.

RESEARCH De,",,-~ V\ t ~.A c: tv\ l~~ ~ ~ d

J\~S ~.f~ C~L~c;y)

6
/'
, of
krstand
the
.
IOS of ,,
".'ences r
:]>racti- Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research
>aand
when
r differ-
EGaN G. GUBA
YVONNA S. LINCOLN

Idigm dialog. In
dialog (pp. 17-

~ theoretical
elson, & P. A.
iFp. 277-294).

'ultural Stud-

988). Marxism
-ana: Univer-
IN this chapter we analyze four paradigms that case for a renewed interestin qualitativeapproaches,
currently are competing, or have until recently com- it became clear that the metaphysical assumptions
;S In social re- peted, for acceptance as the paradigm of choice in undergirding the conventional paradigm (the "re-
sity Press.
informing and guidinginquiry, especiallyqualitative ceived view") must be seriously questioned. ~
---'mce of other inquiry: positivism, postpositivism, critical theory the emphasis of this chapter is on paradigms, their
.inist materi-
and related ideological positions, and constructiv- assumptions, and the implications of those assump-
ism. We acknowledge at once our own commitment tions for a variety of research Issues. npt on the
, .1. L. Millroy,
to constructivism (which we earlier called "natural- relative utility of Qualitative versus Quantitative
k of qualitative
New York: istic inquiry"; Lincoln & Guba, 1985); the reader ~ Nevertheless, as discussions of para-
may wish to take that fact into account in judging digms/methods over the past decade have often be-
the appropriateness and usefulness of our analysis. gun with a consideration of problems associated
__.Jen's experi-
al Theory, 10,
Although the title of this volume, Handbook of with overquantification, we will also begin there,
Qualitative Research, implies that the term qualita- shifting only later to our predominant interest.
tive is an umbrella term superior to the term para-
d: A critique
1, 183-192.
digm (and, indeed, that usage is not uncommon), it
is our position that it is a term that ought to be
of philosophy.
~ss. reserved for a descriptionof types of methods.f!:2m.. The Quantitative/Qualitative
f difference.
our perspective, both Qualitative and qJlantitative Distinction
methods ma be used a ro ria . e-
J nh-ha, & C. search aradi m. estions of meth co -
:ation and con-
darv to Questionsof paradigm, which we define as Historically, there has been a heavy emphasis
unbridge: MIT
the basic belief svstem or worldview that guides the on quantification in science. Mathematics is often
Tnvesti ator not nl in choices of metho but'n termed the "queen of sciences," and those sci-
, inism. post-
ontologically and eoistemo ol!1cally fundamental w1\Ys.. ences, such as physics. and chemistry, that lend
msibility. Stan-
£....
It is certainly the case that interest in alternative themselves especially well to quantification are
paradigms has been stimulated by a growing dissat- generally known as "hard." Less quantifiable are-
isfaction with the patent overemphasis on quantita- nas, such as biology (although that is rapidly
tive methods. But as efforts were made to build a changing) and particularly the social,$ciences, are

AUTHORS' NOTE: We are grateful to Henry Giroux and Robert Stake for their very helpful critiques of an earlier
draft of this chapter.

105
 106 MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES Competing Part

referred to as "soft," less with pejorative intent Contextstripping. Precisequantitativeapproaches External (Extral
than to signal their (putative) imprecision and that focus on selected subsets of variables neces-
lack of dependability. Scientific maturity is com- sarily "strip" from consideration, through appro- The intrapara,
monly beliefed to emerge as the degree of quan- priate controls or randomization, other variables a weighty chall
tification found within a given field increases. that exist in the context that might, if allowed to ogy, but could I
That this is the case is hardly surprising. Iill;. exert their effects, greatly alter findings. Further, rated, by great(
"received view" of science (positivism, transformed such exclusionary designs, while increasing the critics of the ree
over the course of this century into postpositiv- theoretical rigor of a study, detract from its rele- that point; henc(
ism; see below) focuses on efforts to verify (oosi- vance, that is, its applicability or generalizability, tative inputs ha
tivism) or falsify (postpositivism) a priori hy- because their outcomes can be properly applied level accommod
{?otheses. most usefully stated as mathematical only in other similarly truncated or contextually lenge has been
(quantitative) propositions or propositions that stripped situations (another laboratory, for exam- proposed altern
can be easily converted mto recise mathematical ple). Qualitative data, it is argued, can redress that only qualificatie
_ormu as expressing nctional re atJonshlps. or- imbalance by providing contextual information. adjustments in 1
mulaic precision has enormous utilitv W11ei1iiie inquiry altogeth
aim of science is the prediction and control of Exclusion of meaning and purpose. Human be- view can be ju
natural phenomena. Further, there is already avail- havior, unlike that of physical objects, cannot be (Bernstein, 198:
able a powerful array of statistical and mathemati- understood without reference to the meanings and coIn & Guba, g
'cal models. Finally, there eXists a widespread purposes attached by human actors to their activi- chief among the
conviction that only Quantitative data are ulti- ~ Qualitative data, it is asserted, can provide
mately valid, or of high Quality (Sechrest, 1992). rich insight into human behavior. The theory-ll
John Stuart Mill (I 843/1906) is said to have been approaches to f(
the first to urge social scientists to emulate their Disjunction of grand theories with local con- or falsification
older, "harder" cousins, promising that if his advice texts: The etic/emic dilemma. The etic (outsidelj pendence of th
were followed, rapid maturation of these fields, as theory brought to bear on an inquiry by an inves- guages. If an inq
well as their emancipation from the philosophical tigator (or the hypotheses proposed to be tested) must be stated iJ
and theological strictures that limited them, would may-nave little or no mean!!!.&- within the emic way in which t
follow. Social scientists took this counsel to heart (insider) view of studied Individuals, groups, so- collected. But it
(probably to a degree that would greatly surprise cieties, or cultures. Qualitative data, it is affirmed, jection that theOJ
Mill ifhe were alive today) for other reasons as well. are useful for uncovering emic views; theories, to ent-that is, tha
They were the "new kids on the block"; if quantifi- be valid, should be qualitatively grounded (Glaser theoretical frame
cation could lead to the fulfillment of Mill's prom- & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Such tion of the recei'
ise, status and political leverage would accrue that grounding is particularly crucial in view of the hypotheses and
would enormously profit the new practitioners. Imi- mounting criticism of social science as failing to "facts" can be ,
tation might thus lead both to greater acceptance and provide adequate accounts of nonmainstream lives "window" and 0
to more valid knowledge. (the "other") or to provide the material for a
criticism of our own Western culture (Marcus & The underdet
Fischer, 1986). lem is also kno
Not only are fat
Inapplicability of general data to individual dow through wI
Critiques of the Received View cases. This problem is sometimes described as the ferent theory wi
nomothetic/idiographic disjunction. Generaliza- ported by the sa
In recent years, however, strong counterpressures tions, although perhaps statistically meaningful. be possible, giv
against quantification have emerged.Two critiques, have no applicability in the individual case (the deduction what
one internal to the conventional paradiw (that is, fact, say, that 80% of Individuals presenting giyen possible, given
in terms of those metaphysical assumptions that symptoms have lung cancer is at best incomplete by induction at
define the nature of positivist inquiry) and one ex- evidence that a particular patient presenting with deed, it is this
ternal to it (that is, in terms of those assumptions such symptoms has lung cancer). Qualitative data, such as Poppe!
defining alternativeparadigms), have been mounted it is held, can help to avoid such ambiguities. theory verificatl
that seem not only to warrant a reconsiderationof falsification. W
the utility of qualitative data but to question the very Exclusion of the discovery dimension in inquiry. never establish
assumptions on which the putative superiority of Convention em hasis on the verification of s e- proposition tha
quantification has been based. ci IC,a priori hypotheses glosses over the source of swan can comp:
those hypotheses, usually arrived at by what is com- sition of scienc
monly termed the discovery process. In the receiyed mately converg(
Internal (Intraparadigm) Critiques view only.empirical inquiry deserves to be called sharply into qUI
"science." Quantitative normative methodology is
A variety of implicit problems have surfaced to thus privileged over the insights of creative and The value-la.
challenge conventional wisdom; several of these are divergent thinkers. The call for qualitative inputs and facts are n<
described below. is expected to redress this imbalance. and facts. Inde,
 .
ECTIVES Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research 107

