Safety&Security RoadwayTunnels

SAFETY & SECURITY IN ROADWAY TUNNELS
FINAL REPORT
Requested by:
American Association of State Highway
and Transportation Officials (AASHTO)
Standing Committee on Highways
Prepared by:
Kathleen Almand
Fire Protection Research Foundation
Quincy, Massachusetts
March 2008
The information contained in this report was prepared as part of NCHRP Project 20-7, Task 230,
National Cooperative Highway Research Program, Transportation Research Board.
1
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SPONSORSHIP
This work was sponsored by one or more of the following as noted:
⌧ American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, in cooperation

with the Federal Highway Administration, and was conducted in the National
Cooperative Highway Research Program,
Federal Transit Administration and was conducted in the Transit Cooperative

Research Program,
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, in cooperation

with the Federal Motor Carriers Safety Administration, and was conducted in the
Commercial Truck and Bus Safety Synthesis Program,
Federal Aviation Administration and was conducted in the Airport Cooperative

Research Program,
which is administered by the Transportation Research Board of the National Academies.
DISCLAIMER
This is an uncorrected draft as submitted by the research agency. The opinions and
conclusions expressed or implied in the report are those of the research agency. They are
not necessarily those of the Transportation Research Board, the National Academies, or
the program sponsors.
2
NCHRP 20-7 Task 230
Safety and Security in Roadway Tunnels
BACKGROUND
The AASHTO Subcommittee on Bridges and Structures created the Technical Committee
on Tunnels (T-20) to address increased concerns for safety and security in the U.S. tunnel
inventory. In support of the activities of the T-20 Technical Committee, an FHWA-
AASHTO sponsored scanning trip was undertaken in late 2005(ref). The focus of the
scan was on equipment, systems, and procedures incorporated into modern underground
and underwater tunnels by leading international engineers and designers. Team members
identified a number of underground transportation system initiatives and practices that
varied from those in the U.S. in some respect. The team recommended that nine of these
initiatives or practices be considered for further study in the United States.
As a next step, the Technical Committee on Tunnels requested and received approval
through the Transportation Research Board’s National Cooperative Highway Research
Program to conduct a workshop on research needs for safety and security in roadway
tunnels. Project 20-7 Task 230 was approved in May of 2007. A project panel was
formed to oversee the project and plan the workshop. The Panel met by teleconference
three times in 2007 to develop the agenda, recommend speakers and invited participants.
Panel membership roster is located in Appendix A.
SCOPE
The goal of the workshop was to review the state of the art and develop recommendations
on research needs for improving safety and security in roadway tunnels for consideration
by the Technical Committee on Tunnels.
WORKSHOP
The workshop was held on November 29 and 30, 2007 at the National Academies
Beckman Center in Irvine, CA. There were approximately 65 participants in the
workshop including members of AASHTO T-20 and T-1 Committees, highway agency
representatives and a broad spectrum of members of the highway and fire protection
engineering communities. The NCHRP project panel selected five international speakers
to address the key research areas identified in the AASHTO scan. Three additional
domestic speakers were invited to address the scan, NCHRP Report 525 / TCRP Report
86, Vol. 12: Making Transportation Tunnels Safe and Secure, and a review of world wide
standards for fire safety in roadway tunnels. Significant opportunity for participant input
was provided for in the agenda. The workshop agenda, biographies of the speakers,
speaker presentations and the workshop participant list are found in Appendix A.
RESEARCH NEEDS
Each invited participant was asked to identify research needs from their perspective. In
addition, invited workshop participants were invited to submit research needs ideas prior
to the workshop. Two panel sessions during the workshop generated a great deal of
discussion amongst workshop participants and further generation of suggested research
needs. A list of research needs identified at the workshop by these methods are found in
Appendix A.
The project Panel reviewed and synthesized the information from the workshop and
identified ten key research needs statements for consideration by the AASHTO T-20
Technical Committee on Tunnels. These statements can be found in below. Statements
were developed in the following areas: their order in this list reflects the interest
expressed by participants in the workshop:
1. Effective Fire Suppression

2. Design Fires
3. Develop Requirements for Egress and Emergency Signage
4. Tunnel Operations and First Responders
5. Benchmarking Tunnel Incidents
6. Training and Education
7. Design Basis for Egress Systems
8. Effective Incident Detection
9. Fire and Smoke Ventilation System Design Methods
10. Performance of Structural Materials in Tunnels in Fire Incidents
11. Guidelines for Tunnel Geometric Design for Fire Safety
12. Application of ITS to Emergency Operations in Tunnels
RESEARCH PROBLEMS
RP1. Design Fires for Roadway Tunnels
I. RESEARCH PROBLEM
Understanding and characterizing the range of fire scenarios that can occur in
roadway tunnels is an important first step in developing design guidance for this
application.
II. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

Develop an appropriate basis for the design of fire protection strategies for
tunnels. The project should include the following components:
- Research on the effects of different ignition sources on incipient times for fires in
modern vehicles
- A risk based approach that provides a design basis for both large and small
incidents and considers the potential for alternatively fueled vehicles
- Development of appropriate design parameters that can serve as the basis for the
design of suppression, detection, emergency egress and other systems.
4
III BUDGET AND POTENTIAL CO-FUNDING SOURCES - $1,500,000
RP2. Effective Incident Detection
I RESEARCH PROBLEM
Effective early stage fire detection can reduce the costs of fire incidents and increase
available egress and emergency response times. However, tunnels represent a harsh
environment for conventional fire detection systems.
II RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
Build on current research to identify effective fire detection systems for tunnel
applications and develop performance and installation criteria (eg spacing). A particular
focus for the research is quick response smoke detection and dual purpose CCTV
systems.
III BUDGET AND POTENTIAL CO-FUNDING SOURCES - $350,000;

detection system manufacturers
RP3. Effective Fire Suppression
I RESEARCH PROBLEM
Suppression is an effective strategy to minimize the impact of fires on roadway tunnels.
There is worldwide controversy regarding the appropriate design approach to fire
suppression and its impact on and integration with fire fighting operations.
To explore the effectiveness of deluge and water mist suppression systems on selected
design fires. The influence of activation time and ventilation should be explored as
should impacts on tunnel tenability. A comprehensive literature review on recent
worldwide research as well as full scale testing should be undertaken.
III BUDGET AND POTENTIAL CO-FUNDING SOURCES - $1,500,000, fire

suppression system manufacturers
RP4. Fire and Smoke Ventilation System Design Methods
I RESEARCH PROBLEM
Ventilation system design for roadway tunnels may be governed by the fire condition;
current design bases are prescriptive in nature
Develop a design method for ventilation systems which is based on critical velocity and
accounts for the impact of sensor type and location
5
III BUDGET AND POTENTIAL CO-FUNDING SOURCES - $350,000, sensor
manufacturers
RP5. Performance of Structural Materials in Tunnels in Fire Incidents
I RESEARCH PROBLEM
Tunnels represent a unique and extreme environment for construction materials which
compromises their performance in fire conditions
Study the impact of tunnel environments (moisture, design loads, configuration) on the
response of concrete and fire proofing materials in fire incidents. Spalling and stability
should be explored.
III BUDGET AND POTENTIAL CO-FUNDING SOURCES - $250,000 –

concrete and fire proofing material manufacturers
RP6. Guidelines for Tunnel Geometric Design for Fire Safety
I RESEARCH PROBLEM
Tunnel geometry has an impact on the impact of fire incidents in tunnels and should
trigger when fire safety systems are required.
Develop guidelines for accident prevention (sight distance, curve radius, shoulder/curb
design) to minimize fire incidence. Develop criteria based on tunnel length, traffic
volume and type to trigger fire safety provisions.
III BUDGET AND POTENTIAL CO-FUNDING SOURCES - $250,000
RP7. Develop Requirements for Egress and Emergency Signage
I RESEARCH PROBLEM
Recent worldwide research and applications have developed a significant body of
information on effective egress and emergency signage.
Collect information and develop standards for emergency egress and traffic control
signage for tunnels to include the concept of LED lighting for vehicle spacing, egress
signage location, etc.
6
RP8. Application of ITS to Emergency Operations in Tunnels
I RESEARCH PROBLEM
ITS provides the technology to integrate driver behavior with emergency operations
Develop guidelines for the use of ITS to guide tunnel drivers toward safe vehicle spacing,
emergency closure procedures, and other safe behaviors in road tunnel fire incidents
RP9. Design Basis for Egress Systems
I RESEARCH PROBLEM
Human behavior in emergency situations is critical to the design of egress systems.
European studies may not be directly relevant to the performance of the U.S. population.
To investigate aspects of egress behavior of the U.S. population to provide an informed
basis for egress design. Issues such as panic response, walking speeds, and attachment to
vehicles should be explored
RP10. Tunnel Operations and First Responders
I RESEARCH PROBLEM
First responders are a critical element in the overall response to fire incidents in tunnels.
Tunnel operators need guidance to integrate emergency response into their emergency
planning procedures.
Develop operating protocols for tunnel operators for emergency conditions to include the
roles for and communications between fire responders. Aspects such as ventilation
control, power loss, and response time, and driver behavior scenarios, should be explored
III BUDGET AND POTENTIAL CO-FUNDING SOURCES - $500,000, U.S.

Fire Administration
RP11. Training and Education
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I RESEARCH PROBLEM
The behavior of truck and passenger vehicle drivers can have a major impact on the
consequence of a fire event in a tunnel
Develop targeted training materials for safe behaviors for car and truck drivers. This
should include a formal assessment of the impact of leaflet type education; research on
new education and training methods; and formal training programs for truck drivers,
enforced as a condition of license renewal.
III BUDGET AND POTENTIAL CO-FUNDING SOURCES - $350,000, AAA
RP12. Benchmarking Tunnel Incidents
I RESEARCH PROBLEM
A comprehensive understanding of tunnel fire problem is necessary to determine the
allocation of resources and target appropriate research and design guidance.
To develop and implement a process to benchmark fire incidents in U.S. tunnels. This
should include an upgrade of the domestic tunnel scan; a study of near miss accidents in
tunnels; a continuation of the international technical exchange, in particular to Asian
countries; and development of a database of lessons learned.
LIST OF APPENDIX MATERIAL
Appendix A – Workshop Materials

Workshop Agenda
Workshop Participants
Speaker Biographies
Speaker Presentations
Research Needs Identified by Participants and Speakers Prior to Workshop
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Appendix A
Workshop Materials
Workshop on Safety and Security in Roadway Tunnels
Meeting of the National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP)
Project Panel 20-7 Task 230, Safety and Security in Roadway Tunnels: Research for the T-20 Technical
Committee on Tunnels, American Association of State Highway & Transportation Officials (AASHTO)
November 28-29, 2007

The Arnold and Mabel Beckman Center
of the National Academies of Sciences and Engineering
Irvine, California
Please note: Business casual attire is strongly encouraged.
FINAL AGENDA
Presiding: Harry Capers, Chair, NCHRP Project Panel 20-7 Task 230
Wednesday, November 28, 2007
7:45 Gather in hotel lobby to carpool to the Beckman Conference Center.

Maps are available at the hotel front desk.
Beckman Conference Center

National Academies of Sciences & Engineering
100 Academy, Irvine, CA 92617
8:00 Buffet breakfast (provided to all meeting participants—Beckman Conference Center)

Registration (Beckman Conference Center)
9:00 Welcome/Introductions/Workshop Charge

Harry Capers, Chair, NCHRP Panel 20-7 Task 230
AASHTO/FHWA International Scan on Underground Transportation Systems Safety and

Security – Summary and Critical Issues
Steve Ernst, Federal Highway Administration
NCHRP Report 525, Vol. 12 / Transit Cooperative Research Program Report 86, Vol. 12:
Making Transportation Tunnels Safe and Secure – Research Needs
Chris Hawkins, PB Americas, Inc.
10:00 Break
10:30 Way Finding, Signage and Human Behavior

Gunnar Jenssen, SINTEF, Norwegian Fire Research Laboratory
Fire Growth and Heat Release in Tunnel Incidents

Haukur Ingason, SP, Swedish National Testing and Research Institute
500 Fifth Street, NW Phone (202) 334-2934
Washington, DC 20001 Fax (202) 334-2003
www.TRB.org
12:30 Lunch Buffet (provided to all meeting participants)
13:30 Incident Detection and Tunnel Ventilation

Peter - Johann Sturm, Graz University of Technology, Austria
14:30 Break
15:30 Risk Management and Safety Concepts for the Oresund Link Immersed Tunnel
Mikael Braestrup, Ramboll, Denmark
16:30 Panel Discussion – Research Needs
17:30 Hosted Reception and Dinner (provided to all meeting participants)
Thursday, November 29, 2007
7:15 Gather in hotel lobby to carpool to the Beckman Center.

Maps are available at the hotel front desk.
Beckman Conference Center

National Academies of Sciences & Engineering
100 Academy, Irvine, CA 92617
7:30 Buffet breakfast (provided to all meeting participants—Beckman Conference Center)

Registration (Beckman Conference Center)
8:30 Guidelines and Standards for Roadway Tunnel Safety

William Connell, PB Americas, Inc.
9:30 Panel Discussion – Needed Guidelines
10:30 Break
11:00 Summary of Research Needs

Kathleen Almand, Fire Protection Research Foundation
11:30 Concluding Comments, Next Steps for AASHTO Technical Committees

Harry Capers, Chair, NCHRP Panel 20-7 Task 230
12:00 Lunch Buffet (provided to all participants)
13:00 Adjourn
NCHRP Workshop on Safety and Security in Roadway Tunnels, November 28, 29, 2007
Attendees
Kathleen Almand The Fire Protection Research Foundation kalmand@nfpa.org
Moe Amini Caltrans moe_amini@dot.ca.gov
Randy Anderson Caltrans randy_anderson@dot.ca.gov
Melissa Avila Tyco Fire and Building Products Melissa.Avila@tycofp.com
Alexander Bardow Massachusetts Highway Department alexander.bardow@mhd.state.ma.us
Mikael Braestrup Ramboll mwb@ramboll.dk
Harry Capers Arora and Associates, P.C. hcapers@arorapc.com
Robert Carasitti Schirmer Engineering Corporation bob_carasitti@schirmereng.com
Hugh Caspe HNTB Corp. hcaspe@hntb.com
Sean Cassady HNTB Corporation scassady@hntb.com
Nick Chen Jacobs Engineering nick.chen@jacobs.com
Sunghoon Choi PB Americas, Inc. chois@pbworld.com
William Connell PB Americas Inc. connellw@pbworld.com
Rhonda Cruz City of Coronado rcruz@coronado.ca.us
William Davis National Institute of Standards & Technology william.davis@nist.gov
Robert DiAngelo U.S. Army Corps of Engineers robert.m.diangelo@usace.army.mil
Rachel Diaz National Cooperative Highway Research Program rdiaz@nas.edu
Arnold Dix Counsel at Law counsel@arnolddix.com
Donald Dwyer NYSDOT Geotechnical Engineering Bureau ddwyer@dot.state.ny.us
Gary English Seattle Fire Department gary.english@seattle.gov
Steven Ernst Federal Highway Administration steve.ernst@fhwa.dot.gov
Helmut Ernst Massachusetts Turnpike Authority helmut.ernst@masspike.com
Jason Gamache National Fire Protection Association jgamache@nfpa.org
Enzo Gardin NRC Institute for Research in Construction enzo.gardin@nrc.gc.ca
Daniel Gemeny Rolf Jensen & Associates, Inc. dgemeny@rjagroup.com
Hossein Ghara Louisiana Department of Transportation hosseinghara@dotd.la.gov
Daniel Gottuk Hughes Associates, Inc. dgottuk@haifire.com
NCHRP Workshop on Safety and Security in Roadway Tunnels, November 28, 29, 2007
Attendees
Chris Hawkins PB Americas Inc. hawkins@pbworld.com

