No 23?

Copies

(H1SA-TM-X-61634) EOSTLAONCH MEMORANDUM

HEFOBT FOB M E R C U R Y - A T I A S NO. 9 ( H A - 9 ) . PART
1: MISSION A N A L Y S I S ( N A S A ) 350 p

no/
POSTLAUNCH MEMORANDUM REPORT

FOR

MERCURY-ATLAS NO. 9 (MA-9)( L 0

PART I - MISSION ANALYSIS

| intervals; declassified

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMIN

MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
Cape Canaveral, Florida
June 2k, 1963

nent contains information affecting the national defense of the

~ MiHlMii. |-
I VJ • \J i *** » f

contents
 POSTLAUNCH MEMORANDUM REPORT

FOR

MERCURY-ATLAS NO. 9 (MA-9)

PART I - MISSION ANALYSIS

Idited By: J. H. Boynton, Senior Editor

v R. G. Arbic

^C. A. Berry, M.D.

rfR. E. Day

^P. C. Donnelly

,,W. R. Kelly

J. P. Mayer

^A. B. Shepard

R. E. Smylie

rt C M S
crt cS .H
O >s fl r-l 0
EH pq 0 om

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER

Cape Canaveral, Florida

June 2k, 1963

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section Page

1.0 MISSION SUMMARY 1-1

2.0 INTRODUCTION 2-1

3.0 SPACE VEHICLE DESCRIPTION 3-1

3.1 Spacecraft Description 3-1

3.2 Launch-Vehicle Description 3-15

Ij-.O TRAJECTORY AND MISSION EVENTS U -1

U.I Sequence of Flight Events U-l

U.2 Flight Trajectory U-3

5.0 SPACECRAFT PERFORMANCE 5-1

5.1 Spacecraft Control System 5-1

5.2 Life Support Systems 5-7
5-3 Communications Systems 5-27
5.U Mechanical and Pyrotechnic Systems 5-28
5-5 Electrical and Sequential Systems 5-30
5.6 Instrumentation System 5- 33
5.7 Heat Protection System 5 - 3^
5.8 Scientific Experiments 5-38

6.0 LAUNCH-VEHICLE PERFORMANCE 6-1

6.1 Airframe 6-1

6.2 Propulsion System 6-1
6.3 Propellant Tanking 6-2
6.U Propellant Utilization 6-2
6.5 Pneumatics '.... 6-2
6.6 Electrical System 6-3
6.7 Flight Control System 6-3
6.8 Guidance 6-U
6.9 Abort Sensing and Implementation System 6-5

7.0 ASTRONAUT ACTIVITIES 7-1

7-1 Aeromedical Analysis 7-1

7.2 Pilot's Performance 7 - U-2
7.3 Pilot's Flight Report 7 - 7U

8.0 FLIGHT CONTROL AND NETWORK PERFORMANCE 8-1

8.1 Flight Control Summary 8-1

8.2 Mercury Network Performance 8-12
Section Page

9.0 RECOVERY 9-1

9.1 Recovery Plans 9-1

9.2 Recovery Operations 9-2
9-3 Recovery Aids 9-3

10.0 APPENDIX A 10-1

10.1 Spacecraft History 10-1

10.2 Launch Procedure 10-6
10.3 Weather Conditions 10-7
10 A Flight Safety Review 10-9
10.5 Photographic Coverage 10-11
10.6 Postflight Inspection 10-11+

11.0 APPETOIX B - ACKWOWLEDGEMEET 11-1

 I
LIST OF TABLES

Table Page
3.1-1 SUMMARY OF SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS MODIFICATIONS 3-13

3.1-2 WEIGHT AND BALANCE DATA FOR SPACECRAFT 20 3 - l4

4.1-1 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS .. 4-2

4.2-1 COMPARISON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS . 4-5

5.1.5-1 MA-9 FUEL USAGE 5-6

5.2.1.2-1 POSTFLIGHT ANALYSIS OF LITHIUM-HYDROXIDE CANISTER . . . . 5 - 2 5

5.2.4.1-1 BODY-MASS BALANCE SUMMARY 5-26

7.1.2.1-1 PILOT PREFLIGHT ACTIVITIES 7-24

7.1.2.1-2 PERTINENT EXCERPTS FROM CLINICAL EXAMINATIONS 7-25

7.1.2.1-3 COMPLETE BLOOD COUNTS 7-26

7.1.2.1-4 COMPARISON OF TYPICAL PREFLIGHT AND POSTFLIGHT URINE

VALUES 7-27

7.1.2.1-5 URINE ANALYSIS 7-28

7.1.2.1-6 LOW-RESIDUE DIET 7-30

7.1.2.1-7 AEROMEDICAL COUNTDOWN 7-31

7.1.2.2-1 DETAILED PREFLIGHT HEART-RATE AND RESPIRATION- RATE

DATA 7-32

7.1.2.2-2 SUMMARY OF HEART-RATE AND RESPIRATION-RATE DATA 7-33

7.1.2.2-3 DETAILED PREFLIGHT BLOOD-PRESSURE DATA 7-34

7.1.2.2-4 SUMMARY OF BLOOD PRESSURE DATA 7-35

7.1.3.1-1 SUMMARY OF CALIBRATED WORK 7-36

7.1.3.2-1 INFLIGHT SLEEP PERIODS 7-37

7.1.4.1-1 PILOT POSTFLIGHT ACTIVITIES 7-38

7.1.4.2-1 RECORD OF'PILOT'S WEIGHT CHANGES 7-39

7.1.5.1-1 SUMMARY OF TILT STUDIES . 7 - 40

 •GOIinDDMlAL •
Table Page

7.1.5.3-! BLOOD CHEMISTRIES 7 - 4l

7.2.1.1-1 PILOT TIME IN SPACECRAFT 20 DURING HANGAR AND LAUNCH

COMPLEX TESTS 7-59

7.2.1.2-1 PILOT TRAINING SUMMARY IN THE MERCURY PROCEDURES

TRAINER NUMBER 2 AT CAPE CANAVERAL 7 - 60

7.2.1.3-1 FLYING TIME FROM JANUARY 1 TO LAUNCH DATE 7 - 6l

7.2.1.5-1 PILOT PREFLIGHT ACTIVITIES FROM JANUARY 1, 1963 TO

LAUNCH DATE 7-62

7.2.2.1-1 SUMMARY OF MAJOR FLIGHT ACTIVITIES 7-65

7.2.2.2-1 PILOT'S EQUIPMENT LIST 7-71

7.2.3.2-1 SUMMARY OF ATTITUDE MANEUVERS 7-72

7.2.4.1-1 CONTROL MODE USAGE 7-73

8.2.1-1 ORBITAL INSERTION CONDITIONS AVAILABLE AT MCC 8-20

8.2.2-1 COMMAND HANDOVER SUMMARY 8-21

8.2.2-2 COMMAND FUNCTION SUMMARY 8-27

8.2.3-1 COMPUTER READOUT OF RADAR TRACKING DATA 8-28

8.2.3-2 RADAR TRACKING PERIODS 8-30

8.2.4-1 TELEMETRY COVERAGE 8-32

8.2.5-1 AIR-43ROUND COMMUNICATIONS COVERAGE 8 - 4l

9.1-1 RECOVERY SHIP AND AIRCRAFT DEPLOYMENT IN PLANNED

LANDING AREAS 9-5

10.5-1 AMR OPTICAL LAUNCH COVERAGE 10-13

 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

2.0-1 MA-9 astronaut prior to entering the transfer van

on the way to the launch complex 2-2

2.0-2 MA-9 astronaut on the launch-pad gantry prior to

flight 2-3

2.0-3 Ground track for the MA-9 orbital mission 2 -4

3.0-1 MA-9 space vehicle prior to lift-off 3-1?

3.0-2 MA-9 lift-off configuration 3 - 18

3.1-1 MA-9 spacecraft and adapter, prior to lift-off 3-19

3.2-1 Booster engine offset at lift-off 3-20

4.2-1 Altitude versus longitude profile 4-7

if.2-2 Time histories of trajectory parameters for MA-9

mission launch phase

(a) Altitude and range 4-9

(b) Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle ... 4-10
(c) Earth-fixed velocity and flight-path angle ... 4-11
(d) Dynamic pressure and Mach number 4-12
(e) Longitudinal acceleration along spacecraft
Z-axis 4-13

4.2-3 Time histories of trajectory parameters for MA-9

mission orbital phase

(a) Latitude, longitude, and altitude versus time . . 4 - 14

(b) Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle ... 4-20

4.2-4 Time histories of trajectory parameters for MA-9

mission reentry phase

(a) Latitude} longitude, and altitude . . . . . . . . 4-26

(b) Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle ... 4-27
(c) Earth-fixed velocity and flight-path angle ... 4-28
(d) Dynamic pressure and Mach number 4-29
(e) Longitudinal deceleration along spacecraft
Z-axis 4-30

^*£\-F i ^ 1" AM_F

 GOlUriDDMTlAL"
Figure Page

5.1-3-1 Postf light photograph of amplifier -calibrator

power socke't ... ................... 5-

5.1-3-2 Blue ribbon connector showing corrosion ......... 5-55

5.1.5-1 RCS auxiliary fuel tank ................. 5-56

5.1.5-2 Solenoid -inlet "B"-nut temperature -time history ..... 5-57

5.2.1.1-1 MA. -9 suit circuit condensate trap ............ 5-58

5.2.1.2-1 Cabin temperature evaluation ........... ^ . .. 5-59

5.2.2.1-1 MA-9 helmet details ................... 5 - 60

5.2.3-1 Urine and condensate transfer system ........... 5 - 6l

5.2.3.1-1 Liquid transfer syringe ................ . 5-62

5.3-1 Onboard television system equipment ........... 5 - 63

5.3-5-1 TV picture of spacecraft interior ............ 5 - 6U

5-3.5-2 TV picture taken through the window ........... 5-64

5- 4.3-1 Comparison of normal retropackage umbilical disconnect

squib with one missing main change ........... 5-65

5.6.1-1 l6-mm movie camera .......... -. ......... 5-66

5.6.2-1 MA-9 programer showing misalinement of faulty gear . . . . 5-67

5.7.1-1 Postf light photograph of MA-9 ablation shield ...... 5-68

5.7-3-1 Postflight photograph of paint patches .......... 5-69

5.8.1-1 Camera for dim -light phenomena experiment . . ...... 5-70

5.8.1-2 Typical photograph taken for dim-light photography

experiment ....................... 5-71

5.8.2-1 Light assembly for ground light experiment ........ 5-72

5-8.3-1 Installation of flashing light and geiger counters on

retropackage ...................... 5-73
Figure Page

5.8A-1 Hasselblad 500-C'camera modified for MA-9 mission ... 5 - 7^

5.8A-2 Infrared photograph taken for U.S. Weather Bureau

experiment over Florida peninsula 5-75

5.8.5-1 Quadrantal photograph taken for horizon-definition

experiment »"V :• • 5-76

5.8.6-1 Equipment for flashing-light' experiment ..."...'.. 5-77

5.8.6-2 Topical history trace of flashing light output ; . . . . 5-78

5-8.6-3 Typical horizontal intensity distribution of the

flashing light 5-79

5.8.6-^ Calculated sighting parameters for flashing-light

experiment . ' '..'.... 5 - 80
f t

5.8.8-1 Photograph'of Himalaya Mountains taken with

Hasselblad camera . ' •'. . . .5 -.81

6.8-1 Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle in the

region of cut-off using launch-vehicle guidance
data

(a) Space-fixed velocity ..... 6-7

fb) Space-fixed flight-path angle .. 6-8

6.8-2 Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle in t;he

region of cut-off using IP 709^ data

(a) Space-fixed velocity . . ' ,. . 6-9.

(b) Space-fixed flight-path angle . . . . . . . . . . ' " 6 - 1 0

6.-'8-5 Space-fixed flight-path angle versus space-fixed

velocity in the region of cut-off 6-11

7.1.2.2-1 Oral temperature probe 7-91

7.1.2.2-2 Installation of oral temperature probe in helmet . . . . 7-92

7.1.2.2-3 MA-9 May l^, 1963, 07:^2:00 e.s.t. Sample record

illustrating nodal beats occurring during canceled
launch count down. Recorder speed 25 mm/sec ..'.'.. 7-93

COPlPffiENTlAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

Figure Page
7.1.2.2-4 MA-9 16:11:30 - Sample of biosensor record at a range
station illustrating one of the frequent occurrences
of sinus arrhythmia with wandering of the cardiac
pace maker. In this sample, the negative P wave
suggests inverse depolarization from the atrioventri-
cular node. Similar changes were observed before
i s .

7.1.3.1-1 MA-9 12:29:52 - Sample of typical biosensor data

received at a range station. Blood pressure,
7 - 95
7.1.3.2-1 7 -96
7.1.5.1-1 Tilt studies - heart rate responses ..... 7 - 97
7.1.5.1-2 Tilt studies - blood pressure responses for MA-9 7 -98
7.1.5.2-1 Exercising device used for calibrated work 7 - 99
7.1.5.2-2 Calibrated work - MA-9 . . 7 - 100
7.2.2.2*1 Special equipment storage kit 7 - 101
7.2.2.2-2 7 - 101
7.2.2.2-3 7 - 102
7.2.3.1-1 7 - 103
7.2.3.5-1 7 - 104
7.2.4.2-1 - 7 - 105
7.2.4.2-2 7 - 106
9.1-1 Planned landing areas
fa) Atlantic Ocean 9-6
(b) Pacific Ocean . 9-7
9.2-1 9-8
9.2-2 MA-9 spacecraft in auxiliary flotation collar with line
9- 9"
 iNTIAL
Figure • Bage
9.2-3 Side hatch being actuated on MA-9 spacecraft 9-10

9.2-4 Astronaut Cooper egressing from. MA-9 spacecraft .... 9- H

9.3-1 Details of landing area 22-1 9-12

10.3-1 Wind direction and velocity at launch site 10-17

10.5-2-1 AMR engineering sequential tracking camera coverage . . 10-18

10.6-1 Postflight photograph of MA-9 spacecraft 10-19

 NOTICE

NO. 1: LIFT-OFF TIMS (2-INCH MOTION) FOR THE MA-9 FLIGHT WAS

8:04:13.106 A.M. E.S.T. RANGE ZERO TIME WAS ESTABLISHED

AS 8:04:13 A.M. E.S.T. ALL TIMES REFERRED TO IN THIS

REPORT ARE IN ELAPSED TIME IN HR:MIN:SEC FROM RANGE ZERO

UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.

NO. 2: THE MA-9 POSTLAUNCH MEMORANDUM REPORT IS IN THREE PARTS,

UNDER SEPARATE COVERS, AS FOLLOWS:

PART I - MISSION ANALYSIS - CONTAINS AN OVERALL ANALYSIS

OF THE MISSION AND PRESENTS A MINIMUM OF DATA.

PART II - DATA - CONTAINS COMPLETE TIME HISTORIES OF

SPACECRAFT DATA, WITHOUT ANALYSIS.

PART III - MISSION TRANSCRIPTS - CONTAINS ESSENTIALLY

UNEDITED TRANSCRIPTS OF THE FLIGHT COMMUNICATIONS,, THE

PILOT'S POSTFLIGHT SELF-DEBRIEFING, AND THE FORMAL TECHNICAL

DEBRIEFING CONDUCTED ONBOARD THE RECOVERY AIRCRAFT CARRIER.

IDEMTVb.
 AL Page 1-1

1.0 MISSION SUMMARY

The MA-9 mission was successful in nearly every respect. The planned
launch time of 8:00 a.m. e.s.t. oh May l4, 19&3; was postponed for 1 day
because of intermittent digital data in both the azimuth and range
channels of the C-band radar at Bermuda. Prior to postponement, the
countdown had proceeded as planned until T-60 minutes, when an unscheduled
hold of 2 hours and 9 minutes became necessary because of a fuel-pump
failure in the diesel engine on the gantry transfer table. After this
hold, the countdown was continued until T-13 minutes when the flight
was postponed because of the radar problem. The launch operation on
May 15, 1963, was "the most efficient conducted to date. Four minutes
of unplanned hold time were required to evaluate an external RF inter-
ference problem at the guidance central rate station. Weather conditions
at the launch site and in the primary landing area were satisfactory.
Lift-off occurred at approximately 8:04 a.m. e.s.t. on May 15, 19^3^
2 hours and 31 minutes after the astronaut entered the spacecraft.

Launch-vehicle performance was excellent, and the trajectory

parameters displayed at the Mercury Control Center indicated a "go"
condition at insertion. A near-perfect orbit was attained, with deviations
from planned postposigrade values of space-fixed flight-path angle and
velocity of 0.0037° and -1.4 ft/sec, respectively. Both the perigee
and apogee of the initial orbit differed from the planned values of
87 and 1^4 nautical miles by 0.2 nautical mile. The decay in perigee
and apogee after nearly 22 orbital passes was 1.6 and 7-1 nautical
miles, respectively.

Spacecraft separation from the launch vehicle was satisfactory and

the planned manual turnaround was well executed by the pilot. The
performance of the spacecraft systems was excellent for the first
18 orbital passes with the exception that the automatic section of the
programer failed at 12:18:19- In addition, several minor problems
were encountered with the R and Z calibrations, the drinking-water
valve, and the condensate transfer system. Upon contacting Hawaii
on the 19th orbital pass, the pilot reported that the 0.05g warning
light had come on. Systems checks by the astronaut revealed that the
amplifier-calibrator was in the 0.05g configuration and that the ASCS
could be used only during reentry. However, planned use of the ASCS
for reentry was abandoned at about 33:07:00 when neither the main nor
the standby 250 v-amp inverters would supply electrical power to the
ASCS bus. The pilot manually initiated the required retrofire and
reentry events. He controlled the spacecraft attitudes during retro-
fire by utilizing the manual proportional system. Because of the ASCS
failure, the pilot was also required to conduct the reentry maneuver
manually, and he elected to use both the manual proportional and fly-
by-wire modes during this phase.
Page i - 2
The pilot's performance throughout the mission was excellent, and
he adhered closely to the flight plan until the ASCS problems occurred.
The pilot had no difficulty in sleeping during the mission, although
he woke up several times during the planned rest period and found it
necessary to reestablish a comfortable suit temperature. He did not
eat and drink as much as was desirable, and he has since commented on
the difficulty of performing these functions with the devices that were
available to him. Six of the eight planned scientific experiments were
successfully conducted during the mission. The balloon drag and
visibility experiment was not accomplished because of failure of the
balloon to deploy, and the window attenuation experiment was not
accomplished because the pilot could not get the standard light source
out of the special equipment storage kit.

The pilot's control of the spacecraft during retrofire and reentry

was excellent and resulted in a landing only k.k nautical miles from
the prime recovery ship, the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Kearsarge. Visual
contact was made from the carrier and the. recovery helicopters reached
the spacecraft and circled it during its descent. Swimmers were
deployed from the helicopters and they immediately attached a flotation
collar to the spacecraft. The pilot remained in the spacecraft until
it was hoisted aboard the carrier, the hatch had been blown, and the
doctors had given him a preliminary examination. The pilot egressed
from the spacecraft in good condition kO minutes after landing. A
postflight physical examination conducted onboard the recovery ship
revealed no evidence of significant degradation of pilot function directly
attributable to the space flight. The pilot demonstrated an orthostatic
rise in heart rate and fall in blood pressure which was more pronounced
than that detected after the MA-8 flight. Although this condition is
not an inflight hazard, the implications of this hemodynamic response
on return to Ig conditions will have to be given very serious consider-
ation for longer missions.

Support activities from all ground elements, including flight

control, Mercury Network, and recovery, were excellent and contributed
greatly to the successful accomplishment of the mission.

Postflight examination of the spacecraft and evaluation of the data

collected during the mission have revealed some anomalies, and detailed
systems tests have determined the most likely causes of the major
problems. Considerable information regarding man's capabilities to
perform his assigned tasks during extended periods of time in the space
environment has been obtained. Evaluation of the overall mission indicates
that a high degree of success was obtained and confirms the accomplishment
of all mission objectives.
 Page 2-1

2.0 INTRODUCTION

The first manned 1-day mission (MOEM) as a part of the United

States' program of space exploration was successfully accomplished
on May 15 and May 1.6, 1963- This mission was the fourth manned
orbital flight in Project Mercury. It was also the ninth of a series
of flights utilizing production Mercury spacecraft and Atlas launch
vehicles and, therefore, was designated Mercury-Atlas Mission 9 (MA-9).
Astronaut L. Gordon Cooper, Jr., shown in figures 2.0-1 and 2.0-2,
was the spacecraft pilot for this flight.

The MA-9 space vehicle was launched from the Missile Test Annex at
Cape Canaveral, Florida, at 08:OU a.m. e.s.t. on May 15, 1963 The
flight ended as planned, after completing nearly 22 orbital passes around
the earth, with a successful landing approximately 70 nautical miles
southeast of Midway Island in the Pacific Ocean at 06:2^ p.m. e.s.t. on
May l6, 1963. Ground tracks for the 22 orbital passes of the MA-9 space-
craft are shown in figure 2.0-3-

The MA-9 mission was a continuation of a pioneering program to acquire

operational experience and information for extended manned orbital space
flight. The objectives of the flight were to evaluate the effects on the
astronaut of approximately 1 day in orbital flight; to verify that man
can function for an extended period in space as a primary operating system
of the spacecraft; to evaluate in a manned 1-day mission the combined
performance of the astronaut and a Mercury spacecraft specifically modi-
fied for the mission; to obtain the astronaut's evaluation of the opera-
tional suitability of the spacecraft and supporting elements for extended
manned orbital flight; and to assess the effectiveness of the Mercury
Worldwide Network and mission support forces during an extended manned
orbital flight. Each of these objectives was satisfactorily fulfilled.

A preliminary analysis of the significant flight data has been made,

and the results are presented in this report. Brief descriptions of the
mission, the spacecraft, and the launch vehicle are followed by the per-
formance analyses and supporting data. All major events of the MA-9
mission, beginning with delivery of the spacecraft to the launch site and
continuing through recovery and postflight examination, are documented.

The graphical information presented herein has been included to

support and clarify the text; however, the reader is referred to Part II,
Data, for a complete presentation, without analysis, of all MA-9 time-
history flight data. Part III, Mission Transcripts, presents essentially
unedited transcripts of the flight communications, the pilot's postflight
self-debriefing, and the formal technical debriefing conducted onboard
the recovery aircraft carrier.

WTOBMTIAIi
Figure 2.0-1.- MA-9 astronaut prior to entering the transfer
van 9Ji«JAe
i e .p.j^a
a .k%.,kQ
Q .p.3b]ae
b ] el launch complex.
 Page 2-3

Figure 2.0-2.- MA-9 astronaut on the launch-pad gantry prior to flight.

• CONFIDENTIAL
 Page 2-4

Latitude, deg

COMriDCMTIAfe.
 EMTIAL • Page 3 - 1

3.0 SPACE-VEHICLE DESCRIPTION

The MA -9 space vehicle, consisting of the Mercury spacecraft and the

Atlas launch vehicle, is shown prior to launch in figure 3-0-1 and at
lift-off in figure 3.0-2.

3-1 Spacecraft Description

Spacecraft 20, shown in figure 3-l-lj> was employed for the MA-9
orbital mission and was of a configuration similar to that of spacecraft 16,
which was flown for the MA-8 mission. However, certain system modifica-
tions were incorporated since the previous flight to save weight, to in-
corporate new experiments, and to reflect a continuing effort to improve
system performance. In addition, other system modifications were incor-
porated as a direct consequence of extending the flight duration. The
modifications that were made to spacecraft 20, including the more signifi-
cant changes, are listed in the following sections according to the major
spacecraft systems to which they apply. Those modifications needed Toe-
cause of the extended mission are noted with an asterisk. Table 3-1-1
presents a summary and breakdown of the approximate number of changes
for each system; and the weight and balance data, which accounts for
actual flight consumable usages for spacecraft 20, are given in
table 3.1-2.

3-1.1 Spacecraft control system. -

3.1.1.1 Automatic stabilization and control system:

1. The rate stabilization control system was removed.

2. The ASCS rate gyros were operated continuously from

the time the ASCS bus was energized until the antenna fairing
was separated.

3- The horizon scanners were no longer powered when the

gyro switch was in the "cage" or "free" position. A 30-second
time delay was added in the horizon- scanner circuit.

U. The control -mode selector switch was changed to allow

the deenergizing of the automatic reaction control system
solenoids when using the manual proportional system for con-
trol of the spacecraft.

5- The pitch-attitude gyro was replaced with a gyro

incorporating a -3^-° pitch caging capability.
 3 -2

6. A "rate indicate" switch with an automatic and manual

position was added. In the mnaual position, telemetry and
pilot-indicated rates were given continuously; and in the auto-
matic position, the rate indications were cut off from the time
of spacecraft separation plus 5 minutes to 10 minutes before
retrosequence time.

#7- An "out-of-orbit mode" warning light and tone switch

were added. This circuit was available from 5 minutes after
spacecraft separation until the beginning of retrosequence.

3.1.1.2 Reaction control system:

1. The 1-pound and 6-pound thrusters of the reaction

control system (RCS) were replaced with units of an improved
design.

^2. The nitrogen tank in the automatic RCS was pressurized

to 2,800 psi instead of 2,250 psi, as in previous missions.

3. A special corrosion-deterrent paint was applied to

the outside of all hydrogen peroxide (H 0 ) tanks.

U. A dual indicator was added to the instrument panel

to display to the astronaut the regulated nitrogen pressures
in the automatic and manual reaction control system.

5- The time-delay relay used in the jettison of HO was

changed to extend the jettison time from 60 seconds to
150 seconds.

61. The wall thickness of the expulsion tubes of the

automatic and manual HO tanks was increased from 0.062 inch
to 0.125 inch.

•"-7. A 15-pound capacity HO tank was added in parallel

with the automatic HO tank.

-«8. A manually operated interconnect valve was added to

provide the capability to transfer fuel between the automatic
and manual HO fuel systems.

9. A drain and purge valve was added to the automatic

and manual HO systems.

10. The nitrogen and hydrogen peroxide relief valves were

replaced with units of a more reliable type.
 Page 3-3

3.1.2 Life support system. -

3-1.2.1 Environmental control system:

1. The electrical inverters were cooled by using heat

sinks and ducted cabin air circulation, rather than the pre-
viously used coolant circuit and heat exchanger.

*2. The CO adsorption capacity was increased by adding

0.8 pound of lithium hydroxide to the CO canister. The amount
of charcoal in the canister was reduced to 0.2 pound.

3. A provision was added for manually sealing the cabin

pressure-relief valve from water leakage at landing.

k. The warning light for indicating excess water or low

temperature in the suit or cabin heat exchangers was made de-
pendent upon the associated dome temperature.

-:;-5- The cabin oxygen-partial-pressure indicator was re-

placed with a dual indicator displaying cabin 0 partial
pressure and suit-circuit CO partial pressure. Also, a warn-
ing light and a tone switch were added to the panel to indicate
excessive CO .

6. A redundant coolant-control valve was added in parallel

with the existing valve for the suit cooling circuit. Also,
these valves and the cabin coolant-control valve were of an
improved design.

#7- An oxygen bottle containing h pounds of oxygen was

added in parallel to the primary oxygen bottle.

•;:'8. A 9-pound coolant water tank was added in parallel

with the existing 39-P°und coolant water tank.

9. The suit and cabin freon orifices and check valves

were replaced with units of an improved design.

10. The primary and secondary oxygen high-pressure regu-

lators were replaced with modified units of an improved design.

*L1. The secondary oxygen-supply system had a warning

light and tone switch for an indication to the pilot when
pressure in the oxygen bottle dropped below 6,500 psi.

CONFIDENTIAL
Page 3 - k

12. The emergency oxygen rate valve was replaced with one
of an improved design.

IJ. The pressurization system for the coolant-water

supply was provided with gas pressure from the suit circuit
only.

Ik. The pressure-sensing circuit that was used to cut

off the ca~bin fan and energize a warning light indicating low
cabin pressure was removed.

-"-15. A timer circuit was installed to actuate the water-

separator sponge for a JO-second period every 10 minutes.

16. A "sponge-squeeze" switch and water-separator travel

indicator lights were added to the main instrument panel to
allow automatic or manual initiation of the water separator
and to provide a visual aid for monitoring the separator piston
position.

17. The absolute-pressure relief valve was removed from

the coolant-water pressurization system.

18. Insulation was added to the CO absorber, and a

deflector was added to the cabin fan outlet to prevent cold
air from the cabin heat exchanger from impinging on the CO
absorber.

19. A screen was added over the relief port of the

negative pressure relief valve to prevent objects from falling
into the valve opening.

20. The suit inlet for emergency oxygen flow was re-
positioned upstream of the suit-circuit CO partial pressure
sensor. This change permitted purging of the sensor with
100-percent oxygen to verify its operation.

#21. A condensate trap was installed in the suit circuit

to aid in removing water.

22. The suit-circuit ducting, from the water separator

to the junction of the suit-inlet flexible hose, was insulated
to reduce heat loss.

3.1.2.2 Food, water, and waste management:

*1. Condensate and urine transfer systems were installed.

 Page 3-5

2. The nylon drinking-tut)e assembly from the 39-pound

coolant water tank was removed.

#3- An expulsion-type drinking-water container was added.

The tank contained a transfer fitting to provide the capabil-
ity of transferring condensate to the tank after the drinking
water was consumed.

3.1.2.3 Pull-pressure suit:

1. The sealing technique for the faceplate on the helmet

was changed from pneumatic to mechanical. In addition, small
velcro tape patches for attaching the oral temperature pro"be
to the right earcup, radiation film badges attached to the
helmet shell, and an improved helmet tiedown system were in-
stalled.

2. The torso section of the pressure suit was modified

in the shoulder and wrist areas. In addition, the boots were
made a permanent part of the torso assembly, and they were
provided with improved ventilation.

3- A poppet-type valve was added to the suit-inlet venti-

lation fitting to prevent water from entering the suit should
the astronaut leave the spacecraft and enter the water after
landing.

h. An additional locking feature was added at the

glove-to-torso connection to prevent accidental disengagement.

•"•5. A urine transfer fitting was added to the suit.

6. The lifevest pack was moved to the front of the

lower left leg since this was a m©re convenient location.

7- Items carried in pockets on the suit included a

handkerchief, pocket folding knife, biomedical injectors,
heavy-duty scissors, and a mechanical pencil.

3.1.2.^ Personal equipment:

1. The navigation yaw reticle was deleted.

2. An opaque window cover was added to the spacecraft

window, and the red window filter and the map case were removed.
 3- A work-table and storage space assembly was added in
front of the main instrument panel pedestal.

U. The flashlight, the food container, the knife mounted

on the spacecraft structure, and the waste container were
removed.

*5- An exercising device of the type used during the

MA-6 flight was added.

6. The rear-view mirror was removed.

3.1.3 Communications system.-

1. The hardline cable which allowed operation of the

voice communications system outside of the spacecraft was
deleted.

2. Nitrogen gas pressure from the manual RCS was used

to deploy the HP recovery antenna.

3- The fingers were removed from the bicone antenna to

improve communications while in the attitude-free drifting-
flight mode.

*k. The back-up UHF voice transmitter-receiver was

removed.

5- The capability for ground command of the telemetry-

system and radar-beacon operation was incorporated.

6. The HP voice transmitter was disabled from the time

of antenna-fairing separation to the time of HF recovery
antenna deployment to prevent damage to the voice system.

7. A switch was added to allow the pilot to disable the

UHF power amplifier for increased reliability of the UHF trans-
mitter-receiver system.

8. A slow-scan television system was added for real-time

observation of the pilot and spacecraft environment. The TV
transmitter was also available as a backup to the T^VI trans-
mitter.

9- The phase-shifter switch was removed, and the phase

shifter was controlled by a relay such that it was on whenever
the C-band beacon was on. Phase-shifter power was changed from
the ASCS bus to the fans bus.
 Page 3-7

10. Deployment of the HF orMtal antenna was effected by

only one bellows motor, 10 seconds after spacecraft separation.

11. A control unit was added to allow the pilot to set

a high volume on his receiver with a minimum of side tone
while transmitting.

12. The miniaturized helmet microphone was modified to

include noise rejection characteristics. The helmet was also
modified to include two miniaturized earphones in each ear-
piece.

J.lA Mechanical and -pyrotechnic systems. -

*1. The periscope was removed, and a spring-loaded device

was used to close umbilical door.

2. The SOFAR bomb on the main parachute riser was set

to detonate at a depth of 3,000 feet.

3. The main and reserve parachute deployment bags were

modified for increased reliability.

U. The landing-bag release system was modified to im-

prove its reliability.

5. A redesigned survival kit pan was installed.

6. One of the two squibs in the retropackage explosive

jettison bolt was disarmed because it contained a ground loop
circuit.

7- The explosive-actuated hatch actuator cap was vented.

3.1.5 Electrical and sequential systems.-

1. A redundant 3-volt power supply was added for instru-

mentation reference. It could be actuated by the astronaut for
an instrumentation reference of flight-critical items in case
of failure of the primary 3-volt power supply.

2. The eight day correlation clock was removed.

3- The satellite clock was powered by the 2^ v d-c main

bus rather than the isolated bus.

^. An "off" position was added to the instrument-panel

warning-light circuit to turn off all lights except those for
the satellite clock for improved pilot dark adaptation.

iV711 r UL/IMl 1 lALi

page 3 - 8 . OOHriDCNTIAL
5. The main inverters were replaced with those of an im-
proved design having superior thermal characteristics and a
greater efficiency.

#6. In order to provide increased power for the longer

MA-9 mission, five 3^000 watt-hour and one 1,500 watt-hour
batteries were flown in spacecraft 20 instead of the three
3,000 watt-hour and the three 1,500 watt-hour batteries flown
in spacecraft l6 (NLA-8).

7- The fire retro, green telelite was made dependent on

the ignition of all three retrorockets rather than being
dependent on the ignition of the third retrorocket, as was the
case for spacecraft 16.

8. A switch was added to provide the astronaut with the

capability of turning off the flashing recovery light to con-
serve power during daylight hours.

9. An auxiliary portable light was installed for the

astronaut's use during flight.

10. A switch was added to allow turning the prelanding

buses back on once the landing relay timed out to permit post-
landing blood-pressure and EGG recordings.

11. A tower-jettison arm relay was added in the tower-

jettison circuit to prevent inadvertent firing of the tower-
jettison rocket.

12. A green telelite was provided to give the astronaut

an indication of umbilical door closure, and a red telelite
was provided to indicate when the door was open. The door posi-
tion was also monitored by telemetry.

13. A tower-separation abort-interlock relay was added on

the 2h- v d-c isolated squib bus. If an abort signal were to be
received by the spacecraft and power from the main squib bus
were lost, initiation of retropackage jettison would occur when
spacecraft separation was sensed. Tower-jettison rocket igni-
tion would occur when tower-clamp-ring separation was sensed.

1^. Both the main and isolated bus circuits for the retro-
rocket ignition squibs were controlled by the retrofire arm
circuit. This change was made to improve the switching arrange-
ment for the astronaut. Only the main squib-bus circuits were
so controlled on spacecraft 16.
 Page 3 - 9 *"-;

15. The automatic retrofire arm feature was made functional

for all retrosequence modes except manual retrofire, with or
without attitude permission. As a result,, whenever the pilot
elected to ignite the retrorockets using the retrofire switch,
the retrorocket arm switch had to "be in manual position.

16. The Mayday circuit was powered from the main bus; it
was powered from the main squib bus on spacecraft 16.

IT- A rescue aids switch was rewired to provide the

astronaut with the capability of manually extending the HF
recovery antenna after landing.

18. Three diodes were put in series with the flashing

light to prevent damage to the light, because the light was
powered by the 6-volt isolated bus, rather than its own
self-contained battery.

19. A resistor was added to the command input circuit of

the programer to reduce the programer's susceptibility to
transient voltage spikes.

20. A standby inverter automatic tone generator was added

to indicate automatic switching of the inverter to either a-c
bus.

21. The emergency reserve parachute deployment and the

emergency landing-bag-deployment circuits were powered through
switch fuses.

22. The satellite clock, pilot, and ground command retro-

sequence signals were powered through a common fuse switch.

23. An emergency spacecraft separation bolt relay was

added in the spacecraft-separation pull-ring circuitry to allow
the pilot to fire the escape rocket with isolated bus power
only.

2^-. Two spacecraft-separation-sensor relays were added to

the isolated squib bus. One relay improved the reliability of
the maximum-altitude sensor and the other was used in the
tower-separation abort-interlock relay circuitry.

25- Automatic 21,000-foot drogue-parachute deployment was

made more reliable by paralleling the main and isolated squib
arming circuits.
Page 3-10

3.1.6 Instrumentation system.-

1. A switch was added to provide the astronaut with the

capability to remove electrical power from the R- and
Z-calibration relays. This switch would be used to stop
calibrations should the programer fail 1;o perform this function
as planned.

2. The HF telemetry system was deleted from the spacecraft.

3. The low-level commutator and temperature-survey pick-

ups were removed from the spacecraft.

^4-. Several timing functions were added to the programer.

In spacecraft 1.6, its only function was programing the water-
squeezer operation.

5. The frequency of the voltage-controlled oscillator

for the automatic-solenoid malfunction detector was changed to
3-9 kc to provide better tape-recording reproduction of this
function.

6. The "A" package of the instrumentation system was

modified to protect the d-c amplifiers from over voltage and
to provide for a better reading of the 115 v a-c fans bus.

7- The oxygen-quantity indicator was expressed in per-

cent. Maximum indication was 250 percent on primary and
125 percent on secondary.

8. The R- and Z-calibration signals were no longer

initiated only on ground command. They were initiated when
the telemetry transmitter was energized through the command
link and when the tape recorder was programed.

9. The tape-recorder operation was no longer completely

continuous. It was modified to run at a speed of rr inch
per second, giving a longer recording capability, and its
operation was either off, programed, or continuous, as selected
by the pilot.

10. A three-position switch with off, continuous, and

ground-command positions was added for astronaut control of
telemetry transmitter operation.

11. The astronaut-observer camera was replaced with a

self-contained, hand-held moving-picture camera. This camera
was a l6-mm type that could be mounted on the instrument panel
for observation of the pilot or on a special bracket to photo-
graph through the window.
 12. The retrorocket temperature sensor was moved from
the right to the bottom retrorocket.

13. The low-fuel-pressure -warning switch was changed

from a 1,580-psi switch to a 2,200-psi switch, and the auto-
matic ECS high-pressure transducer range was 0 to 3,500 psi.

1^. The cabin and heat exchanger dome temperature light

and tone alarm replaced the excess cabin and suit excess
water light and tone alarm.

15. Suit outlet temperature was sensed by the body tem-

perature sensor when the sensor was not measuring body
temperature. Temperature range of the sensor was 75° F to
108° F.

16. Temperature sensors were installed in all three fuel

tanks, and the temperatures were displayed on an instrument-
panel indicator.

17. Standby inverter and cabin heat-exchanger outlet

temperatures were telemetered to the ground.

18. The blood-pressure-measuring system controller was

changed to provide easier gain adjustment.

3.1.7 Heat-protection system. -

1. Six bolts were added to the ablation heat shield to

retain the shingle portion of the shield in case of delamina-
tion at landing.

2. In addition to the previously flown rectangular paint

patch, two new types of paint were added for evaluation.

3.1.8 Experiments.-

1. A tethered balloon similar to that flown during the

MA-7 mission was packaged in the antenna canister.

2. A self-contained flashing beacon was installed on the

retropackage.

3- Two geiger counters, a dosimeter, four film badges,

and a Schaeffer radiation package were installed on or in the
spacecraft to determine radiation exposure during the flight.
Page 3-12

U. A special 35-™m camera was added for use in photo-

graphing the zodiacal light and the airglow layer.
5. A special 70-rnm Hasselblad camera was added for use
in taking general color photographs, infrared weather photo-
graphs, and horizon definition photographs.
 Page 3-13

TABLE 3.1-1.- SUMMARY OF SPACECRAFT SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS

System Number of changes

(a)

Spacecraft control system:

Automatic stabilization and control system 10
Reaction control system 19
Life support system:
Environmental control system 31
Food, water , and waste management systems 7
Full -pressure suit 7
Personal equipment 6
Communications systems 15
Mechanical and pyrotechnic systems 8
Electrical and sequential systems 35
Instrumentation system:
Telemetry and sensor systems 16
Instrument panels and consoles 5^
Heat protection system 2

Scientific experiments 5
Total 215

The total is not an accurate indication of the total number of

spacecraft modifications, since the nature of certain system interfaces
requires that some changes be repeated for more than one system. In
addition, because of this repetition in some areas and the fact that
some modifications which are counted only once can reasonably apply
to another system, the numbers in the column should be regarded as
approximate and only a gross indication of the degree of modification
for any given system.
 Page 3 -

TABLE 3.1-2.- WEIGHT AND BALANCE DATA FOR SPACECRAFT 20

At main
Orbital Reentry
Parameter Lift-off parachute Postlanding
phase phase
deployment

Weight, Ib . . . . \, 330. 82 3,033-35 2,681. U5 2,563.89 2 , ^-00 . ^3

Center -of -gravity

station along:

X-axis, in. . . -0.13 -0.21 -0.20 -0.20 -0.49

Y-axis, in. . . -0.28 -0.1U -0.15 -0.15 -0.06

Z-axis, in. . . 167.81 120.82 12^.68 122 . 22 119.63

Moments of inertia
around :

Roll axis, I ,
2 Z 280.9
slug-ft ... 365.8 298.9 27^.8 269.5
Pitch axis *, I V,
2
slug-ft . . . 7,900.6 653.0 563.0 1+38.7
Yaw axi s , I ,
^
slug-ft2 . . . 7,90^.0 656.8 571-3 505.5 W8.1

11/H7
 Page 3-15

3-2 Launch-Vehicle Description

The MA- 9 launch vehicle, the Atlas 130D, vas an Atlas series D
missile modified for the mission as on previous Mercury- At las flights.
A general launch- vehicle description may "be found in the NASA Project
Mercury Working Paper No. 223A, "Manned One-Day Mission Mercury Spacecraft
Specification Document. "

The MA-9 launch vehicle was very similar to the one used for the
MA-8 mission, and only necessary changes were made. The following is a
summary of the detailed configuration changes from the MA-8 launch
vehicle, the Atlas 11JD.

(1) A plastic liner was incorporated in the wear-ring area of the

turbopump to guard against a possible failure resulting from excessive
rubbing.

(2) A temperature sensor was added to the head- suppress ion valve,
which is located on the sustainer engine housing, to determine the temper-
ature of the head suppression valve during flight and required the
installation of three wires to the harness, a resistor, and two wires to
the telemetry package.

(3) The clips, which are used to attach the shroud to the forging
that holds the yaw activator, were modified so that the clips would not
ride the radius of the vernier engine gimbal shaft.

The mount for the secondary range-safety command battery was

redesigned to reduce weight and provide greater ease in manufacturing.

(5) A redundant circuit, including instrumentation, was provided

in the engine relay box to improve the reliability of the sustainer-
ignition-stage control-valve circuit.

(6) The power pickoff point for the telemetry and instrumentation
system was changed from the power plug to the changeover switch. This
change provided the telemetry system with a 115 -volt (a-c) ^-00-cycle
instrumentation point which would not interfere with the guidance system.

(7) The lox overfill probe was relocated and redesignated "Sequence
II Level Probe." This modification provided for a repeatable method of
determining the proper level at ignition start by maintaining the lox
level at this probe.

(8) A printed circuit board in the programer canister was redesigned

to remove the possibility of a locating pin's shorting a transistor on the
circuit board.
Page 3 - 16 CONFIDENTIAL
(9) The event times for the flight programer were changed to be
compatible vith the staging discretes of the latest launch trajectory.

(a) BECO - 132.9 sec instead of 129-9 sec

(b) Sustainer pitch program duration - 13-5 sec instead

of 16. U sec

(c) Initiation of guidance after BECO - 22.5 sec instead

of 2^.0 sec

(d) SECO - 303.6 sec instead of 305.1 sec

(10) To reduce the possibility of an undesirable lift-off clockwise

roll transient, the booster-engine yaw actuators were offset (see
fig. 3-2-1) as follows to produce a counter-clockwise roll moment:

Booster-engine no. 1 - yaw actuator lengthened by 0.0^ ± 0.02

inch

Booster-engine no. 2 - yaw actuator shortened by 0.0^ ± 0.02

inch

The offsets were checked by the usual level method and by using a new
alinement jig supplied by the engine contractor.

(11) The temperature sensor in the sustainer-engine lubricant tank

was relocated to the aft 20 percent of the tank to provide a temperature
study of the lubricant as it is consumed.

(12) A redundant path to ground was provided for the shielding in

the autopilot harness.

(13) The boat cover in the sustainer engine area was restrained by
a spring which had a tensile strength approximately twice that of the
spring used in the MA-8 launch vehicle. This change was made to provide
better thermal protection of wiring harnesses.

A preflight purge of the boattail area with 100-percent gaseous.

nitrogen was incorporated to reduce the possibility of fire.

(15) The propellent utilization (PU) manometer was calibrated for the
Atlas-D tank, rather than for the Atlas-C configuration.

(16) A microswitch which indicates full lox-valve travel was rewired

to permit inclusion in the ignition-stage sequence circuit to reduce the
possibility of a lox-pump failure.

(17) The wiring technique for the autopilot in the flight control
section was modified to improve its overall reliability. These units were
replaced at the factory prior to delivery of the launch vehicle to the launch
site.
 Page 3-17
SOMflDCNTIAL

-
Figure 3.0-1.- MA-9 space vehicle prior to launch.
COHriPfMTIAl •
 Page 3-18
CONFIDENTIAL

Figure 3-^2^K,JVW^-.W^y^off configuration.

 3MEIPENTIAL Page 3-19

Figure 3.1-1.- MA-9 spacecraft and adapter prior to lift-off,

 Page 3-20
CONFIDENTIAL

Previous position

Offset position

Figure 3.2-l!€®fjftfSISi!6Rf"offset at lift-off

Page k - 1

k.O TRAJECTORY AND MISSION EVENTS

Sequence of Flight Events

The times at which the major events of the MA-9 mission occurred
are given in table U.l-1.
 Page h - 2

TABLE IK 1-1.- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

ELanned time , Actual time, Difference ,

Event hr :min : sec hr:min:sec sec

Launch phase

Booster engine cut-off (BECO) 00:02:12.8 00:02:12. !<• -OA

Tower release 00:02:35.6 00:02:36.3 0.7
Escape rocket ignition 00:02:35.6 00:02:36.3 0.7 .
Sustainer-engine cut-off (SECO)
discrete signal (b) 00:05:03.0
Tail -off complete 00:05:0^.5 00:05:03.2 -1.3
Orbital phase
S/pacecraft separation 00:05:05.5 00:05:05.3 -0.2
Retrofire sequence initiation 33:58:5^.1 33:58:59 ^.9
Retrorocket no. 1 (left) 33:59:25.1 33:59:30 ^.9
Retrorocket no. 2 (bottom) 33:59:30.1 33:59:35 ^.9
Retrorocket no. 3 (right) 33:59:35.1 33:59:^
J>k:OQ:hk C
Retrorocket assembly jettison 3*1:00:25.1 l8.9
c^- 9

Reentry phase

Communications blackout 3^:07:56.1 3lv:08:17 20.9d(l)

0.05g relay actuation 3^:08:36.1 (e)
Drogue parachute deployment 3^:13:53.1 3^:1^:03
Main parachute deployment 3^:15:21.1 3^:15:33 n.99d(-9)
Spacecraft landing 3^:19:56.1 3li:19:lj.9 (g)

Preflight calculated, based on nominal Atlas performance.

Planned trajectory times are based on tail-off-complete conditions, rather
than SECO conditions.
Ketrorocket assembly jettisoned manually.
Difference between the actual and the postflight-calculated reentry event
times, shown in parentheses, is based on actual insertion parameters.
e
Q.05g sequence disabled prior to retrofire.
f
Drogue parachute deployment initiated manually.
^Landing time could not be established accurately.
 Page h - 3

k-,2 Flight Trajectory

The trajectory for the MA-9 flight is discussed in three conven-

ient phases: launch, orbital, and reentry. In all trajectory figures,
the trajectories marked "planned" are preflight-calculated nominal tra-
jectories and the trajectories marked "actual" are based on Mercury net-
work tracking data. The altitude-longitude profile for the entire flight
is presented in figure U.2-1.

A comparison of the planned and actual trajectory parameters is

given in table ^.2-1. The differences between the planned and actual
flight trajectory parameters are a result of the actual cut-off conditions
being slightly different than the planned conditions and the atmospheric
density profile on the day of the actual flight being different from that
assumed for the preflight-calculated trajectories.

The launch trajectory data shown in figure ^-.2-2 are based on the
real-time output of the Range Safety Impact Predictor Computer (lP-709^-),
which used Azusa MK II and Cape Canaveral FPS-16 radars, and the General
Electric-Burroughs (launch-vehicle guidance) computer. The data from
these tracking facilities were used during the time periods listed in
the following table:

Facility Elapsed time, minrsec

Cape Canaveral FPS-16 .0 to 00: 36

Azusa MK II 00:36 to 01:0^

General Electric -Burroughs 01:0^ to 05:55

The orbital portion of the trajectory, shown in figure k.2-3, was

derived by starting with the spacecraft position and velocity vector
obtained at the beginning of the second pass over Bermuda, as deter-
mined by the Goddard computer using Mercury network tracking data.
The Bermuda vector was integrated backward along the flight trajectory
to orbital insertion and forward to the time of the Cape Canaveral vector
at the end of the l8th pass. The Cape Canaveral vector was then integrated
forward to the start of retrorocket ignition in the 22nd pass. These inte-
grated values were in good agreement with the values measured by the launch-
vehicle guidance system at orbital insertion. They were also in good agree-
ment with the position and velocity vectors determined by the Goddard com-
puter for passes near Eglin Air Force Base, Florida (end of 3rd pass),
Eglin Air Force Base (updated at end of 13th pass), and Cape Canaveral
(end of l8th pass); thus the validity of the integrated orbital portion
of the flight trajectory was established.