ve approaches External (Extraparadigm) Critiques ~selves value statements. Thus putative

-bles neces- "facts" are vIewed not only through a theory win-
ugh appro- The intraparadigm problems not~d above offer dow but through a value window as well. The value-
.1II::rvariables a weighty challenge to conventional methodol- tree posture ot the receIved vIew is compromised.
if allowed to ogy, but could be eliminated, or at least amelio-
-~s. Further, I rated, by greater use of qualitative data. Many The interactive nature of the inquirer-inquired
reasing the critics of the received view are content to stop at into dyad. The received view of science pictures
,,<.1mits rele- '[
!
that point; hence many of the calls for more quali- the inquirer as standing behind a one-way mirror;
leralizabili ty, tative inputs have been limited to this methods- viewmg natural phenomena as they happen and
,-Iy applied level accommodation. But an eyen weightier chal- recording them objectively. The inquirer (when
mtextually lenge has been mounted by critics who have using proper methodolo ) does not influence the
I.J, for exam- proposed alternative paradigms that involye not p enomena or vIce versa. But eVI ence suc as
.n redress that 'OnlyqualificatIOn of approaches but fundamental the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the Bohr
Formation. ao ustments in the basIc assum tlOns that gUIde complementarity principle have shattered that ideal
inquiry altoe:ethe(. Their rejection 0 the received in the hard sciences (Lincoln & Guba, 1985); even
, Human be- vIew can be justified on a number of grounds greater skepticism must exist for the social sci-
:ts, cannot be (Bernstein, 1988; Guba, 1990; Hesse, 1980; Lin- ences. Indeed. the notion that findings are created
:naanings and coln & Guba, 1985; Reason & Rowan, 1981), but throu~h the interaction of inquirer and phenome-
. '1eiractivi- chief among them are the following. I non (which in the social sciences, is usually peo-
10 provide ple) is often a more plausible description of the
The theory-ladenness of facts. Conventional inquiry process than is the notion that findings are
approaches to research involving the verification discovered through objective observation "as they
j local con- or falsification of hypotheses assume the inde- really are, and as they really work."
I (outsider) pendence of theoretical and observational lan-
.by an inves- guages. If an inquiry is to be objective, hypotheses The intraparadigm critiques, although expos-
ta. be tested) must be stated in ways that are independent of the ing many inherent problems in the received view
I I the emic way in which the facts needed to test them are and, indeed, proposing some useful responses to
roups, so- collected. But it now seems established beyond ob- them, are nevertheless of much less interest-or
it is affirmed, jection that theories and facts are auite inteT{kpetl{/: weight-than the extraparadigm critiques, which
>;J!1eories,to ent-that is. that facts are facts only within some raise problems of such consequence that the re-
I ed (Glaser theoretical framework. Thus a fundamentalassump- ceived view is being widely questioned. Several
90). Such tion of the received view is exposed as dubious. If alternative paradigms have been proposed, some
view of the hypotheses and observations are not independent, of which rest on quite unconventional assump-
: as failingto "facts" can be viewed only through a theoretical tions. It is useful, therefore, to inquire about the
["ream lives "window" and objectivity is undermined. nature of paradigms and what it is that distin-
I rial for a guishes one inquiry paradigm from another.
e {Marcus &

"( 'ndividual
:cn bed as the The Nature of Paradigms
Generaliza-
-:aningful,
J case (the Paradigms as Basic Belief Systems
'I>udng given Based on Ontological, Epistemological,
t incomplete and Methodological Assumptions
r-ting with
I: .tive data,
J_o.Jities.

