Professional Documents
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PHILIPPINE AIR LINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA) and PHILIPPINE AIR LINES
SUPERVISORS' ASSOCIATION (PALSA), petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC.,
respondent.
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, PHILIPPINE AIR LINES SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION and the COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Mariano V. Ampil, Jr., Vicente T. Ocampo and Casiano P. Laguidon and Edwin G.
Lagayada for petitioners in L-31341.
Mariano V. Ampil, Jr. and Vicente T. Ocampo for respondent Philippine Air Lines
Employees Association PALSA, ACAP and PALEA.
SYNOPSIS
In the dispute between PAL and its two unions, the PALEA and the PALSA over the
method of computing the basic and hourly rate of monthly-salaried employees the
Industrial Court declared PAL's formula legal and proper. The unions moved for
reconsideration, attributing error to PAL's wage formula, particularly in the use of
365 days as divisor for this would necessarily include off-days which, under the
terms of the collective bargaining agreements entered into between the parties,
were not paid days. A reversal of the decision was obtained but the industrial court
ordered computation of pay differentials effective only July 1, 1957. From this
resolution, both parties appealed, PAL contending that respondent court erred in
holding that its formula for determining the basic daily or hourly rate of its monthly-
salaried employees was not correct; that the unions, by their long period of consent
and inaction, are estopped and barred from questioning the long-adopted formula;
and that in the recovery of the pay differential, the three-year prescriptive period
provided in the Eight-Hour Labor Law should apply. The unions appealed from that
portion of the respondent court's resolution making the payment of the adjudicated
differentials only from July 1, 1957, contending that because their claim is based on
written contracts, i. e., the collective bargaining agreements, the differentials
should be effective ten years from the filing of their original complaint, or from
February 14, 1953.
The Supreme Court held that the divisor in computing an employee's basic daily
rate should be the actual working days in a year; that the long silence of the PAL
employees relative to the adopted formula of their employer was innocent silence
which cannot place them in estopped and that since the union members' claim
anchored on the written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive
period provided by Article 1144 (1) of the New Civil Code should govern.
SYLLABUS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; METHOD OF COMPUTING EMPLOYEE'S BASIC DAILY RATE. — The
divisor in computing an employee's basic daily rate should be that actual working
days in a year. The number of off-days are not to be counted precisely because on
such off-days, an employee is not required to work.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULING IN NAWASA VS. NWSA CONSOLIDATED UNIONS, ET AL.,
APPLICABLE TO INSTANT CASE. — PAL maintains that the NAWASA doctrine
(enunciated in G.R. No. L-18938, August 31, 1964) should not apply to a public
utility like PAL which, from the nature of its operations, requires a whole-year-round,
uninterrupted work by personnel. What PAL apparently forgets is that just like it,
NAWASA is also a public utility which likewise requires its workers to work the whole
year round. NAWASA is a government-owned corporation to which PAL is akin, it
being a government-controlled corporations. PAL inked with the represented unions
of the employees collective bargaining agreements wherein it bound itself to duly
compensate employees working on their off-days. The same situation obtained in
the NAWASA case, hence, the settled doctrine should not be disturbed.
5. ID.; ID.; CLAIM FOR PAY DIFFERENTIALS; APPLICABLE LAW. — Where the claim
involves the strict compliance with the provisions on wage computations embodied
in the collective bargaining agreements inked between the litigants, the Civil Code
provisions on the prescriptive period in the filing of action based on written
contracts should apply. Where the claim for differentials is solely based on the
Eight-Hour Labor Law, the three-year prescriptive period fixed therein will apply.
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J p:
In G.R. No L-31341 (PALEA vs. PAL), petitioners question the date of effectivity of
the adjudicated pay differentials due to the monthly-salaried employees of
Philippine Air Lines, Inc.
In G.R. No. L-31343 (PAL vs. PALEA), petitioner assails the reversal by the Court of
Industrial Relations of its earlier resolution on the method employed by the
Philippine Air Lines in computing the basic daily and hourly rate of its monthly-
salaried employees.
On February 14, 1963, the Philippine Air Lines Employees' Association (PALEA) and
the Philippine Air Lines Supervisors' Association (PALSA) — petitioners in G.R. No. L-
31341 and respondents in G.R. No. 31343 — commenced an action against the
Philippine Air Lines (PAL) in the Court of Industrial Relations, praying that PAL be
ordered to revise its method of computing the basic daily and hourly rate of its
monthly-salaried employees, and necessarily, to pay them their accrued salary
differentials.
