Charles W.lngrao, senior editor Gary B.

Cohen, editor

STATE COLLAPSE IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE:

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON YUGOSLAVlAS DISINTEGRATION

CENTRAL EUROPEAN STUDIES

Edited by Lenard], Cohen and Jasna Dragovie-Sesc

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Purdue Unlversity Press West Lafayette. Indiana

Copyright 2008 by Purdue Univ.:rsiry. All rights reserved.

Primed in the United States of America.

ISDN 978-1-55753-460-6

Library of Congress Cawoglng-in-Publication Data

Stlte collapse in South-eastern Europe: new perspectives on ¥ugoslavia's disintegration I edited by Lenard J. Cohen and Jama Dragovle-Sose,

p. em. - (Central European studies) Includes bibliographical reli:rences and index. ISDN 978-1-55753-460-6 (aile. paper)

I. ¥ugoslavia-HislOI}'-1918-1945. 2. ¥ugosIavia-Histol}'-1945-1980. 3. Nalionalism-¥ugoslavia.

4. Europe-Polilics and gov.:mment--1989- I, Cohen. Lenard]. n. .

Dragovic-Soso. Jasna.

DR I 298.S75 2007 949.702-dc22

2007004052

To Dennison Rusinow (1930-2004) A fine man, wonderfol colkague. and distinguished scholar.

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ROLE OF THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE'S ARMY IN THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA:

THE ARMY WITHOUT A STATE?

• Florian Bieber •

171C YUJ.:OSI;1I' AI1nydcJca/J:(1 Yugoslmia more he;wi/y illall ;111 dIC llaliOJw lc<ulcIS, their miJjlia, their volumccss end their WI- 1i0JJaI gu;ur/s pUllogcther. It coald 110t, hOIll:vcr, /laJ'C brought victolJ'to all)'OIIC, lcast ofall to its"'l:

-StOjaIl ('croviet, 1991

, , . Idlc/ JNA ... became all aIm." withou: a s/;Ilc, 1111ich is :I uuiquo esse ill the world.

-Vcliko K;U/jjCI1C. 199iJ

back on the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the failure of the army to prethe country. Yugoslavia's last minister of defense,' Veljko Kadijevic, noted that purely military measures can be successful against a policy, unless they are in me hands of another policy. The other, Yugoslav policy did not exist. it ..... "UlJ ....... contradictory and paralyzed."2 Indeed. the Yugoslav People's Army If.OSIJweflrska Narodna Armija, JNA) in the last years ofYugoslavia's existence suf-

from inherent contradictions between viewing its primary role as preserving

, and at the same time seeking radical unilateral changes to me system that remcompanbte with the reform debates that shaped the late 1980s. The alliance revenmauv transformed the JNA into a partner, albeit never fully in line, of the government. was neither a foregone conclusion nor based primarily on ties.

This chapter follows me transformation of the JNA in the years preceding the of Yugoslavia and seeks to explore why and how it became associated theSerbian side in the dissolution process. It will seek to challenge simplistic

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; 1he Yugoslav People'S Army 10 me Ul~~OlUUUll Ul .1UOV~l""" I

'1).6 The support in the removal of Rankovic had been particularly significant the minister of defense. Ivan Gosnjak (1953-1967). had been a key ally of

I.lIDlWVII,;. with whom he had opposed political reforms? By 1971. a majority of , perceived the main threat to originate from na~ionalism rather ~han fr~m , aggression. When Tiro opted for the suppression of the Croatian Spring 'the dismissal of the leadership of the Croatian League of Communists. the

" allied itself with the suppression of the both liberal and nationalist movement

Croatia. which had begun to challenge the party's dominance. For the first time. veterans' organizations had also become a key tool to reassert control in Croatia. ~foIJow'ing the purges in Croatia. Tiro invoked in several speeches the domestic role

, the armed forces. emphasizing that "our army must not merely watch vigilantly borders but must also be present inside the country."8 At the same time. the !inHI~enlce of the army came to be seen as being too great.

Later on, TItO would note that "the chief guardian of the achievements of our !ttvc)lution should be the League of Communists. not our army."9 The army did not its force to assert its influence autonomously but. rather, stabilized TItO in crucial

mOlnenlts by leaving no doubt about its loyalty. This domestic support was recognized who pointed to the internal importance of the JNA: "our army is also called

to defend the achievements of our revolution within the country, should that necessary." 10

: The combination of the domestic use of the armed forces and the absence of an

,', . political identity would come back to shape the behavior of t~e J!,,~

the late 1980s. Anticipating the inabiliry of the army to play the role of savior the collapse of the country in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the leading Croat I,;,UrnmUllIl'" functionary Vladimir Bakaric noted in an interview with a German

IhC\iI$Dapl:r in the early 19705 that Tiro's authority was so great that nobody in ~u~'osl~lvia could inherit it, not even the army. II

A specificity of the Yugoslav army was its high degree of formal autonomy. had elements of sovereignty and its own legal system. Until the 1980s, the was linked to the national income, not the GOP. In addition to its source

, funding, the army controlled a large sector of the economy through

armament industry and ran its own foreign trade," In addition, it set the comlanguage and sent its own deputies to party congresses and assemblies of , republics and the federation. In educational and social terms. the army ~Iso inaiin~linc=d a distinct health and educational system apart from the rest of society. control of the army on the other hand was formally limited. The minister of was always a career officer. formally a member of the government. and an

d ed b h . .. 13

!tx~()It1ICIO nonvoting member of the presi encj, propos y t e prime minister

'to parliament but in reality chosen by a collegium of senior generals. The minisof defense was thus under control of the army, and not the army under civilian ""I;t.nuvl.14 There is little doubt, however. that the formal autonomy of the army was in check by the League of Communists, who effectively constituted the only

explanations for the army's suppOrt for the Serbian side in the conflict, such as .. disproportionately high share of Serbs in the army. Instead, it will examine the rurional interests of the army and its loss ofideological orientation. Here in n:ll·ri ... II~r: a comparison with other federal institutions and their position during the disl;olulliil~ process is necessary. Additional attention will be paid to the problem of the disintegration in terms of the recruitment crisis prior to and during the early of the war. In understanding the relationship between the army and Milosevit. it ' also crucial to address the clear distrust displayed by the regime toward the .' ',' as exemplified by frequent purges in the army and the militarization of the force during the 1 990s. 111e key argument of the chapter is that it was the we:ilknm" of the army, both ideologically and strucrurally within the late Yugoslav system, facilitated its support for Serbia during the conflict.

The Structure and Role of the Army after Tiro's Death The Yugoslav People's Army emerged together with the Communist Parcy slavia as the key vicrorious force from World War II. The Partisan victory olnstiruirM, a founding myth that besrowed upon the army a degree of legitimacy that none the armies of other Communist countries enjoyed. with rhe exception of the Red Army. Although originally not highly professionalized and with little colltinluity to the prewar Yugoslav army, the Partisan forces rapidly transformed into a army modeled on that of the other socialist armies in Eastern Europe.3

During the Tltoist era, the army was formally highly independent but in closely associated with the League of Communists and controlled by the Parcy. Yugoslav army had been inherently political. shaped by the development of League of Communists and being both a powerful symbol and key domestic This symbolic importance of the army. based on the Partisan war. was carefully vated by official and popular culture. The symbolic foundation empowered Ul!'o,lUU!".1! of former Partisan generals within the armed forces and advanced the miIitarwwQi of society in the educational system and other spheres.'

While generally tasked with the defense of the country from outside. important; in the face of tensions with Italy in the immediate postwar period and after 19~i8\l1im; the Soviet Union. the army constirured a key support to the regime do,me;tic~ Generally. the army exercised this role on behalf of the Party and state independent actor. However, considering that most of the key conflicts in Yugoslavia rook place within the Party. it often took sides within the Parry.

the dominant role of Josip Broz Tito, the army's key alliance was with the ' President and Marshal of Yugoslavia. The army thus came to act with ronorny in times of crisis when its support for Tiro helped srabilize the regime.

army played a decisive role in supporting Tiro during three key episodes in,'

war Yugoslavia: during the break with the Soviet Union (1948), over me of Aleksandar Rankovic (1966), and in the purge of the Croatian party leac1CJ3rup

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The Yugoslav People's Anny in the Dissolution of Yugoslavia

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source of political authority for the army. The choice of the minister of defense-an high-ranking personnel decisions in the army would not be made without consent, In addition. the minister of defense would traditionally be a '" the Central Committee of the League of Communists. Nevertheless. the army , crated largely separately from civilian structures and institutions. This collSicler.!I:!: autonomy. in the words of the political scientist Miroslav Hadiic. gave rise to tarchic tendencies as shown by the top generals' strivings to become turlctiomllJ] detached from society.""

The increased decentralization of the state starting in the mid-I960s the army despite its high degree of autonomy. In response to the Soviet inv'3Sicln'( Czechoslovakia in 1968. Yugoslavia established republic- and province-based

torlal defense (Teritorijal1lll odbrana, TO). Formally. these units together JNA constituted the defense system of Yugoslavia. but factually they rc:lI, ...... O;U· .. ~ in terms of equipment and manpower. The territorial defense units were not following the boundaries of the republics and provinces but operated in guage of the respective republic (or province) and had commanders from the republic or province. The leadership of the JNA held a critical view of the ten:itol~ defense units. seeing them as a competition to the army's established dominanci and as embryonic republican armies that might undermine the state. As such. JNA sought to curb the independence of these units in the 19805. well conflict between the republics and provinces escalated. with the army arrempdng disarm the territorial defense in 1990-91. The Kosovo TO was already ug. ... UJ,.u; the aftermath of the March 1981 riots, and by the mid-1980s. Secretary Branko Mamula established greater control over the units throughout the ClIulnfr'lrk The 1974 Constitution also complicated the command structure of (he JNA

and gave rise to the operational organization of the armed forces following can lines. as will be discussed later. The decentralization enhanced the lmportano of the army's intelligence agency. the Counterintelligence Service (KI1ntJraolfJafltitA#I sildba. KOS) because the Slate Security Service (Sluiba driavne bezbednosti. had been decentralized along republican and provincial lines. 16

In addition to the structural impact of decentralization that shaped the political and ideological consequences were probably even more signibC3lllL:!t general. the army. especially the higher ranks. was more Yugoslav in ont:lUilU'''' more dogmatic understanding of socialism than the rest of the party. This is structural reasons. such as extraterritorial stationing. greater mobility within slavia, as well as due to historical reasons that linked the army to the Partisan

and the conservative and authoritarian structure of armies in general. The not have political officers who ensured the ideological dogma of the armed forces.

the League of Communists of Yugoslavia maintained a separate Organization League of Communists in the JNA (Organizacija SKj-a u JNA. OSKj). which for obvious reasons influential in the army. The separate army organization was established to ensure party control but. ramer. as a consequence of the dec:entralwlicl

the party that saw the establishment of separate organizations for each republic. the League of Communists of Yugoslavia thus became the association of

republican parries'and the republican parties did not provide for an adequate ,"UI~~Ul'-.u home for party members in the army who were not necessarily linked to republic: the army organization of the League of Communists was qcsclbl~she.:l. The OSKj generally constituted part of the conservative grouping of ipar:tf organbations during' the reform debates of the 1980s. Within the overall party.

, army organization was not particularly important numerically. In 19n some 6 (97,424) of the total party membership was active in the army or police," in 1988 the OSKj had some 76,000 members. However. this arrangement the army to participate in all party structures and enabled members ofOSKJ l~Jlorrnullatc and express the army's position. In face, the creation of the separate army

[9IJliUlizat'ion resulted in a process that occurred as a consequence of the decentralizathe League of Communists from a Yugoslav party that expressed countrywide with some regional variationS to a "transmission belt" between republics

provinces) and the federal structures. and ultimately to an eventual "voice" of ,IW,"iR:PUDIJC5. As such. the OSKJ was less and less the reflection of the Party's voice the army but the army's voice in the Party. Nevertheless. the influence of the in the army. in turn, is obvious when considering the number of Party mern-

, : at different levels in the army hierarchy. While only 12 percent of soldiers and and 24 percent of the young officers belonged to the Party. 31 percent of the officers and 33 percent of the civilian staff were Party members. IS

Other key political and social channels of communication of the army were the '~.---.-' organization. the Federal League of World War II Veterans (SUBNOR). other civilian organizations with close links to the JNA. such as the Alliance of

Reserve Army Officers (SRVS). the newspapers and magazines it published (e.g .• armija). and the representation it enjoyed in parliament and government all levels. 19

Numbers Game: Ethnicity in the Army

controversy during the late 1980s. as well as in the ensuing literatu re on the of the army in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. has been the ethnic composition of ~fficer corps of the army and its implications for the JNA suppOrt for Miloievic. 'lU~1l0~ll!:n originally composed of the Partisan forces. the new Yugoslavia soon strove

b,uild up a representative army. The rnulrierhnic nature of the army was not only ·in the general effort to structure Yugoslavia as an inclusive state but also based ~e experience of the Royal Yugoslav army. which lacked legitimacy because it viewed by non-Serbs as being dominated by Serb officers."