Jeremy Hung PB Americas Inc. hung@pbworld.com
Haukur Ingason SP Swedish National Testing & Research Institute haukur.ingason@sp.se
Alex Izett Kicking Horse Canyon Project alex.izett@uma.aecom.com
Jon Jensen Kicking Horse Canyon Project starla.weigel@gov.bc.ca
Gunnar Jenssen SINTEF gunnar.d.jenssen@sintef.no
Bruce Johnson Oregon Department of Transportation bruce.v.johnson@odot.state.or.us
Jugesh Kapur Washington State Department of Transportation kapurju@wsdot.wa.gov
Ahmed Kashef National Research Council of Canada ahmed.kashef@nrc.gc.ca
Paul Liles Georgia Department of Transportation paul.liles@dot.state.ga.us
Adrian Lloyd MicroPack Detection (Americas) LLC AdrianLloyd@micropackamericas.com
Igor Maevski Jacobs Engineering igor.maevski@jacobs.com
Stephen Maher The National Academy of Sciences SMAHER@nas.edu
James Murphy Massachusetts Turnpike Authority james.murphy@masspike.com
Prasad Nallapaneni Virginia Department of Transportation Prasad.Nallapaneni@VDOT.Virginia.gov
David Newman Hatch Mott MacDonald David.Newman@hatchmott.com
Barton Newton Caltrans barton_newton@dot.ca.gov
Thomas Ostrom Caltrans tom.ostrom@dot.ca.gov
Dharam Pal Port Authority of New York and New Jersey dpal@panynj.gov
Shyan-Yung Pan Federal Highway Administration shyanyung@yahoo.com
Stephan Parker National Cooperative Highway Research Program saparker@nas.edu
Brian Pearson
Mary Lou Ralls Ralls Newman, LLC ralls-newman@sbcglobal.net
Kelley Rehm AASHTO krehm@aashto.org
Jesus Rohena Federal Highway Administration Jesus.Rohena@fhwa.dot.gov
NCHRP Workshop on Safety and Security in Roadway Tunnels , November 28, 29, 2007
Attendees
Blake Rothfuss Jacobs Associates rothfuss@jacobssf.com

Henry Russell Parsons Brinkerhoff Quade & Douglas Inc russell@pbworld.com
Louis Ruzzi Pennsylvania Department of Transportation lruzzi@state.pa.us
Michael Salamon Colorado Department of Transportation michael.salamon@dot.state.co.us
Albert Samano TRC Corporation asamano@trcsolutions.com
Peter-Johann Sturm Graz University of Technology sturm@vkmb.tugraz.at
Kevin Thompson Caltrans kevin.thompson@dot.ca.gov
Ed Walton
Nate Wittasek ArupFire nate.wittasek@arup.com
Brian Zelenko URS Corporation brian_zelenko@urscorp.com
Daniel Zerga ILF Consultants Inc. dzerga@ilfoak.com
Research Needs
Identified by Presenters and Participants
Research Needs Identified by Presenters (to date)
Design Fires
Explore fire growth rate as an appropriate design basis
Fire and Incident Detection

Develop a program to encourage development of more effective fire detection systems
Evaluate the effectiveness of current fire detection systems
Develop more effective broad based detection systems
Develop effective automatic incident detection systems and intelligent video
Explore one-button emergency response and automated sensor systems
Fire Suppression
Evaluate the effectiveness of current tunnel fire suppression systems
Develop a program to encourage development of more effective fire suppression systems
Ventilation Systems
Develop advanced coordinated control schemes for ventilation systems
Explore factors (geometric) affecting ventilation in tunnels and hence fan installation
design
Develop means to reliably measure and thus control air velocity
Develop appropriate guidelines for inspection and testing of velocity sensors.
Structural Performance
Evaluate fire effects
Develop ground improvement retrofitting schemes
Blast Effects
Conduct structural blast damage potential analyses
General Design Issues

Develop design criteria for new tunnels
Develop AASHTO tunnel guidelines
Identify retrofit technologies to enhance safety
Build test tunnels or models
Develop design criteria to promote optimal driver/user performance and response to
incidents
Develop information systems for safety systems installation – car to car communication,
in-vehicle information, area specific ACC
Egress and Human Factors

Develop intelligent egress systems
Develop escape route signs that are universal and consistent – visual, audible, tactile
Explore LED Lighting for edge delineation and safe vehicle distance
Carry out evacuation studies for various emergency scenarios and apply a risk approach
Use transport modeling to simulate evacuation
Research Needs Identified by Presenters (to date), cont’d
Operation Protocols/First Response

Develop a best practices manual
Identify changes in operation protocols to enhance safety/security
Develop a set of sample emergency response procedures
Develop a tunnel specific inspection manual
Develop guidelines for vehicle inspections
Develop tunnel emergency management guidelines that incorporate human factors
considerations
Develop risk management approaches for tunnel safety inspection and maintenance
Incorporate contingency planning into emergency management approaches
Training and Education

Develop education programs for motorist response to tunnel incidents
Develop programs to educate and inform drivers of varying language, culture, disabilities
Other
Study of past tunnel accidents and incidents
Collaborate with international research initiatives
Research Needs Identified By Participants
Design Fires
Ventilation Effects
Design fires – cargo types and associated heat release
Ventilation effects on fire size
Toxic gas production and associated ventilation design
Design fires for today’s vehicles in tunnels, effects of ventilation and geometry
Realistic design fires for today’s vehicles set in a probabilistic framework

Real time digital recording system for all tunnel and perimeter cameras
Detection and response time for design fires
Effective automatic traffic incident and fire detection systems
Assessment methods for fire detection to include wind and obstacle effects
Effectiveness of linear heat detection for fire incidents
Smoke and flame detection technologies for tunnels
Tunnel fire and smoke detection
Fire Suppression
Tunnel hazard management with fixed fire suppression systems – hazards, design criteria,
including shielded fires
Performance standards for fixed fire suppression in tunnels
Interaction of fixed fire suppression systems with tunnel ventilation
Risk based sprinkler requirements
Effectiveness of water mist systems for very large fires from heavy good vehicles
Effectiveness of deluge suppression systems for fire control
Structural Performance
Tunnel lining performance in extreme loading conditions (eg heat and blast)
Thermal protection of concrete ceilings, supports, and cables
Design criteria for tunnel liners and other structural elements
Blast Effects
Internal blast and its impacts on tunnels
Blast and explosion protection modeling, materials assessment, design, field testing,
detection, and protection measures against progressive collapse
General Design Issues

Risk analysis procedures and selection criteria for target reliability levels, including
structural components and systems consistent with the AASHTO LRFD code
Physical modeling of safety and security aspects
Slope and drainage design for flammable liquid pool fires
Bold type: More detail provided by participant

Research Needs As Identified by Participants, cont’d
Egress and Human Factors

Human factors during self or limited assisted evacuation
Evacuation
Egress symbols for tunnels
Effective alarm notification to vehicle occupants
Exit spacing in tunnels related to design fires
Human reaction time relative to notification
Emergency egress signage in tunnels
Operation Protocols to Enhance Fire Safety/First Response

Overall fire safety planning
Island perimeter security
Effective pubic communication techniques on tunnel safety procedures
Safety and security protocols for tunnel operators – access control, monitoring, and
training of maintenance personnel and first responders
Tunnel hazard assessment for firefighters and first responders
Integrating tunnel safety and security systems with emergency preparedness –
plans, procedures, training
Tunnel security procedures for both terrorist related incidents and accidental fire or
explosion
Other Issues
Safe tunnel portal design factors (related to debris)
Adverse wind effects for jet fan design
Geometric design criteria for tunnels of variable length (alignment and collision
issues)
Detailed Research Needs Statements Provided by Participants
Name: Henry A. Russell Jr.
Title/Affiliation: Vice President, Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas Inc.,
Chairmen of the International Tunneling Association’s(ITA)
Working Group 6 Repair and Maintenance of Underground
Structures
Email: Russell@Pbworld.com
Research Objective: Development of standardized safety and security protocols for

tunnel operators
Brief Description of Proposed Research:

Tunnels in the U.S were all built prior to our concerns about terrorism. In many
cases the security measures utilized within the tunnels are antiquated and the use of state-
of-the-art devices for detection if intruders and the identification of authorized personnel
is for the most part inadequate. There needs to be attention made to have specific
guidelines (protocols) adopted for the access procedures to tunnels and secure areas, and
identification of personnel as well as monitoring systems for detection of chemical,
biological and explosive devices and procedures on how to deal with each type of threat.
Standardized Protocols need to be established for the response to events and training
needs identified for first responders. The development of these protocols would need the
close cooperation of NFPA, AASHTO and FHWA in order to be effective and the
development of these protocols and the training of operational personnel a requirement
for federal funding.
Name: Ahmed Kashef
Title/Affiliation: Senior Research Officer, National Research Council of Canada
Email: Ahmed.Kashef@nrc.gc.ca
Title: Design Fires in Road Tunnels
Research Objective: The objectives of the proposed research are to:
• Investigate passenger vehicle fires in road tunnels;

• Determine the effects of various ventilation conditions, tunnel geometry
and environment on vehicle fire characteristics; and,
• Provide technical data for developing design fire scenarios of passenger
vehicles for use in developing fire safety guidelines, emergency and risk
management tools for evaluating/selecting tunnel safety systems, as well
as for verifying computer models used for tunnel fire safety designs.

The proposed research will be conducted using both full-scale laboratory fire tests
and computer modeling. The main tasks to achieve the objectives of the study
are:
• Collect and analyze statistical data of fire incidents in road tunnels over
the last decade;
• Collect and analyze existing data from full-scale fire tests in road tunnels
over the last decade;
• Select and develop appropriate fire scenarios for full-scale fire tests;
• Conduct full-scale laboratory tunnel fire tests involving passenger vehicle
fires;
• Conduct computational modeling as a basis to extend the experimental
data and investigate the effect of tunnel geometry and different ventilation
schemes on vehicle fire characteristics; and
• Develop design fire scenarios for tunnel applications.
Name: Blake Rothfuss
Title/Affiliation: Associate/Jacobs Associates
Email: rothfuss@jacombsssf.com
Title: Tunnel Hazard Assessments For Firefighter And First Responders

When vehicle fires occur in tunnels, firefighting and rescue risks sky rocket.
Depending upon the amount of energy released and its duration, tunnel linings will
deteriorate in a variety of ways. Firefighters should have an established fire attack plan for
tunnel fires which includes structural hazard assessment, geotechnical hazard assessment,
deep penetration operations, additional ventilation requirements, as well as the firefighting
difficulties of working a fire within a tunnel.
Name: Daniel Gottuk, PHD, P.E.
Title/Affiliation: Senior Engineer – Hughes Associates, Inc.
Email: dgottuk@haifire.com
Title: FDS Modeling of Very Large HGV Fires in Tunnels Interacting

With Water Mist Fire Suppression Systems
Research Objective: Improve the understanding of very large fires in tunnels so that
performance expectations and design criteria can be established
for water based suppression systems in tunnels.

Recent fire catastrophes in highway tunnels in Europe have increased pressure on
tunnel agencies to improve fire safety in tunnels. Active fire suppression systems
involving water sprays have been shown to drastically reduce temperatures, limit the
thermal damage to the tunnel, and prevent fire propagation beyond the vehicles of origin.
Improved thermal conditions and reduced fire spread have major benefits for both life
safety and property protection. Full-scale fire testing is used to confirm performance and
establish design criteria for suppression systems. The fire test programs involve large
heavy goods vehicle (HGV) fires. The experience of the fire testing community,
however, is largely based on moderate scale fire tests. Even for moderate scale fires (e.g.
5 to 10 MW) it is difficult to obtain a high degree of repeatability. For very large fires of
the scale used in testing tunnel fire suppression systems, e.g. 50 to 100MW, the
variability of the fires is significantly greater than with smaller scale fires. It is a
challenge to define fire performance measures that realistically evaluate the benefit of the
suppression system in terms that can be measured with any repeatability. Performance
criteria may be set by authorities who assume the fire behaves in a repeatable and logical
manner. The reality of the highly turbulent conditions of a tunnel fire is such that
unanticipated conditions arise that are, it seems, not logical. The apparent illogic may be
explained easily, however, when the dynamics of the turbulent fire are better understood.
Research is needed to analyze existing fire test data, combined with computational fluid
dynamics (CFD) modeling, to assist in understanding the complex dynamics of very large
fires in tunnels. The challenge is to develop and validate FDS to simulate the heat release
rate, flame spread rate, flame height or length, and the heat flux per unit area of very
large fires in tunnels while interacting with finely atomized water sprays. A validated
FDS HGV model will assist in developing global performance criteria for suppression
systems that are not tied to single point measurements of temperature and inappropriate
assumptions about conditions in around the fire. Validated tunnel fire models will also
permit study of the probable performance of suppression systems in tunnels of different
shape, height, width and ventilation features than the limited number of tunnels used for
fire testing. A validated tunnel fire model will also benefit the design of tunnel ventilation
systems for extreme conditions.
Name: Andrzej S. Nowak
Title/Affiliation: Professor, University of Nebraska
Email: anowak2@unl.edu
Title: Risk Mitigation for Tunnel Systems
Research Objective: Development of risk analysis procedures for tunnels and selection
criteria for the target reliability levels for tunnels, including structural components and
systems.

The research plan will include:
Development of efficient risk analysis procedures that can be used for the assessment of
the actual risk in tunnel structures. The focus will be on the approach at the system level,
using system reliability methods. The work will involve the formulation of limit state
functions, identification of basic parameters, and, in many cases, the development of
advanced procedures for non-linear analysis of structural behavior. A statistical database
will be established for the parameters that determine the performance of the considered
structures. The needs for additional statistical data will be formulated. The procedures
will allow for the development of lifetime reliability profiles, and methodology for
prediction of the remaining life for the considered tunnel structures.
Development of procedures for the selection of rational acceptability criteria for risk, or
the target reliability levels. The approach will be based on the analysis of consequences
of failure to perform as expected and economic analysis (costs). This will be a very
important contribution of the proposed research effort as this is where there is a great
need. The acceptable risk, or target reliability level, can be different depending on
exposure of human life and importance of the tunnel, and the acceptable risk will affect
the structural considerations (selection of the structural systems, components, and
materials).
Development of implementation strategy for risk control to keep risk within acceptable
levels. The format will be consistent with the LRFD
AASHTO Code. The developed reliability analysis procedures will be applied to assess
the risk associated with the selected tunnel systems designed according to the current
AASHTO. The computations will require a statistical database. The results will be
compared with the selected target reliability levels to determine if the current situation
requires changes. The risk control procedures will e developed to ensure that the risk is
at an acceptable level. Sensitivity analysis will be carried out relating the reliability and
various design and other parameters. The sensitivity analysis can require the
development and use of advanced non-linear structural analysis methods.
Name: Sean Cassady
Title/Affiliation: Senior Engineer – HNTB Corporation
Email: scassady@hntb.com
Title: Tunnel Hazard Management with Fixed Fire Suppression Systems
Research Objective: Develop data set of hazard conditions. Identify FFS design
elements and criteria that are most effective at reducing fire
hazards for exposed and shielded fires.

• Full scale testing of several different fire configurations within tunnels, liquid fuel
pool, HGV, shielded pool, shielded HGV.
• Temperature, humidity and radiation measurements of air. Temperature
measurements at wall (energy flux also), smoke layer observations.
• Air velocity measurements.
• Fixed fire suppression systems would include overhead std. drop (OSD) water
sprinklers, OSD low exp. foam, oscillating monitor.
• Investigate ventilation system operation to degrade effectiveness of suppression
system.
Name: Igor Maevski
Title/Affiliation: Jacobs Fellow, Tunnel Ventilation Principal
Email: igor.maevski@jacobs.com
Title: Interaction of Fixed Fire Suppression Systems with Tunnel

Ventilation
Research Objective: To find out the efficiency of the fixed fire suppression system
when ventilation system activated.

Most of the long road tunnels are equipped with tunnel ventilation systems that
should operate in fire emergency to control smoke. The longitudinal airflow, created by
fans, will interfere and blow away water particles from the fixed fire suppression system.
The research should focus on recommendations for the design of the fixed fire
suppression system to make it efficient for fire fighting.
Name: Ian Ong
Title/Affiliation: Senior Project Engineer
Email: ian.ong@hatchmott.com
Title: Wind Effects for Jet Fan Design
Research Objective: Develop global/national standard for adverse wind conditions.

We have numerous projects where we have stumbled due to the community-wide
uncertainties associated with defining external wind conditions. ASHRAE and other
technical publications provide prevailing wind speeds and directions, however these
numbers are consistently challenged. The aim of this research initiative would be to
create a path forward to develop a workable standard.
Name: Robert Carasitti
Title/Affiliation: Schirmer Engineering – Massachusetts Stem to Stern Review
Team
Email: bob_carasitti@schirmereng.com
Title: Design Fire Study
Research Objective: Establish realistic design fire scenarios.