Monthly salary x 12
days in a year)
The unions would like PAL to modify the above formula in this wise:
Monthly salary x 12
days
On May 23, 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Presiding Judge Jose S.
Bautista, issued an order denying the unions' prayer for a modified wage formula.
Pertinent portion of the order reads:
"On the issue of rate of pay, PALSA and PALEA seek to change the long standing
method in PAL of computing the basic daily and hourly rate of monthly salaried
employees for the purpose of determining overtime pay, Sunday and legal holiday
premium pay, night differential pay, vacation and sick leave pay, to wit, the monthly
salary multiplied by 12 and dividing the product thereof by 365 and then the
quotient by 8. PALEA and PALSA claim that the method of computing the basic daily
and hourly rate of monthly salaried employees of PAL prior to the implementation of
the 40-hour week schedule in PAL should be by dividing the monthly salary by 26
working days, and after the 40-hour week schedule, by dividing the monthly salary
by 20 working days, and then dividing the quotient thereof in each case by 8. From
the records, however, it appears that for many years since 1952, and even
previously, PAL has been consistently and regularly determining the basic and
hourly rates of monthly salaried employees by multiplying the monthly salary by 12
months and dividing the product by 365 days to arrive at the basic daily rate, and
dividing the quotient by 8 to compute the basic hourly rate. There has been no
attempt to revise this formula notwithstanding the various negotiations PAL had
with the unions ever since its operations, and it was only on July 18, 1962, when
PALSA, for the first time, proposed that it be changed in accordance with what is
now alleged in the petition. This, however, was a mere proposal by PALSA for the
adoption of a new formula; it was not a demand for the application of a formula
claimed to be correct under the law. Under this circumstance, PALSA and PALEA are
estopped from questioning the correctness and propriety of PAL's method of
determining the basic hourly and daily rate of pay of its monthly salaried personnel,
and considering the long period of time that elapsed before they brought their
petition, are barred from insisting or demanding a different rate of pay formula.
"Upon the foregoing, the Court, therefore, declares PAL's method of computing the
basic daily and hourly rate of its monthly salaried employees as legal and proper,
and denies the petition of PALSA and PALEA.
On May 30, 1964, complaining unions promptly moved for the reconsideration of
the above-said order (p. 51, rec. G.R. No. L-31343).
On June 9, 1964, the unions filed their memorandum in support of their motion for
reconsideration alleging that the questioned order is (a) contrary to law, and (b)
contrary to evidence adduced during the trial (p. 53, rec., G.R. No. L-31343).
The unions attributed error to PAL's wage formula, particularly in the use of 365
days as divisor. The unions contended that the use of 365 days as divisor would
necessarily include off-days which, under the terms of the collective bargaining
agreements entered into between the parties, were not paid days. This is so since
for work done on an off-day, an employee was paid 100% plus 25% or 100% plus 37
1/2% of his regular working hour rate.
"With respect to the period of prescription, it is clear that since the claim arises
from the written contracts or collective bargaining agreements between the
petitioner unions and the PAL, the action thereon prescribes in ten years from the
time the right of action accrues, in accordance with Article 1144 of the New Civil
Code. . . ." (p. 68, rec., G.R. No. L-31343).
On June 26, 1964, the Philippine Air Lines answered point by point the unions'
memorandum, in a prompt reply.
". . . In this connection, however, it will be noted as previously stated, that this case
was considered as an incident of Case No. 39-IPA, in which the issues involved were
related to the application to the respondent PAL of the 40-Hour Week Law (Rep. Act
1880) from the date of its effectivity July 1, 1957 . . .
"This Court therefore believes that in justice and equity and substantial merits of
the case, the aforesaid pay differentials due to the employees involved herein by
the application of the correct method of computation of the rate of pay should be
paid by the respondent also beginning July 1, 1957" (p. 117, rec., G.R. No. L-31343).
From the above resolution, both parties appealed to this COURT. The Philippine Air
Lines filed its appeal petition on December 13, 1969, while PALEA filed its petition
for review on certiorari on January 3, 1970.
For easy comprehension, WE start with the Philippine Air Lines, Inc. versus
Philippine Air Lines Employees Association, Philippine Air Lines Supervisors
Association, and the Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-31343.