. The 1974 Constitution enshrined the principle of proportional reprcsenin the high army ranks. drawing on earlier attempts to ensure the army's

IcpllCSC:nt<lltivenC:5S of Yugoslavia's population. Article 242 of the constitution required

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The Yugoslav People's Army in the Dissolution ofYubrosiavia

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source of polirical authority for the army. The choice of the minister of defense high-ranking personnel decisions in the army would not be made without consent. In addition, the minister of defense would traditionally be a "'~""~"'k~ the Central Committee of the League of Communists. Nevertheless, the erated largely separately from civilian structures and institutions. This considerabl autonomy. in the words of the political scientist Miroslav Hadiit. gave rise to tarchic tendencies as shown by the top generals' strivings to become nll't.:l'Ulla detached from society.""

The increased decentralization of the state starting in the mid·I960s the army despite its high degree of autonomy. In response to the Soviet Czechoslovakia in 1968. Yugoslavia established republic- and province-based torial defense (Teritorijalna odbrana, TO). Formally, these units together JNA constituted the defense system of Yugoslavia, but factually they remained in terms of equipment and manpower. The territorial defense units were not following the boundaries of the republics and provinces but operated in me guage of the respective republic (or province) and had commanders from .republic or province. The leadership of the JNA held a critical view of me defense units, seeing them as a competition to the army's established dOllllir!an~ and as embryonic republican armies that might undermine the state. As JNA sought to curb the independence of these units in the 1980s. well conflict between the republics and provinces escalated. with the army attempnng) disarm the territorial defense in 1990-91. The Kosovo TO was already dis:am1edl the aftermath of the March 1981 riots, and by the mid·1980s, Secretary Branko Mamula established greater control over the units throughout the The 1974 Constitution also complicated the command structure of the JNA

and gave rise to the operational organization of the armed forces following can lines, as will be discussed later. The decentralization enhanced the important of the army's intelligence agency. the Counterinrelligence Service (/G~ntTIIO'blll'ldt.qn sluZba, KOS) because the State Security Service (SluZba driavne bezbednom. had been decentralized along republican and provincial lines. 16

In addition to the structural impact of decentralization chat shaped me the political and ideological consequences were probably even more signilllcaJlt.!J general. the army. especially the higher ranks. was more Yugoslav in onencauon ,~, more dogmatic understanding of socialism than the rest of the party This is structural reasons" such as extraterritorial stationing. greater mobility wimin slavia, as well as due to historical reasons that linked the army to the Partisan

and the conservative and authoritarian structure of armies in general. The not have political officers who ensured the ideological dogma of the armed tnn~.lhllili the League of Communists of Yugoslavia maintained a separate Organization League of Communists in the JNA (Organizadja SKj·a u JNA, OSK). which for obvious reasons influential in the army. The separate army organization was established to ensure party control but. rather. as a consequence of the de<:enltralizatiOJ

the parl)' that saw the establishment of separate organizations for each republic. the League of Communists of Yugoslavia thus became the association of republican parties and the republican parties did not provide for an adequate """,,,»HILumli home for parry members in the army who were not necessarily linked to .particular republic. 'the army organization of the League of Communists was ~~CS12bIi,shed. The OSK) generally constituted part of the conservative grouping of ~plft)' organizarions during the reform debates of the 1980s. Within the overall parl)'. organization was not particularly important numerically. In 1977 some 6

(97,424) of the total party membership was active in the army or police," in 1988 the OSKJ had some 76.000 members. However. this arrangement the army to participate in all party structures and enabled members ofOSKJ

~!II)JOlrmlJlalte and express the army's position. In fact, the creation of the separate army ~~mil~tion resulted in a process that occurred as a consequence of the decenrralizaof me League of Communists from a Yugoslav party that expressed countrywide with some regional variations to a "transmission belt" between republics

provinces) and the federal structures. and ultimately to an eventual "voice" of republics. As such. the OSKJ was less and less the reflection of the Parey's voice the army but the army's voice in the Parey. Nevertheless. the influence of the in the army, in turn. is obvious when considering the number of Party rnemat different levels in the army hierarchy. While only 12 percent of soldiers and and 24 percent of the young officers belonged to the Party, 31 percent of the officers and 33 percent of the civilian staff were Parry members. IS

'. Other key political and social channels of communication of the army were the organization. the Federal League of World War II Veterans (SUBNOR). other civilian organizations with close links to the JNA. such as the Alliance of Army Officers (SRVS). the newspapers and magazines it published (e.g .• armija), and the representation it enjoyed in parliament and government levels. 19

Numbers Game: Ethnicity in the Army

controversy during the late 1980s, as well as in the ensuing literature on the of the army in the dissolution ofYugoslavia. has been the ethnic composition of "", __ . __ ... __ • corps of the army and its implications for the JNA support for Milosevic. !§~rulDloultll originally composed of the Partisan forces. the new Yugoslavia soon strove

build up a representative army. The mulriethnlc nature of the army was not only the general effort to structure Yugoslavia as an inclusive state but also based . the experience of the Royal Yugoslav army. which lacked legitimacy because it viewed by non-Serbs as being dominated by Serb officers.2O

The 1974 Constitution enshrined the principle of proportional represen· in the high army ranks. drawing on earlier attempts to ensure the army's ~ql~eseilltativc:ness ofYugoslavia's population. Article 242 of the constitution required

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The Yugoslav People's Army in the Dissolution of Yugoslavia

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that "the composition of the strategic staff and the employment in the high and leadership functions in the Yugoslav Peoples Army has to ensure the tional representation of republics and autonomous provinces. "21 While this

tion did not stipulate strict proportional representation, it followed the t"nl~~nr~ the "ethnic key" that pertained at other levels of state and party offices, in in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Measures taken to ensure the representativeness of the included the introduction of national and republican quotas in military schools. addition, within the republican quotas, the respective majorities had priority minorities, which in effect confirmed the "national" nature of the republics sought to counter the overrepresentation of Serbs from Bosnia and Croatia in army in particular.P

Despite these measures to broaden the army's base, Serbs. Monrenegnns, Yugoslavs continued to be grossly overrepresented in the officer corps. whereas ficers from most other nations made up a part smaller to their share of the tion (see Table I). At the time of'Tito's death in 1980, the command of the dominated by Serbs. including the minister of defense, chief of the armed and the secretary of the LCY committee in the JNA.2J The mismatch is further ible when comparing the distribution of officers and recruits. Among recruits. tions with a relatively young population structure (Albanians. Muslims) consdnne a share exceeding their overall percentage in the population. This meant that the most underrepresented nations among officers constituted a dlsproportlonatd large share of the total number of recruits. pointing to a source of tension creased during the 1990s and also impaired the use of the army during a conflict. The disproportional distribution among officers in general has tobe differentiated. particularly in light of the constitutional requirement OfpCC)P<llnil)ii

clearly does not refer to all officers but only to the highest ranks. As a result. representation of different nations in the highest ranks followed more closely the DODllllation census than in the officer corps in general. For example. generals from fully reflected the population share, whereas Slovenes remained considerunderrepresented in other ranks. as can be seen in Table 2.

" The overrepresentation of some nations in the army has a multitude of causes the consequence of structural reasons rather than deliberate policy. Only with imminent outbreak of the war could a pattern of discrimination of staff along lines be noted. The national composition of the army can be explained by offacrors, often with different emphasis dependent on the perspective. SoCiooconom,lc explanations suggest that families from regions with higher unemployand lower salary levels were more likely to encourage men to choose a career the army than did those from more prosperous regions in the country. Individual for choosing military careers. including the social and economic origin of

particular family. are particularly important." As Moris Janowitz argues in his of army recruitment patterns in the developing world. the "military esrab"~" ... ~' .•• has its social origins among the rural middle and lower middle c1asses,"27 socio-economic bias of army recruitment is thus a phenomenon at work with

Jloh:ssi()naJ militaries elsewhere around the world." Here. the goal of proportionconflicted with the army's policy to favor career soldiers from modest origins with a workers' and farmers' background." Reducing the discrepancies in the composition through socioeconomic factors might be satisfactory to explain .. :~ri:II'inn between Slovenes. Croats. and Serbs from Croatia. However. it fails to the overrepresentation of Serbs over Muslims. Macedonlans, or Albanians, prone to hail from the lower strata of society. Here other reasons need to be

.~

Table 1: Representation of the main nations and nationalities 2: Ethnic: distribution among higher ranks of the JNA2S
general population and the anned forces (in percentages)U Lieutenant-
Among Generals Colonels Colonels Majors
t. In Yugoslavia In Active Army Officers in% in% in% in%
Nations (1981) Staff(198S) (1981)
Serbs 19 12.4 257 11.0 411 6.7 225 6.4
39.7 57.17 60.0 22 14.4 219 9.4 661 10.8 364 10.4
Croats
22.1 12.51 12.6 12 7.8 103 4.4 394 6.4 236 6.7
Yugoslavs 1.3 n.a. 6.7 3 2.0 28 1.2 109 1.8 82 2.3
Macedonians 5.81 6.74 6.3 12 7.8 72 3.1 142 2.3 68 1.9
Montenegrins 2.5 5.82 6.2 n 50.3 1,511 64.5 3,896 63.5 2,102 60.0
Slovenes 8.2 2.64 2.8 0.7 5 0.2 15 0.2 8 0.2
Muslims 1
8.4 3.65 2.4 6 0.3 15 0.2 14 0.4
Hungarians 2.3 n.a. 0.7 7 4.6 123 5.3 422 6.9 360 10.3
Albanians 6.4 1.09 0.6 18 0.8 73 1.3 46 1.3
Others 3.3 n.a. 1.6 153 2,342 6,138 3,505 ,'.:

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FLORIAN BIEBER

considered. Other arguments place greater emphasis on cultural reasons. including higher respect for and prestige of the armed forces and military service and careers in some parts of Yugoslavia. such as in the Krajina region of Croatia and in rural Serbia. Arguments include less credible cultural and historical references, such as the legacy of the vojna krajina. which brought with it a history of militarization in the regions of Croatia along the Bosnia border, More relevant is the Partisan legacy ef the armed forces and the fact that a disproportionately large number of Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia partook in the Partisan forces. which reflected itself in the officer corps during the period of Socialist Yugoslavia. Thus. the number of Serb generals oscillated between 38.1 percent (1953-54) and 46.6 percent (1969) in Socialist Yugoslavia. but Serbia as a republic remained underrepresented among generals . with only 13.98 percent being from Serbia in 1970. increasing to 28.47 percent by 1980. On the other hand. the republics that saw most Partisan warfare during World - War II. Croatia, Montenegro. and Bosnia. accounted for the overwhelming number.· of generals: in 1970.39.07 percent (1980: 30.56 percent) of generals came from Croatia, 17.2 percent (1980: 11.11 percent) from Montenegro, and 17.56 percent (1980: 15.28 percent) from Bosnia.30 The national distribution thus needs to be. viewed in connection with the republican distribution. Efforts to make the army more representative thus focused not exclusively on the national background of the

officers but also on the republic of origin. .

By the 1980s, the unwillingness of the army to reform itself had also become an increasing reason for the reluctance of many to join the armed forces, in panicular in Slovenia, where the army became increasingly subject to criticism by the vibrant. civil SOCiety.3lThe overrepresentation of Serbs. in panicular from Croatia, cannot be reduced to a single explanation but is instead the result of a complex set of reasons,' including socioeconomic factors, social prestige, and association with YugoslaVia. as well as the legacy of the Partisan war. Unlike in other spheres of public authority, the principle of proportionality is more difficult to implement in the armed forces. lite hierarchical nature of the institution and it reliance on long-term ascent through the ranks rendered any attempt to construct a representative army leadership a long-

term project at best.

