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Republic of the Philipppines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 119712. January 29, 1999]
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision[1] rendered by the Court of Appeals dated
March 28, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 42596 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court-Branch 9 of
Malolos, Bulacan dated October 9, 1992 and adopting in toto the orders rendered by the same trial
court dated August 25 and December 14, 1992. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On November 18, 1985, the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), a government owned and
controlled corporation, filed with the Office of the Sheriff of Malolos an application for extra-judicial
foreclosure of real and personal properties situated at San Jose del Monte and Norzagaray, Bulacan
involving several real and/or chattel mortgages executed by Continental Cement Corporation (CCC), a
corporation organized and existing under Philipine laws, engaged mainly in the manufacture of cement,
in favor of DBP on August 20, 1968; September 4, 1968; May 7, 1969; September 19, 1969; October 24,
1969 and November 13, 1969. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On December 11, 1985, Continental Cement filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan. The suit principally sought to enjoin the then defendants DBP and the Sheriff of Malolos,
Bulacan from commencing the foreclosure proceedings on CCCs mortgages which were executed in
favor of DBP to secure various loans obtained by CCC. In addition, CCC also prayed that a new term for
its loan obligation be established, and that the court declare the interest escalation clause contained in
DBPs promissory notes as null and void. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued and subsequently a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was
likewise issued on January 17, 1986, despite opposition thereto by DBP. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sometime in December 1986, Proclamation No. 50[2] was promulgated by then President Corazon C.
Aquino pursuant to Administrative Order No. 14. The proclamation established the privatization
program of the National Government and created the Committee on Privatization and herein petitioner
ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST (APT) as the privatization arm for the government.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Several non-performing assets of the government financial institutions, including DBP, were transferred
to the National Government. The transfer was implemented through a Deed of Transfer executed on
February 27, 1987 between DBP and the National Government, which in turn, designated petitioner APT
to act as its trustee over the assets. Among the non-performing assets identified and transferred to the
APT was the account of CCC. A Trust Agreement was thereafter executed between the National
Government and APT, wherein the latter was to take title to and possession of liabilities and non-
performing assets. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On September 18, 1987, DBP filed a motion to dismiss contending (1) that the case has become moot
and academic because CCC could no longer secure reliefs from DBP as a result of the transfer of DBPs
claim against CCC to APT; and (2) that the court lost jurisdiction over the subject matter considering that
Section 31 of Proc. No. 50 prohibits the issuance of any restraining order or injunction against APT in
connection with the acquisition, sale, or disposition of assets transferred to it. However, the motion of
DBP was denied by the trial court on January 27, 1988, and APT was eventually allowed to join the
defendant DBP pursuant to Proclamation No. 50, as amended. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In July 1989, the accounting firm of J. C. Laya[3] was designated by the lower court as Commissioner to
resolve the main issue in the case, that is, the determination of the actual arrearages of respondent CCC
to petitioner APT and DBP arising from loan accommodations obtained by CCC from DBP.
To aid the Commissioner and to expedite his task of determining the actual indebtedness of CCC, both
CCC and DBP provided the representatives of the Commissioner with the pertinent data and documents
which were within their custody and possession. Among the documents provided was a copy of the
Memorandum of Agreement[4] executed between CCC and DBP which pegged CCCs total indebtedness
to DBP at P133,717,286.95 as of August 31, 1979. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Commissioner was unable to accomplish his assigned task within the period set by the court. He was
initially given an extension of sixty (60) days. This proved to be insufficient thus he was granted another
forty-five (45) days from December 18, 1989. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Despite several extensions given to the Commissioner to complete his report, he failed to do so. This
prompted the trial court to issue an Order dated April 23, 1990 directing Atty. Jose Leynes[5] to explain
why he should not be cited for contempt for his unexplained omission to perform and accomplish his
duties as the court appointed Commissioner. This was followed by another Order dated July 2, 1990
citing Atty. Leynes in contempt of court and ordered his imprisonment for his non-compliance with the
April 23, 1990 order. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
To avoid the consequences of the contempt order, Atty. Leynes submitted a draft report on July 11,
1990 entitled Summary of Initial Findings. The contempt order was subsequently lifted by the trial court
on August 20, 1990. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
After several months of work had passed, the Commissioner, this time known as Laya Manabat Salgado
& Co., submitted to the lower court its report entitled Commissioners Report on Loan Proceeds and
Payments dated January 11, 1991. The findings of the Commissioner as cited by the Court of Appeals in
its decision were as follows: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It bears emphasis that the report is confined to a determination of CCCs indebtedness to DBP in relation
only to four (4) straight peso loans, namely, a 12% ten-year loan of P3,867,291 signed on August 20,
1968; a 10% ten-year loan of P7,784,000 signed on September 19, 1969; a 10% ten-year loan signed on
October 23, 1969; and a P5.5. Million loan not covered by any promissory note but released to the
extent of P1.0 Million in March 1972, and two (2) guaranteed foreign exchange loans consisting of
US$2,000,000 contracted on September 4, 1968 by CCC but guaranteed by DBP in favor of Somex Ltd.
and DM11,233,115 (German Deutsche Marks) in favor of consortium of West German Manufacturers
headed by Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz, A.G. dated May 9, 1969 (Report, p. 3). The Report excludes the
implications of, firstly, an industrial fund loan extended by DBP for CCCs acquisition of coal conversion
equipment appearing in DBPs books of accounts as US$ 2,558,347 and, secondly, DBPs advances for
insurance, management fees and miscellaneous charges in the total amount of P4,436,807 (Report, pp.
8-9, pars. 4.8, 4.9). x x x[6] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As a result of the report, the parties filed their respective comments and objections thereto. During the
trial, former Central Bank Governor Jaime C. Laya and a representative of the Commissioner were called
upon to testify. The parties also had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses on matters touched
upon in the report as well as those disregarded by the Commissioner in its report.
After having cross-examined the representative of the Commissioner, the parties were then allowed to
submit their respective Position Papers. Contained in their respective position papers was their own
computation of the outstanding liabilities of CCC. CCCs computation of its exact indebtedness to DBP as
of December 1990, covering the straight peso loans and foreign guarantees stood at P43,601,192.73.
The Commissioner reported that the indebtedness amounted to P61,698,849.00 while DBP and APT
computed CCCs total indebtedness in the sum of P2,656,573,716.11.[7] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On July 23, 1992, a hearing was scheduled for the sole purpose of examining three (3) of CCCs witnesses,
namely, Gregorio Lim, Urbano Cruz and Jessica Alonzo. The cross-examination was to be conducted by
APT as DBP had previously conducted its own cross-examination. The counsel for CCC failed to appear as
he was allegedly ill. On that same date, the court issued an order resetting the cross-examination for
CCCs witnesses on August 24, 25 and 26, 1992. Again, the counsel for APT was not able to attend due to
an alleged serious illness (Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever). Also absent during the hearing was DBPs counsel
and DBP/APTs lone witness, Mr. Jaime V. Cruz. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On August 25, 1992, the trial court issued an order which considered the case submitted for decision.
The final paragraph of the order reads as follows: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the light of the foregoing developments, and conformably with the agreement entered into much
earlier by the contending parties to the effect that after the affiants to the position papers shall have
been cross-examined, the parties shall dispense with the presentation of further evidence, the case at
bar is considered henceforth submitted for adjudication on the merits.[8] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is claimed by petitioner APT that when the above-mentioned order was issued, APT did not yet have
the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants of respondent CCC; nor did it have the chance to present
any of their affiants to support their allegations as contained in their Joint Position Papers.
On September 18, 1992, APT filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In an order dated October 13, 1992,
the trial court declared that such motion became moot and academic by reason of the decision
rendered on October 5, 1992. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On that earlier date, the lower court rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which is
as follows: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. fixing the total indebtedness of plaintiff Continental Cement Corporation in favor of defendant
Development Bank of the Philippines on the straight peso loans and foreign guarantees at
P61,498,849.00 as of December 31, 1990;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2. fixing the indebtedness of plaintiff Continental Cement Corporation in favor of defendant