MONTHLY SALARY x 12
DAYS IN A YEAR)
A.
There should hardly be any doubt that off-days are not paid days. Precisely, off-days
are rest days for the worker. He is not required to work on such days. This finds
support not only in the basic principle in labor that the basis of remuneration or
compensation is actual service rendered, but in the ever-pervading labor spirit
aimed at humanizing the conditions of the working man.
Such being the case, the divisor in computing an employee's basic daily rate should
be the actual working days in a year. The number of off-days are not to be counted
precisely because on such off-days, an employee is not required to work.
Simple common sense dictates that should an employee opt not to work — which he
can legally do — on an off-day, and for such he gets no pay, he would be unduly
robbed of a portion of his legitimate pay if and when in computing his basic daily
and hourly rate, such off-day is deemed subsumed by the divisor. For it is
elementary in the fundamental process of division that with a constant dividend, the
bigger your divisor is, the smaller your quotient will be.
It bears emphasis that OUR view above constitutes the rationale behind the
landmark ruling, surprisingly, by the same trial Judge Jose S. Bautista of the Court of
Industrial Relations, in National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority vs. NWSA
Consolidated Unions, et al., (G.R. No. L-18938, August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 766, 783-
784), to which decision WE gave OUR affirmance.
PAL maintains that the NAWASA doctrine should not apply to a public utility like PAL
which, from the nature of its operations, requires a whole-year-round, uninterrupted
work by personnel. What PAL apparently forgets is that just like it, NAWASA is also a
public utility which likewise requires its workers to work the whole year round.
Moreover, the NAWASA is a government-owned corporation — to which PAL is akin,
it being a government-controlled corporation.
As will later be stated herein, PAL inked with the representative unions of the
employees collective bargaining agreements wherein it bound itself on duly
compensate employees working on their off-days. The same situation obtained in
the NAWASA case, wherein WE held:
"And in the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the NAWASA and
respondent unions it was agreed that all existing benefits enjoyed by the employees
and laborers prior to its effectivity shall remain in force and shall form part of the
agreement, among which certainly is the 25% additional compensation for work on
Sundays and legal holidays theretofore enjoyed by said laborers and employees. It
may, therefore, be said that while under Commonwealth Act No. 444 a public utility
is not required to pay additional compensation to its employees and workers for
work done on Sundays and legal holidays, there is, however, no prohibition for it to
pay such additional compensation if it voluntarily agrees to do so. The NAWASA
committed itself to pay this additional compensation. It must pay not because of
compulsion of law but because of contractual obligation." (11 SCRA 766, 776).
B.
PAL also vigorously argues that the unions' long standing silence with respect, and
acquiescence, to PAL's method of computation has placed them in estoppel to
impugn the correctness of the questioned wage formula. PAL furthermore contends
that laches has likewise set in precisely because of such long-standing inaction.
". . . (I)t is meet to recall that 'mere innocent silence will not work estoppel. There
must also be some element of turpitude or negligence connected with the silence
by which another is misled to his injury' (Civil Code of the Philippines by Tolentino,
Vol. IV, p. 600) . . ." [Beronilla vs. GSIS, G.R. No. L-21723, Nov. 26, 1970, 36 SCRA
44, 46, 55, emphasis supplied].
In the cases before US, it is not denied that PAL's formula of determining daily and
hourly rate of pay has been decided and adopted by it unilaterally without the
knowledge and express consent of the employees. It was only later on that the
employees came to know of the formula's irregularity and its being violative of the
collective bargaining agreements previously executed by PAL and the unions.
Precisely, PALSA immediately proposed that PAL use the correct method of
computation, which proposal PAL chose to ignore.
The rationale for this is not difficult to see. The doctrine of estoppel had its origin in
equity. As such, its applicability depends, to a large extent, on the circumstances
surrounding a particular case. Where, therefore, the neglect or omission alleged to
have placed a part in estoppel is actually fraught with badges of innocence,
estoppel cannot be invoked. This was the essence of OUR ruling in the case of
Mirasol vs. Municipality of Tabaco (43 Phil. 610, 614). And this, in quintessence, was
the compelling reason why in Lodovica vs. Court of Appeals (L-29678, July 18 1975,
65 SCRA, 154, 158), WE held that a party who had no knowledge of or gave no
consent to a transaction may not be estopped by it.