Generally speaking, the ethnic distribution should not lead to conclusions about

the behavior or political orientation of the army. The party did not perceive itself as being biased toward one particular nation, and most ofits staff. especially among its higher echelons, identified more strongly with Yugoslavia as a whole than with particular nations or republics. Only once the dissolution began, as will be discussed later,

did the national composition manifest itself as a considerable factor in the development of the jNA. Although the generals of the army were not fully representativ~ of the population structure, they were nevertheless more so than lower ranking officers. As Mile Bjelajac discusses in his study of the Yugoslav army. the distribution of the highest army offices. such as the head of the party organization. the commanders of __ army, navy, air force, and intelligence services, as well as ministers and deputies in '

The Yugoslav People's Army in the Dissolution of Yugoslavia

309

[he ministry of defense did not favor Serbs. suggesting that the greatest distortions could be found in the officer corps but not among the highest officials. nor among recrules." It would thus be misleading [0 attribute the strategic choice of the army [0. the distortion in the officer corps.

However, with the escalation of the Yugoslav crisis, the army had become more heavily dominated by Serbs. As the former commander of the fifth army in Zagreb and later Croatia's firsr minister of defense. Martin Spegelj. details. all key positions in the fifth army in Zagreb on the eve of the war were held by Serbs, whereas only a few years earlier some 50 percent of the command positions were held by Croats." The transformation of the jNA at this late stage, however, was linked with the erosion of the army and the increasing alienation from the nonhero republics. The ethnic bias thus followed the political conflict, rather than vice versa.

The Army and the Reform Debates

The weakness of the army became apparent in the 1980s as Yugoslavia at large came . under increasing pressure to reform itself. Although the army was an autonomous institution predestined to become a key actor in the post- Titoist period, it lacked a coherent political vision. Being a "system" rather than a single institution. the army, with its military. industry, and Party structure, was more dependent on [he political and economic climate and interlinked with the larger society than it had often

. thought itself to be.

As Miroslav Hadiic suggests, the army was hardly a single unified actor.J41he leadership of the army including the minister of defense. the chief of staff. and the tOP commanders of the different army units found themselves increasingly drifting apart in the late 1980s. Furthermore, the leadership of the jNA was constrained by the draft and a large officer corps and finally the economic component of the army's activities. As a result. the army should be viewed as a system that became increasingly unmanageable in the second half of the 1990s. Although the ministers of defense. especially Branko Mamula and his successor Veljko Kadijevic, projected the image of representing the army as a whole, the political decisions of both could hardly reflect the entire JNA.

By the early 1980s, the army was torn between its role to maintain the status-quo and the self-perceived need to reform the decision-making process in the country. __ , The president of the OSKJ. General Georgije jovicic. noted the army's priorities " . _: in reforming the Yugoslav system: "Generally speaking, Communists in the army

believe that our political system is complicated, and in some aspects incomplete and inefficient. The army ... can only realize its function .•• if the political system ... is stable. efficient and capable of action. "3S jovicic openly identified the key causes for these difficulties to lie in the federalization of the SKj and the disintegration of

the Yugoslav marker." This and other pleas for the reintroduction of "democratic . i centralism" in the League of Communists and opposition to "federalization" of the

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The Yugoslav People's Army in the Dissolution of Yugoslavia

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FLORIAN BIEBER

party and the strengthening of the "all-Yugoslav" character of the JNA were curring themes in the public discourse of party officials in the army and the leadership in the first half of the 1980s.37 These calls for changes stood in with the army's emphasis on "preserving the system ('the constitutional Yugoslavia" as being the army's "prime concern." The protection of the existing justified opposition to domestic challenges to the status quo in some rep'UDlucs,I_!Il provinces but was difficult to combine with the IN};s call for fundamental to the same order it was charged to uphold.l8

In the first half of the 1980s. the army lacked a partner at the rc:pIUD11IWU1~~~ who would support increased centralization while maintaining the overall and the role of the army therein. On the contrary. the army was corlfrolntc:d~~i civil unrest in Kosovo in 1981-demonstrations turning to riots demanding [Us of republic for the province-pressure from Slovenia for greater uoeransm autonomy of the republics. and the ever-growing economic crisis. The army presence in Kosovo not only incurred high financial costs but also uncienn.iD.1 its legitimacy and popularity among Kosovo Albanians. who constituted one larger groups of army recruits.39 The JNA further faced reductions in its suppOrt from the federal budget and had to accept criticism ofits autonomous tion while seeing the federalist order of Yugoslavia further challenged . ....acllleVlc..w became secretary of defense in 1988. justified the comradiction between fCOentcilll tion and preserving the existing order by saying that the JNA had [been] given the task of defending the constitutional order [while being] abused

that same Constitution."40 _

The challenge of decentralization did not only affect the state but army directly:' Kadijevle would later note that since the mid-1960s the state being deliberately dismantled. including the army. The 1974 Constitution wai viewed by him as a step toward breaking up the JNA. 42 Similar calls ~UJK" decentralization of the army came from the Belgrade media. The well-knownicui nallst Aleksandar Tijanic. for example. attacked the decentralization of the and noted that the "defense of a federal state is the function of the federal not the republics.43

The targets of criticism were the aforementioned Territorial Defenses republics and the territorial organization of the JNA itself. which followed republican borders.~4 As Martin Spegelj later noted. these features coniStitUfCj:lj,: "guardian of the essentially confederal elements of the 1974 Constitution.D4S the army had few successes in advancing the centralization of Yugoslavia as a the reorganization of the armed forces in 1988 significantly reduced the autonclD;i of the republics and reintroduced the dominance of the JNA. The resttuCluri!l rested on two pillars: one was related to the internal structure of the JNA. affected the relationship oITOs and the JNA. The first measure reduced menWlIlll of armies {the term used for military districts}. which had followed mostly

can boundaries. The six armies (Belgrade. NiS. Skopje. Zagreb. Ljubljana.

(TItograd). and the navy (Split) and air force (ZemunlBelgrade) were o-' ..... u ... ;u to five forces. including three armies (Zagreb. Belgrade. Nil). the navy. and

~orce.·6 As Veljko Kadijevi~ points out. the new "territorial divisions completely the administrative borders of the republics and provinces."~7 According to Spegelj. Lieutenllnt-General Milan Daljevic, who worked on the changes. the abolition of the armies along republican lines because the armies had

to be too close to the republican leadershlps," The army also abandoned the of appointing generals to the armies from the respective republics,"

second component of changes affected the TOs. While still formally separate. subordinated to the theatre commands of the JNA. and thus the JNA reesstronger control over these units.50 However. this degree of control was not

I$¢mp.lete as the JNA had desired. leading to the 1990-91 JNA campaign to disarm Already in 1988. during the changes to the structure of the armed forces. the Kosovo was formally abolished after it had been de facto disarmed in 1981.)1

:j

.,

_,

the crisis of Yugoslavia and the outspoken criticism of the status quo by the

leadership. fear or hope for a coup d'etat by the armed forces become common • Mamula. despite his political outspokenness. rejected the "Jaruzelski seeand consistently noted the army's reluctance to directly intervene in politics. Mikuli~. the Yugoslav prime minister in 1987. explicitly noted that if the constirutional order were threatened. he would use all means necessary to

· it. "and that includes the army.")' Even this threat. however. did not foresee iridependent role of the JNA.

. iThe crisis of the Yugoslav system expressed itself economically. as well as by 1naeasc:d calls for liberalization in Slovenia and ongoing tensions in Kosovo. Furtherthe previously unchallenged authority of the army also eroded in the 1980s.

1985 a number of incidents occurred against officers. especially in Kosovo, as '~ in Split. where srudents of the naval academy were beaten up after a soccer · These incidents by what the army considered "lrridentists, various separatists unitarists"SS furthered the sense of self-isolation of the army.)!; The .. Paracin mas; when the Albanian recruit Aziz Kelmendi killed four fellow soldiers in army · in 1987 in Central Serbia particularly polarized the army. While it remained it was mental illness or nationalism that motivated Kelmendi, media and the army response considered it to be "a shot against Yugoslavia."SJ

~DSC:quc:ntJ:y. nine Albanian soldiers were sentenced to prison terms of twenty to I1CIlltv-IWO years for forming a "hostile group and spreading hostile propaganda."ss described the motivation to be "fanatical hatred towards Serbs and MonreneIY~IUIUIII Kosovo and support for his [Kelmendi's] proposals for actions under the of Albanian chauvinists of ethnically pure Kosovoand the breaking off of the from Yugoslavia."S9

v

.I'LUKJI\J'I Jjl.l!.Jj.l!.K

'Ihe YugoSlav rcop,es .nnllY III Ute: Ul»V'''uvu V •• u6~··-

The incident was not only lnsrrumentalieed by the Serbian rnecna-rnn Milokvic's rise to power but also by the army. Leading generals and Mamula

the incident to demonstrate the problems of the sene, including ·AII'-'>",i"' •• ·tp ....

ism." and to call for a stronger role for the army.60 .

As mentioned above. the economic crisis directly affected the army. . terms. the budget for the armed forces had declined in the 1980s, and the efforts of the Branko Mikulic government reduced the JNA's financial The shortening of the military service from eighteen to twelve months in justified as reflecting a better level of education of the youth but was in fact :. the result of the costs of the longer military service.61

The crises also strengthened calls in Slovenia for greater 1I00eraIlZlllUOln.lJ.! support for the JNA dropped. with many recruits from Slovenia not reponine duty.62 France Poplt, the president of Slovenia in 1987. laid most of the the army itself: "If, today, there is no interest in the military profession, either'" . the Slovenes or among the Croats. Kosovars, the citizens ofVojvodina, and : then the blame for such a situation must be honestly shared by all of us, JNA. as the most responsible factor. to the last communal administrative The army responded sharply to this criticism and appeared further colilvina:d'(lf;tl organized nature of the attacks against the JNA.64

concept of the special war-a conflict against domestic and external fIDIles--l1laa been part of the army's training and preparation for decades. It is no that changes that Yugoslavia encountered in the 1980s were perceived by.the inylea1delship not from the point of view of a domestic crisis but of an army trained

basis of strategic plans against foreign threats and domestic collaborators.68 siege mentality of the JNA was reinforced by a series of articles in the SioveiWI~stUclent magazine MkzJina, which had been on the forefront of challenging the emalinirlg taboos. In an article entitled "Mamula. Go Home" published in February the paper sharply attacked Mamula for supplying weapons to Ethiopia during js:F.iJmin,e.The Sloven ian media that took up the issue suggested that Yugoslavia got ;:"'A;,;"r:,.: •• wrong: it was the eleventh-largest weapon exporter but only the 112theconomic power." Following the attacks on the weapons exports, Mamula himself by suggesting that the arms exports are normal around the world the armament industry is a key employer.7o In addition, the army leadership up the attacks against its critics. The paper of the armed forces. Narodna

singled out the youth publications in Slovenia (and to a lesser degree elseas the primary source of the attacks against the JNA and linked the style to attacks in the Dlaspora media.7lThe conflict between Mladina and the army

in May 1988 when the army arrested journalists from the magazine for ~H,oss:essiion of secret documents on army plans in Slovenia. Both the documents arrest of journalists polarized public opinion in Slovenia-against the army federal state and effectively pushed the Slovene party leadership eventually

io'p'positic,n [0 the army.n

the media critique and the counterattacks by the army leadership and party continued, the funding of the armed forces indeed constituted a key source It,o)n~ention in the federal institutions. with the army arguing for increases and advocating cuts.n Mamula spoke openly about the problems of the army first time in parliament in late 1987. There he noted that 12,000 soldiers and

of the]NA did not have apartments and that the response to recruitment drives 'been declining by 15.5 percent between 1986 and 1987 and by 37 percent the year? Similarly, Vdirnje novosti defended the need of the army to receive

ddltional funding by pointing out that according to the amount of money spent .solider Yugoslavia found itself well below its neighbors." With rwo-thirds of , budget allocated to defense. the presidency decided in 1988 to cut the personne! of the army by 12 percent in peace and 10 percent in wartime. Delays in payment of the budget to the army and high inRation further reduced the funding