I~ inquiry.
a m of spe-
C _ source of
what is com-
I~ received
be called
t dology is
creative and The value-ladenness of facts. Just as theories
:ati.ve inputs and facts are not independent, neither are values
and facts. Indeed, it can be argued that theories
108 MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES Competing Para6

a question of methods; methods must be fit- TABLE 6.1 Basi

ted to a predetermined methodology.
Item

These three questions serve as the major foci Ontology no

around which we will analyze each of the four "I
paradigms to be considered. 31

Paradigms as Human Constructions

\
We have already noted that paradigms, as sets
of basic beliefs, are not open to proof in any Epistemology d.
conventional sense; there is no way to elevate one fi
1. Theontologicalquestion. What is the form
and nature of reality and, therefore, what is over another on the basis of ultimate, founda-
there that can be known about it? For example, tional criteria. (We should note, however, that
that state of affairs does not doom us to a radical
if a "real" world is assumed, then what can be
relativist posture; see Guba, 1992.) In our opin-
known about it is "how things really are" and Methodology e:
ion, any given paradigm represents simply the
"how things really work." Then only those most informed and sophisticated view that its IT
questions that relate to matters of "real" exist- y-
proponents have been able to devise, given the
ence and "real" action are admissible; other h
way they have chosen to respond to the three
questions, such as those concerning matters of defining questions. And, we argue, the sets of q
IT
aesthetic or moral significance, fall outside the answers given are in all cases human construc-
realm of legitimate scientific inquiry. tions; that is, they are all inventions of the human
2. The epistemological Question. What is the mind and hence stibject to human error. No con-
struction is or can be incontrovertibly fight; ad-
nature of the relationship between the knower .vocates of any particular construction must rely
or would-be knower and what can be known? sents efforts of tt!
on persuasiveness and utilitv rather than Droofin a limited way (1
The answer that can be given to this ques- arguing their position. essentially the s:
tion is constrained by the answer already What is true of paradigms is true of our analyses most problemati
given to the ontological question; that is, not as well. Everything that we shall say subsequently term critical thE
just any relationship can now be postulated. is also a human construction: ours. The reader can- denoting a set 0
So if, for example, a "real" reality is as- not be compelled to accept our analyses, or our including additi(
sumed, then the posture of the knower must arguments, on the basis of incontestable logic or Marxism, femini
be one of objective detachment or value indisputable eyidence; we can only hope to be per- tory inquiry. Ine
freedom in order to be able to discover "how suasive and to demonstrate the utility of our position usefully be divic
for, say, the public policy arena (Guba & Lincoln, structuralism, po
things really are" and "how things really 1989; House, 1977). We do ask the reader to sus-
work." (Conversely, assumption of an ob- these two. What
pend his or her disbelief until our argument is com- mon breakaway
jectivist posture implies the existence of a plete and can be judged as a whole. is that of the vallJ
"real" world to be objective about.)
an epistemologie
3. The methodologicalquestion. How can the these positions i
inquirer (would-be knower) go about finding ment call; we VI
out whatever he or she believes can be known? The Basic Beliefs of Received
individual point:
t-gain, the answer that can be given to this and Alternative Inquiry Paradigms ism denotes an al
question is constrained by answers already away assumptio'
realism to ontolc
~iven to the first two questions~that is, not just We begin our analysis with descriptions of the
will become cle~
any methodology is appropriate. For example, responses that we believe proponents of each
a "real" reality pursued by an "objective" in- paradigm would make to the three questions out- Two importan
lined above. These responses (as constructed by First, although VI
quirer mandates control of possible confound-
us) are displayed in Table 6.1, which consists of paradigms we ~
ing factors, whether the methods are qualita- meaning even it
tive (say, observational) or quantitative (say, three rows corresponding to the ontological, epis-
ences, we will ne
analysis of covariance). (Conversely,selection temological, and methodological questions, and
four columns corresponding to the four paradigms ingly, our subse(
of a manipulative methodology-the experi- stood to be limi
to be discussed.The term positivism denotes the
ment, say-implies the ability to be objective "received view" that has dominated the formal Second, we notl
and a real world to be objective about.) The discourse in the physIcal and social sciences for paradigms discus
methodological question cannot be reduced to no final agreemeJ
s~me 400 years, whereas postpositivism repre-

---
 :TIVES Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research 109

!ill:Ist be fit- TABLE 6.1 Basic Beliefs (Metaphysics) of Alternative Inquiry Paradigms
Item Positivism Post positivism Critical Theory et al. Constructivism

major foci Ontology naive realism- critical realism- historical realism- relativism-local and
the four "real" reality but "real" reality but only virtual reality shaped specific constructed
apprehendable imperfectly and by social, political, realities
probabilistically cultural, economic,
apprehendable ethnic, and gender
values; crystallized
over time
__, as sets ----------------------------------------------
>of in any Epistemology dualist/objectivist; modified dualist/ transactionaU transactionaU
w..vateone findings true objectivist; critical subjectivist; value- subjectivist; created
founda- tradition/community; mediated findings findings
rer, that findings probably
o a radical true
I-Ouropin-
Iply the Methodology experimentaU modified experi- dialogic/dialectical herrneneuticaUdialectical
that its manipulative; mental/manipulative;
given the verification of critical multiplism;
0he three hypotheses; chiefly falsification of
sets of quantitative hypotheses; may
mstruc- methods include qualitative
the human methods
r No con-
ght; ad-
ust rely sents efforts of the past few decades to respond in their proponents about their definitions, mean-
to proo/in a limited way (that is, while remammg within ings, or implications. Thus our discussion should
essentially the same set of basic beliefs) to the be considered tentative and subject to further re-
.- malyses most problematic criticisms of positivism. The vision and reformulation.
. :quentIy term critical theory is (for us) a blanket term We will first look down the columns of Table
reader can-
;es, or our denoting a set of several alternative paradigms, 6.1 to illustrate the positions of each paradigm
including additionally (but not limited to) neo- with respect to the three questions, followin with
;logic or a 00 across rows to com are and contrast the
Marxism, feminism, materialism, and participa-
, be per- tory inquiry. Indeed, critical theory may itself posItions 0 t e paradigms. Limitations of space
'urposition
& Lincoln, usefully 6e divided into three substrands: post- make it Impossible for us to develop our asser-
,-. to sus- structuralism, postmodernism, and a blending of tions in any depth. The reader will be able to find
is com- these two. Whatever their differences, the com- other evidence, pro and con, in other chapters of
mon breakaway assumption of all these variants this volume, particularly in Chapters 7-11.
IS that of the value-determined nature of in ui -
an e istemolo di erence. Our grouping of
these positions into a single category is a judg-
'~.l ment call; we will not try to do justice to the Intraparadigm Analyses
individual points of view. !he term constructiv- (Columns of Table 6.1)
digms ism denotes an alternative paradigm whose break-
away assumption is the move from ontological
s of the realism to ontological relativism. These positions Column I: Positivism
s of each will become clear in the subseQuent eXpOsition.
;tions out- Two important caveats need to be mentioned. Ontology: realism (commonly called "naive re-
I cted by First, although we are inclined to believe that the alism"). An apprehend able realIty IS assumed to
sists of paradigms we are about to describe can have exist, driven by immutable natural laws and mecha-
:ical, epis- meaning even in the realm of the physical sci- nisms. Knowledge of the "way things are" IScon-
tions, and ences, we will not defend that belief here. Accord- ventionally summarized in the form of time- and
:adigms ingly, our subsequent comments should be under- context-free generalizations, some of which take
( >testhe stood to be limited to the social sciences only. the form of cause-effect laws. Research can, in
he formal Second, we note that except for positivism, the 'principle, converge on the "true" state pf affairs.
iences for paradigms discussed are all still in formative stages; The basic posture of the paradigm is argued to be
:r- repre- no final agreements have been reached even among both reductionist and deterministic (Hesse, 1980).
 110 MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES Competing Paradi