Furthermore, jurisprudence likewise fortifies the position that in the interest of
public policy, estoppel and laches cannot arrest recovery of overtime compensation.
The case of Manila Terminal Co. vs. CIR (G.R. No. L-9265, April 29, 1957, 91 Phil.
625), is squarely in point. In this case WE intoned:
"The principle of estoppel and laches cannot well be invoked against the
Association. In the first place, it would be contrary to the spirit of the Eight-Hour
Labor Law, under which, as already seen, the laborers cannot waive their right to
extra compensation. In the second place, the law principally obligates the employer
to observe it, so much so that it punishes the employer for its violation and leaves
the employee or laborer free and blameless. In the third place, the employee or
laborer is in such a disadvantageous position as to be naturally reluctant or even
apprehensive in asserting any claim which may cause the employer to devise a way
for exercising his right to terminate the employment.
"If the principle of estoppel and laches is to be applied, it may bring about a
situation, whereby the employee or laborer, who cannot expressly renounce their
right to extra compensation under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, may be compelled to
accomplish the same thing by mere silence or lapse of time, thereby frustrating the
purpose of the law by indirection" (91 Phil. 625, 633, emphasis supplied).
In another count, the unilateral adoption by PAL of an irregular wage formula being
an act against public policy, the doctrine of estoppel cannot give validity to the
same (Auyong Hian vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 59 SCRA 110, 112).
II
G.R. No. L-31341 is an appeal from that portion of the en banc resolution of the
Court of Industrial Relations dated October 9, 1969 in case 43-IPA making the
payment of the adjudicated pay differentials effective only from July 1, 1957.
In their lone assignment of error, the unions argue that pay differentials should be
effective February 14, 1953, or ten (10) years from the date of the filing of their
original complaint; because the claim for pay differentials is based on written
contracts — i.e., the collective bargaining agreements between PAL and the
employees' representative unions — and under Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code,
actions based on written contracts prescribe in ten ( 10) years.
PAL, on the other hand, maintains that the employees' claim for pay differentials is
"an action to enforce a cause of action under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444,
as amended)" (p. 592, rec., G.R. No. L-31341). As such, the applicable provision is
Section 7-a of CA No. 444, which reads:
"Sec. 7-a. Any action to enforce any cause of action under this Act shall be
commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued, otherwise such
action shall be forever barred; provided, however, that actions already commenced
before the effective date of this Act shall not be affected by the period herein
prescribed" (As amended by Rep. Act No. 1993, approved June 22, 1957, emphasis
supplied).
Moreover, PAL argues that even assuming that the issue calls for the application of
Article 1144(1) of the New Civil Code, a general law, still in case of conflict,
Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended, should prevail because the latter is a
special law.
WE believe that the present case calls for the application of the Civil Code
provisions on the prescriptive period in the filing of actions based on written
contracts. The reason should be fairly obvious. Petitioners' claim fundamentally
involves the strict compliance by PAL of the provisions on wage computation
embodied in the collective bargaining agreements inked between it and the
employees' representative unions. These collective bargaining agreements were:
the PAL-PALEA collective bargaining agreement of 1952-53; the PAL-PALEA
collective bargaining agreement of 1956-59; the PAL-PALEA collective bargaining
agreement of 1959-61 (with Article VI as supplement); the PAL-PALEA agreement of
September 4, 1961; the PAL-ACAP collective bargaining agreement of 1952-54; the
PAL-ACAP collective bargaining agreement of September 6, 1955; the PAL-ACAP
collective bargaining agreement of 1959-61; the PAL-PALSA collective bargaining
agreement of 1959-62; and the supplementary PAL-PALSA collective bargaining
agreement (pp. 54-55, rec., G.R. No. L-31343).
The three-year prescriptive period fixed in the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444, as
amended) will apply, if the claim for differentials for overtime work is solely based
on said law, and not on a collective bargaining agreement or any other contract. In
the instant cases, the claim for overtime compensation is not so much because of
Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended, but because the claim is a demandable
right of the employees, by reason of the above-mentioned collective bargaining
agreements. That is precisely why petitioners did not make any reference as to the
computation for overtime work under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Secs. 3 and 4, CA
No. 444), and instead insisted that work computation provided in the collective
bargaining agreements between the parties be observed. Since the claim for pay
differentials is principally anchored on the written contracts between the litigants,
the ten-year prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(1) of the New Civil Code
should govern. (General Insurance and Surety Corp. vs. Republic, L-13873, January
31, 1963, 7 SCRA 4; Heirs of the Deceased Juan Sindiong vs. Committee on Burnt
Areas and Improvements of Cebu, L-15975, April 30, 1964, 10 SCRA 715; Conde vs.