, the ]NA, increasing its financial crisis and causing continuous tensions between ,me;armlyand republics that sought to curb army financing.76

Although the Slovenian critique of the armed forces had been nearly unilaterally by the party, in 1988 Mamula had become untenable as secretary of national due to his virulent response to criticism. Furthermore, the army had threatened Slovene leadership with direct intervention against "counterrevolutionary activities"

"Special War" and the Crisis in Slovenia Nineteen eighty-eight was a decisive year in the evolution of the tionship to reform in Yugoslavia. Because the army had earlier formullatea~it opposition to multiparty elections and signaled its support for a rugher centralization of Yugoslavia. the critique of the army in Slovenia and its

. set the scene for placing the army against the emerging pluralism in rne.wesre republics. The mounting critique of the army was described by hiI:h-ltallkil1lgaiJl officials as a "special war." reflecting the isolated view of society within in the mid-1980s. By grouping together different types of critiques, raneiiilsdiid demands to financial cuts, greater openness to decentralization of r-h,',,,,""';.:·" even the dissolution of the state. the army closed itself to substantial en~r.tg.emi:ni with the reform discourse and considered any critique of the army an .attadcfon the state and thus a crime. As a result. the army's doctrine of total Oec:IDII:£sdff defense was defended by Admiral Stane Brover, deputy minister of deferuie.:~i 1988. and he described its opponents as being "aggressive and collStitutinJ!["Pa: of a special war."6S The term special war was particularly popular in the used by Mamula." Hinting at a large conspiracy, Mamula took up a theme,tba would dominate the army's and its top leadership's explanation ofdC\relolp.ml~ht in Yugoslavia in subsequent years: "[I]r is clear that this is a special war clear that its creators are not the editors of single papers or magazines. but. these are just the implementers."67

314

•

FLOlUAN BIEBER

with the consent of the presidency.77 The increased tension between his teadersmp 3J~ the party and republican leadership from Slovenia and Croatia coincided with ing opposition in the two republics against the governmem of Branko Mikulic whole. Mamula's retirement in May 1988 was thus an apparent attempt to the overall government that would resign only half a year later. During the 1IQ;51UI.1 III; which Mamula's resignation was announced, the Mikulic government could vote of no confidence by a wide margin. Mamula's replacement, Veljko Kadijevic.

only three years younger (sixty-three) and had been his deputy. However, during conflict between the Slovenian press and Mamula, Kadijevic had been largely and was thus perceived as being a less politicized choice." In the aftermath of the conflict, the army and the Slovene leadership sought to address some of the Wlllln»,,' which included compromise on army funding, publishing the army paper 1V8_ft"'. armija in Slovene, and putting up signs at army installations in Slovene, but - J'-~'-, Gow notes. "it is hard to conclude that the publishing of Narodna armija in Slovene. was enough to combat the damage done by the trial" of the M/m:Jjna journalists.79

Kadijevic as Minister Although Kadijevic appeared to be less outspoken than Mamula, his conservanveand dogmatic world view largely coincided with Mamula's. Throughout the final years •.... of Yugoslavia. Kadijevie supported the recentralization of Yugoslavia and remained' hostile to the introduction of multiparty elections. Nevertheless. his shift in .... ,,""" ,'" from Ante Markovic toward MiloSevic between 1988 and 1991 is indicative of the '. larger transition made by the army and parts of its top leadership.

This continuity between Kadijevlc and Mamula was not only a consequence the fact that they had been close associates. Similar views on the political engagement of the army could be found in the public statements of most army and minisny defense officials. As noted earlier, the army had a vested interest in a strengthening .. of the cen tral government. The fact that the party had become relatively weak as a . : cohesive force and the Yugoslav governments had been unable to either . the status quo or engage in successful reforms had deprived the army of a patron clear ally well before the party formally broke up in 1990.

Kadijevic, like his predecessor, noted in October 1988 that "Yugoslavia can: exist only as a true federation or else not at all. Thar is why neither the unitary the confederal system can be alternatives to the Federal system."80 Clearly. he the organization of Yugoslavia at the time as being "the most complicated thing world has seen .. ," and noted that "the 1974 Constitution inevitably led the ~n •• nr".~ to dislnregrarion,"!' Kadijevic and Mamula also shared their view that the critique from Slovenia was parr of an orchestrated campaign organized by the Slovenian leadershlp." The Slovene member of the last Yugoslav presidency, Janez Drnovsek, repom in his memoirs that his repeated request for the release of the journallsts'] of Mladin« were rejected by Kadijevic and the pro-Milosevlc presidency members

The Yugoslav People's Army in the Dissolution of Yugoslavia

315

.>.tl;)c[IJla. Vojvodina, Montenegro). During one of these discussions, the president of < Slovene presidency, janea Stanovnik, poignantly told Kadijevlc that "[i]f you do 'oot listen to us now, you will negotiate with separatists the next time."u

'; Despite the army's rejection of budgetary cuts and attempts to link it to a plot

against the JNA. the army was unable to confront the fundamental economic crisis. .• 'Although newly elected Slovene member of the presidency Janez Drnovsek was sur. by KadijeviC's liberal economic views,84 the army leadership neither endorsed 'economtc reform nor had any answer to the economic crisis, resulting in an "appar-

helplessness in the face of the country's fundamental problems [that] has served 'to reduce their influence on civilian institurions."1S

,

, j

1

JNA and the Rise of'Milosevic

, The rapid rise of Milosevic to power in Serbia was the key transforrnative event in me second half of the 1980s. Not unlike the intellectuals who would ultimately find an ideological partner in Milokvic, the army only gradually built up links with the

'. Serbian president. As the events until 1991 and the repeated purges of the army after 1991 demonstrate. the alliance between the Serbian party and the army was never tf;,.c:O,mlplete and often was motivated by different priorities.

During the crucial Eighth Session of the Central Committee of the Serbian League of Communists. when Milokvic took full control of the party and sidelined his mentor .. Ivan Starnbolic, support for Milokvic came from Nikola LjubiCic, who had been minis:.:' tee of national defense before Mamula and continued to wield great influence within the '.' party and the armed forces. He had already been a key actor in TItO's purges of the liberal :' J party leaderships in the 1970s. Mamula suggests in his memoirs, however, that LjubiciC's support for MiloSevic did not reflect a broad position within the army. which at that

'point did not maintain direct contacts with Milokvic. Despite the support Milosevic received from the retired Generals Ljubicic, Graeanin, and A1eksandar Simic, evidence not suggest close ties between army and the new Serbian leadership in September 1988.86 However, in December 1988. after the resignation of the Mlkullcgovemmenr,

Kadijevic proposed Milosevic as prime minister to the president of the presidency, Raif 'Dizdarevic.87 MiloSevic himself. however, rejected the proposal, probably recognizing me weakness of the position of the prime minister.88 From Kadijevic's memoirs it clearly

• emerges that Milokvic sought to focus on Serbia. whereas Kadijevlc, possibly naively,

thought that his "political authority and proven abilities, especially his ability to find . ' ••. 'simple solutions (0 ... could create a turning poinr."89

. At the same time. MiloseviC's use of extralnstirutlonal means to consolidate his

power, such as the support and organization of mass protest throughout Montenegro and Serbia in 1988. alarmed parts of army. In response. Mamula suggested that "[i]f

. me search for solutions for the crisis is being made outside the system, there will be me emergence of decision making centers, which Incorporate even more chaos into me society and every organized measure to overcome the crisis will be impossible.''90

316

FLORIAN BIEBER

'Ine Yugoslav Yeoples JUmy 10 me UlllilliU1UUVU V1 'U!;V~'"''''

-;

Perar $imic. head of the OSKJ. condemned even more explicitly the of the people": "The mass protests can be a contribution to the svstern-destrnenon Every mass protest ... includes the possibility of manipulation. abuse and ... ~'''u ..... behavior of human beings,"?' This critique suggests that although Milosevic vks joying the support from some senior military figures. such as the Generals " and Gracanin. his tactics met with resistance among the high ranks of the JNA. "

Kadijevic's and the JNA lead<;rship's support for Milosevic was never firm and fluctuated throughout the last years ofYugoslavia. Franc Serine, a ~IClveJliaJj representative in the Central Committee of the League of Communists. remembers being told by General Buncic that "we in the Yugoslav Federal Army UNA) arc for Milosevic!"; a position echoed by Kadijevic and Mamula in a meeting with Kuean and other members of the Slovene leadership during military maneuvers Slovenia." Although arguably the statements of the army toward the Siovenian ership have to be evaluated with caution considering the strained relations since Mladina affair. Prime Minister Ante Markovic similarly suggested that KaI~ljeYl~ support for Milosevic was far from unwavering. Markovic noted chat the between him and Kadijevic were at first often better than KadijeviC's contacts Milosevic."

The loyalty of the Serbian and army leadership was linked to the I.IIIW1;""" government's endorsement of the concept of centralization. The changes to Yugoslav constitutions. driven by Serbia. satisfied the JNA. especially because improved army financing.94 Similarly. the army leadership broadly agreed with Serbian leadership over Kosovo's being a key threat to Yugoslavia's srability." army had been concerned by what it termed nationalist "outbursts" among recruits from Kosovo." During the June 1989 commemoration of the 600th versary of the Kosovo battle, Kadijevic expressed reservations to Drnovkk Serbia's policies in Kosovo,97 but the army supported the overall approach. it was only with the end of the League of Communists that the alliance " .. , ....... ", ... JNA and Milosevic intensified because the only other political patron had ceased to exist.

in the words ofPetar $imic, head of the OSKJ, it would "further enhance

-,.-:---~

llliinaIJOII'itll:,. split within Yugoslavia."lol Although the army grudgingly accepted the

lifllluitiparty elections in 1990, its relationship with political pluralism continued to be '''''''''".'-'--_. Thus, still in October 1990. the deputy secretary of national defense, Milan noted that the army accepted pluralism despite resulting in more cridcism

JNA.I02

In 1988 and 1989 the army leadership expressed its disappointment with the of Communists increasingly openly. Petar $imic attacked the party particu,strongly. accusing it of "opportunism. vacillation, insufficient ideology and "103 Warning that the army would not tolerate the feuding in the Central lli"..onIrn,ul;:c, he noted that "in the postwar period we have never faced greater danto the integrity of the country," but "if someone has proclaimed the battle for ~t'ltlltOS:1avlla. this battle will not be fought without the JNA." The number of political ~StafCJlnClnts by the army increased in the course of 1989 and took a more conservative Despite the forceful appearance of the army. the army recognized its own conin having an impact on the overall political situation. As Milan Andrejevich "is [there] really a federal party left for the army to defend?"l04 or how could

army defend Yugoslavia in the absence of a federalally? With relations between

dlllidiil!VlC and Ante Markovic increasingly strained, mostly over economic reforms the unwillingness of Markovic to reject the newly elected leaders in Slovenia and 1£ ... ' ...... " ........ the federal government no longer constituted a clear ally. The strength of llitlt1cA<larJtovlcgovernmentderived less from its limited formal powers than from the WlPilpuJarity of Markovic himself and his reforms. The presidency, with members that from the republics and provinces, had transformed itself in 1990 from includonly high-ranking officials of the respective Leagues of Communists to includrepresentatives of the newly elected governments, including Stjepan Mesic from

~~!, •• Will"" 'UI .. Janez Drnovsek from Slovenia. This left only the League of Communists

" apolitical "forum" for the army. The party's fragmentation, the dissolution of the 1ill-",JltuCl:itl party following the "interruption" of the Fourteenth Congress, deprived the of the only remaining means of pursuing its political agenda.

