NEW YORK v.

QUARLES

FACTS: Respondent was charged in a New York state court with criminal possession of a
weapon. The record showed that a woman approached two police officers who were on road
patrol, told them that she had just been raped, described her assailant, and told them that the man
had just entered a nearby supermarket and was carrying a gun. While one of the officers radioed
for assistance, the other (Officer Kraft) entered the store and spotted respondent, who matched
the description given by the woman. Respondent ran toward the rear of the store, and Officer
Kraft pursued him with a drawn gun but lost sight of him for several seconds. Upon regaining
sight of respondent, Officer Kraft ordered him to stop and put his hands over his head; frisked
him and discovered that he was wearing an empty shoulder holster; and, after handcuffing him,
asked him where the gun was. Respondent nodded toward some empty cartons and responded
that "the gun is over there." Officer Kraft then retrieved the gun from one of the cartons, formally
arrested respondent, and read him his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 .
Respondent indicated that he would answer questions without an attorney being present and
admitted that he owned the gun and had purchased it in Florida. The trial court excluded
respondent's initial statement and the gun because the respondent had not yet been given the
Miranda warnings, and also excluded respondent's other statements as evidence tainted by the
Miranda violation. Both the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court and the New
York Court of Appeals affirmed.

ISSUE: Should the Court suppress Quarles's statement about the gun and the gun itself because
the officer had failed at the time to read Quarles his Miranda rights?
HELD: No. The Court held that there is a "public safety" exception to the requirement that
officers issue Miranda warnings to suspects. Since the police officer's request for the location of
the gun was prompted by an immediate interest in assuring that it did not injure an innocent
bystander or fall into the hands of a potential accomplice to Quarles, his failure to read the
Miranda warning did not violate the Constitution.

ENRILE VS SALAZAR

FACTS: In February 1990, Sen Enrile was arrested. He was charged together with Mr. & Mrs.
Panlilio, and Honasan for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
which allegedly occurred during their failed coup attempt. Enrile was then brought to Camp
Karingal. Enrile later filed for the habeas corpus alleging that the crime being charged against
him is nonexistent. That he was charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no
complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due
process; denied his right to bail; and arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued
without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable
cause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court should affirm the Hernandez ruling.

HELD: Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied bail although ordinarily a charge of
rebellion would entitle one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged against him however is
complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murders – the intention of the prosecution was to
make rebellion in its most serious form so as to make the penalty thereof in the maximum. The
SC ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder.
What Enrile et al can be charged of would be Simple Rebellion because other crimes such as
murder or all those that may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is absorbed hence he
should be entitiled for bail. The SC however noted that a petition for habeas corpus was not the
proper remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step that should have been taken was for Enrile
to file a petition to be admitted for bail. He should have exhausted all other efforts before
petitioning for habeas corpus. The Hernandez ruling is still valid. All other crimes committed in
carrying out rebellion are deemed absorbed. The SC noted, however, that there may be a need to
modify the rebellion law. Considering that the essence of rebellion has been lost and that it is
being used by alot of opportunists to attempt to grab power.

PEOPLE VS DONATO

Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for
acts committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash
alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants;
and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987
Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail
anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART.
135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among
others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the
bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court
once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a
supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it
to present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused
will not comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that:

1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention
when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented
a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity
and address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was
offered and paid for his arrest.

This however was denied. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.

Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a
capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a
capital offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to
change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution.

Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua
to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him.

Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements
were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and
Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit
themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the
security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We
hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a
right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.