PostScript Nov-Des 2010

Vol.VII, No.
6, November-December 2010
TOWARDS FINDING SOLUTIONS

TO CLIMATE CHANGE
Editor’s Note New Media Power:

3 What is Actually Happening to Indonesia? 21 A Review of the Wikileaks Case
Towards Finding Solutions TKI, Prosperity and the Lack of

6 to Climate Change 27 Employment Opportunity
“New Kids on The Blocks and the

13 Godfather”: A Comparative Analysis on
Local Oligarchs in Indonesian and the
Philippines Local Politics
Editor’s Note
What is actually happening
to Indonesia?
N
atural disasters are striking one after the other, from the flash flood in
Wasior, West Papua Province in East Indonesia, to the western part of
the archipelago, the island of Java with the eruptions of two mountains
(Merapi and Bromo with Anak Krakatau in the Sunda Strait still prepar-
ing to get more active), to the tsunami that struck the Mentawai Islands in the western
part of Sumatra, all taking a high death toll and huge property damage. Many specu-
lations unfolded mostly mystical, since no one could say anything understandable
about these acts of nature; they could only repair the damage. In the mystic sense,
many people took images of the Merapi eruptions as a warning for those who are still
living not to be wrongdoers and always remember and respect the might of nature.
The religious people, too, do not forget to relate the disasters to the probable wreath
of God, with warnings for the people to walk back on the right side.
The handling and overcoming the impact of the disasters will automatically add a
burden to the government’s national budget. Economically, Indonesia has been in the
way of improvement. There is a small disturbance here and there, and the coming
of the yearend news puts a bit of emphasis on the rise of daily commodity prices
preceding Christmas and New Year. However, people are increasingly sensitive about
the performance of SBY’s government; it is criticized as walking a slow pace in
meeting its obligations which are many: fighting corruption including eradicating the
“legal mafia”; improving the economic and welfare situation and not to encourage
people to go abroad working as housemaids and in other blue collar jobs that many
abroad no longer want to do (with some excesses where many female workers
especially become the victims of abuse by their employers).
As a matter of fact, many others are successful and go home with enough money to
improve their families’ lives—a success as “foreign currency patriots” which is only
tacitly acknowledged by the authorities. What makes news are only the victims of
abuse, who go home disabled or even in coffins; many are facing death sentences in
Publisher: A. Watik Pratiknya, Co-editors: Andi Makmur Makka, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Chief Editor: Siti Zuhro, Executive Editor: Mustofa
Kamil Ridwan, Editors: Andrinof Chaniago, Rahimah Abdulrahim, Assistant Editor: Wenny Pahlemy, Secretary & Layout: Kanti, Circulation &
Production: Ghazali H. Moesa, Address: The Habibie Center, Jl. Kemang Selatan No. 98, Jakarta 12560, Indonesia, Tel. (62-21) 781 7211,
Fax. (62-21) 781 7212, thc@habibiecenter.or.id, www.habibiecenter.or.id- No. ISSN 2087-1619
PostScript is published bimonthly by The Habibie Center. @2010 by The Habibie Center. All Rights reserved. Unless stated otherwise, all views
expressed in PostScript reflect the views of the editorial staff. Inquiries on circulation and editorial correspondence should be addressed to
PostScript editors.
PostScript 3
prisons abroad. The problem of Indonesian migrant workers is an old problem which
Editor’s Note
nobody takes good care of; it is neglected by whom it may concern, especially the
government agencies. On the other hand, a lot of workers are stubborn. They know
that they have to obey the rules in going abroad to work, but wherever they find the
chances, rules or no rules, they go.
This is where they become the victims of the “vultures”, people who see the workers
as the source of money for them. They do not care whether their recruitment process
for the workers violates the human rights or not. They manipulate the stubbornness
of the workers and they try anything and any way they can, and in one case including
herding the workers through the jungle of Kalimantan in their journey to Malaysia
by evading the posts of the border guards and customs officials. Even after work, the
workers work (illegally) in the Malaysian states of Sabah or Sarawak in the northern
part of Kalimantan, and to evade the Malaysian officials they have often no choice
but to live in the jungle by building huts. It is no wonder that Malaysian authorities
have more than once extradited tens of thousands of Indonesian illegal workers.
Many in Indonesia have suggested that the government impose a temporary

postponement of permitting the sending of workers abroad without proper preparation,
especially their skills including the mastering of language (Arabic, English, mainly)
and permit papers. The government itself—since it is seemingly impossible to stop
the flow of workers out of this country—prefers to hold negotiations with foreign
governments, recipients of Indonesian workers (Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and others)
to find the best solutions to the migrant workers’ problem.
Corruption is still the number one enemy of the state. People ask about the promise
of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who once said that he himself would lead
the corruption eradication program. Looking into the fact that corruption is still
rampant, SBY’s promise looks like a paper tiger. It is not surprising if people talk
about the need to find a president who dares enough to fight corruption. Actually, the
fight against corruption is going on, only that each of the corruption cases is always
difficult to solve, the complication is that by commonly involving the big fish that the
corruption eradication agencies like the KPK (Corruption Eradication Commission)
must be very careful and on the look out for revenge by the corruptors. The head of
the KPK Antasari Azhar has to taste the prison bars for some years by the verdict
of the judges on the charge of murdering a high official with only one witness, a
golf caddy, whose testimony is seen by some circles as ambiguous. Now, two of his
companions, Bibit Samad Riyanto and Chandra Hamzah have to go to trial by the
decision of members of the House of Representatives, also on the basis of ambiguous
charges. But some verdicts have already been handed down by judges against people
related to the bribery case, namely, businessman at large Anggoro and his brother
Anggodo.
However, the tax corruption case of Gayus Tambunan is still far from complete and
involves some rank and file police officers. People are waiting for the completion
of the case that involves a huge sum of money. Again, the KPK with its new head,
4 PostScript Vol. VII, No. 6, November-December 2010

Busyro Muqoddas (who has tenure of only one year) must step very carefully since
Politics and Human Rights

Gayus had mentioned three companies which had given him billions of rupiah. But
how about the tens of other companies that Gayus had to iron out taxation problems
on when he was a medium rank official of the Directorate General of Taxation?
There are still three years left to the 2014 elections. Politicians have mentioned a
lot about the method of balloting. A recent test case was the regional head election
(pemilukada—the general election of head of regions—regencies and mayoralties).
There has been some speculation about the percentage of the parliamentary thresh-
old which for some parties—small ones—means death. These days there has even
been a contention that for the presidential election there must also be a “presidential
threshold”. Who said so? Politicians of course, who have set their eyes on the office
of presidency, since they are forever mindful that SBY will not be permitted to seek
another round.
PostScript 5
New Media Power:

A Review of the Wikileaks Case
Aryati Dewi Hadin, PR & Communications,
The Habibie Center
“…a free press and an active political opposition constitute the best early-warning
system a country threatened by famines can have.” Amartya Sen
N
obel Prize winner Amartya Sen (1933 - ) argued that democracy, including
the right to information, is the best way for a nation to avoid devastation.
Triggered by the recent phenomenon, WikiLeaks, this paper discusses
the dilemma between the right to information in democracy and national
secrecy.
The Grand Leakage
WikiLeaks’1 radical transparency during 2010 in particular has startled the world.
In April 2010, it shocked audiences with a video of a 2007 incident in which Iraqi
civilians and journalists were killed by US forces. On July 25, 2010, a collection
of 92,000 classified reports on the war in Afghanistan was released simultaneously
to The Guardian, The New York Times, and Der Spiegel. The so-called “Afghan
War Diary” was followed, in October, by a package of almost 400,000 documents
called the “Iraq War Logs”. Then, on 28 November 2010, WikiLeaks and five major
newspapers from Spain, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States
began to simultaneously publish the first leaked confidential - but not top secret - US
State Department diplomatic cables from 274 US Embassies and Consulates around
the world. Among the latter were 3,226 classified documents from the US Embassy
in Jakarta (3,059) and the US Consulate in Surabaya (167), covering the period 1990
– 2010, but mostly from 2006 onwards.
As leaked by WikiLeaks, a diplomatic cable in 2009 revealed a conspiracy between

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman with Israel asking the
US for help to suppress Iran for its nuclear program. An Arabian columnist, Abdel
Rahman al-Rashid in his editorial on Asharq al Awsat daily newspaper wrote, “The
1
For a comprehensive review of the WikiLeaks phenomena, praise as well as criticism, see
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/wikileaks

