. 'Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism' Mind 86: 532-554.
Aristotle. Ethica Nicomachea. I. Bywater ed. 1894. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Cooper, J. 1975. Reason and Human Good in Arütotle. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Cooper, J. 1980. 'Aristotle on Friendship' in A. Rorty ed. 1980. Essays on Aristotle 's Ethics. Berke-
ley: University of California Press.
Engberg-Pedersen, T. 1983. Aristotle 's Theory of Morallnsight. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hardie, W.F.R. 1980. Aristotle' s Ethical Theory. Second edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Irwin, T.H. 1988. Aristotle 's First Principles. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kahn, C. 1981. 'Aristotle on Altruism' Mind 90: 20-40.
Ross, W.D. 1949. Aristotle. Fifth edn. London: Methuen.
Smith, J.A. and Ross, W.D. trans. 1925. The Works of Aristotle Translated into English. vol. ix.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.

21 Perhaps Irwin has a different way of sorting out Aristotle's views. He seems to agree that a
good person performs virtuous actions because they are noble and that many virtuous actions are
noble because they benefit other people (lrwin 1988, 349, 389, and 439-441). But he also believes
that Aristotle must show that an agent is rationally justified in acting nobly by showing that these
actions will further the agent' s eudaimonia. So Irwin might think that Aristotle is not an egoistic
eudaimonist in his moral theory (when he explains why virtuous actions are noble), but that he is an
egoistic eudaimonist in his theory of rationality (when he explains why it is rational for us to perform
these actions). If this is Irwin's view, I think that he attributes too many theories to Aristotle. Aristotle
would not distinguish between the thought that I should perform an action because of its nobility and
the thought that I am rationally justified in performing the action. Aristotle has a unified account of
what it is right to do and what it is rational to do, and the issue is whether the account has an altruistic
or an egoistic structure. That is why I do not think that there is a powerful argument for egoistic
eudaimonism that starts from Aristotle' s view of rationality. If Aristotle' s ethical theory teIls us that
we should have an independent concern for the eudaimonia of other people, then I do not think that
Aristotle would hesitate to claim that this concern is required by reason.
22 I am indebted to James Dybikowski and the referees and editor of this journal for helpful sug-

gestions in writing this paper. Thomas Hurka has commented on and improved many different ver-
sions of it. And I wish to acknowledge a very special debt of gratitude for the patience and
encouragement of Professor J.L. Ackrill.