Research needs to be done that entails full scale testing of modern vehicles
coupled with a study of probabilistic events. For example, full scale tests of
ordinary/typical transportation vehicles, cargo and arrangement need to be performed to
determine what fire sizes can be expected. In conjunction with testing, a separate
probabilistic study must be performed to look at the likely scenarios of multiple vehicle
incidents.
Name: Wern-Ping (Nick) Chen
Title/Affiliation: Vice President; Tunnel Design Principal
Email: nick.chen@jacobs.com
Title: Internal Blast and its Impacts to Tunnels
Research Objective: Data collection for blasting in underground confined space.

Blast data for airblast is clear from several Army/Navy research programs. Most
of the blasting curves for design are based on actual tests; however, underground
confined blast data does not exist, or is not popular or available. The purpose of this
research will fill the gap.
Name: Albert Samano III
Title/Affiliation: Vice President Security and Emergency Preparedness/Consultant
Email: asamano@trcsolutions.com
Title: Integrating Tunnel Safety and Security Systems with Emergency

Preparedness
Research Objective: Identify the programmatic linkages between tunnel safety and
security systems and emergency preparedness elements such as
plans, procedures, training and exercises.

Research and tunnel emergency preparedness programs in the US and overseas
that addresses both the tunnel safety and security systems and the emergency
preparedness programs that result in an integrated solution involving security and safety
systems along with the emergency operations plans, procedures, public info, training and
exercises for tunnel operations personnel and emergency responders.
Name: Thomas Zimmie
Title/Affiliation: Professor and Acting Head, Civil and Env. Engineering Dept., RPI
Email: zimmit@rpi.edu
Title: Physical Modeling of Safety and Security Aspects
Research Objective: To improve the safety and security of tunnels by validating and
calibrating procedures, retrofitting schemes, damage, etc.

Utilize geotechnical centrifuge modeling (physical modeling) to investigate
various aspects of tunnel safety and security. The physical models allow one to
investigate conditions that cannot be tested full scale. For example, blast damage,
retrofitting schemes, damage assessment, total failure, etc. The models allow the
calibration and validation of computer models, which can also be utilized for design
purposes. Utilizing RPI’s geotechnical centrifuge, we have done and are doing this type
of research now for governmental agencies. (I would be happy to do a presentation at the
workshop on centrifuge modeling.)
Name: Alex Izett
Title/Affiliation: Project Manger, Kicking Horse Canyon Project
Email: alex.izett@uma.aecom.com
Title: Geometric Design Criteria for Tunnels of Variable Length
Research Objective: To establish design guidelines for geometric engineers involved

with designing highway alignments for short, moderate and long
length tunnels.

There is a wealth of geometric design guidance available to the highway design
engineer to assist in the development of highways in an open-air environment, including
design guidance for highways on grade and on structures. However, there is very little
published information available to the geometric designer to assist in the selection of
appropriate alignment and cross-section elements in a tunnel environment. With all of the
excellent efforts put forward to defining appropriate and necessary tunnel fire, life and
safety elements, it may also be appropriate to develop geometric design guidelines, in
particular focusing on:
- horizontal alignment through a tunnel in the context of the highway’s alignment
on the approaches to a tunnel;
- vertical alignment through a tunnel, and in particular its effect on commercial
vehicle and bus speeds;
- horizontal alignment and vertical alignment coordination;
- appropriate cross-sectional area, in particular the appropriateness of carrying the
outside and inside shoulder width from outside of the tunnel through the tunnel;
- appropriate sight distance, given that the tunnel walls are an obstruction, and how
this should be considered in the selection of appropriate horizontal alignment and
cross-section;
- appropriate collision modification factors to be used in the evaluation of safety of
a tunnel alignment versus an alternative surface alignment.
Name: Melissa Avila
Title/Affiliation: Project Engineer/Tyco Fire and Building Products
Email: Melissa.Avila@tycofp.com
Title: Development of Fire Suppression System Objectives in Tunnel

Standards
Research Objective: Develop performance standards for fixed fire suppression systems
in tunnels

Over the past four years, there has been a global interest in the value of fitting
fixed fire suppression systems in tunnels and several research programs have been
conducted to develop baseline data regarding the level of performance that is possible.
However, the lack of a performance standard establishing minimum life safety and asset
protection requirements for these systems has limited the ability of engineers to
incorporate these systems into the overall tunnel design in a manner that accounts for the
benefits these systems provide. Preliminary data suggests that significant potential exists
for cost reducing design tradeoffs when these systems are included, along with significant
potential for cost reductions of the suppression systems themselves if/when a competitive
environment is established. The goal of the proposed research would be to develop
minimum performance standards for tunnel fire suppression systems which could be
included in AASHTO standards, permitting independent product verification bodies (i.e.
Underwriters Laboratories) to develop system test standards and issue certifications for
systems that meet these performance requirements.
Speakers Biographies
Steve Ernst, Senior Bridge Engineer, Safety and Security

Federal Highway Administration, Highway Infrastructure, Office of Bridge
Technology
Steve Ernst is a registered professional engineer in Virginia with a BSCE from the
University of Arkansas and a BS in English from Arkansas State University. He has
worked with the Federal Highway Administration for 23 years, including 9 years as a
bridge designer with Eastern Federal Lands Highway Division and 10 years as a
structural engineer in Federal Highways’ Office of Bridge Technology. He is currently
responsible for bridge technology programs, including policies, procedures, standards and
practices related to safety and security in bridge structures engineering.
Christopher Hawkins, P.E., Senior Supervising Engineer, PB Americas, Inc.
Chris Hawkins, working as project manager and engineer, he has gained broad
experience in the design and installation of underground life safety systems and
mechanical/electrical support systems. The scope of his work includes highway tunnels,
metropolitan subway systems, railroad tunnels, and water/sewage tunnels. He has
worked on-site for major underground transportation projects in Asia, Europe and the
USA. This experience encompasses new facility work as well as the often challenging
task of rehabilitating existing tunnel facilities. He has held key positions of responsibility
during all phases of underground construction and mining, from conceptual design to
project commissioning. Chris is a graduate of West Virginia University with degrees in
Mining Engineering and a Masters in Business Administration.
Gunnar D. Jenssen, Senior Research Scientist, SINTEF Transport Safety and

Informatics
Mr. Gunnar Deinboll Jenssen obtained his M.Sc. in Psychology 1986, The University of
Trondheim (UNIT). Until 1989 Mr. Jenssen was a Research Fellow at the Institute of
Psychology (UNIT), with research on perception, hormones and learning disabilities. Mr.
Jenssen is presently a Senior Research Scientist at SINTEF Transport Safety and
Informatics and has completed the first part of his PhD on Safety effects of driver support
systems. His main field of competence is: Traffic safety, Tunnel safety human factors
analysis, road-user behaviour and driving simulation.
Haukur Ingason, Senior Research Scientist, SP Swedish National Testing and

Research Institute
Haukur Ingason has nearly twenty years of international experience in fire safety research
and engineering. He is a senior research scientist at SP Fire Technology and part time
Prof. at the Malardalen University in Sweden. He was the initiator and project leader of
the Large Scale Tests performed in Runehamar tunnel 2003.
Peter J. Sturm, Associate Professor, Graz University of Technology, Austria
Born in 1958, Dr. Sturm holds a PhD in mechanical engineering. The Habilitation was
done in the field of environmental engineering with a thesis dealing with road traffic
related air pollution. The current position is head of the section “traffic and environment”
at the Institute for Internal Combustion Engines and Thermodynamics. A major activity
is in the field of tunnel ventilation and safety, with a focus on road tunnels. He was
involved in the ventilation design for more than 100 road tunnels in Austria and all over
the world. Peter Sturm is member of the Austrian committee for the design guidelines for
tunnel ventilation and safety issues and represents Austria in PIARC technical
committees for safety, ventilation and operation of road tunnels.
Mikael W Braestrup, Senior Engineer, Ramboll
Born in 1945, Mikael W. Braestrup obtained his Ph.D. in structural engineering from the
Technical University of Denmark in 1970. During the period 1992 - 2005 he was
attached to the RAMBØLL Department of Bridges, a major assignment being the
preparation of the design basis, with the application of Eurocodes, to the 16 km Øresund
Link road and rail strait crossing between Denmark and Sweden.
Dr Braestrup is an active member of a number of international associations (IABSE, fib,
ACI), and has served on several Danish code committees. He has authored or co-authored
a substantial number of papers, reports and monographs on concrete plasticity, marine
pipelines, and bridge and tunnel projects.
William G. Connell, Mechanical Projects Manager and Assistant Vice President, PB

Americas, Inc.
Bill Connell has over 30 years of experience working on major transportation

infrastructure projects and is expert in the requirements of fire and life-safety systems for
vehicular, railway, and rapid transit tunnels including ventilation analysis and design, fire
protection and detection system applications, and emergency response coordination and
planning. Bill is also the current Chairman of the Technical Committee for NFPA
Standard 502, Road Tunnel, Bridges and Limited Access Highways.
Kathleen H. Almand, P.E., Executive Director, Fire Protection Research

Foundation
Kathleen Almand is the Executive Director of the Fire Protection Research Foundation,
an affiliate of the National Fire Protection Association. She holds a master’s degree in
civil engineering from the University of Ottawa, Canada and is a registered professional
engineer in the State of Maryland and a Fellow of the Society of Fire Protection
Engineers. Prior to joining FPRF in 2004, Kathleen was the Executive Director of the
Society of Fire Protection Engineers and held research and management positions with
the Civil Engineering Research Foundation, the American Iron and Steel Institute, and
the National Academy of Sciences.
Safety and Security
in Roadway Tunnels UTS TEAM MEMBERS
FHWA: State DOTs:
International Scan on Underground • Steve Ernst, Co-
Co-Chair • M.G. Patel, Co-
Co-Chair, PA
Transportation Systems in Europe • Jesus Rohena • Harry Capers, NJ
• Gary Jakovich • Don Dwyer, NY
Safety, Operations, and Emergency Response • Wayne Lupton,
Lupton, CO
Bay Area Rapid Transit
November 28, 2007 District (BART): Industry:
Steve Ernst • Chris Hawkins, Consultant
Federal Highway Administration • Tom Margro,
Margro, General
Manager, CA Tunnel Design Engineer,
NY
International Technology Scanning Program Massachusetts Turnpike • Mary Lou Ralls,
Authority (MTA): Report Facilitator, TX
NCHRP • Mike Swanson, Chief
National Cooperative
Operating Officer, MA Contractor: John O’Neill, ATI
Federal Highway Administration
American Association of State
Highway and Transportation Officials Highway Research Program (rep: IBTTA)
SCAN COUNTRIES UTS Scan Locations Visited

Yellow – countries visited
Blue – representatives from
Countries visited: Also meeting with us these countries joined
were experts from: the meetings
Norway
The Netherlands
Denmark
Germany
Sweden
Italy
France
Rome
Austria
Switzerland
September 23 – October 9, 2005
September 23 – October 9, 2005
I-5 Tunnel Fire

California 2007
1
UTS – Safety, Operations
& Emergency Response Focus
Tunnel Systems and Designs
Modes • Fire and blast protection and response, refuge
areas, evacuation planning and passages
• Highway tunnels
• Passenger rail tunnels Arrangements of Components
• Freight rail tunnels • Maximize effectiveness, assure inspectability
and maintainability, promote cost savings
Focus, cont’d. Focus, cont’d.

Tunnel Operations Safety and Security Aspects
• Incident detection and deterrent technology
• Incident response and recovery planning • Planning approaches
• Standards
Specialized Technologies and Standards
• Manpower roles and responsibilities
• Monitoring or inspecting structural elements
• Operating equipment to ensure optimal • Communication techniques
performance • State-
State-of-
of-the-
the-art products and equipment
• Minimize downtime during maintenance or
rehabilitation • Education for users
Gotthard Tunnel Fire on October 24, 2001

Findings
34 technologies of interest
– 9 for further consideration
Key:
• Innovative design and emergency
management
• Used for both natural and man-
man-made
disasters
2
Visual
Audible
Findings - 1 Tactile
Escape Route Signs that are Universal and
Consistent – Visual, Audible, Tactile
• Widespread uniformity promotes understanding.

• In an incident, confusion is minimized.
• Use of combined senses (visual, audible, tactile)
increases effectiveness.
• U.S - National Fire Protection Association codes
should include human factors considerations.
Escape Route
and Signage
Universal and
Consistent Signs
in Mont Blanc Tunnel
Universal and Consistent Signs
Findings - 2
Guidelines for Existing and New Tunnels
• Need AASHTO tunnel guidelines

– Planning, design, construction, maintenance,
inspection, and operations
Note: AASHTO Subcommittee on Bridges and Structures

created Technical Committee for Tunnels, T-
T-20
Issues to consider: Emergency pull-out areas and variable message signs
3
Findings - 3
Tunnel Emergency Management Guidelines
- Human Factors
• Behavior hard to predict during emergency.
• People are their own first rescuers.
• People must react correctly and quickly.
• Guidelines must account for this human behavior.
• Guidelines should be included in tunnel planning,
Issues to consider: Refuge room requirements design, and emergency response.
Tunnel Ventilation Findings - 4

Education for Motorist Response to Tunnel
Incidents
• Self-
Self-rescue is best first response in tunnel
incident.
• It is important to react quickly and correctly.
• Motorists are not clear on needed action.
Findings - 5 Findings - 6
Automatic Incident Detection Systems Design Criteria to Promote Optimal
Driver/ User Performance and Response
& Intelligent Video
to Incidents
• Automatically detects, tracks, and records
incidents.* • Designers - be aware of ways to minimize
• Tells operator to observe event in question. fire and traffic safety hazards
• Allows operator to take appropriate action. • Evaluate materials and design details
* This concept can also be applied to detect other activities and
incidents in areas besides tunnels, from terrorist activities to
accidents, vandalism and other crimes, fires, vehicle breakdowns,
breakdowns,
etc.
4
A86 East Uniform &
Tunnel Consistent Signs
Emergency
alcoves &
shelters
every
656 feet
One-way
Traffic
on Each
Level Independent
Ventilation
at each level Full-size Model of One Section of Paris A-86 Motorway Twin Tube
Findings - 7
One-
One-Button Emergency Response &
Automated Sensor Systems
• To “Take action immediately!”
immediately!” the operator
must initiate several actions simultaneously.
• “Press one button”
button”
– Initiates several critical actions
– Eliminates operator chance to omit important step Several actions are initiated
or perform action out of order by moving a yellow line over
the area of a fire incident
• Automated sensor systems are helpful in
determining response, e.g., opacity sensors.
Mont Blanc Tunnel Fire Fighting Truck
5
Findings - 8 Findings - 9
Risk-
Risk-Management for Tunnel Safety Light-
Light-Emitting Diode (LED) Lighting for
Inspection & Maintenance Edge Delineation & Safe Vehicle Distance
• European use of risk-

risk-based methodologies for • Lights identify edge of roadway
– Safety inspection time and frequency
– Maintenance/rehabilitation scope and timing • Blue lights identify safe vehicle spacing
– Blue lights are spaced among the edge delineation

• Inspect less-
less-critical or more-
more-durable portions
of system less frequently and concentrate lights
inspections on more critical or fragile – More reliable than speed-
speed-based guidelines
components.
LED Lights on Outside Roadway Edges LED Lights for Edge Delineation and
in Grilstad Tunnel in Norway Vehicle Spacing in Mont Blanc Tunnel
Thank You
NCHRP International Technology

Scanning Program
6
Report 525, Vol. 12
“Making Transportation Tunnels Safe and Secure”
NCHRP Project 20-

20-67, FY 2005 Highway, rail, and transit tunnels
TCRP Project J-
J-10G, FY 2004
Defines tunnel elements: structural

and systems
Making Transportation
Tunnels Safe and Secure Identifies specific vulnerabilities
Provides a countermeasures.
Future Potential Research Issues Future Potential Research Issues

Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated
Priority Priority
Future Potential Research Schedule Cost Future Potential Research Schedule Cost
Rank Rank
(months) ($1,000) (months) ($1,000)
1 Develop a pocket-sized user guide 3 35 14 Develop design criteria for new tunnels 12 160
2 Develop a CD containing the report tables 6 60 Develop a program to encourage development of more effective fire
15 12 120
detection systems
3 Collaborate with European/Asian research programs 6 60
4 Evaluate the effects of fire on the tunnel structure 6 60 16 Develop a program to conduct interactive industry feedback workshops 6 60
5 Evaluate the effectiveness of current tunnel fire detection systems1 12 200 17 Develop an interactive electronic version of this report 18 360
6 Summarize and publish a set of “lessons learned” 6 60 18 Evaluate the effectiveness of current tunnel fire suppression systems 18 200
7 Develop a best practices manual 12 120 19 Identify retrofit technologies to enhance safety 6 60
8 Identify changes in operation protocols to enhance safety 12 120 Develop a program to encourage development of more effective fire
20 12 120
suppression systems
9 Develop a set of sample emergency response procedures 12 120
21 Develop a tunnel-specific inspection manual 12 120
Develop a program to conduct a series of interactive owner orientation
10 6 120
workshops 22 Develop advanced coordinated control schemes for ventilation systems 12 120
11 Develop more effective broad-based detection systems2 24 200 23 Build test tunnels or models 48 2,000+
12 Develop ground improvement retrofitting schemes 12 150 24 Conduct structural blast damage potential analyses 12 200
13 Develop requirements for vehicle inspections 9 90 25 Develop intelligent egress systems 24 400
1. Current research by NFPA 26 Research issues identified by case studies 0 0

2. Work being done by national labs
Design Target Model Tunnel

Has all the features needed to
protect the public and
Model Tunnel
employees.
Vs.
“Our Tunnel”
1
Model Tunnel Model Tunnel
Define the features of a Model Tunnel Designer and Inspectors
Tunnel. (The research end) Perspective:
Job used to be easier.