CONFIDENTIAL"
Page

The orbital lifetime of the spacecraft, bas.ed on the 1959 ARDC

atmosphere, was calculated to be 92 passes. After nearly 22 passes,
the decay in apogee was 7-1 nautical miles and the decay in perigee
was 1.6 nautical miles.
The reentry portion of the trajectory, shown in figure 4-.2-4, was
derived by starting with the spacecraft position and velocity vector,
as determined by the Goddard computer, obtained at the end of the
l8th orbital pass near Cape Canaveral, Florida. Integrating forward
along the flight path to retrorocket ignition and, after introducing
nominal retrofire conditions, continuing the integration through space-
•craft landing yielded the reentry trajectory. Nominal retrofire condi-
tions include a retrorocket total impulse of 38,975 l^-sec at spacecraft
attitudes of -34° in pitch and 0° in roll and yaw. The spacecraft weight
at retrofire was estimated to be 2,979 pounds by using data obtained from
the. Mercury network stations. The times of communications blackout and
main-parachute deployment from the integrated reentry trajectory were in
good agreement with data from the Mercury network stations and the space-
craft onboard measurements. In addition, the landing point from the
integrated trajectory was in good agreement with the retrieval point
reported by the recovery ship. The agreement in these events serve to
confirm the validity of the integrated reentry portion of the flight
trajectory.
 Page k - 5

TABLE IK 2-1.- COMPARISON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS

Condition Planned Actual Difference

1

Cut-off conditions (including tail-off)

3014,5 303.2 -1-3

Range time min°sec 05:0*4-. 5 05:03.2 -00:01.3
Geodetic latitude , deg North . .. 30.4323 30.1t857 0.053U
Longitude deg West 72.5023 72.5178 0.0155
Altitude feet 528,l4-02 529,735 1,333
Altitude nautical miles 87.0 87.2 0.2
437.7 437.7 0
Space -fixed velocity, ft/sec . .. 25,715.3 25,714.0 -1.3
Space -fixed flight -path
0.0016 O.OQli-7 0.0031
Space -fixed heading angle,
deg East of North 77.4909 77-5510 0.0601
Postposigrade firing conditions

Range time sec 306.5 306.3 -0.2

Range time mint sec . . . . . . . . 05:06.5 05:06.3 -00:00.2
Geodetic latitude, deg North . . . 30.11-621 30.5315 0.0694
Longitude deg West 72.3552 72.2897 -0.0655
Altitude feet 528,434 529,793 1,359
Altitude nautical miles 87.0 87.2 0.2
Range, nautical miles 445.5 1+49.8 4.3
Space-fixed velocity, ft/sec . . . 25,736.3 25,734.9 .-1.14-
Space-fixed flight-path angle,
des .. -0.0014 0.0023 0.0037
Space-fixed heading angle, deg
East of North 77.5695 77.6731 0.1036

Orbital parameters

Perigee altitude, statute miles . . 100.1 100, 3 0.2

Perigee altitude, nautical miles 87.0 87.2 0.2
Apogee altitude , statute miles . . 165.7 165.9 0.2
Apogee altitude, nautical miles . . i44.o 144.2 0.2
Period, min:sec 88:1(4 88:45 00:01
Inclination angle deg 32.52 32.55 0.03
 Page 4 .- 6

TABLE 4.2-1.- COMPARISON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS - Concluded

Condition Planned Actual Difference

Maximum conditions

165-T 165-9 0.2

Altitude, nautical miles . . . . 144.0 144.2 0.2
Space -fixed velocity, ft/sec . . 25,736 25,735 -1.0
Earth-fixed velocity, ft/sec . . 2k, 420 24,419 -1.0
a7'7 7-6 -0.1
8
Exit dynamic pressure, Ib/sq. ft . 969 974 -5
. 7-6 7.6 0
Reentry dynamic pressure,
Ib/sq. ft 443 446 3
Landing point
b
Latitude, degimin 27°26- N.; 27°20' N. • -06' N.
Longitude, degrmin 176 °27- w. 176°26' w. -01' W.

Based on atmosphere at Cape Canaveral below 30 nautical miles and 1959

ARDC model atmosphere above 30 nautical miles.
"Actual" landing coordinates shown in table were those resulting from
the trajectory integration. The retrieval point after landing was re-
ported as 27°22.6' N. and 176°35.3' W. by the recovery ship. (See
section 9-0.)
 Page 4-7

£ =

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•CONFIDENTIAL
Page 4-8

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TIDCNTIAL •*» § 5-
5. 0 SPACECRAFT PERFORMANCE

The spacecraft as an entity performed adequately. Some system

anomalies were experienced, and analyses of these are discussed in the
following paragraphs. Also discussed, from an overall mission viewpoint,
are the spacecraft systems' general performance. In addition, a descrip-
tion of each spacecraft system is presented. This description is pre-
sented in terms of the major changes made since the MA-8 mission, and
reference should be made to section 3-1, Spacecraft Description, for a
listing of all significant spacecraft changes.

5-1 Spacecraft Control System

All spacecraft control system components functioned normally until

approximately 28:3^:3^.> at which time the 0.05g relay circuit was actuated.
The astronaut did not report this event on the onboard tape until approxi-
mately 28:59-'00. The .reason for this delay in reporting was twofold:

1. The control mode at the time of 0. 05g relay activation was manual
proportional with gyros caged, and

2. The spacecraft warning lights switch was in the off position

because the astronaut was engaged in taking photographs.

When the warning lights switch was placed in the dim position, the
0.05g green light was noted. From 28:3^:3^ until the end of the mission,
the amplifier-calibrator (amp-cal) was locked in the 0.05g configuration.
Operation of the automatic stabilization and control system in this con-
figuration resulted in damping about the pitch and yaw axes and in a
-12°/sec rate command in the roll axis unless one of the manual control
modes was selected.

5-1.1 System description.- The spacecraft control system is designed

to provide stabilization and orientation of the spacecraft from
immediately following spacecraft—launch-vehicle separation until
deployment of the main parachute. The system is capable of
operation in the following modes:

1. Automatic stabilization and control system (ASCS) with

alternatives of orientation, orbit, and auxiliary damping modes.

2. Fly-by-wire (FB¥), which is an electrical "on-off"

command of the automatic reaction control system (RCS) thrusters
initiated by the astronaut's control stick. Astronaut's choice
of high and low thrusters or low thrusters only (FEW low) is
available.

3. Manual proportional (MP), which is a mechanical command

of the manual RCS thrusters initiated by the astronaut's control
stick.

V^Vr.1 T.T JI-LrEjl^ M.'M.£^L^^^^

page 5 - 2
Modes 1 and 2 utilize the automatic ECS fuel supply, while mode
3 utilizes the manual RCS fuel supply. Combinations of modes
1 and 3 or 2 and 3-are available to provide "double authority"
at the astronaut's discretion.

Major changes made to the control system since the previous

mission are as follows: the vertical attitude gyro was modified
to provide the capability to cage and uncage at -3^°, which
simplified the astronaut's task in alining the gyros to retro-
attitude (orbit attitude); the rate stabilization and control
system (RSCS) was removed to reduce weight; the ASCS rate gyros
were rewired to run continuously when the ASCS was powered up
until antenna fairing separation; the ASCS mode switch was changed
to provide a means of deenergizing the automatic RCS solenoid
circuitry; a horizon-scanner power circuit was incorporated into
the attitude gyro switch, which powered up the scanners only when
in the "slave" position; and a JO-second time delay was added to
the horizon-scanner slaving circuitry to allow time for scanner
warm-up.

5.1.2 Performance analysis.- The performance of the spacecraft control

system was completely satisfactory during the first l8 orbital
passes. Outputs of the gyros and the horizon scanners agreed to
within 2° during the periods of scanner slaving.

The ASCS orbit mode limit cycles in the pitch, roll, and yaw axes
were relatively balanced; that is, there were an equal number of
pulses on both sides of attitude gyro null. For the greater por-
tion of operation in the ASCS mode, the yaw-axis limit cycle
reached +10° in periods of less than 3 minutes. However, more
activity in this axis was expected because of the cross-coupling
effect between the roll and yaw slaving circuitry. The average
limits of the roll axis cycle were ±8.5% and the limits of the
pitch axis cycle were +7°. As was noted during the MA-8 mission,
pulse durations were not sufficient to limit the orbit cycle to
within the more desirable ±5.5°- However, this condition is not
considered to be detrimental and does not appreciably increase
fuel consumption.

At 28:3^:3^; the 0.05g relay circuit actuated and locked in. At

approximately 29:^9tOO? "the astronaut powered up the ASCS bus and
verified that the amplifier-calibrator was in the 0.05g configu-
ration by noting that the attitude indicators would not respond
to spacecraft attitude changes. He then made a reentry roll rate
check at about 31:17'-00 and verified that the ASCS would function
normally in the 0.05g logic circuit during reentry. However,
planned use of the ASCS for reentry was abandoned at about 33:07:00
when it became evident that the ASCS bus was not receiving power
from either the ASCS a-c main inverter or the standby a-c inverter.

CONFIDi
 Page

The attitude gyro output signals, as noted both orb telemetry

and the onboard attitude indicators, showed random; drifting
in pitch and yaw at approximately 32:16:00. The gyros were
in the caged configuration at this time, since the capability
to uncage had been removed by the premature 0.05g signal. When
the ASCS bus was powered at 32:48:30, the yaw-gyro output signal
was erratic for 6 minutes. During this same period, the roll-
gyro signal moved off of the cage null. This drift in indicator
readings continued off and on about all axes for the remainder
of the flight.

5.1.3 Postflight analysis.- Postflight analysis of the amp-cal re-

vealed that the circular power plug on the amp-cal was burned,
as shown in figure 5-1-3-1. Direct shorts between the 115-volt
a-c, 24-volt d-c, and the logic ground pins were evident. A
close visual inspection of the plug showed the presence of
water and evidence of corrosion. For a discussion of possible
sources of this water, see section 5-2, Life Support System.
Tests were conducted in the laboratory and attempts were made
to duplicate the shorting condition by saturating a plug with
condensate water and then applying voltage. Continuous arcing
formed between the pins resulted in charring of the connector,
but a permanent short between the pins was not achieved. How-
ever, it is believed that, under zero-g and with a nearly con-
tinuous source of moisture at the plug, the pins would short
and burn repeatedly under a constant cycling of power.

Corrosion was also found in the oval blue ribbon connector

that contains the 0.05g circuitry as shown in figure 5-1-3-2.
Postflight resistance measurements of this connector indicate
that a conducting path was present between the pins where
corrosion existed and could have caused the premature 0.05g con-
dition. The internal face of the male portion of the connector
was cleaned and dried after several samples of the corrosion
were taken. A new plug was then installed, and the amp-cal
was subjected to a series of tests. Operation of the unit was
satisfactory in all modes, including the 0.05g function. With-
out supplying power to the circuit, several drops of condensate
water were then placed on the connector in the area from which
the corrosion had been removed. When power was subsequently
applied, the 0.05g relay circuit did, in fact, actuate.

Detailed testing of the amp-cal repeater section revealed no

signs of malfunction. It can only be speculated that the gyro
repeaters received intermittent input voltages from the shorted
power plug. The pin (see fig. 5-1-3-1) that furnished the
normal 115-volt a-c signal to the attitude gyro repeaters and
amplifiers is directly adjacent to the pins that were found to
have burned and supposedly shorted.
page 5 - * OOMTDDPiTIAL tner*

The shorting and charring of the power plug and the 0.05g relay •
circuit actuation occurred independently; however, both mal-
functions apparently resulted from the presence of moisture.
5-1.^ Control system -utilization.- Immediately after spacecraft
separation at 00:05:0^, the astronaut switched to the auxiliary
damping mode for k seconds. At 00:05:1? he began to execute
the yaw turnaround maneuver by using the fly-by-wire low
thrusters. By 00:08:33> the turnaround maneuver was completed
and the control system was placed in the ASCS orbit mode. This
mode was employed for approximately 15 percent of the time that
spacecraft power was utilized. Fly-by-wire low was used for
extended maneuvers and experiments almost exclusively through-
out the mission; and, therefore, a minimum usage of the auto-
matic RCS fuel supply resulted. Only one automatic high thruster
was actuated during the orbital phase of the mission, except for
the momentary high thruster action in the auxiliary damping mode
after spacecraft separation. The negative roll high thrust unit
was utilized prior to retrofire during the epecial 0.05g test
at about 31:17:00.
Attitudes for retrofire were maintained by using the manual
proportional mode, with fly-by-wire high and low ready as a
backup. The astronaut maintained the spacecraft attitudes
extremely well during the retrofire period, as was evidenced
by the spacecraft's proximity to the planned landing position.
Control during reentry was maintained by using the manual
proportional and fly-by-wire modes simultaneously. The maximum
thrust of ^9 pounds about the pitch and yaw axes was used by
the astronaut in maintaining control during reentry.

5.1.5 Reaction control system.- The major changes made to the

reaction control system (RCS) since the previous mission
include the addition of a 15-pound capacity hydrogen-peroxide
tank (see fig. 5-1-5-1) in parallel to the automatic system,
the removal of poppets and springs from the check valve at
the outlet of each fuel tank, the incorporation of an RCS inter-
connect valve between the automatic and manual fuel system, the
installation of a main instrument panel indicator to enable the
astronaut to monitor regulated nitrogen pressure for both the
fuel systems, and an increase in the wall thickness of the
expulsion tubes for the fuel tanks from 0.062 inch to 0.125 inch.

An analysis of the onboard data confirmed the astronaut's report

of satisfactory performance of the RCS throughout the flight.

One instance of thruster "tail-off" in the yaw-right manual

thruster was noted by the astronaut. The incident occurred
approximately 13 hours after lift-off during a flight period
 -fiDMflDENTIAL -

for which no onboard data are available. A postlaunch

evaluation of this minor anomaly indicates no reason for
this action.

The astronaut reported that he had intended to use FEW for

reentry but that the FEW pitch-up high thruster was slow
to light off, and therefore, he selected manual proportional.
An analysis of the onboard data indicates that the FEW pitch-
up high-thruster command was maintained only 0.2 second and
that thruster operation for this brief period was normal. This
short pulse duration, in conjunction with the fact that there
had been no previous use of the high thruster to achieve thrust
chamber warm-up, probably reduced the pilot's confidence in
the FEW mode and led him to elect "double authority" control
during reentry.

The amount of fuel used during the mission is shown in

table 5-1-5-1- Approximately 7 pounds of manual fuel and
21 pounds of automatic fuel were jettisoned after reentry.
Fuel supply pressure readings varied during the mission because
of cabin temperature changes, with the automatic system trans-
ducer being affected the most.

Fuel jettison was initiated after reentry as planned at approxi-

mately 3^:15:55- The total time required to jettison the re-
maining fuel from the automatic and manual systems was approxi-
mately 1 minute and 33 seconds. The RCS interconnect valve
was utilized to permit the manual system fuel to jettison
through the automatic system pitch and yaw high thrust chambers.

Solenoid-valve inlet temperatures for the 1-pound yaw-left,

the 1-pound pitch-down, and the 1-pound roll-clockwise thrust
chamber assemblies in the automatic RCS were measured during
the flight and are shown in figure 5-1-5-2. The maximum
temperature at the solenoid inlet recorded during the orbital
phase was approximately 103° F. This temperature was measured
for the 1-pound roll-clockwise thruster at 11:20:00. The
minimum temperature recorded was approximately 53° F and was
measured for the 1-pound pitch-down thruster at approximately
22:30:00.
Page 5-6

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5.2 Life Support Systems
The life support system group includes the environmental control
system; the pressure-suit assembly; and the water, food, and waste manage-
ment system. In the following sections, these systems are described and
their performance during the MA-9 mission is discussed. In addition, a
discussion of the physiological aspects of the life support system per-
formance is presented.

5.2.1 Environmental control system.- The environmental control system

(ECS) controls the pressure and temperature of the astronaut's
pressure suit and of the spacecraft cabin and provides breathing
oxygen for the astronaut. The ECS automatically maintains the
pressure of the spacecraft and pressure suit at approximately
5-1 psia. Oxygen makeup for cabin leakage and astronaut con-
sumption is supplied from three high-pressure gaseous oxygen
containers. Respired carbon dioxide (C0p) is removed from the
suit ECS circuit by a chemical reaction with lithium hydroxide
(LiOH). Cabin and suit temperatures are controlled by a water-
evaporation process in the cabin and suit heat exchangers. The
rate of heat removal is controlled by the astronaut's manipu-
lation of individual coolant control valves (CCV) for the suit
and cabin heat exchangers. These valves regulate the quantity
of water entering the heat exchangers in such a manner that
the suit and cabin environmental temperatures can be maintained
within comfortable limits.

The ECS maintained nominal values during the entire mission.

The only major problem area was the difficulty encountered by
the astronaut in stabilizing the suit heat- ex changer dome
temperature by adjustment of the CCV. The fluctuations in
the dome temperature did not appreciably affect the suit inlet
temperature, which was in the range of 60° to 65° F for the
major portion of the mission.

5-2.1.1 System description: The ECS was originally designed for an

l8-orbital-pass capability, but three major changes from the
ECS configuration used in the previous mission (MA.-8) were
required for a mission of longer duration. A second bottle
containing 4 pounds of oxygen was installed in parallel with
the primary oxygen bottle. This addition increased the previous
total oxygen supply, including the primary and a secondary source,
by 50 percent. The quantity of LiOH was increased from 4.6 pounds
to 5-^ pounds, and the amount of charcoal was decreased from
1 pound to 0..2 pound. Also, an auxiliary LiOH canister was
utilized in the suit outlet line during manned prelaunch tests
to conserve the LiOH in the flight canister. An additional tank
with a nominal capacity of 9 pounds of coolant water was in-
stalled to complement the original 39-P°un(i capacity tank. This
new tank was serviced before launch with 9-3 pounds of water.
 5 -8

In addition to system changes to accommodate the extended flight,

other modifications from the spacecraft 16 (MA-8) configuration
were required to improve system performance. The major changes
in this category are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Because of the partial blockage problem experience in MA-8, a

suit bypass CCV was installed in parallel with the existing CCV
for redundancy.

A condensate trap, shown in figure 5-2.1.1-1, was installed at

the suit-inlet port to extract free condensate water which would
adhere to the inner wall of the water separator and thus escape
extraction. The inner wall of this trap was a wicking material,
which has the property of passing water, but not gas, when the
material is wet.

The cabin-pressure relief valve was equipped with a water sealing

device to enable the astronaut to lock this valve and prevent
sea water from entering the spacecraft after landing.

A sensor for measuring carbon-dioxide partial pressure (PCO ) was

installed in the suit circuit to indicate CO concentration and
actuate a warning tone and light at a PCO value of 8 mm Hg.
The suit inlet for emergency oxygen flow was repositioned upstream
of the PCO sensor, and thereby permitted a purging of the PCO
sensor with 100-percent oxygen to verify its operation.

The suit-circuit, from the water-separator to the junction with

the suit-inlet flexible hose, was insulated to reduce, heat loss;
and the LiOH canister was insulated to minimize condensation.
The dome temperature, which was monitored by the astronaut during
the MA-8 mission, was also monitored on telemetry and recorded
for MA-9.

5.2.1.2 System performance: The analysis of the ECS performance during

the MA-9 mission was dependent upon the results of preflight tests,
real-time telemetry data, the pilot's inflight voice reports, on-
board recorded data, and postflight inspection and test results.

Launch phase: The suit-inlet temperature was 55° F at astro-

naut insertion into the spacecraft and gradually increased to
6l° F during the freon cooling period prior to lift-off. The
oxygen partial pressure (PO ) readout for the cabin was 0.6 psi
below total cabin pressure after the cabin was purged with
oxygen at the launch site. A gas analysis at this time indicated
98-percent 0 at a cabin pressure of 1^.9 psia. At lift-off,
 5 -9

the PO was O.k- psi below cabin pressure. Measurements during

the countdown did not indicate a change in the PO amplifier
calibration. The telemetry readout (percent full scale) from
the PCO sensor was negative during the countdown period. This
negative value is normal and results from the logarithmic
voltage output characteristic of the sensor; that is, the zero
reference of the sensor corresponds to a finite level of PCCL.

The ECS operated normally during powered flight, and the cabin
pressure held at 5-5 psia. The dome temperatures of both heat
exchangers decreased during powered flight. This decrease in-
dicates a rapid response of the cooling circuits upon reaching
altitudes at which the water would boil at lower temperatures
and pressures.

Orbital phase: The PO at orbital insertion was 0.3 psi below

cabin pressure. The cabin pressure decayed to 5-1- psi at
approximately 03:00:00, at which time cabin-pressure regulation
began. The cabin pressure, which is influenced by cabin tem-
perature, varied between 5-0 and 5-2 psi during the orbital
phase. This range of pressure is within the specified toler-
ance of the cabin-pressure regulator.

Calculations of total oxygen consumption show that 2.18 pounds

of oxygen were used from 03:05:00 to 3^:05:00. These calcu-
lations were based on tabulated data for primary oxygen bottle
pressure and estimates of bottle temperature. The time of
03:05:00 was chosen to correspond to the estimated time at
which cabin pressure regulation began. Postflight analysis of
the LiOH canister revealed that 2.90 pounds of CO were absorbed
in the canister. This CO was produced during the launch attempt
on May lU, the successful launch period of May 15, the mission
orbital phase, and, of minor significance, the major simulated
launch and the simulated flight. Based on a total canister usage
time of ^-2. h hours and neglecting the small amount of C0p pro-
duced during the simulated flight and launch, the average
astronaut C0? production rate was 26l cc/min. Chemical analysis
of the two auxiliary canisters used in series with the flight
canister during the countdown shows average C0? rates of
26k cc/min and 285 cc/min. Since these rates are of the same
order of magnitude as that calculated for the flight canister,
Page 5 - 1 0

it is concluded that the C0p rate of 26l cc/min is believable

for the orbital period. Since the faceplate was estimated by
the astronaut to have been open approximately one-third of
this time, an undetermined amount of CO escaped into the
cabin. This CO would raise the cabin PCO_ reading and leak
overboard. Since there was no measurement of PCO? in the
cabin, it is impossible to estimate from a systems standpoint
the quantity of COp that was lost when the faceplate was open.
An estimate of the maximum PCO^ in the cabin based on physio-
logical considerations is contained later in this section.
Based on this estimate, a negligible amount of C0p was lost
through the open faceplate. In any case, the figure of 26l cc/min
for the average CO^ production rate is a minimum value.

The cabin-leakage rate determined several days prior to the

first launch attempt was ^85 cc/min at 19.7 psia and 70° F.
This leakage rate was determined by a stabilized flowmeter
measurement. Subsequent to this check the hatch was removed
and replaced several times. A brief leakage check on the day
of the launch showed no detectable leakage. This check, however,
was quite gross and has no particular significance. A gross
leakage-rate determination after launch was obtained from the
reading of cabin pressure decay from relief-valve seal-off
pressure to the point when cabin-pressure regulation began.
This determination showed a leakage of 510 cc/min corrected
to 19.7 psia and 70° F.
Extrapolating the prelaunch leakage determination from the sea-
level condition to the orbital condition shows that the equiv-
alent cabin leakage rate during the orbital period would be
0.528 X 10 Ib/min. This leakage rate is determined by
computing the equivalent orifice area required to leak the
^-85 cc/min at sea level and then using this area to compute
the choked orifice flow during the orbital period.
Based on the average C0? production rate and a respiratory
quotient (RQ) of 0.83., as noted in a later paragraph, the astro-
naut oxygen consumption from 03:05:00 to 3^:05:00 would be
1.84 pounds. The leakage for the same period based on extrapo-
lated precount measurements amounts to 0.98 pound. The sum of
computed astronaut consumption and computed leakage rate is
therefore 2.82 pounds as compared with the calculated bottle
depletion of 2.18 pounds.
 Page 5 - 1 1

A high level of confidence should be placed in the calculations

of total oxygen usage and astronaut metabolic consumption. The
values for leakage rate are based on prelaunch measurements,
and the equivalent orifice areas to produce these leakage rates
are very small. It is possible that any given leakage area
could change after the measurement, which would, of course,
alter the leakage rate. Therefore, it is concluded that the
leakage rate decreased after the prelaunch measurement. From
cabin pressure decay data, there is evidence that a reduction
in leakage occurred soon after the first hour of flight. The
average oxygen-leakage rate, based on the difference in computed
total usage and computed astronaut consumption, is 0.183 x 10
pound per minute. In addition to the oxygen leakage, there
probably was a small quantity of CO and water vapor leakage
which would depend on the partial pressures of these parameters
in the cabin.

At 1:35:00, the astronaut opened the hose clamp on the condensate-

trap water-outlet line. He did not observe water flowing through
the transparent line and closed the clamp, as planned, after
about 30 minutes. At 8:00:00, the astronaut again removed the
clamp and soon observed the flow of condensate water. The trap
remained in operation until approximately 12:22:00, when the
clamp was again closed. The clamp was reopened at 26:56:00 for
a 6-minute period. Although it had been planned to use the trap
more extensively during the flight, failure of the condensate
transfer pump prompted the astronaut's decision to discontinue
its use. This action was taken to minimize the possibility of
water leakage through the condensate tank vent into the cabin.
The astronaut observed that the water separator cycled through-
out the flight. The fact that water flowed from the condensate
trap, which is downstream from the water separator, indicated
that the water separator was not efficiently removing condensate.
Data from prelaunch and postflight tests, as well as results
from previous missions, support a belief that water can move
freely around the sponge in the water separator under weightless
conditions, thereby reducing its water removal effectiveness.

At approximately 06:22:00, the astronaut began the cabin

temperature evaluation by turning off the cabin fan and
coolant-water flow to the cabin heat exchanger. At this
time the cabin temperature was oscillating slowly between
90° and 95° F, as shown in figure 5-2.1.2-1. The maximum
cabin temperature observed during the period of evaluation
was 103° F, which occurred during a powered-up condition,
and the minimum temperature was 8^-° F, which occurred during
an extended period while the spacecraft was powered down.
The cabin temperature during the experiment oscillated approxi-
mately ±5° F, and the temperature trend was influenced by the
cycling of electrical power and sun-light heat loads. The
Page 5 - 1 2

average cabin temperature during the evaluation was 90° F.

At 32:05:00 the astronaut terminated the evaluation and
turned on the cabin cooling system, as planned, in prepara-
tion for reentry.. The cooling system responded rapidly, as
evidenced by a drop in the cabin-heat-exchanger outlet
temperature.

At 52:15:00, a marked increase occurred in the PCOp level,

which reached 2..8 mm Hg by 32:45:00. Prior to 32:15:00, the
PCOp was less than 0.1 mm Hg. At 32:44:20, the astronaut
selected the emergency rate mode of 0? flow to purge the PCO
transducer and test its readout validity. This mode was in
operation for 25.5 seconds. The PCO decreased to approxi-
mately 1.9 mm Hg at 32:44:56 thereby verifying the validity of
the readout. The PCO? again continued to rise gradually until
33:59:30, which is the exact time of ignition for the first
retrorocket. At this time, the PCO? indication decreased
sharply to a negative voltage output. Test experience has
shown that the sensor indication will not normally change as
rapidly as it did during this brief period. Postflight cali-
bration of the PCOp sensor did not indicate a significant
shift in its calibration.

The LiOH canister has been tested extensively under normal

gravity conditions,- and the operational life of the 5-4-pound
charge of LiOH was well established. Prior to astronaut in-
sertion on the day of the launch, the effective life of the
LiOH canister had been reduced by approximately 8 hours because
of usage during systems tests conducted for the unsuccessful
and successful launch attempts of May l4 and 15, respectively.
Calculations made after the launch attempt indicated that the
canister capability was sufficient to accommodate the mission
with at least a 3-hour margin. Consequently, it was known
that PCO might build up during the latter part of the mission,
since the useful life of the canister is defined as time re-
quired to reach a PC02 level of 8 mm Hg, rather than the time
to the first indication of C02 buildup. Postflight chemical
analysis of the canisters (table 5.2.11.2-1) indicates that the
astronaut's carbon dioxide production was below the design level
of 400 cc/min and that there was 2.18 pounds of LiOH remaining
in the canister. However, postflight analysis showed that some
channeling of flow occurred in the flight canister. This
channeling of flow could explain the indicated PCO buildup.

"CONFIDENTIAL
 Page 5-13

The suit heat-exchanger dome temperature is the measurement used

by the astronaut to evaluate the operation of the cooling circuit.
The astronaut made a considerable number of adjustments to the
suit CCV, but he was unable to attain stabilization of this
temperature. The requirement for this frequent adjustment pre-
sented the major anomaly in the ECS performance during the
mission. The dome temperature, which ideally should be main-
tained between ^0° F to 55° F, is a function of the coolant-
water flow and the heat load on the heat exchanger. The heat
load can be affected by the astronaut's activity level, the
helmet-visor position, and the cabin temperature. The dome
temperature is, by nature, sensitive to small changes in the
coolant-water flow rate, and the resulting dome-temperature
changes can be rapid. However, the suit-inlet temperature was
relatively stable and not appreciably affected by the dome-
temperature fluctuations. The average suit-inlet temperature
for the entire mission was from 6° F to 15° F lower than those
experienced during any previous flight.

The cooling water used during the flight was determined by post-
.flight testing to be 23.38 pounds. The average coolant-flow rate
for both the cabin and suit circuits was approximately 0.6 Ib/hr.
This rate was determined by using estimates of CCV settings
obtained from the onboard voice transcripts and postflight
measurements of coolant water remaining in the system.

The astronaut reported that suit pressure was at times slightly

negative with respect to cabin pressure and that it was necessary
to breathe deeply occasionally to correct this condition. This
action causes the demand regulator to supply oxygen to the
suit circuit and, therefore, increase the pressure. This con-
dition could be corrected for operation with the faceplate
closed by decreasing the negative pressure required to activate
the demand regulator. A configuration using lower negative
pressure was tested early in the ECS development program, and
it was discovered that operation with the faceplate open caused
inadvertent operation of the demand regulator and, therefore,
excess oxygen usage.

Reentry phase: The ECS operation during reentry and landing

was normal. The snorkels actuated automatically at 3^-: 15:25
at an altitude of 18,500 feet. The astronaut reported that
he was comfortable during the postlanding phase. The flapper
diaphram of the cabin-air outflow valve, which is normally
open after the water-sealing device in the cabin pressure-
relief valve has been engaged, would ordinarily be closed by
the water pressure. However, a small quantity of sea water
reported to have entered the cabin upon landing could have
passed through this valve prior to the closing of the diaphram.
Page 5 -

5.2.1.3 Results and conclusions: The only major anomaly in the ECS
was the inability of the astronaut to stabilize the suit heat-
exchanger-dome temperature. A possible solution for this
problem is presently under investigation. In all other re-
spects, the operation of the system was satisfactory.

The results of the cabin temperature evlauation show that cabin

cooling of the Mercury spacecraft is not required during a
powered-down condition.

Since the astronaut observed water flow from the condensate

trap, it must be concluded that an unknown percentage of con-
densate bypasses the water separator in a zero "g" environment.
Because of the configuration of the condensate trap, it can be
further concluded that the condensate water is transported along
the walls of the ducting.

Unlike the MA.-8 mission, the postflight calibration of the CCV's

. showed no significant shift in the flow rate for a given valve
setting from the preflight calibration. Prior to flight, the
CCV's in the MA-9 spacecraft had been thoroughly cleaned, and
their lubrication procedure had been improved. In addition,
the coolant water was passed through a 0.15 micron filter before
being transferred to the coolant water tank.

5.2.2 Pressure-suit assembly.- The Project Mercury pressure-suit

assembly utilized on the MA-9 flight differed considerably from
those used in previous flights. The areas in which changes or
modifications were made are discussed in the following paragraphs.

5.2.2.1 Helmet: On previous flights the helmets utilized a pneumatic

system for sealing the helmet faceplate, which has been described
in previous reports. The MA-9 helmet (see fig. 5.2.2.1-1)
utilized a newly developed mechanical sealing system which con-
siderably increased the reliability and operating lifetime of
the system. The mechanical faceplate-sealing system consists of
a pivot and crank mechanism which required that a bail (semi-
circular member) be manually rotated from the top-of-the-head
' ' position to the front-down position. As the faceplate assumes
the down position, the bail rotation actuates a gear mechanism
in the pivot housing. A crank, in turn,, is rotated to the rear
by the gear mechanism which brings the faceplate back and the
sides in against a sealing gasket. This action effects a com-
plete pressure-tight seal. Other changes to the helmet include
the addition of small velcro tape patches for attaching the
oral temperature probe to the right ear cup and the radiation
film badges to the helmet shell.
 Page 5 - 15

5-2.2.2 Torso: Improvements and changes were made to the torso section
of the pressure suit to provide increased comfort, performance, and
mobility when pressurized. These are listed as follows:

(1) The shoulder areas were rebuilt to utilize a combination

sliding cable system and tapered convolute mobility design.

(2) The wrist areas of the gloves were modified by adding a

"link net" material, which eliminated the need for wrist restraint
straps.

(j) Improved foot ventilation was incorporated by the inclusion

of vent channel innersoles into the boots. The boots were also
made a permanent part of the torso assembly.

The suit-inlet ventilation fitting was modified to incorporate

a poppet type valve which automatically closes when the ECS
hose nozzle is disconnected from the fitting. This would pre-
vent water from entering the suit should the astronaut leave
the spacecraft after a water landing. The helmet tiedown system
incorporated a modified pulley and buckle mechanism. This
modification allowed adjustment of the helmet rise by the astro-
naut in the event of suit pressurization.

The glove-to-torso disconnect bearings were modified to incor-

porate an additional locking feature to prevent accidental disen-
gagement. At the interface with the urine transfer system, a
fitting was added to accomodate the urine transfer valve. The
lifevest pack, previously mounted in the front upper chest area
of the suit, was moved to a more convenient location on the
front of the lower left leg. Accessories carried in pockets on
the suit included a hankerchief, pocket folding knife, biomedical
injectors, heavy-duty- scissors, and a mechanical pencil.

5.2.2.3 Suit performance: The suit performed satisfactorily throughout

the flight. The astronaut stated that suit ventilation was
excellent and that in the zero-g environment the presence of the
suit was barely noticeable. The only problem noted was some
discomfort around the knees because of pressure points in the
suit at this body location. This discomfort apparently resulted
from a somewhat tight fitting before the flight. Although the
discomfort could be relieved by stretching the legs, the fitting
of the suit at this location will receive closer attention in
future missions.

5-2.3 Water and waste management systems.- Three considerations made it

necessary to change the configuration of the urine, condensate,
and drinking-water systems from those flown in previous missions
to accomodate the MA-9 mission requirements. First, it was pos-
sible that the condensate tank was spilling water into the cabin
through the tank vent. In zero-g conditions, liquid adheres to

CONFIDENTIAL'
Page 5 - 16 GOPiriDDNTIAIj

the tank walls and creeps out of any wall opening, for example,,
the tank vent. In addition, more recent estimates of condensate
generation for the MA.-9 mission exceeded the condensate tank
capacity of a"bout U pounds. Second, the capacity of the suit
internal urine reservoir was insufficient to store the urine out-
put estimated for the MA.-9 mission. In addition, it was a medical
requirement that urine specimens representing various phases of
the flight be collected for analysis. Third, the extended flight
duration made it necessary to provide additional water for drinking
and food preparation. Figure 5-2.3-1 is a schematic diagram of
the MA.-9 urine and condensate system.

5.2.3.1 System description: A total of 10 pounds of potable water was

aboard in the survival-kit package and a separate drinking-.water
tank. The survival kit contained a polyethylene bag which was
filled with 5.5 pounds of water. The drinking-water tank, with
a 4.5-pound capacity, was the primary drinking-water supply and
was located to the immediate right of the astronaut's head. It
consisted of two separate synthetic-rubber bladders, one to con-
tain the water and the other to pressurize the system. The
bladders were mounted in a rectangular metal container equipped
with a drinking tube and mouthpiece, a pressurizing hand pump,
and a safety relief valve. To .drink, the astronaut would operate
the pump to build up a pressure of approximately 2 psi in the
container. He would then open the mouthpiece valve to extract
water from the system. The mouthpiece valve snaps closed when
the unit is withdrawn from the mouth.

A transfer fitting was connected to the drinking-water tank to

provide the capability of transferring condensate water into
the tank after the drinking water was consumed.

Four urine storage bags with a total combined capacity of

13 pounds were installed beneath the astronaut's couch. These
bags were each connected to individual urine transfer fittings
located on the right-hand console. The containers were in, two
assemblies, one 7-pound-capacity bag mounted under the left
side of the astronaut's couch and three 2-pound-capacity bags
mounted under the right side. The bags were constructed of
neoprene-coated nylon enclosed in an aluminized nylon-twill
bag. Each bag was evacuated to a pressure of 6.7 psia prior
to launch to remove entrapped air which, unless removed, would
expand upon cabin pressure reduction. Each bag contained
neomycin sulfate to prevent urine decomposition prior to analysis.

A 60-cc capacity syringe pump (see fig. 5-2.3-1-1) was provided

on a bracket located to the astronaut's left for urine transfer.
The syringe pump inlet hose was attached to the suit urine
collection bag through a connector on the astronaut's suit.
The syringe outlet hose was connected to a protected needle
 1ENTIAL Page 5 - 1?

assembly which could be inserted into the desired urine transfer

fitting located on the right-hand console. Pumping the syringe
causes urine to flow from the suit bag to the desired storage
bag beneath the couch. At the completion of urine transfer,
the protected needle is withdrawn from the urine transfer fitting,
and the rubber diaphragm within the fitting automatically seals.

The condensate collection system was capable of storing up to

12.36 pounds of condensate in permanently installed containers
and 6 pounds of condensate in small 1-pound plastic bag con-
tainers, giving a total storage capacity of over 18.36 pounds.

The condensate collection components are the squeezer-type water

separator, a condensate trap, the ^(--pound-capacity condensate
tank, a 3-86-pound-capacity bag installed under the head rest,
and the 4.5-pound potable water tank, which could be utilized
after its contents were depleted. A new vent was extended into
the condensate tank interior as a standpipe. The interior, or
tank side, of the standpipe was coated with a non-wetting
silicone material to prevent water from creeping up the stand-
pipe and out the vent under zero-g conditions. A separate
transfer syringe, similar to that in the urine transfer system,
was mounted on the left side above the astronaut's head. The
inlet of the syringe was connected to the 4-pound-capacity con-
densate tank. This syringe could be used to transfer water
from the 4-pound capacity condensate tank to either the 3-86-pound-
capacity bag or the 4.5-pound~capacity drinking-water tank. The
condensate water was to collect initially in the 4-pound- capacity
condensate tank from both the water separator and the condensate
trap and then be transferred to the 3-86-pound-capacity bag under
the couch headrest. After the 3-86-pound-capacity bag under the
couch was filled, the condensate was then to be transferred to
the 4.5-pound-capacity drinking-water tank, if the drinking
water had been consumed.

After these three containers were filled, the procedure would

then be to transfer additional condensate to 1-pound plastic
bags included in the special equipment storage kit. These
plastic bags could be filled in the same manner as that used
when adding water to the food packets.

5.2.3.2 Systems performance: The 4.5-pound-capacity water tank operated

satisfactorily, except for the drinking-water mouthpiece. The
astronaut reported that the mouthpiece leaked about the valve
body when he opened it to add water to the dehydrated-food bags.
A postflight failure analysis of the valve revealed that if any
back pressure, such as that created when filling the food bags,
is imposed at the valve outlet, it would leak between the valve
locknut and the mouthpiece (fig. 5-2.3-1). This leakage could
Page 5 - 18

Toe minimized by holding the mouthpiece tightly against the

locknut. If the mouthpiece was only partially opened and
not held against the locknut, it would leak at a very high
rate. The same test performed on a stock valve revealed
similar performance.

The astronaut reported satisfactory operation of the urine

transfer system, except for the time required to transfer a
urine sample from the suit to the urine "bags. This time in-
crement results from the restriction to the flow of fluid
caused by the small bore of the hypodermic needle used in
conjunction with the transfer fittings. A quick disconnect
arrangement could be used to overcome this problem. At the
end of the mission, 1126 grams or 2.48 pounds of urine were
removed from the urine collection "bags.

At 7:^0:18, approximately 300 cc of water was pumped to the

3.86-pound-capacity condensate bag. Later in the mission,
the astronaut transferred some additional condensate to this
bag. He noted, however, that he could get very little fluid
into the bag because of back pressure on the pump. He then
drank all of the wateri he could from the 4.5-pound drinking-
water tank, relocated the needle to the drinking-water-tank
inlet transfer fitting, and pumped several times into this
tank. He then relocated the needle to the 3-86-pound-capacity
bag transfer fitting and tried again to pump water into this
bag, but with no success. He noted that the pump seemed com-
pletely jammed. He then attempted to relocate the needle to
the drinking-water tank transfer fitting, but the transfer-
fitting needle guide of the 3-86-pound-capacity bag unscrewed
from its base and remained firmly affixed over the-needle.
Therefore, it was impossible to insert the needle into any
other transfer fitting. He then unsuccessfully attempted to
transfer condensate into the 1-pound plastic bags. These
events occurred at approximately 27:50:00.

The syringe pump stem is made with serrations on its surface

which indicate pump stroke capacity in cubic centimeters. Be-
cause of the orientation of the syringe in relation"to the
astronaut, a considerable side load was placed on the plunger
stem each time it was actuated. This load caused a severe
broaching action between the serrated plunger stem and its
metal guide. The broaching action generated metal chips and
slivers, which migrated past the pump plunger, entered the
system and clogged the transfer needle, thereby preventing
fluid flow. The syringe pump operated normally when these
metal particles were flushed out after the flight.

V.V71! f
 Page 5-19

The malfunction of the 3-86-pound-capacity bag transfer

fitting was caused by a failure to get the proper seating
of a set screw between the fitting parts. The fitting con-
sists of a base and a needle guide which screw together to
retain the rubber diaphragm. The needle guide external male
threads mate with female threads in the nylon cover shield
of the transfer needle. When the diaphragm was replaced
prior to flight, the set screw was not set firmly enough to
prevent relative motion between the fitting base and needle
guide. Friction between the needle guide threads and the
nylon cover threads would have been great enough to cause the
fitting-needle guj.de to stay with the transfer needle when
disengagement was attempted. It is possible that the 3-86-pound-
capacity bag evidently got some air into it after the evacu-
ation had been performed. The expansion of this air during
ascent could have reduced the capacity of the bag in orbit.

The total condensate recovered after the mission was 4.2 pounds,
assuming that all of the water in the 4.5-pound-capacity drinking-
water tank was condensate. The condensate removed from this tank
amounted to 2.4 pounds. In addition, 0.7 pound of condensate
was removed from the 3.86-pound-capacity bag, and 1.1 pounds
of condensate was removed from the 4-pound-capacity condensate
tank.

5-2.4 Thermal and water balance analyses.-

5.2.4.1 Metabolic analysis: The average metabolic heat production

during the mission may be calculated quite accurately from the
amount of carbon dioxide (COp) absorbed in the lithium hydrox-
ide (LiOH) canister. The rate of COp absorption during the
mission, including that experienced prior to both lift-off
attempts, was 26l cc/min at standard temperature and
pressure (STP). One correction to this figure would be the
COp lost through cabin leakage. With the faceplate closed,
the partial pressure of C0p in the cabin would be zero. How-
ever, the astronaut had his faceplate open at times during
the flight, and some COp will have been lost directly to the
cabin. It is not possible to determine accurately the average
COp partial pressure in the cabin during the flight, but the
amount was most likely well below 10 mm Hg. Therefore, the
leakage rate of C0p probably did not exceed 2 cc/min (STP).

Assuming a normal respiratory quotient (RQ) of 0.83, the

average metabolic heat production was 92 kilocalories/hr
(kcal/hr), or 370 B.t.u./hr. The astronaut's surface area is

GQNFIDENTIAlr
Page 5 - 2 0

•j
1.83 m } and his heat production per unit area was, there-
2 2
fore, 50 kcal/m -hr, or 200 B.t.u./m -hr- These values are
2
lower than the 57-kcal/m -hr figure estimated prior to flight
on the basis of C0p absorption in the' canisters used during
previous Mercury flights. The average inflight metabolic
rate was equal to that of a nonfasting subject seated quietly
at rest on the ground. This rate would be lower during sleep
and higher during activity. There was no instrumentation
available for recording these variations. From the assumed
RQ of O.Sj, total oxygen consumption by the astronaut during
the orbital: phase of the mission was 2.05 pounds, which
corresponds to a usage rate of 301 cc/min (STP). This value
has been used in a previous section for the computation of
cabin leakage.
Since the cabin ECS fan was turned off for most of the flight,
convective heat exchange between the pressure suit surface and
the cabin gas was undoubtedly lower than with the fan operating.
The mean cabin temperature of 90° F was comparable to the
astronaut's mean skin temperature of about 95° F. Taken
together, these factors indicate that the astronaut's heat
loss to the cabin must have been small. If it is assumed that
half the heat taken up by the ventilating oxygen between the
suit-inlet and outlet ports was extracted from the astronaut's
skin^ then the remainder of the metabolic heat production must
have been dissipated in the vaporization of moisture from the
lungs and from the skin. Convective cooling would then account
for about 12 kcal/hr, and the latent heat of vaporization would
account for 80 kcal/hr. This latter figure is equivalent to
a body-water vapor loss of 0.3 Ib/hr, or 11.0 pounds for the
total time spent in the spacecraft during the mission. The
astronaut was sweating throughout the flight, which is con-
firmed by his comment that he was usually warm.
Oral temperatures of the astronaut taken in the spacecraft
during the mission were as follows:

Time Oral temperature , 9F

T-15 min 97-5
1:10:00 98-5
6:00:00 100.0
10:25:00 100.0
12:25:00 99-0
23:50:00 98.0
No significant correlation could be found between the tempera-
tures of the astronaut and the cabin or with the times during
which the condensate trap was or was not operating. A
 Page 5 - 2 1

calculation of the metabolic rate at specific times during

the flight was not possible because of insufficient instru-
mentation. It is likely that the two readings of 100.0° F
are related to the combined effects of a mild sustained heat
stress and moderate physical activity during the early part of
the flight. Further analysis of the thermal condition of the
astronaut is not possible because of the absence of detailed
data for cabin environmental conditions and metabolic, rates.
It can be said that the deep body temperature did not vary from
normal sufficiently to impair the astronaut's inflight per-
formance. However, the astronaut's skin temperature and sweat
rate were at somewhat higher levels than those considered to
be ideal for a suited pilot over this period of time.

The estimate of 11.0 pounds for body-water vapor loss, cal-

culated from the thermal balance, can be verified by a calcu-
lation of the vapor loss from body-mass balance if all of the
relevant data are accurately known. The major unknown is the
intake of drinking water. The astronaut was not certain that
he emptied his ^^-pound-capacity drinking-water tank before
adding condensate to this tank. The mass balance of the
astronaut is given in table 5.2.4.1-1. The maximum possible
body-water vapor loss is seen to be 10.1 pounds. The actual
loss would be less than this value by the difference between
4.5 pounds and the amount that was actually drunk from the
drinking-water tank. At recovery of the spacecraft, 2.4 pounds
of water were present in the tank, and some of this was condensate.
The minimum value for consumption of drinking water from the
tank is therefore 2.1 pounds, and the actual consumption was
probably nearer to 4.5 pounds.

The amount for body water vapor loss, calculated from the
mass balance, is less by at least 0-9 pound than the value
calculated from heat exchange. The heat-exchange value of
11.0 pounds is calculated on the assumption that all water
evaporated from the skin came from sweat. During the time
that the condensate trap was turned off, primarily the entire
period after 12:14:00, free water must have passed into the
suit and been absorbed by the astronaut's undergarment. This
water was subsequently evaporated into the ventilating gas and,
therefore, reduced the need for sweat production. This
regenerative cooling has been observed during various simu-
lations and experiments in the altitude chamber, where the
free water condensed out by the suit-circuit heat exchanger
was allowed to pass back into the suit. Since some water
must have passed into the suit, the total body water vapor
loss (maximum, 10.1 Ib) will have been less than the amount
predicted from the thermal balance (ll Ib.). The astronaut
was not able to differentiate between the degrees of wetness

INriDENTLIL"
Page 5 - 2 2

of his skin and undergarment when the condensate trap was

clamped off and when it was in operation. The pilot did state
that he was somewhat cooler and more comfortable when the conden-
sate trap was operating. His undergarment was apparently wet at
all times during the flight.
Total water input into the suit circuit also included approxi-
mately 1 pound of water liberated from the lithium hydroxide
canister. Total water recovery from the system should have
been 11.1 pounds.
Of this quantity, the following amounts were recovered and
measured:
Container Water, Ib
3. 86 -pound -capacity condensate bags 0.7
U-pound-capacity condensate tank 1.1
Lithium hydroxide canister 0.2
This tabulation leaves 9-1 pounds of water which can only be
accounted for as follows:
Source Water, Ib
Condensate pumped into drinking-
water tank, maximum
Residual water left in the under-
garment and space suit (estimated
minimum figure from previous labora-
tory experiment)3 2.0
Water lost into spacecraft from the
condensate tank and leaking valves (b)
Water loss from cabin ECS circuit
during ventilation with ambient
air after snorkels open during
reentry (c)
Residual water in suit environmental
control system (d)

Not measured.

Values not yet available.

'Negligible and cannot be calculated from present data.

d
Cannot be meaningfully calculated because of inaccuracies.
 Page 5 - 2 J

It is emphasized that the computations of thermal and vater

balance is subject to considerable inaccuracy because of
the lack of specific measurements of some of the variables.
The various locations of water and rates of vater loss given
above could account for the total water input of a maximum
of 11.1 pounds to the suit circuit of the environmental
control system.

5.2.4.2 Food and water consumption:

The astronaut's total food consumption during the flight was

as follows:

Item Time when Amount, Value,

eaten, hr:min:sec gm kcal
One bacon
square 06:32:15 5 19
One container 0^:53:58 88 429
of dessert 06:32:15
cubes 26:1^:^2
One -third
packet of
dehydrated beef
11: 16: 04 1 32
pot roast

Two fruit cakes 26: 14:42

28:29:41 2k 92
One container
of peanut 28:29:41 124
_22_
butter
sandwiches
Totals 146 696

Although the astronaut was not hungry, he found that the

food he ate tasted good. He wanted to try the freeze-
dehydrated foods and juices, but he was unable to put
sufficient water into the food reconstitution bags because
of leakage from the drinking water valve. The valve was
tested after the flight and found to leak freely when the
nozzle was at intermediate positions between off and fully
open. There was, therefore, an inadequate pressure head
to fill the food bags with water.
Page 5 - 2^

During the flight the astronaut noticed that the packet

containing "beef sandwiches was full of floating crumbs
and did not open it. The tapes of the cube food dis-
pensers were a source of considerable trouble under weight-
less conditions. When the empty containers were stored
after use in the desk, the tapes fluttered around each time
the desk lid was opened.