In October 1989, the army for the first time defined its political platform, ~J'lrmgmg together the different elements that Kadijevic, Mamula, and the army ~ldetShiIP. as well as the OSKJ, had formulated over the years. Largely, the political combined strengthening of the federal state with limited economic reforms

rejection of political pluralism. lOS

These views of the leadership largely coincided with the positions held by m.Jmlcml)ers of the OSKJ. Some 84.3 percent supported more powers for the federal 1Iiii-';:stlt,carlt:l democratic centralism in the party. There was also support for competition ~"'tlCtWeencandidates and some degree of market economy.l06 The ninth congress of the shortly before the last congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia,

~j:mnhmned this platform. The congress also refused to accept any link between the of socialism in Eastern Europe and the future of socialism in Yugoslavia.107

.z:

The End of the SKJ Contrary to the retrospective claim by both Mamula and Kadijevic98 that was largely supportive of multiparty politics and democratization, the army any liberalization of the political system for a remarkably long time.99 The '

tion of multiparty elections in 1988 by Major General Simeon Buncic as Yugoslav and anti-Communist" was therefore unsurprising. He linked phllr:lli~ with the destruction of the armed forces and the state, a recurrent motifin the opposition to multiparty elections: " [C]ompromise and break up of the armed [are) a means of achieving their final goal, the destruction of Yugoslavia as a federal stare:"OO The JNA Continued to reject multiparty politics even in late 1

318

FLORIAN BIEBER

The Yugoslav People's Army in the Dissolution of Yugoslavia

•

319

The last congress of the SKJ in January 1990 was a turning point for the The OSKJ together with the Serbian League of Communists favored centra1l7J1 state and pany, or in the words of Stane Brevet, deputy minister of defense: . republics become states with all the attributes of statehood, then it will be sible to talk of the statehood of Yugoslavia .... I think neither the LCYor members should adhere to such stands."los Key links between the party o1]:aniizatioj at the time were Nikola Ljubicic, who had been president of the Serbian after Srambolle and later briefly Serbian member of the Yugoslav preSII1I:nc;t'I

to Borisav Jovic), and Petar Graeanin, minister oflnrerlor under Markovic dent of the Serbian presidency after the dismissal ofIvan Stambolic, Both to the Partisan generation and had been crucial in securing MiloSevic's leglitiJt~ the dogmatic and conservative wing of the party. Nevertheless, the OSK] was unified in its support of the Serbian party's tactics. Perar Simic, for example, has against the marginalizing of the Slovene party.IOO As a result, the army's rejected a vote in favor of an economic blockade against Slovenia. 1 10

The Siovenian delegation, on the other hand, favored the contederalizadn of the party, a position for which it found some support in Croatia. Many of republican parties oscillated between the two positions and were more concerne with preserving the cohesion of the SK]. While the OSKJ only accounted of the 1,457 delegates, it found itself in agreement in key issues with the delegation, which accounted for 38.7 percent of the total number of delegates. gerber with some delegates from the other republics, the Serbian members outvote the requests of the Slovenian delegation and find support for the a new, more centralist consrlrurion.'!' The systematic outvoting of the proposals triggered a walkout by the Siovenian delegates, followed soon most Croatian delegates. As a result the congress was adjourned. de facto ing up the federal party. The congress was a display of the failure of crude ity rule in a complex and multinational environment. Although the party army and Serbia (and its allies) dominated, they were unable to impose their on the rest of the country. In fact, the party congress was one of the few decision-making bodies that required neither consensus from all republics least support from the majority of the republics. The dilemma between a political solution and building a consensus between the republics would

the JNA's indecisiveness in the follOWing year. Threatening the northern the army sought to enforce its vision of Yugoslavia, while at the same time it away from enforcing its position without the formal consent of the .key instirurlon, the presidency. After the congress of the party was adjourned. litical and ideological uncertainty of the army became increasingly pronouncedz As a consequence. the army leadership remained deeply ambivalent over calls depoliticization of the JNA II)

Borisav Jovic, who had noted previously his concern with the strong ties Markovic and Kadljevlc, observed optimistically on February 22, 1990: "It is

for once Veljko has 'seen through' Ante Markovic. He has always been obsessed 'the notion that Ante is fighting from Yugoslavia."114 During the elections in 1990. ...",r .. ". rl,·"rllv favored the League of Communists of Serbia' (renamed Socialist Party SPS) and Montenegro by demonstr:atively welcoming the Parties' victory

the first round of electidns, whereas the army papers attacked the winners in and Slovenia. I IS The increased polarization and the disappearance of a clear dtologiica1 roof for the army brought to the foreground the ideological differences army leadership, with Kadijevic and Stane Brovet appearing more moderate the chief of staff. Blagoje Adiic.116 The conflicts within the top leadership of the focused on the alliance with Milwevic and the possibility of a military takeover. ~)Cding to Ivo Korruic, member of the presidency of the League of Communists the army leadership, lead by Petar Simic, approached the Bosnian party ltad!erslltip in March 1990 informing them of the army's plan to carry out a coup. discussions in Belgrade between army and party officials. divisions within

army leadership over a coup became apparent with eventually Simic opposing it. negotiations, according to Korruit, included Raif Dizdarevic, whom the army as prime minister to replace Ante Markovic.117 Although the discussions to naught. they exposed the fragmentation of the army leadership. which in explains the procrasrlnadon of the army when offered the possibility to take in 1990 and 1991.

Generally speaking. the army had difficulties maintaining ideology cohesion, was not only a consequence of the more dogmatic position of the army vissociety at large but also had structural causes. The information flow within the much slower and more hierarchical than in civilian structures, resulting in credibility and reduced responsiveness than the republlcs.!"

The founding of the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia (Savez amu:ms''Il-'l'OI~ret za Jugoslaviju. SK-pzJ) in November 1990 sought to fill the void resulting from the disappearance of the federal party organization. 1 19 apparently the initiative of the army's top brass, it ended up becoming a tool Milosevic regime. Because the party was only founded in November, that is. the elections in all the republics except for the ones in Serbia and Montenegro,

ability to gain seats in any of the parliaments was constrained. 120 While running in ibsequenr electlons in Serbia, the party never received more than marginal electoral The new League of Communists carried over much of the structure of OSK]: the entire party organization formally joined the new party.122 However. percent of the members joined the new party, which received hardly any in Slovenia and Croatia. including among army staff.123 For example, the

of the fifth army, Konrad Kolsek, noted that the "JNA leadership spent nearly with the party. the SKJ, which has already broken apart and which could not . brought back to life."'24 The new party also included dogmatic ideologues from including Mira Markovic, the wife of Slobodan Milosevic. Despite this perlink between the SPS and the new League of Communists, the reception by

'Ihe Yugoslav People's Army 10 the Lnssolution or rugosravia

the Serbian media of the new party was largely negative.'2S The party was to for a ~olitical home [or "old-fashioned" SUpporters of Yugoslavia and dogmatic rnumsrs, whereas the Socialist Party of Serbia opened itself more toward and a (limited) discourse of reform, 126

Around the same time as the SKJ-pzJ was founded. the presidency toward banning party organizations Within the JNA. The establishment of

Pz] can be seen as a preemptive move to prevent the army from losing its rure-Kadijevie banned political party activities already in October 1 ban also complicated the link between army and the Party. By January 1. Party activities were permitted within the army. ConSidering the cOI~hf:ur;ltioIJr the conflict and the emerging party pluralism. the army leadership acted as were a party in the final months of Yugoslavia. 128

the republics and the army become visible. The topic of the debates was iIie-refi.JSal of the Croatian government to disarm special police units following a of the presidency on January 9 to disband all "unauthorized formations," as by the Ministry of Defense already on December 11. 1990.132 The formuof the presidency's decision had been unclear because it did not define which it considered paramilitary. and the army undertook no measure to forcefully any unit. In effect. the army leadership itself remained undecided about which

to undertake and against whom.133 It was only clear against whom not to When Anron Tus, commander of the air force and from September chief the Croatian army. suggested the lifting of the blockades set up by Serbs,

u .. , .... ,', .... , Kadijevie responded. according to Tus: "Do you really wane the Serbs to

that the JNA is against them?"I~

The fact that the army did not intervene more forcefully can be attributed only to the ambivalent presidency's decision but also to the lack of clarity the army leadership on how to confront democratically elected republican

eaderships, During the well-known March 1991 sessions of the presidency, the and Veljko Kadijevic undertook a last attempt to obtai~ presidency suPP?rt

a more forceful intervention. us Already a few days earlier, the army had m,""_vl'r ... tI with presidency support against protesters in Belgrade. 136 In addition to a precedent for civilian intervention. it was the first time t~e army interon behalf of the Milo~evic regimel37 and was clearly a perceived threat to

other governments. As Miroslav Hadiie argues. the intervention could have , interpreted as a type of "ethnic neutrality" as the army signaled its readiness against Serbs. 138

Already in late February the army leadership had prepared the key March

)resitdel~cy session together with Borisav Jovie. Kadijevic notes that although in Croatia and Bosnia. as well as Serbia and Montenegro supported Yugo~ Slovenia and Croatia were favoring independence. with Macedonia and wavering yet leaning toward the northern republics. Kadijevic proposed

hepresldency session, strengthening the Krajina Serbs and organizing mass rallies the governments of Bosnia, Croatia. and Macedonia. and disar~ame~t units. The plan. especially the organization of mass demonstrations. lithe loss of perspective in army leadership to which even Jovie responded skepticism. 139

The meeting of the presidencyHo on March 12. 14. and 15, 1991. was held together chiefS of staff and well orchestrated and filmed (on March 14 and 15) by the JNA attempt to put pressure on the presidency rnembers.!" The meeting was held i.n barracks and was summoned by Borisav Jovie. the Serb presidency member via iteh::vision. While Jovic in his memoirs notes that he was not clear what Kadijevie would propose, the congruence of interests was clear. 142 During his introduction, Kadijevie S~t me tone of the meeting: "the foreign &aor is already here ... we also have domestic , • forces. fascists, Uswa. Cetnic, White Guards. Ballists, Bulgarophiles .... Once

The Failed Coup During the final year of Yugoslavia, the conflicts between the republics and the first local conflicts. in particular in the Krajina region and eastern in Croatia, indicated the real risk of civil war. In 1990 and 1991 rumorsofa army intervention had repeatedly circulated. 129 Although or perhaps because army had been formally depoliticized and "its" party was not represented-in parliament in early 1991, the army de facto took a more explicit political role sought to intervene in the conflict. The fundamental difficulty was the the JNA had no coherent plan to respond to the challenges around ie. As Kadijevic correctly notes in his memoirs. a conventional coup would have chance of success because it would have been necessary to topple anything two (Slovenia and Croatia) and seven governments (all republics and leQl=m,'.':

Recognizing the inability of the army to intervene at such a large scale inherent coneradiction of the legal coup that the army strove to accomplish support of Serbia in Spring 1991. Mter this failed in March 1991, the government abandoned centralizing Yugoslavia over the creation of an Serbia. The army followed but only reluctantly. By the time the first shots fired, the army had equated protecting Serbs in Croatia with pn:)te(:tirllgsuPI>oi'1fei of YugoslaVia. That equation would see to the dissolution of the old subordination to Serbia (from May 1992. Federal Republic Serb srarelen in Croatia and Bosnia.

In early 1991. the army leadership proposed four measures to th~

authorities. i neluding the suspension of all republican laws and acts ;

federal laws and constitution, reform of the constitution and economy, sertirig a

for a new constitution, and protecting Yugoslav independence from outside. onstrating the isolation of the army. the proposal received only limited support the federal government and also did not find majority supporr in the pre,sidc:nCl,.~.I:

During presidency meetings on January 24 and 25. 1991. the unbridgeable diftererla:Si

322

FLORIAN BIEBER

The Yugoslav People's Army in the Dissolution of Yugoslavia

323

1. Impose a state of emergency

2. Mobilize me JNA

3. Bring the defense system within the fiamework of me law, disarming all paramilitary formation

4. Reach an agreement on the future of Yugoslavia

5. Propose a new constitution followed by Yugoslav-wide dcctions'44

:,pll'eSlaellt of the presidency, reconvened a presidency meeting for March 21, thus ;salbOltllgiing the attempt by Jovic to render the presidency lneffecdve.?' According Ante Markovic. Kadijevic laid out to him a plan for a coup d'etat, following

· me failure to win support in the presidency. The plan was to arrest the Croatian and Slovene leadership. Kadijevic had the plan ready but needed political sup-

· port, which he hoped to receive from Markovic. After Markovic pointed out that .me plan failed to arrest Milosevic, Kadijevic responded, "He is the only one who ". is fighting for Yugoslavia. Without him, we could not be proposing this."152 After .'Markovic refused to endorse the plan, the communication between Kadijevic and ,Markovic broke down.153

During a meeting between Milosevic and Jovic with the army leadership.