Then… 100 cfm/ln-ft and 120 ppm
Compare with our “Our Tunnel”, You tell me what is needed…

be it existing or in design What target to design too…
stage. (The ROI) I can design it into the tunnel.
Model Tunnel Tunnel Features – Research Areas

EuroTAP Tunnel Test 2007 EuroTAP Checklist
Tunnel Structure Weighting: 14 percent
EuroTAP has inspected 152 tunnels in 18

Lighting and power supply Weighting: 8 percent

countries over the last 3 years. Traffic control and traffic surveillance Weighting: 16 percent
Communication Weighting: 11 percent

Escape and rescue routes Weighting: 13 percent
314.7 km of tunnel tubes have been Fire protection Weighting: 18 percent
inspected.

Ventilation Weighting: 11 percent
Emergency management Weighting: 8 percent
One in five (20%) of all tunnels tested Add Security Systems. Although these often double for safety systems.
have failed the EuroTAP inspection. Note: Same descriptions used in NFPA 502
http://www.eurotestmobility.net/eurotap.php
Model Tunnel
Tunnel system Weighting: 14 percent
* Number of tubes
* Brightness of tunnel walls
* Width and layout of traffic lanes
* Geometry and layout of emergency lanes / lay-bys and emergency walkways
* Additional measures: Portal design, road surface, tunnel route
• Lighting and power supply Weighting: 8 percent
Back to the Report:

* Lighting throughout and adaptation zones
* Power and emergency power supply
• Traffic and traffic surveillance Weighting: 17 percent
* Congestion in the tunnel
* Restrictions on and/or registration of vehicles carrying hazardous goods
* Measures to close the tunnel: traffic lights, barriers, information displays
* Traffic signs
* Traffic management and control: traffic lights, variable traffic signs, signs
* Visual guidance equipment
* Video surveillance
* Automatic traffic recording and detection of congestion and incidents
* Tunnel control centre
“Making Transportation Tunnels

* Additional measures: for instance for heavy goods vehicles and automatic recognition of hazardous goods transports, height checks, speed
limits, monitoring the distance between vehicles and speed
• Communication Weighting: 11 percent
* Traffic radio
Safe and Secure”

Secure” Research
* Loudspeakers
* Emergency phones: distance, marking, insulation against traffic noise, functions
* Tunnel radio
• Escape and rescue routes Weighting: 13 percent
Recommendations.
* Evacuation lighting and escape route signs in the tunnel
* Preventing smoke from penetrating external escape routes, fire resistant doors
* Distance between emergency exits and marking
* External access and access for rescue services
* Additional measures: special lighting for emergency exits, signs showing what to do, barrier-free emergency exits
• Fire protection Weighting: 18 percent
* Fire protection on the tunnel structure
* Fire resistance of cables
* Drainage system for draining flammable and toxic liquids
* Fire alarm systems: automatic/manual
* Extinguishing systems: arrangement, signs, function
* Time to reach the tunnel, fire brigade training and equipment
* Capacity and efficiency of automatic extinguishing systems
• Ventilation Weighting: 11 percent
* Normal mode to thin out vehicle emissions
* Control of the longitudinal flow in the tunnel and consideration of this in ventilation control
* Temperature stability of facilities and equipment
* Special fire programmes
* Proof of correct functioning in fire trials and by flow measurements
*Longitudinal ventilation: airflow speed, length of the ventilation section, airflow in the direction of traffic, reversible fans.
* Transverse / semi-transverse ventilation: extraction volume flow, longitudinal flow control, opening / closing the exhaust air outlets can be
controlled
• Emergency management Weighting: 8 percent
* Regular training for tunnel control centre staff
* Maintenance plan
* Emergency response plans
* Automatic linking of emergency systems
* Measures in the case of accident or fire
* Regular emergency drills
2
Report Related Tunnel Structural
Develop a pocket-
pocket-sized user guide Evaluate the effects of fire on the tunnel
structure
Develop a CD containing the report table
Summarize and publish a set of “lessons learned”

learned” Develop ground improvement retrofitting
Develop a program to conduct a series of
schemes
interactive owner orientation workshops
Develop an interactive electronic version of this

Conduct structural blast damage potential
report analyses
Research issues identified by case studies
Develop a program to conduct interactive industry

feedback workshops
Fire Protection Fire Protection

Develop a program to encourage Evaluate the effectiveness of
development of more effective fire current tunnel fire suppression
detection systems systems
Evaluate the effectiveness of

Develop a program to encourage
current tunnel fire detection
systems (Active Research Program)
development of more effective fire
suppression systems
Develop more effective broad-
broad-
based detection systems
Develop intelligent egress systems
Emergency Management Tunnel Design

Develop advanced coordinated Develop design criteria for new
control schemes for ventilation tunnels
systems
Identify changes in operation Identify retrofit technologies to

protocols to enhance
safety/security enhance safety (for old tunnels)
Develop a set of sample Build test tunnels or models

emergency response procedures
Develop guidelines for vehicle

inspections
3
General Conclusion
Simply Put:
1. Today - Assessment of Need
Develop a best practices manual
2. Next – Perform Research
Develop a tunnel-
tunnel-specific inspection manual
Establish design criteria, specified or performance based
Collaborate with European/Asian research programs

3. Design the Tunnel
4. Repeat
4
Once the future of transport
Way Finding, Signage and
Human Factors
Gunnar D. Jenssen
Senior Research Scientist
SINTEF Transport Safety and Informatics
NCHRP Workshop on
Irvine California 28-
28-29 November 2007
Outline Changed transportation history

Introduction
State-
State-of-
of-the-
the-art
– Evacuation strategies NPRA
– UPTUN
Human behavior in tunnel fires
Human Response
– Safety, Comfort and Escape routes in long tunnels
Lessons Learnt
Misconceptions
Important Safety Factors
Signage
Minimum requirements
Research Needs
Serious lessons learnt from fires in road tunnels Mont Blanc March 24. 1999
Type of tunnel:
– Single tube, twoway traffic, evacuation rooms
Accident cause
– Smoke from a trailer, fire when it stopped (cigarette / 8% steep hill)
– Dangerous cargo? ….Butter, flour, sugar
– Long cue of vehicles, seriousness not realized
– Heat release, smoke & fire spread
Mont Blanc (France-
(France-Italy) 1999 March 24: – Engine failure?
39 persons died Result:

– 39 fatalities
Tauern (Austria) 1999 May 29 : – 2 in evac.
evac. room, all on French side
12 persons died – 4 of 10 tried to turn, but failed
– 29 dead were found in their cars, 7 outside
St. Gotthard (Switzerland) 2001 Oct. 24: – 4 rescue vehicles met the smoke, escaped through
11 persons died a ventilation pipe, 1 died
– 36 vehicles were destroyed
1
Tauern May 2. 1999 St. Gotthard October 24. 2001
Tunnel type:
– Single tube, two-
two-way traffic, evacuation rooms
Type of tunnel:
– Single tube, two-
two-way traffic, evacuation tunnel
Accident cause:
– Work in the tunnel created queue Cause of accident
– Lorry loaded with paint smashed into the queue – Collision between two heavy vehicles
– Red light at tunnel entrances neglected
– Long cue of vehicles, seriousness not realized
Result: – Motorists hesitate to leave their vehicles
– 8 died in collision, 4 died in fire
– 60 seriously ill of smoke inhalation Result:
– 40 vehicles and the tunnel roof were destroyed – 11 died,
– Some tried to turn, but the smoke was too thick
– A man seeking for documents in his car, died
– 23 vehicles destroyed,
– Roof fell down
Introduction – Longer and

Anxiety in road tunnels
deeper tunnels
Reducing travel time Accident statistics
Connecting areas versus the feeling of
together beeing insecure
Improving urban Reason for
environment discomfort/
discomfort/anxiety
Risk of land slides – Monotony
Risk of avalanches – Absence of daylight
Closed roads in – Bad air quality
winter – Unpleasant
associations in sub sea
tunnels
Prevalence of Tunnel Anxiety

Suveys – Conclusion
Road tunnels (4 Norwegian studies)
¾ Long road tunnels and sub sea tunnels
– 15 % feel unpleasant/
unpleasant/are afraid
– 20 % feel anxious (50 % female)
female) have a considerabe negative effect on
– 6-9 % negative road users feeling of comfort
– 4 % very negative
Long road tunnels (Norway
(Norway))
– 30 % find it dangerous (20 % male, 40 % female,
female, 45 % elderly)
elderly) ¾ Thus,
Thus, there is a need for making the
Sub sea tunnels
– 4-12 % negative i Norway
tunnels more safe & attractive to the road
– 38 % in Denmark are afraid,
afraid, 5 % refuces to drive through users
– Supported in Swedish Austrian and Chinese surveys
2
The Worlds Longest Road tunnel Single tube tunnels
Lærdal 24.5km, Single bore, max daily traffic volume 400
Planed escape route /roundabout
Safety, comfort
and
special lighting design
Improved Design
Increaced safety & comfort.
Visible at 2 km distance
Worlds longest road tunnel: Lærdal 24.5km long

Large rock caverns, divides tunnel into four sections
Rock caverns
Source: Per K.. Lund

Civil Architecht
MNAL
Strategies for interior design and

4 alternatives tested in a driving simulator
lighting have been a success
Alt 1:
”Basic” Norwegian Scandinavian lighting
Lighting 2001 award 2002
Alt 2:
”Water”
Alt 3:
”Rock Crystals”
Alt 4:
”Outdoor experiences”
Cavern 1 Cavern 2 Cavern 3
3
The world longest twin tube tunnel: 2 x 18 km
Qinling Zhongnanshan Tunnel, China
opened for traffic January 2007
Safety and special lighting design
Geology & Rock Mechanics
Traffic Management
Ventilation
Fire safety
Escape routes under the

road
3-D image of tunnel QZM Tunnel Management center

Courtesy IPORY
Safety measures recommended by SINTEF

Escape routes to paralell tunnel
Every 250m for pedestrians
Every 750m for vehicles
4
Breathing space in Chinese tunnel created by Norwegian artists designers
designers
tested and developed in the SINTEF driving simulator
Six rock caverns with special lighting design
Designed, placed, and stress-
stress-measured by SINTEF Rock
Mechanics and SINTEF Transport Safety and Informatics
西安 Borehole 1 Borehole 2 安康
Xi’an Ankang
Light emitting Diodes (LED) to increase comfort and

visual guidance UPTUN Human response
Seen as white with traffic flow and red if you drive against traffic
traffic
Task 3.2: Tunnel user (TNO)
Content of work:
Two driving simulator studies
Video observations of crowd movement
Evacuation in smoke
Evacuation modeling
Innovative evacuation systems
TNO driving simulator study Results

Investigate effect of EU leaflet on best behavior
• 40% left engine running

• Most people do not use the radio
• Most people did not think it was necessary to act
• Not bad, did not see panic
• Leaving vehicle improves with leaflet and operator (<100%)
First encounter traffic queue, then stop then smoke • People still need more information
1 group natural behavior
1 group read leaflet
1 group leaflet and operator voice
5
SINTEF truck driving simulator study
SINTEF truck driving simulator study
Results
How do truck drivers behave – Only 20% stopped safely before the
accident
in a tunnel fire?
– 17% stopped besides the accident
Does the EU leaflet help?
– 2 % passed at a speed of 3 km/h
(Cars 14% - 49km/h)
– 5% collision (EU leaflet!)
– No difference in risk perception
– People underestimate how far they are

inside
Evacuation study and crowd videos Evacuation study

Goal: improve evacuation models
Benelux evacuation tests (TNO, RWS)

If others do not act, people wait
If they evacuate, they may come back
Information of walking speed and waiting times in
model
Train tests (various countries, TNO)
Effect of luggage, door width and
height of stepping down
Results Stage model for Evacuation

Evacuation study UPTUN WP3 Human response
Clearly relevant, audible and visible information

that reduces both the “time in car”
car” and the
“hesitation time”
time”
Most people react and step out of their cars after
an announcement is made
People reacting after the announcement also
spend less time hesitating than those reacting
before the announcement is made
It is clear that the information provided fastens Figure 1: Three stages in peoples emergency behaviour based on observable behaviour
the evacuation process and provides a guiding Three stages in peoples emergency behaviour based on observable behaviour
that is needed.
6
Way finding by
sound and vision New evacuation system (MRSL)
Sound beacon study (TNO, RWS)
• Visual information
• Auditory information (sound beacons)
• Tactile information
• Not dependent on power
• Low-cost installation
• Temperature sensors
• Atmosphere monitoring
• Dynamic guidance
Examples
Figure 1: Examples on escapeon escape
route route signs
signs (Worm, (Worm, E., 2005)
E., 2005)
Misconceptions
Misconceptions Panic Theory
When we realize the danger
Reduced problem solving
Passivity / paralyzed
When there is a fire in a tunnel Not able to receive new information
–Strong focus, Rigidity, Sharpened senses
people panic Experience situation as in ”slow motion”
motion”
Shift of cognitive mode (”acknowledgement of situation”
situation”)
Panic
Fight or flight
In emergencies we do not act as ”rational citizens” Savannah-human
citizens”, but as the ”Savannah-
Actual Observed Behavior in

Tunnel Fires
Initial phase:
–Tendency to interpret information in positive
manner (believe the best)
Misconceptions
–Unrealistic perception of time available
–Unrealistic perception of danger
–Binding to group & belongings Information may scare people
and lead to panic
7
Actual Observed Behavior in
Tunnel Fires
It should be noted that This underlines that
UPTUN evacuation
experiments showed: -Information-
Information-
Misconceptions
"dangerous" information is the antidote to panic
(e.g. explosion danger)
led to orderly evacuation Minimum required Tunnel
rather than to panic
Closing Equipment is
sufficient to stop drivers and
avoid secondary accidents?
Real Accident while we were

Actual Observed Behavior in installing our equipment,
equipment, and the
Tunnel Fires tunnel was closed
Red flashing stoplights
– 20% drive past
– Smoke in tunnel not enough to change behavior
Barrier for closing tunnel Signals for closing tunnel
Lessons learnt
Visibility measures in smoke
(Laser versus Humans)
2 m = disorientation Misconceptions
10 m = poor visibility
20 m = moderate visibility
50 m = good visibility
Herd effects are purely
Placement of escape signs negative for evacuation
– Alternative way finding
– Tactile, visual, audible
8
Actual tunnel evacuation and
crowd observations
We know today more about what is a realistic walking
speed during an evacuation
Misconceptions Realistic walking speeds are on average
2.6 m/sec (not 1.5-
1.5-2.0 m/sec)
Running starts approx.
approx. 7 m/sec
Walking speed will depend, among others, on:

According to norms for evacuation in tunnels, Visibility
the walking speed is set to 1.5-
1.5-2.0 m/sec. Crowdedness
Handicap
These are, however, norms based on Age (children, old people)
observations of healthy adults. Delay due to attachment to a group (family, travel companions etc.)
etc.)
Luggage
EU directive
Minimum Required Signage
Road Signs shall Escape routes
Signage be used to
designate
– Two nearest
emergency exits
shall be signed on
the sidewalls at
Lay-bys distances no more
(Pull-off area) than 25m
Same sign shall – at a height 1.0 to
be used for all 1.5m above escape
kinds of route level, with an
indication of
emergency exits distances to the exits
Emergency exits
EU directive – If local conditions show that the above mentioned
provisions are insufficient, short perpendicular escape
Minimum Required Signage gallery or a parallel safety gallery with cross connections
at maximum intervals of 500 m allowing people to escape
on their own should, be constructed.
– No shelters unlinked to escape routes shall be built.
Distance between lay-

lay-bys
– shall not exceed 1000 m.
Additional provisions for twin-

twin-tube tunnels
– In the event of an incident the other tube is used as
escape and rescue route.
route. Pedestrian cross-
cross-connections
shall link the tubes at maximum intervals of 500 m.
– Every third cross-
cross-connection shall allow the passage of
Figure 1: Line Signals (measures in mm) (Statens vegvesen, 2006)
emergency service vehicles.
vehicles.
– Propagation of smoke of gases from one tube to the
other shall be prevented
9
kkkkkkkkkkk
kkkkkkkkkkk Key research needs
kkkkkkkkkkk
kkkkkkkkkkk 1. State of the art / existing tunnels (US)
2. Retrospective & Proactive studies

Accidents, near miss, effective self rescue
3. Surveys
Tunnel experience/fear
Recall & use of safety information / installations
4. Effective Education & Training
5. Project specific research:

Extremely long, deep (sub-
(sub-sea), complex city tunnels
6. Innovative solutions
Evacuation support/assisted support
z ITS for tunnel safety:
z LED Lights/ tactile/ Acoustic
z Stop cars from entering
z Detecting dangerous goods/vehicles
What can we learn from What can we learn from:

incidents? “A near death experience”
experience”
Fire in a bus in a sub sea tunnel (10% incl.)
Chatastrophes – Phase 1:
Bus driver tried to extinguish, unsuccessful
Accidents Luggage was brought forward
Walked out of the tunnel with their luggage
Passengers got lift by passing vehicles
– Phase 2:
Near miss - incidents Some passengers stayed with driver
Control center alarmed (by mobile phone)
– Phase 3:
Firemen entered contrary to orders from chief
Fire extinguished
Safe Travel
Unfortunately all went well, no experience
30.000 m2 highly inflammable PE insulation
Reasearch on education & Training Project spesific research

Challenge lies in handling Longer
variation among involved
Deeper
road users
Variation across: More complex,
complex, more traffic
language, On-
On-off ramps, Junctions.
Junctions. roundabouts
age,
sex,
culture,
Mobility
Challenge lies in educating & informing

drivers
10
Advanced driver support
ITS for tunnel safety towards Co-
Co-operative systems
Area specific ACC

Car to car communication
In vehicle info
On-
On-board Car-
Car-to-
to-car
Car-to-infrastructure
systems + Communication
Communication +
Com. systems
E/E Architechitechture Com. systems Frequency
CAN-
CAN-bus Frequency Protocol
Digital maps Protocols Services
Sensors Responsability
ACC Cost sharing
Increased safety and comfort with LED
Project spesific research Stockholm ring

Wayfinding signage and human Factors
Extremly:
Extremly:
– Long
– Deep
– Complex,
Complex, high density city tunnels
Design of tunnel On-
On-off ramps, Junctions.
Junctions.
roundabouts
11
Reported from the Eurotunnel fire 1996 [Liew et al
Fire Growth and Heat Release in Tunnel Incidents 1998]
NV 10 HGV
Etot 2200 GJ
HRRmax 370 MW
Prof. Haukur Ingason
tmax 1h
td 2.5 h
SP Fire Technology (www.sp.se) V Ventilation controlled
Malardalen University (www.mdh.se)
NCHRP 20-7 Task 230

Workshop on Safety and Security in Roadway Tunnels
November 28, 29, 2007
Beckman Center, Irvine California
Estimation of the Tauern fire 1999 Newhall Pass Tunnel October 12, 2007
NV 16 HGV
Etot 4000 – 4500 GJ
HRRmax 300 - 400 MW
tmax 2-3 h
td 7 – 10 h
F Fuel controlled
Conseil Général des Ponts et Chaussées

1er mars 2006
Bureau d’Enquêtes sur les Accidents
Large fires in road tunnels Frejus tunnel fire – France-Italy 2005 de Transport Terrestre
Affaire n°BEATT-2005-006
17:47:38 17:48:24
Accident, year Vehicle type Tunnel cross Estimated Estimated peak Estimated Estimated Number of
-section Etot HRR time to peak fire duration fatalities
(m2) HRR
(GJ) (MW)
Road tunnels
Channel 10 HGV 45 2200 370 1h 2.5 (3.4) h 0
tunnel, 1996
Mont Blanc, 15 HGV, 9 50 5000-7000 300-380 2-3 h 9-13 h 39

1999 cars *
17:48:30 17:49:18
Tauern, 1999 16 HGV, 24 45 4000-4500 300-400 2-3 h 7-10 h 12
cars
St Gotthard, 13 HGV, 10 41 - >200 - 3-4 11

2001 cars
Frejus tunnel, 4 HGV, 3 fire 50 - >200 - <6 2

2005 fighting
vehicles
1
Frejus tunnel fire – France Italy 2005 We have learned that …
17:50:55 17:52:42
• it is the vehicles that burns and not the tunnel
• people do not behave as we engineers would like

them to do
• more vehicles are involved than we designed the

tunnels for
• we must consider the fire growth rate and not

only MWs
17:53:55 18:05:00
• semi-trailers load cabins must be built in non-
combustible material
• fire spreads by ventilation
• fire departments get into problems
Fire in vehicles (video)

Tests performed by SP
Runehamar tests 2003 (video) HRR from large vehicles

EUREKA 499 - HGV
EUREKA 499 - simulated truck load
Benelux - 36 wood pallets - 0 m/s - (T8)
250 Benelux - 36 wood pallets - 4-6 m/s - (T9)
Benelux - 36 wood pallets - 6 m/s - (T10)
Benelux - 72 wood pallets - 1-2 m/s - (T14)
Runehamar - wood and plastic pallets (T1)
Heat Release Rate (MW)
200 Runehamar - Wood pallets - mattrasses (T2)

Runehamar - furnitures and fixtures (T3)
Runehamar - cartons and PS cups (T4)
150
100
50
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Time (min)
2
Fire that ”jumps” between vehicles Influence of wind on maximum heat release rate
250
200
q"max (kW/m )
2
150
100
50
T
0
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20
uc (m/s)
Wood crib A Wood crib B Free burn
1 2 3
Model scale tests at SP , see SP Report 2005:49
Influence of wind on fire growth rate Time Temperature curves - RWS, HC, ISO
140
1400
120
Δ Q/Δ t (kW/min)
100 1200
80
1000
Gastemperatur [ C]
60
o
40 800 TISO 834
20
THydrocarbon
600
0
TRWS
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20
uc (m/s) 400
200
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Model scale tests at SP, see SP Report 2005:49
Tid [min]
Relation between Q, u, and A Tests with Water Mist system

Maximum ceiling temperatures Memorial
Longitudinal flow Zwenberg
Other liquid fires
1600
HGV
1400
Ceilingtemperature
Model tests SP 2002

1200
1000 Model tests SP 2005
(o C)
800 Modeltests FOI SP

600 Runehamar T1
400 Runehamar T2
200 Runehamar T3
0 Runehamar T4
0 1 2 3 low
3
medium
Q/u A (MW /m /s)
high
Low severity: Medium severity: High severity:
5Q
( ) 5Q 5Q
T = 900(1 − e uA
) T = 1100(1 − e
(
uA
)
) T = 1350(1 − e
(
uA
)
)
3
Conclusions Why L-surF? What is L-surF? L-surF Services Products and Services
• Mainly HGV involved in large fires

L-surF Services
• Fire can spread over 100 m creating fires over 300 MWs
• Fire growth rate influenced by ventilation
European distributed (virtual)

=
• Ventilation assists in fighting fires
large scale facility
for underground safety and security
• Water spray systems prevent fire spread
A unique expertise
thanks to the diversity and complementarity of the partner organisations
New interesting SP Report
Comparison and Review of Safety Design Guidelines for Road Tunnels
Hak Kuen Kim

Anders Lönnermark
Haukur Ingason
www.sp.se -> in english -> publications -> extended search
SP Report 2007:08
4
AASHTO/NCHRP 20-7 Task 230
Content
Workshop on Safety and Security in Roadway Tunnels,
Nov. 2007, Beckman Center, Irvine CA Ventilation
Systems
Design guidelines
Incident Detection and Tunnel Control
Incident detection
Ventilation Manual
Automatic (heat detectors, CCTV)
Peter J. Sturm (sturm@vkmb.tugraz.at) Interaction with ventilation control
Problems with ventilation control in tunnels
Institute for Internal Combustion and Thermodynamics
Graz University of Technology Conclusions
Institute for Internal Combustion Engines and Thermodynamics Institute for Internal Combustion Engines and Thermodynamics
Graz University of Technology Graz University of Technology
Tunnel ventilation why? Ventilation systems

Aim of ventilation Longitudinal Ventilation
provide sufficient air quality for a safe usage of the
tunnel (normal operation)
improve the safety during fire events
National and international guidelines define the type

of ventilation as a function of tunnel length and
traffic volume
PIARC guidelines (recommendations)
national guidelines (obligations)
Source: PIARC 07 Photo: W. Stroppa
Ventilation systems Ventilation systems

Longitudinal with (massive) point extraction Semi transverse ventilation (air injection)
Not for fire situations
Source: PIARC 07 Source: PIARC 07
1
Ventilation systems Ventilation systems
Semi transverse ventilation in incident mode (air Full transverse ventilation
extraction)
Source: PIARC 07 Source: PIARC 07
System selection System selection - unidirectional traffic

Criteria
Traffic volume
Tunnel length
Risk (share of heavy goods vehicles, hazardous goods, congestions)
Selection has to be confirmed by a risk assessment
EU guideline
Mechanical ventilation for tunnels with more than 2.000 Veh/day
and a length > 1 km
Transverse ventilation (semi or full) for tunnels with more than 2.000
Veh/day and a length > 3 km
Require remote controlled dampers for smoke extraction
System selection - bidirectional traffic Requirements on mechanical equipment
g Jet fans
¾ Temperature: 400 °C over 2 hours (A), in Germany
only in cases of tunnels with high risk
¾ Material: Stainless steel with very high quality
¾ Cables: Fire resistant 90 min
g Axial fans (transverse systems)

¾ Fans and all equipment in the exhaust air duct
400°C over 120 min
¾ Material: all parts in connection with exhaust air
stainless steel with very high quality
2
Ventilation control Ventilation control
g Normal operation
g Tunnel ¾ Monitoring of carbon monoxide (tracer for health
concerns)
g Ventilation ¾ Control of visibility or light extinction (accident
g Ventilation philosophy prevention)
¾ Control of NOx (NO2) in case of portal or shaft
g Sensors (detection and control) locations in critical regions (environmental
g Control mechanism (software) concerns)
g Fire case
¾ Support of self rescue possibilities (phase 1)
¾ Support of external rescue forces (phase 2)
Dürnsteintunnel Wachau; Dürnsteintunnel/Wachau Querlüftung 1958

transverse ventilation 1958
Axial fans (200 m³/s, 800 kW) Control scheme
{
Concentration (CO, NOx)
Situation inside the Visibility
tunnel Traffic volume
Air velocity
Re
ac
Comparison with tio
n
target value
No
Action { Control of fans
Y
ok?
© T. Waltl
3
incident ventilation
Normal operation (CO, visibility) Ventilation control FIRE
localization of the fire
normal operation Fire case allocation to the right fire control section
freezing the current ventilator status
turning off the ventilator with priority „0“
true
selection of the false next lower priority

true flow sensor number of the
true actual value actual value
actual value „sensor OK“ flow sensors
visibility air volicity
CO < 25 ppm
< 3,5x10-3 m-1 < 10 m/s
true
false determination of the flow direction

re-opening the tunnel false false (depending on the prevailing flow)
controller
controller controller
defines the amount of
true defines the amount of defines the amount of
jet fans to reach controller
false jet fans to reach jet fans in the
CO ~ 30 ppm defines the amount
k ~ 3,5x10-3 m-1 opposite direction
of necessary
jet fans
k < 7x10-3 m-1 true CO < 90 ppm true
tunnel is
with decreasing with decreasing
closed
tendency tendency
false false actual flow velocity

false
is in the range
tunnel still closed true
of the set value for the keep status
flow velocity
(chapter 4.6)
CO ≥ 150 ppm false k ≥ 12x10-3 m-1 false CO ≥ 100 ppm

as 1 minute as 10 minute as 10 minute
average average average false
prevailing flow in prevailing flow in

true true true direction Villavicencio depending on the direction Bogotá
determined
flow direction
closure of the tunnel
priority and direction defaults for the fire ventilation priority and direction defaults for the fire ventilation
(table 4-4 to table 4-5) (table 4-2 and table 4-3)
Ventilation philosophy during the self rescue Ventilation philosophy; longitudinal

phase ventilation, unidirectional traffic
g Movement of the smoke in driving direction
g Main criterion Æ Velocity of the air/smoke
g maximum velocity of air
g Too high – self-rescue possibilities restricted
¾ A: 1,5 m/s to 2 m/s (RVS 09.02.31)
¾ D: critical velocity ~ 3m/s (RABT)
CH: 3 m/s (ASTRA)
g Too slow Æ big backlayering may restrict self g Priorities for fans (A)
rescue possibilities
Ventilation philosophy; bidirectional traffic or Ventilation philosophy, PIARC draft 2007

unidirectional and congestion
g Movement of the smoke in driving direction Case Traffic prior to incident Principle for longitudinal ventilation
A Unidirectional traffic Flow velocities in direction of traffic to prevent or at
g maximum velocity of air without traffic least minimize backlayering of smoke
congestion
¾ A: 1,0 to 1,5 m/s (RVS 09.02.31) B Unidirectional traffic Relatively low flow velocities (e.g 1.2+/-0.2 m/s)in
with traffic congestion direction of traffic in order to minimize flow spread
¾ D: 1,5 m/s (RABT) upstream, to allow smoke stratification, to support
¾ CH: 1,5 m/s (ASTRA) dilution of toxic gases and to enable people to
escape.
g Priorities for fans C Bidirectional traffic Relatively low flow velocities should be maintained,
avoiding flow reversal unless circumstances dictate
otherwise (for example fires near portals), to allow
smoke stratification, and to enable people to escape
in both directions.
4
Transverse ventilation Required information
Exhaust Air Duct
Ab l u f t k a n a l 4 Ab l u f t k a n a l 3
Street Tunnel
g Normal operation
V long towards the fire
¾ In – tunnel air quality (CO, visibility, air speed)
3,8 km 1,2 km 3,8 km 1,2 km
g Fire case
© T. Waltl ¾ Detection of the alarm
¾ Localization of the event
¾ Air velocity at the time of detection
¾ Traffic situation at the time of detection
¾ Target velocity depending on traffic situation and
location of incident
Required information Manual detection (emergency case)