Epistemology: Dualist and obiectivist. The inves- Column 3: Critical Theory groups holding tl;1I
tigator and the investigated "obiect" are assumed to and Related Ideological Positions are not more or les
be independent entities, and the investigator to be but simply more 0
Ontology: Historical realism. A realitv is as- ticated. Constructi
capable of study.iiu!:the obiect withoutinfluencin~ it
or being influenced by it. When influence in either sumed to be apprehendable that was once plastic, associated "realitie
direction (threats to validity) is recognized, or even but that was. over time, shaped by a congeries of tinguished from b
suspected, various strategies are followed to reduce social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and (see Reese, 1980, j
or eliminate it. Inquiry takes place as through a gender factors, and then crystallized (reWed) into eral ideas).
one-way mirror. Values and biases are prevented a series of structures that are now (inappropri-
from influencing outcomes, so long as the pre- .!!!ely)taken as "real," that is, natural and immu- Epistemology: 1
scribed procedures are rigorously followed. Repli- table. For all practical purposes the structures are The investigator a
cable findings are, in fact, "true." "real," a virtual or historical reality. are assumed to be
"findings" are lite
Methodolo!!.v: Experimental and manivulative. .E;pistemolovv' Transactional and subjectivist. tion proceeds. The
Questions and/or hypotheses are stated in propo- J'he investigator and the investigated obiect are tween ontology an
sitional form and subjected to empirical test to assumed to be interactively linked. with the val- in the case of crid
verify them; possible confounding conditions must ues of the investigator (and of situated "others") line of Table 6.1 rt
be carefully controlled (manipulated) to prevent inevitably influencing the inquiry. Findings are
outcomes from bein!!:improperlv influenced. Methodology: /;

~
refore value mediated. Note that this posture
effectively challenges the traditional dlstmctlOn '-'.J~..J' "" ~ The variable and p
social constructio[
between ontology and epistemolo~y; what can be ~ N\
structions can be e]
Column 2: Postpositivism
known IS mextricably intertwined with the inter- C-o t \. interaction betwee
~~ ~ · '-\

~
Ontology: Critical realism. Reality is assumed to action between a particular
particularobjector grou"p.Theinvestigator
dashedlineand a
sepa-C .. respondents. These
exist but to be only imperfectly apprehend able be- terpreted using cO!
cause of basically flawed human intellectual mecha- rating
of the6.1
Table ontologicaland epistemologicalrows
is intendedto reflect this fusion. +v-. <I <->...J
1 niques, and are COI
a dialectical intercl
nisms and the fundament . tractable nature of
p enomena. The ontology is labeled as critical real-
ism (Cook & Campbell, 1979) because of the pos-
Methodology:Dialogicand dialectical. The trans-
actional nature of inQuiry requires a dialogue be-
j , a consensus const
and sophisticated
constructions (inc]
ture of proponents that claims about reality must be tween the investigator and the subjects of the
subjected to the widest possible critical examination inquiry; that dialogue must be dialectical in nature struction of the in'
to facilitate apprehending reality as closely as pos- to transform ignorance and misapprehensions (ac-
sible (but never perfectly). cepting historicall mediated structures as immu- (For more about c
ta le)"into more informe consciousness (seeing Chapter 7, this vol
how the structures might be changed and compre-
hending the actions re uired to effec chan ), or,
as ICOUX (1 88) puts it, "as transformative intel-
lectuals, . . . to uncover and excavate those forms
Cross-P
of historical and subjugated knowledges that point
to experiences of suffering, conflict, and collec- (Rov
tive struggle; . . . to link the notion of historical
understanding to elements of critique and hope" Having noted bl
(p. 213). Transformational inquirers demonstrate nents of each para<
"transformational leadership" (Burns, 1978). the three paradigm
Methodolo!!.v: Modified experimentaVmanipu- to look across row:
lative. Emphasis is placed on "critical multiplisl!C (For more discussion of critical theory, see the I positions among tl
Q refurhj~hed version of trian!!:ulation}as a way contributions in this volume by Olesen, Chapter I
I
of falsifying (rather than verifying) hypotheses. 9; Stanfield, Chapter 10;and Kincheloe & McLaren, Ii
The methodology aims to redress some of the Chapter 8.) " Ontology
problems noted above (intraparadigm critiQue~
by doing inquiry in more natural settings, collect- I

ing more situational information, and reintroduc- Column 4: Constructivism

I Moving from Ie
ing discovery as an element in inquiry, and, in the
!! note the move frOJ
social sciences particularly, soliciting emic view-
points to assist in determining the meanings and 1. positivism's
purposes that people ascribe to their actions, as I
I
suming an 0
well as to contribute to "grounded theory" (Glaser
& Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). All i which inquir
these aims are accomplished largely llirongh the I 2. postpositivis
increased utilization of Qualitative techniques. I assumes an (

-- 1_ __ _
 114 MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES Competing Paradigm

fact (or probable fact) serving as a kind of build- duct and human subje
ing block that, when placed into its proper niche, realist ontology underj
adds to the growing "edifice of knowledge." When vides a tilt toward the
the facts take th~form of generalizations or cause- is argued in certain c
effect linkages".they may be used most efficiently mine how "things rea
for prediction and control. Generalizations may sake of some "higher s
then be made, with predictable confidence, to a truth" (Bok, 1978, 198
population of settings.
Critical theory. Etl
Critical theory. Knowledge does not accumu- to this paradigm, as ir
late in an absolute sense; rather, it grows and ignorance and misapI
changes through a dialectical historical account of values an
reVISIOnt at contInuously erodes ignorance and the inquiry process. 1
mIsapprehensions and enlarges more informed the inquirer be revel3
insight,s. Generalization can occur when the mix . ing of "fully informe
of socIal, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, ceptive. Of course, t
and gender circumstances and values is similar prevent unethical bel
across settings. some process barrier!