Development Bank of the Philippines on the coal conversion loan at US$977,000.00, or P7,347,890.00
which is its equivalent in pesos at the official rate of exchange prevailing in August
1979;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
3. ordering the plaintiff to pay unto either of the defendants DBP or APT, within six (6) months from the
finality of this judgment, the aforementioned amount of P61,498,849.00 with interest thereon at 10%
per annum from January 1, 1991 until the same shall have been fully paid and the aforementioned
amount of US$997,000.00/P7,347,890.00 without interest thereon;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
4. declaring premature and without legal basis the application for extrajudicial foreclosure (Annex A of
the Complaint) filed on November 18, 1985 by defendant Development Bank of the Philippines with the
office of the defendant Sheriff of Malolos, Bulacan;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
5. making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on January 17, 1986 in the
case at bar enjoining proceedings on the aforementioned application for extrajudicial foreclosure,
without prejudice to such rights (including the institution of eventual foreclosure proceedings) as the
defendants may opt to pursue against the plaintiff in the event that the directive specified in the
preceding paragraph hereof shall not have been complied with; andchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
6. dismissing the plaintiffs claim for unspecified attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
No pronouncement as to costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.[9] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
After having learned of the decision of the trial court, APT and DBP filed their respective Omnibus
Motions. APT, in its Omnibus Motion dated October 27, 1992, prayed for the issuance of the following
orders by the trial court: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1) vacating and nullifying its Decision dated October 5, 1992;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2) granting APT an opportunity to cross-examine plaintiffs witness;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

3) allowing DBP and APT to present their witnesses and evidence;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
4) after trial, requiring the parties to submit their respective Memoranda.[10]