Cuenca and Malaga, L-9405, July 31, 1956; Veluz vs. Veluz, L-23261, July 31, 1968,
24 SCRA 559).
Finally, granting arguendo that there is doubt as to what labor legislation to apply to
the grievances of the employees in the cases at bar, it is OUR view that legislation
which would enhance the plight of the workers should be followed, consonant with
the express pronouncement of the New Civil Code that:
"In case of doubt, all labor legislation and labor contracts should be construed in
favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer" (Article 1702).
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-63578 July 11, 1985
PHlLIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA) CECILIO
V. BAUTISTA, PANTALEON ARAYATA, CATALINO BAÑEZ LUCIO
CANTILLO, ROBERTO ESPINELI, JASMIN A. ILANO, ALFONSO JOSE,
ROMULO NERY, ET AL., petitioners,
-versus-
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES, INC. (PAL), BENIGNO TODA JR. and GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako Law Office for respondent B. Toda, Jr.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeks to annul the resolution
dated May 31, 1977 of respondent National Labor Relations Commission, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Commission has resolved, as it hereby resolves, to
recall and declare inoperative the Partial Writ of Execution dated
December 6, 1976, and affirm the Order dated March 4, 1977 with
modification that only pay differentials beginning February 14, 1953 up
to September 8, 1963 be ordered paid.
SO ORDERED.
It appears that on March 31, 1976 this Court promulgated a decision in L-31341
(Philippine Air Lines Employees Association (PALEA) et al. vs. Philippine Air Lines
Inc.) and L-31-343 (Philippine Air Lines Inc. vs. Philippine Air Lines Employees
Association, et al.) affirming the resolution of the defunct Court of Industrial
Relations sustaining PALEA's method of computing the basic daily and hourly rate of
PAL's monthly salaried employees. to wit:
Monthly Salary x 12 = x (Basic daily rate)
No. of Actual Working Days
x = Basic hourly rate
8
with modification that the pay differentials be paid effective February 14, 1953
instead of July 1, 1957.
Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration. PAL insisted that the
method of computation of the basic daily rate of pay should be—to divide the yearly
salary by 365 days, to wit:
Monthly Salary x 12 = x (Basic daily wage)
365 days (No. of calendar
days in a year)
x = Basic hourly rate
8
PALEA, on the other hand, prayed that the pay differentials to be paid to the
employees involved should bear interest to be fixed by the Court from the date of the
filing of the complaint on February 14,1963.
This Court denied both motions for lack of merit and declared the denial as final in the
resolution of August 20, 1976. Entry of judgment was made on August 29, 1976.
On September 27, 1976 PALEA filed with the NLRC a "motion for immediate
execution and payments of benefits under the award and motion for immediate
verification, examination and computation and payment of back differentials."
After hearing, Labor Arbiter Francisco delos Reyes issued a partial writ of execution
dated December 6, 1976 directing the Deputy Sheriff of the NLRC to implement,
beginning October 1, 1976, the CIR resolution as affirmed with modification by the
Supreme Court.
On March 4, 1977, Labor Arbiter delos Reyes granted the second portion of the
motion which was filed on September 27, 1976 "for immediate verification,
examination and computation and payment of back differential," and ordered the
computation of differential from February 14, 1953 up to September 30, 1976.
On March 28,1977 PAL filed with the NLRC an appeal with prayer to quash the order
of March 4, 1977, and a motion to stay execution of the partial writ of execution and
the aforesaid order of March 4, 1977.
On May 31, 1977, the NLRC issued the questioned resolution, The NLRC reasoned
out that the application of the adjudged correct method or formula as adopted in the
Supreme Court's decision was based on the specific provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement still existing from 1952 until its expiry on September 8, 1963;
and that beginning September 9, 1963 the aforesaid formula ceased to be effective.
On March 29, 1983 or after a lapse of about six (6) years, the present petition for
certiorari was filed before this Court assailing the said resolution.