Constructivism.)(nowledge accumulates only in Constructivism. Et

a relative sense through the formation of ever more digm also because of
informed and sophisticated constructions via the values in the inquiry
hermeneuticaVdialectical process, as varying con- Row 5: What is the existing constructior
structions are brought into juxtaposition. One im- role of values in inquiry? creased information
portant mechanism for transfer of knowledge from constructions as well
one setting to another is the provision of vicarious Positivism and postpositivism. In both these tion). There is an inl
experience, often supplied by case study reports (see paradigms values are specifically excluded; in- revelation; hiding the
Stake, Chapter 14, this volume). . deed, the paradigm is claimed to be "value free" tive of the aim of unc
by virtue of its epistemological posture. Values structions. In additio
are seen as confounding variables that cannot be tical methodology its
Row 4: What criteria are allowed a role in a putatively objective inquiry infallible safeguard ~
appropriate for judging the (even when objectivity is, in the case of postpo- the close personal i:
goodness or quality of an inquiry? sitivism, but a regulatory ideal). methodology may prc
problems of confide
Positivism and postpositivism. The appropriate Critical theory and constructivism. In both these well as other interpe
criteria are the conventional benchmarks of "rigor": paradigms values have pride of place; they are Lincoln, 1989).
internal validit'i (isomorphism of findings with seen as ineluctable in shaping (in the case of
reality), external validity (generalizability), reli- constructivism, creating) inquiry outcomes. Fur-
ability-(in the sense of stability), and objectiVitY thermore, even if it were possible, excluding val- Row 7: What "voice'
(distanced and neutral observer). These cntena ues would not be countenanced. To do so would in the inquirer's. acti'
depend on the realist ontological position; with- be inimical to the interests of the powerless and especially those dire,
out the assumption, isomorphism of findings with of "at-risk" audiences, whose original (emic) con-
reality can have no meaning, strict generalizabil- structions deserve equal consideration with those Positivism and po
ity to a parent population is impossible, stability of other, more powerful audiences and of the voice is that of the
cannot be assessed for inquiry into a phenomenon inquirer (etic). Constructivism, which sees the forming decision mak,
if the phenomenon itself can change, and objec- inquirer as orchestrator and facilitator of the in- agents, who indepen
tivity cannot be achieved because there is nothing quiry process, is more likely to stress this point formation, at least if
from which one can be "distant." than is critical theory, which tends to cast the justify actions, polic
inquirer in a more authoritative role.
Critical theory. The appropriate criteria are his- Critical theory. TI
!Qricalsituatedness of the inquirY(i.e., that it takes the "transformative
account of the social, political, cultural, economic, Row 6: What is the who has expanded (
ethnic, and gender antecedents of the studied situ- place of ethics in inquiry? position to confront
ation), the extent to which the inquiry acts to erode sions. Change is faci:
ignorance and misapprehensIOns,and the extent to Positivism and postpositivism. In both these greater insight into
which it provides a stimulus to action, that is, to the paradigms ethics is an important consideration, (the nature and exte
transformation of the existing structure. and it is taken very seriously by inquirers, but it are stimulated to act
is extrinsic to the inquiry process itself. Hence
Constructivism. Two sets of criteria have bee ethical behavior is formally policed by external Constructivism. T
proposed: the trust""worthinesscntena of credibil- mechanisms,-such as professional codes of con- the "passionate part

- --- -- ---
 PECTIVES Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research III

groups holding the constructions. Constructions it can be apprehended only imperfectly and
are not more or less "true," in any absolute sense, probabilistically; to
but simply more or less.informed and/or sophis- 3. critical theory's historical realism, which
, reality is as- ticated. Constructions are alterable, as are their
assumes an apprehendable reality consist-
LSonce plastic, associated "realities." This position should be dis-
tinguished from both nominalism and idealism ing of historically situated structures that
-congeries of are, in the absence of insight, as limiting and
, ethnic, and (see Reese, 1980, for an explication of these sev-
u (reified) into eral ideas). confining as if they were real; to
1/ (inappropri- 4. constructivism's relativism, which assumes
-I and immu- multiple, apprehendable, and sometimes con-
tructuresare flicting social realities that are the products
of human intellects, but that may change as
their constructors become more informed
Lsubjectivist. and sophisticated.
d object are
. 1/ith the val-
ated "others") It is the ontological position that most differentiates
~indings are constructiV1sm from the other three paradIgms.
this posture Methodology: Hermeneutical and dialectical.
I distinction The variable and personal (intramental) nature of
y; what can be social constructions suggests that individual con- Epistemology
mth the inter- structions can be elicited and refined only through
gator and a interaction between and among investi ator and We note the move from
:d line sepa- respon ents. These vacymg constructions are in-
ological rows terpreted using conventional hermeneutical tech-
.his fusion. niques, and are compared and contrasted through l. positivism's dualist, objectivist assumption
a dialectical interchange. The final aim is to distill that enables the investigator to determine
Il.The trans- a consensus construction that is more informed "how things really are" and "how things
1dialogue be- and sophisticated than any of the predecessor really work"; to
Mects of the constructions (including, of course, the etic con-
struction of the mvestigator). 2. postpositivism's modified dualist/objectivist
cal in nature
assumption that it is possible to approximate
~nsions (ac-
ures as immu- (For more about constructivism, see also Schwandt, (but never fully know) reality; to
Isness (seeing Chapter 7, this volume.) 3. critical theory's transactional!subjectivist as-
-lnd compre- sumption that knowledge is value mediated
:hange), or, and hence value dependent; to
.rmative intel- 4. constructivism's somewhat similar but broader
:ethose forms
Cross-Paradigm Analyses transactional/subjectivist assumption that sees
-~s that point
and collec- (Rows of Table 6.1) knowledge as created in interaction among
I uf historical investigator and respondents.
ue and hope" Having noted briefly the positions that propo-
-emonstrate It is their epi<tt>AUlh1g;,..,,1
positions that most dif-
nents of each paradigm might take with respect to
1978). the three paradigm-defining questions, it is useful ~rentiate critical theory and constructivism from
to look across rows to compare and contrast those the other two paradigms.
1eory, see the positions among the several paradigms.
''"On, Chapter
I 1cMcLaren, Methodology
i.' Ontology
We note the move from
Moving from left to right across Table 6.1, we
note the move from
1. positivism's experimental/manipulative meth-
'e apprehend- odology that focuses on verification of hy-
}'>ible mental l. positivism's position of naive realism, as- potheses; to ,
I ally based, suming an objective external reality upon 2. postpositivism's modified experimental!
_ 1 elements which inquiry can converge; to
lividuals and manipulative methodology invested in critical
le.nt for their 2. postpositivism's critical realism, which still multiplism focusing on falsification of hy-
, persons or assumes an objective reality but grants that potheses; to '
 112 MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES Competing Paradil