The trial court, on December 14, 1992, issued an Order denying the separate Omnibus Motions of APT
and DBP. Both APT and DBP appealed the trial courts decision dated October 5, 1992 and orders dated
August 25, 1992 and December 14, 1992. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On June 7, 1993, APT and DBP filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for an ex-parte issuance of a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 32853. However, on January 31, 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
lack of merit. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus, on March 28, 1995, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 42596 rendered the assailed decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the Decision dated
October 5, 1992 and the orders dated August 25 and December 14, 1992 in toto. The order dated
January 22, 1993 is hereby annulled and set aside insofar as it directs the partial release of collaterals by
defendants-appellants DBP and APT.[11] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the instant Petition for Review, APT assigns the following errors committed by the appellate court:
Ichanroblesvirtualawlibrary
THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURTS DECISION, DISREGARDED THE PRINCIPLES
EMBODIED IN THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, THUS:
Achanroblesvirtualawlibrary
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER HAS WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO CROSS-
EXAMINE RESPONDENTS WITNESS
IIchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION ADOPTING IN TOTO
THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER
Achanroblesvirtualawlibrary
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION THAT THE MEMORANDUM
OF AGREEMENT IS UNENFORCEABLE
Bchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION LIMITING THE LIABILITY OF
RESPONDENT IN THE AMOUNT OF P61,498,849.00 AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1990 INSTEAD OF
P2,656,573,716.11
IIIchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND WRITS OF PRELIMINARY AND PERMANENT
INJUNCTION.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Anent the first assigned error, petitioner APT insists that the lower court as well as the Court of Appeals
disregarded the principles of the due process clause embodied in the Constitution when it found APT to
have waived its right to cross-examine respondents witnesses. On the other hand, respondent CCC
counters that the findings of the lower court may be attributed to the fault of APTs counsel. CCC alleges
that the counsel for APT often absented himself on scheduled hearing dates, resulting in the failure to
cross-examine the witnesses of respondent CCC. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The insistence of the petitioner is without basis. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Long ingrained in our jurisprudence is the principle that there can be no denial of due process where a
party had the opportunity to participate in the proceedings but did not do so.[12]
As shown from the records, the counsel for APT was absent on several occasions, specifically on April 7,
May 5, June 2, June 16, August 24 and 25, 1992. Several reasons were raised by APTs counsel to justify
his absence, such as withdrawal of previous counsel, unreadiness to conduct the cross-examinations,
and serious illness. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
These flimsy excuses do not warrant consideration from this Court. The withdrawal of APTs previous
counsel in the thick of the proceedings would be a reasonable ground to seek postponement of the
hearing. However, such reason necessitates a duty, nay an obligation, on the part of the new counsel to
prepare himself for the next scheduled hearing. The excuse that it was due to the former counsels
failure to turn over the records of the case to APT, shows the negligence of the new counsel to actively
recover the records of the case. Mere demands are not sufficient. Counsel should have taken adequate
steps to fully protect the interest of his client, rather than pass the blame on the previous counsel.
A motion to postpone trial on the ground that counsel is unprepared for trial demonstrates indifference
and disregard of a clients interest. A new counsel who appears in a case in midstream is presumed and
obliged to acquaint himself with all the antecedent processes and proceedings that have transpired
prior to his takeover.[13] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As regards the serious illness suffered by counsel during the trial dates of August 24 and 25, 1992, we
take note that Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever, if not treated at its early stage, could cause serious illness,
sometimes even death. This Court is not unmindful of the fact that counsels absence was due to this
deadly disease. What baffles this Court is the reason offered by counsel that although two other APT
lawyers were mentioned in the pleadings, only one was actively involved in the handling of the case.[14]
Counsel further adds that he could not have possibly appraised the two other lawyers to appear during
the scheduled hearing in his absence. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We cannot understand why it would be difficult for counsel to appraise his two other collaborating
counsels. Counsel himself readily admits that of the two, only one is actively handling the case. It would
take a mere phone call to inform his co-counsels than he would be unable to attend rather than be
declared absent during trial. Yet, counsel failed to do so. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In view of the foregoing, we find the Court of Appeals did not commit error, when it declared that
petitioner waived its right to cross-examine the respondents witnesses. The due process requirement is
satisfied where the parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers,[15] as in this case. Both
parties, CCC and DBP/APT, were given opportunity to submit their respective position papers after the
Commissioner rendered his report. Contained in their position papers were their respective comments
and objections to the said report. Furthermore, the parties were also given the chance to cross-examine
the Commissioner and his representative. They were likewise granted opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses of the other party, however, like in APTs case, they were deemed to have waived their right,
as previously discussed. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
support any evidence he may have in support of his defense.[16] What the law prohibits is absolute
absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process when he had
been afforded the opportunity to present his side.[17] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As to the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the
trial courts decision adopting in toto the report of the Commissioner and the decision of the trial court
declaring the Memorandum of Agreement as unenforceable. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The above-mentioned issues involve matters which are factual in nature. As a general rule, findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court, and we will not normally disturb
such factual findings unless the findings of the court are palpably unsupported by the evidence on
record or unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.[18]
In the case at bar, we find no such error that would warrant a reversal of the assailed decision. As to the
matter of the memorandum of agreement, we concur with the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
Memorandum of Agreement itself stated that failure of Continental to meet this deadline shall be
construed as its objection to this new restructuring scheme.[19] Moreover, CCC did not execute nor
submit all the documents needed to make said agreement effective. The fact that CCC did not comply
with the requirements of the Memorandum of Agreement at the expiration of the period set by DBP,
only shows CCCs non-conformity to the agreement. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Since CCC did not express its conformity to the agreement, it was only proper for the Commissioner to
consider the amount of indebtedness of CCC based on actual loan releases. The Commissioner did
consider the Memorandum of Agreement as a source document, however, no one was able to
satisfactorily explain how the figure was arrived at. It must be emphasized that the Commissioners
report was limited in relation to four (4) straight peso loans and two (2) guaranteed foreign exchange
loans. It is, therefore, erroneous for APT and DBP to conclude that CCCs entire outstanding obligations
stood at P2,656,573,716.11. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As regards the determination of the Commissioner as to the actual indebtedness of CCC, we uphold the
ruling of the respondent court. The very reason why the Commissioner was appointed as such was due
to the complex nature of the issues involved in the case which required the technical know-how and
expertise possessed by the Commissioner. The records also bear the fact that said Commissioner was
chosen by both parties. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As we have previously ruled in Quebral vs. CA[20] that factual findings of the Court of Appeals normally
are not reviewable by this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, except when the findings of the
appellate court are at variance with those of the trial court. Since the trial court and the Court of
Appeals were in unison with the findings of the Commissioner, this Court is of the opinion that it finds
no compelling reason to reverse the same. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Lastly, petitioner APT argues that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary and permanent injunction against it (APT), despite
the express provisions of Proclamation No. 50. On the other hand, CCC asseverates that since APT was a
mere transferee pendente lite, it was bound by the preliminary injunction previously issued against DBP.
We find merit in the assigned error of petitioner APT. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