Petitioners maintain that this Court in its decision of March 1976 had already settled
the correct method or formula of computation of the basic daily rate of pay of PAL's
monthly salaried employees in determining their overtime pay, night differential pay,
holiday premium pay, vacation and sick leave pay effective from February 14, 1953.
Thus, when the NLRC declared that the said method or formula ceased to be effective
on September 8, 1963, the consequence would be to revert to The use of what had
been adjudged by this Court as an erroneous method of computation of the basic daily
rate of pay, by dividing the yearly salary by 365 days.
The petition should be dismissed.
Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreements entered into between the
parties from 1952 up to September 8, 1963, which were the subject matter of L-31341
and L-31343, off-days were not paid days. Hence, the unions contested the PAL's
wage formula of computing the basic daily rate of the latter's monthly- salaried
employees by using 365 days as divisor thus including even the off-days, In Our
decision of March 31, 1976 in said cases, We categorically ruled that "off-days are not
paid days. Such being the case, the divisor in computing an employee's basic daily
rate should be the actual working days in a year. The number of off- days are not to be
counted precisely because on such off-days, an employee is not required to work." It
should be made clear, however, that such pronouncement was based on the provisions
of the collective bargaining agreements existing from 1952 until September 8, 1963.
As alleged by the respondents and found out by the respondent Commission and
which was not disputed by petitioners, after September 8, 1963, there was a change of
collective bargaining agreement. And the parties incorporated in the subsequent
collective bargaining agreements provisions considering such "off-days" as already
"paid". Hence, the method of computing the basic and hourly rate of respondent
PAL's monthly-salaried employees which We decreed in G.R. No. L-31341 and No.
L-31343 is no longer applicable after September 8, 1963.
WE agree with the respondent Commission in limiting the application of Our decision
of March 31, 1976 from February 14, 1953 to September 8, 1963. The respondent
Commission ruled in this wise:
To our mind, the change of the CBA provisions interpreted by the Court
can lead to no other conclusion than that the Decision is coterminous
with the last CBA containing the interpreted provision. This must be so.
For, the set of facts which justified the assumption that holidays and off
days were not paid, no longer obtains. The facts which form the basis of
the CIR en bancs disposition is clear in pages 9 and 10 of the Resolution
itself.
xxx xxx xxx
What is more, the Supreme Court final decision in this proceeding,
affirming the Resolution of the CIR sitting en banc, in adopting the
correct formula for determining the basic daily and hourly rate of
monthly rate of monthly salaried PAL employees pursuant to specific
provisions of the successive CBA's from 1952 up to that which expired
on September 8, 1963, specifically anchored on the assumption that 'off
days' are not yet paid, could not possibly have intended to unreasonably
extend the effects of the same Decision to subsequent period of time
covered by subsequent CBA's wherein the parties, obviously to prevent
repetition of the same troubles arising from their different
interpretations leading to the present dispute, precisely incorporated
provisions clearly considering such 'off days' as already paid
In other words, by any stretch of valid argumentation, logic communes
with reason to support the conclusion that the coverage of the CIR en
banc resolution as affirmed by the Supreme Court is Limited to the
period from February 14, 1953 to September 8, 196,3. Clearly then,
beginning September 9, 1963, the adjudged formula in computing the
daily and hourly rate of monthly salaried PAL employees ceased to be
effective. A fortiori, there exist no valid rationale for the questioned
Partial Writ of Execution (emphasis supplied: pp. 123-127, rec.).
Finally, petitioners' cause of action questioning respondent Commission's resolution
of May 31, 1977 is almost six (6) years late as the present petition for certiorari was
filed only on March 29, 1983. The questioned resolution having long become final
and executory, this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present petition.
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR certiorari IS HEREBY DISMISSED FOR
LACK OF MERIT. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., took no part.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146667. January 23, 2007.]
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a petition for review 1 to set aside the Decision 2 dated 15 June 2000 and the Resolution
3 dated 27 December 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55130. The Court of
Appeals affirmed with modification the 29 December 1998 Decision 4 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR 02-00949-95.
The Facts
The facts, as summarized by the Labor Arbiter and adopted by the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals, are as follows:
On February 2, 1995, John F. McLeod filed a complaint for retirement benefits, vacation and
sick leave benefits, non-payment of unused airline tickets, holiday pay, underpayment of salary
and 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus interest against Filipinas
Synthetic Corporation (Filsyn), Far Eastern Textile Mills, Inc., Sta. Rosa Textiles, Inc., Patricio
Lim and Eric Hu.