Ph
on
e
g Two major problems g From inside tunnel
¾ Detection of the location of the incident g Reaction:
Location influences the
¾ alarm goes to the control
• selection of fans (priority order) in longitudinal center
ventilated tunnels
¾ confirmation
• selection of damper(s) to be opened in transverse and activation by
ventilated tunnels operator Extinguisher
¾ Quality of the velocity signal Problem y
g
en c
• must give the average velocity over the tunnel cross m er g n
¾ No exact descriptionE of utto
section b
the incident location
• and must be accurate
Manual detection Automatic detection

g In control center via video detection g Linear heat detectors
¾ Reaction: activation by operator ¾ reliable for stationary sources
in case of CCTV Æ confirmation of alarm and ¾ alarm triggered by a linear heat detector activates
activation of procedures automatically the alarm procedures
¾ System requirement: Pre-alarm after 60 s, alarm
after 90 s ( 120 s resp. 150 s if air velocity > 3m/s)
g Smoke detection
¾ e.g. visibility meters (RABT (D) requires
opacimeters every 300 m)
¾ problem: smoke moves with the air, capturing of
source not easy
¾ in most cases no automatic start of emergency
procedures
Æ manual confirmation by operator required
5
Automatic detection Ventilation control
g Tunnel
g Video detection (CCTV)
¾ Very quick
g Ventilation system
¾ Detection of abnormal situations possible
¾ problems with moving smoke (location?)
¾ In order to detect the location of a stationary source,
g Methodology (philosophy) ?
minimum distance between cameras ~ 50 to 70 m
g Detection
g Software (controller)
Controller Requirements for sensor for air velocity

g Aim of the controller is to achieve the target value as soon
as possible and keep it stable g Velocity value as average over cross section
g Required accuracy +/- 0,3 m/s
g Short response (t90) time and time resolution in
the Hz range
Velocity
g Proper positioning of sensors
Bindermichl east bore, problem oscillation Longitudinal ventilation, simple on/off switches
LG_2 (Hitzdraht) Referenzmessgerät LG_2 (USA) of fans Big fans (1600 N thrust)
Test B Zone 7 orig. activation from fire extinguisher
6.0 acting against meteorological conditions
5.5 3.00
5.0 Problem: sensors too slow and influenced by fans Sensor signal ??? Actual velocity
2.00 No. of activated fans
4.5
4.0
1.00
3.5 BOG
Geschwindigkeit [m/s]
3.0
0.00
2.5 10:06:58 10:09:50 10:12:43 10:15:36 10:18:29 10:21:22 10:24:14
2.0
-1.00
1.5
Target
m/s
1.0
-2.00
0.5 value
0.0
-0.5
-3.00 reaction of air inside Alarm off
-1.0 tunnel time shifted V/CIO

-4.00
-1.5 Target velocity band
Alarm on
-2.0
-5.00
-2.5
-3.0
17:20 17:25 17:30 17:35 17:40 17:45 17:50 17:55 18:0
-6.00 activation of
fans too quick
6
Longitudinal ventilation, simple on/off Effect of false signal from vel. sensor
switches of fans
Schacht Nord 240m

Test D Zone 7 (15s floating average)
Fürstenstand
Notausfahrt Nord
Notausfahrt Süd
Schacht Süd 90m
Kaverne Nord
6.00
Tunnelmeisterei Webling
VELAIRE PROMEDIO
Ruine Gösting
763 m
Lüfterstation Raach
TUNNELZENTRALE
Kaverne Süd
No. of activated fans
upper target velocity Fire location 640 m
NORD
4.00 lower targer velocity
455 m
Velocity sensor
SÜD
BOG
2.00 RAACH
0.00
14:15:22 14:16:48 14:18:14 14:19:41 14:21:07 14:22:34 14:24:00 14:25:26 14:26:53 14:28:19 Lüftungsabschnitt Lüftungsabschnitt Lüftungsabschnitt Lüftungsabschnitt Lüftungsabschnitt
6 5 4 3 2 1
m/s
-2.00 ABLUFT ZULUFT
WEST-Röhre
Alarm off Neubau 3,8 k m 1,2 k m
3,8 km 1,2 km
-4.00
Betriebstation
V/CIO KARVERNE SÜD KARVERNE NORD RAACH
ZULUFT ABLUFT
Alarm on
-6.00
OST-Röhre
Bestand G A JW 1 G AJW 1
-8.00 Big fans (1600 N thrust)

acting against meteorological conditions
Problem analysis Problems with software bugs and

errors in addressing fans
g False sensor signal g Longitudinal
g Too much air from ventilated tunnel
downward the fire g 2nd fire alarm
g Only fresh air was g wrong fans used
extracted
Smoke movement longitudinal ventilated Smoke movement longitudinal ventilated

tunnel tunnel
7
Smoke movement longitudinal ventilated Smoke movement longitudinal ventilated
tunnel tunnel
Main problems found A7 - UFT Bindermichl

Traffic signs
g Controller not adjusted for the tunnel and its
specific situation Fans
g Wrong or misplaced velocity sensors
g Fans can not use the full thrust because of Air velocity sensor
Extreme width
misplacement, influences by other equipment, too
short distances between fans, etc.
g Unpredictable influences from additional on/off
ramps inside tunnel, open cross passages (for Fans all 100 m
vehicles), open egress doors,… Huge number of traffic signs
variable cross sections
additional on/off ramps inside tunnel
Highway with connecting ramps Bindermichl incident ventilation, east bore

Muldenstraße
Fire
18
location
Exit
Ramps Muldenstraße
16
North portal
South portal
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
LG_1 LG_2 LG_NP
LG_SP 8 10 12 14
2 4 6
Exit Muldenstraße 16 18
A B C I J
D E F G H
Driving direction Anemometer
Jet fan Fire detection section

A
Without ramps Muldenstraße ca. 50% less fans required

8
Bindermichl incident ventilation, west bore Fire test Muldenstraße Fire location
~4% SL17_1 SL15_1 SL13_1 SL11_1 SL9_1 SL7_1 SL5_1 SL3_1 SL1_1
~1% A B C D E F G H I J
LGSP LGBG1 LGBG2 LGNP
At higher heat release
rates SL17_2 SL15_2 SL13_2 SL11_2 SL9_2 SL7_2 SL5_2 SL3_2 SL1_2
A1 (Wien/Salzburg) Velocity in fire

Auffahrt Ausfahrt Control value
SL17_2
Ventilator zone
LGBG2 LGNP Istwert
LGBG2 Strömungsmessgerät4.0
3.5
Strömungsgeschwindigkeit [m/s]
Brandtasse 3.0
2.5
Prag B Übergeordnete 2.0

1.5
Fans with reduced Fans with good efficiency Brandzone
1.0
efficiency Fire location 0.5
0.0
Brandbeginn .
-0.5
-1.0
-1.5 Flow reversal
-2.0
16:15
16:16
16:17
16:18
16:19
16:20
16:21
16:22
16:23
16:24
16:25
16:26
16:27
16:28
16:29
16:30
16:31
16:32
16:33
16:34
16:35
16:36
16:37
16:38
16:39
16:40
Zeit [hh:mm]
Traffic needs vs. tunnel design Measures to avoid influences from “false air”
Conclusions Conclusions
Consideration of fire case requires a high technical System proof (hot smoke) is necessary before
standard in ventilation and ventilation control opening the tunnel
Complex ventilation control requires a high standard Checks on a regular basis for all elements of the
for sensors and detection “system” imperative (not only maintenance)
Automatic (feed back) control of ventilation system Improved technology results in increased safety
is necessary, manual control only in “simple” standards BUT an increased risk in case of a
longitudinal ventilated tunnels possible malfunction of one part of the system (detection,
Development (adjustment) of the controler requires sensor, software)
time and test possibilities in the tunnel without any
traffic
9
Research needed (not only research) Research needed (not only research)
g Detection g Requirements on equipment in tunnels
¾ Reliable and quick smoke detection g Test protocols for tunnels in operation
¾ Detection of moving fire sources
¾ Currently most tests are done only during the
¾ CCTV (problem of position and distance between
commissioning/approval of the tunnel (i.e. once in
cameras)
the lifetime of the tunnel)
¾ Equipment tests (not maintenance)
g Control system vs. human behavior
¾ Function tests (incident procedures)
¾ Implementation of “unexpected” situations into the
control scheme (e.g. open doors of big cross ¾ Leakage tests (transverse ventilated tunnels) (false
passages, inclusion of more sensor information) ceiling, dampers,…)
g Emergency lighting
Human behavior
Thank you for your attention

City tunnels
Thank you for your attention
10
Fire test, south tube direction ⇒Prag Fire test
Velocity sensors
Istwert für Regelung U im Abschnitt A LGO
Control value
5.0
Fire location Brandbeginn/fire
4.5
Strömungsgeschwindigkeit [m/s]
4.0
Detektion/detection
3.5
3.0 Adjusted to the different
2.5 cross sections
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5 velocity in fire section

0.0
18:18
18:19
18:20
18:21
18:22
18:23
18:24
18:25
18:26
18:27
18:28
18:29
18:30
Fire test Fire test
Influence of ribs
Institute for Internal Combustion Engines and Thermodynamics

Graz University of Technology
11
Risk Management and Risk Management and Safety Concept for the
Øresund Link Immersed Tunnel
Safety Concept for the

Øresund Link Immersed
Tunnel
•Introduction
•Danish Strait Crossings
•The Øresund Link Tunnel
- Contracting
Mikael W Braestrup, M Sc, Ph D - Risk Analysis
Senior Engineer, Ramboll, Denmark - Safety Features
- Construction
mwb@ramboll.com - Operation Slide 2
Location Map Location Map
Denmark
•5.5 million
•43000 km2
Slide 3 Slide 4
Denmark Transport Infrastructure
Sweden
Denmark
Copenhagen
Jutland
Zealand
Funen
Germany
Slide 5 Slide 6
1
Transport Infrastructure Transport Infrastructure
Slide 7 Slide 8
Transport Infrastructure Transport Infrastructure
Slide 9 Slide 10
Transport Infrastructure Railway Bridges
Madsnedssund 1884
Vildsund 1874
Slide 11 Slide 12
2
Railway Bridges The Danish Straits: Lillebælt, Storebælt, Øresund
Skagerak
North Sea Kattegat
Madsnedssund 1884
Jutland
Øresund
Copenhagen
Lillebælt Storebælt
(Great Belt)
Baltic Sea
Slide 13 Slide 14
Storebælt – The Great Divider Storebælt – The Great Divider
Slide 15 Slide 16
Lillebælt – The Cultural Barrier Øresund – The Economic Lifeline

Skagerak Skagerak
North Sea Kattegat North Sea Kattegat
Jutland Elsinore
Øresund Øresund
Copenhagen Copenhagen
Lillebælt
Lillebælt Storebælt Storebælt
(Great Belt) (Great Belt)
Baltic Sea Baltic Sea
Slide 17 Slide 18
3
The Danish Straits: Lillebælt, Storebælt, Øresund Lillebælt Bridges 1935, 1970
Skagerak
New Bridge 1970
North Sea Kattegat 1775
Øresund
Copenhagen
Lillebælt Storebælt Railway Bridge 1935
(Great Belt)
Baltic Sea
Slide 19 Slide 20
Danish Strait Crossings: Lillebælt, Storebælt Storebælt Fixed Link 1997, 1998)
West Bridge (6.6 km)
New Sprogø (1.2 km2)
East Tunnel (8 km)
East Bridge (6.7 km)
Lillebælt Bridges 1935, 1970
18 km (Coast-Coast)
EUR 4000 Million
Slide 21 Slide 22
Danish Strait Crossings: Lillebælt, Storebælt,

Øresund and Femer Bælt Danish Strait Crossings: Road Tunnels ?
Storebælt Link 1997, 1998 Øresund Link 2000
Lillebælt Bridges 1935, 1970
Femer Bælt Link 2018? Slide 23 Slide 24
4
Danish Road Tunnels: Limfjorden Danish Road Tunnels: Limfjorden, Guldborgsund
Aalborg
Limfjorden 1969 Guldborgsund 1988
Limfjorden 1969
Slide 25 Slide 26
Danish Road Tunnels: Limfjorden, Guldborgsund, Øresund Øresund Fixed Link (1993 – 2000)
Dual Track
Railway
Øresund 2000 Four Lane

Motorway
Limfjorden 1969
Guldborgsund 1988
Slide 27 Slide 28
Øresund Fixed Link - Location Øresund Fixed Link - Location
Castle Elsinore
Slide 29 Slide 30
5
Øresund Fixed Link - Location Øresund Fixed Link (1993 – 2000)
Castle Elsinore Dual Track
Railway
3 trains/hr
Four Lane
Motorway
AADT
Øresund Region 19000
16000
commuters
3.5 million people

5 universities
High tech enterprises
International airport
Slide 31 Slide 32
Øresund Fixed Link - Organisation Øresund Fixed Link - Organisation

Toll Funding Toll Funding
EUR 3000 million

• Danish Landworks
• Coast – Coast
• Swedish Landworks
Slide 33 Slide 34
Øresund Link Coast - Coast (1995 – 2000) Øresund Tunnel

Peninsula (0.9 km2)
Øresund Tunnel (3.8 km)
Peberholm (1.3 km2, 4.0 km)
Øresund Bridge (7.8 km)
•Immersed tube concrete

•No external membrane
16 km (Coast-Coast)
EUR 2000 Million Slide 35 Slide 36
6
Øresund Tunnel Øresund Tunnel
•Immersed tube concrete •Immersed tube concrete

•No external membrane •No external membrane
•Gravel bed foundation
•Longitudinal ventilation
•Smoke-free escape gallery
Slide 37 Slide 38
Contract Philosophy Contract Philosophy
1992: 1992:
Owner Øresundskonsortiet: Owner Øresundskonsortiet:
Design & Construct Contracts Design & Construct Contracts
June 1993: June 1993:

House Consultants: House Consultants (ØLC) :
Functional Tender Designs Functional Tender Designs
Four contracts (two combined)
D & R Contract
•Tunnel trench
•Navigational channel
•Peninsula & Island construction
•Work harbours & trenches
•Compensation dredging
Slide 39 Slide 40
Compensation Dredging – Baltic Sea Compensation Dredging

World’s largest body of
brackish water.
Marine life dependent on

inflow of salt and
oxygenated water.
Blockage could have

severe consequences
for Baltic fisheries.
Government decision:
Zero blockage.
Slide 41 Slide 42
7
Compensation Dredging Compensation Dredging
Storebælt
Leonardo da Vinci
Storebælt
Leonardo da Vinci
Øresund
Trial dredging
Slide 43 Slide 44
Compensation Dredging Contracting

•No blockage March 1991:
•Max 5 % Intergovernmental Treaty
sediment spill
Summer 1991:
Ratification
June 2004:
Storebælt Construction Permit
Leonardo da Vinci
July 1995: Contracts:

D & R (EUR 300 Million)
Tunnel (EUR 700 Million)
November 1995: Contract:

Bridges (EUR 1000 Million)
Øresund
Trial dredging
Slide 45 Slide 46
Design Documents Design Documents
Slide 47 Slide 48
8
Risk Management Risk Management
Slide 49 Slide 50
Risk Acceptance Criteria Risk Acceptance Criteria
ALARP Fire Scenarios (Road)

Car
Truck
Heptane
LPG
Operational Risk Analysis Report

ALARP: As Low As Reasonably Possible (Being updated 2007)
Slide 51 Slide 52
Risk Mitigation Risk Mitigation
Design Event
Frequency corresponding to characteristic
load value
Slide 53 Slide 54
9
Technical Design Basis Safety Requirements - KKSURR
DB-GN: Design Basis - General Coast – Coast, Safety, Accidents, Rescue and Clearance
DB-EN: Design Basis – Environmental
DB-CS: Design Basis – Civil and

Structural Design demands
DB-GE: Design Basis - Geotechnical

Risk Analysis
DB-ME: Design Basis – Mechanical
and Electrical
KKSUR (advisory group)
DB-RA: Design Basis – Railway
Works and Installations
DB-SA: Design Basis - Safety Safety Concept
KKSURR Report Design Basis Safety

Target Safety Index β = 4.7
Slide 55 Slide 56
Safety Requirements Tunnel Construction - Dredging
Safety Features:
Escape Route
Fire Protection
Fire Fighting
Ventilation
Drainage
Power Supply Bucket Dredger Chicago
SCADA
7 million m3
Slide 57 Slide 58
Cutter Suction Dredger castor
Kastrup Peninsula Peberholm
Slide 59 Slide 60
10
Tunnel Tunnel Element Fabrication
8 Segments (22 m)
2800 m3
30 hrs
Immersed Length 3510 m

20 Elements
175 m Element
Size
56000 t
175 m
Slide 61 Slide 62
Tunnel Element Installation Tunnel Element Immersion
Slide 63 Slide 64
Tunnel Element Immersion Tunnel Operation - Traffic
30.000
Number of vehicles/day
25.000
20.000
Great Belt
15.000
Øresund
10.000 Øresund Budget
Ferries,
5.000 Great Belt
0
Production Rate:
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
1 element (175 m) per month

19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Traffic Development 2005-06

Year •Storebælt 9 %
•Øresund 16 %
•Motorways 2.4 %
Slide 65 Slide 66
11
Tunnel Operation – Traffic Development Tunnel Operation - Accidents
20.000 + 18%
Rate of accidents involving serious injury (total fixed link)
18.000
16000 Commuters (2006) 16.000