Arabian Gulf states now realize that their main threat in the region now is the Irani-

an nuclear program.” This revelation had replaced the old discourse of “Arab-Israel”
hostility with “Arab-Iran” enmity. In the late November 2010 releases, a leaked cable
about the Copenhagen Climate Conference became a trendy topic. The world knew
that some countries like EU and the US had tried to manipulate their global warming
agendas. As these examples suggest, the WikiLeaks’ controversy had the potential
to change the script of the world’s power game. The configuration of opponent-ally
could well be shifted as a result.
This WikiLeaks phenomenon has affected the world’s diplomacy. Some governments
have become more cautious with their global interconnectivities. A lot of them have
reviewed their foreign policies. Some countries were reported as limiting their
interaction with US diplomats in terms of information exchange. Diplomatic relations
also faced a crisis of trust. In what could only be seen as an attempt to water-down any
collateral damage, on December 10, 2010, the US Embassy in Jakarta held a press
conference to state that there were no important cables from Jakarta or Surabaya that
would affect Indonesia - US diplomatic relations.
The content of the leaked documents also harmed the diplomatic relations between
states. On December 15, 2010, Malaysian foreign officials sent a note of protest over
Malaysia’s humiliation by a Singaporean US diplomat.
The world’s reactions toward WikiLeaks vary. According to The Wall Street Journal,
the US federal government would lay off any employee who accessed WikiLeaks.
Some universities in the US warned their students not to access, share links with
or make comments about it in the social networking media. China blockaded access
to the website. Several companies were reported to have stopped cooperating with
WikiLeaks. Julian Assange, an Australian citizen who was described as the WikiLeaks’
founder and spokesperson, had been arrested in the United Kingdom. A presumption
also occurred that there was a conspiracy to overthrow WikiLeaks.
However, support for WikiLeaks remains. Vladimir Putin, Russian prime minister
regarded the arrest of Assange as a betrayal to democracy. Hundreds of hacktivists,
WikiLeaks’ voluntary supporters,, attacked Amazon.com as revenge for ousting
WikiLeaks from its server. These hacktivists who call themselves “Anonymous”
threatened to attack websites that refused to cooperate with WikiLeaks. They extracted
WikiLeaks’ content and broadcast it to other channels such as Facebook, MySpace,
Twitter, e-mails, etc. Later on, WikiLeaks hosting moved to a provider in Sweden;
it remains the central provider, but it also maintains its own servers at undisclosed
locations across the globe. A wave of protests against the blockades of WikiLeaks
and the arrest of Julian Assange has come from the US, Australia, Great Britain, the
Netherlands, Spain, Colombia, and Mexico. Although the Congress in Washington
DC on December 16, 2010 considered options on the right law to prosecute him,
Assange was declared innocent on the same day by a London court.
When borderless global communication becomes possible, the role of the media
PostScript 7
in communication will enter a new phase. What WikiLeaks has done may well be
a consequence of what information technology advancement has offered. Some
theorists believe that the web is able to enhance the geographical reach of information
presentation by speed (Quinn, 2002 ). Therefore, with the internet and mobile
technology making information more accessible, a non-state actor like WikiLeaks
can switch confidential information into public information.
Another consequence of the accelerated advancement of information technology is

that when information becomes more easily accessible, people from all layers are
able to control public opinion on a large scale. Referring to Nancy Fraser (2008),
the bringing together of individual citizens and informal networks through the
interconnected global webs of public communication and dialog has given rise to a
new popular force in the form of public opinion which is influencing both the public
and private structures of power. For instance, when a scandal in the government body
was revealed to the public, the government might lose the people’s trust and political
support. Distrust that is derived from leaked news could also cause a collapse in
foreign investment and to changing trade relations.
On the other side, the WikiLeaks’ phenomenon could trigger information technology
to find other forms of communication in the future, as well as to inspire others to
mirror on the WikiLeaks model. In the latter context, we note the registration, on
7 December 2010 in the Netherlands, of IndoLeaks that seeks to publish classified
documents of the Indonesian government, via The Jakarta Globe.
The Right to Information, Good Governance, and National Security
Apart from the international reaction about WikiLeaks, the continuous coverage
about WikiLeaks by the Indonesian media has not yet significantly caught the public’s
attention. During December 2010, public attention was still focused on other topics
such as the AFF Cup football match, Gayus Tambunan and the bill on the Special
Status of Yogyakarta (RUU Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta).
In Indonesia, the WikiLeaks’ case appears to have only caught the attention of a
limited number of people. The Head of the Information Center of the Indonesian
National Army (TNI), First Admiral Iskandar Sitompul said that the leaked
diplomatic cable from the US Embassy in Beijing about the US and China’s concern
about transparency, accountability and reformation in TNI would not affect TNI’s
performance. As noted by KoranTempo.com, on December 16, 2010, Sitompul said,
“There is nothing influenced (by WikiLeaks). Our work is always referred to as
the government’s policy.” The Minister for Defense, Purnomo Yusgiantoro and the
spokesperson of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Kusuma Habir, also refused to give
any comment. Both underlined that any official statement would be conveyed by the
Coordinating Minister for Political, Justice and Security Affairs (Menkopolhukam).
However, the controversy over the whistle-blower site has created concern within
the government. As reported by the official national radio station (RRI) News

Portal on December 3, 2010, the Minister for Political, Justice and Security Affairs,

Djoko Suyanto, had instructed the Minister for Foreign Affair and the Minister for
Communications and Information to continuously watch the WikiLeaks’ content
before taking further action.
The government’s reaction evoked fear among the activists about the return of the
closed regime in Indonesia. As reported by Antara News on December 17, 2010,
the chairman of the Commission for Public Complaints and Ethics Enforcement of
the Press Council, Agus Sudibyo predicted that the government might restrict the
public’s access to information through a ratification of the draft law on state secrets.
This fear came from the polemic around the secrecy bill itself. Since being prepared
by the Ministry for Defense in 1996, there are four aspects which were still in
question. One of them was that the definition of ‘state secret’ was too general and
unclear. According to Article 1 of the Indonesian Draft State Secrecy Law about the
general provisions:
“State secrets are information, objects, and/or activities officially determined by

the President that should be kept confidential for due protection according to the
management standard and procedure; which upon knowledge of ineligible persons
may be injurious to the sovereignty, integrity and security of the Unitary State of
the Republic of Indonesia and/or may result in disruptions to the administration of
the state, national resources, public order and/or to the execution of the tasks and
functions of state bodies.”
There is not enough parameter to clarify or to define “information” in terms of state

secrets. The scope of “may be injurious to the sovereignty, ..” as the reason to conceal
information from the public still needs to be questioned. As written by Agus Sudibyo
et. al on “Kontra Kebebasan Pers: Studi Atas Berbarapa RUU” (2008), the scope of
state secrets should be limited to strategic information about the implementation of
the national security system and that includes the national security policy, the strategy
of national security policy, the planning and implementation of national security,
resources data, and the facilities and infrastructures of national security.
The unlimited scope and parameter of the draft state secrecy law allows government
officials to conceal some national issues in the name of the bureaucracy or their
personal interests. They could thwart people from accessing information, no matter
how important the information is for the public. For example, while the national
budget ‘wish list’ for weapons acquisitions made by the Ministry of Defense is
regarded as a state secret for the sake of national security, in reality it has very little
meaning because people have no idea about how the government will manage the
budget. Therefore, it is difficult for the public to watch and control the governance.
Compared with the public’s right and need to know, it has become far too easy for a
government to throw into the basket of ‘secrets’ all those delicate issues which the
government for its own sake would prefer to keep secret.
PostScript 9
The right to information is also important for people while selecting their
representatives in the governance.
This could lead to a dilemma for the implementation of democracy in Indonesia. While
democracy demands increasing transparency and supports the right to information,
the government has, at the same time, to protect the national interest. Here again
though we have a definitional problem, what is meant by ‘national interest’ is itself
far from crystal clear.
The Future’s Challenge
There are some lessons that Indonesia could learn from the WikiLeaks’ phenomenon.
First, the government officials and national intelligence service must improve their
information technology literacy. Innovation in information technology is growing
rapidly, and the new media (WikiLeaks and the social networking sites such as
Facebook among others) are fast emerging as a new form of power. Secondly, the
government will need to review its communication performance. In the future, a
crisis of trust would be a serious case for every political practitioner. As information
technology becomes more advanced, the task of winning the hearts and souls of
voters through image building would no longer be effective if not accompanied by
real action. In terms of international relations, Indonesia should build, maintain, and
strengthen its international supports through well-conceived mutual relationships
based on equality and human rights.
Third, all democracy’s stakeholders such as the public, the Constitutional Court
(MK), the Attorney General’s Office, the Supreme Audit office, Indonesian National
Police, Indonesian Corruption Commission (KPK), academicians, NGOs, etc, should
be more enthusiastic and transparent in controlling the government’s performance.
People should be more critical in promoting their rights for information. Fourth, as
all media always contain interests and sometime hoax, it is important for people to be
more critical through better media literacy.
The WikiLeaks case has brought the media into a new era. The power of the media
has become more significant. The borderless and real time communication today has
changed the map of international politics. The new media has become a weapon
in revealing diplomatic and intelligence documents, replacing nuclear as a mental
weapon to win the battle of the global power. The media also replaces diplomacy
– both public diplomacy and diplomacy behind closed doors – as the main tool of
international relations. Therefore, the new media will be a challenge for us in the
future: when the citizens move faster than the states.
-oooOooo-