The caloric value of the food eaten in flight was less

than that needed to balance caloric expenditure, but ade-
quate to prevent ketosis.

The astronaut was dehydrated at the end of the flight.

This dehydration was evident from his complaints of
thirstiness in the last two orbital passes, from the
water-balance figures given previously, and from his•
clinical condition at the postflight medical examination
(see the aeromedical analysis section). The final flight
plan called for the astronaut to drink all of the water from
his survival kit, if necessary. Had this been done, the
majority of the water deficit would have been covered, since
there'was a further ^.9 pounds of water available in the sur-
vival-kit bag at the end of the flight. There were three
reasons why this water was not used appreciably:

1. A real thirst was not experienced until the last two

orbital passes, when the astronaut was preoccupied with
systems problems.

2. He experienced some difficulty with a valve similar to

that on the drinking-water tank which made him reluctant to
spend too much time in freeing the tube from its fastened
position.

J. He did not wish to take too much water from the survival
kit in case he should need it after landing.

It is possible that this dehydration played a significant

part in the cardiovascular symptoms of near-syncope ex-
hibited by the astronaut upon leaving the spacecraft. This
phenomenon is discussed in greater detail in the aeromedical
analysis section.
 Page 5-25

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Page 5 - 2 6

TABLE 5.2 A.1-1.- BODY-MASS BALANCE SUMMARY

Source Weight, Ib

Available for output as vapor

Maximum water intake from drinking

water tank ^•5
Survival-kit water 1.2
Food 0.3
Oxygen (assuming an RQ of 0.8j) 2.2
Body weight loss 7-0
Total 15-2

Not available for output as vapor

Urine 2.6
Carbon dioxide 2.5
Total 5-1

Difference, maxim-urn water vapor loss 10.1

from body
 5 - 27

5-'3 Communications Systems

Performance of the spacecraft communications systems was excellent

during the MA-9 mission. The major modifications to these systems since
the previous mission include removal of the low-power UKF voice trans-
mitter-receiver, the addition of the capability to disable the UHF power
amplifier, the addition of a slow-scan TV system (see fig. 5-3-1)
for flight evaluation and the capability to use the TV transmitter as a
backup to the TM transmitter, and changing the extending-mechanism pressure
source for the HF recovery (whip) antenna from a gas generator to the on-
board manual RCS nitrogen supply.

5.3-1 Voice communications.- The performance of the voice communi-

cations equipment was excellent. Acquisition and loss of UHF
communications occurred, as expected, at about line-of-sight
ranges. Good-quality HF communications between the Coastal
Sentry Quebec (CSQ) command ship and the astronaut were estab-
lished during the 20th and 21st orbital passes and maintained
several minutes before and after line of sight, which is equiva-
lent to a slant range of about 1,500 nautical miles. An HF voice
transmitter-receiver test was conducted by the astronaut utilizing
the HF dipole antenna. The test was initiated near the end of the
19th pass when the spacecraft was just north of Panama. The
stations that reported receiving the HF signals were Mercury
Control Center (MCC)) Hangar S; Point Arguello, California (CAL)>
Guaymas, Mexico (GYM.); Corpus Christi, Texas (TEX); Grand Turk
Island in the Atlantic Missile Range (AMR), Grand Bahama
Island (GBl)} White Sands, New Mexico; and Houston, Texas. The
spacecraft attitude appeared to have had little effect on signal
reception; however, the data obtained during this test are
presently being evaluated. The astronaut reported that he found
it desirable to maintain his UHF volume control at a higher
setting than normal. Investigation of the need for this high
setting is continuing. The HF and UHF voice equipment was
tested after the flight and found to be in satisfactory condition.

5-3-2 Radar beacons.- Performance of the C- and S-band radar beacons

was satisfactory. As in all previous missions, instances of
amplitude and slight frequency modulation were experienced on
the C-band beacon. This condition is not serious and is caused
by the phase shifter and, at times, by poor antenna orientation
resulting from the spacecraft's being in attitude-free drifting
flight. The beacons were found to be satisfactory in postflight tests.

5-3-3 Location aids.- Recovery forces reported that transmissions

from all recovery beacons were received. (See section 9-2,
Recovery Operations.) HF voice communication equipment was
not utilized by the astronaut during recovery. All recovery
communications equipment was checked after the flight and
found to be satisfactory.
Page 5 - 2 8

5.3.4 Command receiver. - Operation of the command receiver was normal

throughout the mission with the exception of spurious command
carrier reception from 03:35:00 to 03:38:00, 11:24:00 to 11:27:00,
and 27:10:40 to 27:13:20. Between 27:10:40 and 27:13:20, eight
all-channel indications with signal strengths from — to 2 micro-
volts were noted. These time periods of spurious command re-
ceiver reception correspond to the time during the 3rd, 8th, and
l8th passes when the spacecraft was in the vicinity of the west
coast of Africa. The receiver was tested after the flight and
found to be within specification requirements. Investigation
to determine the cause of these indications is continuing.

5.3.5 Television system. - Operation of the television transmitter was

satisfactory, and good-quality signal strength was received
by the ground station in both the television and telemetry
modes of operation. However, the quality of the pictures
received was unsatisfactory. Pictures taken of the astronaut
and objects inside the spacecraft were of poor quality because
of insufficient light for the lens arrangement used. An example
of the best quality picture of the astronaut that was received
is shown in figures 5-3-5-1- Most of the pictures taken of
objects outside the spacecraft were also unsatisfactory, and
it is believed that too much sunlight was the cause of this
quality degradation. The system appears to be capable of
indicating cloud coverage and even land masses under proper
lighting conditions. The picture shown in figure 5-3-5-2
was transmitted over Cape Canaveral during the 19th orbital
pass and is one of the better examples of TV photographs taken
through the window.

5- 4 Mechanical and Pyrotechnic Systems

Although the mechanical and pyrotechnic systems performed satis-

factorily, two anomalies were noted. The spacecraft window was coated
on the inside surface of the outer pane with an unknown substance, and
the three retropackage umbilicals and one spacecraft-to-adapter umbilical
failed to separate from the spacecraft. All other components, in this
system group apparently performed their function as planned.

5.4.1 Recovery sequence.- The recovery sequence system was not changed
from that used on the MA-8 mission, and the sequence was con-
ducted satisfactorily.

5.4.2 Parachutes.- The performance of the drogue and main parachutes

upon deployment was satisfactory. Neither the drogue nor the
main parachute was recovered for postflight inspection, but
the astronaut reported that both parachutes were deployed
cleanly and were undamaged during descent. The only difference
in the parachute system from that flown in MA-8 was a minor
 Page 5 - 2 9

modification to the main and reserve parachute deployment

bags to provide greater resistance to tearing. Since the
bag was not recovered, an examination to determine if the
modification was effective was not possible. The drogue
parachute was deployed manually at a pressure altitude of
38,100 ft, standard day conditions. The main parachute was
deployed automatically at a pressure altitude of '10,300 ft,
standard day conditions. This altitude is within the speci-
fication value of 10,600 ± 750 feet.

5A.3 Rockets and pyrotechnics.- A postflight examination of the

spacecraft and an analysis of the pertinent data indicate that
all rockets and pyrotechnics, with the exception of the umbili-
cal- disconnect explosive squibs, functioned normally. It can-
not be determined whether certain pyrotechnics actually ignited
(such as redundant clamp-ring bolts and tower-jettison igniter)
since the available information shows only that the resulting
function was satisfactory. The three retropackage umbilicals
and one of the two spacecraft-to-adapter umbilicals failed to
separate from the spacecraft and were still attached to the
spacecraft during the postflight inspection. Subsequent in-
vestigation has revealed that nine of the ten umbilical squibs,
two for each of the five umbilical disconnects, were from the
same lot. The investigation has also shown that each of the
unused squibs from this lot was loaded with only 18 milligrams
of lead styphnate. The proper load (see fig. 5.^.3-1) is
108 milligrams of lead styphnate and, with proper loading,
ignition of one of the two squibs, is sufficient to separate
an umbilical. The postflight investigation indicated that all
bridgewires in the recovered squibs had apparently been elec-
trically ignited, indicating that an ignition signal had been
sent. Based upon these results, it is concluded that the um-
bilicals failed to separate from the spacecraft because the
squibs were not loaded with a sufficient amount of explosive.
One of the two spacecraft-to-adapter umbilicals had one squib
from a different lot, and this umbilical separated cleanly from
the spacecraft. Postflight tests of squibs in the lot from
which the good flight squib had been taken indicated that each
unit in this lot contained the proper amount of explosive charge.

5.^.Jf Explosive-actuated hatch.- The explosive-actuated side hatch

was operated after the spacecraft was placed on board the re-
covery ship. Hatch actuation was normal although the outer
pane of the spacecraft window was fractured at the time of
actuation. In addition, the outer skin of the pressure vessel
was cracked in two places, and these cracks may have occurred
at the time of actuation. Since neither the skin nor the
window was cracked before flight, and since the hatch imparts
considerable energy to the spacecraft structure, these anomalies
are not considered to be a problem and no investigation is
planned.
5.^.5 Spacecraft window. - The astronaut reported that the spacecraft
window was coated with some type of substance that caused the
window to have a frosted appearance under oblique lighting con-
ditions. This coating was on the inside surface of the outer
pane. A postflight analysis of the surface failed to show any-
thing that could cause this coating and the investigation is
continuing.

5-^.6 Landing-shock attenuation system.- The MA-9 landing-shock attenu-

ation system differed from the MA-8 configuration in that the
pressure tank of the landing-bag actuation system was altered in
shape and moved to the opposite side of the spacecraft to make room
for the hydrogen' peroxide fuel tank that was added to the RCS, and
the check valve on the ground checkout port was, deleted.

5-^.6.1 landing bag.- The landing bag was deployed at a pressure altitude
of 9,500 feet, and the system performed normally, as evidenced
by the astronaut's statements and from postflight examination.
The postflight examination of the bag revealed some small tears
and rips, but they were of a minor nature. The straps and cables
were not damaged beyond that normally expected.

5-^.6.2 Ablation shield and main pressure bulkhead. - The ablation shield
appeared to be intact, and only minor circumferential cracks were
noted. The fiber glass protective shield had been scarred by the
heat-shield lugs, indicating-that minor recontact, less than in
previous flights, haS occurred. The main pressure bulkhead did
not exhibit any visible damage. A more detailed discussion of
heat-shield performance is contained in section 5-7-

5.^.7 Flotation. - Reports and photographs from the recovery forces

and the astronaut indicate that the spacecraft righted itself
quickly and floated at the proper attitude once the parachutes
had been jettisoned.

5-5 Electrical and Sequential Systems

5.5.1 Electrical system.- The major modifications to the electrical

system of the MA-9 spacecraft since the previous mission include
the replacement of the two 1,500 watt-hour standby batteries
with two 3^000 watt-hour batteries to increase the available
electrical energy, the -replacement of the main inverters with
more efficient units which also had improved starting and cooling
characteristics, the addition of a standby-inverter automatic tone
generator to indicate automatic switching of the inverter to either
a-c bus, the addition of a switch to allow repowering of certain
buses after landing to permit postlanding recordings of blood-
pressure and EGG readings, and the addition of an on-off switch
in the flashing recovery light circuit.
 Page 5 - 3 1

All electrical system components operated satisfactorily through-

out the flight. Voltage and current profiles were as expected
with the exception of those from the electrically shorted ASCS
bus. Energy consumption was measured at V? percent of that avail-
able, and usage is apportioned as follows:

Mission phase Energy consumed, watt-hours

Countdown, May lh, 1963 257

Countdown, May 15, 1963 189
Lift-off through recovery 7,620
Total power consumed

Power derived during postflight

discharge 8,7^8

Total spacecraft power

available l6,Qik

The short circuit of the ASCS bus is covered in detail in

section 5-l> Spacecraft Control System, and the results pro-
duced by the short circuit are described below.

All electrical a-c inverters operated normally during the flight

until 33:02:^5; at which time the ASCS bus voltage dropped from
approximately its normal level of 115 v a-c to nearly zero. The
astronaut noted at this time that the faulty inverter circuit
appeared to be cycling on and off. He made several electrical
checks and noted an indication of about 1*4-0 volts at the ASCS a-c
bus. He then switched the ASCS bus to the off position, thereby
powering down both the main and standby 250 v-amp inverters. He
subsequently placed the inverter switch in the standby position
and powered the ASCS bus with that inverter. When the standby
inverter failed to start, he replaced the switch to the off
position and did not attempt to repower the ASCS bus except for
three brief checks of the circuit during the final orbital pass.

A postflight inspection and analysis of both inverters showed

that each was operating properly. However, a short circuit with
a resistance of about 1.5 ohms was measured at the power plug in
the ASCS circuit. When the ASCS inverter was exposed to this
short during postflight testing, the voltage dropped from Il6 to
3 volts. The voltage-sensing relay on the inverter output that
applies the voltage to the ASCS bus immediately began a cycling
operation of dropping out and pulling in.as the short circuit
was alternately applied and removed from the inverter output

At
 5 32 CONFIDENTIAL*

circuit. The large inductance associated with the output

impedance of the inverter, along with the high rate of
current change, resulted in large 600-volt spikes that
shorted the parallel diode (peak inverse voltage rating of
300 volts) across the voltage sensing relay. With this diode
shorted, the relay stabilized in its deenergized state and
caused the standby inverter automatically to begin powering the
shorted bus at 3 volts. The standby inverter warning light came
on at this time. During this test, the standby inverter would
not come up to full power because of the short circuit which
was present at the power plug. Because this circuit failure
could be easily duplicated in the laboratory following the
flight, it is believed a short circuit which prevented their
proper operation could have existed in flight and that no
malfunction of the inverters was present at any time during
the flight. Additional laboratory tests show that the 1^0-volt
a-c meter reading reported by the astronaut resulted from
operation of the inverter under the unusual remaining load in
the circuit, which consisted of a 100,000-ohm resistor in
parallel with a diode other than the one which was shorted.

5-5-2 Sequential system.- The major modifications to the sequential

system of the MA.-9 spacecraft include rewiring of the pilot's
abort circuitry to prevent inadvertent ignition of the tower-
jettison rocket motor, rewiring of the retrorocket arm switch
to provide the capability of disarming both the main and
isolated retrorocket squibs with automatic bypass at retro-
grade signal, rewiring of the."fire-retro" green telelite to
make it dependent on the ignition of all three retrorockets,
and paralleling the no. 1 and no. 2 main parachute arming
circuits to increase reliability in arming the 21,000 ft drogue
parachute barostats.

The sequential system operated satisfactorily throughout the

mission, except for the premature 0.05g signal from the
amplifier-calibrator, which is discussed in section 5-1- This
signal caused the sequential system to remove power from the
attitude gyros, the automatic retrosequence circuitry, the
automatic retropackage jettison circuitry, and the retrorocket
telelites. Since these functions were latched out,' the pilot
was forced to use the emergency retrofire circuitry and to
jettison the retropackage manually.

Since the antenna canister was not recovered, the failure of

the balloon deployment mechanism cannot be explained. Onboard
telemetry verifies that the squib firing relay used in deploying
the balloon was properly actuated. A more detailed explanation
of this failure can be found in section 5-8
 T'* Page 5-33

5. 6 Instrumentation System

The instrumentation system monitors certain parameters relating to

specific equipment in the spacecraft, and, in general, the data are either
displayed to the astronaut or transmitted to the ground, or "both. The
data transmitted are also recorded on the onboard tape recorder along with
additional data vhich are neither displayed nor transmitted.

5.6.1 System description.- The major changes made to the MA-9 instru-
mentation system include deleting the high frequency telemetry
system and the low-level temperature survey; adding switches to
allow the astronaut to select continuous, off, or ground command
for the telemetry transmitter and continuous, off, or program
for the onboard tape recorder; adding a switch to allow the
astronaut to remove power from the R- and Z-calibration relays
in the event the programer failed to perform this function;
7
changing the speed of the onboard tape recorder from ITT inches
per second (ips) to T? ips to increase recording time; and adding
a new type programer which was to perform the following functions:

1. One minute of "on" time of the onboard tape recorder

every 10 minutes of elapsed time, with 15 seconds each of Z- and
R-calibrations during the last 30 seconds of the sixth cycle.

2. Six minutes of "on" time of the telemetry transmitter

together with 15 seconds each of R- and Z-calibrations after a
telemetry "on" command from the ground has been received.

3. Six minutes of "on" time of the C-band beacon together

with 15 seconds each of R- and Z-calibrations after a C-band
beacon "on" command from the ground has been received.

U. Six minutes of "on" time of the S-band beacon together

with 15 seconds each of R- and Z-calibrations after an S-band
beacon "on" command from the ground has been received.

In addition, the astronaut observer camera was replaced with a

l6-mm movie camera, which is shown in figure 5-6.1-1. The
l6-mm camera was a magazine loaded unit which was internally
powered by fourteen R-^-01 mercury cells. The camera could be
hand held by the pilot, mounted on the instrument panel to
photograph the pilot, or mounted at the window to photograph
objects outside the spacecraft. Three magazines of film were
provided. Two magazines were each loaded with approximately
120 feet of Eastman Ecktachrome film and they were to be used
for pilot observer, general, and reentry photography. The
Page

third magazine was loaded with approximately 90 feet of

Eastman Linograph Sheirburst film, and it was to "be used to
photograph the balloon. Two lenses were also provided with
the camera. One lens was a Fairchild fixed-focus f/2.0 2-mm
wide angle lens with a l6o° field of view, which was to be
used for pilot observer, balloon, and reentry photography.
The other lens was a Leitz Wetzlar Elmar f/2.8 50-mm telephoto
lens, which was to be used for balloon tracking and general
photography.

5-6.2 System performance.- The oxygen partial pressure (P00d) reading

1
was approximately ^ psi lower than the indicated cabin pressure
at lift-off. A gradual decrease in the PCL sensor indication
occurred until a reading of 1 psi lower than cabin pressure
was present by the 12th .orbital pass. Data derived during the
0 purge in the launch countdown and during exposure to ambient
air immediately following landing indicate that this sensor
operated normally throughout the flight. A postflight check of
the sensor revealed that it was dried out and would not be
expected to respond to variations in oxygen partial pressure.
Although the P0p sensor is believed not to have malfunctioned,
investigations are continuing.

Two sets of R and Z calibrations occurred at the end of the

first orbital pass. Four more sets occurred at the end of
the second pass before the astronaut placed the programer
R and Z calibration switch to off. The switch was turned back
to the automatic position at the beginning of the third pass
and the R and Z calibrations were normal for the remainder of
the flight. It should be noted that, prior to flight, the
possibility was recognized of improper operation in the "B"
section of the programer, which schedules the R- and Z-calibra-
tion commands, was sensitive to spurious signals at the main
power input. Since these signals could cause repetitive R
and Z calibrations, a resistor was added to the command input
circuitry to reduce the programer's susceptability to transient
voltage spikes, and a switch was added to provide the astronaut
the capability to remove power from the R- and Z-calibration
relays in the event the programer failed to operate properly.
Although it is believed that one or more voltage transients
caused the programer to cycle improperly, the exact nature or
source of the transients is not known, and further studies are
being conducted.

During the 1^-th or 15th orbital pass, the respiration rate and
depth readout became erratic. This condition continued through-
out the remainder of the flight. The sensor was found "loose"
 1DENTIAL Page 5

when the astronaut was desuited aboard the recovery ship. A

postflight check of the harness disclosed a failed solder joint
for one of the wires to the side impedance pneumograph electrode.

Initial playback of the onboard tape indicated that the tape

recorder failed to operate in the program mode after 12:18:19.
Recorder operation in the continuous and vox-record modes was
normal throughout the mission. A postflight test of the pro-
gramer indicated that the "A" section, which controls the
program mode of recording, was completely inoperative. Visual
inspection of the programer revealed that the "A" section was
inoperative because the mechanical timer was jammed. This
jamming was caused by a misalined gear, which resulted from a
broken gear shaft. The misalined gear is shown in figure 5-6-2-1.

At retrofire, the indicated carbon dioxide partial pressure

decreased rapidly from 3-0 mm Hg to zero. Postflight testing
'revealed a J-percent calibration shift which would not account
for the inflight occurrence. However, methods have been found
for. duplicating the sudden drop in PCCU, but these findings as
yet have not been correlated with realistic conditions- which
could exist in the spacecraft. Investigations to determine the
cause of this problem are continuing.
Immediately after retrofire, the indicated temperature of the
150 v-amp inverter decreased from 120° F to 86° F in 35 seconds.
The indicated temperature then increased slowly, followed by
a slow decrease just prior to drogue parachute deployment.
About 30 seconds after drogue deployment, the indicated tempera-
ture increased rapidly to 120° F. The temperature of the
250 v-amp standby inverter also increased momentarily at this
time by about 6° F. The indicated readings are considered to
have been valid, since the sensors involved were found to be
intact and operating normally. Although the possibility exists
that free water in the cabin at retrofire could have been
deposited on or near these sensors, thereby reducing the local
temperature suddenly, this thesis cannot be confirmed and further
investigations are presently in progress.

At 3^-:09:24, there was dropout in the voltage control oscillator

(VCO) outputs for the balloon experiment and for the roll,
pitch, and yaw stick positions. This dropout lasted until
3^:12:51, at which time the stick position outputs returned to
normal. Postflight testing on the stick position VCO's revealed,
however, that they were functioning normally. The balloon ex-
periment VCO could not be tested because it was in the antenna
canister, which was not recovered at landing. Because all of the
associated spacecraft components, except the retropackage and
the antenna canister, which were not recovered, functioned
normally during postflight tests, no explanation can be found
for the dropout of these signals.

• CONFIDENTIAL
Page 5-36

5-7 Heat Protection System

The spacecraft heat-protection system performed satisfactorily as

in previous missions. Detailed discussion is presented in the following
paragraphs.

5-7-1 Heat shield.- The materials and construction of the heat shield
were the same as those for heat shields used on previous
orbital missions with the exception that six "bolts were in-
stalled in a circle having a radius of 1^ inches from the
center of the heat shield to aid in retaining the shingle por-
tion of the shield at landing in case of "bond-line separation.
These bolts were ^ inch in diameter and O.Qkk inch in length,
had 28 Universal National fine threads to the inch, and were
constructed of high-temperature corrosion-resistent steel.
Postflight examination revealed only minor cracks in the
ablation laminate. A section through the center of the shield
indicated that the bond line had separated, but that it had
been held within the tolerance of the bolt installations. The
separated area was not nearly as extensive as that evident on
the MA-8 heat shield, and the surfaces of the separation region
were smooth. No large cracks were observed to emanate from
the separated bond-line area, as has occurred in the previous
two flights.
During reentry, the heat shield provided satisfactory thermal
protection, as on all previous orbital missions. The extended
time of exposure of the heat shield to the space environment
did not result in any noticeable effects regarding the heat-
shield performance. As expected, the stagnation point appears
to have been close to the center of the shield, as evidenced by
the usual glass droplet streaks that extend out from this
point. (See fig. 5-7-l-'l- ) The reentry heating appeared to be
uniform over the shield, as indicated by 10 core samples taken
at various locations. Char depth measurements of these samples
indicated normal heating, and these values varied from O.J to
O.J5 inch as in previous missions.
A bond-line temperature measurement was made in flight at
approximately the geometric center of the shield. The maximum
temperature experienced at this location was Ul5° F and occurred
a short time after main parachute deployment. This value is in
agreement with previous bond-line temperature measurements.
During the orbital phase, the heat-shield showed a fairly
steady temperature increase from 60° F at insertion to 90° F
just before reentry.
 INTIAL ' Page 5 - 37

The measured weight loss of the heat shield was 15-3^ pounds,
which is comparable to that which was measured following
previous orbital missions.

5-7-2 Afterbody. - No temperature measurements were made on the

conical and cylindrical sections of the spacecraft. Postf light
examination of the shingles revealed no areas where adverse
heating occurred.

5-7-3 Paint patch evaluation.- Three individual types of white

paint coatings were applied to a Rene ' 4l shingle on the
conical section, as shown in figure 3 • 1-1 • Each patch was
6 inches square and approximately h mils in thickness. The
three types of pigments were titanium dioxide, zinc oxide,
and zirconium oxide. The coatings were applied with a thermal-
drying binder and cured with a special application to obtain
better adhesion and color characteristics . Previous attempts
to obtain similar results were not successful, probably because
an air-drying binder was used. Postflight inspection revealed
that all three coatings were discolored. The titanium dioxide
and zinc oxide coatings remained bonded to the shingle; however,
the zirconium oxide coating exhibited extensive peeling.
(See fig. 5-7-3-1- ) The paint patches did not experience
erosion, as was evident on previous flights. Further laboratory
investigations are necessary before a conclusion can be reached
regarding discoloration and flaking.

CONFIDENTIAL
Page 5 ~

5.8 Scientific Experiments

A number of experiments and scientific observations were planned
for the MA-9 mission. These experiments were concerned with atmospheric
drag measurements, visual acquisition and tracking effectiveness, various
photographic exercises, cosmic radiation measurements, and general pilot
observations. The results of this experimental effort, which utilized
equipment or materials not normally associated with the basic spacecraft
operation, are briefly summarized in the following paragraphs.
5-8.1 Dim-light photography. • - The dim-light photography experiment
was intended to provide photographic data on two phenomena,
which are best observed from outside the earth's atmosphere.
These phenomena are the so-called zodiacal light and the
night airglow. Photographs of the zodiacal light would help
to determine its exact origin, geometric distribution, and
relationship to solar radiation and flare activity. Data on
the airglow would provide further information on the solar-
energy conversion processes occurring in the upper atmosphere.
Observations of the zodiacal light are partially obscured or
become impossible when viewed through the atmosphere because
of absorption and scattering. For example, measurements of
the brightness of the zodiacal light within 30° °f ^he sun
have not been possible because of the interference of twi-
light.

Space flights provide an excellent opportunity to view the

bright night airglow band in profile. Some data were col-
lected during the MA.- 7 mission on the altitude and bright-
ness of the airglow layer above the earth by observing and
timing the passage of a star through it. The photographs
planned for the MA.- 9 mission were intended to provide\ further
information on the brightness, structure, and altitude of this
airglow band.

The camera used in this experiemnt was a semi-automatic

35-mm hand-held instrument fitted with a fast lens which is
shown in figure 5-8.1-1. The square aperture of the shutter
limited the speed of the lens to an equivalent of f/0. 95- Its
controls were simplified so that operation by the pilot in a
pressure suit would be facilitated. Exposures were manually
timed by depressing a trip button for the duration of the
exposure. For aiming purposes, three small supports or
"feet," capped with silicone rubber, were provided to assist
in maintining the camera in a fixed position relative to the
spacecraft window. The camera field of view was 35° total angle,
with little vignetting over the field. Ansco H 529 emulsion
film, having a film speed of 200, was used for the experiment.
 Page 5 - 3 9

With the spacecraft in retroattitude, the camera was to be

held against the window so that the nominal position of the
earth's horizon would "be 5° below the center of the frame.

Dim-light photography was performed on the night side of the

l6th orbital pass with all cabin lights out. Just prior to
sunset,, the spacecraft was oriented into the plane of the
ecliptic and flown on automatic attitude control throughout
the zodical- light photography period. This sequence was
started just after sunset and several photographs, varying
in exposure duration from one to 30 seconds, were taken.
The initiation and conclusion of all exposures were planned
to be voice-marked on the onboard tape to time the duration
of each exposure. A total of 17 exposures were made of the
zodiacal light during this mission.

Upon completion of the zodiacal-light photographs, the gyro

switch was placed in the slave position and the spacecraft
was slowly reoriented to orbit attitude. Throughout the
remainder of the night period, five series, each containing
a 2-minute, a JO-second, and a 10-second exposure, were made
of the horizon and airglow layer. A total of 15 exposures
were made in this series. Two 30-second and two 1-second
exposures were made of the western horizon when the space-
craft was passing over the terminator at sunrise.

Since much of the analysis depends on conducting microdensitom-

etry of the film, it is premature at this time to present con-
clusions for this experiment. A general summary of the photo-
graphs obtained, however, is available. In the zodiacal-light
sequence, the first two frames showed exposures of dim light,
and all exposures contain stars. The photographs, however,
are generally underexposed and will be of limited value for
analysis. Because of the strong gradient in the zodiacal-
light intensity near the sun, either a small delay in begin-
ning the photography sequence or improper camera aiming would
result in underexposure of the film. A delay of 2 minutes in
beginning the exposures, an 8° e'rror in aiming the camera, or
a combination of the two could decrease the light intensity by
a factor of 10. Because of the known variance in spacecraft
attitude when in the automatic control mode, some attitude
misalinement would naturally be expected. The astronaut also
stated that the message he transmitted over Zanzibar on the
16th orbital pass delayed him somewhat in preparing for the
dim-light experiment, and preliminary data indicate that the
sequence was not begun until 1 minute ^0 seconds after sunset.
However, the star patterns appearing in the zodiacal-light
photographs should provide a reference from which camera
sighting can be accurately reconstructed.
Page 5 - 4o CONFIDENTIAL ^>

The exposures in each of the five series of -airglow photographs

were all of usable quality. Figure 5-8.1-2 is a representative
photograph of this series, shoving the thin "band of the airglow
layer just above the horizon. Some of the 2-minute exposures
are slightly blurred by rates in roll and pitch, but most of the
10-second exposures are quite sharp, vith the airglow layer
located near the base of the photograph. Preliminary measure-
ments of the angular thickness of the airglow layer indicate
that the layer is about 5-5° in thickness. The four exposures
made at sunrise were all overexposed.

5.8.2 Ground-light experiment.- The ground-light experiment was

designed to evaluate the operational problems associated with
visual acquisition from space of earth-based lights and to
compare the observed brightness with predicted values. This
type of information is necessary to determine the feasibility
of using ground lights as navigation fixes during future space
missions.

The light assembly used for this experiment was a pulsed xenon-
arc type consisting of three sections of six lamps each as
shown in figure 5-8.2-1. The lamps were mounted in a shallow
open-top box above a polished reflective surface. The circuit
was operated by a 50-cycle three-phase electrical power supply,
and the lamps in each section flashed 50 times a second with
an input of 27-5 watt-seconds per flash per lamp. Based on a
if-0-kilowatt nominal input to the lamp power supply, the com-
puted average intensity of the light was estimated to be
approximately 120,000 candles in the hemisphere above the light.

The light was located in the Republic of South Africa, 6 miles

east of the town Bloemfontein, which is at 29°06' S latitude,
26cl8' E longitude, and k,k^>k feet in elevation. With the
spacecraft at an attitude of -^0° in pitch and 0° in roll and
yaw, the light would first come into view at about 8:23:00 and
a slant range of 320 nautical miles with an estimated inten-
sity of about a 2.8-magnitude star.

The lamp was turned on at 8:21:56 and turned off at 8:25:06.

The weather was reported on the ground as having been completely
clear at that time. The light was seen by the astronaut prior
to moonrise during his pass over this area. By moving away from
and back to a fixed attitude, the pilot was readily able to
reacquire the light. The pilot estimated that when the light
came into view, it was equal to about a third-magnitude star.
It was in sight for 30 to ^0 seconds before it faded out at
which time the intensity of the light was between Uth and 5th
magnitude in brightness. The experiment produced approximately
the same sighting results as predicted.

CONFIDENTS
 •JCOMlDCPfTIAL ^ge 5 - M
The astronaut considered the light of sufficient brightness
. to be used as a navigation landmark if adequate sighting
information were to be made available. He stated, however,
that the distinctive U-shaped light pattern of the town of
Bloemfontein was a very helpful factor in identifying the
light; the light from the town was about as visible as the
test light and both faded from view at the same time. He
stated that a flashing light would have been much more dis-
tinctive, and he "believed that a pattern of flashing lights
would have been even more distinguishable.

The pilot's observations of the ground light also show that,

for any use of a lighted landmark as a navigation aid, the
rapid passage over the ground (involving angular tracking
rates of as high as l80°/minute) requires that instrument
readings be made very conveniently and rapidly. An attempt
to use the extinction photometer for this experiment was un-
successful.

5.8.3 Radiation studies.- Instrumentation was placed aboard the

spacecraft to measure and record the amount of radiation
encountered on the flight. These measurements are needed to
verify theoretical flux estimates and shielding calculations.
and to ascertain the dose received by the astronaut. Two
major types of radiation are present within the Mercury
orbital altitude range: Protons which are naturally present
in the lower Van Allen belt and electrons which were produced
by decaying fission nuclei from the atomic explosion of July
1962. These radiations are most pronounced for the space-
craft's orbit in an area over the South Atlantic between the
coasts of South America and Africa because of an anomaly in
the earth's magnetic field at that location.

Two Geiger counters were mounted on the retropackage (see

fig. 5-8.3-1) to measure the electron flux incident on the
vehicle. One counter surveyed a hemispherical area about an
axis alined along the 195° yaw and -lit-00 pitch attitudes,
relative to the spacecraft axes. The other counter was
collimated to view a solid angle of approximately 0.8 steradian
along the spacecraft's Z-axis. The latter counter, coupled
with vehicle attitude information, was included to provide
Information on the directionality of the electron flux. The
tubes in both counters had a mass concentration in the wall
i~\
of 90 ilO mg/cm and were filled with a low-pressure, neon-argon,
and halogen mixture. The uncollimated tube had, in addition,
a 1-mm tungsten shield to allow passage of primarily high-energy
electrons. Although Geiger tubes are sensitive to protons, the
Page 5 - te CONFIDENTIAL

count rates recorded were expected to result primarily in

electrons, since the electron flux is several orders of magni-
tude higher than proton flux in the geographical region in
question. A high-voltage power supply maintained an operating
plateau of approximately 550 volts. Power to the tubes was
controlled by a toggle switch on the main instrument panel.
The voltage output, proportional to the count rate, was multi-
plexed and stored on the onboard magnetic tape.

Radiation inside the spacecraft was monitored by a self-

indicating ionization chamber placed on the interior of the
egress hatch, which represents a region of minimum shielding.
The ion chamber, combined with outside flux measurements,
was intended to yield information on the minimum shielding
characteristics of the spacecraft and permit an estimate of
the dosage received by the astronaut. Electron-sensitive film
badges were placed in the astronaut's helmet and on his under-
wear, in the vicinity of the chest and the right thigh, to
measure the received dosage. A nuclear emulsion package was
mounted behind the instrument console to register the proton
dosage.

Since the data were recorded on the onboard tape, it was neces-
sary to have the tape recorder on during periods of measurement.
During passage through the magnetic anomaly for orbital
passes 5, 7, and 8, the switch was turned to the "on" position,
and the magnetic tape recorder turned to "continuous." Back-
ground readings were obtained on the l6th, l8th, and 19th
orbital passes.
The ion chamber was placed on the hatch within 1 hour after
lift-off and remained there until it was stowed just prior
to retrofire. A postflight reading of this sensor was obtained
on the ground.
For the other radiation monitors, no astronaut participation
was required. These items were recovered and are being analyzed
by the U. S. Naval School of Aviation Medicine for evaluation.

Appreciable count rates from the Geiger tubes were obtained,

as expected, on the 7th orbital pass. The spacecraft was in
ASCS orbit attitude during the pass through the anomaly and
should give information on the electron flux and directions
relative to the spacecraft. However, at the time of this
writing, considerable data reduction and interpretation remain
to be accomplished before any quantitative statements can be
made on the electrons in this anomaly.
 Page

The reading on the ion chamber appears to be consistent with

the film-badge results; however, this comparison must be
verified by further analysis of the electron energy spectrum.

The reported doses recorded by the film badges located on the

pilot were well below the physiologically harmful level and
are as follows:

Location Dose, millirad

Right thigh

Right chest 13
Left chest

Helmet (inside) 12

Although the above values are less than the expected level,
further analysis is necessary before any definite conclusion
can be made. Assignment of the proton component of the
total dose awaits radiation emulsion package development and
track analysis, a process that involves several weeks.

5.8.4 Infrared weather photography.- The infrared photography ex-

periment was designed to obtain exposures of the earth and
clouds on infrared film for the National Weather Satellite
Center of the U. S. Weather Bureau. This photography in the
spectral region from 660 to 900 millimicrons is an extension
of the photographic measurements of the visible spectrum
obtained during the MA-8 flight.

The Hasselblad camera, Model 500C, used for this experiment

is shown in figure 5-8.4-1. The infrared film and the special
Wratten filters used were fitted into a film magazine for this
experiment. The lens was an 80-mm Zeiss Planar f/2.8 with six
coated elements. Several modifications were made to the camera
controls for easier operation in the spacecraft. The camera
back contained size 120 film, and the image dimensions on the
film are 2 by 2 inches.

WriDENTIAL
Page 5: - kk CONFIDENTIAL-*

The infrared spectrum from 660 to 900 millimicrons wavelength:

was divided into three parts by inserting filters in the camera'
so that sections of the image were photographed through each of-,
the three filters. Kodak Wratten gelatin filters measuring
2-1/4 by 3/4 inches each were mounted in vertical strips in a '
thin metal holder, which was located in front of the film plane.
The filters are listed in the following table. The lower boundary
of each spectral region is defined by the filter transmission and
the upper boundary is limited by the film sensitivity.

Wavelength, millimicrons Filter

660 to 900 W-70 and 1 .0 neutral density

730 to 900 W-88A and 0.9 neutral density

810 to 900 W-87C

A neutral density filter was added to the W-70 and W-88A filter
sections to obtain the same light attenuation through these
filters as was obtained through the more opaque W-87C filter.
The filters appear in the photographs in the order listed in
the table, with the W-70 filter section on the left, the
W-88A in the center, and the W-87C on the right.
Kodak high-speed infrared film was used and coated on a regular
base support (0.005 inch thick). The film is sensitive through
the visible region of the spectrum and in the infrared to approxi-
mately 900 millimicrons, with the highest sensitivity in the
region from 770 to 84o millimicrons. The filters absorbed all
the light from the visible spectrum and transmitted to the film
only the infrared wavelengths. The ASA daylight-exposure index
is 80 without filters. A shutter speed of 1/125-second and a
lens aperture setting of f/5.6 was used for these exposures.
A series of l6 infrared photographs were taken by the astro-
naut over the southern part of the United States and the southern
part of Africa near the end of the 17th and beginning of the
l8th orbital passes, starting at an elapsed time of 26:38:00.
Figure 5-8.4-2 is representative of the photographs obtained
for this experiment. Geographic locations can be determined
accurately from landmarks in the first ten pictures where clouds
do not obscure the earth. These pictures showed that clouds
covered most of the Pacific coast of Worth America. Cloudiness,
which was associated with a low-pressure area over Oklahoma,
covered most of the lower Mississippi River Valley region and
 «J"«M»l*lWf5WTf5tl^ Page 5 - ^ 5

also obscured landmarks. There were scattered cumulus clouds

over Florida and Georgia, and some cirrus and cumulus clouds
were present over the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean.
Very clear conditions prevailed eastward from California to
eastern New Mexico. Times for the last six pictures which were
taken over Africa have not been determined with certainty, "but
the last picture was taken not later than 27:19:00.

Terrain features appear differently in infrared light wavelengths

than in the visible wavelengths. Green vegetation has a high
reflectivity, while coniferous forests have a relatively low
reflectivity. Bare soil and rock generally have a high re-
flectivity. Clouds composed of ice crystals and water droplets
reflect infrared light very well in the spectral region studied.
Water surfaces reflect very little and they appear as very dark
areas.

The photographic contrast between clouds and water, and land

and water is very high because their differences in infrared
reflectivity are large. This fact is well illustrated in
pictures showing clouds over the Pacific Ocean, the Gulf of
Mexico, and the Atlantic Ocean. The photographic contrast
between land and water is also very high, as shown in pictures
of Baja California, the Gulf States coastline, and the Florida
and Georgia seacoasts-.

A visual examination of the pictures shows that the photographic

contrast may be somewhat higher through the ¥-70 filter section
than in the W-88A and V-87C. Densitometric measurements will
be made later in the laboratory in an attempt to confirm these
observations. The relative brightness of selected areas will be
determined also when density measurements on the negatives are
made.

Detecting clouds over land areas in the 660 to 900 millimicron

region of the infrared spectrum is difficult because the re-
flectivity of both is high. The spectral sensitivity of the sensor
should be restricted to the general region of 550 to 750 milli-
microns as a compromise to counter the adverse effects of scat-
tering by molecules and aerosols at shorter visible wavelengths
and the low contrast effects at infrared wavelengths. However,
the use of infrared wavelengths to show clouds over water and
to detect coastlines appears to be superior to the use of visible
wavelengths.

5.8.5 Horizon-definition photography.- The objective of the horizon-

definition experiment was to study further the earth's sunlit
limb to determine the reliability with which it can be used
for navigational sightings during the terminal phase of advanced
Page 5 - k6 " CQNPIDEJmAL
space missions. Results from the experiment conducted during the
MA-9 flight were intended to extend the data previously obtained
during the MA-7 mission on the relative elevations of the earth's
limb as -photographed through blue and red filters. Past results
indicate that this variation in earth-limb height was dependent
upon the scattering angle of the incident sunlight. Therefore,
a time-extended series of pictures embracing most of the daylight
period of an orbital pass was desired. It was also desired to
obtain a group of photographs taken over a brief time.period
in four quadrantal directions relative to that of the sun. Ac-
curately timed photographs of the earth horizon including the
setting moon were also requested to provide a reference for
measuring the altitude or elevation of the limb.

These photographs were made with the Hasselblad camera, pre-

viously described in section 5.8A. A lens setting of f/8 and
a shutter speed of 1/125 second was used. A filter sandwich
consisting of a no. 92 (red) Wratten filter central panel and
two no. i)-7B (blue) filter side panels were mounted immediately
ahead of the film plane. A narrow, opaque bar extended through
the center of the red filter to hold the filter flat. Linagraph
Shellburst film was used for the experiment.

A planned series of photographs of the earth's horizon through-

out the daylight portion of an orbital pass was not performed
during the 21st orbital pass, as programed, because of the space-
craft control system malfunction. The quadrant photographs and
photographs of the moon-earth limb were taken as planned. A
total of 11 exposures were made, 8 quadrantal photographs (2 of
each quadrant) and 3 moon-set earth-limb photographs.

Because of an unforeseen difficulty in loading the modified

camera back and a consequent inadvertent exposure of the film
to light from a red safe-light, some background "light-struck"
damage was incurred by the film prior to flight.

Careful initial inspection of the film indicated that six of

the eight quadrantal exposures and two of the three moon-set
pictures are usable for quantitative study. The film includes
two good sets of step-wedge sensitometric exposures for cali-
bration, one before the flight and one after. Correction for
the inadvertent background can be made, at least where it is
of moderate density.

Since these densitometric exposures were made with a calibrated

source, a radiance value for the observed limb can be eventually
obtained from the data. The MA-9 results in this regard, con-
stitute a significant advance beyond the photography of the
MA-T flight.
 . CONFIDENTIAL Page 5 ^7
Two of the three moon-set photographs seem suitable for measure-
ment, probably by microdensitometric means. The lack of precise
time correlation for these pictures reduces the significance
of their measurement.

Hgure 5-8.5-1 shows an enlargement of one of eight quadrantal

photographs taken during flight. As shown by this figure,
each photograph affords two adjacent regions for comparison of
the bounds of the earth's atmosphere, as photographed in red
and blue light. Quantitative interpretation of these photo-
graphs will be reported when the measurements and their evalu-
ation have been accomplished.

5.8.6 Flashing light experiment.- Visual acquisition of a target

vehicle in a space environment is being considered as a part
of the operational procedure to be used for rendezvous in ad-
vanced manned space missions. The purpose of the flashing light
experiment was to determine the ability of the pilot to acquire
a light of known intensity under operational conditions similar
to those associated with rendezvous. This experiment would
also provide a means of substantiating estimates of the light in-
tensity that is required to provide a signal of suitable intensity
for easy acquisition. The combination of weight, shape, light
intensity, and ejection conditions of.the beacon and the operational
procedures of the experiment were selected to provide a wide range
of sighting conditions. The beacon was designed to appear as con-
spicuous as a second-magnitude star at a distance of approximately
8 nautical miles.

The flashing light was a 5-75-inch-<J.iameter spherical assembly

with two xenon-gas discharge lamps located at opposite poles.
The beacon, its container, and the ejection mechanism were de-
signed and built by NASA. The flashing-light equipment is
shown in figure 5-8.6-1, with two switch holding devices that
were not present in flight. The beacon was painted flat white
to aid in obtaining a suitable thermal balance, and it weighed
10 pounds. The lamps flashed simultaneously at a rate of approxi-
mately once per second. The power supply was a group of mercury
batteries connected in series. The energy delivered to each
lamp was approximately k watt-seconds per flash. A typical
time history of the light output of a single lamp is shown in
figure 5.8.6-2.

The housing for the beacon was mounted on the retropackage as

shown in figure 5.8.3-1. With planned spacecraft attitudes
of -20° in pitch and 0° in roll and yaw, the beacon would be
ejected in a direction parallel to the -88C pitch direction at
an ejection velocity of 9-7 ft/sec. The beacon initially moves
downward and then ahead of the spacecraft when ejected in this
direction.

iNTIAL
Page 5 - A8 CONFIDENTIAL

As part of the development of the light assembly, it was sub-

jected to various qualification tests. In particular, several
methods of obtaining a measure of the light intensity were used
to establish the characteristics of the beacon. Measurements in
a simulated space environment indicated an effective life of .
approximately 10 hours. Intensity was measured at the National
Bureau, of Standards and documented. Measurements made at the
National Bureau of Standards showed that, in general, the light
output distribution was reasonably uniform, with an average value
of about 12.1 candle-seconds per flash. Using a value of 0.2 for
the Blondel-Rey constant for threshold viewing, a value of 60.5
candles is obtained as the equivalent effective steady-light
intensity. There were some sighting angles, approximately
80° cones centered on the axis passing through both lamps,
when only one lamp was in view and the total observable light
was below average. In these directions the effective inten-
sity was about 46 candles. A typical horizontal intensity
distribution, indicating some of the low intensity directions
near 0° and 180°, was obtained at the National Bureau of Standards
and is shown in figure 5-8.6-3- The average effective intensity
of 60.5 candles would correspond to a second-magnitude star at
a distance of 7-3_ nautical
7 r miles, using the commonly accepted
x
value of 3-3 10 lumens per square meter for a second-magnitude
light.

Some comparison sightings of the flashing beacon and a steady

light, with the use of neutral density filters to simulate a
distance of 8.7 nautical miles for the beacon and second-magni-
tude star for the steady light, were made by several observers.
The observers were in agreement that, when not looking directly
at the lights, the flashing light was as conspicuous as the
steady light.

Measurements were made by comparison sightings using a known,

fixed-intensity light and by comparison to stars in air-to-air
sightings in which the flight astronaut participated. The re-
sults of preflight air-to-air sightings at a distance of approxi-
mately 25,000 feet indicated that the beacon seemed equivalent
to a first-magnitude star at a range of 5 or 6 nautical miles
and to a second-magnitude star at a range of 7 or 8 nautical
miles. The beacon became lost to sight at a distance of l8 nauti-
cal miles and could not be reacquired until the distance was
reduced to 15 nautical miles. Under daylight conditions, the
maximum range at which the light was visible was from 2 to
2— nautical miles. The orientation of the beacon was such that
the low region of effective intensity (average 46 candles)
would have been viewed during these flight tests.
The beacon was deployed, as programed, approximately 15 minutes
prior to sunset on the 3rd orbital pass at 3:25:38. The read-
out of both the horizon scanners and attitude gyros showed that
the beacon was deployed at the planned spacecraft pitch attitude
of -20°il° and attitudes in roll and yaw very close to zero.
After deployment, the astronaut yawed the spacecraft l80° to
view the light, which had gone ahead of the spacecraft. The
separation of the beacon from the spacecraft was calculated using
a drag coefficient of 2 for both the beacon and the spacecraft
and the atmospheric density from "The ARDC Model Atmosphere,
1959-"

Measurements of separation, distance between the spacecraft and

the beacon could not be obtained and all distances are based on
calculations using these parameters. The calculated sighting
parameters, range to the beacon and elevation angle with respect
to local horizontal, are shown in figure 5-8.6-U. They are
shown as bands, which reflect the limits of -19° and -21° in
pitch attitude at deployment.

The beacon was not acquired by the astronaut on the first night
pass after deployment. The astronaut's comments on celestial
sightings during this time indicated that the spacecraft was
probably not oriented closely enough to the l80° yaw position
for the light to be in his field of view because he experienced
difficulty in establishing the 180° yaw attitude during this
first attempt at night.

Upon going into the second night pass after deployment, the
correct spacecraft yaw attitude of l80° had already been
established. The light was first acquired as a steady reddish-
brown light when it was still in sunlight but far enough below
the local horizontal that it was seen against the dark earth
background. At this time, the range was calculated to be approxi-
mately 3 nautical miles. After a brief period, the light ceased
to appear steady in source and commenced to flash at about the
intended frequency. At 1 hour and 46 minutes after the light had
been deployed, the astronaut rated its intensity at approximately
that of a second-magnitude star. However, the beacon's range was
calculated to have been approximately 4 nautical miles at this time,
which, based on preflight tests, would normally correspond to a
brightness of one star magnitude greater than was observed. During
the second night, the astronaut was able to move the spacecraft
off and back in attitude and then readily reacquire the light.
During a period when the beacon was calculated to be between
7— and 9 miles away, the astronaut rated the light as not very
bright but discernible, about of the order of a third-magnitude
star. This rating again was about one magnitude dimmer than
that expected from preflight tests.

CONFIDENTIAL
Page 5 - 50 GOMlDEMnAL

During the third night period, at 3 hours 25 minutes after

deployment and at a range calculated to "be betveen 9^ and
1 ^
11— nautical miles, the light was rated as very veak and just
"barely discernible. This rating indicated again that the
beacon was not as bright as expected. The astronaut also
estimated distances as well as brightness; and since there
were no distance cues other than those related to previous
aircraft sightings, he consistently estimated distances that
were too great.

The sightings were made with all spacecraft internal lights

turned off. An attempt to sight the beacon during the day-
light period after the first night period, when the calculated
minimum range was less than 2 nautical miles, was unsuccessful.
Although, at other times, stars were seen during the daytime,
none were seen during the daylight period in which the astro-
naut was trying to acquire the light.