'.WI..U ... UI; Kadijevic, Stane Brover, and Blagoje Adiic. the army backed away from idea of a coup and instead proposed to raise combat readiness, mobilize. and an ultimatum by which the weapons would have to be collected. Only if this .' ,were to fail, Brovet suggested a blockade of the governments rejecting the measures.

· military administration. and even the use offorce by me army. I S<! Even these measures _were not fully pursued by the army and Kadijevic. who had become reluctant [0 act

autonomously. This lack of army intervention brought about tensions with Jovic, noted in his diary on March 22, 1991: "All possibility of defending Yugoslavia .. b3s been lost ..•. Defending the Serb nation's right to self-determination is realistiimpossible without the JNA. because the Serb nation is not armed."155 Despite tensions between the Serbian president and the minister of defense, Kadijevic come around to the Serbian position. In response [0 [he failure at the presidency.

'I\aICIIJf:VlC: notes that he considered but rejected me collective resignation of me general lSI> Instead, he answered the concerns Jovic expressed above: " [TJ he army, relying political forces in the federation and in the republics which wished to live in · 'Yugoslavia, while peacefully parting with those which wished to leave it ... this

• •. meant protecting the Serb nation outside of Serbia and assembling the JNA within · the border of the future of rugoslavia,"!" In this strategic shift. the army leadership

• chose to align itself with a particular vision of Yugoslavia at the cost of abandoning a consensual and possibly more decentralized Yugoslavia, as had been proposed by . Macedonia and Bosnia. This shift, completed in March 1991, could be traced back · at least to June 1990, when Kadijevic agreed to a similar proposal made by Jovic. In '. August 1990, he mentioned to Drnovsek the possibility of Slovene lndependence.P" · At the same time, he remained skeptical, as Jovic notes in January 1991: "He .• [Kadijevic] has not yet 'swallowed' the idea of defending Serb territory in Croatia. · -He still believes in the defense ofYugoslavia."I)9

The key conflict between me Serbian leadership and the army in the subsequent

· months thus focused less on the goals but more on the unwillingness of [he army [0 intervene. Kadljevic continued to support the Yugoslav constitutional framework. such election of Mesic to head the presidency in May 1991 while Jovic and Mllolevic .' blocked his election. By May. Jovic had given up on direct support from the army,

",-,

again we are clashing with them in a struggle for Yugoslavia."I4lJn response ro this he proposed to the presidency that it would:

The central role of the army in implementing the plan was underlined by Adiic, who told the presidency: "I think that we are the only remaining element society that is executing your decisions .... The JNA has no purpose without Yu~ • slavia .... Accordingly, no one should think that we are fighting for the army-We' are fighting for Yugoslavia. and I hope you are too."145 Because of the heavv-nanded appearance of the army, most presidency members remained reluctant to give army a free hand.

During a one-day break, Veljko Kadijevic went to Moscow to receive support' . from [he equally conservative Red Army and ministry of defense, including Minister:' .•.. of Defense General Dmitri T. Jazov. Kadijevic had been suspicious of the West believed that "the Yugoslav state depended directly on the fate of the Soviet for the balance between the blocs. While jazov was apparently sympathetic, he unable to help, Vuk Obradovie, a close aide to Kadijevic later noted that Kadijcvic .' told him upon returning from Moscow that "the Russians are up to their necks iJi mud, and aren't even capable of helping themselves, let alone us ... "147 During the same time. Drnovsek and Mesic had been back in Ljubljana and Zagreb for consul: . rations. During the one-day break. Blagoje Adiic, the chief of staff, suggested . . . openly than Kadijevic to carry out a coup d'etat and depose the government and " •

presidency if the presidency would fail to support the army's proposal.!" .

The proposal was watered down on March 14 from army mobilization to "com- ': bat readiness," but it become apparent that the army proposal would not receive me ," necessary support. Neither the Kosovo Albanian representative Rlza Sapundziju . the Bosnian representative Bogie Bogieevic, who were considered possible allies in • addition to the firm votes of Serbia (Borisav jovic), Vojvodina (lugoslav Kostic). and . Montenegro (Nenad Bucin), were ready to support the proposed army intervention.' I n response Jovie developed the plan whereby he and his two allies in the presidency .• would resign to paralyze the presidency. This would provide the opporrunity for the ., army to intervene in the absence of a functioning civil supreme command.i" After: ' . , the presidency failed to support the army proposal on March 15, Jovic announced - I· his resignation on Tv. and Milosevic subsequently declared Serbia's decision to not . recognize.rhe decisions of the presidency.l:50 .

Against the hopes of the Serbian leadership. the army decided not to intervene and stage a coup. This was in part due to the fact that Stipe Mesic, as deputy

exclaiming, ."1 have had eno~gh of this empty talk by the militaty.1 no longer confidence m them. They will neirher undertake nor do anything. that is clear."J60

. In addition to Kadijevic's indecisiveness, torn between the perceived need Intervene and the constraints of accepting the institutional framework, the of ~.e reliability of the army came to the fore. Although the leadership could po~JtJcal actors,. they required the whole machinery of the army to aCtually

active. Some of ItS Staff, such as Srevan Mirkovic, were convinced that the .

remain coherent and that soldiers would follow orders, even among Albanians ,.' Kos.ovo. J6J As the war would show, the ability to deploy would be considerably con- • straJne~ by the mo~ilization crisis. During just the first weeks of the war in Croatia. . accordmg to Croanan army officials, some 1,000 soldiers desened. J62 Not only did th.e JNA fall apart as a Yugoslav force by increasingly drawing on Serb recrui[S; itaho .. failed to secure Serb recruits, as the COntinuous recruitment crisis demonstrates.'s later Kadijevic would note that "mobilization became a key limiting factor in'c:ar- " rying alit plans to deploy the JNA, more than all the other problems put . :. and much larger than the armed capacity of the enemy armed forces."J64

Conclusion

The JNA found itself humiliated after [he brief war in Slovenia and still uncertain of its ~ole. The attempt ~o save Yugoslavia through military means clearly saved ~Iovema. Although, there IS no space to discuss the reasons for the army's failure, it ,',' Increased the.armys .dependency on Serbia in terms of manpower, financial sup- , pore, ~n~ a~,lde~logtcal r~ad ~~p. It slowly became the force that would· protect' .' the Mllosevlc regime and Its military goals in Croatia, Bosnia, and later in Kosovo. " 11lis transformation was accompanied by numerous purges. First, most non-Serbs were removed or sent into early retirement in July-August 1991. In early 1992, the pro- Yugoslav army leadership was forced out, including Kadijevic, who resigned o~er the shooting down of an EC helicopter by the JNA in January 1992 over Croatia. The new VOjska Jugoslavij~ (VJ) of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. would continue to be subject to purges and never stood as loyally to the Milosevic regime as the police forces did. Neverthc:less, members of the army, trained in the Geneva Convention before Yugoslavias dissolution, committed countless war crimes from

Croatia to Kosovo. .

The. chapter. has s~ught to address two key questions pertaining to the role of ,.,. the JNA In the dissolu non of Yugoslavia. First, how was this powerful and fiercely" Yugoslav force unable to prevent the slide to war, and second, why did the army evennlallyalign itself with the Milosevic regime? A simplistic answer to these questions, such as reducing the complex role of the army to the ethnic affiliation of its leadership or officer corps, cannot explain the evolution of the army. Instead. this chapter explores the army as a complex institution [hat rarely spoke in one voice or was driven by exclUSively one inreresr. During the crisis-shaken 1980s the army

ine rugosrav reopie S tlI'my 10 rne UISSOIUDon 01 1 ugol;JaVla ·,'.sm~~;leCI to maintain the political order, that is, the Communist system and [he while arguing for greater centralization in state, Party, and army (ac~mplishonly the latter to some degree). As the debates over change and reform m,Yugowedded on the one side liberalization with decentralization and on the other ·'...,,' ... rvarivism and centralization, the army's allegiance fell with the latter, prevent-

it from being an effective arbiter. .

The second key issue in this chapter has been the uneasy alliance between v _ •••• a..... representing large parts of the army leadership, and Milosevic. The coopbetween Milokvic and Kadijevic and other members of the army leadership not automatic, nor was it due to the fact that "he and many of his colleagues Serbs, but because Milosevic was defending socialism."l6s In fact it grew over

last years of Yugoslavia, based on the personal relationship between the two. , ideological dogmatisms, and MiloseviC's pragmatic ~se. o~ ~he arm!. .' Kadijevic's indecisiveness and the inability of the army ~o ful~1I MII~sevlcs ~Ian, m ., the March 1991 coup, constrained the relationship, as did the different

C"QC:jUCes of commitment to Yugoslavia.

, '. Examining the role of the army in the dissolution of Yugoslavia highlights the

~pOwerlessness of this army whose military might and social i~Auence had. been a " ".myth within and beyond the JNA. As a multinati~nal a~my, relying "" rec~ms from throughout Yugoslavia, it could not intervene effectively m the emergmg natJo~al con,', Funhermore, at the officer and leadership levels. the JNA incorporated different

f,"backgroun1d$ and nationalities, irrespective of the misbalanccs. These divergent interests ,.: d all lances expressed themselves not so much in open policy debates within the an b: in the inability of the more dogmatic leadership to enforce its will. When studying the successors to the JNA, one cannot limit oneself to the Yugoslav army but has to include all armies in the successor states because they emerged largely from 'staff from the JNA. The personal continuity with armies that became the "enemy" of

the JNA highlights the depth of the internal divisions of the army. .. .

The army leadership itself was isolated from society and fell VIctim to Its own myth about the external enemies of Yugoslavia. ~e a~my struggled si~ce the. I 980s , • with multiple contradictions: it supponed centralization b.u~ defined. Its role m pre" 'serving the order it sought to change; it wanted to be politically active but not a~t 'independently; it wanted to preserve socialism and the state, even when the ~ombl"'nation was no longer attainable. Its ideological alliance with Serbia prevem~d It from

: negotiating a confederal arrangement that might have preserved Yugo~la.vla.

In late 1990, the army leadership warned of the threat of a CIVIl war, and Kadljevle, invoking the civil war in Lebanon that was jus~ winding d~wn~.suggested that he would use all means available to prevent YugoslaVia from turnmg Into a second Lebanon."166 Although Kadijevle, in a conversation with Drnovsek, according to the latter, noted that "if this [war] should occur, one would have to hang us [the generals] for failing to prevent it," the army not only did not prevent the war but let itsclfbecome a crucial clement in its escalarlon.!"

J~J

326

FLOlUAN BIEBER

Notes

I. His formal title: was secretary for national defense.

2. Kadijevil. op clc •• 1993. p. 102. •• - •

3. A. Ross Johnson. The Self-Destruction of the Yugoslav People:s Army. unpublished paper prepared for a conference on "The Military in Democrarlc Societies," Sofia •. November 16. 1991. on file: with author..

4. Miroslav Hadilt. 1he YugOJ1A1I People's Agony: 1he Role of the l1IgOJIAv Peoplt's Arm] (A1dershoc: Ashgare, 2002). pp. 209. 214.

5. Siobodan Stankovit. "Tho and the Army: The Tlto Era in Yugoslavia," RFE Rrport. 100 (May 5. 1980). p. 25.

6. Ibid •• p. 23.

7. Ivo Paparela, "Die Jugoslawische Volksarmee a1s eln politischer Fakcor," SiUfost<Mil'fllil Vol. 39. No.2 (1990). pp, 98-99.

8. ¥janik. December 23. 1997. quoted from Siobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslav Army

Wait-and-See-Attitude," RFE background report Qanuary 13. 1986). __

9. Adam Roberts. Nations in Arms: 1he 1heory and Praaic« ofTtrritoriai Dtfm« (New _

York: Sc. Martin's Press. 1986). p. 203.

10. December 24. 1971. quoted from Stankovic. "Tlro and the Army," p. 25. II. Frankfortu RlInJschau. December 17.1971. quoted from ibid •• p. 25.

12. ln a sign of the limited accountability of the army. it first released derail~ data on the cary-industrial complex in June 1991. The army owned 56 large companies. ~O which were in Bosnia and Serbia. with 70.000 employees and 100.000 suppliers. By many of the staff had been unemployed or on paid leave. and the &aories worked 20 percenc capacity (lvo Jakovljevic. "Bankror vojne industrije," Da1UlS. August 13.