It must be recalled that the trial court did in fact issue a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against petitioner
APT. The particular section which contains the non-injunction rule is quoted hereunder:
Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of APT, nor block, by an injunction the discharge of its
function and the implementation of its decision in connection with the acquisition, sale, or disposition of
assets transferred to it.[21] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Furthermore, we reiterate the ruling held in that case that Proclamation No. 50 does not infringe any
provision of the Constitution. Thus chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The President, in the exercise of his legislative power under the Freedom Constitution, issued
Proclamation No. 50-A prohibiting the courts from issuing restraining orders and writ of injunction
against the APT and the purchasers of any asset sold by it, to prevent courts from interfering in the
discharge, by this instrumentality of the executive branch of the Government, of its task of carrying out
`the expeditious disposition and privatization of certain government corporations and/or the assets
thereof (Proc. No. 50), absent any grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
on its part. This proclamation, not being inconsistent with the Constitution and not having been
repealed or revoked by Congress, has remained operative (Section 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution).[22]
The records of the case at bar does not disclose any grave abuse of discretion committed by petitioner
APT amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in its effort to take possession of the assets transferred
to it by DBP. We are of the opinion that petitioners simply availed of judicial processes to recover the
transferred assets formerly owned by DBP. We hold respondent Court of Appeals liable of committing
the assigned error. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In sum, petitioner APT was not denied its right to due process when it failed to cross-examine
respondents witnesses as this was due to its own counsels failure and negligence. A party cannot feign
denial of due process when he had the opportunity to present his side.[23] A careful review of the
records reveal that DBP had the opportunity to exhaustively cross-examine respondents witnesses.
Furthermore, as transferee pendente lite, APT merely stepped into the shoes of DBP.
As regards the indebtedness of CCC, petitioners APT/DBP must be reminded that all is not lost when the
Commissioner ruled that the outstanding loans amounted to P61,498,849.00 only. As manifested by the
Commissioner, the report limited itself to four (4) straight peso loans and two (2) guaranteed foreign
exchange loans. This was due to the insufficiency of supporting documents submitted by both parties.
We wish to state that the affirmation by this Court of the rulings of the Court of Appeals as to the
indebtedness of CCC, does not in any way prejudice APT/DBPs right to recover from CCC, provided they
are fully able to substantiate their claim. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED but with
modification as follows: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The writ of preliminary injunction issued on January 17, 1986, and the writ of permanent injunction
issued on October 5, 1992 are hereby declared NULL AND VOID pursuant to Section 31, Proclamation
No. 50. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111737. October 13, 1999]
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
SPOUSES TIMOTEO and SELFIDA S. PIEDA, Respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals[1] in CA-G.R. CV
No. 28549 entitled SPOUSES TIMOTEO PIEDA, ET. AL. vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16[2], Roxas City in Civil Case No.
V-4590, for cancellation of certificate of title and/or specific performance, accounting and damages with
a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The records show that respondent spouses Pieda (PIEDAS) are the registered owners of a parcel of land
(Lot 11-14-1-14) situated at barangay Astorga Dumarao, Capiz containing an area of 238,406 square
meters, more or less, and covered by Homestead Patent No. 0844 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-
1930. On March 7, 1972, the PIEDAS mortgaged the above described parcel of land to petitioner,
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to secure their agricultural loan in the amount of
P20,000.00. The PIEDAS failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the mortgage compelling DBP
to extrajudicially foreclose on February 2, 1977. In the foreclosure sale, DBP was the highest bidder and
a Sheriff Certificate of Sale was executed in its favor. In the corresponding Certificate of Sale, the sheriff
indicated that This property is sold subject to the redemption within five (5) years from the date of
registration of this instrument and in the manner provided for by law applicable to this case. The
certificate of sale was registered in the Register of Deeds of Capiz on April 25, 1977. On March 10, 1978,
after the expiration of the one-year redemption period provided for under Section 6, ACT 3135, DBP
consolidated its title over the foreclosed property by executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership. Subsequently, a Final Deed of Sale was executed in DBPs favor, which was registered
together with the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership with the Register of Deeds of Capiz on May
30, 1978. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title No. P-1930 was cancelled and TCT No. T-15559 was
issued in the name of DBP. Thereafter, DBP took possession of the foreclosed property and appropriated
the produce thereof. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On July 5, 1978, the Ministry of Justice issued Opinion No. 92, Series of 1978[3] which declared that
lands covered by P.D. No. 27[4], like the herein subject property, may not be the object of foreclosure
proceedings after the promulgation of said decree on Oct. 21, 1972. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On August 24, 1981, the PIEDAS offered to redeem the foreclosed property by offering P10,000.00 as
partial redemption payment. This amount was accepted by DBP who issued O.R. No. 1665719 and
through a letter, conditionally approved the offer of redemption considering the P10,000.00 as down
payment.[5] However, on November 11, 1981, DBP sent the PIEDAS another letter informing them that