In general, it was found that the flash of the light made it

easily distinguishable from stars. The "beacon's intensity
appeared to be adequate for acquisition up to distances of
about 8 nautical miles at night.

5.8.7 Tethered balloon experiment.- A JO-inch-diameter mylar sphere

was packaged in the antenna canister of the spacecraft and was
to be ejected, inflated, and tethered at the end of a 100-foot
nylon line for one orbital pass. However, the balloon failed
to deploy and the experiment was not accomplished. This experi-
ment was intended to provide further information about the
atmospheric density through the altitude profile of the Mercury
spacecraft, which ranged from 8k to 1^6 nautical miles. Atmos-
pheric density was to be computed by determining the drag of
the balloon, as measured by the pull of the tether on a strain-
gage balance located at the bottom of the balloon canister. The
equipment configuration for the experiment was nearly identical
to that included in the MA-7 spacecraft for a similar experiment
except that the balloon was painted fluorescent orange and it
was constructed by laminating a T--mil-thick metalized plastic
sheet to a —-mil-thick clear plastic -sheet. The l6-mm camera
(see fig. 5-6.1-1) was mounted in the spacecraft so that photo-
graphic coverage of the balloon's motions could be obtained.
 2NTIAL1 Page 5-51

The pilot attempted to deploy the balloon on two occasions

during the 6th orbital pass without success. A postflight
investigation has verified the integrity of the balloon de-
ployment circuit through the R-calibration function, since
R-calibration signals were recorded in flight. The failure
in the deployment circuit, therefore, had to occur beyond
this point.

Failure of the deployment squibs to ignite if they were ener-

gized seems unlikely, since squibs from the same lot as used
on this flight have been test-ignited a number of times without
a single failure. Furthermore, two of these squibs were con-
nected in parallel and numerous tests had proven that either
of these squibs would release the balloon canister latch and
permit balloon deployment.

Since the antenna canister was not recovered after the flight,
it was impossible to complete the investigation of this anomaly.

General celestial observations.- The pilot reported that on

several orbital passes he entered the daylight phase with his
spacecraft oriented toward the sky away from both the earth
and sun. Under these daylight conditions, he reported that he
was able to see stars. With his eyes well dark-adapted, he
reported that the day time sky appeared lighter than the night
sky and that there was a loss of about 2. to 2.— magnitudes in
visible stars between the day and night side of the ear~ch.
The question then arises as to why there was a reduction in his
ability to see fainter stars during the day under these circum-
stances. It is not reasonable to think this loss of the fainter
stars was due to light absorption, since this limitation should
have been detected by previous scientific investigation. The
possibility arises that this loss may have been a brightening of
the background due to light scattering by small particles in the
upper atmosphere. Preliminary analysis indicates, however,
that the required particle density is approximately 100 parti-
cles per square centimeter in a column that does not extend above
an altitude of 300 kilometers. Micrometeoroid impact measure-
ments during previous satellite studies indicate a particle con-
centration far below this level.

This observation might also have been a result of light scattered

by the window. The pilot reported that a film had been deposited
on the inside of the outer pane during the launch phase. However,
he stated that he felt that the lighter daytime sky could not be
accounted for by light scattering on the window. Light scatter-
ing on the window would not be likely to produce an even distri-
bution of illumination throughout the sky. Instead, it would

^CW^l ™ M. M.mJEtl.v M. tt^^j

Page 5 - 5 2

tend to fall in patterns that would "be easily discernible to

the pilot. Furthermore, since the spacecraft was drifting, the
amount of light falling on the window should be varying con-
tinuously, but the pilot stated that the lightness of the sky
appeared uniform. Therefore, it appears unlikely that this
observation can be accounted for by scattered light on -the
window.

The best explanation for this brightening of the sky is the

o
presence of a general 6300 A emission region above the space-
o
craft. The height of the 6300 A dayglow is not know, but may
occur in the F-region of the atmosphere which is at an altitude
of about 250 kilometers. Preliminary estimates indicate that
o
the visible emission of the 6300 A dayglow could increase the
brightness of the day sky about 3 times above the level of the
night sky. This hypothesis agrees reasonable well with the
pilot's estimate of the reduction in light intensity of stars
visible during daylight.

All of the astronauts have reported the presence of a so-called

haze layer on the night side of an orbital pass. This term
appears to be a misnomer, since the phenomenon probably involves
a region of concentrated airglow emission in the 100-kilometer
region of the atmosphere. The effect of weakening a star's
intensity as it passes through this region could be caused by
a loss of visibility, with respect to the increased brightness
of the airglow foreground, as readily as if it were caused by
the presence of a haze or attenuating layer. Present evidence
supports the former explanation, since measurements of the height
of the layer agree with that of the night airglow layer.

The pilot also reported observing a brownish glow in an east-

northeasterly direction above his orbital altitude at an elapsed
time between 17:25:00 and 17:30:00. At this time, the space-
craft was just above the east coast of South America in the
vicinity of Belem, Brazil. Thus, the phenomenon occurred in
the tropics not far from the geomagnetic equator. The glow
appeared as a patch with an approximate angular size equal to
the spacecraft window, rather than a layer, and the observation
seems to be similar to that reported over the Indian Ocean during
the MA-8 mission. Postflight calculations indicate that the
o
phenomenon was caused by the integrated effect of a 6300 A
cloud of about 3,000 kilometers in horizontal extent. If the
typical vertical thickness is assumed to be about 50 kilometers,
then the integrated intensity of the cloud seen edge-on would be
about 18,000 rayleighs, about the intensity required to give a
visual impression of a light brownish nature.
 Page 5-53

The pilot also reported that at about 20 seconds after sun-

set, a whitish arch extending some 15° or so above the horizon
appears above the sun. Two possible explanations of this arch
exist:

1. It could be the outer corona of the sun.

2. It might be associated with a concentration of dust

around the earth - a sort of terrestrial "zodiacal light."

Approximately 1 minute after sunset, the pilot detected the

zodiacal light. At this time, the spacecraft window was pro-
bably significantly illuminated by the bright remnants of the
orbital twilight. The ability of the pilot to detect the
zodiacal light above the window foreground suggests that it
must have been brighter than the orbital twilight. This is
as it should be at angular distances from the sun of 6° to
10°, which was probably the minimum observed distance. The
fact that the light was concentrated along the ecliptic
established it as truly "zodiacal light."

Thirty general purpose color photographs were taken on this

mission by using the 70-mm Hasselblad camera described in
section 5-8.4. The exposures were made without a filter on
ultraspeed Anscochrome (FPC 289) by using a lens setting of
f/l6 and a shutter speed of 1/250 second. Photographic cover-
age of portions of northern Africa, Arabia and the India-Burma-
China area was obtained. A number of very good exposures of the
Himalayas with excellent resolution were obtained. Figure 5-8.8-1
is an example of these photographs. Some photographs of the
western Pacific and of the Indian Ocean areas were also taken.
In general, the quality and resolution of these photographs
were excellent, and the resolution of terrain features of
the best of the MA-9 photographs compare favorably to that
of the Viking infrared photographs. Interestingly enough,
however, no cultural features whatsoever can be seen on these
color photographs. Even the city of Calcutta, India, could not
be identified, although the quality of the photograph was ex-
cellent. A complete analysis of these photographs will require
a considerable amount of time; however, a preliminary analysis
indicates that this film-camera combination is capable of
yielding photographic information which could be useful for
geological, topographical, and meteorological purposes. All of
the photographs, even if slightly overexposed, contain some usable
information.

CONFIDENTIAL-
 ONFIDENTIAL Page 5-54

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Power (a-c) input to amp-cal
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^igure 5.1.3-1.- Postflight photograph of amplifier-calibrator power socket.

CONFIDENTIAL
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RCS auxiliary
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Figure 5.1.5-1.- RCS auxiliary fuel tank,

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Figure 5.3-1. ision system equipment.

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squib with one missing main change.

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Figure 5.8.6-4.- Calculated sighting parameters for flashing light experiment.

CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 5.8.8-1.- Photograph of Himalaya Moi i^taken with BasseIblad camera.
 *-£MW*f1^BPHT!l^~ Page 6-1

6. 0 LAUNCH-VEHICLE PERFORMANCE

All launch-vehicle systems performed satisfactorily. The following

items are noted for information.

6.1 Air frame

The structural integrity of the launch-vehicle airframe was satis-

faotorily maintained throughout powered flight. Booster staging and
spacecraft separation were satisfactory. Launch-vehicle axial accelera-
tions of 6.83g at booster engine cut-off (BECO) and 7-55g a"t sustainer
engine cut-off (SECO) were indicated. These accelerations were approxi-
mately the same as those experienced on previous Mercury-Atlas launches.

A launch-vehicle longitudinal oscillation of 5 cps, experienced on

previous flights, occurred during lift-off and was essentially damped out
approximately 25 seconds after lift-off. Maximum peak-to-peak variations
during this time period were 0.90g and occurred between 1 and 2 seconds
following lift-off. Dynamic oscillations caused by propellant slosh oc-
curred between 88 and 108 seconds after lift-off. These oscillations are
discussed in section 6.7.

Ambient pressure in the adapter area decreased normally from atmos-

pheric pressure at lift-off to zero at approximately 105 seconds of flight.
In addition, the most severe pressure variations occurred., as expected, in
the transonic speed range at maximum dynamic pressure.

6.2 Propulsion System

As usual, an inert wet-start procedure for starting the booster

engines was used. The booster engines were offset 0.2° to correct for
the lift-off roll transient experienced in previous Mercury-Atlas launches.
This offset effectively reduced the amplitude of the lift-off roll
transient to well below that which had been experienced on previous flights.
Figure 3.2-1 shows the direction of engine offset.

The operation of the propulsion system was satisfactory throughout

the flight. Engine thrust rises and decays appeared normal. During the
MA-8 mission and for the first time in Project Mercury, the launch-vehicle
hold-down period for monitoring engine ignition was eliminated because of
a change in the engine start techniques. However, fuel and lox for the
MA-8 launch vehicle were off-loaded, which negated the additional burning
time afforded by the elimination of the hold-down. For MA-9, the hoId-down
procedure was again deleted, but the tanks were not off-loaded.

The indicated air temperature of the engine compartment was normal and
was ^8° F at lift-off, 56° F at BECO, and 100° F at SECO. A temperature
 6 -2 CONFIDENTIAL

probe in the sustainer-engine lubricant tank, vhich was also installed in

the engine compartment, was used for the first time in this location. The
probe sensed temperatures of 50° F at lift-off, 70° F at BECO, and 9^° F
at SECO. This transducer was shielded from thermal radiation and provided
a temperature study of the lubricant as it is consumed.

6.3 Propellant Tanking

The tanking of EP-1 fuel to the 100-percent probe resulted in a total

fuel quantity at 80° F of 11,^28 gallons, which corresponded to an indi-
cated weight increase of 76,500 pounds. Following the countdown for lox
tanking, a drop in fuel temperature and a resultant density increase re-
quired the addition of 350 pounds of fuel to reestablish the 100-percent
level. Final fuel weight, adjusted to include the weighing system cali-
bration, gravity correction, and pressurization gas weight, was 7^,900
pounds.

Lox tanking to the 100-percent probe required 17^,000 pounds of lox.

Subcooled topping was added to maintain an indicated lox weight constant
at 17^-, 100 pounds. After securing lox tanking, 500 pounds of lox were
calculated to have been lost through the vernier-engine bleed valves and
the start tank vent.

Following final pressurization, the lox level was above the high-level
probe for approximately 10 seconds. However, this level was between the
high- and low-level probes at ignition because of boil-off. The total
weight of the spacecraft and launch vehicle at ignition was 326,^00 pounds.

6.k Propellant Utilization

The propellant utilization (PU) valve operated normally within the

dynamic range up to approximately 35 seconds prior to SECO. At this time,
the valve followed corrections to near-nominal values over a 10-second
period prior to SECO. At this point, the PU valve followed the bias in-
troduced by the capacitance pad.

The fuel and lox-head pressure-sensing ports were uncovered at 3-25

and 6.85 seconds, respectively, prior to SECO. Propellant residuals at
SECO were calculated to be ^83.6 pounds of lox and 5^0.6 pounds of fuel.

6.5 Pneumatics

The lox- and fuel-tank ullage pressures were within normal operating
limits throughout the flight. Booster-tank helium-bottle decay was normal
and the sustainer-tank helium bottle maintained adequate pressure.

CONFIDENTIAL
 6 -3

The unfiltered bulkhead differential pressure reached a minimum of

5.7 psi approximately 1.5 seconds after 2-inch motion (lift-off). The
filtered bulkhead differential pressure measurement vas 8.3 psi. These
values are well above the level required to initiate an abort signal,
since this signal is only generated if the bulkhead differential pressure
falls below 2.5 ±1.0 psi for 0.125 second. Oscillations at this time were
5 cps, with an amplitude of 7-9 Psi for the unfiltered measurement and
2.7 psi for the filtered measurement. Oscillations were damped out approx-
imately 25 seconds after lift-off.

6. 6 Electrical System

An anomaly in the 115-volt a-c phase A voltage was indicated on

telemetry, but this anomaly did not affect associated systems. This volt-
age measurement at lift-off was Il6.1 v a-c, as compared with the desired
value of 115-3 +0'? v a-c. At 201 seconds following lift-off, an oscilla-
tion of approximately 1-percent, peak-to-peak, began in the phase A voltage
and continued until 229-7 seconds, when the voltage settled at 115-7 v a-c
through SECO.

6. 7 Flight Control System

A small roll transient, resulting from a slight engine misalinement

and gas generator exhaust thrust, was present immediately after lift-off.
However, the amplitude of the transient was greatly reduced from that of
previous flights because of the actuator having been offset following a
study of roll transient experienced on the previous Mercury-Atlas launch.
The booster-engine offset is described in section 3-2. The roll transient
at lift-off was 2.5°/sec, with instantaneous spikes reaching k. 5°/sec.
However, no abort signal was generated since the roll rate abort level is
6.^°/sec ±5 percent. The effectiveness of the roll transient cor-
rection is indicated by the small roll displacement of 0.6°, peak-to-peak,
which actually occurred.

Between 88 and 108 seconds after lift-off, dynamic oscillations

caused by propellant slosh were noted on the telemetry recordings of flight
control parameters, including pitch, roll, and yaw rates. A maximum- roll
rate of 3- 5°/sec at a frequency of 1.15 cycles per second was recorded
100 seconds after lift-off. The fuel-slosh oscillations during booster-
engine operation occurred for approximately 35 seconds, beginning at
89 seconds after -lift-off and were completely damped out at 8 seconds be-
fore BECO. Slosh oscillations of approximately 2 cycles per second were
recorded throughout the sustainer phase. These oscillations were approxi-
mately l°/sec, peak-to-peak, in amplitude, with a displacement of
approximately 0.05°, peak-to-peak.

CONFIDENTIAL
page 6 - k GOffriDCHTIAL .».—
6.8 Guidance

The launch-vehicle radio-guidance system performed veil and guided

the sustainer stage to near-nominal cutoff conditions that were veil
within the acceptable limits. The radar data were of good quality and
exhibited lov noise. The errors at insertion were 1.3 ft/sec low in velocity,
1,333 feet high in altitude, and 0.0031° high in flight-path angle.

The guidance-system configuration was similar to that used in the

MA-8 mission except that the duration of the second-stage pitch program
was reduced by 5-0 seconds, resulting in 10° less pitch-down maneuver, and
the ground guidance computer equations were changed. The reduction in the
pitch programer duration gives a more efficient trajectory. Hovever, the
MA-8 capability of reaching acceptable orbital insertion conditions for a
near-nominal trajectory with a loss of closed-loop launch-vehicle guidance
steering vas not maintained.

A somewhat depressed trajectory was flown throughout the flight.

The BECO discrete signal was 0.5 second early, the velocity was high, and
the altitude was low at staging. These conditions resulted in SECO being
1. U seconds early. The radar elevation angle at SECO was a nominal 1.^°.

The guidance system acquired the track beacon of the launch vehicle
in the first radar cube, and lock was continuous from 00:01:04.0 to
00:06:07.1 (6k sec after SECO). Rate lock was continuous in all functions
from 00:00:58.3 to 00:05:55.7 (53 sec after SECO), except for 0.1 second
of bad central rate data 3-7 seconds after BECO. These bad data were caused
by the jettisoned booster stage assembly's passing between the ground radar
and the airborne transponder. The bad data had no effect on the flight of
the launch vehicle, since guidance steering was not initiated until
22.8 seconds later.

Closed-loop radar guidance steering started at 00:02:38.8 with a

25-percent positive pitch rate and a 30-percent positive yaw rate. This
yaw right maneuver corrected a booster-stage roll program error. There-
after, the commands were smooth and small until 5-5 seconds prior to SECO
when 25-percent pitch steering commands were sent to the launch vehicle
to correct the error in flight-path angle. Noise in the steering commands
was lower than for all previous Mercury-Atlas orbital missions.

The ground guidance computer equations had been changed since MA-8
to extrapolate radar data better and to smooth out radar noise. Guidance
initiation was started on slant range rather than on time after BECO.
Other than these changes, the application of these equations was the same
in the normal data mode. The reason for these changes was to give better
steering commands in the event of noise resulting in the loss of radar
data.

In figures 6.8-1 and 6.8-2, the velocity and flight-path angle are
shown in the region of sustainer engine cutoff. The launch-vehicle data
 Page 6 - 5

are shown in figure 6. 8-1, and the range safety impact predictor computer
(I. P. 709*0 data are shown in figure 6.8-2 to illustrate the data quality
during the time of the go—no-go computations. Both data sources exhibited
low noise and the average of these values agrees with the actual flight
conditions. One launch vehicle guidance data point was not received by
the Goddard computer at 00:05:08.07; however, a 20-point average was still
used. Maximum peak-to-peak deviations in the launch-vehicle guidance data
were about one-quarter of the magnitude experienced on MA.-4 and MA-8 and
about one-half the noise level of MA-5, MA-6, and MA-7. The IP -709^ data
noise level was about half that experienced on MA.-4 and MA-8 and about the
same as MA-5, MA-6, and MA-7.

In figure 6.8-3, "the variation of flight-path angle with velocity is

the type of display used by the Flight Dynamics Officer in the Mercury
Control Center for the orbital go— no-go decision. Both the launch -vehicle
guidance and HP-709^ data indicated acceptable conditions.

6.9 Abort Sensing and Implementation System

The ready status of the abort sensing and implementation system was
properly established at 0.8 second prior to lift-off. Telemetry records
indicate that the pressure switches operated correctly. Wo system
parameters reached the abort level, and no abort command was generated
during powered flight. After SECO, the system indicated an abort con-
dition, which is an expected occurrence and results from a decay in the
engine fuel pressure. An incomplete listing of the proximity of monitored
parametric values to the specified limits for the MA-9 abort system is
presented as follows:
 Page 6-6

System parameter Specified abort limits Maximum MA-9

values
Flight control system:

Pitch rate 3'/ ec

Yaw rate 3%ec

Roll rate 3-5°/sec

Tank pressurization system:

Lox tank
Bulkhead differential pressure
Electrical system:
< 21.5 psig (boost phase)
< 11.0 psig (sustainer phase)
5.7 psi filtered
< 2.5+1 psi for 0.125 sec
8.3 psi unfiltered

Launch-vehicle—spacecraft
interface loss of elec. continuity no loss

400-cps power voltage < 70 +10 v-rms for 0. 125 sec 115.7 v-rms

Propulsion system:

Booster-engine manifold
pressure +25 psia

Sustainer-engine manifold
pressure < 560 ±25 psia

Hydraulic system pressure < 2,000 +60 psig

CONriDDMTIAtr
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 page 7-1
7-0 ASTRONAUT ACTIVITIES

This section contains a detailed analysis of the physiological

responses of the astronaut, an evaluation of his performance in com-
pleting the prescribed flight plan, and a flight report "by the astronaut,
The aeromedical analysis documents the preflight medical activities,
the inflight responses, and the postflight examinations; and conclusions
derived from the analysis of these data are presented. The astronaut's
performance is evaluated from the standpoint of his ability to maneuver
the spacecraft, manage the operation of the onboard systems, conduct
scientific experiments, and in general complete scheduled .activities.
This section is concluded with a narrative account by the astronaut of
his flight experience and his evaluation of many operational aspects of
the mission.

7-1 Aeromedical Analysis

7.1.1 Introduction.- The MA-9 flight represents another step in

the serial extension of the observation of man as he functions
under the physical stresses of zero gravity, decreased ambient
pressure, and a pure oxygen environment, and under the psychological
stress of this remarkable experience with the multitude of
risks involved.

The step-wise extension of the mission durations produces

an increasing understanding of man's adaptation to, and
toleration of, this new environment. Application of this
information enhances the confidence in and understanding of
future missions of greater duration. The purpose of this
section of the report is to present the qualitative and
quantitative medical analysis conducted within the Project
Mercury mission framework and thus to indicate the present
state of medical efforts in the area of manned space flight.

The report is presented chronologically in the three categories

of preflight, inflight, and postflight findings. Within each
of these broad areas the data are presented in two parts:
results of clinical studies, both of a conventional nature
and selected special procedures; and results of biosensor
monitoring studies. The concluding portion presents a series
of special medical studies for the MA-9 mission.

The intimate interaction of the pilot and his environmental

control system requires that the discussion of the Life Support
System (Section 5-2) be considered in conjunction with the
Aeromedical Analysis.

CONFIDENTIAL
Page 7-2

7-1.2 Preflight observation.-

7.1.2.1 Clinical data: Data were evaluated from very thorough medical
studies of the pilot, Astronaut L. Gordon Cooper, Jr., conducted
immediately prior to his selection for astronaut training in
1959 and from annual examinations since that date. Medical
examinations were also conducted both before and after six
preflight spacecraft checkout tests and a session in the
Mission Control Center procedures trainer, all of which required
the pilot to wear the full-pressure space suit. Special
examinations to assess the pilot's fitness for flight were
conducted 11 and 3 days before launch. The latter examination
conducted on May 12, 1963, designated the "Comprehensive
Medical Evaluation," was conducted by specialists in internal
medicine, ophthalmology, neuropsychiatry, radiology, and
aviation medicine. The NASA Flight Surgeon who had examined
the pilot for most of the preflight activities conducted the
final preflight medical examination on launch morning. The
preflight aeromedical procedures and examinations are listed
in table 7.1.2.1-1.

The astronaut's pertinent medical history is summarized here

as background medical data. At age 6 he contracted pneumonia
of the left lung, followed by empyema and requiring surgical
drainage. He has residual non-symptomatic adhesions and
thickening of the left lateral pleura and there is a well
healed linear 5 cm scar in the skin at the 9~th posterior
intercostal space at the surgical drainage site. Neither
complications nor sequellae have occurred as a result of this
condition, and repeated pulmonary function studies have been
normal. On November 3? I960, a cholecystectomy and incidental
appendectomy were performed following X-ray demonstration of
cholelithiasis. Full recovery was prompt and no food
intolerance or other sequellae have occurred. He has moderate
seasonal rhinitis relieved by small doses of common
antihistamines. In the three months prior to the MA-9 flight
no antihistaminic medication was required. The pilot
exhibited a gastrointestinal intolerance, evidenced by
cramping abdominal pains, to an oral test dose of morphine
sulfate. This reaction is seen in a small percentage of
normal people. Other than the foregoing items, the pilot's
medical history is not significant.

In addition to examinations by physicians, baseline clinical

evaluations included an audiogram, an electrocardiogram, a
chest X-ray and laboratory studies of blood and urine. The
results of these evaluations are found in tables 7-1-2.1-2
through 7.1.2.1-5. For the 3 months prior to the flight,
the pilot continued in excellent health with significant
abnormalities.

CONFIDENTIAL
 OTIDCMT1AL* page 7 3

Close supervision of the pilot's food intake began 7 days before

the planned flight with special preparation of a normal
balanced diet. To reduce the need for defecation during the
mission, a low residue diet was followed for 4 days before the
launch. This diet was well tolerated, although the pilot did
mention that appetite satisfaction was short-lived following
the low residue meals. The constituents, both qualitative and
quantitative, of this diet are presented in table 7.1.2.1-6.

In the month prior to flight, he maintained his physical

fitness by daily distance running and calisthenics.

The aeromedical countdown, table 7-1-2.1-Tj presents the pilot's

activities on launch morning. Compared with the pilots in
previous orbital missions, the MA-9 astronaut spent the
shortest time (5 hours and 1J minutes) from awakening to
lift-off. In spite of a last minute requirement for an earlier
insertion, all elements of the aeromedical countdown were
accomplished satisfactorily without altering the planned
wake-up time.

The final prelaunch examination showed a healthy pilot who was

ready for the mission. Two minor discrepancies were local skin
erythema at the biosensor sites and moderate erythema,
edema, and tenderness of the skin over the right sacral
prominence. He frequently demonstrates a skin reaction around
the sensors for 2k to j6 hours after application, despite the
use of microporous surgical tape for fastening these sensors.
It should be noted that these sensors were in place for
7 hours during the canceled launch on the preceding day. The
skin findings over the sacrum are frequently present following
prolonged periods of 4 or more hours on his back in the couch.
On the night before the postponed launch of May 1^-, 19^3, the
pilot slept well for about two hours and then dozed fitfully
for another 3^- hours. He had several dreams related to
problems with the use of the flight plan and the inflight
medications and also later reported he did not feel rested.
However, on the night before the successful launch, he slept
well for 6 hours and no dreams were recalled. Although he
did become sleepy during periods of relative inactivity,
such as in the transfer van, he did feel adequately rested
on launch morning. At no time was a drug administered to
induce sleep.

7-1.2.2 Biosensor data: The sources of detailed biosensor data are

outlined in tables 7.1.2.2-1 and 7.1.2.2-2. These sources
include dynamic tests for evaluation of general physical
page 7
condition, Mercury-Atlas three-orbital-pass simulations and
Mercury-Atlas acceleration profiles conducted at the U.S.
Naval Aviation Medical Acceleration Laboratory (AMAL) in
Johnsville, Pennsylvania, and various spacecraft checkout
procedures required during the final stages of preparation for
flight.

The procedures which were monitored resulted in the largest

number of total hours of observation yet available on any
one astronaut. This extensive monitoring was possible as a
result of his activity as the MA-8 backup pilot and of
his participation in three altitude-chamber spacecraft checkout
procedures, including the longest such test conducted at
Cape Canaveral.

The pilot-safety monitoring and data-gathering biosensor

system for this mission consisted of two sets of electrocardio-
graph! c (EGG) leads, the impedance pneumograph, an oral
temperature thermistor, and the blood pressure measuring
system (BPMS). The details of operation of the biosensor
system have been described in previous postlaunch memorandum
reports. Because of the increased duration of the MA-9
flight, a change was made from continuous rectal to intermittent
oral body-temperature measurement. The basic thermistor was
retained with a new covering incorporating velcro. The
thermistor and its lead wires remained within the suit. The
sensor was attached to the right ear muff inside the helmet
where it was readily accessible. The sensor and its location
are illustrated in figures 7.1.2.2-1 and 7.1.2.2-2. It was
recalibrated to sense a temperature range from 75° to 105°,
thereby providing an indication of suit outlet temperature
whenever an oral temperature was not being taken. The
difference between suit inlet and outlet temperatures was
usually 20° F to 30° F. When oral temperature was desired, the
pilot placed the small thermistor under his tongue for about
5 minutes. Preflight body temperatures were all within the
normal range. The remainder of the biosensor system was the
same as that used in MA-8.

Preflight biosensor preparation includes careful calibration

of the system so that accurate, repeatable determinations are
assured. Adjustments are required to compensate for individual
variations. This requirement is especially true for the
blood pressure measuring system (EPMS). The clinical blood
pressure mean values, shown in table 7-1.2.2-3, are of particular
interest and indicate that the correlation is valid for this
system. The stability of these calibrations was rechecked on
several occasions before flight. All systems operated properly
during the final preflight preparation period.
 Page 7-5

The preflight biosensor data are presented in tables 7.1.2.2-1

to 7-1.2.2-k. The analysis methods used were both manual and
automatic.

All respiration minute rates were obtained by 30-second

counts made from the continuous direct-recorded analog signal,
with sampling intervals either every 3 or every k minutes.
Heart rates were determined in the same manner by counting
manually; those sets can be readily identified by the
relatively low number of values used. The automatic analysis
utilizes a general purpose computer to determine the intervals
between all the R waves of the EGG complexes in the record,
and the reported values are computed from these determinations.
The automatically reduced rates are readily identified by the
large numbers of values . The validity of both of these methods
has been substantiated by repeated cross-correlation of results
during the two years of development of the analysis program.
Although the data analysis format was arbitrarily selected,
the results are fully reproducible and appear to be adequate
for the present medical requirements. All blood pressures
on record were incorporated in the tables.

The most significant aspect of the preflight data is the

rather wide range of mean rates, particularly heart rates,
which limits the establishment of expected or so-called normal
responses . This wide variation is a common phenomenon among
healthy individuals and, in this regard, makes it difficult
to predict accurately the responses of such a person under
conditions similar to those during which the background data
are derived.

The EGG from the preflight observation period was scanned

repeatedly by numerous observers. The collective opinions
were that marked normal sinus arrhythmia was present with
frequent occurrences of a wandering cardiac pacemaker. At
times, sinus node suppression was sufficient to allow
activation by the atrio-ventricular (A-V) node with escape and
fusion beats. This occurrence was identified by both biphasic
and negative P waves of decreased amplitude, and on occasion
by changes in the ventricular complexes. There were numerous
such beats noted during the countdown of the postponed launch,
and there was one brief episode of nodal rhythm during this
period. These data are illustrated in figure 7.1.2.2-3 and
7.1.2.2-^4-. There was sinus bradycardia, which, at times,
was followed by a sinus-generated beat and, at other times,
an A-V nodal-generated escape beat. Other infrequent rhythm
alterations were premature atrial and ventricular beats.
These preflight data were collected in order to establish
the baseline physiological responses of the MA-9 astronaut
specifically using the flight biomedical instrumentation.

OOMFIDEMTIAL
page 7 - 6 CONFIDENTIAL

7.1.3 Flight observations.-

7.1.3.1 Biosensor data: Inflight biomedical monitoring spanned a
time interval of 3^ hours, l6 minutes,, and ^3 seconds on this
flight. Continuous onboard recording included the first
1 hour and 35 minutes and the last 10 hours and ^5 minutes of
flight time until bioplug disconnect. Flight data were
programed to be intermittently recorded for 1 minute of every
10 minutes between 1 hour and 39 minutes elapsed time and
23 hours and 32 minutes elapsed time. Recording of physiolgical
data through the mid-portion of the flight was erratic and
did not follow original plans because of a malfunction of the
tape-recorder programer which occurred at approximately
12:00:00 and continued throughout the flight. Data during
the final portion of the flight, from 24:00:00 until landing,
were made possible because the failed programer was overriden
by the astronaut's selection of continuous recorder operations.
However, sufficient data points were obtained for confident
extrapolation of trends of physiologic values during such periods
by the astronaut's voice contacts with the ground, use of the
vox-record actuation of the tape recorder, or turning the
tape recorder temporarily to continuous to document certain
inflight experiments. During the period when the astronaut
was resting quietly or was asleep, essentially no medical
data were obtained on the onboard recorder; consequently mean
heart rate values for the entire duration of the flight are
probably biased on the high side of a true mean. Data from
the onboard recorder have been supplemented by data obtained
during network station passes throughout the mission, and an
exceptionally valuable short period of recording was obtained
onboard the carrier during egress of the astronaut. The
inflight responses are summarized in tables 7-1-2.2-2 and
7.1.2.2-4. Hear rate response, including mean rates, was
obtained through a computer reduction of the inflight data
from the onboard tape recorder.

Respiration rates were obtained by the manual counting of

30-second periods every 3 minutes during the period of
continuous recording, and from 30-second averages taken at
all other short intervals when data were available from the
onboard tape recorder. Blood pressures were obtained according
to the flight plan with only very minor variations. These
values were with few exceptions not recorded on the onboard
recorder since the astronaut was generally quiet while sending
the blood pressure, and therefore the tape recorder was not
operating. However, the values were received at ground
stations in every instance and read in real time by medical
monitors. The readings were subsequently verified by
 Page 7-7

postflight analysis of the tracking-site data. Body

temperature was sampled intermittently during the flight
with an oral thermistor, which the pilot placed under his
tongue on five occasions as planned, and one additional oral
temperature was requested and obtained during the flight. Body
temperatures obtained in flight and listed below were all
within the normal range.

Time Oral temperature, °F

1:10:00 98-5
6:00:00 100.0
10:25:00 100.0
12:25:00 99.0
23:50:00 98.0

The most noteworthy elements of the physiological parameters

recorded during this flight are the evidences which tend to
confirm the astronaut's impression of fairly strenuous exercise
throughout the major portion of the flight. The overall
mean heart rate recorded during the period when the inflight
recorder was operative was 89 beats per minute, and the overall
respiratory rate recorded from available data was 19 breaths
per minute. The significant events of powered flight showed
corresponding increases in heart rate and respiratory rate,
as has been the case in all manned Mercury flights. The
pilot's heart rate at BECO was 1^7 beats per minute; at
launch-escape-rocket ignition, 15^ beats per minute; and at
SECO, 1^ beats per minute. Within 2 minutes after SECO,
heart rate subsided to about 110 beats per minute and then
gradually declined over the next 13 minutes to rates of
80 to 100 beats per minute for the remainder of the first
orbital pass. Respiratory rate was 28 breaths per minute at
BECO, between 25 and 30 breaths per minute through SECO,
and then declined to rates of 18 to 20 breaths per minute
within the first 15 minutes of weightless flight. During the
first orbital period, while the astronaut was becoming accustomed
to the weightless environment and was verifying the functional
integrity of his control systems^ his heart rate remained at
between 80 and 90 beats per minute except for a few short
spurts above 100 which generally are related to periods of
physical activity. During the second pass his heart rate
generally declined to a steady level of about 80 beats per
minute with rapid rises to between 100 and 110.beats per minute
when the pilot was exerting himself to conduct experiments.

FIDEMTIAL
page 7 8
When the flashing light was deployed at about 3:26:00, his
heart rate rose to a sharp peak of 13^- teats per minute and
then promptly declined to 95 teats per minute while the
pilot was maneuvering the spacecraft in an attempt to sight the
flashing light. Heart rate remained stable around 80 beats
per minute throughout the remainder of the first 8 hours in
space except during periods when the astronaut announced
on the tape that he was performing some specific exertion
such as emptying the condensate tank or removing equipment
from the equipment 'kit. During these intervals, rates would
increase to values from 100 beats per minute to as high as
130 beats per minute for very short times.

At 8:25:00, the pilot specifically mentioned struggling with

his writing desk. At this time, his heart rate was seen to
rise to 96 beats per minute and then promptly settled back
to its resting rate of about 80. The longer period of
observation and the opportunity which this flight afforded
to correlate pilot activities with heart and respiratory rates
permits tentative appraisal of the effect on these rates of
exertion in the orbital spacecraft based on similar physical
exertion under equally cramped circumstances at Ig. There
does not appear to be a significant difference in terms of
pulse rate and respiratory rate response in the two situations.
This impression was further borne out in the two planned
exercise periods where there was consistent similarity
between the response to exercise in orbital flight and the
response to exercise in preflight practice sessions, as
shown in table 7-1-3-1-1.

The respiratory rate sensor became unreliable during the

flight. The failure was subsequently traced to a separation
of the electrode lead wire from the electrode, which was
attached to the left lower chest. The first sign of respiration
sensor failure occurred at 7:08:00, and throughout the
remainder of the flight, the respiratory rate recording was
intermittent. Sometimes it appeared to trace a faithful
replica of the pilot's breathing, but at other times it
was entirely unreliable or without apparent relationship to
respiration. The respiratory rates during the last portion
of the flight are tentative rates based on the appearance
of the pneumograph waveform during periods when evidence
available indicates it was following changes in thoracic
volume. Typical signals for properly operating biosensors
are illustrated in figure 7-1-3-1-1•

During the sleeping period, heart rates recorded on passes

over tracking stations were generally as lov as 50 and
averaged between 55 and 60 beats per minute. However, when
 page 7 - 9
the pilot awoke and announced anything which was recorded on
the onboard recorder his heart rate immediately rose to about
80 which is the same value as during his working periods
earlier in the flight. After about 23:32:00 and for the
remainder of the normal orbital flight, the astronaut's
mean heart rate rose to a value of about 100 beats per
minute. His first indication of a spacecraft system
malfunction occurred at about 28:34:00 when he noticed the
0.05g relay light had come on. Heart rate at this time rose
sharply to l48 beats per minute and then rapidly declined
to the low of 60 beats per minute and stabilized at a rate of
around 100 beats per minute. After a preliminary analysis of
the nature of the malfunction indicated by this 0.05g light,
the pilot's heart rate varied, with a peak of 142 beats per
minute while he was engaged in checking his ASCS system at
approximately 30:08:00. Again, the heart rate declined
rapidly to its resting level of approximately 100 beats per
minute.

At about 32:41:00, the pilot was advised to take 5 ing of

dextro amphetamine orally which he did very shortly after
receiving the advice. A gradual rise in the heart rate can
be seen, beginning at 33 hours elapsed time, with rather
marked swings in rate between levels as high as l4o beats
per minute and lows of about 80 beats per minute throughout
the remainder of the flight. The last significant inflight
change in heart rate occurred at retrofire when the heart rate
rose to l66 beats per minute for no longer than 20 seconds.

The heart rates during reentry varied between 120 and l4o beats
per minute until drogue parachute deployment when it spiked
to 184 beats per minute. It then gradually declined to
164 beats per minute when bioplug disconnect was accomplished
subsequent to main parachute deployment.

The changes in heart rate throughout this flight seem to

fall readily into two categories. The gradual increases in
rate with correspondingly gradual returns to normal resting
heart rate are seen in response to physical exertion. The
peak heart rate which was noted corresponded to levels which
would be expected following an equivalent amount of exertion
under Ig. A sharper rise of heart rate to high levels in
excess of l4o beats per minute is seen as a startle response
when the astronaut is evidently emotionally alerted to a
highly significant change in his environmental situation.

From an electrophysiology standpoint, the EGG was well

within normal physiologic limits during the major portion of
this flight. The A-V nodal beats noted during the prelaunch
period were nearly non-existent during the entire

COMriDDHTIAL
Page 7 - 1 0 ^CONFIDENTIAL

3W hours of flight monitoring. A careful review of the

entire flight revealed that data from both leads of EGG
showed periodic changes in the character of the P wave and the
P-R interval which are consistent with a wandering pacemaker.
There were frequent prolonged sinus pauses during the flight
which generally are associated with deep inspiration by'the
pilot, and in every instance a sinus beat, rather than a
ventricular escape, followed the pause. One period when
this rule did not hold was during the sleeping time as the
astronaut was passing over the RKV tracking ship. At
17:10:00 and 18:45:00, the medical monitor reported a nodal
rhythm which was verified during the postflight examination
of the records. Figure 7-1-2.2-4 illustrates this variation.
Late in the flight, the sternal EGG lead became rather noisy
with a marked fluctuation of the baseline. This fluctuation
appeared at times to be synchronous with respiration and at
other times to bear little or no relationship to respiratory
movements. At this period in the flight, sinus arrhythmia
was somewhat more pronounced than it had been early in the
flight. A recurrent finding on the record consisted of a
simultaneous disruption of the sternal EGG recording with a
sharp negative impulse on the relatively insensitive respiratory
channel and a sinus pause showing on the side-to-side EGG
lead. It is tentatively believed that this characteristic
pattern resulted from either a habitual deep sighing breath
taken by the pilot or perhaps a repeated stretching motion
made in an attempt to relieve his cramped position.

Blood pressures did not vary remarkably during the flight

from preflight values, as shown in table 7.1.2.2-4.

Postflight analysis of the radiation film badges worn by

the astronaut revealed a total dose of from 15 to 20 millirads,
which is well below the maximum allowable dosage.

7.1.3.2 Clinical observations: The information contained in this

section was derived from reviewing the pilot's comments on
voice track of the onboard tape, conversations immediately
after the flight, and from his answers to a comprehensive
list of questions during the medical debriefing on the day
following recovery.

The noise and increased "g" forces associated with launch

were not uncomfortable and caused no problem. Specifically,
the pilot stated he felt very little vibration and had no
blurring of vision. He attributes this absence of blurring
to a slightly thicker' rubber pad which had been added to the
couch beneath his helmet. The cessation of powered flight
and the onset of weightlessness did not cause vertigo, tumbling
 CONFIDENTIAL Page 7 - n

sensations, or other unusual symptoms. The pilot rapidly-

adjusted to zero g and described it as "pleasant, extremely
relaxing, and a real floating sensation." His observations
indicate that vision was entirely normal throughout the
flight.

He noticed a phenomenon of orientation similar to that

reported by the MA-7 pilot. He stated that after SECO and
during the first 20 minutes or so of gravity-free flight,
he felt the equipment kit located near his right arm was
rotated 90°• This phenomenon did not extend to the instrument
panel, window, instrument panel compartment or any other
structure within the spacecraft, and it was not troublesome.
The pilot's body was his reference for orientation to the
spacecraft and this relationship was never in question.

The astronaut stated that he did not feel particularly

hungry for the majority of the time during the flight and ate
primarily because it had been scheduled. However, later in
the flight he did feel hungry on one occasion and after
eating felt better. Because of problems with the food
containers and water nozzle during flight, he was unable
reconstitute properly the freeze-dehydrated food and could
only eat one-third of a package of beef pot roast. Therefore,
he subsisted on bite-sized cubed food and bite-sized peanut
butter "sandwiches." He avoided the bite-sized beef sandwiches,
since they had crumbled in their package. His caloric intake
during the flight was only 696 calories of the 2,369 calories
available to him at launch. He rapidly tired of the cubed
"snack-type" foods and this contributed to his low caloric
intake. Typical samples of the food types which were carried
aboard for the MA-9 flight are shown in figure 7-1-3.2-1.

The astronaut's water intake was also limited. When the

condensate transfer system would no longer permit fluid storage
in the main condensate bag (3.86 Ib) during the flight, he
was forced to put condensate water into one of the drinking-
water tanks before he had consumed all of its contents. Normal
operational procedures required the exclusion of condensate
water as a drinking-water source. He began drinking small
amounts from his survival kit water supply, as planned, but
wished to conserve this as much as possible. He was not
really thirsty until during the last orbital pass, but he
was so busy at this point he did not take time to drink.
Because condensate water was placed into the drinking-water
tank, in which an unknown amount of drinking water remained,
it is impossible to make a valid statement as to his water
intake during flight, but he did consume more than 1,500 cc.
The drinking water rapidly became unpalatable because of its
equilibration with 95° cabin temperature and an alteration of

Up
7 -12
its taste by the plastic "bags in which it was carried. The
astronaut stated that he probably would have drunk more liquid,
including the dehydrated juices, if he had not experienced
difficulty with the mouthpiece of the drinking water tank.

At one point during the flight the pilot felt a vague gastric
awareness or queasiness, but this feeling rapidly cleared when
he ate a little food and drank some water. At no time did
he have any nausea, vomiting, or other gastrointestinal problems.

He urinated without difficulty several times during flight

and stated that bladder sensations were normal. The urine
collection and transfer system worked well, and separate urine
samples were obtained at four different times during the flight.
It did require considerable time and effort to transfer the
urine to the storage bags, although not as much as was
encountered with the condensate system.

The astronaut had a very good sleep the night prior to launch
and was as rested as possible. He found, even early in the
flight, that when he had no tasks to perform and the space-
craft was oriented such that the earth was not in view from
the window, he easily dozed off for brief naps. There
were times when he awoke without realizing he had fallen
asleep. This dozing did not occur during times when there
were tasks to perform or items to see through the window.
During the period designated for sleep, he slept only in a
series of naps lasting no more than 1 hour each. His total
sleep time was about ^-5- hours. He awoke from these 30- to
60-minute naps feeling alert and rested, but 30 to ^5 minutes
later he would again doze off. He stated that if there had been
another person along to monitor the spacecraft, particularly
the ECS functions, he could have slept for much longer periods,
but still "no more than k to 6 hours in a day." Table 7-1-3-2-1
lists the estimated inflight sleep periods.

He had a brief period of confusion the first time or two

that he awoke, not realizing exactly where he was. However,
it took him only a very few seconds to become completely
awake and oriented. He reported that this brief period of
confusion did not occur later in the flight. The pilot
stated that he slept "perhaps a little more soundly" than
on earth and that he did dream, but he did not remember the
contents of the dreams. He did not notice significant changes
in dreaming from ground experience.

M. M.J\Li
 AL Page 7-13

He felt that being strapped into the seat made little

difference in his sleep, but he definitely had the feeling
he was sleeping sitting up. He noted when he awoke that his
arms were floating but in front of him, and because of his
concern that he might inadvertently trip a critical switch
during sleep, he folded his hands and hooked his thumbs under
the helmet restraint cables. He was never startled or
alarmed to awaken and see his hands floating in front of his
faceplate.

The oral temperature probe was easily handled by the pilot.

It was necessary to use a small hand mirror to check its
position on the right ear muff to be sure it was not extending
beyond the helmet, but at no time did it interfere with
closing the faceplate.

The only real discomfort experienced during the flight was

associated with the pressure suit being pulled tightly across
the pilot's knees. By the 6th or 7"th orbital pass, his knees
were becoming quite uncomfortable. This discomfort was
somewhat alleviated by the astronaut's periodically sliding
his feet up past the normal foot position into the tower area
of the spacecraft. This action permitted straightening of
his legs to relieve most of the pressure and also allowed
him to pull on the legs of the suit to gain a little slack
around his knees.

A drug was taken during flight for the first time during a
Mercury flight. The astronaut took 5 mg of dextro amphetamine
sulfate approximately 1 hour 20 minutes prior to retrofire.
He stated that within 20 minutes he felt much more alert and
confident and seemed to be "more on top of things. " He then
had less tendency to drop off to sleep for short naps for the
remainder of the flight. There was no apparent degradation
in the pilot's performance following this medication. He also
stated that the drug, as far as he could tell, had the same
effect^ as test doses taken prior to flight.

One of the most aggravating problems during flight was the

continuous fluctuation of the suit temperature. The pilot
was forced to adjust the suit-circuit coolant-control valve
nearly every 15 or 20 minutes, and he was seldom really
comfortable. This frequent adjustment also played a role
in limiting his sleep. In addition, his suit was very wet
since free water was not being sufficiently extracted from
the suit ducting leading into the suit.

During the last two orbital passes, the PC02 gage was noted
to be indicating a rise in the amount of COp in the suit. The

Afc.
page 7 - i4 -CONFIDENTIAL

astronaut actuated the emergency oxygen flow rate for 30 seconds

which should have reduced the PCOp reading. It did not seem
to change the pilot's onboard reading noticeably, although
telemetry signals indicated a slight drop. At this time the
pilot closed his faceplate and felt that his respirations
were deeper and more rapid. This change in respiration could
not be confirmed by postflight examination of respiration
and heart .rate recordings. Although he felt more comfortable
with the faceplate open,, he kept it closed during the final
orbital pass and the reentry as planned. The PCOp gage
indicated about 5 mm Hg at reentry. This concentration is
not enough to cause symptoms of hypercapnia on the ground, and
there was no apparent interference with the pilot's normal
functions.

7-1.4 Postflight observations.-

7.1.^.1 Recovery history: The spacecraft landed in the water about

4.4 miles from the recovery ship, the U.S.S. Kearsarge,
and was placed on deck approximately 40 minutes later. In
order to gain medical data as early as possible, the NASA
Flight Surgeon aboard the recovery ship was equipped with an
8-foot extension cord for the biomedical cable. Immediately
after the hatch was opened, this cord was attached to the
astronaut's biosensor plug and blood pressure fitting and
connected to the spacecraft onboard recorder in order to
record blood pressures and EGG before, during, and after
egress. This system was extremely effective in deriving
post-egress data.

The astronaut was then taken to the ship's sick bay where a
comprehensive medical examination and preliminary debriefing
were performed. The remainder of the debriefing was conducted
by the NASA Flight Surgeon in the admiral's in-port cabin.
The astronaut spent 48 hours onboard the ship. Details of
his activities during this 48-hour period are shown in
table 7.1.4.1-1.

7-1.4.2 Physical examinations: The postflight examination began

prior to egress from the spacecraft. Approximately 40 minutes
after landing, two measurements of the astronaut's blood
pressure were recorded while he was still lying in the space-
craft on the deck of the recovery ship. He was then able
to egress from the spacecraft without assistance and stand
erect on the deck vhile his blood pressure was again recorded
on the onboard tape. Later examination of this 3— minute
record shows that, while still in the spacecraft, the blood
 TOM1DENTIAL Page 7 - 1 5

pressures were 101/65 and 105/87, with a corresponding

heart rate of 132 beats per minute. During egress and immediately
thereafter while standing upright on the deck, his heart
rate rose to 188 beats per minute with atrio-ventricular
(A-V) dissociation. At that point, another blood pressure
recording was attempted and, although the apparatus appeared
to cycle normally, no pressure pulses were seen on the
recording. His heart then returned to a normal sinus rhythm
with a rate of 92 beats per minute at sensor disconnect.

After standing on the deck for approximately a minute, he

began to look pale and, although his face was already wet,
new beads of perspiration appeared on his forehead. He
swayed slightly and whispered, "I think I am going to
faint." The cable was immediately disconnected and, with
support at each arm, he began to walk away from the spacecraft.
After a few steps'and 5 to 10 seconds later, he was able to
walk without assistance and to salute the ship's commanding
officer. There were no other objective changes of this
kind throughout the postflight examination and debriefing
period.

The astronaut described this episode as, "I felt fine,

although somewhat warm, within the spacecraft and continued
to feel fine during egress. My legs felt cramped and stiff
and I was a little concerned whether or not they would
support me. After standing for a few seconds I felt woozy
and light-headed and noted 'gunbarreling' of vision similar
to that experienced during oxygen lack. Voices were distant
and my feet and legs tingled. For the first step or two I
could not feel my feet except as a tingling sensation, but
with walking the sensations all rapidly cleared. I think
I would have fainted if the doctors had. not started my
walking when they did."