+ 15%
+ 16%
Nos/vehicle km x 10x8
14.000
•6000 by car 12.000
+ 14%
+ 10%
+ 16% 6
•10000 by train
10.000
8.000
6.000 5 4,9
Reasons for travelling by passenger 4.000
car across Øresund

2.000
4
-
3,8
3,6
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
3,2
3
2,8
2001 2015 2,5 2,4
Holidays 2006
Holidays Holidays
11% 7% 2 2
19% Business Business
Business Short-breaks
25% 22% 1,7
10% 1,6
One incident in
29% Short-breaks
12%
1 1 0,9 2000, 2001,2004
Short-breaks
19%
Leisure
19%
(and 2007), none in
0 0 0 0 0
Commuting
5% Leisure 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
the tunnel
22%
Commuting
Leisure 30% Commuting
28% 42% Øresund Link Great Belt Average Danish motorw ays
Slide 67 Slide 68
Tunnel Operation - Accidents Escape Route
Rate of accidents involving serious injury (total fixed link)

- One incident in 2000, 2001,2004 (and 2007), none in the tunnel
Nos/vehicle km x 10x8
Low accident rate: No emergency lane
6 •Efficient O&M procedures
5
•Traffic information systems Escape doors at 88 m
•Systematic monitoring of traffic
4,9
4
3,8
3,6
and weather conditions Escape doors never locked
3
3,2 •Preventive road service activities
•Continuous evaluation and
2,8
2,5 2,4
Escape gallery not used
improvements
2 2
1,7 1,6
1 1 0,9
0 0 0 0 0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Øresund Link Great Belt Average Danish motorw ays
Slide 69 Slide 70
Traffic Management
Escape Route
Evacuation Strategy
Drivers shall evacute to the opposite motorway tunnel,
through the technical gallery
Swing Boom
North motorway
South motorway
North rail track
Stop Boom
South rail track
Slide 71 Slide 72
12
Traffic Management Traffic Management
DK Tunnel SE DK Tunnel SE
Stop boom A5.2 Stop boom A5.2
Motorway north Motorway north
Swing boom B3.2 Swing boom B4.3 Stop boom A5.1 Swing boom B3.2 Swing boom B4.3 Stop boom A5.1
Stop boom A1.1 Swing boom B3.3 Swing boom B4.2 Stop boom A1.1 Swing boom B3.3 Swing boom B4.2
Stop boom A1.2 Motorway south Stop boom A1.2 Motorway south
Tunnel Tunnel
Slide 73 Slide 74
Traffic Management Ventilation
CCTV (Closed Circuit TV)

Traffic Monitoring and Control
Closing the Link
Vehicle Lane Regulations
Speed Regulations
Warning signs Each jet fan has a nominal thrust

of 780 N. The nominal motor power is 33 kW at a voltage of 690 V
Information signs
Design velocity: approx 5 m/s
High Control Approx. velocity using the concept: 2-3 m/s
All jet fans in the ventilation system are maintained once a year
Every months each jet fan is motioned to check the function and
need for further maintenance
Slide 75 Slide 76
Ventilation Concept Safety Management
Starter panel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Í Í Í ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤
North Motorway – NM Í Í Í ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ Other safety measures
Í Í Í
Other Safety Measures
¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤
Í Í Í ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤
Escape Gallery/
Escape door no.
53 54 55 56 57 67 68 69 70 71 74 75 76 77 78 90 91 92 93 95
¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ Í Í
Traffic-
South Motorway – SM ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ Í Í direction
¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ Í Í
¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ Í Í
90 km/h in the tunnel
North Railway – NR ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ Í Í Í Í
South Railway – SR ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ Í Í Í Í
No taking over for trucks
DK SE Restrictions for Dangerous goods
•Blow out of affected tube (suction)
•Blow into evacuation tube (overpressure) Detection for stopped vehicles in the tunnel
•Immediate start-up (no time delay) Yearly safety assessment on organization, installations,
strategies and plans, education and training
(manager, emergency authorities and drivers)
Slide 77 Slide 78
13
Safety Management Escape Doors
Dangerous Goods
Dangerous Goods on Road
Application:
Transport of dangerous goods is allowed between 11pm
and 6 am – 7 days a week.
Vehicles that do not require marking in accordance with

ADR regulations are not considered to be hazardous goods
and are therefore not subject to restrictions.
Transports of class 1.1 and 1.5 explosives are restricted to

a freight load at 1 ton per vehicle and trailer.
Slide 79 Slide 80
Fire Protection Fire Fighting
•No sprinklers
•Automatic Fire Alarm and Fire Fighting Systems in technical rooms
(Gas extinguishing, Water Spray and Foam ext.)
•Pressurised Fire Hydrants
•Fire Push Buttons in
Emergency Panels
•Powder extinguishers
21 mm Fendolite MII (cementitious material with vermiculite aggregate)

applied to outer walls above New Jersey barrier, roof, and internal walls
1 m below haunches
Slide 81 Slide 82
Emergency Panels Power and Communication
Normal Power Supply from Denmark or Sweden
Emergency Power Supply – UPS

Power Supply
Additional diesel generator
(installed 2007)
Mobile telephony GSM / DCS
FM radio
Emergency Phones
Radio Communication for rescue services
Slide 83 Slide 84
14
Alarm and Rescue Full Scale Exercises
Computer Based Alarm System

PAPRIKA 16 May, 2000
• Tunnel - Motorway
Full scale Exercises
OREGANO 22 May, 2000

• Bridge - Railway
CHILI 29 May, 2000
• Tunnel – Railway
ROSMARIN 7–8 February, 2001
• Bridge – Motorway
•MCs for the Rescue Services LAVENDEL 6 October, 2004

•Infra read cameras • Tunnel - Motorway
•Helmet-microphones
•Casualty radios
•Water tank vehicles
Slide 85 Slide 86
Full Scale Exercises Full Scale Exercises
Slide 87 Slide 88
Major Maintenance Activities Øresund Bridge
Escape Doors: Opening mechanism replaced (easy operation)

Firewater: Mains pipe replaced (water hammer burst)
Fire hydrants replaced (easy operation)
System compartmentalised (easy maintenance)
Water Spray: Piping replaced (corrosion)
Power: Diesel generator installed (security of supply)
Lighting: Light fixtures replaced (operational wear)
Slide 89 Slide 90
15
Bill Connell Regulations, Standards & Guidelines
Parsons
Parsons Brinckerhoff
Brinckerhoff Presentation Outline
NCHRP 20-
20-7 Task 230
Workshop on Safety and Security in Document Definition
Chairman - NFPA Technical
Roadway Tunnels Committee Issuing Entities
Regulations, Standards and NFPA 502 - Road Tunnels Bridges and Key Documents
Other Limited Access Highways - A Comparison
Guidelines
Conclusions
November 28 - 29, 2007 Irvine, California
Regulations, Standards & Guidelines Regulations, Standards & Guidelines

Problem Statement Document Definition Issuing Entities
Regulation - a document containing specific
mandatory requirements adopted and enforced by a
legal government entity.
We don’t have one of UNECE - Transport Division
these !! Standard - a document containing mandatory
European Union Commission
language, usually produced by a technical entity
>>> such as an association or society. These documents
by themselves have no legal standing except where PIARC
they have been adopted by or on behalf of a
government agency by legislative action. NFPA
ASHRAE
Guideline - a document providing recommended
practices in the design, construction, installation, ITA
and operation for the fire life safety and fire
protection systems in road tunnels. These Individual Nations
documents have been typically prepared by
technical associations as well as some
governmental agencies..
Regulations, Standards & Guidelines Regulations, Standards & Guidelines Regulations, Standards & Guidelines
United Nations Economic European Union PIARC Technical Committees

and Social Council Commission
Technical Committee on Road
Inland Transport
Tunnel Operation (C5)
Division – Directive 2004/54/EC -
Recommendations of the • Operational
Group of Experts on Minimum Safety • Human Factors of Safety
Safety in Road Tunnels – Requirements for Tunnels • Pollution, Ventilation, Environment
Final Report 2001 in the Trans-
Trans-European • Communication Systems
Road Network - 2004 • Dangerous Goods Transport
• Fire and Smoke Control -1999
Regulations, Standards & Guidelines

National Fire Protection ASHRAE International Tunneling

Association Association
Maintenance and
Technical Repair (WG6) -
NFPA 502 – Committee TC 5.09
Standard for Road Guidelines for Structural
Tunnels, Bridges and Applications Handbook Fire Resistance for Road
Other Limited Access Chapter 13 - Enclosed Tunnels - 2004
Highways - 2008 Vehicular Facilities
Regulations, Standards and Guidelines
Individual Nations
Comparison of Documents Regulation Document – EU Directive
Australia Australasian Fire Authorities Council

Fire Safety Guidelines for Road Tunnels 2001
Netherlands Recommendations Ventilation of
Road Tunnels, RWS Bouwdienst, Steunpunt
Three specific documents will be compared: Directive 2004/54/EC -
Tunnelveiligheid, 2005
Austria Design Guidelines Tunnel Ventilation, RVS
9261:9262, Austria, 1997 Norway Norwegian Design Guide—Road Tunnels, Regulation–
Regulation– (EU Directive)
Public Roads Administration, Norway, 1990
• “Directive 2004/54/EC of The European Developed by the
Croatia Regulations on technical Standards and
Conditions for Design and Construction of Nordic Countries Ventilation of Road Tunnels,
Sub-Committee 61, Nordisk Vejteknisk Forbund
Parliament and of the Council on Minimum European Parliament and
Tunnels on Roads, Croatia, 1991 (NVF), Report No. 6, 1993 Safety Requirements for Tunnels in the Trans-
Trans- the Council as the listing of
European Road Network”
Network”
Czech Republic Design of road tunnels,
Standard ČSN 73 7507 Road tunnel equipment Sweden Tunnel 2004—General Technical
Specification for new tunnels and upgrading of minimum safety requirements
Standard - (NFPA 502)
– technical specifications - Guideline TP 98 old tunnels, Swedish National Road
Administration, Pub. 2004,124, Sweden 2004 for all tunnels belonging to the
France Inter-Ministry Circular No. 2000-63—Safety
in the Tunnels of the National Highways
Network, Ministry of the Establishment, Switzerland Ventilation for Road Tunnels, Swiss • “Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges and Other trans-European road network.
Transport and Housing, France, 2000 Federal Roads Authority (FEDRO), Limited Access Highways”
Highways”
United Kingdom Design Manual for Roads and The directive as adopted
Germany Forschungsgesellschaft für Strassen-
and Verkehrswesen, Richtlinien fuer Ausstattung
und Betrieb von Strassentunneln (RABT),
Bridges, Part 9, BD 78/99, Design of Road
Tunnels, 1999 Guideline - (PIARC 1999) is dated 29 April 2004.
Germany, 2006
United States Road Tunnel Design Guidelines, • “Fire and Smoke Control in Road Tunnels”
Tunnels”
Japan National Safety Standard of Emergency Federal Highway Administration, FHWA-IF-
Facilities on Road Tunnel, Japan Road 05-023, 2004
Association, Japan, 2001
Regulation Document – EU Directive Regulation Document – EU Directive
Regulation Document – EU Directive
The EU Directive introduction states in part that: SUMMARY
SUMMARY OF OF MINIMUM
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS
REQUIREMENTS
“International bodies such as the World Road Traffic

Traffic ≤
vehicles
≤ 22 000
vehicles per
000 Traffic
per lane
Traffic >
lane vehicles
> 22 000
vehicles per
000
per lane
lane Additional
Additional conditions
conditions for
for implementation
implementation to
to be
be mandatory,
mandatory,
Association and the UNECE have for a long time

500
500--11 000
000m> 000 500
m>11 000 500 -- 11 000
000 11 000
000 -- 33 000
000 m
m >
> 33 000
000 m
m
been making invaluable recommendations to help

improve and harmonise safety equipment and traffic
rules in road tunnels. However, as these
recommendations are not binding, their full potential
can only be maximized if the requirements they
identify are made mandatory through legislation.”
legislation.”
As such, the EU Directive establishes specific

minimum requirements for fire protection
and fire safety systems requirements for all
tunnels on the trans-European road network
that equal or exceed 500 meters in length.
Standard Document – NFPA 502 Standard Document – NFPA 502 Standard Document – NFPA 502
Standard for Road Tunnels, The 2008 edition of NFPA 502 includes revisions that further
Bridges and Other Limited clarify the categorization of road tunnels and provides broad
Access Highways reconsideration of the requirements and recommendations for The 2008 Edition of
NFPA 502 the following areas: NFPA 502 has added
Standard for Table 7.2, Road
NFPA 502, Standard for Road Tunnel Protection
Tunnels, Bridges and Other Limited Road Tunnels, Bridges, Application of fixed water-based fire suppression systems Reference, which
Access Highways establishes and Other Limited Protection of structure and structural elements clearly defines the
minimum fire and fire life safety Access Highways Maintaining a tenable environment minimum Fire Life
2008 Edition Safety elements
requirements for road tunnels, Transport of regulated and unregulated cargos required based on
bridges and other roadways where tunnel length
access by emergency responders is Several other modifications have been made throughout the
physically limited. 2008 Edition Standard that are intended to capture the latest thinking on the
best practices for fire and life safety provisions. Annex
material has been added and expanded to share relevant
information and source material related to specific provisions.

Guideline Document – PIARC 1999
Guideline Document – PIARC 1999 Guideline Document – PIARC 1999
Table of
"Fire and Smoke This 1999 report was prepared by the PIARC Technical Committee Contents for this
C5 (now C3.3) and its Working Group 6 as an effort to present a
Control in Road “state-
state-of-
of-the-
the-art”
art” assessment on the issues and methodologies for guideline
Tunnels" fire and smoke control in road tunnels. It was intended for those
those
interested in road tunnel planning, design, construction, operation
operation document, the
and safety including owners, consultants, operators, researchers,
researchers,
regulators and emergency responders. The document provides an
technical report
overview on the key issues related to fire emergencies in road titled:
A technical guideline tunnels and offers background information and recommendations
published in 1999 in on the means and methods to provide reasonably efficient and
cost-
cost-effective systems to protect against fire and smoke in road
conjunction with the tunnels. For each subject addressed, references for obtaining “Fire and Smoke
XXIst World Road
further technical detail are provided. Control in Road
Congress in Kuala This report has become one of the “best selling”
selling” publications in Tunnels”
Tunnels”
Lumpur. PIARC history and went into its second printing in 2004. (PIARC 1999)
Comparison – Water Supply Requirements
Comparison of Requirements Comparison – Fire Detection Requirements
EU Directive
• Application Criterion
Required in all tunnels longer than 500 meters EU Directive
Water Supply System • Required Capacity
Required in all tunnels longer than 500 meters.
Not Addressed Incident detection may be used in place.
Fire Detection System
NFPA 502 NFPA 502
Emergency Exits • Application Criterion • Application Criterion
Required in all tunnels longer than 90 meters Required in all tunnels longer than 300 meters
Emergency Ventilation System Two means required – one must be manual.
• Required Capacity
Hydrants/Hose Connections I hour at 1,920 L/min PIARC 1999
PIARC 1999
Portable Fire Extinguishers • Application Criterion
Recommends either automatic detection or
surveillance
Recommended
Fixed Fire Fighting System
• Recommended Capacity
1,000 L/min at 0.5 mPa

Comparison – Emergency Ventilation Comparison – Hydrant/Hose Valve
Comparison – Emergency Exit Requirements Requirements Requirements
EU Directive EU Directive
• Application Criteria • Application Criterion
Required in all tunnels longer than 500 meters EU Directive Required in all tunnels longer than 500 meters
and • Emergency ventilation required when:
Tunnel Traffic is greater than 2,000 vpl (vehicles per lane) • Required Spacing
Tunnel length is 1,000 meters or greater
Spacing shall not exceed 250 meters
• Required Spacing and
Spacing shall not exceed 500 meters Tunnel Traffic is greater than 2,000 vehicles/lane/day NFPA 502
NFPA 502 NFPA 502 • Application Criterion