Bibliography

Green, Lelia. (2010). The Internet: An Introduction to New Media. Berg Publisher.
Curran, James and Witschge, Tamara et.al (2010). New Media, Old News:
Journalism and Democracy in the Digital Age/Part III: New Media and
News in Practice/Chapter 6: Liberal Dreams and the Internet. SAGE
Publications Ltd.
Fenton, Natalie et. al. (2009). New Media, Old News: Journalism and Democracy
in the Digital Age/Part I: Drowning or Waving? New Media, Journalism
and Democracy. SAGE Publications Ltd.
Sudibyo, Agus et. al. (2008). Kontra Kebebasan Pers: Studi Atas Beberapa RUU.
Yayasan Sains Estetika dan Teknologi.
Fraser, Nancy. (2008). Scales of Justice: Re-imagining Political Space in a
Globalized World. Columbia University Press.
Morrisett, Lloyd N et.al. (2003). Democracy and New Media/Part I: How
Democratic is Cyberspace?/Chapter 1: Technologies of Freedom?
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Clayton Powell III, Adam et.al. (2003). Democracy and New Media/Part II: Global
Developments/Chapter 12: Democracy and New Media in Developing
Nations: Opportunities and Challenges. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
Quinn, S. (2002). Knowledge Management in the Digital Newsroom. St. Louis,
MO: Focal Press.
Mark D. Alleyne. (1995) International Power and International Communication.
Palgrave Macmillan.
PostScript 11
Towards Finding Solutions

to Climate Change
Tatat Sukarsa, Researcher, The Habibie Center
“Had the climate been a bank, it would have been saved”.

Hugo Chavez
Climate Change and Its Real Impact
T
he latest report of the Global Humanitarian Forum (The Anatomy of a Si-
lent Crisis, Geneva, 2009) says that climate change causes the death of
300,000 people a year and affects a further 325 million people. Floods,
droughts, hurricanes, rising sea levels, heat waves, crop failures, to in-
creases in the spread of various diseases are just some examples of the impacts of
climate change that are already present (Kompas, November 19, 2010).
As an archipelagic state located in a tropical region, Indonesia is one of the countries

most vulnerable to the threats and impacts of climate change. Geographic location
and geological conditions make Indonesia more vulnerable to natural disasters re-
lated to climate change. According to the IPCC report (Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change), Indonesia is expected to face various threats and impacts of cli-
mate change. A research institute in Singapore said that Indonesia is the country most
vulnerable to climate change in Southeast Asia, while the capital city of Jakarta, is
biggest city most vulnerable to climate change. This was expressed by Arif Fiyanto,
Campaigner of Greenpeace Climate and Energy Division, during a press conference
in Jakarta (5/26/2009).
Rising sea levels, widespread drought and floods, reduced agricultural production,
and the increasing prevalence of climate-related diseases are some of the impacts
of climate change that have and will happen in Indonesia. Most large cities in the
densely populated country are located in the coastal areas. In the upcoming decades,
these cities are threatened by drowning due to rising sea levels. Research conducted
by Gordon McGrahanan from the International Institute for Environment and Devel-
opment, in the United Kingdom, found that approximately 10% of the total popula-
tion of the earth who live about 10 yards from the beach are threatened with drown-

ing when the polar ice melts due to climate change. Jakarta, Makassar, Padang, and

several cities in West Java will sink in the next few decades, if we refer to this study
(Universitas Negeri Malang Community, 2010).
Declining food production due to crop failures caused by floods and droughts is also
expected to increasingly happen; some areas in eastern Indonesia such as Papua and
East Nusa Tenggara are the region’s most vulnerable to this threat. Increasing tem-
peratures lead to an increased prevalence of several climate-related diseases such as
malaria, diarrhea, and respiratory disease. In the case of malaria, the increase in tem-
perature causes the mosquito, vector of malaria, which previously only lived in low
areas, to now be able to live in upland areas that were previously free of malaria. This
causes an increase of malaria in various regions in Indonesia. The scarcity of clean
water due to drought and salt water spilling over because of rising sea levels, could
trigger an increase in diarrheal diseases in the future.
Some Records of Climate Change Summits
The Kyoto Protocol is a protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on

Climate Change (UNFCCC), aimed at fighting global warming. The UNFCCC is an
international environmental treaty with the goal of achieving “stabilization of green-
house gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The Protocol was initially ad-
opted on 11 December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan and entered into force on 16 February
2005.
The objective of the Kyoto Protocol is to establish a legally binding international

agreement, whereby all the participating nations commit themselves to tackling the
issue of global warming and greenhouse gas emissions. The target agreed upon was
an average reduction of 5.2% from 1990 levels by the year 2012. According to the
treaty, in 2012, Annex I countries must have fulfilled their obligations of reduction of
greenhouse gases emissions established for the first commitment period (2008-2012)
(see Annex B of the Protocol). The Protocol expires at the end of 2012.
As of November 2009, 187 countries and one regional economic organization have
ratified the agreement, representing over 63.9% of the 1990 emissions from Annex I
countries. The most notable non-party to the Protocol is the United States, which is a
party to the UNFCCC and was responsible for 36.1% of the 1990 emission levels of
Annex I countries. Countries like China, India and Brazil are still in the non-annex
group. This makes them without obligations in the Kyoto protocol to limit their CO2
emissions. As of November 2010, these countries haven’t changed their minds about
signing in as Annex-1 countries and thereby making them able to obligate themselves
to a reduction. But making obligations to the protocol aren’t simple, as they also can
be seen as damages to national competitiveness. The Protocol can be signed and
ratified only by parties to the UNFCCC, and a country can withdraw by giving 12
PostScript 13
months notice (Wikipedia, Kyoto Protocol).
To replace the Kyoto Protocol that its first commitment period will expire in 2012, the
UNFCCC COP (Conference of Parties) 15 in Copenhagen was expected to produce
a binding agreement, as an initial step to replace the Kyoto Protocol. Unfortunately,
the COP 15 Copenhagen which took place on 7 to 19 December 2009 only ended
with the recognition of the Copenhagen Agreement or the “Copenhagen Accord” by
the 15th Session of the COP that was not legally binding, as expected by some coun-
tries. The climate change negotiation that became a means for a large gathering of
negotiators from both government and social movements from 193 countries, failed
to produce substantial points to overcome the global climate crisis. The so-called Co-
penhagen Accord “recognizes” the scientific case for keeping temperature rises to no
more than 2C but does not contain commitments to emissions reductions to achieve
that goal (guardian.co.uk). This means that, since the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de
Janeiro, there was no progressive improvement to cope with the global climate crisis.
The earth’s temperatures remain high and sea levels continue to rise. Negotiations on
climate change had been done only in vain.
Developed countries or the so-called Annex-1 are clearly a major contributor to the
failure. Copenhagen was weak because it did not express a concrete commitment of
developed countries to reduce emissions significantly. Meanwhile, developed coun-
tries claimed that countries, whose economies were in the process of development,
had to reduce emissions by the same percentage. This was obviously not fair because
developed countries were free of the historical responsibility and their carbon debt.
Reducing emissions of developed countries should be a minimum of 40% by 2020
(from 1990 levels), while the emission reductions for developing countries should
depend on the ability and willingness of developing countries, considering that de-
veloping countries deserve a chance to build their economies. Developed countries
had already experienced the stage of industrialization that has been initiated since the
industrial revolution.
Furthermore, a new round of the UN climate summit (UNFCCC COP 16) which took
place from 29 November to 10 December 2010 in Cancun Mexico and attended by
about 200 countries, was originally expected to reach an agreement on narrowing the
gap between rich and developing countries. The two-week conference on the resort
beach in Cancun was aimed at seeking agreement on the funding and approaches to
preserving rain forests, as well as preparations for the world getting warmer. The cli-
mate meeting was also seeking to formalize the existing targets to address greenhouse
gas emissions. The main goal of this climate summit was to agree a tougher climate
agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol which expires in 2012, to step forward in the
fight against global warming. Last year, the Copenhagen Climate Summit agreed on a
new climate deal but it ended with a non-binding agreement which was then rejected
by a number of developing countries (Kompas, 29 November 2010).