The remainder of the physical examination was conducted in

the ship's sick bay and was completed within 2 hours after
landing. During desuiting it was noted that the astronaut was
soaking wet, presumably with perspiration. His hands had
the white, puffy, wrinkled appearance characteristic of
prolonged submersion in water. His feet and socks were dry.
He complained of being thirsty and his voice was dry and hoarse.
He participated actively in the desuiting and examination,
but appeared tired and less talkative than usual. His body,
and especially his hands, had absorbed the odor of the
inside of the pressure suit.

The urine collection device was still firmly attached and

contained 107 cc of urine. When the soaking wet underwear
was removed, the lead wire to the lower left sensor on the
chest was seen to be disconnected. It is not known whether

CONFIDENTIAL
page 7 16 CONFIDENTIAL

it separated prior to this time although it appears probable

that it was loose, making partial contact and held by the
plastic insulation sleeve until the suit was removed. There
were some evidences of pressure on the skin at all lateral sensor
locations, but no signs of irritation by sensors, paste,
or tape. All sensors were securely in place and the
electrode paste seemed to have maintained its normal consistency.
At the sensor locations on the left lateral chest, there were
narrow semicircular marks that looked like a very shallow
cut with a sharp blade. These cuts may have been caused
by the thin edge of the tape where the rubber sensor disc
slightly overlapped it.

There were painful and slightly swollen red areas over each
patella caused by the pressure suit having been pulled
tightly across the anterior knee when the knee was flexed.
Other reddened areas were found over each posterior inferior
iliac spine and the posterior spinous process of the fifth
lumbar vertebra. There was a diffuse redness over the
right lateral iliac area, but none on the left. No explanation
can be offered for this condition at the present time.

Additional findings of note were a bilateral conjunctivitis,

which probably resulted from drying of the eyes by the
constant oxygen flow and a slight reddening around the left
tympanic membrane. He complained that he had a little trouble
clearing his left ear during descent. Both ears "crackled"
for 6 to 8 hours after recovery as the oxygen in the middle
ear was gradually absorbed and replaced with air. This
condition is commonly seen in aviators when they have been
breathing 100-percent oxygen.

Tilt table studies were performed at 1, 3, %-, and 19 hours

after landing. At no time did the astronaut have any
subjective complaints, nor were objective changes noted
except in pulse and blood pressure. Specifically, there were
no unusual color changes in the feet, as had been noted
following the MA-8 flight. The results of the tilt table
studies are tabulated and discussed under Special Studies.

The medical findings during the initial recovery examination

are shown in table 7.1.2.1-3, and included a blood pressure
of 90/80 mm Hg while supine, a heart rate of 86 beats per
minute, a respiration rate of l6 breaths per minute, a
body weight of 139r pounds, and a body temperature of
99.k° F taken orally. Three hours after landing, his urine
showed a specific gravity of 1.031, an(i the hematocrit
was ^9. These findings, combined with the clinical evaluation,

GONriDDFITf
 Page 7-17

indicate a moderate dehydration. As has been indicated

elsewhere, this dehydration resulted from a reduced intake
of food and water during the flight. Detailed results of
the blood and urine analyses currently available are contained
in tables 7.1.2.1-3 to 7.1.2.1-5. The reversal of the ratio
of lymphocytes to polymorphonuclear leukocytes during the
week following the flight, without a significant change in
the total count, is presently unexplained. This ratio has
since returned approximately to unity, but the study of this
phenomenon is continuing. A clinical electrocardiogram and
a chest X-ray completed the initial postflight examination.
The chest X-ray showed no changes when compared with that taken
before the flight on May 12, 1963. The EGG showed a moderate
rightward shift in the QRS and T axes when compared to that
of May 12, 1963. This shift is probably the result of a normal
cardiac position change.

The astronaut slept very soundly for 9— hours and awoke

cheerful and eager to complete the debriefing activities.

A brief examination the following day showed that the

conjunctival irritation, the hoarseness of his voice, most of
the skin pressure marks, and most of the evidence of dehydration
had disappeared. The areas of pressure over the knees were
still painful and somewhat more swollen than on the previous
day. The sharp semicircular marks were still much in evidence
and remained visible for several days.

Table 7.1.4.2-1 states the pilot's weight loss during several

preflight activities and the inflight experience. Intake and
output records for the first 2.k hours after recovery indicate
a fluid intake of 3^900 cc and a urine output of 5^5 cc.

The pilot returned to the launch site on the fourth day following
launch and was examined the following morning. The same
medical specialists found him to be in excellent health.
The only changes noted were the persistent slight erythema
and tenderness of both patellae, resulting from the pressure
areas in the suit, a continued, rightward shift in the QRS
and T axes of the EGG, and a persistence of the previously
noted alteration in blood count. The EGG- shift had become
less apparent, however. The laboratory studies of blood and
urine are contained in tables 7-1-2.1-3 to 2.1.2.1-5.

The pilot remained in good health and maintained his high morale
following this examination. He participated in debriefing
sessions and other postflight activities without further medical
change.

lOOMilDBMTAL
Page 7 - 1 8

7.1.5 Special studies.-

7-1-5-1 Tilt test evaluation: The medical examination performed

immediately after the MA-8 recovery suggested an alteration
in the pilot's cardiovascular responses to position changes.
In order to obtain more quantitative measurements of these
responses, an operational tilt procedure was developed for
shipboard use. This procedure utilized a Stokes' Litter with
cross-bars added for lifting and stabilization. These modi-
fications permitted a tilt of 70° from the horizontal in
3 to 4 seconds. The individual being tested was comfortably
secured in the litter, without circulatory interference, by
straps across the knees and the upper chest.

Heart rate and blood pressure measurements were taken at

least every minute on all tests and were chosen as the primary
indicators of altered function, in conjunction with observation
of visible reactions and subjective comments. Operational use
called for minute heart rates calculated from 15-second counts
of the right radial pulse with clinical blood pressures taken
from the left arm. Greater capability in the Space Medicine
Laboratory in Hangar S permitted simultaneous determination of
both clinical and BFMS blood pressures and continuous recording
of respiration rate and EGG from the biosensor system. Minute
heart rates were determined from the directly recorded biosensor
data by using 12-second counts made every 30 seconds.

Minute respiration rates were determined from 30-second counts

made each minute. There were no apparent differences between
the clinical and biosensor values, but continuous EGG readings
produced interesting additional information.

The procedure was carried out in the following manner. After

k sets of similar control values, the individual was tilted for
5 minutes and values were sampled at least every minute, then
returned to the horizontal position for a recording of at least
4 more sets of similar values. Thus, the minimum time for the
complete test was 13 minutes. In order to superimpose a further
cardiovascular stress, Flack Tests were used in some of the tilts.
This test utilizes a tube with an orifice through which the indi-
vidual exhales after a maximum inspiration, producing a constant
pulmonary overpressure of ^0 mm Hg. The Flack Test lasted
15 seconds and was conducted from 3;j to ^ minutes after the
individual was tilted to the 70° position.

Preflight results were obtained from 11 tilt tests on the flight

astronaut from January 5 to May 10, 1963. Flack Tests were per-
formed with k of the tilts . All of these tilts were performed
in conjunction with a spacecraft checkout procedure which required
 Page 7-19

at least 2 hours in the spacecraft couch In the semisupine

position. The time between the prerun tilts and the procedure
varied from 1 to 5 hours because of uncontrollable operational
factors. In each case, the postrun tilts were conducted from
5 to 15 minutes after the procedure, and on January 5, 1963,
a second postrun tilt was performed 1 hour after the first.

The heart rate and blood pressure values are summarized in

table 7.1.5-1-1 and illustrated in figures 7.1.5.1-1 and
7.1.5.1-2. The preflight results fall within the ranges
reported in the literature. In the prerun period, most heart
rates were between 55 and 80 beats per minute. The tilt pro-
duced a rise in heart rate varying from 5 to about 20 beats
per minute within 30 seconds. This reading gradually increased
during the first 2 minutes to rates of 80 and 9° beats per
minute, at which point it stabilized. Post-tilt values between
100 and 110 beats per minute occurred after a 6— hour run, which
was more than twice as long as any of the other runs.

At the beginning of the Flack Test, a bradycardia for 3 or 4

beats usually occurred, followed by an increase in rate to 80
to 90 beats per minute. On several occasions, the maximum
observed rates of 110 beats per minute followed a Flack Test.
The sudden release of the increased intrathoracic pressure
again produced a transient bradycardia followed by an "over-
shoot" of 10 to 15 beats per minute. Conclusion of the tilt
period consistently produced an immediate drop in rate to the
pretilt range. Respiration rates were without significant
change and are not reported. The increases in diastolic blood
pressure were the most' remarkable produced by the tilt. The
mean increase was 15 mm Hg, but many of the diastolic pressures
rose 20 to 30 mm Hg. An initial systolic drop was followed by
a compensatory rise. Post-run tilts produced somewhat more
striking blood pressure changes, with narrowing of some pulse
pressures to as little as 6 mm Hg. The maximum systolic levels
followed Flack Tests, without an assosicated diastolic change
of significance.

The EGG demonstrated expected alteration of the QRS axis

secondary to position change. Decrease in size of the QRS
was especially prominent in the chest lead as a consequence
of E wave depression. There were sinus pauses with an occa-
sional aberrant complex of ventricular origin. The usual pre-
tilt sinus arrhythmia disappeared with the rate increases. The
Flack Test produced dropped beats and occasional premature ven-
tricular contractions during the period after sudden release.

COMriDEMTIAL
page 7 - 20
On no occasion could symptoms of near-syncope be detected.
Subjectively, all of these tests were exceedingly well-
tolerated. Observation of the physical appearance while
tilted showed a tendency to bluish mottling of the hands and
feet and a tendency to increased filling of the veins of the
legs.

Postflight results are shown adjacent to the preflight findings

in table 7.1.5.1-1- and figures 7.1.5.1-1 and 7.1.5.1-2. It is
readily evident that the postflight tilt test no. 1 (conducted
approximately 1 hour after landing) found the mean pretilt
heart rates 11 beats per minute higher than those for the
similar period preflight, and that the tilt produced a greater
heart rate response than any of the preflight tilts. Most of
the values from tilt test no. 1 were 120 beats per minute
(maximum 132 beats per minute) and exceeded any of the maximum
values obtained during the 11 preflight tilts. A Flack Test
was not felt to be indicated in view of the tilt response.
Tilt test no. 2, conducted J hours after landing and 2 hours
after no. 1, began from a higher point and showed an even
greater rate response; three of the six values were between
1^0 and ikk- beats per minute. Within ^—minutes after the tilt,
the heart rate had declined to 1J2 beats per minute when the
Flack Test produced a jump to 1^5 beats per minute. The tilt
was ended and subsequent rates were similar to the pretilt
rates. Tilt test no. 3, conducted 6f^ hours after landing and
1
3o- hours after no. 2, showed responses very close to the pre-
flight maximums, which are still excessive, but much less so
than the previous two tilts. The rates decrease slightly after
the Flack Test. Tilt test no. k, initiated 19 hours after
landing and 12— hours after no. 3, produced responses very near
those obtained before flight with a continued slowing of heart
rate after the Flack Test. Unfortunately, simultaneous EGG-
could not be recorded with any of these tilts.

The blood pressure responses to the postflight tilts were

more nearly uniform; therefore only the mean values are
graphed. Instead of the preflight systolic drop with prompt
compensation and a 15 mm Hg diastolic rise following the tilt,
most of the postflight tilts were followed by a systolic
drop, a very delayed systolic rise, and little or no change
in diastolic levels. Narrowing of pulse pressure to as little
as 6 mm Hg was evident in the early postflight tilts. The
following table summarizes the pulse-pressure changes:

CONFIDENTIAL
 Page 7 - 2 1

Tilt test Pretilt Tilt Posttilt

no. Mean I Minimum I MaximumMean I Minimum Maximum Meanl Minimuml Maximum

Preflight pulse pressure, mm Hg

29 17 4o _ 21 6 58 31 10 46
Postflight pulse pressure, mm Hg

1 to 3 25 10 38 17 6 42 29 20 36
4 37 36 38 26 14 46 46 40 50

The blood pressure responses to the final tilt were nearly

normal, but still showed a delayed compensation for the systolic
drop. Wo visible objective changes occurred and there were no
subjective symptoms.

In summary, the preflight tilt tests produced expected

cardiovascular compensatory reactions insofar as they could
be demonstrated by heart rate, blood pressure, and EGG data,
and all of these tests were well tolerated. The postflight
tilt tests demonstrated the presence of moderate orthostic
hypotension, with far greater heart rates required to maintain
effective cardiovascular function. Compensation was achieved,
however, and the pilot did not even develop near-syncope.
Tilt studies of responses after stresses similar to those
experienced during flight are not available, and inadequate
water intake and weight loss create difficulty in interpreting
these results. It is well known that dehydration and decreased
blood volume are some of the factors which will decrease
cardiovascular stress tolerance.

7.1.5.2 Calibrated work: A device for calibrated work consisting of

a short plastic handle and expandable bungee cords (see
fig. 7-1-5-2-1) was fixed within the spacecraft near the
astronaut's feet. A limiting cable ensured repeatability
of handle travel, requiring 65 pounds of force for each full
extension. At 2:25:00 and again at 7:4l:00, the astronaut
recorded his blood pressure, pulled the device 30 times in as
near 30 seconds as possible, and again recorded his blood
pressure. The results of these two work periods were compared
with 5 such periods performed at normal gravity in the space-
craft and in the procedures trainer.

Subjectively the astronaut could tell little difference

between the work performed under normal gravity and under
zero gravity, the effort under zero gravity being, if anything,

CONFIDENTIAL
 slightly easier. During flight he felt his post-work
breathing was not as labored and he thought his heart rate
returned to pre-work values more rapidly. The data are
somewhat, affected by the difficulty he had in freeing the
work handle from its restraining clip during flight.

Analysis of the data does not show any striking differences

between the one gravity and zero gravity work periods.
Inflight mean heart rates during the calibrated work period
are 2.6 beats per minute higher than preflight, but his
inflight mean heart rate before work is 15 beats per minute-
higher; therefore this difference is not though to~v be significant,
The results are given in table 7-1-3-1-1 and presented
graphically in figure 7-1-5.2-2. One preflight heart rate
during work was l6o beats per minute. This value occurred
at the only time in one of the seven periods that he worked
over 0.7 minute and probably reflects the prolongation of
the work period rather than indicating a higher work load.
During the 18-second recovery period after the test, the
preflight mean heart rate is seen to drop to 11 beats per
minute over the preflight value, while during the flight it
falls to 17 beats per minute over the prework mean. This
difference is also not thought to be significant. Blood
pressure readings taken before and after work show no
significant changes from baseline values.

In summary, based on the inadequate evidence obtained during

the MA-9 mission, it appears that for brief periods of work
following relatively short periods of zero gravity, the
cardiovascular system shows no significant changes in heart
rate or blood pressure. Subjectively,.calibrated work
under zero gravity seems easier, as do most tasks requiring
physical effort.
7.1.5.3 Special clinical studies: Retinal photography, urine and
plasma electrolyte determinations, and plasma enzyme studies
comprise the special clinical studies. The retinal photographs,
taken after the flight for comparison with preflight pictures,
are not ready at the present time. The preliminary results
of the plasma electrolyte determinations are available
and appear in table 7-1'5-3-1- If the increase in serum
calcium is valid, it is a small change. The results of the
urine-electrolyte determination are presented in table 7.1.2.1-5;
however, the plasma-enzyme determinations are not yet available.

7-1.6 Conclusions.-
1. There was no evidence of significant degradation of
pilot function directly attributable to the space flight.
Thirty-four hours of zero gravity were well tolerated and
all body functions appeared unaffected during flight.
 Page 7 - 2 J

2. For the first 7 to 19 hours after landing, the pilot

demonstrated an orthostatic rise in heart rate and fall in
blood pressure which was more pronounced than that detected
after the MA-8 flight. Although this condition is not an
inflight hazard, the implications of this hemodynamic response
on return to the Ig condition will have to be given very
serious consideration for longer missions.

3- Difficulties with the dehydrated food container, the

water nozzle and control of the ECS system interfered with the
pilot's ability to maintain an adequate food and fluid intake,
thereby causing moderate dehydration.

k. Added stresses were placed on the pilot by the

constant adjustment required and by the inability of the
environmental control system to maintain consistent
physiologic conditions within the space suit.

5- Sleep in flight is possible, appears normal, and the

evidence does not clearly indicate any change in pattern or
overall sleep requirements. It is possible that space flight
has a soporific effect.

6. The radiation dose received by the pilot was

physiologically insignificant.

7- Wo inflight increase in the frequency of instantaneous

heart-rate variations has been documented. Cardiovascular
response to normal inflight events and activity appears to be
similar to that seen in the Ig environment.

8. There was no physiologically significant amount of

COp in the suit circuit during the flight.

9. There is no evidence of abnormal mental responses to

an exposure in the space-flight environment for the flight
duration involved in this mission.

10. No significant changes have been found in comprehensive

preflight and postflight physical examinations. The significance
of the laboratory finding of an increase in lymphocytes and
reduction in polymorphonuclear leukocytes in spite of a
fairly constant total white-blood-cell count is unknown at
this time. This finding will be further evaluated.
 Page 7-24

TABLE 7.1.2.1-1. - PILOT PREFLIGHT ACTIVITIES

[Selected activities for which medical study or support was performed!

Date Activity Medical study or support

January 5 Altitude-chamber Physical examination before and after

spacecraft checkout Background data (biosensors)

March 22-23 Hangar flight Physical examination before and after

simulation Background data (biosensors)
Low residue diet (3 days) and flight food (2 days)

April 23 Flight simulation no. 1 Physical examination

Background data (biosensors)
Timed urine collection

May k T-10 day physical Physical examination, ^5 minutes

examination

May 7 Mission simulation Physical examination before and after

(procedures trainer) Background data (biosensors)
Timed urine collection
May 8 Launch simulation Physical examination before and after
Background data (biosensors)
Timed urine collection
Begin controlled diet
Blood specimen, 50 cc

May 10 Flight simulation no. 3 Physical examination before and after

Timed urine collection
Background data (biosensors)

May 11 Begin low residue diet

May 12 T-2 day physical Comprehensive medical examination, 2— hours

examination Blood (30 cc) and urine specimen

May Ik Countdown Physical examination before and after

(flight canceled) Timed urine collection
Blood specimen, 30 cc

May 15 Flight countdown Physical examination

Aeromedical countdown
Awaken 2:51 a.m. e.s.t.
Launch Q:0k a.m. e.s.t.
1
CONriDENTlAr
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•COHriDEHTIAL'
 Page 7 - 2 ?

TABLE 7.1.2.1-lj-.- COMPARISON OF TYPICAL PREFLIGHT

AND POSTFLIGHT URINE VALUES

Pre flight Postflight

Date, 1963 May 12 Hay 20

Source Random sample Random sample

Specific gravity 1.018 0.019

pH 6.0 6.0

Albumen, sugar,
acetone, and bile Negative Negative

Microscopic Few TOG, no RBC, One to 2 WBC/HPF,

small amounts of no RBC, no casts,
amorphous phosphates moderate amount
and mucous, and of amorphous
one hyaline cast phosphates

CONFIDENTIAL
 Page 7 - 2 8
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TABLE 7.1.3-2-1.- INFLIGHT SLEEP PERIODS

[other unrecorded naps occurred!

Time, c.e.t. Estimated duration, Source

min

02:10:15 to 02: 11*: 00 k Onboard tape

05: 1*0: 00 to 05:^5:00 5 Astronaut record

13:50:00 to Ik:k6:00 56 Onboard tape

Ik: 20: 00 to lk:kj:00 27 Astronaut record

15:11:00 (a) Onboard tape

15:20:00 to 16:05:00 ^5 Astronaut record

16:28:11 (a) Onboard tape

16:50:00 to 17:50:00 60 Astronaut record

18:20:00 to 18:25:00 5 Astronaut record

18:1*0:00 to 19:27:00 ^7 Astronaut record

19=38:39 (a) Onboard tape

21:22: kk (a) Onboard tape

27:26:08 (a) Onboard tape

Total sleep recorded: k hours and 9 minutes

Short naps, duration not determined-

 Page 7-38 CONFIDENTIAL
TABLE 7.I.IK 1-1.- PILOT POSTFLIGHT ACTIVITIES

Date, Time, local Midway Activity

1963 (a)

May l6 12:25 P-m. Landing

12:55 p.m. Spacecraft on deck

1:09 p.m. Blood pressure, recumbent in spacecraft

1:12 p.m. Egress and blood pressure standing

1:15 p.m. Physical examination begun in recovery ship sick bay

l:U5 p.m. First tilt table procedure

J:00 p.m. Examination completed

3:30 p.m. First postflight urination

3: U2 p.m. Second tilt table procedure

U:10 p.m. First postflight meal

5:^5 p.m. First postflight bowel movement

7:11 p.m. Third tilt table procedure

9:30 p.m. To bed

May 17 7:00 a.m. Awakened

7:1+0 a.m. Fourth tilt table procedure and brief medical

examination

8:00 a.m. Breakfast

9:00 to 11:00 a.m. Self-debriefing

2:00 to 5:00 p.m. Technical debriefing

7:00 to 9:00 p.m. Medical debriefing

May 18 1:00 p.m. Left recovery ship

May 20 9:00 a.m. e. s. t. Comprehensive postflight medical examination at

Patrick Air Force Base, Florida

To convert times to e.s.t., add 6 hours

 Page 7-39

TABLE 7.1.^.2-1.- RECORD OF PILOT'S WEIGHT CHANGES

During the J-^eek period prior to flight, the pilot's maximum weight was
1^9r lb and his minimum weight was 1^6 l"b. His weight on launch morning
!
was 1^7 lb and his weight on the recovery ship was 139r It.

Date Activity Duration, hr Weight loss, lb

Pre flight

January 5, 19^3 Altitude -chamber spacecraft 9 3-5

checkout procedure

April 23, 1963 Flight simulation 7 2.0

May 8, 1963 Launch simulation 8| 3.0

May 10, 1963 Flight simulation 6 2.0

May 14, 1963 Canceled launch 8 1-3

Flight

May 15/16, 1963 Orbital flight 7-75

COMTDDFriTAL
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 Page 7 - 4l

TABLE 7.1.5.3-1.- BLOOD CHEMISTRIES

JA11 "values must be reverified

May 16, 1963 May 17, 1963 May 20,

Determi- March 12, May 8, May 12, May 1^, Landing + 24
nation 1963 landing + 2— 1963
1963 1963 1963 hours
hours
a
Calcium, k.YI 4.28 l|.60 U.22 4.67 4.56 4.22
mEq./l

Chloride, 105 106 100 104 104 102 104

mEq/1

Protein 6.0 6-3 6.0 6.6 6-3 6.2 6.2

(total),
g/100 ml

Pho sphorous , 4.2 3-5 u.u k.h 4.5 4.0 3-4

mg/100 ml

Sodium 153 151 161 14U 153 147 146

mEq./l

Potassium, k.6 4.6 5.1* 5-2 5-2 5-0 4.9

mEq./l

This value is particularly in question.

page T - ^2 tJONFIDENTIAL

7.2 Pilot Performance

7.2.1 Preflight training.-

7.2.1.1 Spacecraft checkout activities: Intensive participation in

the preflight checkout activities enabled the pilot to be-
come familiar with the MA-9 spacecraft and launch-vehicle
systems. Participation in these activities was particularly
important because the pilot had the opportunity to operate
and to become familiar with the characteristics of the modi-
fied systems and switching procedures peculiar to his own
spacecraft. Table 7*2.1.1-1 summarizes the checkout activi-
ties in which he spent 73 hours and 50 minutes in the space-
craft. This table does not include the many hours spent
by the pilot in preparation, troubleshooting, monitoring
tests as an outside observer, and posttest analysis. In
addition, as backup to Astronaut Schirra, the pilot spent
approximately ^0 hours in the MA-8 spacecraft, which added
to his knowledge of the Mercury spacecraft in general.

7.2.1.2 Flight simulation training activities: Table 7.2.1.2-1

summarizes the training activities on the Cape Canaveral
procedures trainer from March 15 to May 13, 1963* The pilot
spent 33 hours and 30 minutes on the trainer accomplishing
^3 turnaround maneuvers, 62 simulated manual retrofires,
8l simulated systems failures, and 28 manual reentries. In
addition, the pilot spent approximately 20 hours on the pro-
cedures trainer during the MA-8 preflight period.

The pilot spent the majority of his time during these sessions
on the detection and circumvention of simulated systems failures
and various mission anomalies which would require an abort
during the launch phase of the flight. The pilot concentrated
on these areas because of their critical importance and because
the procedures trainer is best equipped to simulate these
phases of the mission. He did, however, spend approximately
one-third of his time during these training sessions on the
normal flight activities specified in the flight plan and
practicing of retrofire and reentry attitude and rate control
maneuvers. The pilot also participated in several launch
abort and network simulations during which mission rules and
operational procedures were extensively used and reviewed.

7.2.1.3 Flying proficiency: Throughout the preflight training period,

the pilot continued to maintain flying proficiency in high-
performance aircraft. He logged 6k hours and 35 minutes in
flying time from January 1 to May 10, 1963 (see table 7.2.1.3-1),
Flying high-performance aircraft is an important complement to
the more direct space-flight preparation activities on the
static trainers, because it requires the pilot to maintain the

COMTDONTIAlr
 Page

ability to make quick and accurate analyses and decisions under

actual operational conditions.

7.2.1.U Systems and operational briefings: The pilot received two

series of formal systems briefings which were oriented as
much as possible toward the operational requirements of the
mission. The first series of briefings required 3 days time
during which each spacecraft subsystem was extensively re-
viewed, while the second series required only 1 day since
its purpose was to review recent spacecraft systems
modifications.

The pilot received two series of briefings on inflight

experiments, each series requiring 1 day to complete. During
these presentations'1 the experiment, its purpose, its associated
equipment, and the operational procedures were discussed, final-
ized, and integrated into the flight plan. In addition, the
pilot spent many more hours with various systems and operations
personnel on an informal basis in order to establish optimal
operational procedures.

7.2.1.5 Preflight-operations schedule: Table 7-2.1.5-1 summarizes

the major activities in which the pilot was involved from
January 2, 1963, until launch. In addition to the large
amount of time spent in briefings, spacecraft checkout
activities, flying, and on the procedures trainers, the
pilot was also able to take part in several special training
activities. Among these activities were four sessions at the
Morehead Planetarium, during which he reviewed the celestial
sphere and participated in a simulation of the flashing light
experiment; acceleration refamiliarization in the Johnsville
centrifuge; and recovery and egress training and survival-
equipment exercises.

7-2.1.6 Training analysis: The pilot, like his predecessor, con-

centrated his major effort in learning the spacecraft' s
systems and their operational characteristics. The pilot
achieved a high level of skill on the procedures trainer
in coping with systems failures and operational anomalies.
Particular concentration was placed in developing proce-
dures for accomplishing inflight activities with a minimal
expenditure of onboard consumables. The pilot practiced
these activities on the trainers only after he knew each
system or operation extremely well and all spacecraft sys-
tem modifications had been completed.

He also obtained considerable practice in performing man-

ually such tasks as the turnaround, retrofire, and reentry
maneuvers by using the attitude and rate indicators. A good
understanding of the spacecraft's control systems was provided

CONFIDENTIAL
page 7 - ^ * CONFIDENTIAL

through systems briefing and the use of the transparent

gyro simulatior; and the yaw-recognition trainer helped
him to prepare for those inflight activities, such as
gyro realinement and- flight maneuvering with the use of
external references, that are not properly simulated on
the Cape Canaveral procedures trainer. The pilot reported
that the' one inflight experience for which he was not well
prepared was the out-the-window view. Since this view can-
not be easily simulated, it was a novel experience to the
pilot and did cause him some distraction, but it was not
a major problem.

Because of experience gained from past Mercury flights, a

fairly long preflight period, and a diligent and intensive
training program, the pilot reported, and the results verify,
that>he was very well prepared for this flight. He reported
that, in general, there was a proper proportion of training
effort placed upon the different aspects of his mission. The
only significant areas of pilot preflight preparation that the
pilot believed could be improved or supplemented were:

1. An earlier finalization of systems and attendant

operational procedures

2. Additional improved external-reference simulations

3- Additional training on the recognition and observa-

tion of celestial bodies

k. Less egress training through the top hatch

5. Somewhat more concentration on normal as opposed

to emergency procedures during the simulation of the launch
phase of the mission on the procedures trainer

7.2.2 Flight-plan activities.-

7-2.2.1 Flight-plan description and results: The flight plan was

designed so that the operational test requirements and
approved experiments could be accomplished within a 22-pass
mission. The duration of the mission required the scheduling
of an 8-hour sleep-rest period.

The mission was separated into four phases with go-no-go

decisions at the end of the 1st, 7"th, and l6th orbital passes.
In order to conserve consumables and still accomplish all of
the operational and experimental objectives, the pilot was
to refrain from using the automatic stabilization and control
system (ASCS) bus and allow the spacecraft to drift for long
periods of time. The turnaround maneuver was scheduled to be
 Page 7 -

accomplished manually by the pilot; however, the retrofire

and reentry events were to be controlled by the automatic
control system.

The pilot's adherence to the flight plan was excellent, and

almost all of the flight activities were completed as planned.
Table 7.2.2.1-1 presents a summary of the major events that
occurred during the flight. Up to the time at which a fail-
ure involving the automatic stabilization and control system
0.05g relay circuit and the subsequent loss of all ASCS
a-c power occurred, all of the major planned events were
accomplished at approximately the programed times. Thereafter,
the pilot concentrated primarily on checking out the status of
systems and isolating the malfunctions that had occurred. How-
ever, he still managed to complete most of the flight-plan
activities that were scheduled after the malfunctions were
noted.

The first phase of the mission was accomplished as planned and

all systems were thoroughly checked out with the exception of
the fly-by-wire (PBW) high thrusters. A decision was made to
proceed into the second phase of the mission at the end of the
1st orbital pass.

The second phase was accomplished as planned. The flashing

light was deployed at 3:25:38 and shortly thereafter the
ASCS a-c bus was powered down. Although the pilot did not
observe the flashing beacon during the first night phase
after deployment, he was able to make several observations
during the next two night phases. The telemetry mode of
the TV transmitter was checked over Hawaii and California
during the 3^1 orbital pass, and the pilot sent continuous-
wave code signals to Bermuda during the ^th orbital pass.
At 6:22:00, the pilot turned the cabin fan and cabin-coolant
flow off, powered up the ASCS a-c bus, and returned the space-
craft to ASCS control. At about 8:21:00, the pilot returned
to FBW-low and pitched down for observation of the ground
light. After successfully completing this experiment, the
spacecraft was returned to ASCS control. At about 09:00:00
the pilot returned to FEW-low and at 9:01:00 and 9:07:00,
he attempted without success to deploy the tethered balloon.
He then returned the spacecraft to ASCS control and continued
to check out the spacecraft systems in preparation for the
decision to proceed with the third phase of the flight.

A go decision was made at 10:00:00, and the ASCS a-c bus

was powered down at 10:26:36. Shortly before the start
of the rest period, the pilot took some general purpose
photographs, had a meal, and checked the manual pro-
portional and FEW-low control modes. His sleep-rest period
lasted from about 1J:50:00 to 21:23:00, at which time the
pilot reported to Muchea. At approximately 23:30:00, the
pilot powered up the ASCS a-c bus, checked manual pro-
portional and then alined the spacecraft by using FBW-low.
He then went to ASCS control for another checkout of the
systems and to prepare for the dim-light-phenomena photo-
graphs. This experiment, as well as the horizon-definition
quadrant photographs, was completed on schedule.

The systems were checked prior to the decision to proceed

into the fourth and final phase of the flight, and the ASCS
a-c bus was powered down at about 25:17:00- The pilot con-
tinued with the flight plan and completed moon-earth limb
and the infrared weather photography as scheduled.

At 28:3^:3^; "the 0.05g relay circuit latched in; however,

the pilot continued with the flight plan with the exception
of those activities requiring ASCS control. He performed
the first half of the HF antenna test on schedule. The ASCS
a-c bus was powered up twice after the 0.05g light illumin-
ated and the pilot made checks which verified that the attitude
gyros had been lost. However, these checks revealed that the
auxiliary damping mode was functioning properly and that ASCS
could be used during reentry. As a result of the loss of the
attitude gyros, the pilot did not take the horizon-definition
photographs.

The cabin fan and the cabin-coolant flow were turned back on
at 32:05:00, and the pilot stowed the onboard equipment shortly
thereafter. At about 33:07:00 planned use of the ASCS for re-
entry was abandoned when it became evident that all ASCS a-c power
had been lost. The pilot did not check out the FBW-high
thrusters prior to retrofire as ASCS problems were receiving
his primary attention during this period. The retrofire,
retropackage jettison, and reentry events were all initiated
and controlled manually by the pilot. He momentarily checked
his FBW-high thrusters subsequent to retropackage jettison;
but he was unable to detect proper high-thruster action and there-
fore elected to control the spacecraft, during reentry by
using FEW, high and low, and manual proportional simultaneously.
The pilot was able to control the reentry manually by using this
"double-authority" control, and the remainder of the descent
was normal.

The pilot managed the operation of the telemetry system, the

C-band beacon, and the S-band beacon throughout the mission
according to the scheduled program. He completed all but
three of the short status and consumable reports which were
 Page ? -

programed for approximately once per orbital pass except

during the rest period, and he completed all three of the
planned long status reports.

7.2.2.2 Operational equipment: The pilot was provided with food,

drinking water, and equipment designed to obtain quantitative
data during experiments, operational information in case
communications were lost, and information which might aid
him in completing normal and emergency operating procedures.
These items were stored in three locations: a special equip-
ment storage kit to the right of the pilot's shoulder, a
specially shaped container with a writing-desk lid that could
be pushed out of the way or pulled up into the pilot's lap,
and the instrument panel storage compartment.

The space in the equipment kit was devoted entirely to experi-

mental equipment and food. (See fig. 7-2.2.2-1.) As in
previous manned orbital flights, the pilot reported extreme
difficulty in locating, acquiring, and stowing items in this
container. Because of the limited space available, a more
suitable location has not yet been found.

Equipment stowed in the writing desk (see fig. 7-2.2.2-2)

was accessible, with the exception of the small standard
light source which could not be dislodged from its velcro
attachment point between two of the desk's structural ribs.
In addition, the desk's position when extended was too close
to the pilot's lap during weightless flight. The desk contained
equipment for experiments and observations, food, and two items
of considerable operational value to the pilot, the navi-
gation booklet and the star navigation charts. The naviga-
tion booklet contained a map in two sections, each covering
the orbital ground track of 11 passes with ground-elapsed-time
marks at 1-minute intervals. The map sections included informa-
tion relating to primary- and contingency-recovery and
tracking-station locations. The booklet also contained the
world-wide weather forecast map; the nominal and "red-line"
curves for automatic and manual fuel usage, oxygen consumption,
and recording-tape expenditure; a table of nominal retrosequence
times; normal, emergency, and experiment checklists; and a
special list of abbreviated continuous-wave Morse code signals.
The star navigation charts were so constructed that a slide
mechanism could be positioned by timing marks to provide a
star-field picture equivalent to the window view with the
spacecraft at attitudes of 0° in roll and yaw and from 0° to
-3^-° in pitch.
Page 7-^8

The panel compartment was used for storing two small experi-
mental items, the wrist mirror and the continuous flight-plan
strip on its holder. The flight-plan strip contained columns
of information consisting of continent passage, tape-recorder
switching, telemetry switching, star-chart reference times
with day-night overlays, control-mode switching, communication-
and tracking-station passage, elapsed time from lift-off, and
other pertinent remarks and comments. During flight, the panel
compartment was also used as a general-purpose storage area be-
cause of its convenient location. As on previous flights, the
equipment was held in its stowed position with velcro strips,
and as added convenience, the inside of the hatch was covered
with velcro to hold items when they were neither being used
nor required to be in their stowed positions. A list of all
the equipment is given in table 7-2.2.2-1 showing the stowage
location during launch. The flight plan and its holder are
shown in figure 7.2.2.2-3.

7.2.3 Spacecraft attitude control.-

7.2.3.1 Turnaround maneuver: The purpose in accomplishing a manual

turnaround maneuver by using FBW-low is to conserve control
fuel. If the flight were proceeding normally, the maneuver
was to be executed at a leisurely pace by using a 3°/sec to
4°/sec yaw rate and relying solely on the rate and attitude
indicators.

Figure 7-2.3.1-1 shows the turnaround-maneuver flight gyro

attitudes, together with those during three maneuvers on the
procedures trainer. The turnaround was accomplished about
the yaw and roll axes essentially as it had been practiced
on the trainer. The only deviation was in pitch attitude
and can be explained as follows. There exists approximately
a 10-percent thrust coupling, which is caused by the location
of the 1-pound thrusters, between the pitch and yaw axes.
Therefore, when the pilot puts in a left-yaw rate of 3°/secJ
it normally will result in a pitch rate of -0.3°/sec, which
had indeed occurred on the trainer. However, on the trainer
the initial pitch attitude is normally very close to 0°,
whereas the initial inflight gyro pitch attitude was a -9°.
In the flight situation, the attitude moved from the -9° to
a +9° indicated pitch attitude as a result of the spacecraft
being yawed 180° in the absence of thrust coupling. This
factor, therefore, tended to cancel out the -0.3°/sec pitch
rate, resulting from the thruster coupling, and left the space-
craft at approximately 0° in pitch attitude at completion of the
turnaround maneuver. The pilot had been informed by the ground
that he had a good insertion, and that it was not at all imper-
ative that the spacecraft be pitched down to retroattitude;
 CNTIAL Page 7 -

therefore, he chose to observe and photograph the launch-vehicle

sustainer stage prior to assuming orbit attitude.

The pilot reported that the maneuver felt just as it had on

the procedures trainer and he used the rate and attitude indi-
cators in accomplishing it. The maneuver required 0.2 pound
of control fuel. This value is approximately 5 percent of
the control fuel typically required by the ASCS during an
automatic turnaround maneuver.

7.2.3.2 Gyro realinement maneuvers: The gyros were realined with

the spacecraft on three different occasions. Table 7-2.3.2-1
gives the time required and the fuel used for each of these
maneuvers. The first two maneuvers were performed by using
FBW-low; however, the third realinement was accomplished in
part with FBW-low and the remainder with manual proportional.
In the two cases in which data are available, there were virtu-
ally no errors between the scanner and gyro readouts in pitch
and roll when the scanner first came on the line. The data
also indicate that yaw was in good alinement at the completion
of both maneuvers. During the alinement periods, the space-
craft rates were held to l°/sec or less, and this reduced
rate probably accounts in part for the small amount of auto-
matic-system fuel which was used. All three realinement
maneuvers were accomplished on the day side of the orbit;
however, the astronaut performed an equivalent maneuver on
the last night phase of the mission, apparently with good
results. The results indicate that realinement of the gyros
to the true spacecraft attitude is easy on the day side. Re-
alinement on the night side is not difficult but requires a
longer time period than on the day side. That the pilot was
able to accomplish these maneuvers so accurately and with so
little fuel usage can partially be attributed to the fact
that the spacecraft gyros, for the first time, could be re-
alined while at the -3^° position in pitch.

7.2.3.3 Drifting flight: The pilot spent approximately 4 3 percent

of the orbital phase in attitude-free drifting flight with
the gyros caged and with no control-system operation. He also
spent another 39 percent of the flight with the gyros caged,
but he used either the manual proportional or the FBW-low con-
trol mode at infrequent intervals. The pilot reported during
the flight and in subsequent postflight debriefings that
drifting flight presented no problems either with respect
to his orientation or use of the spacecraft systems. He
reported that drifting flight was very pleasant, and the
realization that he was conserving electrical power and control
fuel was comforting to him. He also commented that, during
page 7 - 50
drifting flight, there were long periods with no observable
spacecraft rates on the indicators and also periods when rates
1°
of -^ /sec were present. The highest attitude rates during
drifting flight seemed to predominate in roll, but did alter-
nate between axes.

7.2.3.4 Yaw-attitude determination: Determination of yaw attitudes

and rates in daylight was reported to be quite easily accom-
plished, even when only a small portion of the earth was in
view through the window. The pilot felt confident that he
could accurately aline the spacecraft directly towards or
away from his direction of motion over the ground within 1°.
At the 90° position, that is, perpendicular to the direction
of travel, he believed that his accuracy might be degraded to
±10°. He therefore chose to use his attitude indicators when-
ever a precise 90° Yaw maneuver was required. The instrumenta-
tion system does not indicate yaw attitude directly; however,
analyses of horizon-scanner outputs after each uncaging maneuver
and return to ASCS orbit mode suggests that the pilot had deter-
mined the proper yaw attitude to within 5°. The pilot used
several visual cues to determine yaw attitudes and rates dur-
ing daylight, such as the "streaming" by of terrain features,
cloud patterns, or both, the convergence point of these flow
lines, and the tracking of terrestrial objects or cloud promi-
nences across the window. The view through the window kept
the pilot constantly aware of his rapid motion over the ground,
and he reported absolutely no difficulty in orienting quickly
to retroattitude.

The pilot reported that yaw-attitude determination at night

was not difficult, although it usually required a longer period
of time, particularly in the absence of good external visual
cues. The determination of yaw attitude at night was accom-
plished in two different ways. When the moon was illuminating
the earth and if the pilot was sufficiently dark-adapted, he
used the motion of terrestrial and cloud features to find the
points directly approaching or receding along the spacecraft's
ground track, just as in the daytime. In some cases lighted
cities or the glow of their illumination through thin cloud
decks provided a good reference for observing their direction
of relative motion, even without moonlight, for yaw attitude
determination at night.

The second method of determining yaw attitude at night was used

during periods when ground objects were not visible. In this
situation, the star field was the pilot's only source of in-
formation for finding yaw attitude," and more time was required
 Page 7 - 5 1

to find identifiable stars and constellations. He found the

star charts to "be invaluable for identification and for re-
establishing his yaw attitude by using stars near the plane
of the spacecraft's orbit. Star recognition was complicated
by the restrictive field of viev through the spacecraft window,
but prominent groupings of stars were periodically available
during the early part of the night phase before moonrise.

The pilot's inflight reports and postflight comments of stars

in view during the first night after deployment of the flashing
light indicated that he may have been some 30° to the right of
his intended position while searching for the light. However,
this was his first attempt to aline l80° in yaw at night and
had the added complication of the reversal of the normal
orbital attitude shown on the star charts. He accredited
his prompt observation of the beacon just at sunset of the
subsequent night phase to the easier task of accurately
alining the spacecraft during daylight towards the beacon's
expected position. It should be noted that the pilot expertly
performed his most critical night yaw alinement, that for retro-
fire, without attitude indications by using star and ground
references only.

A convenient method of yaw determination was put forward

by the pilot after observing the relative motion of the so-
called fireflies, which he and pilots of all previous orbital
missions have reported as having seen. The luminous particles,
which appeared to emanate from the thrusters, were observed
to move outward from the spacecraft, then to recede back along
the spacecraft's trajectory in the manner of a contrail, re-
maining visible for many seconds. The pilot suggested that
by positioning the spacecraft relative to the motion of these
particles, an accurate determination of the 0° pitch positions
might be possible.

Retrofire: It was originally planned to have the pilot use

ASCS control during the retrofire period, with the manual
proportional control system ready as a backup, if necessary.
As a result of the loss of ASCS power, the pilot was required
to initiate manually the retrofire event and to control the
spacecraft during the retrofire period by using the rate gyro
indicators and the view of the earth through the window as his
attitude references.

The pilot, realizing that he would be conducting the retro-

fire maneuver shortly after sunrise of the final daylight
phase, oriented and maintained the spacecraft near retro-
attitude throughout the last night period. He made very
small attitude corrections by using stars and clouds as
Page 7-52

references. Other than a brief period immediately after

sunrise during which the pilot could not see through the
window because of frost and glare, the pilot was well pre-
pared for retrofire. He had accomplished the stowage and
preretrosequence checklists well in advance of their sched-
uled times. During the retrofire maneuver, the pilot used
the manual proportional control mode and cross-checked be-
tween his rate indicators and the view through the window.
Because of a high contrast between the relative brightness
of his interior and exterior references, the pilot experi-
enced difficulty in adapting his vision while shifting from
one reference to the other. Consequently he had to shade
his eyes with his left hand when attempting to view his
rate indicators. In spite of this problem,, as well as the
fact that he never had the opportunity to practice retro-
fire maneuvers with this combination of attitude references,
the pilot was able to maintain excellent control of his space-
craft, as evidenced by the nominal trajectory and accuracy in
landing position.

Figure 7-2.3-5 -1 gives the spacecraft's attitude rates and

attitudes, which were calculated from an integration of the
spacecraft rates during the retrofire period. The calculated
attitudes and the initial attitudes at the beginning of the
retrofire were further verified by reentry trajectory com-
putation. The pilot controlled rates extremely well, particu-
larly in pitch, which is the most critical axis. Rate control
was maintained within ±2°/sec In pitch and roll attitudes and
within ±5°/sec in yaw attitude throughout 19 seconds of the
22-second retrofire period and during the time when practi-
cally all of the decrease in velocity was effected. As the
pilot reported, the maximum misalinement torque of approxi-
mately ko to 50 foot-pounds produced by the retrorockets
appears to have occurred in left yaw when the number two retro-
rocket was ignited. This value is between one-third and
one-half of the manual proportional control response capa-
bility.

The pilot maintained good control of spacecraft attitudes,

with a maximum deviation of -12° occurring in roll at the
completion of the retrofire event. Attitude deviations in
pitch and yaw were negligible, as far as the reentry tra-
jectory and landing accuracy are concerend. The maximum
yaw attitude deviation was 5% and the maximum pitch devia-
tion was 9°} which occurred very late in the retrofire period.
The pilot maintained the pitch attitude near the nominal ~^>k°
position or slightly lower, a direction of deviation which least
affects the reentry trajectory.
 ICNTTCAL Page 7 - 53

7.2.3-6 Reentry: Because of the loss of the ASCS power, the pilot
was required to position the spacecraft manually to the proper
reentry attitude by using external visual reference to insert
manually the proper roll rate, and to damp manually the reentry
rate oscillations. The pilot checked his FEW control mode
shortly before the nominal time for the 0.05g event and was
not satisfied that the high thrusters were working properly.
He, therefore, elected to control reentry rate oscillations
by using both the manual proportional and the FEW control
systems; thereby, U9 pounds of thrust capability was made
available to him about the pitch and yaw axes.

The pilot maintained the earth horizon in the window for

attitude reference until shortly before the nominal time for
0.05g. He then allowed the spacecraft to pitch up slowly to
reentry attitude and reduced his angular rates to near zero.
During the early portion of the reentry, he was easily able
to damp the small and rather slow oscillations by using FBW-low
thrusters and the manual proportional control mode. At approxi-
mately 1 minute and 30 seconds prior to peak reentry deceler-
ation, the pilot inadvertently actuated the IW-high yaw thruster.
This actuation resulted in almost ^9 pounds of thrusting and
added to the amplitude of the oscillations. He brought them
back under good control within a 1-minute period and main-
tained positive control of the oscillations through drogue
parachute deployment. The pilot had no further difficulties
in controlling the reentry oscillations except for a brief
period during maximum deceleration. He was unable to manipu-
late the control handle at this time because the g-forces
pulled his arm away from the control handle and into a trough
on the arm rest.

The maximum frequency of oscillation occurred at peak deceler-

ation and lasted on the order of 0.9 second. Maximum rates
were approximately ±159/sec or 20°/sec, with a maximum ampli-
tude of approximately ±10° in both pitch and yaw which occurred
just after the peak deceleration period. The pilot reported
that he believed he needed dual authority control to be effective
during this reentry period.

7.2.k Systems management and operational procedures.-

7-2.^.1 Control system utilization and switching: Table 7.2.U.1-1

and table 7-2.2.2-1 show control-mode usage and switching
during the flight. In general, control system usage was al-
most identical to the planned rate until the 0.05g relay pre-
maturely latched, with a subsequent loss of ASCS power. The
pilot was able to perform even more maneuvering during the
Page

period than scheduled "because of this effective and frugal

use of control fuel. Following the failure of the amplifier-
calibrator, the pilot was required to deviate somewhat from
the planned control-mode schedule, and for the remainder of
the mission manual proportional or FEW was used for space-
craft control.

The pilot was highly successful in switching from the manual

proportional and FEW to ASCS control. The orientation high-
thruster mode was never inadvertently actuated. The pilot
alined the spacecraft manually to the proper orbital attitude
on eight occasions during the flight. The spacecraft always
passed through orientation low before dropping into orbit
mode. The -maximum excursion that was evident during periods
of switching from manual to automatic control was 5° in atti-
1°
tude and ~z /sec in rate.

The pilot's utilization of the manual proportional control

mode was much better than what was expected, based on the
previous flight results. By making very rapid hand-controller
motions in this mode, he was able to produce a thrust level
which was much less than the expected level of approximately
^ pounds. The performance of the manual proportional control
system, by using this technique, compared very favorably with
the performance of the FB¥-low system both with respect to
fuel usage and fine attitude control. The manual proportional
control mode was utilized during the last orbital pass for
alinement and attitude hold prior to retrofire, during which
slightly more than 2 pounds of manual fuel was expended.

The pilot did not at any time inadvertently use double author-
ity during the mission. The only time double authority was
used was for damping the reentry oscillations. This choice
was made because the pilot was not satisfied that the FBW-high
thrusters were working properly, and he therefore elected to
use FB¥ as a backup to the manual proportional control system.