pursuant to P.D. 27, their offer to redeem and/or repurchase the subject property could not be
favorably considered for the reason that said property was tenanted.[6] On November 16, 1981, in
deference to the above-mentioned opinion, DBP through Ramon Buenaflor sent a letter to the Acting
Register of Deeds of Capiz requesting the latter to cancel TCT No. T-15559 and to restore Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1930 in the name of the PIEDAS. The Acting Register of Deeds, in reply to such
request, suggested that DBP file a petition in court pursuant to Section 108 of Presidential Decree
1529[7]. In compliance with said suggestion, DBP petitioned for the cancellation of TCT No. T-15559 with
then Court of First Instance of Capiz, Branch II, docketed as Special Case No. 2653. The petition was
favorably acted upon on February 22, 1982. Thus, the foreclosure proceeding conducted on February 2,
1977 was declared null and void and the Register of Deeds of Capiz was ordered to cancel TCT No.
15559; OCT No. 1930 was ordered revived. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Meanwhile, on December 21, 1981, the PIEDAS filed the instant complaint against DBP for cancellation
of certificate of title and/or specific performance, accounting and damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction averring that DBP, in evident bad faith, caused the
consolidation of its title to the parcel of land in question in spite of the fact that the 5-year redemption
period expressly stated in the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale had not yet lapsed and that their offer to
redeem the foreclosed property was made well within said period of redemption.[8]
After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of the PIEDAS stating that DBP violated the stipulation in the Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale which provided that the redemption period is five (5) years from the registration
thereof in consonance with Section 119[9] of CA No. 141[10]. DBP should therefore assume liability for
the fruits that said property produced from said land considering that it prematurely took possession
thereof. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendant Development
Bank of the Philippines as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. Condemning the defendant DBP to pay the plaintiffs P201,138.28 less whatever amount the plaintiffs
still have to pay the said defendant DBP as balance of their loan account reckoned up to the date of this
decision; P20,000.00 as attorneys fees; P5,000.00 as litigation expenses and
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.[11] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
DBP appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals
stated that since DBP was in evident bad faith when it unlawfully took possession of the property
subject of the dispute and defied what was written on the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale, the PIEDAS were
entitled to recover the fruits produced by the property or its equivalent valued at P72,000.00 per annum
or a total of P216,000.00 for the three-year period. Respondent court stated that said amount was not
rebutted by DBP and was fair considering the size of the land in question. The court added that any
discussion with respect to the redemption period was of little significance since the foreclosure
proceeding was declared null and void in Special Civil Case No. 2653[12] on February 22, 1982. Thus, the
right of the PIEDAS to redeem the property has become moot and academic. Finally, the award of
attorneys fees amounting to P10,000.00[13] was justified considering that the PIEDAS were compelled
to protect their interests.[14] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
DBPs Motion for Reconsideration[15] was denied; hence this petition where it assigns the following
errors: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ground No. 1 The Honorable Court Of Appeals Gravely Erred In Affirming The Court A Quos Decision
Awarding Actual Damages In The Amount Of P216,000.00 In Favor Of The Private Respondents
Notwithstanding The Absence Of Evidence Substantiating Said Award. Thus, The Honorable Court Of
Appeals Had Decided This Instant Case In A Way Not In Accord With Applicable Law And
Jurisprudence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2. Ground No. 2 - The Honorable Court Of Appeals Gravely Erred In Affirming The Court A Quos Finding
That DBP Was In Bad Faith When It Took Possession Of The Property In Question Notwithstanding the
Contrary Evidence Adduced By Petitioner DBP. Thus, The Honorable Court Of Appeals Departed From
The Accepted And Usual Course of Judicial Proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
3. Ground No. 3 - The Honorable Court Of Appeals Gravely Erred In Affirming The Court A Quos Decision
Awarding Attorneys Fees And Litigation Costs In Favor Of The Private Respondents Notwithstanding
Absence Of Evidence Proving the Same. Clearly, The Lower Court Committed Misapprehension Of Facts
That Can Be Considered A Question Of Law.[16] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
DBP maintains that the valuation of the income derived from the property in dispute allegedly
amounting to P216,000.00 was not proven by the PIEDAS. DBP argues that they granted the PIEDAS a
loan of P20,000.00 in March 7, 1972 and up to the time of the foreclosure of the property, the PIEDAS
have paid only P2,000.00 on their principal. The failure of the PIEDAS to pay this loan is attributable to
the fact that said property did not produce income amounting to P72,000.00 per annum. According to
DBP, in the absence of receipts or other evidence to support such a claim, the Court of Appeals should
not have granted said amount considering that the PIEDAS had the burden of proving actual damages.
Furthermore, Selfida Pieda herself admitted that the property never produced income amounting to
P72,000.00 per annum. At any rate, the actual amount earned by the property in terms of rentals turned
over by the tenant-farmers or caretakers of the land were duly receipted and were duly accounted for
by the DBP. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
DBP also alleges that the mere fact that DBP took possession and administration of the property does
not warrant a finding that DBP was in bad faith. First, records show that the PIEDAS consented to and
approved the takeover of DBP. Second, Sec. 7[17] of Act No. 3135[18] allows the mortgagee-buyer to
take possession of the mortgaged property even during the redemption period. Third, DBPs act of