TABLE 6.2 Paradigm Positions on Selected Practical Issues quite different. Fin:
Issue Positivism Post positivism Constructivism
training, accommod
Critical Theory et al.
deemed especially
., ponents; they repr
Inquiry aim explanation: prediction and control critique and trans- understanding;
formation; restitution reconstruction
ceived view is cons
and emancipation
The entries in the I
public positions, ~
Nature of verified hypotheses nonfalsified hypoth- structuraVhistorical individual reconstructions been addressed by
knowledge established as facts eses that are probable insights coalescing around some cases, theref
or laws facts or laws consensus that we believe fo
metaphysical (ontl
Knowledge accretion-"building clocks" adding to historical revisionism; more informed and methodological) p
accumulation "edifice of knowledge"; generalizations generalization by sophisticated take one example
and cause-effect linkages similarity reconstructions; addressed directly I
vicarious experience but we believe the
is one that would
Goodness or conventional benchmarks of "rigor": historical situatedness; trustworthiness and were they to be ch
quality criteria internal and external validity, reliability, erosion of ignorance authenticity An immediately:
and objectivity and misapprehensions; ble 6.1 and Table 6
action stimulus case it was possible
cell, in the case of
Values excluded-influence denied included-formative overlap within row
Ethics
and postpositivist (
extrinsic; tilt toward deception intrinsic; moral tilt intrinsic; process tilt issues in which the
toward revelation toward revelation; different, the diffe
special problems contrast, one may r
Voice "disinterested scientist" as informer of
between these two I
"trans formative "passionate participant" and constructivist
decision makers, policy makers, and change intelIectual" as as facilitator of multi-
differ among them:
agents advocate and activist voice reconstruction We have form\)
technical and which follow.
Training technical; quantitative resocialization; qualitative and quantitative;
quantitative; and qualitative; history; values of altruism and empowerment
substantive theories substantive theories
Row I: What is
Accommodation commensurable incommensurable the aim or purposl

Hegemony in control of publication, funding,

Positivism and
seeking recognition and input
promotion, and tenure paradigms the aim
Wright, 1971), uIt
and control of ph
human. As Hesse (
3. critical theory's dialogic/dialectical meth- criterion for progn
odology aimed at the reconstruction of pre- capability of "sci
viously held constructions; to should improve O'
4. constructivism's hermeneutic/dialectic meth- determinism impl
noted. The inquire
odology aimed at the reconstruction of pre- situation that seem
viously held constructions. unmerited, priviIe~
'1
Critical theory.
tique and transfo.
Implications of cultural, economi
Each Paradigm's Position that constrain and
on Selected Practical Issues ment in confront:
(Rows of Table 6.2) rion for progress:
emancipation sho
and activism are k
Differences in paradigm assumptions cannot be in the role of inst
dismissed as mere "philosophical" differences; that the inquirer I
formations are m

- - L
 ECTIVES Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research
quite different. Finally, the last four issues (voice.
training, accommodation, and hegemon
.tivism
eemed especially important by alternative pro-
ding; onents; they re resent areas on which the re-
cion ceive view is considered particularly vulnerable.
The entries in the table are based only in part on
public positions, given that not all issues have
reconstructions been addressed by all paradigms' proponents. In
uround some cases, therefore, we have supplied entries
that we believe follow logically from the basic
metaphysical (ontological, epistemological, and
rmed and methodological) postures of the paradigms. To
lted take one example, the issue of voice is rarely
)ns; addressed directly by positivists or postpositivists,
perience but we believe the entry "disinterested scientist"
is one that would be given by those proponents
liness and were they to be challenged on this matter.
An immediately apparent difference betweenTa-
ehensions; ble 6.1 and Table 6.2 is that whereas in the former
case it was possible to makea distinct entry for every
cell, in the case of Table 6.2 there is considerable
overlap within rows, particularly for the positivist
and pOStpOSltiVISt columns. Indeed, even for those
l .cess tilt issues in which the entries in those two columns are
velation; different, the differences appear to be minor. In
ohIems
contrast, one may note the major differences found
between these two paradigms and the critical theory
I Jarticipant" and constructivist paradigms, which tend also to
tor of multi-
differ among themselves.
IDstruction
We have formulated the issues as questions,
which follow.
I ~tjtative;
npowerment
Row 1; What is
the aim or purpose of inquiry?
input Positivism and postpositivism. For both these
paradigms the aim of inquiry is exvlanation (von
Wright, 1971), ultimately enabling the vrediction
and control of phenomena, whether physical or
human. As Hesse (1980) has suggested, the ultimate
ons have im- criterion for progress in these paradigms is that the
;-;onduct of capability of "scientists" to predict and control
I IIIof find- should improve over time. The reductionism and
lected to dis- determinism im lied b this position should be
ent issues. noted. The inquirer is cast In e role of "expert," a
IstS of four situation that seems to award special, perhaps even
a digms and unmerited, privilege to the investigator.
;uc:::S,summa-
implications. . Critical theory. The aim of inquiry is the cri-
!Jur issues tique and transformation of the social, political,
.nowledge cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender structures
: au10ng those that constrain and exploit humankind, by engage-
}sitivists and ment in confrontation, even conflict. The crite-
:1- issues on rion for progress is that over time, restitution and
I: 'requently emancipation should occur and persist. Advocacy
s _nd ethics) and acti vism are key concepts. The inquirer is cast
uadigms, al- !!t the role of instigator and facilitator, implying
'r--1onses are that the inoUirer understands a priori what trans-
formations are needed. But we should note that
113
some of the more radical stances in the criticalist
camp hold that iudgment about needed transfor-
mations should be reserved to those whose lives
are most affected bv transformations: the inquiry
participants themselves (Lincoln, in press).
Constructivism. The aim of inquiry is under-
standin and reconstruction of the constructions that
people (including the inquirer lrutia y 0 d, amling
toward consensus but still open to new interpreta-
tions as information and sophistication improve. The
criterion for progress is that over time, everYOne
formulates more informed and sophisticated con-
structions and becomes more aware of the content
and meaning of competing constructions. Advocacy
and activism are also key concepts is this view. The
inquirer is cast in the role of participant and facilitator
in this process, a position that some critics have
faulted on the grounds that it expands the inquirer's
role beyond reasonable expectations of expertise and
competence (Carr & Kemnlis, 1986).
Row 2: What is
the nature of knowledge?
Positivism. Knowledge consists of verified hy-
potheses that can be accepted as facts or laws.
Postpositivism. Knowledge consists of nonfal-
sified hypotheses that can be regarded as probable
facts or laws.
Critical theory. Knowledge consists of a series
of structural/historical insights that will b~-
formed as time passes. Transformations occur
when ignorance and misapprehensions give way
to more informed insights by means of a dialec-
tical interaction.
Constructivism. Knowledge consists of those
constructions about which there is relative con-
~susJor at least some movement toward con-
sensus) among those competent (and, in the case
of more arcane material, trusted) to interpret the
substance of the construction. Multiole "knowl-
edges" can coexist when equaily com etent or
truste In erp e ers Isa ree, an r de endin
on social. po ltica , cultural, economic, ethnic,
and gender factors that differentiate the interp~t-
gs.. These constructions are subject to continuous
revision, with changes most likely to occur when
relatively different constructions are brought into
juxtaposition in a dialectical context.
Row 3: How does knowledge accumulate?
Positivism and postpositivism. Knowledge ac-
cumulates bv a process of accretion, with each
 ~ .
TI ES Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research 115