7-2.h-,2 Conservation on consumables: The consumables of which the

pilot could directly affect the usage were control system fuel,
electrical power, and onboard tape-recording capability. Since
the use of these consumables, particularly the first two, is
important to the successful completion of the mission, their
use was carefully programed prior to flight to allow a suf-
ficient reserve in the event of a procedural change during
the mission.
 COMriDEMlAL Page 7 - 55
The fuel usage throughout the entire flight is shown in
figure 7.2.IK2-1, and the fuel usage for specific maneuvers
is shown in table 7-2.J.2-1. A comparison of the fuel used
during flight with the predicted usage shows that the actual
fuel remaining stayed above the predicted curve until approxi-
mately 23:30:00. The actual fuel remaining was never more
than 2 pounds below the predicted curve and was always well
above the minimum fuel levels required to continue with a
normal flight plan. The pilot used between one-third and
one-tenth of the predicted fuel for individual maneuvers.
This effective use of fuel allowed him to perform a large
number of additional maneuvers, particularly those associated
with taking general-purpose photographs.
The pilot followed very closely the planned program for
electrical-power consumption. The ASCS bus was powered
down and up, as scheduled, throughout the mission until
the failure of the amplifier-calibrator. Following this
failure, the pilot powered up the ASCS bus on two occasions
in an attempt to isolate and identify the problem. He then
completed the remainder of the mission with the ASCS bus
powered down to prevent further short circuiting. The pro-
gram for other power-consuming equipment, such as the radar
beacons, telemetry transmitter, and television system, were
followed almost exactly as planned throughout the flight.
The tape recorder was programed to meet two requirements: to
record data during the more important phases of the mission
and to record medical data continuously, beginning with re-
entry and lasting until approximately 2 hours after landing.
Although the pilot followed the tape program quite closely,
some important data were lost early in the flight as a
result of the recorder being in the "program" position in-
stead of the "continuous" position, as had been planned. The
pilot did follow the remainder of the tape program very well
and had approximately 25 percent of the tape supply remaining
after landing. (See fig. 7*2.^.2-2.) However, the amount of
tape remaining was greater than expected primarily because of
a failure that occurred in the programer during the rest
period and because the pilot used the vox-record mode less
than expected.

7.2.4.3 Power-up and power-down procedure: The pilot's accomplish-

ment of the power-up and power-down exercises of the ASCS
inverter was excellent. He performed these procedures six
times prior to the loss of the inverter which occurred during the
21st orbital pass. It was required that ASCS control mode
be switched from the automatic position and the gyros be
caged before powering up or down. After powering up, it

TOEMTIAL
7 - 56 GOPfFIDEfTTlAr
was recommended that at least 5 minutes be allowed for the
gyros to achieve a good operating speed prior to uncaging.
In all cases the pilot switched properly and allowed more
than 7 minutes after powering up before uncaging the gyros.

Experiments procedures and performance: The flashing light

was deployed on schedule and was within acceptable limits in
attitude. The pilot achieved a good retroattitude and then
pitched up at 0.5°/sec. The beacon was deployed at a space-
craft pitch attitude of -20° ±1°. At that time the roll
attitude was 3% the yaw attitude was 8% and attitude rates
were very near zero. The subsequent power down and yaw maneu-
ver to observe the flashing beacon were completed as planned;
however, a possible error in yaw determination during the
first night observation probably caused the pilot to miss
this sighting. Thereafter, the flashing-light observations
were completed exactly as planned.

Six of the ten planned radiation measurements were accomplished

as scheduled. The final two measurements were not attempted
because of more pressing operational problems beginning with
the early actuation of the 0.05g relay. The other two measure-
ments which were not taken as planned were overlooked by the
pilot; the first during an attempt to sight the flashing beacon,
and the second while he was encountering difficulties with the
condensate transfer system.

The ground-light observation was completed on the 6th orbital

pass generally as planned. Continuous recording during this
experiment was not initiated;, and as a result no analysis of
attitudes and rates was possible.

The balloon experiment failed for technical reasons, but the

two attempts by the pilot to position the spacecraft for de-
ploying the balloon could be readily analyzed for performance.
During deployment, the spacecraft was to be held as close to
zero rates and attitudes as possible to allow the balloon
to trail directly rearward along the trajectory. On the first
attempt to deploy the balloon, attitudes and rates were es-
sentially zero. During the second attempt, rates were zero
with attitudes of 8Q in pitch, 5° in yaw, and 0° in roll. In
both instances, all switch functions were correct and con-
ducted in the proper sequence, including the setting up of
the l6-mm movie camera.

The pilot was very conscientious in correctly performing the

dim-light-phenomenon experiment. Maneuvering for this experi-
ment consisted of alining yaw on the setting sun while holding
pitch at -3^-% caging the gyros, and going to the gyro-free
position. A roll maneuver of 3^° was then required to aline
 CONFIDENTIAL Page 7 - 57

the pitch plane of the spacecraft with the plane of the ecliptic
for the first series of zodiacal-light photographs. The space-
craft was held by the ASCS in this special alinement by first
caging the gyros and then switching to the gyro-free position
with pitch torquing on. At the conclusion of the zodiacal-light
photographs, the gyros were switched to the "slave" position,
which allowed the horizon scanners to return the space-
craft slowly to its normal orbital attitude.

The pilot accomplished all maneuvers and switching as planned.

Using FBW-low, he yawed over to the setting sun; however, he
was not satisfied with his alinement and introduced a correction.
The 3^-° roll maneuver was difficult to monitor on the instru-
ments because of the bright sunlight streaming directly into
the window. After uncaging, the roll angle was set in correctly.
Since the roll maneuver had introduced a yaw component, the
pilot adjusted yaw attitude before the final gyro caging and
uncaging and then went to ASCS control for holding on the
ecliptic plane. After completing the zodiacal-light photo-
graphs, the pilot switched the gyros to "slave" and corrected
the spacecraft back to the normal orbital attitude. For best
photographic results, the cockpit was completely darkened;
thus, it was necessary to count to himself to obtain the correct
exposure times and intervals between photographs. He performed
this entire experiment in an exceptionally efficient manner.
Shortly after the dim-light photography, the pilot executed
a series of yaw maneuvers to accomplish the horizon-definition
photography. The pilot used the gyro indicators selectively
to locate precisely the 90° positions in yaw. The maneuvers
were completed as planned and required 8 minutes during which
time only 0.255 pound of control fuel was used.

The U. S. Weather Bureau infrared photography was performed

during drifting flight, with small manual proportional control
inputs occasionally applied to help in alining on the more
interesting cloud features. The pilot's very conservative
fuel usage and low-order control inputs in utilizing this
control mode indicated a very refined manual technique and
skill.

In spite of the 0.05g-relay problem, the pilot completed one

HF antenna test with good results. The pilot also photographed
interesting terrain features, and again the technique and pro-
cedures used reflect quite favorably on the pilot's performance.

CONFIDENTIAL
Page 7 - 58 ~ COftTFID

7.2.^.5 Pilot performance summary: The pilot's inflight performance

can be summarized as a conscientious adherence to the planned
tasks, as well as the application of proper corrective actions
when system or operational problems occurred. The pilot was
in complete control of every situation throughout the flight,
and he exhibited smooth piloting abilities. He completed his
inflight activities almost exactly as they were scheduled,
even though adjustment of the suit environmental circuit plagued
him constantly throughout the flight. The program of scientific
experiments, until pre-empted by system difficulties, was con-
ducted very satisfactorily. The premature 0.05g function
engrossed the pilot with critical operational considerations
in order to complete the flight successfully, and these con-
siderations took precedence over nonoperational activities.
Thereafter, the pilot elected to perform only those flight-
plan tasks which would not complicate or interfere with
management of the malfunctioning systems. Switching was both
'timely and accurate throughout the flight. Emergency switching
after the 0.05g telelite illumination and ASCS inverter problems
became evident was excellent. Some switching in noncritical
areas was overlooked occasionally, but usually because the
pilot was concentrating on more important tasks. Both his
technique and fuel usage during manual control were commend-
able. The pilot's use of the'manual proportional control mode
was so excellent as to warrant a reappraisal of the value of
this system. Control systems checks were accomplished quickly,
in less than 1 minute per system on the average, and each check
required only approximately 0.02 pound of fuel. The pilot con-
sistently used less than the expected amounts of consumables;
and, in the absence of the system malfunctions which were ex-
perienced, he would, as planned, have had more than enough con-
sumable quantities to accomplish easily all of the many flight
activities.

CONriDDMTIAfc
 JVF1DEIVTIAL
" -
Page 7 - 5 9

TABLE 7.2.1.1-1.- PILOT TIME IN SPACECRAFT 20 DURING

HANGAR AND LAUNCH COMPLEX TESTS

Date Test description

Duration,
hr:min
Oct. 11 to Integrated systems tests 06:45
19, 1962

Nov. 11, 1962 RCS - hangar 03=15

Jan. 5, 1963 Altitude chamber 06:^5
Jan. 12 and TV systems test 07:00
Mar. 1, 1963

Mar. k, Ik, 15, Communications systems radiation test 04:^5

1963

Mar. 19, 1963 Darkness and egress 01:20

Mar. 20, 21, 22, Simulated flight, hangar 12:10

1963

April U, 1963 Prepad RCS test 00:50

April 18, 1963 Alinement, weight, and balance 0^:00

April 23, 1963 Systems test and simulated flight no. 1 0^:00

April 2^, 1963 Electrical mate 0^:30

May 3, 1963 Mark instrument normal and emergency limits 00:^5

May 6, 1963 Flight configuration sequence and abort 03:00

May 8, 1963 Launch simulation and RF compatibility 05:00

May 10, 1963 Systems test and simulated flight no. 3 03:^5

May 14, 1963 Countdovn (canceled) 06:00

Total 73:50

CONFIDENTIAL
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 Page T - 6l

TABLE 7.2.1.3-!.- FLYING TIME FROM JANUARY 1 TO LAUNCH DATE

Date, 1963 Type aircraft Hr:min Date Type aircraft Hr:min

Jan. 2 TF-102A 2:00 Mar. 8 F-102A 3:00

Jan. 10 TF-102A 2:15 Mar. 13 T-33A 1:50

Jan. 12 TF-102A 2:00 Mar. 13 F-102A 2:00

Jan. 18 TF-102A 1:30 Mar. 2^ F-102A 2:15

Jan. 30 F-102A 3:15 Mar. 26 T-35A 2:15

Jan. 31 T-33A U:30 Mar. 27 T-33A 2:15

Feb. 2 T-33A i+:00 Mar. 28 T-33A 2:1*5

Feb. 3 T-33A 2:30 Apr. 5 F-102A 1:30

Feb. 7 T-33A 3:15 Apr. 7 F-102A 2:^5

Feb. 8 T-33A 1:30 Apr. 9 F-102A 2:00

Feb. 12 F-102A 1:1+5 Apr. 15 F-102A 2:15

Feb. 20 F-102A 2:^45 Apr. 18 T-33A 2:30

Feb. 23 T-33A 2:00 May 5 TF-102A 2:00

May 10 F-102 2:00

Total 6^:35

CONriDDMTIAL
 Page 7 - 6 2

TABLE 7.2.1.5-1.- PILOT PKEFLIGHT ACTIVITIES

FROM JANUARY 1, 1963 TO LAUNCH DATE

Date Day Activities

Jan. 2 Wed. Altitude Chamber Systems Test Review,

blood-pressure checkout in altitude
chamber, flying (TF-102A)
Jan. U to 7 Fri. to Tues. Altitude Chamber Systems Test
Jan. 10 Thurs. Flight-plan review, flying (TF-102A)
Jan. 12 Sat. TV systems test, flying (TF-102A)
Jan. 18 and 19 Fri. and Sat. Morehead Planetarium (celestial reviev)
Jan. 21 Mon. Weight and balance
Jan. 22 Tues. Systems briefings (ASCS and RCS)
Jan. 23 Wed. Systems briefings (communications and
sequential)
Jan. 2^ Thurs. Flight- plan and experiments review
Jan. 25 Fri. Systems briefings (electrical and ECS)
Jan. 30 Wed. Flying (F-102A)
Jan. 31 Thurs. Flying (T-J5A)
Feb. 1 Fri. Booster rollout
Feb. 2 Sat. Flying (T-JJA)
Feb. 3 Sun. Flying (T-3JA)
Feb. k Mon. Experiments status review
Feb. 5 Tues. Flight -plan review
Feb. 6 Wed. Couch fitting
Feb. 7 Thurs. Flying (T-JJA)
Feb. 8 Fri. Observation of flashing beacon on T-33A
Feb. 11 Mon. Flight-plan briefing to Deputy Director
for Mission Requirements
Feb. 12 Tues. Flying (F-102A)
Feb. 20 Wed. Flying (F-102A), flight-food testing
Feb. 21 Thurs. Experiments briefings
Feb. 23 Sat. Flying (T-33A)
Mar. 1 Fri. TV systems test
Mar. U Mon. Communication systems radiation test
Mar. 6 Wed. Weight and balance
Mar. 8 Fri. Flying (F-102A)
Mar. 12 Tues. Couch fitting
Mar. 13 Wed. Flying (T-JJA, F-102A)
Mar. lU Thurs. Communication systems radiation test
Mar. 15 Fri. Communication systems radiation test,
Mercury Procedures Trainer
Mar. 19 Tues. Darkness and egress test

Includes only major activities and does not include such activities
as spacecraft reviews, physical exercise, study, monitoring systems test,
informal briefings with operational and systems personnel.
 IENTIAL Page 7-63

TABLE 7.2.1.5-1.- PILOT PREFLIGHT ACTIVITIES FROM

JANUARY 1, 1963 TO LAUNCH DATE - Continued

Date Day Activities

Mar. 20 to 2k Wed. to Sun. Simulated flight (Hangar)
Mar. 2^ Sun. Flying (F-102A)
Mar. 26 Tues. Flying (T-33A)
Mar. 27 Wed. Flying (T-33-M, Mercury Procedures Trainer
Mar. 28 Thurs. Flying (T-33-M, Centrifuge - acceleration
re familiarization
Mar. 29 Fri. Mercury Procedures Trainer
Apr. 1 and 2 Mon. and Tues. Mercury Procedures Trainer
Apr. U Thurs. DOD-NASA MA-9 Review, Prepad RCS test
Apr. 5 Fri. Mercury Procedures Trainer, flying
(TF-102A), Morehead Planetarium
(Celestial review)
Apr. 6 Sat. Morehead Planetarium (Celestial review)
Apr. 7 Sun. Flying (F-102A)
Apr. 9 Tues. Flying (F-102A)
Apr. 10 Wed. Egress and recovery training
Apr. 11 Thurs. Egress and recovery training, survival
pack exercise
Apr. 15 Mon. Flying (F-102A)
Apr. 16 Tues. Mercury Procedures Trainer, mission and
flight controller briefing
Apr. 17 Wed. Mission and flight controller briefing
Apr. 18 Thurs. Alinement, weight, and balance, Mercury
Procedures Trainer
Apr. 19 Fri. Mercury Procedures Trainer
Apr. 22 Mon. Mechanical mate
Apr. 23 Tues. Simulated flight no. 1
Apr. 2}4 Wed. Electrical mate
Apr. 25 Thurs. Mercury Procedures Trainer
Apr. 27 Sat. Mercury Procedures Trainer
Apr. 29 Mon. Yaw demonstration (AF Hangar)
Apr. 30 Tues. Systems briefings (review)
May 1 Wed. Systems and operations examination
May 2 Thurs. Launch simulation, Mission Rules review
May 3 Fri. Examination questionnaire review, marked
spacecraft's normal and emergency
instrument limits
May ^ Sat. Launch simulation
May 5 Sun. Flying (TF-102A)
'4ay 6 ton. Flight configuration sequence and aborts

Includes only major activities and does not include such activities as
spacecraft reviews, physical exercise, study, monitoring systems test, informal
briefings with operational and systems personnel.

CONFIDENTIAL
Page 7 - •CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 7.2.1.5-1.- PILOT PREFLIGHT ACTIVITIES FROM

JANUARY 1, 1963 TO LAUNCH DATE - Concluded

Date Day Activltiesa

May 7 Tues. Network simulation, Flight Plan Procedures

training
May 8 Wed. Launch simulation and RF compatibility tests
May 9 Thurs. Network simulation
May 10 Fri. Simulated flight no. 3, flying (F-102A)
May 11 Sat. Mission Status Review, flight-plan and
experiments briefings
May 12 Sun. Network simulation, physical examination
May 13 Mon. Mercury Procedures Trainer, mission review
May 14 Tues. Countdown (canceled)
May 15 Wed. Launch

a.,Includes only major activities and does not include such activities
as spacecraft reviews, physical exercise, study, monitoring systems tests,
informal briefings with operational and systems personnel.

CONFIDENTIAL
 Page 7 - 6 5
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 Page 7 - 7 1

TABLE 7.2.2.2-1.- PILOT'S EQUIPMENT LIST

Special equipment storage kit

Hand-held Hasselblad camera

Hand-held Ro~bot camera
U. S. Weather Bureau film magazine
MTT film magazine
Six-inch focal length TV lens
O.JO neutral density filter for 6-inch TV lens
Special water flask
Water-tight container
Condensate purification containers
Vomitus container
Food

Writing desk

l6-mm balloon film magazine

l6-mm reentry film magazine
Extinction photometer
Standard calibration light
f/2.8 50-mm lens for l6-mm camera
Exposure meter
Sighting device for the Hasselblad camera
Food
Star navigation device
Navigation booklet

Glove box

Flight-plan roller and flight plan (see fig. 7-2.2.2-3)

U. S. Weather Bureau filter mosaic
Radiation dosimeter
Wrist mirror
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 WriDCNTIAL Page 7 - 7 3

TABLE 7.2.4.1-1.- CONTROL MODE USAGE

Maximum time
Percentage
Control mode used at any Frequency
time used
configuration one time, used
in rank order
hrrmin

Drift 43 13:01 2

Drift and MP 26 8:44 1

ASCS orbit 13 1:20 7

Drift and FBW-low 13 3:11 l
FBW-low (gyros uncaged) 2 0:11 8
ASCS reentry 2 0:37 1
MP (gyros uncaged) 1 0:04 5

Note: 1. Percentage usage times are test estimates "because

the tape recorder was in the program mode during
some switching operations and because of the
apparent tape failure during the rest period.

2. There is only intermittent use of the control

system during all of drift and MP and drift
and FBW-low periods.

CONFIDENTIAL
•
 7 7^
7-3 Pilot's Flight Report

7.3.1 Introduction.- The MA-9 mission was designed to evaluate

the operational and aeromedical aspects of the man-
spacecraft system in a manned one-day mission. The flight
of Faith Seven has demonstrated this capability and, I
hope, has shown the way for expanded capabilities in the
manned space-flight program.

Because of the extension of the flight duration for this

flight, there was much more time available for evaluating
systems, conducting experiments, and determining man's
adaptability to the space environment.

The name of my spacecraft, Faith Seven, was chosen for

three reasons; a belief in God and country, a loyalty to
my parent organizations, and a confidence in the entire
Mercury space team.

This flight was an excellent example of a well coordinated,

well disciplined, voice procedure between the spacecraft
and the world-wide tracking network. The information
received onboard Faith Seven was clear, concise, and served
to keep me continuously updated throughout the flight.
In my opinion, it is pertinent that this data flow was so
complete that I felt confident of my ability to accomplish
the mission successfully in the event of an unexpected
loss of air-ground communications.

The remaining context of this report will be a chronological

discussion of the flight from launch to recovery.

7.3.2 Launch.- Launch activities were well planned and were accom-
plished smoothly. We were always on or slightly ahead of
schedule, and I did not feel at all rushed for time. The
donning of the Mercury pressure suit for my second flight
attempt was accomplished in good order, and we arrived at
Launch Pad Ik on schedule. I was inserted into the
cockpit, and we had completed the necessary checks
7 minutes ahead of the scheduled time for gantry removal.
This time, the gantry came back without any delays, and
the countdown proceeded very successfully with lift-off
occurring 4 minutes behind schedule.

The time interval between my insertion into the spacecraft

and lift-off did not seem excessive, although insertion

GONriDCHTIAL
 Page 7 - 7 5

time could be shortened to T-90 minutes. All spacecraft

systems were functioning properly. The suit-inlet temper-
ature varied slightly, and for a period of time it was at
57° F and I was quite cold. It slowly increased to
approximately 6l° F, which was satisfactory because I wanted
to be precooled prior to lift-off.

7.3.3 Powered flight.- I felt that I was well trained, very much
at home, and had a complete grasp of the powered-flight
of the mission. The engines really felt good when they
started. Lift-off was smooth, but definitely noticeable,
and the acceleration was very pleasant. There were no
lateral or roll accelerations at all. The launch vehicle
was very steady with only small vibrations up to "max g" which
were not at all disturbing. I was able to read the
instruments very clearly. I had more foam-rubber padding
behind my helmet than did my predecessors, and this probably
reduced my head vibrations.

At approximately 00:01:45, I experienced several yaw oscil-

lations of rather large amplitude which, on the gage, were
indicating ±6°/sec. I was somewhat concerned about the
possibility of an abort sensing and implementation system
(ASIS) abort occurring at this time. However, the
oscillations damped and powered flight was again proceeding
smoothly at booster-engine cut-off (BECO).

The staging event is very obvious. BECO occurred with a

load "glung" followed by a sharp, crisp "thud" as the
booster engines dropped off. Although the sounds associated
with BECO are very definite, the change in acceleration
is even more apparent.

The sustainer portion of the powered-flight phase was very

smooth. I could detect no oscillations. The acceleration
felt just like that I had recently experienced on the
centrifuge. Tower jettison occurred later than I had
anticipated; therefore I was reaching for the manual tower
pull ring when it departed. I did not notice it ignite,
but first saw it at a range of approximately 100 yards
accelerating very rapidly straight ahead and then arcing
over slowly, forming a spiral pattern way out and to the
left.

Sustainer-engine cut-off (SECO) occurred right on time and

was very apparent because of the sharp dropoff in accel-
eration, as well as the distinct "glung" sound similar to
the sound made by BECO. I did not get as much of an
indication of spacecraft separation as I had expected I
Page 7-76

would; however, the thrust of the posigrades gave me a

distinct boot in the rear.

Window discoloration, or smudging, occurring during powered

flight. The window appeared to be smudged in two areas.
The first smudge was streaks, similar to powder burns, on
the outside of the window. The second appeared to be a
solid, greasy, coating on the inside of the outside pane
of glass. It appeared oily when I looked through it with
direct light; but with oblique light, it blotted out the
external view and resembled ice or frost.

7-3-^- Orbital flight.- The turnaround maneuver felt just as it

did on the procedures trainer. I went to auxiliary damping
control mode, waited for a short interval, and then selected
fly-by-wire control and started a k°/sec left yaw rate using
instruments. I did not pitch down because we had calculated
that a left yaw rate would result in a slow negative pitch
rate. However, the spacecraft did not pitch down as much
as expected during the turnaround; and, consequently, my
pitch attitude was still well above orbit attitude at com-
pletion of the maneuver.

Immediately after turnaround, my attention was attracted

to the booster, which was not more than 200 yards away.
I could read the lettering on the sides and could see
various details of the sustainer, such as the tanks. It
was a very bright silver in color, with a frosty white band
around the center portion of it. It was still wisping
lox and fuel from the aft end. It was yawed approximately
15° to 20° to its left. I had it in sight for a total of
approximately 8 minutes. The front end was slowly turning
in counterclockwise rotation'. The last time I saw it, it
was turned about 70° to the azimuth at which I had departed
from it. I began to drop slowly down to my -3^-° pitch
attitude. After selecting ASCS control, I pulled the
l6-mm camera out of its bracket and took a short film
burst of the booster with part of the east coast of the
United States and Cape Canaveral in the background;
however, the booster had moved some distance away by this
time.

I agree with Scott Carpenter that visual perspective

changes when you go into zero-g. The cockpit did seem to
be somewhat differently located in perspective to myself.
You move up forward in the seat, regardless of how tight
your straps are cinched. The ditty bag (special equipment
storage kit) on the right seems to be a different angle
to you than it is when you are on the launch pad. I did
 WriDCNTIAL Page 7 - 77

feel very distinctly that I was sitting upright. Most of

the time I felt as if I were lightly floating. A couple
of times I felt almost as if I were hanging upside down
because of the feeling of floating into the shoulder
straps. Every time I "dropped" something, I grabbed below
it, expecting it to fall, (items stayed close to the
place I put them when the cabin fan was off.)

Speed is very apparent when overflying clear or broken-

cloud areas. You definitely have a feeling of really
traveling along. If the cloud is a solid deck underneath
you and you don't have any other motion cues, you have a
very slow, floating feeling.

You really need to use automatic control on the first

orbital pass or to have a low work load in order to
collect your senses, to acclimatize yourself to this new
situation, and to organize the flight activities. I felt
that I was not on top of the situation as completely as
I would like to be right after insertion. Although I was
thinking about all the items to be done and of how to do
them, I did not feel completely at home. I felt that I
was in a strange environment and was not at my best, until
perhaps halfway through the pass. By the end of the first
pass, I was feeling really ready to power down and go into
drifting flight - able to manage the spacecraft in manner
or means.

The operating bands of the automatic control mode, particu-

larly in yaw and roll, appeared to "be wider than I thought
they would be. You just slop along between these 11-5° bands,
Sometimes, it varied right out to the full extent of the
limits. It does not hold a precise attitude, as I knew
it would not from a previous engineering analysis. However,
it did not occur to me that these excursions would show
up so much from visual reference. You soon get accustomed
to it, and it is no problem.

I checked my T +5 second relay by going to gyros-free

s
with pitch-torquing on, and it worked. I got TV on for
the Canary Islands, gave a consumable readout over Zanzibar,
and checked the manual proportional system and found that
it was functional. The manual proportional control mode
in procedures trainer felt identical to that in the space-
craft. It worked very well. After becoming used to the
slow light-off and the slight lag, I could control attitudes
easily, even down to small changes. It is not as good
for very fine attitude control as the 1-pound fly-by-wire
low thrusters.

•
Page 7-78 1 »• J. J^f Hill I

I put a short status report on the tape at ho minutes

and went into the night side. I immediately saw the
white haze layer, as described by Wally, in which the
stars would fade out, when behind it, and then reappear
below it before disappearing behind the horizon. The
earth has a sharp horizon even at night. I estimated the
haze layer to be about 6° or 7° in height and located
2°, or perhaps 5° above the horizon line.

I never tired of looking at the sunsets. As the sun

begins to get down towards the horizon it is very well
defined, quite difficult to look at, and not diffused as
when you look at it through the atmosphere. It is a very
bright white; in fact, it is almost the bluish white color
of an arc. As it begins to impinge on the horizon line,
it undergoes a spreading, or flattening effect. The sky
begins to get quite dark and gives the impression of deep
blackness. This light spreading out from the sun is a
bright orange color which moves out under a narrow band
of bright blue that is always visible throughout the day-
light period. As the sun begins to go down, it is re-
placed by this bright gold-orange band which extends out for
some distance on either side, defining the horizon even
more clearly. The sun goes below the horizon rapidly, and
this orange band still persists but gets considerably fainter
as the black sky bounded by dark blue bands follows it on
down. You do see a glow after the sun has set, although
it is not ray-like. I could still tell exactly where the
sun had set a number of seconds afterward.

I conducted the emergency voice check over Muchea, sent a

blood pressure, switched the S-band beacon to "ground
command," and at 1:10:00 gave a short status report.

When there is no moon, the earth is darker than the sky;

there is a difference in the two blacks. In general, there
was more light from the sky; the sky is a shining black
as compared with a dull black appearance of the earth.
There is a distinct line at the horizon and the earth is
the darker.

I saw the lights of Perth on the'west coast of Australia.

If there is moonlight, then cloud layers and ground
features can be seen. The moonlight is bright enough to
see the motion over the ground. On several occasions I
could see light from cities on the ground glowing through
the clouds.

•-*-3^ ' "

CONFIDENTIAL
 page 7 - 7 9
At night I could see the glow from every one of the thrust-
ers. I saw a tremendous amount of these fireflies regardless
of my attitude. They appeared to come out from the space-
craft and go back along the flight path. I could see some
of them for as long as 30 or kO seconds. I could see them
coming directly out of the pitch-down thruster when it was
activated.

The first indication I got of the sun coming up behind

me was the lighting of the clouds from underneath. I noted
the clouds getting lighter and lighter, and I could still
see the stars. Suddenly, my window would get into the
oblique sunlight and appear to frost over just as an
aircraft canopy does. This frost was apparently a result
of a greasy coating on the inside of the outer pane, which
completely occluded my vision under these lighting conditions,

I caged the gyros, powered down ASCS bus, and went into
drifting flight. I opened the condensate trap clamp and
did not see water flowing at this time. I left the clamp
open for a while to see if the trap would work, and then
I closed the clamp.

When I was drifting, the changing view out the window was
not at all disconcerting, and the random orientation caused
me no concern. In fact, it is a very relaxed way to travel.
I might mention an item here on the natural dynamics of
the spacecraft. When rates were near zero, and the space-
craft was powered down, I never observed any rate greater
than l^sec along any one axis. Generally, if it were as
great as this, l°/sec, there were no rates along the other
two axes. These rates would switch from axis to axis and,
more than likely only two axes would have any rate at all,
1° 1°
and these rates would be between j-/sec and p/sec, at the
most. Frequently, for long periods of time, the spacecraft
would have absolutely no rates at all and would be almost
completely motionless. The one axis that appeared to have
more predominate rate than the others was the roll axis;
and the rate, almost invariably, was to the left, or
negative roll. More times than not, while drifting, there
1°
would be a roll rate of approximately —/sec.

At 3:00:00, I powered up the ASCS bus, and at 3:04:00 I

started alining the spacecraft, uncaged the gyros, and went
on automatic control. Alining yaw is a simple matter when
you have land or broken clouds. Even solid masses of
clouds will have some tops and breaks in them and will give

CONFIDEHTIAL
Page T - 80

good yav indications. At night I saw some towns and

cities underneath some of the cloud decks, which are
excellent yaw indicators.

At 3:25:00 I went to fly-by-wire low, slowly pitched up

to the -20° mark on the window, deployed the flashing
beacon, and there was a loud "cloomp" as the squib fired
and it departed. I then caged the gyros and powered down
the ASCS a-c bus. I never did see the beacon on that first
night, but I was having some difficulty finding my
180° point. I tried unsuccessfully to observe the flash-
ing beacon early on the day side also.

On the second night side after deploying the flashing beacon,

shortly after going into the night side, I spotted the
little rascal. It was quite visible and appeared to be
only 8 to 10 miles away. I deliberately moved off target,
waited until 5:^0:00 and eased back to l80° yaw and
saw the light again, at which time it appeared to be
around 12 to 1^ miles away and still quite visible.

On the third night side after deploying the flashing light,

I had, no anticipation of seeing it at all; but at 6:56:00
there it was, blinking away. It was very faint and
appeared to be at a distance of about 16 to 17 miles. I
would say it was approximately the brightness of a fifth-
magnitude star, whereas on the second night side after
deployment it appeared to be about that of a second-
magnitude star.

At 4:25:00 I gave the medics their first orbital urine

sample. At 4:5^:00 I ate four brownies from one of the
little snack boxes and drank five or six gulps of water.
While in flight, you must force yourself to eat and drink.
When you have a fairly full flight plan, the temptation
is not to bother with eating and drinking, but to devote
your time to doing a good job on the items you have to do
so that you can do them correctly. I deliberately made
a point of forcing myself to drink water regularly. The
food was so difficult to prepare and to eat that I did not
eat the quantity of food I had planned to. The older type
of tube food would have been better on this flight.

Control of suit circuit is definitely marginal. It was

physiologically and psychologically the worst problem I
had during the flight. I was concerned with the suit circuit,
probably more than with any other system throughout the
entire flight. I worked continuously to keep it within
limits. The suit was very moist and I was really soaked
with water for some time before recovery. Controlling the
 n
Page 7-81

suit heat exchanger was a big problem during the entire

flight. Wo setting, regardless of how small the change,
would hold the suit dome temperature within acceptable
limits. It was frequently frozen, at which point I would
have to turn the suit water flow completely off until
it thawed. At times, it would then go to the high temperature
side, and the suit-inlet temperature would also become
uncomfortably high. I would slowly work it back down to a
point where I was beginning to get a comfortable suit; and
then upon leaving it there, it would hold for a short while
and suddenly would plunge on down to the freezing mark and
I would have to start all over. Even when I would remember
the settings that I had previously used and go back to
even slightly lesser settings than these, it would hold
for a short while, but then plunge or rise. It did not
appear to be constant at all. Naturally, opening and
closing the visor also added to the variations.

At 8:21:00, I pitched down to observe the ground light with

gyros free. At 9:00:00, I tried to deploy the balloon,
with no success. At 9'10:00; I tried again to deploy the
balloon, and again with no success. I used the procedure
on the checklist, but nothing happened.

The valve on the drinking container leaked so much water

that I could not place water in any of the plastic food
containers. The plastic food containers, with the frozen
dehydrated food, are completely unsatisfactory for zero-g
use. Under zero-g, there is no way of getting the plastic
container away from the nozzle to work the water down into
the food. The water tends to come out of the plastic
top as you try closing it off. I tried one of them and
had so much trouble and got water all over myself, my
gloves, and the instrument panel, but only enough water
in the container to wet approximately one-third of the food
that was in there. I finally just gave it up as a lost
cause, and ate only the snack-type foods.

The condensate bag appeared to fill up much sooner than it

should have and was so hard to pump against that I was afraid
I would rupture it if I pumped any harder. I finally
stopped pumping, transferred over to the 4-pound tank and
proceeded to pump some water into it. Subsequently, the
pump appeared to be jammed, and after switching back to
the other tank the needle fitting came out with the entire
system completely out of commission.

As previously stated, I found that orienting the space-

craft after drifting flight was quite easy on the day side
and not too difficult on the night side, although
7 - 82
orientation on the night side takes more time unless there
is moonlight or broken clouds or land masses below. Stars
and star patterns are more difficult to recognize because
of the limited view through the window and the various
angles and attitudes. You can slowly drift until you find
some star pattern that is recognizable and from this
you can pick up a zero yaw star. If you have moonlight,
or any broken cloud masses or land masses, you can pick
up zero yaw very readily if you turn all the lights off
in order to become night adapted, and pitch down to
approximately -20°.

I made a manual fly-by-wire low thruster check at 13:15:00,

prior to resting and turned the rate indicators to auto-
matic or off. I had a hang-fire, or slow thrust decay,
of the right yaw thruster in the manual proportional mode.
It gave me a large yaw rate, which I corrected. I tried
it again, and it operated properly.

At night I could see lightning. Sometimes five or six

different cumulus buildups were visible at once in the
window. I could not see the lightning directly, but the
whole cumulus mass of clouds would light up. From space,
ground lights twinkle, whereas stars don't twinkle. I
could not distinguish features on the moon. It was a
partial moon at night, but it was full when it was setting
in the daytime. It was quite bright at night, but on the
day side it was a lightish blue color.

I encountered no difficulty in being able to sleep. When

you are completely powered down and drifting, it is a
relaxed, calm, floating feeling. In fact, you have difficulty
not sleeping. I found that I was cat-napping and dozing
off frequently. Sleep seems to be very sound. I woke up
one time from about an hour's nap with no idea where I was
and it took me several seconds to orient myself to where
I was and what I was doing. I noticed this again after
one other fairly long period of sleep. You sleep completely
relaxed and very, very soundly to the point that you have
trouble regrouping yourself for a second or two when you
come out of it. I noted that I was able to awaken prior
to having a task to do. Neither did I encounter any type
of this so-called "break-off phenomena." Although this
flight was very enjoyable, a thing of delight, it still
is a strange environment to a human being and you have
every desire to get back to earth.
 iOMriDCNTlAL Page 7 - 83

I dropped off to sleep very soundly at about 13:30:00, and

slept on until I woke up at 1^:48:00. I dropped off to
sleep again at about 16:50:00 and slept right on through
until 17:50:00. I woke up and the dome temperature light
was on. After adjusting the temperature, I dropped off
to sleep immediately thereafter and woke up at 18:25:00.
I dropped off to sleep again and did not wake up until
19:27:00.

During portions of the rest period when I was awake, I made

several interesting ground observations. I could detect in-
dividual houses and streets. I also saw what appeared to be
trains and trucks in some of the clear regions in the Tibetian
area. I noted several cases of observing wind direction and
velocity on the ground from smoke emanating from smokestacks
or fireplaces of houses. Particularly in the Himalaya
area I could see houses, yards, fields, roads, streams, and
lakes. I could see a lot of snow on the ground in the upper
portions of the mountains and a lot of the lakes frozen over
even down in the lower sections of the windblown, sandy, high
plateau areas of the Himalayas.

During the day, the earth has a predominantly bluish cast.

I found that green showed up very little. Water looked
very blue, and heavy forest areas looked blue-green. The
only really distinctive green showed up in the high
Tibetian area. Some of the high lakes were a bright emerald
green and looked like those found in a copper-sulphate
mining area. The browns of the Arabian desert showed up
quite distinctly, but the Sahara was not quite so brown.
If you are looking straight down on things, the color is
truer than if you're looking at an angle.

At 21:34:00 on the night side, I observed a line of lighted

cities along the East Coast of Australia - Sidney, Melbourne,
Brisbane. I powered up the ASCS bus at 23:30:00, alined
the spacecraft at 23:^0:00 and uncaged the gyros. The Cap
Com in the Mercury Control Center mentioned that the scanner
outputs and gyro outputs agreed perfectly.

At 2^:15:00, I went to fly-by-wire low and zeroed the space-

craft yaw axis on the setting sun, which was very difficult
because the sun is extremely bright. I then caged the
gyros, brought them back to free, rolled to 3^° right,
caged the gyros again, brought them back to free. The
pitch torquing switch was on and I placed the spacecraft
on automatic mode to start the zodiacal light photographs.

CONFIDENTIAL
Page 7-84

On the latter part of the night side, I placed the gyros

to "slave" and the scanners began to correct the spacecraft
back to the orbital plane. Meantime, I was busily snapping
pictures. The fuel quantity warning light came on at
6l percent at 24:58:00. I remained on automatic control,
snapped two pictures of the horizon-definition quadrant
photographs, went to gyros free, yawed 90° right, took
two pictures, caged and uncaged the gyros, went to 90° right
again (which put me directly into the sun) snapped two
pictures, went to 180° right (which put me to the
2700 point) snapped two pictures., gave one negative yaw
pulse to start back around to get the gyros off the
l80° stop, let it drift on around for a few moments, caged
the gyros, and powered down.

At 25:20:00 the moon was beginning to set in the west. I

was faced in the right direction so I used manual propor-
tional to keep my attitudes nearly correct and made three
shots of the setting moon for M.I.T. At this time the
moon appeared full from earthshine.

At two different times, I saw a faint glow just after

sunset or prior to sunrise; it was somewhat cone shaped,
and I believe it was the faint glow of zodiacal light. It
was not exactly vertical to the horizon. I had a feeling
that this was just a glow off the sun. It was not as
bright as the Milky Way. Another night phenomenon that I
noticed occurred when I was over South America looking East
or Northeast. At the particular time I couldn't see this
layer, but I had the feeling that it was more of a ceiling
than a layer. It was not distinct and did not last long,
but it was higher than I was, was not well defined, and
was not in the vicinity of the horizon. It was a good
sized area very indistinct in shape. It had a faint glow
with a reddish brown cast. It seemed to be quite extensive,
very faint, and contrasted as a lighter area in the
night sky.

On the 17th and l8th orbital passes, I took infrared

photographs. The G.m.t. time check over Mercury Control
at 26:45:00 showed the G.m.t. clock to be 10 seconds fast.
I made more photographs. I was using full drifting flight
and engaging the manual proportional handle to make some
very slight attitude corrections when necessary to
photograph, trying to hold a window-down attitude, and
allowing yaw to ease around wherever it would. At times
during the day, I did note that the sun was very, very
hot through the window. The particular pattern of the
sun would be hot on my suit. I could feel heat on the
inside of the window from the sun, too, and through my
glove.

CONFIDENTIAL
 Page 7-85

I had been switching the warning light control switch to

the "off" position in order to darken completely the
interior of the spacecraft and thus become dark adapted.
When I returned the switch from the "off" to "dim" position,
the 0.05g green light illuminated. I immediately turned
off the ASCS 0.05g switch fuse and the emergency 0.05g
fuse. Thereafter, we made three checks to verify that
the ASCS 0.05g relay functions were operative. Since
the amp-cal was now latched into the reentry mode, the
attitude gyros were no longer operational.

Partial pressure of oxygen in the cabin slowly dropped

throughout the flight to about 3-5 psia. I was worried
that the range might get concerned about this on the next
to the last pass. Also, the partial pressure of CCU in
the suit circuit had gradually increased to a reading of
3-5 mm Hg. I suspected the gage and went to emergency
rate flow and did not get any apparent decrease in this
reading. However, I did not stay on emergency rate flow
very long. I recognized that my breathing was more rapid
and deep. The PCOp gage indicated that we were up over
5 on the gage setting just prior to retrofire. However,
I could have gone on emergency Op flow and accepted slightly
higher suit temperatures because of the fans shutting down,
which reduces suit circuit flow.

At 32:05:00, I turned on the cabin fan and cabin coolant

flow, turned the cabin coolant up to the launch mark, and
the cabin temperature immediately began to cool down from
95° F, partially because I had entered the night side.

The 250 v-amp main inverter failed to operate on the 21st pass.
At about 33:03:00 the automatic changeover light for the
standby inverter came on. I had noticed two small fluctua-
tions in the ammeter a little previous to this and had gone
through an electrical check; everything appeared normal.
The temperature on the 250 v-amp inverter was about 115° F,
the temperature on the fans inverter was about 125° F, and
the standby inverter was about 95° F. At this point the
light came on and I checked the inverters, and the
250 v-amp inverter was still reading about 115° F on
temperature, but was indicating 1^-0 volts on the ASCS
a-c bus voltage. I then turned it off. At that time I
selected the slug position (manual selection of the
standby inverter for the ASCS) and found that the stand-
vy inverter would not start. I put the switch back to
the "off" position of ASCS a-c power and elected to make
a purely manual or fly-by-wire retrofire and reentry.
 7 - 86
7.3.5 Retrofire.- As a result of the premature latching in of
the ASCS 0.05g relay and the subsequent loss of the ASCS
main and standby inverter power, I was required to initiate
and control the spacecraft manually during the retrofire
and reentry events. I decided to control the spacecraft
during the retrofire period on manual proportional with
fly-by-wire ready as a backup, if necessary. I stowed the
equipment and completed the necessary preretrofire switching
procedures well in advance and was all set except for the
squib switch.

As I entered the last night side prior to the retrofire

event, and realizing that I would have to orient the
spacecraft to the proper retroattitude within 10 minutes
after sunrise for a countdown from Coastal Sentry Quebec
(CSQ), I decided to orient the spacecraft to retroattitude
during the night side and stay fairly close to it. I was
able to use stars that were near my flight path as well
as cloud patterns after the moon came up to maintain proper
yaw orientation. Shortly after sunrise when sunlight
first struck the window at an oblique angle, the window
became completely translucent, thus making it impossible
to see through it for aljnost a minute. I flew instruments
(rate needles) during this period and when I again was able
to see out the window I was still close to the proper
retroattitude. I positioned the spacecraft exactly on
retroattitude. I could now see out the window clearly,
and the manual proportional control system was operating
very well.

The procedure from the ground to prepare me for retrofire

was good with one exception. The original plan had been
to count down to retrosequence (if it was to be used) and
then to retrofire. When retrosequence was not used, I
had rejected the idea of any count except to retrofire,
so that there was some doubt in my mind when the CSQ
Cap Com began a countdown, whether it was retrofire or not.
I would recommend that we not count down in this same manner
for anything but retrofire in the future. Fortunately,
we had set the clock on minutes and seconds so that I
assured myself with this and waited for the second count.
The CSQ spacecraft communicator (John Glenn) gave me a
countdown for retrofire, and at 5 seconds to go, I placed
the squib switch to "on." I punched the retrofire button
at time zero and the retrorockets commenced firing right
on time.
 Page 7 - 87

Because of the loss of my attitude indicators, I was

required to use the view of the earth through the window
for attitude reference. During the thrust period of the
retrorockets, I used the gnat rate gyro indicators in
order to control rates while crosschecking through the
window for attitude control. This method proved to Toe
somwhat difficult because of the high contrast in brightness
level existing between the exterior and interior of the
spacecraft. Consequently, I had to hold up my hand to
shade my eyes from the light coming through the window
while viewing the rate indicators. Other than this, I
had no difficulty in controlling the spacecraft during this
event.

The first retrorocket offset moment was fairly mild; I

kept the rates close to zero and observed that attitudes
were still fairly close to nominal. As the second one
fired, the attitudes shifted off a little but I brought
them back and then shifted my vision to the rate indicators.
The greatest offset moment appeared to be in plus yaw when
the number two retrorocket commenced firing.

I had plenty of training using the fly-by-wire and manual

proportional control modes to control retrorocket firing
disturbances. I did not have the opportunity to practice
controlling retrofire simulations on the ground trainers
using a combination of window reference and rate indicators.
This, however, was not a great problem.

If I had lost air - ground communications prior to retro-

fire, I would have been able to use the last retrofire
time I received, which was correct, and could have accomplished
retrofire at the proper time and in a proper manner.

The retros give a good, solid "thump" in the seat of your

pants and I could very easily count each one as it ignited.
Retrojettison, which I did manually, was a very solid
"clack" in the retropack area. I felt that I could actually
feel the pack depart.

I maintained retroattitude for part of the 10-minute period

prior to the nominal 0.05g time in order to keep the earth
reference in view as long as possible before going to
reentry attitude. A few minutes prior to the time for
0.05g, I slowly pitched up to a negative 12° to 1^° pitch
attitude, just keeping the earth horizon at the bottom of
the window and holding yaw and roll at zero.
Page 7-

7.3.6 Reentry.- Initially, I was intending to use fly-by-wire

for reentry. The fly-by-wire pitch-up high thruster was
slow to light off. So I pushed in the manual proportional
handle and decided to go dual authority, which gave me
^9 pounds of thrust capability in the pitch and yaw axes.

About 1 minute prior to 0.05g, the spacecraft began to

feel definitely like it wanted to reenter. It was sluggish
on the controls, and began to pitch up to zero pitch
attitude. I allowed it to pitch on up, and started a
negative roll rate. I was rather surprised to see what
a "wallow" the spacecraft set up with this roll rate.
This, of course, is something you do not see in the procedures
trainer. The spacecraft more or less "wallowed" or spiraled
around, and the pitch and yaw rates began to build very
slowly; they were a very low order of magnitude. For the
early oscillations, pure manual proportional would have
handled them very nicely. The 1-pound thrusters would
almost handle the initial oscillations. Later the
oscillations had considerable more force to them, and
required more thrust to damp them.

The fly-by-wire high thrusters were not used during the

first part of the reentry. The oscillations began to
increase and thereby required a continuously greater control
input. It was at this time that the fly-by-wire high
thrusters unexpectedly fired, causing me to overshoot two
different yaw oscillations. I began to be a little more
cautious on the amount of thrust called for and had them
well under control prior to max g. On down through max g,
I held the rates down relatively low. At 95;000 feet on
down to about 50,000 feet, the rates became quite pronounced.
It seemed to take on a different ratio in amplitude and
frequency. Even using dual authority with ^9 pounds of
thrust, I still was not able to pin the rates as well as
I would have liked to. The oscillations were held to a
reasonable degree until about 50,000 feet at which time
the oscillations got fairly large and fast and I was really
having difficulty controlling them. You could actually
feel the oscillating g-forces, but they were not physio-
logically objectionable at all.

7.3.7 Landing and recovery.- As planned, I started to deploy the

drogue parachute when passing through 42,000 feet as
indicated on the altimeter. I pushed the drogue button
and the drogue came out immediately. I realized I was
in the clouds when the parachute deployed, but I still
could see it very easily. It immediately stabilized the
spacecraft and it looked very nice.
 WIAL* Page 7 -

The main parachute came out automatically at approximately

11,000 feet indicated altitude, reefed normally, and then
blossomed fully.

The g's from the parachute opening were much less than I
had expected. Rate of descent after parachute opening was
between 35 and 40 feet per second. The spacecraft was
oscillating slowly under the parachute. At 4,000 feet
indicated altitude the rate of descent was down to JO feet
per second, but oscillations were still present.

The landing bag deployed automatically. Landing was solid

but not severe. Considerable water splashed in, apparently
through the snorkles, but was splashing all about the
cockpit in small amounts from each side. The spacecraft
went down to the left side, rolled around with my head
down, and wound up with the right side of the spacecraft
under the water. I could see the spacecraft then ease
back up the water line where it was lying flat in the water,
with my head up.

The helicopter pilot circling the spacecraft reported that

the parachute was slow in disconnecting. I put the main
and emergency disconnect fuse switches to number 1, and
the rescue aids switch was placed to "manual." (l am
not absolutely certain, but it is my feeling that I placed
the rescue aids switch to manual immediately after landing.)
It appeared to be a matter of a minute before the space-
craft began to right itself, and it came right up to an
upright position.

At this point, I used the swizzle stick and turned the

manual-fill nitrogen handle, pulled it out, turned it to
the "on" position and then put the rescue aids switch
to "automatic" to extend the whip antenna. By this time
there were swimmers actually in the water around me.

Immediately after main parachute deployment, I began to

hear the helicopters contacting me on radio. There were
two of them circling me at this time. They stated that
the carrier was very nearby (4.4 miles) and would be
right with me. This was extremely comforting. I was
asked how I preferred to be recovered. I elected, as I
had planned, to be hoisted onboard the carrier.
Everything proceeded very smoothly, and I did not get out
of the spacecraft until John Graham and his troops blew
the hatch from the outside on the carrier. I was met by
John and Dick Pollard, and we took two blood pressures

CQNriDEPfTIAL
Page 7 - 90 CONFIDENTIAL

while I was still inside the spacecraft. I then climbed

out and we took another blood pressure. While standing
still for the blood pressure I "began to feel somewhat
light headed. This feeling disappeared as soon as I had
taken two steps away from the spacecraft. At no time
after that did I again notice any more light headedness.
We then proceeded below for the medical and technical
debriefings.

CONriDENTIAL
Page 7-91
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Page 7-97

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CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL Page 7-102

Figure 7.2.2.2-3.- Flight plan and holder,

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL
Page 7-103

\SSSS> Trainer background

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Figure 7.2.3.1-1.- Turnaround maneuver.

CONFIDENTIAL
 I r^i-i. 1 Page 7-104

Flight rates and attitudes

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 Page 7-105

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8.0 FLIGHT CONTROL AND NETWORK PERFORMANCE

8.1 Flight Control Summary

8.1.1 Prelaunch operations.- The Mercury Control Center (MCC) and

Bermuda (BDA) flight controllers were deployed for the MA-9
mission on April 30, 19^3. The remainder of the flight con-
trol teams began to deploy on May 2, and all teams had "been
deployed by May 5, 196j. The MCC-BDA flight control teams
were exercised through a series of 10 launch simulations.
These simulations exercised the decision capability of the
flight controllers and the astronaut during the critical
powered-flight phase of the mission.