13. Officially called the Chair of the Federal Executive Council (Savezno imino yea.

14. Paparela, op. cic •• pp. 99-100.

IS. Hadiic. 7"e l1IgoslAII Ptople's Agony. p. 211.

16. Marko MUivojevit. "The Role of the Yugoslav Intelligence and Securiry ColmmlunJcy;:' in John Allcock. John J. Horton. and Marko Milivojevit (eds.), YugoslAvia in (New York/Oxford: Berg. 1992). pp. 216-217.

17. Siobodan Stankovic. "A Survey of the Yugoslav Party Membership," RFEBllJrltpTlund;'~

&pon. 152 Qune 23. 1980).

lB. Hadiic. 'Ib« YugoslAv Peopit's Agotry. p. 69.

19. Hadiic. SuJbinapartijske vojskdBelgtade: B92. 2001). p. ia

20. Mile Bjelajac, Die jugOJlAwische Erfahrung mit tin muitiet/hJnischm Armee

(Belgrade: UDI. 1999) Available at: http://www.udi.org.yu/dod_knj.asp?knj = 6.

21. Ustav SFRj. 1974. Art. 242.

22. Hadiic. the YugoslAv Peopit's Agotry. p. 215.

23. J>odruwljasljc varnosti in obrame, 19113-B4. Ljubljana, p. 18. quoted from usttlm~.;: 8/91. A4B2.; Amon Bebler, "Das Militiir in Jugoslawiens Krise," Europiiis(heRllJWNM; Vol. 3 (1991). p. 10; Bjelajac. op. cit .. p. 12.

24. Stankovic. "Tlto and the Army," p. 23.

25. Rrvija Obramba. 4.1991. pp. 56-61. quoted from Wolfgang Osehlies, "Wer hill Jugoslawiens Armee in del Hand," BIOst, AkrutUt Analystn (May II. 1991). Due to rounding. the total percentages mighc not be 100.

26. Auton Behler. "Political Pluralism and the Yugoslav Professional Military," in Jim Seroka. Vukasin Pavlovic (cds.). 711e TragrJy ojYugoslA"ia: 1ht Faiiurt of Dtmomltic Transformation (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1992). p. 116; Vlatko Cvrtila, "Tko je ito u armiji," Danas. February 5. 1991.

The Yugoslav People's Army in the Dissolution of Yugoslavia

•

327

Morris Janowia. Military Institutions and Coercion in Dtllt/oping Nations (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press. 1977). p. 104.

This phenomenon has been widdy studied for the United States. Charles C. Mokos, -Making the: All-Volunteer Force Work: A National Service Approach," Forrign Affoin. Vol. 60, No. 1 (1981). PI!' 18-34; and in devdoping countries, for example. Morris Janowia. Military Institutions and Comon in Dtlle/oping Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1977). p. 104. For the case of Bulgaria see Stephan E. Nikolov. "A Gypsy Military Ahead? A C:ise Study from Bulgaria," Conference Paper. Gtntlla Cen," for the Democram Control of AnneJ Forces (2002).

Oschlies. 0p. cit.

Bjelajac. op. cit.

James Gow. Ugitimacy and the Military: the YUgoslall Crisis (London: Pinter. 1992). pp. 70, 76-77.

Bjdajac. op. cit •• pp. 15-17. Spegelj. op. cir •• p. 21.

Hadilc. the YugOJIA" People's Agony. p. 13.

P"Iitiluz. December 15. 1984. quoted from Siododan Stankovic, "Warnings Against 'Hostlle Elements' in Yugoslavia,D RFE Backgraund Rrport. December 27. 1984. Ibid.

·0 sarnuptavljanju i jedinsrvo," Komunist. June 7. 1985.

Mamula. quored in Siobodan Stankovic. "Yugoslavia Would Resist Any Foreign Aggressor.D RFE. May 16. 1986.

. Gow, op. cit .• p. 70; Branko Mamula. Slulaj jugosl4vija (Podgorica: CID. 2000). pp.35.40.

Vdjko Kadijevic. p. 84; see Gow. op. cit •• p. 72.

As James Gow argues, the federalizarion of the state in faa secured me autonomy of the: army as the ninth unie of the Federation. Gow. op. cit .• pp. 59-60.

Vdjko Kadijevic. pp. 72-73.

Aleksandar TIjanic. "Unurrasnje poreklo spoljne amine." NIN. December 22. 1985. pp.19-20.

Kadijevic. op. clt •• p. 76. As would become clear later on. the complex decision-making structures at the federallevd and the strong role of republics in the presidency as the collective head of state consdrured probably the greatest reason for immobilizing the :limy.

Martin Spegdj. "The Flrst Phase. 1990-1992: The JNA Prepares for Aggression and Croatia for Defense," in Branka Maga! and [yo Zanic (eds.), the W1lr in Croatia and Bosnia-HtTZtgOllina. 1991-1995 (London: Frank Cass. 2001). p. 16.

The fifth atmy. based in Zagreb. covered Slovenia and Croatia without Slavonia and Dalmatla, the latter remaining under navy COntrol. The areas of responsibility of the first army now included most of Bosnia (witllout Cazinska krajina). Siavonia. Serbia. and parts of Montenegro. The third army was responsible for Macedonia. most of Montenegro. Kosovo, and Southern Serbia.

Kadijevil. op. cit .. p. 77.

Spegdj. op. cit .• p. 18

Bjelajac. op. cit .• p. 17

Kadijevic. op. cit .• p. 78. "One of the mosr importanr steps taken ••. was the decision to disarm the territorial defense: and place ic under the control of the JNA.-

Spegdj. op. cit .• pp. 18-21.

Jens Reuter. "Der XIII. Kongress des BKJ," Siidostnlropa. No: 10. 1986. pp. 552-553.

54. 55.

53. Siobodan Stankovic compares the statement with TIro's speech in Rudo in

prepared the ground for the crackdown on the Croatian Spring. Siobodan "Yugoslav Premier May Use Army in Defending System; RFEJia'~g7'OUl'd

March 24. 1987.

Stankovic, "Yugoslav Army Adopts W.1it and See Attitude," January 13, 1986. Simeon Buncic, "Refleksije nacionalizma u JNA,h Komunist. March 7, 1986. quoted from Siobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslavia Would Resist Any Foreign flI<)"""lUr •.

RFE Background Rtpon, May 16, 1986, p. 13. . !

56. Borba. February 18, 1986; january 4/5, 1986, quoted from Ostturopa, Vol. 36, (1986), p. A491.

57. See julie A. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths ana Truths Starud a 1f{tr (Berkeley: of California Press, 1999). pp, 145-158.

58. "Strole kame,· Vtltrnjt novosli. May 8, 1988; Zdzislaw P. Gwozsdz. "Natie)flaliQlrar, zwist in jugoslawiens Kasernen. A1banische Soldaten vor MUitiirgerichten.~

january 21.1988.

Tanjug. May 7, 1988.

Siobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslav Military Leaders Warn the Oppositjon.~ "S".C.D.tza<o."

ground RtporlS. September 23. 1987. .

Naroana armija, july 4. 1985. quoted from Oslturopa. Vol. 36 No 10 (1986) P

A491. •. •.

NIH, july 7, 1985. quoted from Ostturopa. Vol. 36. No. 10 (198G). p, A491. '.'

Borba. August II. 1987. quoted from Stankovic. "Yugoslav Military Leaders Wam Opposition .•

Stankovic. "Yugoslav Military Leaders Warn the Opposition." "Napadi POpUt konrrarevolucije.· Borba. March 30. 1988.

"Jasni su ciljevi napada na JNA.· I'olilika. March 6, 1988; see also Mamula. 01'. ~ p. Ibid.

Hadfic, ?ht Yugoslav Ptoplti Agony. p. 10. .. _. "In Belgrad wachS( die Kritik an der Volksarmee wegen Walfenexporten i~ Krisen~ biere," Handtltblall. March I. 1988.

70. Miroslav Lazanski. "Armija bez tabua," Danos. March 29. 1988; Mamula. op. dr.. pp. 122-123.

As evidence for the fact that the attacks constituted a special war. the JNA issued a POrt on Mladina's reporting that noted rhar of 267 articles published on the am:w OIllV' one was objective (Tanjug. April 10.1988).

!II is case is discussed in detail in Gow. op. cit •• PI'. 79-85; Milan Andrejevich. . Yugoslav Military again Criticized by Mladina: RFE Background Rtpom June 16,-

1988. •

73. In fact. funding for the army has been dc:clining since I 97G. ibid .• p. 102.

74. Lazanski, "Armija bez tabua."

75. "Kosovo glavna bitka" Vtltrnjt nDllOsti, November II. 1988. The claim was later dismissed by defense analyst Gersak, who documents that among its ncigltborsonly Greece spent a higher ratio of its GOP on defense; see Gow. 01'. cit .• p. 105.

76. Tanjug. March 3, 1988; Zdzislaw P. Gwozdz. "Die Arrnee flirter hefiig mit der Di~ Pms«; Ocrober 28. 1988.

77. Viktor Meier. "Militars drohren der politischen Fiihrllng: Frankforur AUgtmdnt Zri-

tung. May 16.1988. .

78. Milan Andrejevich. "Prime Minister Remains in Power; New Defense Minister Elected." RFE Background Rrports. May 19. 1988. Mamilla notes thar he decided to

59. GO.

GI.

62. 63.

64. G5. 66. 67. 68. 69.

71.

72.

'Ihe Yugoslav reopie's J\rmy In the 1.I1S501uOOO 01 rugosravia resign because he no longer had the support of the party and state leadership (Mamula. op. cit .. p. 151).

. Gow. op. cit •• p. 87. f

Comments at the Seventeenth Central Committee meeting of rhe League 0 Com milnists of Yugoslavia. October 17. 1988. quoted from Kadijevic. op. cit., p. GO.

-Ibid.. pp. 61. 65.

Ibid.. pp. 99-100.

Jana Drnonek. Mant Wahrh~it (Kitchberg: Srnarrbooks, 1998). p. 55. Drnovsek, op. cit •• p. 33.

Srankovic. "The Role of the Army in Post-lito Yugoslavia."

Mamula points out that General Djordjevic opposed MiI?Jevic's ~ethods during the session. At the same time Mamula's memoirs have to be viewed with some degree of suspicion because he goes to great lengths to p~ent himself (improbably) as a democrat and opponent ofMiloievic (Mamula. op. CIt .• pp. 113. 116).

Oizdarevjc himself only mentions MUoSevic (and Kutan) as candidates but not as those e : ,Who nominated him. He further notes that a number of presidency members supported

the Id of MiloSevic or Kuean as prime minister because this would have removed

. th:r:. ~m the republics and focused their work on the federation (Raif Dizdarevic, Od

smrtll TItaaosmniJugoslavijdSarajevo: Svjedost. 2000]. p. 321). ~

Ante MarkoviC. "Moja istIna 0 smrti Jugoslavij~ (6). Vojska van konrrole, Danos. November 11.2003.

Kadijevic. op. cit., p. lOG. The personal links between Kadijevic and MiioSevic became more apparent by the fact that their f.unilies spent their holidays in August 1989 together. Durin the holidays. Borisav jovic. a dose ally of MiloSevic and the Serb mem~r of

resid!tcy noted thar Kadijevic "has all the same positions as Serbia. That cerramly pUIS ~ dose to the Army- (Borisav jovic.l'olItdnji dani SFRJ lKrar?jevac:. Pdzma. .. 19?6).

45). Mamula notes that upon finding out about the dose ues between KadlJCV1c and truoSevic. his rdations with Kadijevic cooled off (Mamula. op. cit .• p. 158).

Gwozdz, "Die Armee flirtet heltig mit der Politik.-

Ibid.

Svetlana Vasovic-Mekina. "Reactions on Srambolic's Book: Franc Serine between 3 Genius and a Madman; Vmnt NtwS DigtstAgnuy. No. 210 (October 9.1995).