However, the UNFCCC COP 16 even failed to produce a binding agreement. The

Cancun meeting which resulted in the Cancun text, in fact made it more likely for
the developed countries to shift from the Kyoto Protocol, and its binding regime
of emission reduction commitments, to a voluntary system in which each country
only makes pledges on how much it will reduce its emissions. The Cancun text also
recognized the emission reduction targets that developed countries listed under the
Copenhagen Accord. But these were overall such poor targets that many scientific
reports warned that the developed countries by 2020 might decrease their emissions
by only a little or even increase their level. The world was on track for a temperature
rise of 3 to 5 degrees, which would lead to a catastrophe.
But even as it prepared the ground for the developed countries’ “great escape” from
their commitments, the Cancun text introduced new disciplines for developing coun-
tries. They were now obliged to put forward their plans and targets for climate mitiga-
tion, which are to be compiled in a document and later in registries. It was the first step
in a plan by developed countries (they have been quite open about it) to get develop-
ing countries to put their mitigation targets as commitments in national schedules,
similar to the tariff schedules in the World Trade Organization. The Cancun text also
obliged developing countries to report on their national emissions every two years as
well as on their climate actions and the results in terms of emission avoidance.
Many developing-country officials were increasingly worried in Cancun about how

they were going to implement these new obligations, as a lot of people, skills and
money would be needed. In fact the developing countries made a lot of concessions
and sacrifices in Cancun, while the developed countries managed to have their obli-
gations reduced or downgraded (Khor, 2010).
Only one dissenting country, Bolivia, dared to voice its dissent with the Cancun text.
Bolivia’s indefatigable negotiator, Pablo Solon, put it most cogently in the conclud-
ing plenary, when he said that the only way to assess whether the agreement had any
“clothes” was to see if it included firm commitments to reduce emissions and whether
it was enough to prevent catastrophic climate change. As a press statement from
Bolivia put it: “Proposals by powerful countries like the US were sacrosanct, while
ours were disposable. Compromise was always at the expense of the victims, rather
than the culprits of climate change.” Solon concluded that in substance the Cancun
text was little more than a rehashed version of the Copenhagen Accord that had been
widely condemned the year before. Patricia Espinosa, chair of the talks, refused to
open up any points of her draft text for negotiation and cheered on by other delegates
made the legally dubious ruling that Bolivia’s opposition did not block consensus.
The Cancun agreements were “approved” to great celebration from the international
community (LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal, 2010).
Bolivia’s commitment to support a climate change solution that was more equitable
for developing countries was shown by Bolivia’s invitation to host an Alternative
Climate Conference, as disillusionment with the Copenhagen Accord of December
PostScript 15
2009. The ‘World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother
Earth’ took place in Cochabamba, Bolivia, April 19-22 2010. This conference re-
sulted in a ‘People’s Alternative to Climate Change’ which was seen as a fair solution
to climate change for all countries both developing and developed countries, for the
poor people who live in different parts of the world, for countries and peoples who
were most vulnerable to the impact of climate change, and to ensure the sustainability
of human’s life on earth.
Indonesia’s Role in Tackling the Impact of Climate Change
In the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh in September 2009, Indonesian President, Yud-

hoyono pledged to reduce emissions by 26% from 2005 emission levels, or 41% if
accompanied by financial support from developed countries. With this commitment,
Indonesia claimed to be the first developing country that would voluntarily commit
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
At the same time, domestic policies that were contrary to these commitments kept
running. The government reserved 17.91 million hectares of natural forest area to be
converted into infrastructure areas outside the forestry sector (source: Greenomic).
The government also planned to expand oil palm plantations covering an area of 26.
7 million hectares in 17 provinces which would also convert Indonesia’s remaining
natural forests (source: Sawit Watch). In addition to the above projects, the govern-
ment would encourage the use of coal, especially for the phase II power plant project
of 10,000 Megawatt (source: Doc. National Summit). From these facts it is clear that
the emission reduction commitment that was expressed by President Yudhoyono was
only a commitment in newspaper headlines. What was really needed was real action
to tackle climate change in keeping with the interests of the Indonesian people.
In the climate change talks COP 15 Copenhagen, that the Indonesian Delegation
declared a success because they had the two points of Reducing Emissions from De-
forestation and Forest Degradation (REDD)+ included in the text of the Copenhagen
Accord as a mechanism to mobilize financial resources from developed countries. In
fact, this REDD+ mechanism will not be able to reduce greenhouse gas emissions un-
less accompanied by fundamental emissions reductions by Annex-1 countries. In the
text, the mechanism was also not accompanied by guarantees of rights and access to
small communities that were vulnerable to resource and other areas of life that result
in endangerment of agricultural and forest areas.
In fact, the intention of the Government to mortgage Indonesian forests was already
apparent before the REDD+ scheme was included in the Copenhagen Accord. A
number of projects on behalf of the pilot project had been implemented in Indo-
nesia by the issuance of Permenhut (Forestry Ministry Regulation) No. 68 of 2008
concerning the implementation of demonstration activity and reduction of carbon
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. In Ulu Masen, Nanggroe Aceh

Darussalam, about 750,000 hectares of community land could not be occupied and

cultivated again. In Muara Jambi, farmers had to protect 101,000 hectares of their
agricultural land which was claimed as a conservation area in the carbon trading
scheme.
In the second week of December 2009, the Ministry of Finance of Indonesia also
released a “Green Paper” on the Strategic Economic and Fiscal Policy for Climate
Change Mitigation in Indonesia. The document set out concrete strategies for forestry
and land conversion as one of the major contributors to emissions in Indonesia today,
and also for the energy sector which was expected to be a long-term strategic frame-
work for climate-related policy making. But as predicted, this document was only
a tool for giving legitimacy to international investment in clean energy and forestry
industries, which has resulted in Indonesia’s forest and natural resources being sold
out to foreign countries.
Although the Government has already stated a commitment to a variety of ways to

reduce carbon emissions and to address the consequences of climate change, the facts
are that the opposite has happened. In any of the climate change negotiations, par-
ticularly the newly passed (Copenhagen, Cancun), Indonesia has always supported a
solution that was not beneficial to the interests of the people of Indonesia as a whole.
Indonesia is not on the side of developing countries, but always supports solutions
built in the interests of developed countries.
Solution
Indonesia as a developing country which holds an important position on the interna-

tional stage should have helped push global support for the People’s Alternative to
Climate Change produced in Bolivia rather than support a solution that would lead
to catastrophes for the majority of the Indonesian people. Among concrete solutions
at the global level, the global climate change negotiations should result in a binding
agreement (have legal consequences) for both developed and developing countries.
Another solution is by carbon debt payments from developed countries to develop-
ing countries, as well as by changing the development model of pursuing economic
growth to development that puts human welfare and nature preservation in the first
position.
The Government of Indonesia also should start to commit to the use of clean en-
ergy such as wind, geothermal, solar and wave energy and not endorse the use of
wrong clean energy such as agro fuels. Meanwhile, one solution that could be done
by the government is supporting the implementation of sustainable agriculture which
is managed by millions of small farmers in Indonesia. For indeed through sustain-
able agriculture, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions causing climate change while
also helping millions of small family farmers. Of course, all the above national solu-
tions must be accompanied with the support of the Government of Indonesia for fair
PostScript 17
global solutions to climate change that are not only for the interests of developed
countries.
Climate crisis and climate change mitigation should be a main agenda of the gov-
ernment and the people of Indonesia. Do not let other issues conceal the problem of
solving climate change, because this crisis is real and affects people and the earth’s
population as a whole.
-oooOooo-
Reference
Buxton, Nick. 2010. Cancun climate agreement stripped bare by Bolivia’s dissent;
Pablo Solon on why Bolivia opposed the Cancún deal. LINKS International Journal
on Socialist Renewal, http://links.org.au/node/2052
Khor, Martin. 2010. Strange Outcome of Cancun Climate Conference, published in
The Star, Malaysia on 13 December 2010
http://cetak.kompas.com/read/2010/11/19/03225092/paduan.maut.korupsi.dan.pe-
rubahan.iklim
http://community.um.ac.id/showthread.php?54561-Ancaman-perubahan-iklim-di-
Indonesia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyoto_Protocol
http://sains.kompas.com/read/2010/11/29/21450171/KTT.Iklim.Cancun.Persempit.
Miskin.Kaya
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-deal