:ra~jty duct and human subjects committees. Further, the tively engaged in facilitating the "multi voice"
I (: :al- realist ontology undergirding these paradigms pro- reconstruction of his or her own construction as
a}1jng vides a tilt toward the use of deception, which, it well as those of all other participants. Change is
, 1985); is argued in certain cases, is warranted to deter- facilitated as reconstructions are formed and in-
ltcW>gi- mine how "things really are and work" or for the, dividuals are stimulated to act on them.
ct IS), sake of some "hi!!"hersocial good" or some "clearer
u er- truth" (Bok, 1978, 1982; Diener & Crandall, 1978).
authen- Row 8: What are the implications
entidty Critical theory. Ethics is more nearly intrinsic of each paradigm for the
9). 'he to this paradigm, as implied by the intent to erode training of novice inquirers?
)Iv he ignorance and misapprehensions, and to take full
f1these account of values and historical situatedness in Positivism. Novices are trained primarily in
lIelism the inquiry process. Thus there is a moral tilt that technical knowledge about measurement, design,
:t. he the inquirer be revelatory (in the rigorous mean- and quantitative methods, with less but substan-
cr :al ing of "fully informed consent") rather than de- tial emphasIs on formal theories of the phenom-
:he two ceptive. Of course, these considerations do not ena in their substantive specialties.
IUthen- prevent unethical behavior, but they do provide
ru v- some process barriers that make it more difficult. Postpositivism. Novices are trained in way~
fu: ~r paralleling the positivist mOde,but with the addi-
Constructivism. Ethics is intrinsic to this para- tion of qualitative methods, often for the purpose
digm also because of the inclusion of participant of ameliorating the problems noted in the opening
values in the inquiry (startmg with respondents' paragraphs of this chapter.
existing constructions and working toward in-
creased information and sophistication in their Critical theory and constructivism. Novices must
constructions as well as in the inquirer's construc- first be resocialized from their early and usuall
~)e tion). There is an incentive-a process tilt-for Intense exposure to the received view of science.
n- revelation; hiding the inquirer's intent is destruc- That resocializationcannotbe accomplished without
'-~tl"ce" tive of the aim of uncoverin~ and improving con- thorough schooling in the postures and techniques
Values Structions. In addition, the hermeneuticaIJdialec- of positivism and postpositivism. Students must
-Ie tical methodology itself provides a strong but not come to appreciate paradigm differences (summa-
infallible safeguard against deception. However, rized in Table 6.1) and, in that context, to master
the close personal interactions required by the both qualitative and quantitative methods. The
methodology may produce special and often sticky former are essential because of their role in car-
.£!oblems of confidentiality and anonymity, as rying out the dialogic/dialectical or hermeneuticaIJ
1 tl ;e well as other interpersonal difficulties (Guba & dialectical methodologies; the latter because they
ey _.e Lincoln, 1989). can playa useful informational role in all paradigms.
1se of They must also be helped to understand the social,
;. Fo-r_ litical omic ethnic, and ender his-
Ig' 1- Row 7: What "voice" is mirrored to and structure that serve as the surround or elr
wed in the inquirer's. activities, inquiries, and to incorporate e values of altruism
;s and especially those directed at change? and empowerment in their work.
:) COD-
th e Positivism and postpositivism. The inquirer's
)f e voice is that of the "disinterested !;cientisC in- Row 9: Are these paradigms
~s the forming decision makers, policy makers, and change necessarily in conflict?
he in- agents, who independently use this scientific in- Is it possible to accommodate
pc t formation, at least in part, to form, explain, and these several views within
st
.f
I

1
justify actions, policies, and change proposals.

Critical theory. The inquirer's voice is that of

a single conceptual framework?