Ante Markovic Evidence. MUosevic (ITo02-54) "Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia" •

23.10.2003. 28OG2-28OG2. Available ae hnp:/Iwww.un.orgiictyltranse54/031 .. 023ED. han; Ante MarkoviC, "Mola istina 0 smrti jugoslavije (6). Vo;ska van konrrole, Danos. November 20. 2003.

Ttmjug. November 25. 1988.

"Kosovo glavna bitka. - . " Srankovic. "The Role of the Army in Post-lito YugoslaVIa. Dmovie!c, op. cir.. p. 62.

Kadijevic. op. cit •• p. 79.

Gow. op. cit •• pp. 92-93.

Tanjug. December 16. 1988.

AP. November 23.1989.

Tanjug. December 15. 1990.

7itnjug.June21.1988. • Milan Andrejevich, "Yugoslav Leaders Issue Stern Warnings to the LCY CC: RFF. BackgrollndRtports. February 1, 1989.

I'olilika. October 19. 1989.

•

330

FLORIAN BIEBER

106. Hadiic. 7h~ Yugoslllll P~opkiAgqny. pp. 61-63.

107. Ibid .• pp. 56-57.

108. Milan Andrejcvich. "What Furure for the League of Communlsts of1(UI!osl.tvia.!':':B, Background &po11l. January 22, 1990.

109. Mamula. op. cit •• p. 167.

110. Konrad KolWek, 1991. Prui pumji u SFRf StiJmja 1111 pot~tak oruianih sukoba':

(Belgrade: Dan Gra£, 2005). p. 28. ;

Ill. jelena Lovric. -Midng istine u Sava cenrru," Da1UlS. 30.1.1990; Dejan IV ... ", 1""""" drilllla koja je odumrlll (Belgrade: 892. 2003). pp. 470-471.

112. Borisav Jovic notes that Kadijevic became dispirited as a result of the f.illed See Jovic. op. clt., p. 94.

113. Milan Andrejcvich. "The Military's Role in Cunent Yugoslav Developments:

Background &p011l. October 16.1990.

114. Jovic. op. cit •• p. 118.

115. Bebler."Das Miliw in Jugoslawiens Krise," pp. 3. 7; Hadiic. 7h~ YugllSlIlu Ag0'!7. p. 81. Some army leaders, such as Simic, also criticized the Serbian and negrin poUrical ellre (Paparela. op. cit., p. 104).

116. Viktor Meier, "Wcshalb der Armee Jugoslawiens das Putschen schemIlt: Fral,kfunerAlIg~~iM Zlitung, Oaober 17, 1990. At the same time, Jovit reportS a .M."";~,,, ~, ....... on the Serbian leadership by AdiiC in February 1990. He criticized Serbia the northern republic through its heavy-handed style and confirming their ....... ,""'.;,.,:" toward Yugoslavia Oovic, op. cit., p. 119).

117. See "Debate on the Wars in Croatia and Bosnia. Pan Il," Bosnia Repon. lan'U3ll'f-ADI 2005, available at: hup:llwww.bosnia.org.ukIbosrep/repon_format.cDn?anicieid

reportld e 167. -

118. Hadiic, ~ YugllSlllll P~opk's Ago'!7, pp. 86-87.

119. See Mamula. op. cir., pp. 189-190.

120. The parI)' president, Stevan Mirkovic called on its members to vote for the 111001as. 7h~ Politia ofStrbia in th~ 1990s [London: Hurst. 1999). p. 77). K:uUjC'VU:-'· mentioned die idea of founding a new socialist pany already in April 1990 cit •• pp. 139-143).

121. The parI)' later transformed itsdf into JUL. the Yugoslav Left. coalition partner

SPS in Serbia until 2000.

122. Hadfic. 7h~ Yugoslllll hoplei AgoIV' p. 80. The founding congress included prominent" army leadership. Graemin, yubiCit. Kadijevic. Mamula. and Adiic. Carl E. "Demoksatische Erneuerung nicht mehr gefragt.w Siiddmtsch~ Zlitung. November 1990; CyriU Srieger, "Politische Ambitionen der Armee Jugoslawieos?" ~ilung, December 6. 1990.

123. Mamula. op. cit •• pp. 189-193.

124. Kolsek, op. cit .. p. 28

125. Viktor Meier. -J\rmeepartei' in jugoslawlen," Frankforter AUg~in~ Zeitung; 22,1990.

126. Many army members. such as the first parry president general •. Srevan MirkOvic. became lnactive in 1991 (Slavoljub Djuklc, Mi/Q;tuit und di~ Macht. &rbims Wei dtn Abgrund I Bad Vilbel: Nidda Verlag, 2000], pp. 95-98).

127. Hadiic, 'Ih« Yligos/allP~ople'sAgo'!7. p. 89.

128. limjng, December 15, 1990.

129. Jclcna Lovric. "Sceoarij ddavnog udara, Da1lJ1S, October 16, 1990, pp. 15-17.

130. K.,dijevic. op. cit., p. 114.

:.'. The Yugoslav People's Army in the Dissolution of Yugoslavia

331

•

:lbid., pp. 108-109.

. op. cit., pp. 257-261.

. CyriU Srieger. "Jugoslawiens Armee im Zwidicht-Ablauf der Frist zur Entwaffnung - der Milizen," Ntw ZUrrh" ~itung, january 24, 1991; Hadiic. 1ht Yugoslllu Ptopki

· · Agony. p. 118. •

J Anton Tus, "The War in Slovenia and Croatia up to the Sarajevo Ceasefire," Branka 'MagaS and Ivo Zanic (eds.). 7h~ \WI, in Croatia and BlISnia-HtrUgOllina. 1991-1995 (London: Frank Cass. 2001), p. 42.

The plan was coordinated with the different :limy units duoughout Yugoslavia. although the commander of the fifth army notes in his memoirs that he received only

· ,minimal information on the plan of me army leadership (Ko1Sek. op. cit., pp. 100-101.) CyriU Stieger, "Jugoslawiens Armee zuriickgcbunden: Ntw ZMrrh" Zlitung. March 15. 1991.

The JNA did. however. have 15.000 uoops stationed in Kosovo since 1989 to suppress

· . Kosovo Albanian opposition to the abolition of autonomy nugoslawiens Armee warnt .: Kritiker,w Siit/deutsdH Zlilrlng. April I, 1989).

Hadiic. 1h~ YrlgDfIlluPn1pkiAgo'!7. p. 119. - Jovit, op. cit •• pp. 276-278.

Dmoriek did not attend the first meeting for fear of arrest but joined the meetings on March 14 and 15.

. The best description of the circumstances can be found in Laura Silber. Allan Lirde, 1h~ lJuJh ofYrlgllSlIlvia (London: Penguin, 1995). pp. 135-139.

JOOt. op, cit., pp. 286-295.

Ibid.

Kadijcvic. op. cit., p. 113. jovic. op. cit .• pp. 286-295.

Kadijcvic. op. cit .. p. 31. jovic repeatedly notes KadijcviC's hope of receiving support from Moscow, i.e •• Jovic (cp, cit •• p. 276).

Filip Svann. "Alter the Battle: The. Generals Write ••. ," Vmn~ Nnus Dignt Agmcy No. 299, June 28, 1997; see also ·Vuk Obradovic 0 tajnoj misiji V. Kadijeviea u Moskvi," DaNIS, No. 11 Oune 14. 1997).

Jovic. op. cit., pp. 295-296; Drnovsek, op. cit .. p. 272. jovic. op, cit .• pp. 296-297.

-Ibid.. pp. 297-306.

See Stipe MesiC. 7h~ Demise ofYugllSlIlllia (Budapest: CEU Press. 2004). pp. 54-55. Kadijcvic later noted that he considered the idea to topple Milo~evic a ploy to destroy Yugoslavia and notes that the two pillars of defense for Yugoslavia were "the Serb nation and the JNA," Kadijcvic, op. cit •• p. 89.

Ante Markovic. "Rupa u planu Kadijeviea, Moja isdna 0 srnrti Jugoslavije (7),N Danas, November 21, 2003. This appears to be a change from 1989-90, when according to Marrin Spegelj. the first minister of defense and general of the JNA. Kadijevlc contemplated to "get rid of both Miloievic and the leading people in the Western republics ... and to return Yugoslavia to the centralist model" (Spcgdj. op. cit •• p. 14).

Jovic. op. clt., pp. 306-310.

Ibid., pp. 310-311.

A meeting of the entire army leadership took place on March 26 witb the commanders from all rhe armies to discuss the f.illure of the presidency to make a decision. During the meeting Kadijevic outlined die risk of a civil war and failure of federal institutions. Subsequendy, the leadership decided 10 take a more active role in: confronting die

i· -:

conRia. During the meeting. Chief of Staff Ad!ic oudined steps for a higher stare o~' , ' alert on me basis of the S-2 plan for an attack from the West (KoUek. pp. 114-117). __

Kadijevic. op. cit •• p. 114. .

Jovic told Kadijevic in June 1990 mat he would prefer to "forcibly expel them "

and Croatia] from Yugoslavia. by simply drawing border •.• , but I do not know : _ •

h should do with me Serbs in Croatia. I am not for me use of foree; ramer I .: .. ,

w at we I v.'-' k DO·J. • 159:

would like to present them with a fait accomp i. CJj 0 agrees OVI ... op. at •• p. ,

DmovSek. op. cit,. p. 234). "

Jovic. op. cit •• p. 264. Ibid .• pp. 337-338. • . . U d • Stephen Engelberg. "In Tattered Yugoslavia. me Annys Loyaldes Remain n ear,

YOrk Tima, March 18. 1991. AP.July 10. 1991. . .. Idi...3, '" Ofi:)ija Backovic. Milos Vasic. and A1eksandar VasovlC. Who Wan." t;::a ~~_I"':'; " The Call-Up Crisis-An Analytical Overview over Media Reports. B "_:' , Ivo Zanic (cds.). 1h~ MIT in Croillia and Bomill-HtTZtgOVina, 1991-1995 (Londenr-" ,

Frank Cass. 2001). pp. 329-345. ' '

Kadijevic. op. cit .. p. 97. Vojin Dimitrijevic. "Socieral and Cultural Prerequisites.for Promotion ~d Imp,lemleD-',:c:

ration of me Democratic Control of the Armed Forces. DECAF. m,rking Pal".

(2002). p. 6. _ . .. _ .

Carl E. Buchalla. "KonRikt in Jugoslawien verscharn sich. sikbkutsrh~ Ze,tung.

December 7. 1990. Drnovsek, op, cit .• p. 245.

332

FLORIAN BIEBER

157. 158.

159. 160. 161.

162. 163.

164. 165.

166.

167.

THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA

o._" ........ ;~WESTERN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1980s

• Paul Shoup •

this chapter we shall reexamine the foreign policies of the United States and toward Yugoslavia prior to the outbreak of war in June 1991. The subject is 2!Qllntl1oversi~LI: the so-called lessons learned. even more so. American foreign policy as we shall suggest at the end of this essay. is in some ways still trying to free

from what many analysts (but not necessarily the author of this chapter) feel a mistaken approach to Yugoslavia-~)Qe based on caution. on keeping one's rather than in active engagement in the Yugoslav crisis. especially before

~~ __ ••••• _. began.

Our starting point will be the 1980s. For Yugoslavia. the decade was a turning (or better said. a disaster). At the outset of the 1980s. Yugoslavia faced a nurnchallenges. the most important being the rapid deterioration of the economy. prospect of the dissolution of Yugoslavia nevertheless seemed remote. By the the decade. Yugoslavia had. for all intents and purposes. disintegrated. Serbs. Slovenes. and Albanians were on the verge of civil war. The international ',DUl~unlUy. for its part, was in the throes of uncertainty. distracted by events else-

collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe}. and alternately hopeful and ~liril1lg that Yugoslavia could be saved.

As a consequence. the foreign policies of the United States and Europe were for their lack of engagement with Yugoslavia during the 1980s; one might call "decade of "nonevents" on the foreign policy front. Only in the late 1980s. with

, of Warren Zimmermann as American ambassador to Belgrade in

1989. did American policy show signs of interest in addressing the Yugoslav By then. many analysts and scholars have argued. it was too late. We shall take . note of these criticisms in the pages to follow. Indeed. the reader must bear in that the literature on the Yugoslav crisis is immense but seldom analyzed in its More regrettable. certainly. is the fact tliar primary sources have not yet been

333