consolidating the title of the property in its name does not constitute bad faith as there is no law which
prohibits the purchaser at public auction from consolidating title in its name after the expiration of the
one (1) year redemption period reckoned from the time the Certificate of Sale was registered; and
neither is there any law or jurisprudence which prohibits the PIEDAS from exercising their right of
redemption over said property within five (5) years even if title is consolidated in the name of the
purchaser. When DBP consolidated title over the property in its name, the new TCT issued in its favor
was subject to the lien i.e. the right of redemption of the PIEDAS; if there was a failure to register this in
the TCT, DBP should not be faulted. Besides, even if the five (5) year period of redemption was not
indicated therein, Sec. 44[19] and 46[20] of Presidential Decree No. 1529[21] attaches such lien by
operation of law even in the absence of an annotation in the title. Moreover, Sec. 119 of CA No. 141 also
makes said right of redemption a statutory lien, which subsists and binds the whole world despite the
absence of registration. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
DBP also could not have been in bad faith when it denied the PIEDAS offer to redeem the property since
the denial was premised on Opinion No. 92 of the Minister of Justice series of 1978 which stated that
said land was covered under P.D. 27 and could not be the subject of foreclosure proceedings. For this
reason, DBP immediately filed a petition to nullify the foreclosure proceedings which was favorably
acted upon prior to the service of summons and the complaint in the present case on DBP on June
30,1982. If DBP was really in bad faith, it would not have filed said petition for said petition was against
its own interests. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Further, DBP asserts that PIEDAS appointed DBP as their attorney-in-fact or agent in case of foreclosure
of the property under Section 4 of the mortgage contract, which provides: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
4. xxx In case of foreclosure, the Mortgagor hereby consents to the appointment of the mortgagee or
any of its employees as receiver, without any bond, to take charge of the mortgage property at once,
and to hold possession of the case and the rents and profits derived from the mortgaged property
before the sale. xxx[22] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
DBP was therefore entitled to take possession of the property pursuant to the mortgage contract.
Finally, considering that DBP lawfully had material possession of the property after it consolidated its
title, DBP was entitled to the fruits and income thereof pursuant to Section 34, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sec. 34. Rents and Profits Pending Redemption. Statement thereof and credit therefor on redemption.
The purchaser, from the time of the sale until a redemption, and a redemptioner, from the time of his
redemption until another redemption, is entitled to receive the rents of the property sold or the value of
the use or occupation thereof when such property is in the possession of a tenant.
xxxchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Taking all this into consideration, DBP cannot be faulted for taking over possession of the property in
question. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The core issue in this case is whether DBP was in bad faith when it took possession of the disputed lot.
We rule in the negative and find DBPs contentions meritorious. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any
flaw, which invalidates it.[23] Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the
part of a possessor rests the burden of proof.[24] It was therefore incumbent on the PIEDAS to prove
that DBP was aware of the flaw in its title i.e. the nullity of the foreclosure. This, they failed to do.
Respondent PIEDAS argue that DBPs bad faith stems from the fact that DBP consolidated title over the
disputed property despite the statement in the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale to the effect that said land
was subject to a five year redemption period. The period of redemption of extrajudicially foreclosed
land is provided under Section 6 of ACT No. 3135 to wit: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sec. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred
to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or
any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the
property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date
of sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four
to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure[25], in so far as these are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
If no redemption is made within one year, the purchaser is entitled as a matter of right to
consolidate[26] and to possess[27] the property.[28] Accordingly, DBPs act of consolidating its title and
taking possession of the subject property after the expiration of the period of redemption was in
accordance with law. Moreover, it was in consonance with Section 4 of the mortgage contract between
DBP and the PIEDAS where they agreed to the appointment of DBP as receiver to take charge and to
hold possession of the mortgage property in case of foreclosure. DBPs acts cannot therefore be tainted
with bad faith. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The right of DBP to consolidate its title and take possession of the subject property is not affected by the
PIEDAS right to repurchase said property within five years from the date of conveyance granted by
Section 119 of CA No. 141. In fact, without the act of DBP consolidating title in its name, the PIEDAS
would not be able to assert their right to repurchase granted under the aforementioned section.
Respondent PIEDAS are of the erroneous belief that said section prohibits a purchaser of homestead
land in a foreclosure sale from consolidating his title over said property after the one-year period to
redeem said property has expired. Section 119 does not contain any prohibition to convey homestead
land but grants the homesteader, his widow or legal heirs a right to repurchase said land within a period
of five years in the event that he conveys said land. This is in consonance with the policy of homestead
laws to distribute disposable agricultural lands of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and
cultivation.[29] The right to repurchase under Section 119 aims to preserve and keep in the family of the
homesteader that portion of public land which the State had gratuitously given him.[30] Such right is