“New Kids on The Blocks and the
Godfather”: A Comparative Analysis
on Local Oligarchs in Indonesian and
the Philippines Local Politics
Nurul Rochayati, Researcher, The Habibie Center
Introductions
Contemporary Southeast Asia is characterized by democratic transitions experienced

by several countries in the region. The democratic transitions have taken place to
compensate for the negative effects due to state mismanagement1 by centralized
authoritarian regimes. Several institutional reforms are commonly involved including
decentralization, empowerment of local governance, elections and the enhancement
of public participation. Decentralization in this case means the transfer of existing
governmental powers to organizations that are lower from the highest rank of
governance; i.e., transfer of power from the central government to the provincial or
local government (Legowo and Djadijono, 2007). In the region, decentralization in
Indonesia and the Philippines sets as examples of how the process could lead to the
emergence or strengthening of local oligarchs.
Local oligarch2 refers to a group of local or regional elites that have a strong political—
as well as an economical—impact in the region. They are checked by the national
elites yet they don’t necessarily have an impact on national politics in the DPR or
DPD or in executive bodies (Ufen, 2008; Hutchcroft, 1991). Their main focus is to
gain control over economic and political resources at the regional level as well as
to win support from the local communities that they lead. The opening of the new
political channel to win office through local direct elections is believed to be the main
factor behind the mushrooming of local oligarchs.
1
State mismanagement in this paper refers to undemocratic practices in governing the
country such as corruption, collusion and nepotism. Due to state management, regions had
suffered at their socio-political and economic development.
2
In many analyses, the term “local oligarch” is often used interchangeably with “local
strongmen” or “local bosses”. Migdal defines local strongmen as autonomous social organi-
zations that enjoy significant influence and leverage over state leaders and local bureaucrats
while gaining support from the populations through various means. For a deeper under-
standing, see Joel S. Migdal’s explanation in his book, Strong Societies and Weak States:
State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World.
PostScript 19
What is of concern, however, is the current tendency for the rising political dynasty in
Indonesia to form a local oligarchy, in Indonesia as has happened in the Philippines.
There are a number of cases that show this tendency. Husband and wife, Prof Dr
Drg I Gede Winasa and Ratna Ani Lestari SE MM were at the same time governing
Jembrana Regency and Banyuwangi Regency respectively. Ratu Hemas, the wife
of the Yogyakarta Governor, currently sits as a DPD member. Though currently in
dispute, for the local election in South Tangerang, a running candidate, Airin Rachma
Diany, is the sister-in-law of Ratu Atut Chosiyah, current Governor of Banten
Province. In Bantul Regency, the current head of the regency, Sri Suryawidati, is none
other than the wife of a former head. There are similar experiences in Bone Bolango,
Gorontalo; Indramayu, West Java; and Kediri in East Java. It is to no surprise that
Andreas Ufen (2006) later sounded his worry over the possibility of philippinisation
in Indonesia as the political dynasty is growing and most likely will take control over
local or regional resources. But will it be the same? Where does Indonesian stand
compared to the Philippines?
The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the rise of local oligarchs in local
politics in Indonesia and the Philippines. The comparative analysis, thus, will be built
around two main questions:
1. In what ways is the emergence of local oligarchs in Indonesia similar to the

Philippines`?
2. How does the entry of local oligarchs in Indonesian politics differ from the
Philippines`?
In an attempt to explain the rise of local oligarchs in local politics in Indonesia
and the Philippines, it is argued that the opening of competitive local elections in
decentralized politics has given an opportunity for groups of people with relatively
high economic power to control political power as well. However, local oligarchs in
Indonesia and the Philippines are different in their entry to local politics despite a
similar experience in democratic transition, from centralization to decentralization.
The difference lies in the political background where local oligarchs in the Philippines
had been in power before the centralized system was enacted under Marcos while
Indonesian local oligarchs are a new phenomenon to the country.
Local Oligarchs in Indonesia and the Philippines:

How Are They Similar?
Based on their historical background, Indonesia and the Philippines share some
commonalities. Both countries are relatively newly independent countries in which
politics developed on the basis of political clientism. According to Reid (2008),
clientelism entails patterns of service provision and resource distribution that over-
privilege some groups and excludes others. Patron-and-client relationships thus
describe the relationship of power between elites and non-elites. The political oligarchs,
as the patrons, work on the basis of “stick and carrot” to maintain their power. They

act based on the political line of thinking of how to reward their supporters and what

kind of burden to put upon those that did not support them.
The political clientism was put to the test when Indonesia and the Philippines began
their democratic transition with the introduction of decentralization in 1998 and 1986
respectively. Indonesia, which was governed by the highly centralized New Order
Regime, began the transition by de-concentrating political power away from Jakarta
to the regional (district) administrations For 32 years, the regions had lain buried
under centralistic control. Political and economic affairs were controlled by the so-
called national oligarchy in which Soeharto was in the top command. The oligarchy
system was supported by three main powerbrokers: state bureaucrats, the military,
and business conglomerates (McLeod, 2005).
In Indonesia, the decentralization process began in 1999 soon after the downfall
of Soeharto and his New Order Regime. Soeharto`s vice president, Habibie, took
office and implemented a series of constitutional and institutional reforms. One of
the most noted reforms was decentralization which came into force after the House
of Representative passed two sets of regulations, Law No. 22/1999 on Regional
Administration and Law No. 25/1999 on Fiscal Balance between the Central and
Regional Administrations. By implementing decentralization and regional autonomy,
the local governments were developed responsibility over all government aspects
except those of defense, foreign policy, monetary, fiscal and religious affairs.
Meanwhile, the authorities that were to be executed by a regional administration were
among others education and culture, health, social protection, public infrastructure,
agriculture, communication, environment, land affairs cooperative, manpower,
industry and trade, investment, including the development of small and middle-scale
industries. It was aimed at deepening democracy down to the local level.
Decentralization in Indonesia, however, did not necessarily wipe out the oligarchs
from the socio-political map. Some powerbrokers simply just resurfaced in a new
form in the existing patrimonial pattern at the local level. Before the local elections in
2005, only state bureaucrats remained in power without much change. Nonetheless,
local elections soon opened ways for other groups such as local business capitalists,
political entrepreneurs, gangsters, or military members to battle for power. It is
important to note that they might not necessarily hold the office, but they were the
ones who created new informal networks of patronage which often overlapped and
competed among one another for access and control over political power and resources
(Hadiz, 2004). The rise of the local oligarchs in Indonesia, thus, represented a new
pattern of local politics where wealthy notables were elevated to office and political
power by their alliances or networks(Buehler and Tan, 2007).
In the Philippines, the decentralization process began almost a decade earlier than
Indonesia. It started a year after the downfall of Marcos by the EDSA movement in
1986 with the introduction of the Local Government Code (LGC). The Code itself
PostScript 21
was finally enacted into law in 1991 and came into effect in 1992. The Code was
aimed to transfer certain powers from the central to local government as well as to
promote public participations. Despite the positive expectations at the beginning of
its implementation, decentralization did not change local power relations very much.
Traditional political families and local bosses stayed in power. John T. Sidel (1999)
even suggested that bosses were a common phenomenon and an inseparable part of
Philippines` politics. Meanwhile in Indonesia, decentralization gradually made ways
for strongmen who held both coercive and economic resources to come into political
power.
Local oligarchs, thus, have been a long-standing part of Philippines’ politics. Local
oligarchs in the Philippines rose from private landowners that accumulated their wealth
and power mostly through “rent-seeking” opportunities in the province, district, and
town. They were also quite separate from the state bureaucracy (Hutchcroft, 1991).
In the 1960s, these landowners expanded their base for the accumulation of wealth
by obtaining contracts with private capitalists, gangsters, and political entrepreneurs
(Sidel, 1996). They were the local oligarchs with much power before Marcos put
Philippines under authoritarian rule from 1975 to 1986. However, they actually
resurfaced again in the early 1980s. Once Marcos was ousted from national office,
they retook their power base at the local level with the help of decentralization.
Based on the above explanations, it can be seen that decentralization in both countries
was applied soon after the fall of the authoritarian regimes as if it was a silver bullet
to prevent another powerful central government coming to power in the future. It was
aimed to create a politically and economically sound environment, especially at the
local level. However, decentralization has proven to be a paradox of democracy. It
has not necessarily resulted in the deepening of democracy. Instead, decentralization
has opened a new way for local oligarchs to capture the state power through local
elections and other monopolistic measures. It is through local elections, which later
became the sub-policy of decentralization that local oligarchs have competed for
power. As a result, local political competition in both countries has always been
among and between elites / local oligarchs, not inter-group competition. Interest
groups and civil society have mostly been excluded from the process due to their
limited bargaining power and resources.