Required in all tunnels longer than 90 meters
• Application Criterion • Emergency ventilation required
Tunnel length is 300 meters* or greater • Required Spacing
Spacing shall not exceed 85 meters*
• Required Spacing
Spacing shall not exceed 300 meters. Cross-passageways spaced at PIARC 1999 PIARC 1999
200m permitted in lieu of emergency exits
• Emergency ventilation recommended • Application Criterion
No specific application criteria specified Recommended
PIARC 1999
• Application Criterion • Recommended Spacing
Recommended Spacing should be 100 meters to 200 meters
* 240 m when the maximum distance from any point within the tunnel
• Recommended Spacing to a point of safety exceeds 120 m
Spacing should be 100 meters to 200 meters
*No location on the protected roadway shall be more than 45 m from the hydrant
Comparison – Portable Fire Extinguishers Comparison – Fixed Fire Fighting System Comparison Table
EU Directive
The application of fixed fire fighting systems to road
tunnels is still evolving. These systems are not yet
• Application Criterion universally accepted as a legitimate fire protection and
fire safety system in road tunnels by the industry.
Existing tunnels - spacing shall not exceed 250 meters EU Directive A tabular
New tunnels - spacing shall not exceed 150 meters
comparison of the
NFPA 502 Not addressed fire and life safety
• Application Criterion NFPA 502 system
Required in all tunnels longer that 300 meters*
• Application Criterion requirements of
Permitted but not mandatory
Spacing shall not exceed 90 meters the three different
PIARC 1999 PIARC 1999
documents
• Application Criterion • Application Criterion examined.
Recommended Optional
• Recommended Spacing
Spacing should be 100 meters to 200 meters

The Thematic Network FIT ‘‘Fire
Fire in Tunnels’
Tunnels’
SUMMARY STATEMENT
Reference Table It may be summarized that each of the document types examined: Technical Report Part 2
¾ Do not uniformly recognize nor address the same fire and life safety
safety ‘‘Fire
Fire Safe Design’
Design’
hazards, issues and concerns unique to road tunnels.
¾ Provide differing - albeit typically small differences - in the setting or

A tabular reference suggesting of requirements for many of the fire safety systems and and
to the fire features.
protection and life ¾ None of these documents are considered incorrect - as each have
safety system each been developed from a different vantage point.
requirements
contained in each ¾ Standard and Regulation documents are developed to set a
minimum level of fire safety making it incumbent on the AHJ,
of the three engineers and tunnel operators to ensure a safe facility design.
documents
compared. ¾ Guideline documents provide a invaluable compendium of
information that allows the AHJ, engineers and road tunnel
operators to make fire and life safety design decisions based on
best industry knowledge and generally accepted practices.
Fixed Fire Fighting Systems
Thank you PIARC Position (1999)
for your
• “… sprinklers (FFFS) are generally not
considered as cost-
cost-effective and are
not recommended in usual road
Kind Attention tunnels.”
tunnels.”
NFPA Position (2004)
• “… the use of sprinklers (FFFS) in road
tunnels generally is not
recommended.”
recommended.”
Regulations, Standards and Guidelines

Regulations, Standards & Guidelines National Regulations
Future Issues – NFPA 502 International Organizations
Austria
Australia
NFPA NFPA 502, Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges,
France and Other Limited Access Highways, National Fire Protection
Association, Quincy, MA, 2004
The 2007 Edition of NFPA 502 is Germany
PIARC Fire and Smoke Control in Road Tunnels,
currently being prepared and Italy World Road Association (PIARC), Paris, 1999
should be available to the industry Japan European Union Directive 2004/54/EC of the European
in the fall of 2007. Netherlands Parliament and of the Council on minimum safety requirements
for tunnels in the trans-
trans-European road network, 2004
Norway
United Nations Economic Council, Economic Commission
Sweden for Europe, Inland Transport Committee, Recommendations of
the Group of Experts on Safety in Road Tunnels, 10 December
2001
United Kingdom
United States
Comparison – Critical Systems Future Issues
Impact on tunnel ventilation from alternate field vehicles such as hydrogen fueled cars.
Detection system (still not reliable)
Fire Detection System

Effect of fire protection system on tunnel ventilation (still not

not clear about it)
Portable Fire Extinguishers The two most significant future issues

Human factor in evacuation.
Integration of BCR with tunnel ventilation
Water Supply System Possible implementing one hour fire rating for cargo containers
Standpipe most likely to be considered by both the

Hydrants/Hose Connections PIARC and NFPA Technical Committees
Fire Department Connections
Fixed Fire Fighting System related to road tunnels the issue of the
Drainage System

Communications System installation of automatic fire fighting
Emergency Exits systems (FFFS) in road tunnels and the
Emergency Ventilation System
determination of the proper size of the

Structure resistance to fire
vehicle fire to be employed in the road
tunnel safety design process.
Background
- Research Needs • FHWA/AASHTO Scan
• AASHTO T-20 Committee
Kathleen H. Almand, P.E. • Foundation/NFPA Involvement
Executive Director • NCHRP 20-7 Task 230 Project
Fire Protection Research Foundation Panel Planning
Research Needs Research Needs – Topics

• Design Fires
• Presenters
• Fire and Incident Detection
• Participants • Fire Suppression
• Ventilation Systems
• Panel Sessions • Structural Performance
• General workshop discussion • Blast Effects
• General Design Issues
• Egress and Human Factors
• Operation Protocols/First Response
• Training and Education
• Other
Design Fires, at wkshp

Design Fires
• Conduct research on the effects of different
• Explore fire growth rate as an appropriate ignitions sources on incipent times of modern
design basis vehicles
• Ventilation Effects • Develop a Critical Fire Spread Parameter
• Design fires – cargo types and associated heat • Research alternate fuel loads in tunnels
release • Develop design approaches that focus on the
• Ventilation effects on fire size elephants
• Toxic gas production and associated ventilation • Research fire growth rate as a design
design parameter – explore effects of commodity
• Design fires for today’s vehicles in tunnels, • Develop design relationships between heat
effects of ventilation and geometry release rate, energy, ceiling temperatures and
• Realistic design fires for today’s vehicles set in a velocity
probabilistic framework • Use scale modeling as a first order research
tool
1
Fire and Incident Detection, cont’d
• Develop a program to encourage development • Detection and response time for design fires
of more effective fire detection systems • Effective automatic traffic incident and fire
• Evaluate the effectiveness of current fire detection systems
detection systems
• Assessment methods for fire detection to
• Develop more effective broad based detection
systems include wind and obstacle effects
• Develop effective automatic incident detection • Effectiveness of linear heat detection for fire
systems and intelligent video incidents
• Explore one-button emergency response and • Smoke and flame detection technologies for
automated sensor systems tunnels
• Real time digital recording system for all tunnel • Tunnel fire and smoke detection
and perimeter cameras
Fire and Incident Detection, at wkshp Fire Suppression
• Develop methods to detect • Evaluate the effectiveness of current

tunnel fire suppression systems
dangerous goods on vehicles • Develop a program to encourage
• Develop new quick response smoke development of more effective fire
suppression systems
detection technologies • Tunnel hazard management with fixed
• Develop positioning guidelines for fire suppression systems – hazards,
design criteria, including shielded fires
CCTV systems
• Performance standards for fixed fire
suppression in tunnels
Fire Suppression, cont’d Fire Suppression, at wkshp
• Interaction of fixed fire suppression • Research and conduct full scale fire tests
systems with tunnel ventilation with deluge, mist, and other types of
• Risk based sprinkler requirements sprinkler systems.; include effects of
ventilation on effectiveness
• Effectiveness of water mist systems
for very large fires from heavy • Develop new cost effective purpose built
goods vehicles systems for tunnels
• Focus on sprinkler performance
• Effectiveness of deluge suppression
objectives and test methods
systems for fire control
2
Ventilation Systems Ventilation Systems, at wkshp
• Develop advanced coordinated control • Develop a design method based on

schemes for ventilation systems
critical velocity – how impacted by
• Explore factors (geometric) affecting
ventilation in tunnels and hence fan
sensor type and location
installation design
• Develop means to reliably measure and
thus control air velocity
• Develop appropriate guidelines for
inspection and testing of velocity sensors
Structural Performance Structural Performance, at wkshp
• Tunnel lining performance in extreme • Research concrete spalling in

loading conditions (eg heat and blast)
tunnel fires
• Thermal protection of concrete ceilings,
supports, and cables • Research effects of humidity on
• Design criteria for tunnel liners and other structural fire proofing
structural elements • Develop post fire damage
• Evaluate fire effects assessment models
• Develop ground improvement retrofitting
schemes
Blast Effects Blast Effects, at wkshp

• Internal blast and its impacts on tunnels
• Blast and explosion protection modeling,
materials assessment, design, field
testing, detection, and protection
measures against progressive collapse
• Conduct structural blast damage
potential analyses
3
General Design Issues General Design Issues, cont’d
• Develop design criteria for new tunnels • Develop information systems for safety systems
installation – car to car communication, in-
• Develop AASHTO tunnel guidelines vehicle information, area specific ACC
• Identify retrofit technologies to enhance • Risk analysis procedures and selection criteria
safety for target reliability levels, including structural
components and systems consistent with the
• Build test tunnels or models AASHTO LRFD code
• Develop design criteria to promote • Physical modeling of safety and security aspects
optimal driver/user performance and • Slope and drainage design for flammable liquid
pool fires
response to incidents
General Design Issues, at wkshp Egress and Human Factors
• Develop guidelines for accident • Develop intelligent egress systems

prevention such as sight distance, curve • Develop escape route signs that are universal
radius, shoulder/curb design and consistent – visual, audible, tactile
• Develop criteria based on length, traffic • Explore LED Lighting for edge delineation and
safe vehicle distance
volume and type to trigger fire safety
• Carry out evacuation studies for various
provisions emergency scenarios and apply a risk approach
• Use trade offs to improve cost • Use transport modeling to simulate evacuation
effectiveness of various fire safety • Human factors during self or limited assisted
systems evacuation
Egress and Human Factors, cont’d Egress and Human Factors, at wkshp
• Evacuation • Investigate the use of blue LED
• Egress symbols for tunnels lights as a spacing mechanism
• Effective alarm notification to vehicle • Conduct survey on U.S. feelings of
occupants anxiety in tunnel situations
• Exit spacing in tunnels related to design
fires
• Conduct research on U.S.
walking/egress speeds
• Human reaction time relative to
notification • Research LED lights as indicators
• Emergency egress signage in tunnels for emergency exiting
4
Egress and Human Factors, at wkshp
• Update the manual on uniform traffic • Develop a best practices manual
devices with modern egress signage
concepts • Identify changes in operation protocols to
• Explore application of ITS to egress – enhance safety/security
safe vehicle spacing, tunnel closure, • Develop a set of sample emergency
information to drivers, response procedures
• Develop design guidance on refuge • Develop a tunnel specific inspection
areas manual
• Explore the relationship between fire • Develop guidelines for vehicle
growth and exit distances
inspections
Operation Protocols/First Response Operation Protocols/First Response

cont’d cont’d
• Develop tunnel emergency management • Effective pubic communication techniques on
guidelines that incorporate human factors tunnel safety procedures
considerations • Safety and security protocols for tunnel
operators – access control, monitoring, and
• Develop risk management approaches training of maintenance personnel and first
for tunnel safety inspection and responders
maintenance • Tunnel hazard assessment for firefighters and
• Incorporate contingency planning into first responders
emergency management approaches • Integrating tunnel safety and security systems
with emergency preparedness – plans,
• Overall fire safety planning procedures, training
• Island perimeter security • Tunnel security procedures for both terrorist
related incidents and accidental fire or explosion

Training and Education
at wkshp
• Research ways to implement the use of • Develop education programs for
professional drivers monitoring tunnels
• Develop a Critical Response Time for fire motorist response to tunnel
brigade incidents
• Research possibility and outcomes of power
loss • Develop programs to educate and
• Develop operating protocols for the roles for and inform drivers of varying language,
communications between first responders and culture, disabilities
tunnel operators
• Explore interaction of fire fighting and ventilation
fan operation
5
Training and Education, at wkshp Other
• Conduct survey on U.S. leaflet/education test • Study of past tunnel accidents and
results incidents
• Research new education and training methods • Collaborate with international research
for drivers
• Develop training protocols on sensor operation
initiatives
and response to unique human behaviors for • Safe tunnel portal design factors (related
tunnel operators to debris)
• Develop and enforce training programs for truck • Adverse wind effects for jet fan design
drivers as a condition of license to drive in
tunnels • Geometric design criteria for tunnels of
• Use tunnels for first responder and operator variable length (alignment and collision
training issues)
Other, at wkshp Next Steps

• Study near miss accidents in tunnels
• Review and prioritization by
• Continue the international technical exchange
• Develop a database of lessons learned AASHTO T-20
• Address the issue of security in the release of • Research Needs Statements
information on tunnels
• Form a series of working groups to implement • Final TRB Report
results
• Facilitate the adoption of innovation – case • Presentation at ISTSS, March 13,
study implementation
• Geometrics for road tunnel safety
2008, Stockholm, Sweden
• Scan N.A. road tunnels

Safety&amp;Security RoadwayTunnels

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SAFETY & SECURITY IN ROADWAY TUNNELS

This work was sponsored by one or more of the following as noted:

⌧ American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, in cooperation

Federal Transit Administration and was conducted in the Transit Cooperative

American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, in cooperation

Federal Aviation Administration and was conducted in the Airport Cooperative

which is administered by the Transportation Research Board of the National Academies.

1. Effective Fire Suppression

RP1. Design Fires for Roadway Tunnels

II. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

RP2. Effective Incident Detection

III BUDGET AND POTENTIAL CO-FUNDING SOURCES - $350,000;

RP3. Effective Fire Suppression

III BUDGET AND POTENTIAL CO-FUNDING SOURCES - $1,500,000, fire

RP4. Fire and Smoke Ventilation System Design Methods

RP5. Performance of Structural Materials in Tunnels in Fire Incidents

III BUDGET AND POTENTIAL CO-FUNDING SOURCES - $250,000 –

RP6. Guidelines for Tunnel Geometric Design for Fire Safety

III BUDGET AND POTENTIAL CO-FUNDING SOURCES - $250,000

RP7. Develop Requirements for Egress and Emergency Signage

III BUDGET AND POTENTIAL CO-FUNDING SOURCES - $250,000

III BUDGET AND POTENTIAL CO-FUNDING SOURCES - $350,000

RP9. Design Basis for Egress Systems

III BUDGET AND POTENTIAL CO-FUNDING SOURCES - $500,000

RP10. Tunnel Operations and First Responders

III BUDGET AND POTENTIAL CO-FUNDING SOURCES - $500,000, U.S.

RP11. Training and Education

III BUDGET AND POTENTIAL CO-FUNDING SOURCES - $350,000, AAA

RP12. Benchmarking Tunnel Incidents

III BUDGET AND POTENTIAL CO-FUNDING SOURCES - $250,000

LIST OF APPENDIX MATERIAL

Appendix A – Workshop Materials

November 28-29, 2007

Please note: Business casual attire is strongly encouraged.

Wednesday, November 28, 2007

7:45 Gather in hotel lobby to carpool to the Beckman Conference Center.

Beckman Conference Center

8:00 Buffet breakfast (provided to all meeting participants—Beckman Conference Center)

9:00 Welcome/Introductions/Workshop Charge

AASHTO/FHWA International Scan on Underground Transportation Systems Safety and

10:30 Way Finding, Signage and Human Behavior

Fire Growth and Heat Release in Tunnel Incidents

13:30 Incident Detection and Tunnel Ventilation

16:30 Panel Discussion – Research Needs

17:30 Hosted Reception and Dinner (provided to all meeting participants)

Thursday, November 29, 2007

7:15 Gather in hotel lobby to carpool to the Beckman Center.

Beckman Conference Center

7:30 Buffet breakfast (provided to all meeting participants—Beckman Conference Center)

8:30 Guidelines and Standards for Roadway Tunnel Safety

9:30 Panel Discussion – Needed Guidelines

11:00 Summary of Research Needs

11:30 Concluding Comments, Next Steps for AASHTO Technical Committees

12:00 Lunch Buffet (provided to all participants)

Chris Hawkins PB Americas Inc. hawkins@pbworld.com

Blake Rothfuss Jacobs Associates rothfuss@jacobssf.com

Fire and Incident Detection

General Design Issues

Egress and Human Factors

Operation Protocols/First Response

Training and Education

Fire and Incident Detection

General Design Issues

Safety&Security RoadwayTunnels

Safety&Security RoadwayTunnels

Defines tunnel elements: structural

Lighting and power supply Weighting: 8 percent

Communication Weighting: 11 percent

Ventilation Weighting: 11 percent