based on the assumption that the person under obligation to reconvey the property has the full title to
the property because it was voluntarily conveyed to him or that he consolidated his title thereto by
reason of a redemptioners failure to exercise his right of redemption.[31] It is also settled that the five-
year period of redemption fixed in Section 119 of the Public Land Law of homestead sold at extrajudicial
foreclosure begins to run from the day after the expiration of the one-year period of repurchase allowed
in an extrajudicial foreclosure.[32] Thus DBPs consolidation of title did not derogate from or impair the
right of the PIEDAS to redeem the same under C.A. No. 141. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It may be argued that P.D. 27 was already in effect when DBP foreclosed the property. However, the
legal propriety of the foreclosure of the land was put into question only after Opinion No. 92 series of
1978 of the Ministry of Justice declared that said land was covered by P.D. 27 and could not be subject
to foreclosure proceedings. The Opinion of the Ministry of Justice was issued on July 5, 1978 or almost
two months after DBP consolidated its title to the property on March 10, 1978. By law and
jurisprudence, a mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may properly be the basis of good
faith.[33] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the case of Maneclang vs. Baun,[34] we held that when a contract of sale is void, the possessor is
entitled to keep the fruits during the period for which it held the property in good faith. Good faith of
the possessor ceases when an action to recover possession of the property is filed against him and he is
served summons therefore.[35] In the present case, DBP was served summons on June 30, 1982.[36] By
that time, it was no longer in possession of the disputed land as possession thereof was given back to
the PIEDAS after the foreclosure of DBP was declared null and void on February 22, 1982. Therefore, any
income collected by DBP after it consolidated its title and took possession of the property on May 30,
1978 up to February 22, 1982 belongs to DBP as a possessor in good faith since its possession was never
legally interrupted. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Finally, we delete the award for attorneys fees. Although attorneys fees may be awarded if the claimant
is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an
unjustified act or omission of the party from whom it is sought[37], we hold that DBPs acts were clearly
not unjustified. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED, and the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED. The Development Bank of the Philippines is absolved from any liability to Timoteo and
Selfida Pieda in so far as it orders the DBP to pay the PIEDAS P216,000.00 as annual produce value of the
land; P20,000.00 in attorneys fees, P5,000.00 in litigation expenses and the costs of the suit. This
decision is without prejudice to whatever liability the PIEDAS may still have to the DBP with respect to
their loan. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtualawlib
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 147217. October 7, 2004]
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and NILO C. GALORPORT, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS (Former First Division), HON. ACHILLES L. MELICOR (as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 4, Tagbilaran City), BIBIANA GUREA VDA. DE AZARCON, HEIRS OF INOCENTES AZARCON, namely,
PERLA ROO, INOCENTES AZARCON, JR., LORENZITA CALAMBA, ELSA ANGALOT, MANUELA B. TUASON,
DARIETTA AZARCON and DONALITA A. ALONSO (For Herself and as Attorney-In-Fact of her Co-heirs),
respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
September 26, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 60838 dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and Atty. Nilo Galorport (DBP deputized special sheriff[1]),
herein petitioners. The ground for the dismissal is that the certification against forum shopping was
signed only by Atty. Demosthenes Demecillo, DBP Branch Manager at Tagbilaran City, the banks
representative. Atty. Galorport, DBPs co-petitioner did not sign the same.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Also assailed in the instant petition is the subsequent Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January
29, 2001 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of the previous Resolution as there is no proof
that DBP Branch Manager Atty. Demosthenes Demecillo, who alone signed the certification against
forum shopping, is the duly authorized representative of the bank.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Records show that on February 11, 2000, the above-named private respondents filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City Civil Case No. 6464 for annulment of contract and Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 42996 and 42997 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and preliminary injunction. Impleaded as defendants are the DBP, represented by Atty.
Demosthenes Demecillo, DBP Branch Manager at Tagbilaran City, and Atty. Nilo Galorport, DBP
deputized special sheriff.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
During the hearing of the application for a preliminary injunction, it was established that the lots
covered by TCT Nos. 42996 and 42997 were owned by Bibiana Guerra de Azarcon (one of the herein
private respondents) and her late husband Inocentes Azarcon. They obtained a loan from the Philippine
National Bank (PNB). As collateral, they mortgaged these two (2) lots with the bank. But they could not
pay their loan. Asuncion Calceta, a close friend of private respondent Donalita Alonzo, told Bibiana that
she is willing to pay their loan if she (Bibiana) would mortgage the lots to her. Private respondents
agreed.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Asuncion Calceta then made an initial payment of P273,000.00 to the PNB. In turn, the bank extended
the redemption period to allow Asuncion to apply with the DBP a loan of P3,500,000.00 to be paid to
the PNB.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Upon Asuncions persistence, private respondents executed a simulated deed of sale of their lots in her
favor to enable her to mortgage the same with the DBP. Thus, TCT Nos. 42996 and 42997 were issued in
her name by the Register of Deeds of Tagbilaran City.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Asuncion then mortgaged the two (2) lots with the DBP. When the proceeds of the loan were released,