Local Oligarchs in Indonesia and the Philippines: How Are They Different?
What differentiates the experience of Indonesia and the Philippines with political
oligarchs is the form and playing field of oligarchs itself. To explain this feature, future
analysis should be based on a certain timeframe, before and after decentralization. In
Indonesia before decentralization, political oligarchy took its form as a powerful New
Order Regime under Soeharto. It was an undisputed national oligarchy. However
in the Philippines, there were two phases in the re-organizing of power between
the elites. Before the rise of Marcos, politics was mostly centralized at the local

level where local oligarchs, who could be both political dynasties and local bosses,

played the central role. Local oligarchs tried their best to ensure the existence of
the balance of power among them to prevent certain local bosses conquering the
national power. Their efforts were proven to be a failure when Ferdinand Marcos
came to the presidency in 1965. Marcos consolidated the politics under his rule with
Martial Law before finally stepping down in 1986. After the fall of Marcos, local
oligarchs in the Philippines were able to re-enact their political power within their
respective boundaries through the decentralization process. To put it simply, after
decentralization, Indonesia witnessed the rise of the local oligarch in local politics
while the Philippines saw the comeback of the local oligarch into their undisputed
control over local politics.
The phenomenon of local oligarchs in Indonesia and the Philippines differs as well
in the spread of local oligarchs throughout the nation. In Indonesia, not every region
has a local oligarch running the government office as well as controlling the region’s
economic resources. Regions have not yet been defined by certain local oligarchs
as is the case of the Philippines. In some regions in Indonesia, the local figure came
to office after being nominated by political parties as his / her charisma has the
persuasive power to win the vote of the local constituency. However, regions with a
strong tradition of old kingdom like Bali and South Sulawesi usually witnessed the
rise of the local oligarch with an aristocratic background (Buehler and Tan, 2007; Siti
Zuhro, 2009)
Local oligarchs in Indonesia and the Philippines are also different in the position of the
state apparatus in the network of oligarch patronage. The state apparatus in Indonesia
can be considered a local oligarch. Their long experience in state business enables
them to acquire power synonymous with rising power brokers. In addition, business
capitalists’ dependence on state-funded projects adds more to the power of the state
apparatus in terms of their know how in dealing with the allocation of state resources.
However, in some cases like Banten and Bali, business capitalists are slowly taking
over the office to obliterate their subordination to the state apparatus (Henk Schulte
Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken, 2007). In other words, they are slowly changing
their network of patronage to gain greater advantage in acquiring state resources.
Meanwhile in the Philippines, the state apparatus is subordinate to elected officials in
determining the allocation and accumulation of state wealth (Sidel, 1996; Hutchcroft,
1991). They behave on behalf of oligarchs who are favored by its top officials that are
either part of the oligarch itself or their cronies.
Decentralization and the rise of local oligarchs in local politics have changed
the configuration and relations between local and national politics. Indonesia
experienced vertical disconnection between national and local politics as heads of
local governments were being elected directly and held no responsibility toward
higher hierarchy. The weak link that connects local and national politics only lies in
the fiscal balance between central and local government as the central government
PostScript 23
still has a mandatory obligation to allocate national state budget funds for regions.
To cope with the possibility of total disconnection, Indonesian government recently
rules that governors will once again be elected by Local House of Representatives
(DPRD) and thus can be rechecked by the higher authority at the national level.
Decentralization in the Philippines did not cause vertical disconnection as did in

Indonesia. It only reversed the position of national and local government. The national
government came back to its previous position of serving local government with
privileged access to state resources. Meanwhile, local oligarchs returned to their old
tradition of feeding the government by providing them the necessary “voter base” for
national elections. As a result, national leaders became beholden to local oligarchs’
demands as they have to allocate certain national funds in the form of government-
funded projects, export quotas or licenses. One of the examples was when President
Gloria Arroyo during her taking the oath in 1994 assured local government executives
that she would oppose the proposal in Congress to suspend the release of the Internal
Revenue Allotments (IRA) of local government units (LGUs)(Aben, 2004). The
Governors’ League argued that IRA was necessary to provide basic services to the
people in the regions although one governor claimed that IRA was unlawful according
to the Code.
Current national - local political relations helps to explain why local oligarchs in
Indonesia and the Philippines are different despite both countries implementing
decentralization in their democratic transition. Decentralization entails at least two
important elements, transfer of governmental responsibility (deconcentration) and
transfer of political power (devolution) from national to local government (Rondinelli,
1983:14). Indonesia witnessed the entry of local oligarchs into local politics because
decentralization resulted in the dispersion of once-centralized power at a time of
an absence of power at the local level. Wealthy notables and state bureaucrats were
parties that saw the chance and captured them for their own interest. To secure the new
power, they needed to make boundaries with national politics to reduce any chances
of re-centralization. It explains why national and local politics in Indonesia seems
to have no connection at all. Meanwhile in the Philippines, there was no absence of
power at the local level when decentralization was first implemented, as there were
local bosses already in power long before Philippines’ politics became centralized
under Marcos. They only need to reverse the national-local dependency mode in
which the national government should be in previous position, the beholden of the
oligarchs’ interests.
Conclusion
Democratic transition can take different forms from one country to another. When
Indonesia and the Philippines started their democratic transition, it was rare to find
scholars that imagined that both countries would share the same experience afterwards,
the rise of local oligarchs in local politics. Their democratic transition began with the

enactment of decentralization, the anti-thesis of the centralized authoritarian regime

that ran the country for certain periods of time. But soon after, both countries witnessed
wealthy notables who captured the power and subordinated the state apparatus to
their own interests. As much as it looks similar, local oligarchs in Indonesia and the
Philippines are different. Indonesian local oligarchs are somehow the new kids on
the block while the Philippines’ are the godfather. While the godfathers have long
governed their respective areas in the Philippines, the new kids are trying to capture
local power by disconnecting national and local politics. In sum, decentralization in
Indonesia has promoted the entry of local oligarch’s to local politics while the one in
the Philippines has paved ways for the local oligarchs to make their comeback into
their undisputed area of power.
-oooOooo-
References
Books
Nordholt, Henk Schulte and Gerry van Klinken (eds), 2007, Renegotiating
Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia, Leiden: KITLV Press
Migdal, Joel S., 1988, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations
and State Capabilities in the Third World, US: Princeton University Press.
Robison, Richard and Vedi R. Hadiz, 2004, Reorganising Power in Indonesia:
The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets, London and New York:
RoutledgeCurzon
Sidel, John T., 1999, Capital, coercion, and crime: bossism in the Philippines, US:
Stanford University Press.
Zuhro, R. Siti, et.al., 2009, Demokrasi Lokal: Perubahan dan Kesinambungan
Nilai-Nilai Budaya Politik Lokal di Jawa Timur, Sumatera Barat, Sulawesi
Selatan dan Bali, (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Ombak)
Journals
Buehler, Michael and Paige Tan, 2007, “Party - Candidate Relationships in

Indonesian Local Politics: A Case Study of the 2005 Regional Elections in
Gowa, South Sulawesi Province”, Indonesia, Vol. 84, October
Hadiz, Vedi R, 2004, “Indonesian Local Party Politics: A Site of Resistance to
Neoliberal Reform”, Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4.
Hutchcroft, Paul D. 1991, “Oligarchs and Cronies in the Philippine State: The
Politics of Patrimonial Plunder”, World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3, page 421
McLeod, Ross H., 2005, “The Struggle to Regain Effective Government Under
Democracy in Indonesia”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol.
PostScript 25
41, No. 3.
Reid, Anthony, 1998, “Political ‘Tradition’ in Indonesia: The One and the Many”,
Asian Studies Review, Vol. 22, No. 1
Rondinelli, Dennis A. et.al, 1983, “Decentralization in Developing Countries: A
Review of Recent Experience”, World Bank Staff Working Paper, No. 581
Sidel, John T., 1996, “Siam and its Twin? Democratization and Bossism in
Contemporary Thailand and the Philippines”, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 2,
page 57
Ufen, Andreas, 2006, Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Between politik
aliran and ‘Philippinization’, GIGA Research Programme, No. 37,
December.
Ufen, Andreas. 2008, “From aliran to dealignment: political parties in post-Suharto
Indonesia”, South East Asia Research, Vol. 16, No. 1
Internet Articles
Aben, Elena L., “Arroyo assures LGUs to oppose IRA suspension”, http://www.
articlearchives.com/government-public-administration/government-
bodies/523434-1.html accessed on 2 July 2009
Legowo, T. A. and M. Djadijono, (2007), “Decentralization in Indonesia: How far

can it go? (1999-2006)” accessed from http://ipdprojects.org/logolink-sea/
resources/pdf/Decentralization%20Indonesia_english.pdf on 20 February
2009