Four days of network simulations were conducted in prepara-

tion for the mission. The exercises performed on May 1, 8,
and 9 involved two simulations daily. The final network
simulation was performed on May 12, 1963. At the completion
of this exercise, the network and the flight control teams
had reached a satisfactory state of readiness and were ready
to support the scheduled flight.

Because of the extended flight duration, an additional flight

controller was assigned to the flight control teams at both
Kano, Nigeria (KNO) and Zanzibar (ZZB). The Kauai Island,
Hawaii (HAW) site was supported by two complete flight con-
trol teams, because of the frequency of its contact periods.
Several new flight controllers were used, primarily at BDA,
ZZB, Rose Knot Victor command ship (RKV), and HAW. The Corpus
Christi, Texas (TEX) site was again used as a training facil-
ity for the mission. Five aeromedical monitors and five
procedures-trainer personnel from the Flight Crew Operations
Division participated in the simulations at this site.

The Mercury Control Center was manned on a two-shift basis.

The shift changeover occurred approximately every 8 hours
throughout the flight. The flight control countdown was in-
itiated by the second shift team at T-215 minutes. The first
shift was on duty at T-120 minutes. Both shifts were on duty
for the launch and reentry phases of the mission.

The flight control documentation for the MA-9 mission was sat-
isfactory. A total of 3^ Instrumentation Support Instructions
was transmitted to the network. The majority of these docu-
ments required only one revision during the prelaunch period.
The only major revisions required were those to the instrument
calibration curves. These changes were necessary because of
calibration shifts and are normally transmitted after the launch-
pad tests, conducted 4 days prior to lift-off. Other minor
 8 -2
revisions were made to the Network Countdown, Mission Rules,
and Data Acquisition Plan.

8.1.2 Prelift-off operations.- The network countdown was initiated

on May 14, 1963, at 2:00 a.m. e.s.t. The spacecraft-launch-
vehicle countdown was proceeding normally. The computer and
range checkout (CADFISS) test was completed on schedule and
all site equipment mandatory for the mission was in a satis-
factory condition with the exception of the BDA FPS-16 radar,
which had failed the CADFISS slew tests in "both azimuth and
range. The slew tests were rescheduled for BDA and the "C"
computer at Goddard was placed on a standby basis to check
the BDA data. At BDA, it was estimated that it would take
1 hour to isolate the problem, and at T-125 a decision was
made to continue the count, with a hold at T-60, if necessary.
The CADFISS tests at T-80 minutes indicated good radar data
in azimuth, range, and elevation; however, there were some
dropouts in range, and the BDA station personnel continued
to investigate the problems in the radar.
At T-60 minutes a series of short duration holds, eventually
totaling approximately 2 hours, was called because of problems
with the diesel engine for the gantry transfer table. The
fuel pump on the diesel engine was changed and the count was
resumed at 9:09 a.m. e.s.t.

During the hold at T-60 minutes, the Bermuda radar passed the
CADFISS test. The radar was performing satisfactorily when
the count was resumed] however, there was still an error rate
of 14 percent in the range data. An error rate of 20 percent
is the maximum acceptable error rate for these data. Continual
status reports were obtained from BDA, and the radar was in a
marginal green condition for the lox status check at T-V?
minutes. The spacecraft test conductor was advised that the
countdown would be continued until T-15 minutes, at which
time a final status would be given. A final slew check was
performed with BDA at T-20 minutes; the error rate on these
data was 100 percent. It was then determined that the radar
would not be able to support the mission and that an additional
12 to 24 hours would be required. The launch attempt was
canceled at 9:56 a.m. e.s.t.
The BDA station began an immediate investigation of the pro-
blems in the FPS-16 radar system. The Goddard computers were
placed on a standby status to run Data Slew Tests with the
BDA radar when it was repaired. The status of the radar was
reported every 2 hours. By 2:00 p.m. e.s.t., the problems
had been isolated to the preamplifier in the azimuth digital
 Page 8-3

data channel and the shift register in the range digital data
channel. The simultaneous failure of both components compli-
cated an effective failure analysis and caused the earlier
difficulties in solving the problems.

At 4:00 p.m. e.s.t. it was decided that the BDA FPS-16 radar
system would be able to support the launch and that the count-
down for the second launch attempt would be initiated the
following day.

The countdown was recycled for 24 hours, and the network count-
down was resumed at 2:00 a.m. e.s.t. on May 15, 19&3- All
primary network systems, with minor exceptions, were operable
when the countdown was initiated.

The confidence summaries transmitted by the network to verify

the site and calibrations were very good. No major discrepan-
cies were noted in the network voice communications. However,
the ZZB, Canton Island (CTN), RKV, and Coastal Sentry Quebec (CSQ)
sites were influenced by propagation, and several repeats were
required from the stations. The ships were serviced by two
diverse radio links. The CSQ communications were routed through
New York and Honolulu. In most cases, these different paths
allowed communications to the ships during the periods of day-
night frequency transition. The sites suffered short-duration
dropouts on the voice links throughout the test; however,
communications were quickly reestablished.

This countdown was continuous, except for a short hold for the
launch-vehicle ground support equipment at T-ll minutes 30 sec-
onds. The countdown was resumed within approximately 4 minutes
and lift-off occurred at 8:04:13 a.m. e.s.t.

8.1.3 Powered flight.- The powered flight phase was normal and all
launch events occurred at nearly the expected time. The guidance
and data systems performance was excellent. All data sources
provided good, consistent data. Sustainer engine cut-off occurred
at 00:05:02.9 at a space-fixed velocity of 25,735 ft/sec. The
flight-path angle at cut-off was +0.00321°. A "go" condition
was evident at insertion, and the orbit lifetime was not con-
sidered to be a problem. All spacecraft and launch-vehicle
systems performed satisfactorily during the launch phase, and
the air-ground communications were somewhat better than those
in previous missions.

8.1.4 Orbital flight.- After spacecraft separation, the astronaut

performed a fly-by-wire (ZBW) turnaround maneuver. Shortly
after completion of this maneuver, the BDA capsule communica-
tor (Cap Com) advised the MCC that an approximate 6° rise in

CONFIDCHTIAL" -
 • -»**»*-^" -.••--• . ... tttfg.f.,

Page 8 - CONFIDENTIAL
ca~bin- and suit-dome heat-exchanger temperatures had been
observed on telemetry at BDA. The astronaut was appraised
of this situation and increased the coolant flow. At space-
craft loss of signal with BDA, the dome temperatures had
stabilized. When the astronaut acquired communications with
the Canary Islands (CYl), he said that the dome-temperature
warning light was on. This warning indication was caused
by the suit dome temperature decreasing below 51° F. The
astronaut was required to monitor this temperature through-
out the flight and make frequent adjustments to the coolant
control valve. As a result of the exit heat pulse, the
cabin temperature indication on telemetry rose from 9^-° F
at launch to approximately 118° F when the spacecraft was over
Muchea, Australia (MUG). Subsequently, this temperature de-
creased slowly to a value between 90° F and 100° F. The
cabin-air temperature appeared to vary slightly as a function
of the spacecraft a-c power usage. During the periods in
which the automatic stabilization and control system (ASCS)
115 v a-c inverter was being used, the temperature would rise
to a value of between 97° F and 105° F; and when this inverter
was not being used, the temperature would apparently decrease
slowly over a period of two passes to a value of between
90° F and 97° F. All spacecraft systems were functioning
normally, and the MCC advised the Guaymas, Mexico (GYM) site
to transmit a "go" decision for seven orbital passes to the
astronaut.
The first minor discrepancy occurred over MCC at the beginning
of the second orbital pass. When the telemetry was commanded
by the ground, a series of repetitive R- and Z-calibrations
occurred. It was decided that the programed R and Z calibra-
tion function would be turned off during the sleep period.
This anamoly occurred again when the C-band beacon was
commanded "on" over MCC at the beginning of the l6th orbital
pass.
The flashing beacon was deployed at 03:^5:00. The astronaut
reported that he felt the beacon deploy; however, he did not
see the light during its first night period. The astronaut

All instrumentation values presented in this section were

derived in real time over telemetry, unless otherwise stated.
 Page 8-5

verified that the attitudes and time were correct for deploy-
ment of the beacon. The "beacon was observed during sunset
of the 4th orbital pass~"and was tracked during the night per-
iod of that pass. All systems continued to perform satis-
factorily. However, the astronaut was required to make
frequent changes to the suit coolant control valves in order
to maintain the suit heat-exchanger dome temperature within
limits.
At the beginning of the 5th orbital pass, the astronaut
turned the cabin fan and cabin heat exchanger off as scheduled
by the flight plan. It was noted subsequently that turning
off the cabin fan while in a powered-down condition did not
materially affect the cabin temperature. The astronaut opened
the outlet port of the condensate trap in accordance with his
flight plan.
It was noted early in the flight that the actual power usage
was slightly less than predicted. This condition resulted in
allowing for more radar beacon tracking during the later phases
of the flight. The C-band beacon was turned on three times
prior to passes over the HAW station to enable tracking by the
Range Tracker ship. Attitude-control-fuel usage was also less
than expected, and all reports indicated that the astronaut
was managing his fuel supplies exceptionally well.
The astronaut made two attempts to deploy the balloon for the
balloon drag and visibility experiment, starting at 09:00:00.
All attempts were unsuccessful; and based upon analysis of
the system and the undesirability of powering up the squib
bus, it was decided that no further attempts would be made to
deploy the balloon. The astronaut was advised not to actuate
the jettison switch.
During the 7th pass at 10:02:00, MCC directed ZZB to transmit
to the astronaut a "go" decision to continue for 17 orbital
passes. At this time all systems were performing well. In
general, the usage of consumables was better than expected
and the astronaut was in excellent condition. Because of the
excellent performance of the astronaut and the spacecraft
systems, the task of flight control was one of monitoring
systems performance, gathering and transmitting summary infor-
mation, and assisting the astronaut in carrying out his flight
plan.
At the end of the 7~th pass the astronaut powered down the ASCS
bus over the CSQ and began a period of extended drifting flight.
At this time he stated that he was perspiring lightly and that
 n f
Page 8-6

he was continuing to monitor the suit dome temperature.

Occasionally, the ground stations became concerned because
of the gradual temperature increase apparent in the cabin-
heat-exchanger dome temperature. This measurement was
expected to reach ambient eventually, but it stabilized at
approximately 75° F. The HAW site obtained good tracking
on the C-band beacon on the 7th pass, and these data con-
firmed the nominal orbit. All scheduled radar tracking during
the orbital phase was good and the acquisition and retrofire
times were near nominal throughout the entire flight.

The RKV received a readout of the major onboard parameters

from the astronaut at 12:28:00, and the astronaut turned the
telemetry to continuous in preparation for the sleep period.
The astronaut performed a checkout of the manual and fly-by-
wire (FEW) thrusters. He reported to the CSQ at 13:30:00
that the system was performing satisfactorily and that he had
just been sitting quietly looking out the window. He then
indicated that he was ready to sleep. The network sites were
advised that the sleep period had started, and that they were
to maintain air-ground communications silence unless telemetry
signals indicated that the astronaut should be contacted.
Throughout the sleep period, all parameters indicated normal
systems operation. The suit dome temperature reading received
at the KNO site changed abruptly. The change indicated that
the astronaut had adjusted his suit coolant flow in order to
maintain the dome temperature within the limits. The aero-
medical parameters which were monitored by the remote sites
indicated that the astronaut was sleeping. The respiration
rate was holding fairly steadily at 15 breaths per minute,
and the heart rate was steady, at approximately 60 beats per
minute. During the llth pass, the MCC received electrocardio-
gram (EGG) data, remoted from the Ascension Island; and a
sudden increase in the heart rate from 60 beats per minute to
110 beats per minute was noted. The heart rate then decreased
to 70 beats per minute. These data were interpreted by the
aeromedical monitors to indicate that the astronaut may have
been dreaming. During the llth through l4th passes, the
indicated automatic fuel quantity decreased from 82 percent
to 75 percent. This change initially caused some concern,
but, after evaluation it was attributed to temperature stabi-
lization effects, the normal nitrogen bottle leakage rate,
and the readout accuracy of the ground telemetry for automatic
fuel quantity.

During the l^th pass at 21:23:00, the MUG site received a re-
port on consumables from the astronaut. The astronaut stated

COMriDEHTlAL
 Page 8 - 7

that he slept veil, that he had transferred the urine and

condensate, and that the condensate trap vas apparently per-
forming satisfactorily. The suit-dome-temperature warning
light was on; however, the astronaut had reduced the suit
coolant flow and the temperature was increasing.

The astronaut checked his FEW-low and manual yaw thrusters

during the 15th pass and he advised MUG that the thrusters
were operating satisfactorily.

At the beginning of the l6th pass the astronaut ate and drank,
and he stated that he felt fine. The ASCS was powered up at
23:j6:00, as the spacecraft passed over MUG, and the astro-
naut selected ASCS orbit mode. The ASCS was operating normally,
and good correlation was obtained between spacecraft attitudes
and horizon-scanner outputs. The MCC advised the MIJC site to
transmit to the astronaut the "go" decision for 22 orbital
passes. The automatic-fuel-quantity warning light came on at
2^:58:00 when the spacecraft automatic-fuel-quantity meter
was indicating 6l percent remaining.
The 17th and l8th passes were completely nominal. The space-
craft clock continued to gain approximately 1 second per
orbital pass and it was 18 seconds fast at 27:33:00. This
clock error was within specification accuracy and was of no
concern.

At approximately 29:27:00 during the 19th pass, the HAW cap-

sule communicator contacted the astronaut via the Kwajalein
Island air-ground remoting circuit. At this time the 0.05g
telelite event had not yet been reported. At 29:32:00 when
the spacecraft passed over HAW, the astronaut stated that
when he changed the warning-light switch from off to dim,
the green 0.05g telelite came on. He then placed the ASCS
0.05g fuse switch and the emergency 0.05g fuse in the off
position. It should be noted that at this time the only
concern at MCC was co determine what effect the indicated
problem had on the amplifier-calibrator and what functions,
if any, were lost as a consequence. There was no need to
terminate the mission at that time since no Mission Rules
had been violated and there were two control modes remaining.

After some analysis and discussion of the problem, it was

decided that the first step was to have the astronaut power
up the ASCS bus, which he did when the spacecraft passed
over GYM. Over MCC, the gyros were slaved to the horizon
scanners and after about 1 minute of operation no gyro or
scanner deviation from the gyro caged condition was noted.
This condition indicated that the power to the gyros and
scanners was off. At this point, although the tests were
Page 8 -

not yet completed, it was generally thought that the gyros,

attitude indicators,, and scanners were inoperative and that the
0.05g circuit was latched up. At this time it was realized
that a manual retrofire would be required and that a check-
list would have to be prepared for the astronaut.

At approximately 30:00:00 the remote site flight control

personnel that were on standby status were recalled to their
stations, and they were advised to stand by to attempt to
relay communications to the astronaut if directed by MCC.

While he was in contact with the CSQ, the astronaut was

requested to turn on the telemetry and the C-band beacon in
order that the Range Tracker could make a check of its radar
data, since this ship was the prime station for reentry
tracking. These data were even more important since the
retrofire maneuver would be performed manually. During the
time interval between loss of signal with MCC on the 20th pass
and acquisition of communications with HAW on this pass, addi-
tional tests were devised to verify where the ASCS logic was
latched up. As the spacecraft passed over HAW, the astronaut
was requested to place the ASCS 0.05g and emergency 0.05g fuse
switches in the on position and to select the ASCS automatic
mode to verify the 0.05g event. If the spacecraft began to
roll as it would normally do if 0.05g indications were valid,
the ASCS was latched in to the reentry mode. The astronaut
verified this roll rate, and the 0.05g event was confirmed
by telemetry over the GYM site. At this point the flight
controllers knew the configuration of the ASCS logic and
the required configuration for reentry. After completion
of this test, it was determined that the ASCS would provide
proper attitude control and roll rate for reentry.

Prior to the astronaut's acquiring communications with the

CSQ on the 21st pass, a manual retrofire checklist was com-
pleted and thoroughly checked out by MCC. This checklist
was sent via TWX to ZZB, CSQ, and HAW, and its receipt was
acknowledged. The checklist was as follows:

A. Primary procedure for retrofire

1. Attitude permission by-pass

2. Retrorocket arm switch, manual

3. Fly-by-wire thrust select switch, high and low

4. Retrosequence fuse switch, number 2

 Page 8-9

5- Retrofire manual fuse switch, number 2

6. ASCS a-c bus switch, on

T. ASCS 0.05g fuse switch, number 1

8. ASCS control switch, select

9- Mode select switch, off

10. Manual handle, push on

11. Squib arm at retrofire minus 5 seconds

12. Countdown to retrofire

IJ. Depress fire retro override at retrofire time

B. Backup to be used if there is no retrofire

1. Retro delay to instant

2. Depress retrosequence button

C. Additional precautions

1. Retropackage jettison will have to be manual.

Be sure not to arm the retropackage jettison
switch until after the rockets are fired.

2. Astronaut probably will not get a fire retro

telelite

D. Hold retroattitude and jettison retro, keep rates

as low as possible while maintaining usual reference
as an aid for low rates and at the nominal 0.05g time
(3^:09:19); select reentry mode.
E. At correct 0.05g time, select automatic on the ASCS
continuous switch.

In addition to the checklist which was relayed to the space-

craft and written down by the astronaut, the CSQ attempted
to reset the clock by a ground command. The desired clock
setting for the time of retrofire was 3^ hours 59 minutes and
52 seconds.

The desired time of retrofire was 33:59:30. The difference

between the clock setting and the desired time of retrofire
- 10

resulted from a correction for the predicted clock error

which would be 22 seconds fast at time of retrofire. Also
since the clock was not to be used for retrosequence, only
the minutes and seconds needed to be accurate for the astro-
naut's reference and the clock setting advanced 1 hour to
avoid possible clock timeout. This command was not set into
the clock, but the astronaut successfully reset the clock.
The telemetry and G-band beacon were again turned on for the
Range Tracker as the spacecraft passed over the CSQ.

The astronaut was advised to "take green for go, " which was
a coded means of telling him to take a dextro amphetamine
pill. The pill was used as an added precaution to be sure
that the astronaut was alert for the retrofire maneuver.
The flight surgeon was not concerned over the astronaut's
condition but he was not sure the astronaut was thoroughly
rested from his sleep. The ZZB site noted a rise in carbon
dioxide partial pressure (PCCu) and the astronaut was advised
to purge the suit circuit with fresh oxygen by going on
0 emergency rate flow. A quick estimate of the quantity of
d
1
oxygen remaining indicated that Ip- hours of 0 emergency rate
flow was available. The ZZB capsule communicator confirmed
each item on the checklist with the astronaut and he verified
that all items on the list were completed with the exception
of arming the squib switch.

Two additional items were added to the checklist at this

time. The first was to be sure that the visor was closed,
and the second was to cage the gyros.

For the first time, the astronaut reported to ZZB that the
main and standby 250 v-amp inverters had failed to operate.
At this point, MCC advised ZZB to turn the ASCS a-c switch
to off, because the inoperative power circuit would require
the entire reentry to be manually controlled.

The CSQ acquired communication with the spacecraft at 33:56:5^--

The capsule communicator and the astronaut reviewed the retro-
fire and reentry procedures and it was apparent that the
astronaut was prepared for his task. Time hacks were trans-
mitted to the astronaut at retrofire time minus 60 seconds
and at retrofire time minus 30 seconds. Finally, a 10-second
terminal countdown to retrofire was transmitted. The squib
bus was armed at retrofire minus 5 seconds. The number one
retrorocket was ignited at 33:59:30 and ignition of retro-
rockets number two and three occurred at the proper 5-second
 Page 8 - 1 1

intervals. The telemetry data immediately confirmed the

retrofire. The astronaut stated that his attitudes were
good and confirmed the ignition of the three retrorockets.
The retropackage was manually jettisoned at approximately
3^:00:43. Communications were good through loss of signal
with CSQ. The "beginning of the reentry blackout was re-
ported by the Range Tracker to be within 2 seconds of the
time predicted, which indicated that the landing point would
be close to nominal. Communications were regained by the
HAW capsule communicator via the relay aircraft at approxi-
mately 3^-: 20:30. The weather in the recovery area was good.
The final landing point was only about 4 miles from nominal.

8.2.7 General Comments.- The network flight control teams per-

formed extremely well. Communications between the ground
and the astronaut were concise and they conveyed the nec-
essary information. The flight control teams utilized the
proper contact and reporting procedures that were developed
for this mission. The network data as presented on the
summary messages appeared, in most cases, to have an accuracy
within 2 percent. The operations messages provided much use-
ful real-time data, and no difficulty existed in determining
the precise status of the spacecraft, the astronaut, and the
mission.

The ground communications were generally good; however, those

at the ZZB and CSQ sites were not as good as those from the
rest of the network. The air-ground communications as
monitored on the Goddard loop were somewhat better than in
previous missions and probably resulted from the use of
squelch control at the remote sites. The air-ground com-
munications as remoted through the HAW site were good; how-
ever, two transmitters at the HAW site failed.

The entire mission was an extremely smooth and well coordinated

effort. The preflight network simulation exercises were the
best planned and executed to date. The flight controllers
response was very good, and it is felt that this test was
the best executed mission or Project Mercury. The cooperation
between the flight astronaut and flight control personnel had
a significant influence on the success of the MA-9 mission.

CQNriDEMTIAlr
Page 8 - 12 "CONFIDENTIAL

8.2 Mercury Network Performance

The Mercury network performed its mission of flight-control support

and data collection in a very satisfactory manner. At lift-off, no major
equipment problems existed on the network. Several minor equipment mal-
functions occurred but they did not materially affect mission support.
Communications to all network sites from the Mercury Control Center
(MCC) were excellent during the countdown and throughout the flight.
Both high-frequency (HF) and teletype communications to the Rose Knot
Victor (RKV) tracking ship were lost at J2 minutes prior to lift-off
(T-J2) because of unfavorable atmospheric conditions. However,, teletype
communications were reestablished at T-9 minutes and HF communications
were reestablished 68 minutes after lift-off (T+68) to the RKV.

The computer and range checkout (CADFISS) tests made during the
mission indicated that the operational condition of sites which had been
released to a standby status was satisfactory prior to the next
spacecraft pass over that site. Radar data from the tracking ships,
Range Tracker and Twin Falls Victory, proved to be usable; however, the
data were not needed to determine orbital decay. The telemetry coverage
for all sites was excellent. Land-based radar coverage provided
excellent data to the Goddard computers. Attempts to skin track the
spacecraft were not successful. Air-to-ground communications were
good throughout the flight. Remote air-to-ground voice relays were
successfully operated through Ascension, Wake, and Kwajalein Islands and
through the Range Tracker Ship. Electrocardiogram (EGG) readouts were
transmitted in real time to the MCC from the network stations at
Antigua, California, Bermuda, and Ascension.

The onboard TV system proved to be compatible with the ground

systems at MCC and the Canary Islands (CYl); however, the picture
definition was usually very poor. This poor quality resulted from
unfavorable lighting conditions within the spacecraft and through the
window. The Coastal Sentry Quebec (CSQ) TV system did not function
properly and the system is being investigated. Command coverage was
available throughout the flight but not required for spacecraft control.

For the first time during a Mercury mission, aircraft equipped with
radar tracking equipment were used in an attempt to skin track the
spacecraft while in orbit and through the communications blackout period
during reentry. An analysis of the results, of these tests indicates
that tracking can be accomplished by airborne radars. Two radar aircraft
in the primary recovery area successfully skin tracked the spacecraft
from a slant range of over 600 nautical miles to the landing point.

The performance of the network for the MA-9 mission is consistent

with the support given for the MA-6, MA-7, and MA-8 missions. The
 1DENTIAL Page 8 - 13

absence of equipment malfunctions during the longer duration of the

MA-9 mission, considering that sites were allowed to go to a standby
status at various times, is indicative of a high degree of excellence
in maintenance and operational procedures by all sites.

8.2.1 Computing and trajectory displays.- The network countdown for

the MA-9 mission began at the Goddard Computing Center at
midnight on May 14. The Goddard computer, equipment, interface,
CADFISS, and trajectory confidence tests were all satisfactory.
During the countdown, some dropout in the Goddard "B" computer
readouts was observed at the MCC. The high-speed output
subchannel on the data communication channel for this computer
was interchanged with the plotboard high-speed subchannel.
At the request of the Flight Dynamics Officer, the powered-
flight- phase was supported with the "A" and "C" computers,
and then the support was switched to the "A" and "B" computers
during orbital flight. The "B" computer gave no indication
of dropout during the rest of the mission. Lift-off occurred
at 08:04:13 a.m. e.s.t.

The Atlantic Missile Eange (AMR) I.P. 709^ and the General
Electric - Burroughs computers provided excellent data
throughout the launch. A "go" decision was indicated by all
three data sources. The cut-off conditions are shown in
table 8.2.1-1.

In the orbital phase, during the periods when the spacecraft

C- and S-band beacons were on, the tracking data received
from the network sites were excellent. During the mission,
weight changes in the spacecraft resulting from fuel and
coolant-water usage were manually put into the computers.

The retrofire time recommended by the Goddard computers was

33:59:30, and retrofire was manually initiated at this time.
After retrofire, the predicted landing point transmitted to
the MCC from the Goddard computer was 27° 22' North latitude
and 176° 29' West longitude. An attempt to refine this
prediction with six frames of data from the Range Tracker
ship, acquired during blackout, failed to yield a converged
solution. The computed time of the blackout was from
3^:08:16 to 3V. 22:30. The actual time of initial blackout
was reported by the Range Tracker to be 3^-:08:17« The actual
landing point was reported by the recovery ship to be
27° 22.6' North latitude and 176° 35-3' West longitude.

Although several minor computer problems were encountered and

corrected throughout the flight, at no time during the mission
did the computers fail to drive the digital displays and
plotboards at the MCC. In addition, performance of the high-
speed lines between Goddard and the MCC was excellent.
 3-
For the first time, CADFISS tests were conducted during the
mission to determine the operational status of major equipment
subsystems at network sites. These tests were considered
necessary since mandatory equipment at many sites was shut
down for prolonged periods of time when the spacecraft was out
of range. All of these tests were successfully supported by
the third Goddard computer while the other two Goddard
computers continued the operational support of the mission.
This flight was the first to be supported by a triplex computing
system and the IBM 709^ computers.

Two range ships, the Range Tracker and the Twin Falls Victory,
were used to provide tracking data to the Goddard computers.
The Range Tracker provided good tracking data during the 7th,
20th, and 21st orbital passes. During reentry the Range Tracker
was poorly positioned with respect to the blackout zone and
provided only six frames of data for this phase of reentry.
An analysis of these data indicated a landing point which was
about-3° or 180 nautical miles away from the correct landing
point. Twin Falls Victory data readout was good on three passes.
East Island data appear to be unusable. Ascension Island data,
used for the first time in a Mercury mission, appear to be
satisfactory.

8.2.2 Command system.- The command system for the MA-9 mission
operated in a satisfactory mariner, and the command control plan
was followed very closely throughout the mission. Several
malfunctions were noted at various sites, but command capability
was never lost by any site during the time in which the space-
craft was passing over that site. The command carrier "on"
indication from BDA to the MCC was delayed approximately
32 seconds on the first pass; however, it had no net effect on
the mission since the onboard command receiver signal strength
remained above the receiver threshold setting. A summary of
the command handover exercises is shown in table 8.2.2-1 and
a summary of command transmissions is shown in table 8.2.2-2.

8.2.2.1 Ground system: A preliminary evaluation of the data shows

that all command sites had very good command coverage during
each pass. Command coverage became reliable at slant ranges
varying from 300 to 950 nautical miles. This large variance
was caused by the change in spacecraft antenna orientation
while the spacecraft was in attitude-free drifting flight, the
trajectory of"the spacecraft over the site, and the transmitter
output power of the respective sites.

MCC, GBI, and San Salvador (SAL) provided command con-

trol coverage during launch. This coverage was provided
by the MCC low pover unit from lift-off to T+90 seconds,
by the MCC high power unit from T+90 seconds to
 Page 8 - 1 5

seconds, and by the SAL high power unit from

T+245 seconds to T+3&0 seconds, at which time command control
was switched to BDA. This switch to BDA was performed at
00:05:58.350, but the command carrier "on" indication was not
received at MCC until 00:06:30.3^, a delay of 32 seconds.
An evaluation of the onboard receiver signal strength data
revealed that the ground transmitted carrier was being received
by the onboard system at a signal strength of 27.5 microvolts
from lift-off to 00:07:03. The ground-recorded telemetry
readout correlates well with the onboard recorded data. This
delay is considered to have been a function of the ground
remoting equipment and was not detrimental to command control
during the launch phase. Investigations are continuing to
determine the cause of this delay.

The command control handover plan was updated one time during
the mission. This change compensated for the slight variance
in the orbital trajectory over the 22 orbital passes and was
sent to the Coastal Sentry Quebec (CSQ) ship for the reentry
phase. All other times were nominal.

A total of 19 functions was transmitted from the command

stations. All of these functions were received onboard the
spacecraft with the exception of one telemetry "on" function
from Muchea (MUG) and the clock change from the CSQ. The
telemetry "on" command from MUG was not received because it
was transmitted when the spacecraft was out of range of the
600-watt ground transmitter. The clock change from the CSQ
was not received because the command tone was also sent before
the spacecraft was within range of the ground transmitter.
The frequency monitor aircraft which was stationed in the
Pacific reported through the CSQ that they did not attempt
any transmissions on the command frequency during the orbital
passes monitored.

The following ground system malfunctions were experienced:

1. The Bermuda high-power transmitter came on with a

3-6-kw output but did not come up to full power and failed
over to low power at approximately 00:06:16. This failover
did not interrupt command control during this pass. Beam
voltage was low and was corrected in time to support the next
pass with full 10 kw-power output.

"Vailover is defined as failure of the primary system,

accompanied by automatic switching to standby system.

•
 8 -16
2. The RKV had an intermittent problem in the beam
power supply of the backup power amplifier, and at 09:24:47 it
was reported as being inoperative for the remainder of the
mission. The prime transmitter was used to support the remainder
of the mission.

3. At BDA the C-band beacon "on" command was on before

the command carrier came up at 22:08:00, giving a code fault.
The code fault was released after the command system was brought
up manually.

4. Guaymas (GYM) had an autotransformer failure in the

standby transmitter at 25:16:47, and the system was reported
as operative at 27:13:47.

8.2.2.2 Spacecraft command system: The spacecraft had only one command
receiver onboard during the MA-9 mission. The threshold level
was intended to be set between 2.5 and 3 microvolts; however,
the receiver was capable of and did receive command functions
at a level of approximately 5-microvolt. The saturation
value of the receiver was 27-5 microvolts. The system operated
normally with the exception of spurious command carrier reception
at 03:35:00 to 03:38:00, 11:24:00 to 11:27:00, and 27:10:40 to
27:13:20. During the time period of 27:10:40 to 27:13:20,
eight functions, having a duration of approximately 2 seconds
each, were recorded on the onboard recorder. These functions
have yet to be identified; however, they were of such a nature
that they did not affect the mission. An investigation is in
progress to determine the exact cause of these recorded events.
The preliminary results tend to show that these signals were
generated outside the spacecraft and were not caused by internal
EF beat harmonics.

The effect of antenna orientation angle during drifting flight

was noticeable, as it had been during the MA-8 mission.
However, the signal strengths received were much better than
had been anticipated. The onboard system was capable of and
did receive functions whenever they were transmitted within
range of the ground transmitters.

8.2.3 Eadar tracking performance.- During the countdown on May l4,

1963, the radar at Bermuda failed to pass the CADFISS slew
tests. Digital data were intermittently of poor quality in
both the azimuth and range channels. Efforts to locate the
trouble were ineffective, and the quality of the data
gradually decreased. At T-15 minutes, the range data error
exceeded the tolerable limits, and at T-13 minutes the mission

CONFIDENTIAL
 Page 8-17

was postponed. Subsequent trouble shooting revealed a

faulty preamplifier in the azimuth digital data channel and
a faulty shift register in the range digital data channel.
The simultaneous failure of both components complicated the
failure analysis. The radar was repaired at 2:00 p.m. e.s.t.
on May l4, 1963.

On launch day there were no radar problems, and the C- and

S-band beacon checks prior to launch indicated no beacon
problems. The network C-band radars tracked approximately
10 percent of the total mission time, which is 80 percent of
the total time that the C-band beacon was turned on. The
network S-band radars tracked 1.7 percent of the total mission
time, which is 36 percent of the total time that the S-band
beacon was turned on. The amount of radar data furnished to
the Goddard computers was of sufficient quality and quantity
to update the trajectories, and it was determined that the
orbital parameters did not decay an appreciable amount.
Initial tracking reports indicated that the C-band beacon
was not as good as it had been on previous missions because
of the heavier than usual modulation on the beacon replies.
The heavy modulation experienced by the MCC and BDA radars
during launch seemed to lessen as the mission progressed.

In addition to the normal Mercury Network radar sites, the

following sites were used for the MA-9 mission: Ascension
Island, East Island, Puerto Rico, and the radar ships Twin
Falls Victory and Range Tracker. Radar tracking data for all
sites are tabulated in tables 8.2.3-1 and 8.2.3-2.

8.2.4 Ground telemetry system performance.- The telemetry coverage

for the MA-9 mission was excellent as shown in table 8.2.4-1.
There were no major ground system failures, although some
coverage was lost because of the manual switching procedure
used onboard the spacecraft. In general, any deviation from
nominal coverage can be attributed to spacecraft attitude or
to the transmitter being turned off. The telemetry relay
circuits from Antigua, California, Bermuda, and Ascension
were satisfactory in all respects. During all passes over
these stations when telemetry antennas were radiating, data
were remoted to the MCC. During the third orbital pass, the
telemetry was switched to the high-frequency link prior to the
spacecraft's passing over Hawaii and remained on until it
was over the California site, at which time telemetry was
switched back to the low-frequency link. At all other times,
the telemetry remained on low frequency. No telemetry system
anomalies were noted during this period.
Page 8 - 18 CONFIDENTIAL

In general, the performance of the acquisition-aid systems

at all stations was satisfactory and comparable to that of
previous missions. Low-angle elevation tracking, "below
approximately 15% was accomplished manually because of
multipath conditions at most stations. The only major
acquisition-aid problem experienced during the mission was
on the CSQ where failure of the elevation antenna drive
system occurred prior to the 6th orbital pass. However, the
antenna was positioned manually from the 6th through the
8th passes, and the malfunction in the drive system was corrected
in time for acquisition in the 9~th pass.

8.2.5 Air-to-ground communications.- During the MA-9 mission, the

air-to-ground communications were of good quality. The UHF
system was used as the primary communications system except
for the scheduled HF checks. During periods of communication,
UHF coverage varied only slightly from predicted acquisition
and loss times because of the nominal orbital trajectory.
As expected, air-to-ground communications could not be
established during the communications blackout period. An
Instrumentation Support Instruction was transmitted to the
network outlining the use of the UHF squelch circuit as defined
in the network documentation. A premission checkout and the
mission results indicate that proper use of the squelch
circuit eliminates background noise from open UHF receivers
during periods of silence. This change also resulted in a
reduction of noise level on the Goddard circuit during
air-to-ground transmissions.

The results of the ground HF antenna test, in which a

vertically polarized antenna replaced the normally used
horizontally polarized two-element beam, are inconclusive at
this time. The Kano station reported that the signal strength
received was lower when the vertically polarized antenna was
used than when the horizontally polarized antenna was used.
Texas reported higher signal strengths when the vertically
polarized antenna was used during the second period of space-
craft contact. Since these reports are conflicting, analysis
of the test results is continuing.

Relay aircraft in the Atlantic Ocean area reported good UHF

reception from the spacecraft and good relay transmissions to
MCC on the 2nd, 3rd, and 17th orbital passes. A relay attempt
on the l6th pass was unsuccessful because of a severe thunder-
storm in the vicinity of the relay aircraft. Communications
from the MCC to the spacecraft through the relay aircraft
were not attempted on the 2nd pass, and they were unsuccessful
on the 3rd pass because the spacecraft had passed out of range.
However, they were successful on the 17th pass. Ascension and
 8-19

Antigua Islands in the Atlantic were also available for

relaying communications between the spacecraft and the MCC.
Relay through Ascension was successfully accomplished for a
period of approximately 6 minutes during the 3rd orbital
pass. The Antigua voice relay was not used during the
mission.

In the Pacific Ocean area, communications were successfully re-

layed from Hawaii through Kwajalein and ¥ake Islands on passes 3
and 19, respectively. A voice-operated relay from the MCC
through the Range Tracker was attempted on the 20th orbital pass.
However, this attempt was unsuccessful because the transmission
was made on the MCC/HAW remote air-ground position instead of
the Goddard Conference Loop. This error apparently placed a
1700-cps tone on the circuit to the Range Tracker and resulted
in keeping the auto-voice relay continuously closed; however,
several transmissions from the astronaut were received in the
MCC. Another attempt to use the relay on the 22nd pass was
ineffective. As in the MA-8 mission, satisfactory communications
were established in the primary landing area between the space-
craft and Hawaii using relay aircraft.

Table 8.2.5-1 summarizes the air-to-ground communications

coverage.

Wfctfe
 .•„*"•#-»'.• '•' • -•*• - i.

- 20 COMriDEMTIAL

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 Page 8 - 2 1

TABLE 8.2.2-1.- COMMAND HANDOVER SUMMARY

Orbital coverage: Mercury Control Center, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna;

Grand Bahama Island, 10 kw into sterling antenna; San Salvador, 10 kw
into sterling antenna; Bermuda, 600 w into quadhelix antenna (1st pass)
10 kw into quadhelix antenna (all other passes); Hawaii, California,
and Rose Knot Victor, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna; Muchea, Guaymas,
and Coastal Sentry Quebec, 600 w into quadhelix antenna

Command carrier +10 [iv carrier

Station coverage above
line of sight,
On, g.e.t Off, g.e.t. percent

Mercury Control Center Launch 00:04:05

(00:04:07) 100

Mercury Control Center 00:04:05 00:06:00

(San Salvador) (00:04:07) (00:06:00) 100

Bermuda 00:05:58 00:12:00

(00:06:16) (00:12:00) 52

Muchea 00:45:00 00:59:00

(00:45:00) (00:59:00) 86

California (backup to 01:23:00 01:30:30

Guaymas ) (01:22:14) (01:33:1^) Mo radiation

Guaymas 01:20:00 01:33:00

(01:20:00) (01:30:00) 85
Mercury Control Center 01:33:00 01:38:00
(01:33:02) (01:38:00) 100

Bermuda 01:38:00 01:45:00

(01:38:00) (01:45:00) 97
Muchea 02:15:00 02 : 32 : 00
(02:15:00) (02:32:50) 95
Hawaii 02:45:00 02:56:00
(02:45:00) (02:56:00) 100

California 02:56:00 03:04:00

(02:53:49) (03:04:49) 93
Guaymas 03:04:00 03:06:00
(03:04:00) (03:06:00) 30
Mercury Control Center 03:06:00 03:12:00
(03:06:02) (03:11:50) 91

xhe times given in parentheses are actual; times not given in parentheses
are planned.

Reduced signal strength and multi-path anticipated at the spacecraft due

to the low elevation angle and/or excessive slant range. Command Control Carrier
ON/OFF times are as noted.
 - 22

TABtE 8.2.2-1.- COMMAND HANDOVER SUMMARY - Continued

Orbital coverage: Mercury Control Center, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna

Grand Bahama Island, 10 kw into sterling antenna; San Salvador, 10 kw
into sterling antenna; Bermuda, 600 w into quadhelix antenna (1st pass)
10 kw into quadhelix antenna (all other passes); Hawaii, California,
and Rose Knot Victor, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna; Muchea, Guaymas,
and Coastal Sentry Quebec, 600 w into quadhelix antenna

Command carrier +10 p,v carrier

Station coverage atove
line of sight,
On, g.e.t. Off, g.e.t. percent

Bermuda 03:12:00 03:18:00

(03:12:03) (03:18:00) 100
t
Muchea 03:54:00 04:05:00
(03:54:00) (Ok: 05:00) 90
Hawaii 04:15:00 04:30:00
(04:15:00) (04:30:00) 69
California 04:30:00 Ok : 36: 00
(04:27:27) (04:40:12) 84
Guaymas 04:36:00 04:40:00
(04:36:00) (04:40:00) 100

Mercury Control Center 04:40:00 04:45:45

(04:40:02) (04:45:48) 100

San Salvador 04:45:45 04:47:00

(Ok-.h-y-.k8) (04:47:02) 100

Grand Turk Island o4:47:oo 04:50:30

(4:47:03) (04:50:33) 97
Hawaii 05=56:00 06:03:00
(05:55=00) (06:03:00) 100

California 06:03:00 06:09:00

(06:00:11) (06:11:11) 100

Guaymas 06:09:00 06:14:15

(06:09:00) (06:14:00) 100

Mercury Control Center 06:14:15 06:19:30

(06:14:16) (06:19:29) 100

Hawaii13 07:30:00 07:35:00

(07:30:00) (07:35:00) 77

The times given in parentheses are actual; times not given in parentheses
are planned.

Reduced signal strength and multi-path anticipated at the spacecraft due to

the low elevation angle and/or excessive slant range. Command Control Carrier
OH/OFF times are as noted.

counsel
 Page 8 - 2 3

TABLE 8.2.2-1.- COMMAND HANDOVER SUMMARY - Continued

Orbital coverage: Mercury Control Center, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna;

Grand Bahama Island, 10 kw into sterling antenna; San Salvador, 10 kw
into sterling antenna; Bermuda, 600 w into quadhelix antenna (1st pass)
10 kw into quadhelix antenna (all other passes); Hawaii, California,
and Rose Knot Victor, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna; Muchea, Guaymas,
and Coastal Sentry Quebec, 600 w into quadhelix antenna

Command carrier +10 p,v carrier

Station coverage above
line of sight,
On, g.e.t. Off, g.e.t. percent

California13 07:37:00 07:42:30

(07:34:28) (07:44:34) 82

Guaymas 07:42:30 07:48:00

(07:42:30) (07:48:00) 74
Coastal Sentry Quebec 08:45:00 08:54:30
(08:43:40) (09:00:40) 37
Hawaii 09:02:00 09:10:30
(09:02:00) (09:10:30) 96
Coastal Sentry Quebec 10:18:00 10.28:00
(10:17:53) (10:30:21) 81
Hawaii 10:35:00 10:45:00
(10:35:00) (10:45:00) 77
Coastal Sentry Quebec 11:53:00 12:02:00
(11:50:36) (12:03:46) 88
Hawaii13 12:10:00 12:17:00
(12:10:00) (12:17:00) 50
Rose Knot Victor 12:23:00 12:33:00
(12:20:47) (12:34:06) 31
Coastal Sentry Quebec 13:25:00 13:36:00
(13:23:30) (13:37:42) 97
Rose Knot Victor 13:55:00 14:07:00
(13:53:47) (14:07:45) 100
Coastal Sentry Quebec 15:00:00 15:09:00
(14:57:24) (15:10:53) 79
Rose Knot Victor 15:30:00 15:40:00
(15:27:47) (15:41:03) 93

T?he times given in parentheses are actual; times not given in parentheses
are planned.

Reduced signal strength and multi-path anticipated at the spacecraft due

to the low elevation angle and/or excessive slant range. Command Control Carrier
ON/OFF times are as noted.

*
 Page 8 - 2 4

TABLE 8.2.2-1.- COMMAND HANDOVER SUMMARY - Continued

Orbital coverage: Mercury Control Center, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna;

Grand Bahama Island, 10 kw into sterling antenna; San Salvador, 10 kw
into sterling antenna; Bermuda, 600 w into quadhelix antenna (1st pass)
10 kw into quadhelix antenna (all other passes); Hawaii, California,
and Rose Knot Victor, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna; Muchea, Guaymas,
and Coastal Sentry Quebec, 600 w into quadhelix antenna

Command carrier +10 |_LV carrier

Station coverage above
line of sight,
On, g.e.t. Off, g.e.t. percent

Coastal Sentry Quebec (16:28:47) (l6:42:0j)

Rose Knot Victor 17:04:00 17:14:00
(17:01:4?) (17:14:42) 100

Rose Knot Victor 18:38:00 18:48:00

(18:34:47) (18:48:44) 92

Rose Knot Victor 20:12:00 20:21:00

(20:08:47) (20:21:58) 95

Grand Turk Island 20:30:00 20:35:30

(20:30:02) (20:35:34) 57
Muchea 21:18:00 21:27:00
(21:18:00) (21:27:00) 76
Mercury Control Center 22:02:00 22:08:00
(22:02:01) (22:08:00) 71
Bermuda 22:08:00 22:13:00
(22:08:00) (22:13:00) 100

Muchea 22:50:00 23:00:00

(22:50:00) (23:00:00) 78
Guaymas 23:30:00 23:35:00
(23:30:00) (23:35:00) 62
Mercury Control Center 23:35:00 23:40:45
(23:35:01) (23:40:46) 54
Bermuda 23:40:45 23:46:45
(23:40:45) (23:46:00) 81
Muchea 24:24:00 24:34:00
(24:24:00) (24:34:00) 69

The times given in parentheses are actual; times not given in parentheses
are planned.

Reduced signal strength and multi-path anticipated at the spacecraft due

to the low elevation angle and/or excessive slant range. Command Control Carrier
ON/OFF times are as noted.
 Page 8 - 2 5

TABLE 8.2.2-1.- COMMAND HANDOVER SUMMARY - Continued

Orbital coverage: Mercury Control Center, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna;

Grand Bahama Island, 10 kw into sterling antenna; San Salvador, 10 kw
into sterling antenna; Bermuda, 600 w into quadhelix antenna (1st pass)
10 kw into quadhelix antenna (all other passes); Hawaii, California,
and Rose Knot Victor, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna; Muchea, Guaymas,
_and Coastal Sentry Quebec, 600 w into quadhelix antenna

Command carrier +10 n,v carrier

Station coverage above
line of sight,
On, g.e.t. Off, g.e.t. percent

1
California (backup to 25:00:00 25:07:00
Guaymas ) (25:00:00) (25:06:47)

Guaymas 25:00:00 25:10:00

(25:00:00) (25:10:00) 95
Mercury Control Center 25:10:00 25:14:00
(25:10:02) (25:14:00) 55
Bermuda 25:14:00 25:20:00
(25:14:00) (25:20:00) 86
Muchea 25:57:00 26:07:00
(25:57:00) (26:07:00) 88
Hawaii 26:23:00 26:32:00
(26:23:00) (26:32:00) 100

California 26:32:00 26:39:00

(26:32:04) (26:39:02) 56
Guaymas 26:39:00 26:43:00
(26:39=00) (26:43:00) 64
Mercury Control Center 26:43:00 26:48:00
(26:43:02) (26:48:00) ^5
Bermuda 26:48:00 26:53:00
(26:48:00) (26:53:00) 100

Muchea 27:30:00 27:40:00

(27:30:00) (27:40:00) 100

Hawaii 27:56:00 28:05:00

(27:56:00) (28:05:00) 97
California 28:05:00 28:12:00
(28:05:15) (28:12:14) 73

T?he times given in parentheses are actual; times not given in parenthese
are planned.

Reduced signal strength and multi-path anticipated at the spacecraft due

to the low elevation angle and/or excessive slant range. Command Control Carrier
OH/OFF times are as noted.
 Page 8 - 2 6

TABI£ 8.2.2-1.- COMMAND HANDOVER SUMMARY - Concluded

Orbital coverage: Mercury Control Center, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna;

Grand Bahama Island, 10 kw into sterling antenna; San Salvador, 10 kw
into sterling antenna; Bermuda, 600 w into quadhelix antenna (1st pass)
10 kw into quadhelix antenna (all other passes); Hawaii, California,
and Rose Knot Victor, 10 kw into quadhelix antenna; Muchea, Guaymas,
and Coastal sentry Quebec* 600 w into quadhelix antenna

Command carrier +10 u.v carrier

Station coverage above
line of sight,
On, g.e.t. Off, g.e.t. percent

Guaymas 28:12:00 28:16:30

(28:12:00) (28:16:30) 57
Mercury Control Center 28:16:30 28:23:00
(28:16:32) (28:23:00) 92
Hawaii 29:30:00 29:38:00
(29:30:00) (29:38:00) 78
California 29:38:00 29:44:30
(29:38:00) (29:44:30) 66
Guaymas 29:1)4:30 29:50:00
(29:1(4:30) (29:50:00) 78
Coastal Sentry Quebec (30:48:47) (30:59:^3) 49
. .b
Hawaii 31:05:00 31 : 11 : 00
(31:05:00) (31:11:00) 97
California 31:13:00 31: 19 :~00
(31:13:00) (31: 15 -AT) 25
Guaymas 31:15:00 31:22:00
(31:15:30) (31:22:00) 70
Coastal Sentry Quebec 32:22:00 32:30:'00
(32:19:00) (32:32:19) 88
Hawaii 32:38:00 32:46:00
(32:38:00) (32:46:00) 84
Coastal Sentry Quebec 35:55:00 34:03:00
(33:51:30) (34:05:30) 91
Hawaii (backup for 34:11:00 34:20:00
Coastal Sentry Quebec -
reentry )

times given in parentheses are actual; times not given in parentheses

are planned.