Positivism and postpositivism. Proponents of

the "transformative intellectual" (Giroux, 1988)
who has expanded consciousness and so is in a
position to confront ignorance and misapprehen-
sions. Change is facilitated as individuals develop
th(~ greater insight into the existing state of affairs
Hit . (the nature and extent of their exploitation) and
but It are stimulated to act on it.
lence
Constructivism. The inquirer's voice is that of
cc . the "passionate participant" (Lincoln, 1991) ac-
these two paradigms, given their foundational
orientation, take the position that all paradi~ms
can be accommodated-that is, that there exists:
or will be found to exist, some common rational
structure to which all questIOns ot dlqerence can
be referred tor resolutIOn. 1he posture IS reauc-
tionist and assumes the possibility of point-by-
point comparisons (commensurability), an issue
about which there continues to be a great deal of
disagreement.
 116 MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES Competing Paradig,

cal theory and constructivism will continue to worlds within worlds,

Critical theory and constructivism. Proponents
of these two paradigms join in affirmin~ the basic play secondary, although important and progres- paradigms. Infinitesim
incommensurability of the paradigms (although sively more influential, roles in the near future. 3. It is unlikely tha
they would agree that positivism and pos~- would agree that our s
Ism are commensurable, and would probably agree he or she thinks or d.
have either the time c
that critical theory and constructivism are com-
mensurable). The basic beliefs of the paradigms Conclusion they do in philosophic
are beheved to be essentially contradictory. For ever, that these desci
constructivists, either there is a "real" reality or strokes, if not always.
The metaphor of the "paradigm wars" described
there is not (although one might wish to resolve
by Gage (1989) is undoubtedly overdrawn. De-
this problem differently in considering the physi- scribing the discussions and altercations of the
cal versus the human realms), and thus construc-
past decade or two as wars paints the matter as
tivism and positivismlpostpositivism cannot be more confrontational than necessary. A resolu- R
logically accommodated anymore than, say, the tion of paradigm differences can occur only when
ideas of flat versus round earth can be logically
accommodated. For critical theorists and con- a new paradigm emerges that is more informed Bernstein, R. (1988).
and SOphiStIcatedthan any existing one. That is ism. Philadelphia:
structivists, inquiry is either value free or it is not;
iiffi5nikely to occur if and when proponents of Bok, S. (1978). Lies: ~
again, logical accommodation seems impossible. these several points of view come together to
Realism and relativism, value freedom and value life. New York: J
discuss their differences, not to argue the sanctity Bok, S. (1982). Secn
boundedness, cannot coexist in any internally con- of their views. Continuin!!:dialogue among para-
sistent metaphysical system, which condition of and revelation. J
digm proponents of all stripes will afford the best Burns, J. (1978). Lea
consistency, it is stipulated, is essentially met by avenue for movin!!:toward a responsive and con-
each of the candidate paradigms. Resolution of Carr, W., & Kemmi:
genial relationship. Education, /enO}
this dilemma will necessarily await the emer-
We hope that in this chapter we have illustrated don: Falmer.
gence of a metaparadigm that renders the older, the need for such a discussion by clearly deline-
accommodated paradigms not less true, but sim- Cook, T., & Campbel
ating the differences that currently exist, and by tation: Design
ply irrelevant. showing that those differences have significant tings. Chicago:
implications at the practical level. Paradigm is- Diener, E., & Cranda
Row 10: Which of the sues are crucial; no inquirer, we maintain, ought behavioral rese
to go about the business of inquiry without being cago Press.
paradigms exercises hegemony over
the others? That is, clear about just what paradigm informs and guides Gage, N. (1989). n
his or her approach. mattJ: A "his tor
which is predominantly influential?
ing since 1989.
Positivism and postpositivism. Proponents of Giroux, H. (1988). S
positi vism gained hegemony over the past several Notes lic life: Critic.
centuries as earlier Aristotelian and theological Minneapolis: l
paradigms were abandoned. But the mantle of Glaser, B. G., & Stra
he!!:emonyhas in recent decades graduallv fallen 1. Many of the objections listed here were first enun- grounded theo
on the shoulders of the postpositivists, the "natu- ciated by positivists themselves; indeed, we might ar- search. Chicag
ral" heirs of positivism. Postpositivists (and in- gue that the postpositivist position represents an attempt Guba, E. G. P981). (
deed many residual positivists) tend to control to transform positivism in ways that take account of ness of naturali
publication outlets, funding sources, promotion these same objections. The naive positivist position of nication and Te
and tenure mechanisms, dissertation committees, the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries is no Guba, E. G. (Ed.). (
and other sources of power and influence. They longer held by anyone even casually acquainted with bury Park, CA
were, at least until about 1980, the "in" group, and these problems. Although we would concede that the Guba, E. G. (1992;
continue to represent the strongest voice in pro- postpositivist position, as enunciated, for example, by 22, 17-24.
fessional decision making. Denis Phillips (1987, 1990a, 1990b), represents a con- Guba, E. G., & Line-
siderable improvement over classic positivism. it fails evaluation. N(
Critical theory and constructivism. Proponents to make a clean break. It represents a kind of "damage
of critical theory and constructivism are still seek- control" rather than a reformulation of basic principles.
ing recognition and avenues for input. Over the The notion that these problems required a paradigm
past decade, it has become more and more possi- shift was poorly recognized until the publication of
ble for them to achieve acceptance, as attested by Thomas Kuhn's landmark work, The Structure of Sci-
increasing inclusion of relevant papers in journals entific Revolutions (1962, 1970), and even then pro-
and professional meetings, the development of ceeded but slowly. Nevertheless, the contributions of
new journal outlets, the growing acceptability of pre-Kuhnian critics should be recognized and applauded.
"qualitative" dissertations, the inclusion of "quali- 2. We are reminded by Robert Stake (personal com-
tative" guidelines by some funding agencies and munication, 1993) that the view of paradigms that we
programs, and the like. But in all likelihood, criti- present here should not "exclude a belief that there are
 SPECTlVES Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research 117

.w..tlcontinue to worlds within worlds, unending, each with its own Hesse, E. (1980). Revolutions and reconstructions in
t and progres- paradigms. Infinitesimals have their own cosmologies." the philosophy of science. Bloomington: Indiana
. near future. 3. It is unlikely that a practitioner of any paradigm University Press. .
would agree that our summaries closely describe what House, E. (1977). The logic of evaluative argument. Los
he or she thinks or does. Workaday scientists rarely
have either the time or the inclination to assess what
they do in philosophical terms. We do contend, how-
.Angeles: University of California, Center for the
Study of Evaluation.
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolu-
ever, that these descriptions are apt as broad brush tions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
strokes, if not always at the individual level. Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions
-ars" described
(2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
'erdrawn. De-
Lincoln, Y. S. (1991). The detached observer and the
v..:ations of the
passionate participant: Discourses in inquiry and
ts the matter as
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tQJIcede that the Guba, E. G. (1992). Relativism. Curriculum Inquiry, research: Grounded theory procedures and tech-
~ .r example,by 22, 17-24. niques. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
'resents a con- Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1989). Fourth generation von Wright, G. (197]). Explanation and understanding.
IOsitivism, it fails evaluation. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
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