she paid the PNB P900,000.00 representing the unpaid balance of respondents
loan.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
However, Asuncion failed to pay her loan with the DBP, prompting the bank to foreclose the mortgage
covering the two (2) lots.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
After hearing private respondents application for preliminary injunction, the RTC, on June 9, 2000,
issued an Order enjoining the DBP and Atty. Nilo Galorport, the banks deputized special sheriff, from
proceeding with the auction sale of the lots pending the final determination of Civil Case No.
6464.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The DBP and Atty. Galorport filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC. Hence, they
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari alleging that in granting the injunctive relief in
favor of private respondents, the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion. As stated in the outset, the
Appellate Court issued a Resolution on September 26, 2000 dismissing the petition for certiorari for
failure of one of the Petitioners, Atty. Nilo Galorport (DBPs deputized special sheriff), to sign the
certification against forum shopping. Subsequently, acting on petitioners motion for reconsideration,
the Appellate Court likewise denied the same in a Resolution dated January 29, 2001, holding that Atty.
Demosthenes Demecillo, Branch Manager of the DBP at Tagbilaran City, failed to show that he is the
banks authorized representative to file the petition for certiorari.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The issue for our resolution is:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed twin
Resolutions dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It bears reiterating that the petitioners before the Court of Appeals were the DBP, represented by Atty.
Demosthenes Demecillo, the banks Branch Manager at Tagbilaran City, and Atty. Nilo Galorport, DBPs
deputized special sheriff. The certification against forum shopping was signed by Atty. Demosthenes
Demecillo only. According to private respondents, Atty. Demecillo was not authorized by the DBP to
represent it in filing with the Court of Appeals the petition for certiorari. Hence, Atty. Demecillos
signature appearing on the certification against forum shopping has no legal significance at all. It cannot
bind DBP.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioners explained in their motion for reconsideration that in the verification of the petition for
certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60838, Atty. Demecillo stated under oath that he is the DBPs incumbent
Branch Head and its duly authorized officer. They submitted a copy of Resolution No. 0192 dated April 5,
2000 passed by the DBP Board of Governors. This Resolution authorizes Branch Heads of the DBP to sign
the verification and certification against forum shopping of all initiatory pleadings of the
bank.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
What petitioners failed to explain, however, is their failure to attach a certified true copy of Resolution
No. 0912 to their petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60838. Their omission is fatal to their case.
Courts are not, after all, expected to take judicial notice of corporate board resolutions or a corporate
officers authority to represent a corporation. To be sure, petitioners failure to submit proof that Atty.
Demecillo has been authorized by the DBP to file the petition is a sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof.[2]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the part of Atty. Galorport, he admits that he did not sign the certification against forum shopping in
CA-G.R. SP No. 60838, contending that the signature of Atty. Demecillo, representing the DBP, is
sufficient since he (Atty. Galorport) and the DBP are being sued jointly, they having a common interest
in the lots under litigation. His contention lacks merit. DBP is being sued as a mortgagee, while he is
impleaded as the banks deputized special sheriff who conducted the extra-judicial foreclosure of the
mortgage. Surely, their interests are not the same. He should have signed the certification. In Docena vs.
Lapesura,[3] we ruled that the certification against forum shopping should be signed by all the
petitioners in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In sum, we find that the certification against forum shopping in CA-G.R. SP No. 60838 is fatally defective,
not having been duly signed by both petitioners. This procedural flaw warrants the dismissal of the
petition for certiorari. We have consistently held that the certification against forum shopping must be
signed by the principal parties.[4] With respect to a corporation, the certification against forum
shopping may be signed for and on its behalf, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has personal
knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document.[5]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We, therefore, hold that in rendering the assailed twin Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 60838, respondent
Court of Appeals did not gravely abuse its discretion.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
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DBP Vs Ca

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c 

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Republic of the Philipppines

[G.R. No. 119712. January 29, 1999]

MARTINEZ, J.: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

2. fixing the indebtedness of plaintiff Continental Cement Corporation in favor of defendant

1) vacating and nullifying its Decision dated October 5, 1992;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

2) granting APT an opportunity to cross-examine plaintiffs witness;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

4) after trial, requiring the parties to submit their respective Memoranda.[10]

The insistence of the petitioner is without basis. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

We find merit in the assigned error of petitioner APT. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Republic of the Philipppines

[G.R. No. 111737. October 13, 1999]

We rule in the negative and find DBPs contentions meritorious. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Republic of the Philipppines

The issue for our resolution is:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

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