Reduced signal strength and multi-path anticipated at the spacecraft due

to the low elevation angle and/or excessive slant range. Command Control Carrier
ON/OFF times are as noted.
 Page 8 - 2 7

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 Page 8 - 2 8 •CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 8.2.3-1.- COMPUTER READOUT OF RADAR TRACKING DATA

Station Pass no. Lines of data Maximum elevation, deg

Total Invalid Garbled
1 a 1 18 0
Bermuda, 7^ 67-5
Bermuda 1 7k 17 0 67-5
Canary Islands 1 61 3 1 72.1
Canary Islands 1 62 3 0 72.1
Muchea 1 85 11 1 64.4
Woomera 1 62 38 0 79-2
White Sands 1 36 9 0 15.4
Eglin AFB 1 70 33 0 44.9
East Island 2 2 2 0 .7
Mercury Control Center 2 67 25 0 18.2
Bermuda 2 77 52 2 96.0
Hawaii 3 50 28 4 25.0
California 3 42 7 0 36.5
White Sands 3 ^5 14 0 80.9
Eglin AFB 3 73 10 0 36.6
Mercury Control Center 1* 45 32 0 37-2
San Salvador k 15 0 0 84.4
East Island 4 56 1 0 47.7
Bermuda 4 47 4T 0 2.8
Ascension 4 73 13 0 25.0
Rose Knot Victor 7 26 0 0 59-0
Hawaii 7 49 18 0 71.7
Woomera 14 58 33 0 70.2
Mercury Control Center 15 47 25 0 8.8
East Island 15 15 0 0 6.9
San Salvador 15 10 3 0 2.0
Bermuda 15 64 17 0 14. 3
Muchea 15 74 2 0 61.2
Woomera 15 66 29 0 49.4
Eglin AFB 15 59 37 0 25.2

FPS-16
Verlort
 Page 8-29

TABLE 8.2.3-1.- COMPUTER READOUT OF RADAR TRACKING DATA - Concluded

Station Pas s no . Lines of data Maximum elevation, deg

Total Invalid Garbled

Mercury Control Center 16 €k 16 0 65.0

Bermuda 16 63 24 0 76.5
Hawaii 18 30 2k 0 21.1
California 18 33 17 0 27.6
White Sands 18 1*0 1 0 70.2

Eglin AFB 18 68 12 0 28.0

Mercury Control Center 19 31 12 0 27-3
San Salvador 19 kl 1 0 56.9
East Island 19 8 0 0 33-0
Bermuda 19 39 0 0 2-3
Rose Knot Victor 20 29 1 0 59-8
Rose Knot Victor 21 28 0 0 48.5
Hawaii 21 37 18 0 9-1
Rose Knot Victor 22 20 14 0 24.1

CONFIDENTIAL
..» _
 8 - 30

TABLE 8.2.3-2.- RADAR TRACKING PERIODS

Duration of signal
Station
Acquisition, g.e.t. Loss, g.e.t.

C-"band

Mercury Control 00:00:00 00:06:10

Center 01:25:54 01:itO:07
04:43:36 Oi4-:^7:32
22:05:59 22:09:13
28:17:45 28:23:21

Grand Bahama 00:00:52 00:05:08

Island Oil-: 114:00 04:Vf:V7
28:18:47 28:23:30

San Salvador 00:02:00 00:06:^7

22:09:39 22:10:1+3
28:18:58 28:24:28

East Island 04:U6:06 04:51:^

22:07:25 22:09:46
28:21:50 28:24:30

Twin Falls Victory 01:38:05 01:40:20

0^5:^0 04:48:07
22:06:59 22:08:35
22:10:09 22:10:49
23:^0:33 23:44:11

Ascension Olf:59:26 05:04:58

05:05:lU 05:06:35

Bermuda 00:03:25 00:09:55

01:37:38 01:40:18
Ol4-:l|^:39 04:49:10
22:06:^2 22:12:51
23:37:^5 23:44:51
2^:20:15 24:20:27
28:20:30 28:23:41

Woomera 00:56:16 01:02:42

21:25:12 21:29:43
22:57:2^ 23:03=31
 TABLE 8.2.3-2.- RADAR TRACKING PERIODS - Concluded

Station
Duration of signal
Acquisition, g.e.t. Loss, g.e.t.

C-band

Rose Knot Victor 10:33:28 10:36:29

31:01:44 31:04:44
32:35:10 32:37:54
34:09:51 34:10:33
Hawaii 04:23:40 04:28:36
05:57=17 06:01:27
10:37:17 10:43:23
27:58:14 28:04:22
31:06:20 31:10:16
32:40:02 32:45:37
California 01:27:05 01:31:05
04:29:06 04:34:09
28:ll:lU 28:13:17
White Sands 01:29:59 01:33:22
04:37:19 04:41:21
23:34:1*4 23:37:03
26:40:22 26:40:42
28:11:59 28:16:20

Eglin APE 01:34:01 01:38:54

04:39:21 04:4-5:57
23:37:28 23:40:16
28:15:16 28:21:25

S-band

Bermuda 00:04:11 00:09:57

Canary Islands 00:15:47 00:21:35
22:19:41 22:23:29
Muchea 00:49:45 00:58:07
22:53:27 23:00:44

... CONFIDENTIAL
•* -.
Page 8 - 3 2

TABLE 8.2.4-1.- TELEMETRY COVERAGE

Duration of signal
Coverage., percent
Acquisition, g. e.t. Loss, g. e. t.

Mercury Control Center

0 00: 07: k2 90
01:33:22 01: 40: 42 95
03:06:57 03:14:15 95
Ok: kO: 18 Ok: 47: 16 95
06:15:06 06:20:00 95
22:04:15 22:10:37 95
23:36:5? 23:44:21 90
25:09:20 25:16:27 95
26: 42: 45 26:50:51 95
28:16:10 28:23:10 95
29:50:37 29:55:05 95
Grand Bahama Island

00:01:14 00:06:44 98
01:34:15 01:40:15 98
03:08:00 03:14:13 98
04:41:30 04:45:50 98
06:15:20 06:20:30 98
22:03:50 22:10:10 98
23:37:00 23:43:05 98
25:10:30 25:16:45 98
26:44:30 26:50:30 98
28:17:30 28:23:15 98
29:51:50 29:55:50 98

— * -ii "r ,
 Page 8 - 3 3

TABLE 8.2.4-1.- TELEMETRY COVERAGE - Continued

Duration of signal
Coverage , percent
Acquisition, g. e.t. Loss, g. e.t.

Grand Turk Island

00:02:30 00: 07: 42 90

01:37:04 01:41:10 100
03:10:12 03:15:06 100
04:43:00 04:50:50 95
06:17:08 06:23:10 95
20:31:10 20:37=30 98
22:04:09 22:11:04 95
23=38:45 23=43:43 95
25:13:0? 25:17:12 100
26:46:08 26:52:10 95
28:18:55 28:23:12 98
29:52=03 29: 58: 21 95

Bermuda

00:03:12 00:10:23 95
01:36:41 01:43:56 99
03:10:05 03:15:09 99
04: 44: 15 04:49:15 99
20:35:38 20:38:40 95
22:06:31 22:13:18 99
23:39:36 23:46:41 99
25:12:51 25:20:06 99
26:46:12 26:53=12 99
28:20:26 28:23:14 95

OOMTDDMIAfc
 TABLE 8. 2. 4-1. - TELEMETRY COVERAGE - Continued

Duration of signal
Coverage ^ percent
Acquisition, g. e.t. Loss, g. e.t.

Canary Islands

00:14:11 00:21:37 100

01:47:52 01: 54: 27 98
17=37:14 17:43 = 30 100
19:09:54 19:17:02 100
20:44:04 20:50:24 100
22: 17:34 22:24:00 100
23:50:39 23:57:42 100
25:24:21 25=30=33 100

Kano

00:21:09 00:28:29 98
01:54:49 02:01:30 97
14:33:24 14:40:23 98
16:07:13 16:13:13 98
22:26:26 22:28:21 94
23=57:25 24: 04: 42 98
25:31:15 25:37:20 98

OONnDDPiTIAL1
 Page 8 - 35

TABLE 8. 2. 4-1. - TELEMETRY COVERAGE - Continued

Duration of signal
Coverage , percent
Acquisition, g. e.t. Loss, g. e.t.

Zanzibar

00:29:59 00:39:17 96
02:04:02 02:11:12 90
10:00:02 10: Ok: 04 88
11:52:56 11:38:05 89
22:35:2? 22: 38: 42 95
23=53:55 24:02:02 97
25:40:42 25:46:52 96
33: 32: 42 33=39:32 97

Muchea

00:49:19 00:58:11 96
02:22:52 02:31:40 97
03:58:12 04:04:27 97
21:19:40 21:27:11 97
22:52:12 23:00:50 94
24:25:30 24:35:12 97
25:58:55 26:07=37 98
27:33:52 27:40:06 98

COMriDDWTIAL
Page 8 - 3 6

TABLE 8.2.4-1.- TELEMETRY COVERAGE - Continued

Duration of signal
Coverage} percent
Acquisition, g. e.t. Loss, g. e.t.

Canton Island

01:09:25 01:l6:4l 98
02:43:10 02:49:45 99
12:16:15 12:24:06 95
13:50:14 13:57:03 98
24:11-5:25 24:53:01 97
26:19:21 26:25=35 99

Coastal Sentry Quebec

08:52:00 08:54:57 40
10:21:30 10:28:22 90
11:55:0? 12:01:46 95
13:28:34 13:35:42 100
15:02:02 15:08:03 95
16:37:45 16: 40: 03 05
32:23:26 32:30:19 98
33:56:52 34:03:30 90
 .COinTDDOTfAL Page 8 - 3 7

TABLE 8.2.4-1.-- TELEMETRY COVERAGE - Continued

Duration of signal
Coverage . percent
Acquisition, g. e.t. Loss, g. e.t.

Hawaii

02:49:17 02:55:12 80
04:22:01 04:29:02 93
05:57:20 06: 01: 45 92
07:30:51 07:35:07 10
09:04:02 09:10:25 60
10: 37: 03 10:44:48 75
12:11:18 12:17:17 75
26:24:50 26:31:22 90
27:57:57 28:04:32 75
29:35:02 29:37:20 95
31:07:00 31:10:41 85
32:39:3^ 32:45:50 80

Rose Knot Victor

12:25:26 12:33:20 98
13:58:22 14: 07: 14 98
15:32:24 15: 40: 40 98
17:06:30 17:14:22 93
18:39:57 18:48:31 98
20:13:34 20:21:14 98
Page 8 - 3 8

TABLE 8.2.4-1.- TELEMETRY COVERAGE - Continued

Duration of signal
Coverage, percent
Acquisition, g. e.t. Loss, g.e.t.

Guaymas

01:25:57 01:33:27 80
03:00:23 03:06:47 89
04:34:22 04:40:27 96
06:07:33 06:14:17 96
07:40:59 07:47:20 94
23:30:23 23:35:37 94
25:02:42 25:09:31 97
26:36:28 26: 42: 47 95
28:10:03 28:16:17 96
29:43:18 29: 50: 03 98
31: 16: hO 31:22:40 94

California

01:26:4? 01:31:07 95
02:58:37 03:05:07 98
04:31:07 04:38:32 97
06:04:02 06:11:03 95
07:38:17 07:44:17 98
25:02:32 25:07:32 98
26:34:27 26:41:02 99
28:06:27 28:14:25 98
29:39:07 29:47:17 97
31:13=47 31:19=47 98

COIUriDDNTIAtr
 Page 8 - 3 9

TABLE 8.2.^-1.- TELEMETRY COVERAGE - Continued

Duration of signal
Coverage , percent
Acquisition, g.e.t. Loss, g.e.t.

Texas

01:29:31 01:36:25 70
03:03:20 03:09:55 100
0^:36:52 0^:^3:55 100
06:10:08 06:17:30 100
07:50:00 07:^:07 100
22:02:05 22:03:^7 100
23:32=22 23=39:1^ 100
25:05:^0 25:12:3^ 98
26:39:25 26:^5:55 100
28:12:^5 28:19:^2 90
29:^6:56 29:53:00 100
31=12:35 31:23:20 50

Ascension

06:3^:39 06:39:38 99
12: 52: Ml- 12: 58: 57 99
14: 2k: ^3 1^:33:21 99
16:02:13 16:02:17 99
27:01:^0 27:09:39 99

COMriDDPiTIAL
Page 40 •CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE 8.2.4-1.- TELEMETRY COVERAGE - Concluded

Duration of signal

Coverage , percent
Acquisition, g. e. t. Loss, g. e.t.

Antigua Island

05:12:53 03:13:30 98
04:45:22 04:52:30 98
06:19:52 06:25:24 98
18:59:40 19:05:20 98
20:32:10 20:39:30 98
22:07:00 22: 11: 40 98
26:48:50 26:54:35 98
28:21:20 28:23:15 98
29:55:50 30:00:29 98

Pretoria

02:05:50 03:10:37 98
06:44:25 06:52:20 98
27:12:37 27:18:26 98
31: 53: 20 32:02:07 98
33:26:46 33:33:00 98

fflFIDEMTIAL-
 Page 8 - 4l

TABLE 8.2.5-1.- AIR-GROIMD COMMUNICATIONS COVERAGE

Orbital Duration of signal Average UHF signal

Pass Acquisition, g.e.t. Loss, g.e.t. strength, microvolts
Mercury Control Center

1 00:00:00 00:10:30 1000

2 01:33:53 01 : 42 : 04 40
3 03:OT:29 03:14:01 34
4 04:40:30 04:49:20 53
5 06:15:28 06:25:20 52
15 22:02:30 22:12:28 30
16 23:37:00 23:43:15 3T
17 25:11:24 25:17:52 50
18 26:45:50 26:47:38 100
19 28:16:38 28:21:28 80
20 29:52:00 29:56:00 48
Grand Bahama Island

1 00:00:27 00:07:17 (a)

2 01:34:22 01:40:12
3 03:08:07 03:13:07
4 04:41:17 04:48:12
5 06: 16: 17 06:19:17
15 22:03:3T 22:09:04
16 23:36:22 23 : 43 : 07
IT 25:11:32 25:16:32
18 26 : 45 : 42 26:47-:4l
19 28:l6:5T 28:21:25
20 29:50:07 29:55:06

Grand Turk Island

1 00:03:18 00:06:48 (a)

2 01:37:13 01:41:03
3 03:10:10 03:13:48
04:43:18 04:49:13
^
5 06:17:13 06:20:03
15 22:04:18 22:10:43
16 23:39:18 23:43:38
IT 25:13:03 25:16:43
18 26:46:48 26:48:48
19 28:18:48 28:20:48
20 29:52:48 29:55:48

Recordings not available

Page 8 - 4 2

TABLE 8.2.5-1.- AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS COVERAGE - Continued

Orbital Duration of signal Average UEF signal

Pass Acquisition, g.e.t. Loss, g.e.t. strength, microvolts
Bermuda

1 00:03:29 00:09:33 41
2 01:36:48 01 : 42 : 04 70
3 03:10:27 03:14:01 28
4 04:44:39 04:48:13 12
15 22:06:52 22:12:28 17-5
16 23:39:59 23:43:15 80
17 25:14:00 25:17:52 4l
18 26:46:23 26:47:38 29
19 28:21:28 28:21:30 (*)
Canary Islands

1 00:15:10 00:21:20 5.4

2 01:48:35 01:50:23 l
15 22:18:24 22:23:31 5-3
16 23:51:37 23:56:10 (c)
IT 25:25:54 25:30:09 3-5
Kano

1 00:22:28 00:27:48 31
2 01:55:09 01:55:14 17-5
15 22:27:09 22:27:54 6
16 23:57:48 23:59:31 24
17 25:31:49 25:35:17 11
Muchea

1 00:51:07 00:56:57 60
2 02:24:17 02:30:47 38
3 03:58:37 04:04:13 (c)
14 21:22:27 21:26:29 4o
15 22:53:12 22:57:20 25
16 24:27:36 24:33:13 60
17 26:00:39 26:07:14 50
18 27:33:23 27:40:00 22

b
Wo contact
'No record
 Page 8 - 4 3

'TABLE 8.2.5-1.- AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS COVERAGE - Continued

Orbital Duration of signal Average UEF signal

Pass Acquisition, g.e.t. Loss, g.e.t. strength^ microvolts
Canton Island

1 01:09:25 01:16:42 22
2 02:43:11 02:49:49 20
9 13:44:37 13:52:40 (b)
10 15:18:40 15:25:32 (b)
16 24:45:22 24:53:03 22
17 26:19:14 26:25:40 5
Guaymas

1 01:27:16 01:29:10 25
2 03:01:00 03:04:17 4o
3 04:35:22 04:37:17 25
4 06:08:42 06:10:34 30
5 07:4l:54 07:45:58 15
15 23:30:50 23:33:16 12
16 25:03:07 25:09:13 50
17 26:36:41 26:36:43 (c)
18 28:12:49 28:13:18 10
19 29:43:46 29:49:18 15
20 31:16:43 31:22:39 15
Zanz ibar

1 00:30:55 00:37:^5 32.2

2 02:05:23 02:19:53 13-5
7 09:59:5^ 10:03:37 18
8 11:32:29 11:36:02 55
15 22:36:14 22:37:49 21
16 24:07:24 24:14:04 26.9
17 25:41:37 25:42:43 19
22 33:32:55 33:38:47 (c)

Texas
2 03:03:47 03:10:02 12
3 04:36:55 04:43:57 20
1* 06:16:22 06:17:37 15
5 07:45:47 07:48:17 20
16 25:06:12 25:12:44 40
18 28:13:02 28:19:52 20
19 29:46:12 29:53:12 25
Wo contact
"No record
Page 8 - 44 EKTIAL
TABLE 8.2.5-1.- AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS COVERAGE - Concluded

Orbital Duration of signal Average UHF signal

Pass Acquisition, g.e.t. | Loss, g.e.t. strength, microvolts
Coastal Sentry Quebec

5 07:17:20 (a)
6 08:51:37 08:5^:57 (a)
1 10:21:30 10:28:22
8 11:55:01 12:01:46
9 13:28:34 13:35:^2
20 30:50:46 30:51:56
21 32:22:31 32:31:06
22 33:56:5^ 34:03:18

Rose Knot Victor

8" 12:25:47 12:33:32 18

Hawaii

2 02:51:47 02:52:17 34
3 04:22:12 04:25:12 110
4 05:58:37 06:05:15 7
5 07:31:25 07:3^:50 22
6 09:0^:17 09:09:52 29
7 10:37:33 10:43:40 51
8 12:10:15 12:14:20 37
17 26:26:^-5 26:26:54 48
18 28:00:11 28:01:47 80
19 29:33:^7 29:36:42 19
20 31:07:17 31:11:47 19
21 32:40:22 32:45:57 18
California

1 01:28:22 01:29:22 20
2 03:00:02 03:05:02 16
3 0^:33:16 04:37:02 24
4 06: 06: 00 06:11:47 25
5 07:^0:55 07:44:0? 14
16 25 : 03 : 22 25:07:27 15
17 26:36:32 26:38:12 14
18 28:07:51 28:13:27 39
19 29:41:17 29:44:32 3^
20 31:16:22 31:19:^5 30

Recordings not available

One contact only
 EH^~* Page 9-1

9.0 RECOVERY

9-1 Recovery Plans

The areas where recovery ships and aircraft were positioned in the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans are shown in figure 9-l-l(a) and figure
9-l-l(b), respectively. Recovery capability was provided in areas A
through F in the event that it became necessary to abort the mission
during powered flight. Areas 2-1 through 21-1 were areas in which the
spacecraft could have landed if the flight were terminated earlier than
planned. These areas were spaced so that the spacecraft would pass
over one of them approximately every 90 minutes, or about once per orbital
pass. Area 22-1, which was the primary planned landing area for a nom-
inal flight of 3^- hours and 20 minutes, was located approximately 70
nautical miles southeast of Midway Island.

Recovery forces were deployed within these planned landing areas so"
that recovery and assistance could be provided within 3 to 9 hours after
spacecraft landing. This "access time" varied for the different areas
and was based on the probability of a spacecraft landing within a given
area and the planned deployment of recovery forces in that area. Selec-
tion of landing areas at spacecraft ground-track intersections permitted
a unit to move from one area to another and thereby provide a recovery
capability in several landing areas. A total of 23 ships and kk aircraft
were employed in the MA-9 recovery operation, of which 12 ships and 26 air-
craft were in the Atlantic landing areas and 11 ships and 18 aircraft were
in the Pacific. Table 9-1-1 indicates the number of ships and aircraft
on station at the various landing areas, their movements from one area to
another, and the access time for each area. Additional search aircraft
were available as back-ups to the aircraft on station. Also, helicopters,
amphibious surface vehicles, and small boats were positioned for recovery
support near the launch complex.

Contingency recovery aircraft and personnel were on alert status at

staging bases around the world to provide support in the event a landing
should occur at any place along the orbital ground track. These aircraft
were equipped to locate the spacecraft and to provide emergency on-the-
scene assistance if required. A typical support unit at a staging base
consisted of 2 or 3 long-range aircraft and pararescue personnel.

The locations of these staging bases are as follows:

Patrick Air Force Base, Florida Singapore, Malaya

Kindley Air Force Base, Bermuda Clark Air Force Base, Philippines
Lajes Air Force Base, Azores Waha, Okinawa
Nouasseur, Morocco Tachikawa, Japan
Wheelus Air Force Base, Libia Andersen Air Force Base, Guam
Kano, Nigeria Perth, Australia
Aden Protectorate Townsville, Australia

COMF1DEMTML
Page 9-2

Nairobi, Kenya Midway Island

Salisbury, Rhodesia Kwajalein Island
Mauritius Island Wandi, Fiji Islands
Ascension Island Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii
Trinidad Island Johnston Island
Lima, Peru Papeete, Tahiti
Galapagos Islands San Diego, California

9-2 Recovery Operations

All recovery forces were on station at launch time and moved to

planned positions as the mission progressed. Weather conditions were
favorable for spacecraft location and retrieval in all planned and con-
tingency areas throughout the mission.

A communications network linked the deployed recovery forces to the

recovery room of the Mercury Control Center at Cape Canaveral. Recovery
communications were good throughout the entire operation and the recovery
forces were informed of mission status during all phases of the flight.

At an appropriate time, recovery units were informed that the flight

would proceed to normal completion, and the expected retrorocket ignition
time of 33:59:30 for landing area 22-1 was transmitted. At about 34:04:00,
approximately l6 minutes prior to landing, recovery forces in area 22-1
were informed that the retrorockets had ignited normally and that the
landing position was predicted to be 2T°23r North latitude and 176°30' West
longitude. This information was transmitted as CALREP 1 (calculated land-
ing position report) to the recovery forces from the Recovery Coordinator
in the Mercury Control Center.. Recovery units in the area made contact
with the descending spacecraft before any additional predicted landing po-
sitions, based on reentry tracking, were made available from network support.
At about 34:12:00 the U.S.S. Kearsarge, the aircraft carrier positioned in
the center of area 22-1, reported radar contact with the spacecraft at a
slant range of l80 nautical miles and held contact until shortly before
spacecraft landing. A "sonic boom," similar to that heard during the
MA-8 reentry, was detected by recovery ship personnel. Personnel aboard
the U. S. S. Kearsarge reported first visual contact with the spacecraft as
it descended on the main parachute at an altitude of about 8,000 feet.
(See fig. 9.2-1. ) The spacecraft landed at approximately 34:20:00 at
27°22.6' North latitude, 176°35.3' West longitude, which corresponded to
a position approximately 4.4 nautical miles uprange of the recovery ship.
Weather conditions in the recovery area are listed in section 10.3.

Helicopters had been launched from the U.S. S. Kearsarge 15 minutes

prior to spacecraft landing and were in an excellent position to deploy
swimmers immediately. These swimmers quickly installed the auxiliary
flotation collar around the spacecraft. Helicopter pilots and swimmers

1 M.J\Li
 Page 9-3

in the landing area reported that the spacecraft, Immediately after land-
ing, was floating on its side and gradually righted itself soon after main
parachute release, which was estimated to have occurred about JO seconds
after landing. Four minutes after landing, the astronaut reported that
he would remain in the spacecraft and await retrieval "by the recovery ship.
The antenna canister landed within 600 feet of the spacecraft but sank
before the back-up swimmers could attempt retrieval. The ejected reserve
parachute was retrieved by the swimmers. At about 5k:k6:OQ as the U. S. S.
Kearsarge approached within 600 feet of the spacecraft, a motor whaleboat
(shown in fig. 9.2-2) attached a lifting line to the recovery loop of the
spacecraft. The spacecraft was then brought alongside the ship, lifted
clear of the water, and placed on the no. 3 elevator of the recovery
carrier at 3^t56:00. The explosive -actuated hatch was released, as shown
in figure 9-2-3, by using the external release lanyard. At about 35sOlsOO>
doctors began examining the astronaut and taking blood-pressure measure-
ments. The astronaut egressed from the spacecraft kQ minutes after landing
at 35:08:00. (See fig. 9.2-^. ) He remained onboard the Kearsarge for a
period of examination, rest, and debriefing.

There was no apparent damage to the spacecraft at the time of landing.

The swimmers who attached the auxiliary flotation collar to the spacecraft
reported that none of the heat -shield straps were broken and damage to
the landing bag consisted of several small vertical tears. However, while
the spacecraft was being lifted aboard the carrier, the UHF descent and
recovery antenna was broken loose at the hinge point. In addition, when
the explosive -actuated hatch was released, the spacecraft window was
broken.

Certain spacecraft onboard equipment was removed immediately after

recovery and flown to Cape Canaveral. Two days after recovery, the space-
craft was transferred from the recovery ship to a truck at Pearl Harbor Naval
Base. Prom there, it was taken to Hickam Air Force Base, loaded aboard a
C-130 aircraft, and delivered to Cape Canaveral the next day.

9- 3 Recovery Aids

Prior to spacecraft landing, telemetry aircraft established contact

before and after communications blackout, and radar tracking aircraft
maintained contact during most of the blackout period.

All spacecraft visual and electronic recovery aids were reported to

have been operating normally. Helicopters reported that the dye marker
presented a brilliant green visual target which could be observed from a
distance of 500 yards. The flashing light was reported as operating
normally by on-scene observers.
page 9 - ooinrroraiTLiL
The HF/DF- stations in Midway Island and San Francisco, California,
received, spacecraft • HF transmissions after landing and determined the
landing position within approximately JO nautical miles of the actual
retrieval point, as shown in figure 9- 3-1-

The telemetry and search aircraft reported contact with and verified
the operation of both spacecraft SARAH beacons. Acquisition ranges re-
ported by these aircraft were as great as 270 nautical miles.

Stations reporting fixes from the SOFAR -bomb detonation determined

the landing position within 10 nautical miles. A quick fix was provided
approximately 20 minutes after landing. Post-landing details of area 22-1
are illustrated in figure 9-3-1-
 Page 9-5

TABLE 9.1-1. - RECOVERY SHIP AND AIRCRAFT DEPLOYMENT IN PLANNED LANDING AREAS

Access Ships Aircraft

Areas
time, hours Cb)
Atlantic
A 6 3 destroyers 2
B 9 4 destroyers and 1 carrier 3
C 6 1 destroyer 1
D 3 1 fleet oiler 1
E 6 1 fleet oiler 1
F 6 1 destroyer 1
2-1 3 1 destroyer, 1 carrier from area B 3
16-1 and 17-1 3 Area 2-1 ships plus additional
destroyer from B 9
3-1 and 18-1 3 2 destroyers from A k
15-1 3 2 destroyers (l from B, 1 from C) 2
1*4—1 3 1 fleet oiler, 1 destroyer from D
and E 2
13-1 5 1 destroyer from F 1
Total 12 26

Pacific
9-1 5 1 destroyer 2
10-1 5 1 destroyer 2
11-1 3 2 destroyers 2
3-2, 8-1, and
18-2 3 2 destroyers 2
^-1, 7-1, and
22-1 3 2 destroyers, 1 carrier 2
5-1 and 6-1 3 2 destroyers 12
20-1 and 21-1 2
Total 11 18

Carriers had recovery helicopters embarked.

Numbers indicate maximum number of aircraft supporting a specific

area at the calculated time of spacecraft landing in that area. In some
cases aircraft supported more than one area.

COMTDDPiTIAL
 Page 9-6

Ai
 Page 9-7

CONriPEMTIAL
 Page 9-9

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CONFIDENTIAL
Page 9-11
 Page 9-12

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CQIiiriDCMTIAL
 Page 10-1

10.0 APPENDIX A

10.1 Spacecraft History

Spacecraft 20 arrived at Cape Canaveral, Florida, on October 9>

1962. The preparation period for the spacecraft and the individual
onboard systems and equipment was slightly different from that of
previous spacecraft in that an integrated systems test was made prior
to the normal individual system tests. This sequence of testing was
possible because of the extensive individual spacecraft systems tests
which had been performed by the spacecraft contractor. The number
of work days in the hangar totaled 170 days, of which 59^ days were
spent on formal tests. There were 6ll Mission Preparation Sheets (MPS),
which authorize specifically required work, and 62^ Discrepancy
Reports (DR), which describe items requiring rework.

The spacecraft was transported to the launch site and mated with
the launch vehicle on April 22, 19&3-
The major prelaunch tests, modifications, and events in the
history of spacecraft 20 at Cape Canaveral are shown in chronological
order in the following table:

A¥
Page 10-2 COffriDENTlAL

Number Item Completion date

1 Spacecraft arrived at Hangar S Oct. 9, 1962

2 Voltage standing vave ratio (VSWR)
check completed Oct. 15, 1962

3 Integrated systems test completed Oct. 19, 1962

U Rate stabilization control system

(RSCS) fuel selector valve replaced
with a shut-off valve Oct. 26, 1962

5 Cabin leak checks Nov. 15, 1962

6 Reaction control system (RCS) tests Nov. 19, 1962

7 Blood pressure measuring system (BPMS)

controller and pneumograph installed Nov. 27, 1962

8 Time -delay relay changed to extend

HO jettison time from 60 seconds
to 150 seconds Nov. 28, 1962

9 Coolant control valves (CCV) installed Dec. 7, 1962

10 Environmental control system (ECS)

tests completed Dec. 17, 1962

11 Solenoid functional blip test in

altitude chamber completed Jan. 7, 1963

12 Alt itu.de -chamber test completed Jan. 8, 1963

13 Wiring installed to enable simultaneous

HF and UHF transmission after landing Jan. 17, 1963

111 Balloon-drag experiment wiring and

circuit test completed Jan. 18, 1963

15 Six bolts added to the ablation heat

shield Jan. 2h, 1963

16 More reliable type of relief valves

installed in HO system Feb. 1, 1963

COMTDDHTIAl,
 Page 10-3

Number Item Completion date

17 Temperature survey wiring removed Feb. 2, 1963

18 Recovery light manual disable svitch

installed Feb. 3, 1963

19 HO low-pressure indicators installed Feb. 5, 1963

20 Thruster "B" nut temperature wiring

installed for T/M and recorder Feb. 10, 1963

21 Geiger counter calibration completed Feb. lU, 1963

22 CO adsorber assembly insulation

installed Feb. 16, 1963

23 Coolant control valve flow rate tests

were completed Feb. 18, 1963

2U BPMS microdot cable was replaced with

a seven- strand cable Feb. 20, 1963

25 A later model pitch attitude gyro

having a -3^-° pitch caging
capability was installed Feb. 20, 1963

26 Final inspection of TV circuitry Feb. 28, 1963

27 Television system test completed Mar. 1, 1963

28 Communications system radiation test

completed Mar. k, 1963

29 Trial mating of spacecraft with

adapter Mar. 5, 1963

30 Main clamp-ring fitted Mar. 7, 1963

31 Air deflector installed on cabin fan Mar. 8, 1963

32 Urine bags and couch installed Mar. 16, 1963

33 Primary simulated flight in hangar Mar. 23, 1963

Page 10 - IVFIDEPrTLIL

Number Item Completion date

Adapter transported to the launch site Mar. 26, 1963

35 Automatic stabilization and control

system (ASCS) test completed Mar. 26, 1963

36 Low-level fuel warning indicator

system installed Mar. 27, 1963

37 ECS system reworked to flight config-

uration. The automatic and reserve
fuel tanks paralleled. Mar. 28, 1963

38 Special test to evaluate inverter out-

put voltages completed Apr. h, 1963

39 Prepad RCS test completed Apr. 6, 1963

Special screen added to the negative

pressure relief valve Apr. 10, 1963

in N -pressurized whip antenna installed Apr. 1*4-, 1963

Flight batteries installed Apr. 15, 1963

Final heat-shield drop tests Apr. 16, 1963

Final prepad cabin-leak check

(i+50 cc/min) Apr. 17, 1963
Alinement, weight, and balance
completed Apr. 18, 1963

Spacecraft transported to the launch

site for mating Apr. 22, 1963

Simulated flight no. 1 Apr. 23, 1963

Electrical mate Apr. 2U, 1963

Simulated flight no. 2 (Joint FACT) Apr. 25, 1963

50 Urine transfer pump installed Apr. 30, 1963

 KFIDEKTIAL Page 10-5

Number Item Completion date

51 Simulated flight no. 2., joint FACT

(repeated) May 1, 1963

52 RCS checks completed May 1, 1963

53 Launch simulation May 8, 1963

5U Condensate trap installed in the suit

circuit May 9, 1963

55 Simulated flight no. J May 10, 1963

56 One of the squibs in the retropackage

explosive bolt disabled May 13, 1963

57 Launch postponed because of radar

encoder problem at Bermuda site May 'Ik, 1963

58 Final launch countdown and lift-off May 15, 1963

MFIDEPOIAL
 10 - 6 • CONFIDENTIAL
10.2 Launch Procedure

The space-vehicle launch operations were planned about a 560-minute

split countdown, with a scheduled 19-hour hold at T-390 minutes for
fueling of the spacecraft reaction control system and servicing of pyro-
technic systems. To provide additional assurance that the projected
launch time of 8:00 a.m. e.s.t. could be met, a scheduled 90-minute
hold was established at T-l4o minutes.

The second half of the split countdown was started at midnight on

May 13, 1963- Because of a fuel-pump failure in the gantry diesel
engine, a hold lasting 2 hours and 9 minutes was begun at T-60 minutes
to repair this malfunction. The countdown was resumed, but at T-13
minutes, another hold was called to evaluate a malfunction in the C-band
encoder at Bermuda-. The nature of this problem prompted a decision at
9:56 a.m. e.s.t. to postpone launch operations until this problem could
be corrected. The flight was rescheduled and the second half of the
split countdown was started at midnight on May lk, 1963. The countdown
proceeded smoothly; and after a ^--minute hold at T-ll minutes, launch
occurred at 8:0^-:13 a.m. e.s.t. on May 15, 19^3-

The following is a sequence of major events which occurred during

the final countdown:

Time, min

T-390 Start of second half of countdown

T-l4o Astronaut insertion

T-107 Spacecraft hatch closure began

T-92 Spacecraft hatch closure secured; shingle

installation began

T-82 Spacecraft shingle installation complete

T-62 Service tower removal

T-35 Lox pumping started

T-24 Lox filling complete

T-ll A ^--minute hold was called to evaluate an external

KF interference problem with the guidance central
rate station.

T-0 Lift-off
 Page 10-7

10.3 Weather Conditions

Weather conditions in the area of the launch site vere completely

satisfactory for operations several days prior to and on the days of
the MA.-9 flight. However, there was a trough in the Atlantic Ocean
near the Caribbean which was moving north and could have caused concern
in some of the mid-Atlantic recovery areas had launch been postponed
longer than a few days. In addition, a weather front was moving down
the Atlantic seaboard that could have resulted in unsatisfactory launch
conditions, but these conditions did not materialize.

In the western Pacific Ocean, a tropical disturbance near the

southern Philippine Islands did not intensify sufficiently to cause
problems in the planned recovery area. Possible scattered light
showers and cloud cover were the only items of concern for the
Pacific recovery areas, and conditions were deemed satisfactory on
the day of launch for normal recovery operations.

During the 2 days of flight, exceptionally good weather conditions

were prevalent around the world. High-pressure regions which were
prevalent throughout the latitudes of the orbital ground track resulted
in only slight cloud cover around the entire ground track and in excel-
lent visibility for the astronaut from orbital altitudes.

Weather observations in the launch area at 8:07 a.m. e.s.t., just

after lift-off, were as follows:

Wind direction, deg 270

Wind velocity, knots 5
Temperature, °F 7^.8
Relative humidity, percent J2
Dew point, °F 65
Visibility, miles 8
Cloud coverage (Cirrus with haze aloft) 5/10
Pressure, in. Hg 30.095

A plot of the launch-area wind direction and speed is shown in

figure 10.3-1.

KriDEPFTIAL
Page 10 - CONFIDENTIAL

The weather and sea conditions reported in the primary Pacific

landing area by the Kearsarge at landing were as follows:

Wind direction,, deg 060

Wind velocity, knots 19
Wave direction, deg 060
Wave height (at 6 sec intervals), ft
Swell direction, deg 080
Swell height (at 9 sec intervals), ft
Cloud cover (l,500 ft scattered; 10,000
ft scattered; high, broken) 8/10
Relative humidity, percent 69
Temperature, °F 75
Sea temperature, °F 75

Wind shifted from 090° at 10 minutes prior to landing.

 Page 10-9

10.h Flight Safety Review

Flight safety and mission review meetings were conducted to determine

the flight worthiness of the MA-9 spacecraft and launch vehicle and to
ascertain the readiness of all supporting elements for the MA-9 mission.

10.h.I Spacecraft. - As a result of the systems changes necessitated by

the extended mission, flight safety review meetings were held
after the completion of the RCS and ECS systems tests and after
the primary simulated flight in the hangar. The meeting on the
RCS system was held on November 29, 19^2, and, for that stage of
checkout and preparation, the system was found to be capable of
performing,' its intended mission. The meeting on the ECS system
was held on February 5, 19&3, and no problems other than those
already in the process of being resolved were noted. Again, for
that stage of checkout and preparation, the system was found to
be capable of performing it's mission. A review of the spacecraft
systems following the primary simulated flight was held on
April 9, 1963? arid all problems encountered were discussed and
direction for corrective action was given. At the spacecraft
flight safety review held on May 9, 196j, all systems were
approved as ready for flight, pending the successful completion
of the final simulated flight test, which was satisfactorily
completed on May 10, 1963.

10. U. 2 Launch vehicle.- Several meetings were held to determine the status
of the Atlas IJOD launch vehicle. The first meeting was conducted
on April 22, 1963, to review the nature and the solutions of the
problems in the flight control system that had caused the late
delivery of the launch vehicle to the Atlantic Missile Range.
Satisfactory resolution had been obtained on all problems. The
regular launch-vehicle review meeting was held at 9'00 a.m. e.s.t.
on May 11, 1963- The status of the launch-vehicle systems was
reviewed and all systems were approved for flight, pending the
resolution of a ground-equipment fuse anomaly. Subsequent testing
revealed the anomaly to be an out-of-tolerance fuse, and this com-
ponent was replaced.

10.^-3 Mission.- The MA-9 mission review meeting was held on May 11, 1963-
The launch vehicle was listed in a no-go status because of the fuse
problem mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The spacecraft was
also determined to be in a no-go status pending a leak check on a
pressure transducer in the reaction control system. In addition,
trouble with Bermuda tracking was reported. All other elements of
the flight were found to be ready.

-CONFIDENTIAL
Page 10 - 10 GOFfriDDHTIAL

The X-l Day Flight Safety Reviev Board met on May 1J, 1963. This
board was advised that the Launch-Vehicle Status Reviev Board had
met earlier at 8:15 and had determined the Atlas 1JOD was ready
for flight. In addition,, problems with the spacecraft and
Bermuda tracking were reported as having been solved, and the
Flight Safety Review Board approved both the MA-9 spacecraft and
launch vehicle for flight.
 10 -
10.5 Photographic Coverage

Photographic coverage, including quantity of instrumentation com-

mitted and data during the launch phase, which was obtained "by the
Atlantic Missile Range (AMR) is shown in table 10.5-1 and discussed
in the following paragraphs. Additional coverage obtained by the re-
covery forces in the landing area is also described. Launch-phase photo-
graphic coverage was generally poor in quality because of sunlight and
overcast haze conditions. However, photographic data were obtained
through the time of launch-vehicle staging and were available for a
detailed photographic evaluation had it been necessary. The photo-
graphic coverage discussed in the following sections is based on film
available for evaluation during the postlaunch reporting period.

10.5-1 Metric film.- Metric film from 16 cameras were processed,

and the results were tabulated by the AMR. These data were
not required for evaluation by the Manned Spacecraft Center,
since the powered-flight phase was normal.

10.5-2 Engineering; sequential film.- Engineering sequential coverage

of the launch phase is shown in figure 10.5-2-1. This figure
indicates the time interval for which the spacecraft, launch
vehicle, and/or exhaust flame were visible to the tracking
camera. Optimum camera coverage was obtained from lift-off
through the region of maximum dynamic pressure, and adequate
data would have been available had a malfunction occurred
during this time. Although photographic coverage was obtained
through launch-vehicle staging, coverage near the region of
staging is considered marginal. At lower altitudes, coverage
was primarily limited in quality by a low-level haze. At
higher altitudes sun, haze, and image reduction caused by the
increasing slant range restricted tracking capability and
affected both the quality and the duration of tracking camera
coverage. Fifteen films were reviewed, including l6-mm and
35-mm film from four fixed cameras and eleven tracking cameras.
Fixed camera coverage with respect to exposure, focus, and film
quality was good, with the exception of one item which faced
into the sun and overexposed and one item which was grainy
because of haze. Two fixed cameras indicated normal lox
boil-off, umbilical disconnect, and umbilical door closure.
The two other fixed cameras showed close-up views of space-
craft and launch-vehicle displacement through lift-off. The
quality of the tracking camera coverage was generally good
with respect to exposure, focus, and tracking but was poor
in quality with respect to color, grain, and resolution.
Five tracking cameras showed launch-vehicle ignition and
lift-off. Ten tracking cameras indicated normal launch-
vehicle staging.
Page 10 - 12

10.5-3 Documentary film. - Documentary coverage used for engineering

evaluation of the mission was provided "by eight l6-mm motion-
picture films and numerous still photographs. Three films
provided tracking coverage of lift-off from different loca-
tions near complex 12 and from a recovery vehicle positioned
on the beach.

Six aerial motion-picture films of the launch sequence were

taken by aircraft in the launch area. Two films provided very
good aerial photographic coverage with the exception of slight
camera vibration and intermittent tracking. The remaining
aerial films provided additional photographic coverage of the
launch sequence but were poor in quality with respect to color,
focus, and resolution. One motion-picture film of the recovery
operation was- available for review. This film provided aerial
and shipboard photographic coverage of the spacecraft descending
on the main parachute, spacecraft landing in the water, para-
rescue personnel being dropped near the spacecraft, activities
of pararescue team with the spacecraft in the water, space-
craft retrieval from the water by the recovery aircraft carrier,
spacecraft preparation for astronaut egress, removal of the
spacecraft hatch, astronaut egress from spacecraft, and re-
trieval of pararescue personnel from water. Photographs of
personnel with the spacecraft below the main deck of the air-
craft carrier were also obtained.

Documentary coverage of the mission by still photography was

very good. Numerous still photographs were available for re-
view, in which prelaunch, launch, flight, recovery, and post-
flight operations were documented. Still photographs of
prelaunch activities included views of astronaut preparation
at Hangar S, insertion of the astronaut into the spacecraft,
and securing for launch. Also included were prelaunch photo-
graphs of the spacecraft alone and mated with the launch vehicle.
Still photographs taken during the flight provided views of the
launch sequence from different locations, flight operations in
Mercury Control Center, and the slow-scan TV pictures received
from the spacecraft. Recovery photographic coverage showed
views of the spacecraft on the main parachute, the spacecraft
and pararescue personnel in the water before retrieval by the
recovery carrier, spacecraft retrieval by the aircraft carrier,
the spacecraft onboard the carrier after pick up, removal of
the hatch, astronaut's egress, the spacecraft in close-ups
after recovery, and astronaut activities after the medical
examination. Engineering still photographs, showing close-up
views of the spacecraft during postflight inspection at Cape
Canaveral, were also available.
 Page 10 - 13

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CONFIDENTIAL
 10 -
10.6 Postf light Inspection

Spacecraft 20, shown in figure 10.6-1, underwent the normal

postflight inspection and conditioning procedure. A thorough visual
inspection was made of the external and internal areas of the space-
craft in the "as received" condition. The immediate postflight-
inspection procedure included removal of the heat shield, landing bag,
and conical and beryllium shingles for inspection of the pressure
bulkhead and internal skin areas. A photographic record was made of
the inspection process.

A desalting wash-down, tank drainage, and flushing procedure, as

applicable, was accomplished; and safeguards against deterioration
were taken. The detailed inspection results of the individual space-
craft structural systems are discussed in the following paragraphs.

10.6.1 General.- The overall condition of the spacecraft structure

was good. The outer pane of the spacecraft window was
broken during actuation of the explosive hatch aboard the
recovery ship. As on previous flights, there were drops
of water on the inside of the outer pane of the spacecraft
window. The exterior of the spacecraft showed the usual
discoloration due to aerodynamic heating. There were
numerous deposits of molten metal on both the conical and
cylindrical portions of the spacecraft exterior. The
deposits were in the areas above each of the three
retropackage umbilicals and one of the spacecraft-adapter
umbilicals, all of which failed to jettison from the
spacecraft. Most of the deposits had the appearance of
solder spots. There was also evidence of considerable
aerodynamic heating in the area around where the still
attached umbilicals were located.

The coaxial antenna cable also did not separate from the
spacecraft, although it had been severed by the coaxial
cutter located beneath the shingle. The cable evidently
was caught at the hole in the shingle, through which it
passed and broke off, leaving about 6 inches of free cable
remaining.

Hydrogen peroxide was noted to be dripping very slowly

from the spacecraft between stringers 15 and l6 on to the
edge of the heat shield. Subsequent inspection showed that
an RCS line beside stringer 15 had corroded through from
the outside and was leaking hydrogen peroxide. Several
RCS lines had "considerable amounts of corrosion on their
outer surfaces; however, all RCS lines were exceptionally
clean and free of corrosion on their inner surfaces.

COMJD:
 Page 10 - 15

10.6.2 Structure.- The spacecraft experienced very little

structural damage. Two cracks in the outer skin of the
pressure vessel, one of which was 3^ inches long and the
other 2 inches long, were noted in the area just to the
right of the hatch. This damage most probably resulted
from the explosive-hatch actuation which produced a warp
in the hatch sill.

10.6.3 Ablation shield.- The ablation shield appeared to be intact.

There were several minor circumferential cracks noted in
ablation laminate, but they were less severe than the ones
noted on the MA-8 heat shield. One of the heat-shield re-
taining lugs was broken off and another was bent. The
ablation-shield bondline under the flotation weights had sep-
arated in places, but the bolts held the weights in place.

10.6.^4- Landing bag.- The landing bag was slit vertically in six
places. The slits varied in length from 6 to 20 inches.
In addition, there were numerous small tears and punctures
near the top of the bag. All of the landing bag straps
were intact, although they were twisted and kinked.
Twisting and kinking probably occurred during postrecovery
handling.

10.6.5 Recovery compartment.- Wo damage was noted in the recovery

compartment area except that the UHF descent and recovery
antenna was broken loose at the hinge point. This damage
occurred while the spacecraft was being lifted aboard the
recovery ship.

10.6.6 Main pressure bulkhead.- The main pressure bulkhead area

sustained very little damage on landing. The postflight
appearance of the honeycomb structure was not noticeably
changed from that before the flight. The fiberglass shield
had five scratches along the right X-axis and a dent in the
center stiffening ring in the same location. The protector
over the manual system selector valve was bent; and two dents,
or creases, in a bead in the skin next to the valve indicated
that the skin was pushed in during the landing. Also, there
was a surface crack in a spot weld in this area.

10.6.7 Spacecraft interior.- The interior of the spacecraft was

in good condition. The astronaut's couch had been
removed by the recovery forces for access to the area under
the couch and it had been replaced without being bolted
down. Approximately 0.28 pound of liquid was removed from
under the couch by the recovery personnel, and approximately
0.39 pound of liquid was removed from the same area during
Page 10 - 16

postflight inspection at Cape Canaveral. A chemical

analysis of this liquid to determine its source is in
process. There was a considerable amount of paint chips
throughout the interior of the spacecraft. These chips
resulted from initiating the explosive-actuated hatch.

CONFIDE1
 Page 10-17

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COMriDCNTIAL
 Page 10-19

Figure 10.6-1.- of MA 9 spacecraft

~ -
 Page 1 1 - 1

APPENDIX B

11.0 ACKNCMIiEDGEMENT

The Flight Evaluation Team for the MA-9 flight, upon whose
analysis this report is "based, was composed as follows:

3.0 SPACE VEHICLE DESCRIPTION

3-1 Spacecraft Description

C. Vaughn

3.2 Launch Vehicle Description

L. DuGoff
A. E. Franklin

14-.0 TRAJECTORY AND MISSION EVENTS

D. Incerto M. Apple
M. Cassetti F. McCreary
E. Hawkins J. Wells
P. McKaskill S. Yates

5.0 SPACECRAFT PERFORMANCE

5.1 'Spacecraft Control System

G. T. Sasseen
R. Buckley
T. Williams

5.2 Lift Support System

F. Samonski J. Billingham, M.D.

D. Hughes D. Hampton
J. Whalen F. Hettinger

5-3 Communications Systems

W. R. Stelges

5.^ Mechanical and Pyrotechnic Systems

S. T. Beddingfield

FIDENTIAL
11 - 2 COPTIC CMTIALi

5-5 Electrical and Sequential Systems

M. A. Guidry
J. D. Collner

5-6 Instrumentation System

¥. R. Durrett
M. A. Wedding
H. J. Ness

5-7 Heat Protection Systems

J. Pavlosky

5.8 Scientific Experiments

¥. Armstrong
J. McKee

6.0 LAUNCH VEHICLE PERFORMANCE

L. DuGoff
M. Cassetti
A. E. Franklin

7.0 ASTRONAUT ACTIVITIES

7-1 Aeromedical Analysis

E. P. McCutcheon, M.D.
D. D. Catterson, M.D.
R. A. Pollard, M.D.
H. A. Minners, M.D.
R. Hackworth

7-2 Astronaut Performance

J. B. Jones T. ¥. Holloway
J. J. Van Bockel R. B. Benson
R. D. Mercer G. ¥. Harvey

7.3 Pilot's Flight Report

L. G. Cooper, Jr.

8.0 FLIGHT CONTROL AND NETWORK PERFORMANCE

8.1 Flight Control Summary

C. Kraft
E. Kranz
J. Hodge

HAL/"'
 Page 11-3

8.2 Mercury Network Performance

R. Holt
T. Stuart
9.0 RECOVERY OPERATIONS

J. C. Stonesifer
C. I. Tynan, Jr.

10.0 APPENDIX A
10. 1 Spacecraft History
H. Shoaf
10.2 Launch Procedure
D. Phillips
10.3 Weather Conditions

R. Hegwood
10.h Flight Safety Reviews
N. Vaughn
10. 5 Photographic Coverage
F. Blanton
10.6 Postflight Inspection
K. Christopher

NOTE: Acknowledgement and gratitude are extended to the many typist,

artists, and clerical help who assisted so admirably in the
publication of this report.

ENTUL