TKI, Prosperity and the Lack of
Employment Opportunity
Adhi Darmawan, Researcher, The Habibie Center
In the midst of rampant disasters from floods and flash floods, earthquakes
and tsunamis to the barrage of volcanic eruptions that leave a heavy death
toll, a similar “disaster” befalls on Indonesians who work abroad. A lot of
cases of violence and inhuman treatment ambush them. Nevertheless, the
flow of Indonesian workers to seek jobs abroad cannot be stopped since the
employment opportunity and the dream of prosperity are still held to be within
reach.
T
hose who are mostly responsible for taking care of Indonesian migrant
workers (TKI) are the people in the Ministry of Manpower and
Transmigration. Since it was felt as inadequate, the government, by Law
39/2004, through Presidential Decree (Perpres) No. 81/2006, in 2007
established a special body to carry out placement services and protection of the
TKIs outside of the government program of placement. The name of the body is the
National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers
(BNP2TKI).
It turns out that even though the BNP2TKI was formally established to provide
maximum protection for migrant workers, the cases of abuse and inhumane treatment
of TKIs have not ceased. During the first 11 months of 2010, 4.532 cases relating
to TKIs were reported to the Indonesian foreign ministry in Jakarta.1 The widely
reported abuses of Sumiati, a woman worker—TKW—from Dompu, West Nusa
Tenggara, and the death of Kikim Komalasari, a TKW from Cianjur, West Java, are
only two of a series of sad stories of the Indonesian foreign currency patriots in
foreign countries.2
Moreover, instead of providing protection, the formation of BNP2TKI created

a conflict of interest since it carried out the roles of both regulator (policy maker)
and operator (policy implementer), which often overlapped with the Ministry of
Manpower and Transmigration regulations (Kemenakertrans). Steps have been
taken to iron out the conflict between the two government agencies, the latest is the
1
Suara Pembaruan, Friday, December 3, 2010.
2
Antara, November 28, 2010 and the Jakarta Post, Friday, December 17, 2010.
PostScript 27
enactment of the Minister’s Regulation (Kemenakertrans) No. 14/MEN/X/2010 by
Minister Muhaimin Iskandar on Wednesday night, October 13, 2010. The regulation
has put an end to the dual handling of the TKIs between the Kemenakertrans and the
BNP2TKI.
The question on everybody’ mind is, why can’t the abuses against the TKIs be
prevented? Why is there such great enthusiasm among Indonesian people to
become TKIs? What is the root cause of the abuses against the TKIs that seems
unstoppable?
TKI’s Limitations
In the Middle East countries, especially the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia is
viewed more as the biggest worker exporting country. The majority of the TKIs and
the TKWs, even those who are able to enter the European countries, work mostly as
blue collar workers and domestic servants, not as skilled workers.3
The majority of the TKIs and the TKWs have only a low education level (elementary
and junior high school) and ordinarily they fall below the poverty line. Of course, the
main purpose of the TKIs and the TKWs is to improve their and their families’ quality
and standard of living although it has the major disadvantage of forcing them to leave
their children and husbands or wives in Indonesia for two years in general. Such an
embedded motivation has made them seemingly to not care of the inhuman treatment
during their work in the foreign countries.4 They do not care that they can not read
and write (illiterate) in Arabic let alone English or even Indonesian so that they are
prone to a lot of hardship abroad.5
It starts with the recruitment process by the firms for the TKI-to-be in the villages,
using brokers with a compensation of a sum of money for everyone who is willing
to be a TKI. The brokers persuade the villagers to get as many people as possible.
The more people persuaded the more the brokers get in compensation. They do it
any way they can, even cheating, through falsification of their age (underage), health
condition (pregnancy) among others; big salaries will be the main enticement. There
is no requirement or criterion whatsoever, the important thing is that the brokers get
as much money as possible from the greatest number of people they can trick.
Similar to the brokers, for the sending firms, the more people they could send abroad
the more money they could make from the payments for the TKIs-to-be, with the
effect that many unfit and unskilled workers are sent abroad. And, too, a lot of TKIs,
especially TKWs, are actually women who used to walk on the wild side.
3
Viva News, Thursday, October 14, 2010.
4
Including dramatic changes to the TKIs’ family life, where there are many divorces that have
traumatic effects on the life of their children.
5
Kompasiana, Diki Abdi Haikal, March 22, 2010.

Government Protection

The TKIs have limitations, yes, but nobody turns a blind eye to them. It is thanks
to them that Indonesia is able to run its development programs; it is the TKIs who
“accidentally” provide significant support to the programs of the government. By
the fact that the TKIs come from almost all parts of Indonesia, then the support
they provide means that they support a lot of locals from most parts of the country.
Nowadays, there are about 6.5 million TKIs legal and illegal.6 On the assumption that
each TKI supports five family members it means 32.5 million or 7.2% of Indonesian
society live off the TKIs support. From the state’s earnings side it means that the
remittances that each TKI sends home is 6.5 million x US$150/ TKI = US$975
million per month. It means that in a year TKIs donate as much as $11.7 billion in
foreign currency. With $1 = Rp9,000 then each year the TKIs support the state around
Rp105.3 trillion.7
Unfortunately, there are very few success stories exposed, concerning the workers
who are able to send enough money back home to enable their families to buy land,
to build new houses or repair the old ones, send their children to school, and of course
support the government programs, “accidentally”. People can see the “happiness”
of Indonesian workers in Hong Kong or Taiwan, even in Malaysia who get good
employers and do not fall victims of abuse, for instance. What the media exposes
mostly are stories about the bad luck that befalls upon mostly female workers, from
being tortured by their employers, murdered and thrown out to the garbage dump, to
those who come back with newborn babies from sexual abuse and who knows what
else.
Now, how about the protection provided for the TKIs? Let us look into the realities of
the TKIs in the first steps after they are recruited. They are prone to abuse and other
inhuman treatment from the collection stations, a place where they should be properly
prepared, and their skills improved to enable them to communicate better with
foreigners especially their employers-to-be, to do their jobs at their employers’ home
or other workplaces (in Malaysia and Middle Eastern countries the TKIs especially
the males are needed as truck and taxi drivers, workers in building construction,
workers at palm and rubber plantations, etc). These include the skills in languages—
Arabic and English mainly—their vocation and other things they need. But the facts
show otherwise. Many places of collection are made arbitrarily, in nondescript places
where people are hard to find, the TKIs-to-be are kept out of sight of others, including
the government officials who must check how they are treated, yet cannot see their
6
The two biggest recipient states of Indonesian migrant workers are Malaysia with 2.2 mil-
lion TKIs and Saudi Arabia with 1.2 million TKIs. The rest are spread over many countries,
like Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, as stated by Anis Hidayah, Executive Director of
Migrant Care to detik.com (19/9/2010).
7
The TKIs are often called “foreign currency patriots”. It is only natural since they are the
second biggest Indonesian foreign exchange earners after oil and gas. According to Bank
Indonesia, 2009, remittances from the TKIs reached US$6.617 billion. See detik-finance,
Wednesday, June 2, 2010.
PostScript 29
condition. They live like in prison. It is not uncommon for the TKIs to fall into the
hands of human traffickers who will sell them to organized crime syndicates.
Whenever a TKI request to cancel their intention to work abroad, they are required
to pay a ransom to the managers of the placement station.8 Or, alternatively, they
run away from the place, as five TKI candidates did who could not stand the torture,
insult, beatings, and even the drinking of dirty water.9
Travelling to and their experience at the Soekarno-Hatta international departure

terminal is a similar case. It is not difficult to see how badly the government officials,
or the Indonesian migrant workers worker delivery companies (PJTKI) or the airport’s
officials treat the TKIs. It is common at the airport to see a group of 60 or 70 TKW
in the hands of one, maybe two, individuals. They are herded like animals, often with
verbal rudeness like being derided and snarled at.10 The look on the faces of these
TKWs tells its own story.
That the training is inappropriate or non-existent at the placement stations is evident

from the start when the TKI candidates are on board of the plane to the country of
destination. Not a few of the TKIs do not know how to use the lavatory with the
inevitable result that after use the cubicle has water split everywhere. Many of them
do not know where to discard the tissues so that they litter the lavatory floor; even
they do not know how to lock the lavatory door.11 Nobody introduces them to any of
these things.
When they arrive at their country of destination and appear for the first time at the
doors of their employers that they have not yet known, the TKIs face a new social
situation, a social system that is totally foreign to the one that they are used to, and are
forced to rapidly adapt. Failure to adapt means they are faced with mental isolation.
The TKIs are quite prone to treatment as slaves that are manipulated. Many are used
to satiate the lust of their employers to be impregnated.
8
Its effect is that a lot of TKIs run away to avoid paying the ransom.
9
The five TKIs ran away from the placement station owned by PT Gasindo Buala Sari located
at Tangerang, by going through a hole (for the air to go through) then leaped over the wall
using a long cloth. The TKIs-to-be were promised jobs as domestic servants in Malaysia and
Singapore with a salary of about Rp1.5 million to Rp2 million per month, but they had been
at the placement station for almost two months without any indication that they would be go-
ing anywhere.
See: www.bnp2tki.go.id, Friday, January 2, 2009.
Another example was what was experienced by Rosdianah, 34 years of age. She came from
Dompu, West Nusa Tenggara and said that she came to Jakarta with a hope to get training
and be sent to Malaysia as a TKI. Rosdianah ran away after she had received no training but
was put to work as a servant without pay. She had even often been asked by her employer to
use her own money to pay telephone bills or to buy food. See Tribune News.com, Wednes-
day, November 24, 2010.
10
Kompasiana, Nining, July 1, 2010.
11
Ibid

The inappropriate treatment even continues once the “foreign currency patriots”

return to Indonesia. They become subject to many kinds of illegal levies, and this is
a very common practice. The government has tried to facilitate the safety of the TKIs
by providing means of transportation for the TKIs back to their home towns. But,
instead of safety, during the journey home the TKIs become the victims of extortion
by those who are supposed to be guarding them.12 What was experienced by Suciati
and Latia among others at the waiting terminal of the Soekarno-Hatta airport showed
how the TKIs have indeed often been treated inhumanly even in their home country.
The Lack of Employment Opportunities
For the poor people, to become TKIs is seen as offering them a chance to improve their
families’ welfare. Amidst the higher and higher living costs in Indonesia, while to get
a better pay is quite difficult, especially when they have only limited education, then
to be TKIs would become a way out to improve their welfare. The larger and larger
numbers of the society who choose to work as TKIs abroad is seen as a reflection of
the domestic economic system and its inability to guarantee everybody’s right to a
worthy livelihood and means of living and welfare.
Poverty is a situation where the authorities as the medium of last resort are unable to
meet the people’s basic needs like clothing, food, shelter, education and health care.
Poverty could also be the result of how investment and a lack of public infrastructure
to meet the basic needs, or to difficulties in accessing education and employment. So
far, the poverty level in Indonesia is about 13.33 percent out of the total population of
around 234.2 million.13 It means that about 31.02 million Indonesians still live under
the poverty line.
Mostly poor Indonesian people work in the agriculture field with an uncertain
income.14 Farming is a profession closely related to seasonal unemployment. In this
phenomenon, farmers are often out of a job caused by fluctuations in short term
economic activity like waiting for the rainy season that indicates the start of planting
time.
Sufficiency in decent employment is one of the requirements to reduce the poverty

level as well as a source of poor family empowerment. Unfortunately, compared
to the ever increasing workforce, the availability of employment opportunities
especially for the poor grows insignificantly. Even though the number of unemployed
people had fallen by around 270,000 in August compared to the level of February
2010, the number could not keep up with the increase in the work force that reached
12
One example is the obligation to use special transportation vehicles provided by the gov-
ernment to send the TKIs back to their homes. Drivers and other persons often extort the
TKIs. See Kompas: The TKIs’ fate, Extorted Until the Last Drop of Their Blood, Monday,
November 2, 2009.
13
BPS, 2010
14
As high as 64.65% in 1999, ibid
PostScript 31
116.5 million.15 Put another way, the increase of the workforce and the reduction in
the numbers of unemployed heightened the Labor Force Participation Rate of the
workforce (TPAK) by 0.49 percent during 2010.16
The heightened needs of the workforce are an annual phenomenon. However, up to

now, the government is still counting on its old policy to leave open the opportunity
for members of the Indonesian society to become TKIs abroad. The policy is
imperative due to the disparity in the jobs needed with the availability of employment
opportunities.
The issue of sending Indonesian workers abroad is admittedly a complex one, and
involves many facets, among others, from increasing employment opportunities
for those people not otherwise provided for at home, augmenting foreign exchange
to support general government programs, and as a tool to help tackle poverty in
Indonesia. It is these that drive the continuation of the Government’s TKI program.
The huge negative or contradictory view is that despite a long-standing commitment
to improvement, the government appears unable to prevent the abuses that continually
befall its citizens working abroad or for that matter those that deface the recruitment
process and yet again in the course of the return of the TKIs to their home in various
parts of the country. It also is seen to encourage those involved in organized crime
and people smuggling.
When it all boils down, the government seems not to have a firm bargaining stance or
equal position with the states where abuse befalls on Indonesian workers. Because,
however big the harshness or cruelty that occurs to the TKIs, the Indonesian
government would never concede to the dismantling of a program that directly or
indirectly camouflaged its own failure.
15
Ibid
16
Ibid

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Vol.VII, No.

TOWARDS FINDING SOLUTIONS

Editor’s Note New Media Power:

Towards Finding Solutions TKI, Prosperity and the Lack of

“New Kids on The Blocks and the

Many in Indonesia have suggested that the government impose a temporary

4 PostScript Vol. VII, No. 6, November-December 2010

Politics and Human Rights

New Media Power:

The Grand Leakage

As leaked by WikiLeaks, a diplomatic cable in 2009 revealed a conspiracy between

6 PostScript Vol. VII, No. 6, November-December 2010

Politics and Human Rights

Another consequence of the accelerated advancement of information technology is

The Right to Information, Good Governance, and National Security

8 PostScript Vol. VII, No. 6, November-December 2010

Politics and Human Rights

“State secrets are information, objects, and/or activities officially determined by

There is not enough parameter to clarify or to define “information” in terms of state

The Future’s Challenge

10 PostScript Vol. VII, No. 6, November-December 2010

Politics and Human Rights

Towards Finding Solutions

“Had the climate been a bank, it would have been saved”.

Climate Change and Its Real Impact

As an archipelagic state located in a tropical region, Indonesia is one of the countries

12 PostScript Vol. VII, No. 6, November-December 2010

Politics and Human Rights

Some Records of Climate Change Summits

The Kyoto Protocol is a protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on

The objective of the Kyoto Protocol is to establish a legally binding international

14 PostScript Vol. VII, No. 6, November-December 2010

Politics and Human Rights

Many developing-country officials were increasingly worried in Cancun about how

Indonesia’s Role in Tackling the Impact of Climate Change

In the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh in September 2009, Indonesian President, Yud-

16 PostScript Vol. VII, No. 6, November-December 2010

Politics and Human Rights

Although the Government has already stated a commitment to a variety of ways to

Indonesia as a developing country which holds an important position on the interna-

18 PostScript Vol. VII, No. 6, November-December 2010

Nurul Rochayati, Researcher, The Habibie Center

Contemporary Southeast Asia is characterized by democratic transitions experienced

1. In what ways is the emergence of local oligarchs in Indonesia similar to the

Local Oligarchs in Indonesia and the Philippines:

20 PostScript Vol. VII, No. 6, November-December 2010

Politics and Human Rights

22 PostScript Vol. VII, No. 6, November-December 2010

Politics and Human Rights

Decentralization in the Philippines did not cause vertical disconnection as did in

24 PostScript Vol. VII, No. 6, November-December 2010

Politics and Human Rights

Buehler, Michael and Paige Tan, 2007, “Party - Candidate Relationships in

Legowo, T. A. and M. Djadijono, (2007), “Decentralization in Indonesia: How far

26 PostScript Vol. VII, No. 6, November-December 2010

Adhi Darmawan, Researcher, The Habibie Center

Moreover, instead of providing protection, the formation of BNP2TKI created

28 PostScript Vol. VII, No. 6, November-December 2010

Politics and Human Rights

Travelling to and their experience at the Soekarno-Hatta international departure

That the training is inappropriate or non-existent at the placement stations is evident

30 PostScript Vol. VII, No. 6, November-December 2010

Politics and Human Rights