In his Position Paper, complainant alleged that he is an expert in textile manufacturing process;
that as early as 1956 he was hired as the Assistant Spinning Manager of Universal Textiles, Inc.
(UTEX); that he was promoted to Senior Manager and worked for UTEX till 1980 under its
President, respondent Patricio Lim; that in 1978 Patricio Lim formed Peggy Mills, Inc. with
respondent Filsyn having controlling interest; that complainant was absorbed by Peggy Mills as
its Vice President and Plant Manager of the plant at Sta. Rosa, Laguna; that at the time of his
retirement complainant was receiving P60,000.00 monthly with vacation and sick leave benefits;
13th month pay, holiday pay and two round trip business class tickets on a Manila-London-
Manila itinerary every three years which is convertible to cas[h] if unused; that in January 1986,
respondents failed to pay vacation and leave credits and requested complainant to wait as it was
short of funds but the same remain unpaid at present; that complainant is entitled to such benefit
as per CBA provision (Annex "A"); that respondents likewise failed to pay complainant's holiday
pay up to the present; that complainant is entitled to such benefits as per CBA provision (Annex
"B"); that in 1989 the plant union staged a strike and in 1993 was found guilty of staging an
illegal strike; that from 1989 to 1992 complainant was entitled to 4 round trip business class
plane tickets on a Manila-London-Manila itinerary but this benefit not (sic) its monetary
equivalent was not given; that on August 1990 the respondents reduced complainant's monthly
salary of P60,000.00 by P9,900.00 till November 1993 or a period of 39 months; that in 1991
Filsyn sold Peggy Mills, Inc. to Far Eastern Textile Mills, Inc. as per agreement (Annex "D") and
this was renamed as Sta. Rosa Textile with Patricio Lim as Chairman and President; that
complainant worked for Sta. Rosa until November 30 that from time to time the owners of Far
Eastern consulted with complainant on technical aspects of reoperation of the plant as per
correspondence (Annexes "D-1" and "D-2"); that when complainant reached and applied
retirement age at the end of 1993, he was only given a reduced 13th month pay of P44,183.63,
leaving a balance of P15,816.87; that thereafter the owners of Far Eastern Textiles decided for
cessation of operations of Sta. Rosa Textiles; that on two occasions, complainant wrote letters
(Annexes "E-1" to "E-2") to Patricio Lim requesting for his retirement and other benefits; that in
the last quarter of 1994 respondents offered complainant compromise settlement of only
P300,000.00 which complainant rejected; that again complainant wrote a letter (Annex "F")
reiterating his demand for full payment of all benefits and to no avail, hence this complaint; and
that he is entitled to all his money claims pursuant to law.
On the other hand, respondents in their Position Paper alleged that complainant was the former
Vice-President and Plant Manager of Peggy Mills, Inc.; that he was hired in June 1980 and
Peggy Mills closed operations due to irreversible losses at the end of July 1992 but the
corporation still exists at present; that its assets were acquired by Sta. Rosa Textile Corporation
which was established in April 1992 but still remains non-operational at present; that
complainant was hired as consultant by Sta. Rosa Textile in November 1992 but he resigned on
November 30, 1993; that Filsyn and Far Eastern Textiles are separate legal entities and have no
employer relationship with complainant; that respondent Patricio Lim is the President and Board
Chairman of Sta. Rosa Textile Corporation; that respondent Eric Hu is a Taiwanese and is
Director of Sta. Rosa Textiles, Inc.; that complainant has no cause of action against Filsyn, Far
Eastern Textile Ltd., Sta. Rosa Textile Corporation and Eric Hu; that Sta. Rosa only acquired the
assets and not the liabilities of Peggy Mills, Inc.; that Patricio Lim was only impleaded as Board
Chairman of Sta. Rosa Textile and not as private individual; that while complainant was Vice
President and Plant Manager of Peggy Mills, the union staged a strike up to July 1992 resulting
in closure of operations due to irreversible losses as per Notice (Annex "1"); that complainant
was relied upon to settle the labor problem but due to his lack of attention and absence the strike
continued resulting in closure of the company; and losses to Sta. Rosa which acquired its assets
as per their financial statements (Annexes "2" and "3"); that the attendance records of
complainant from April 1992 to November 1993 (Annexes "4" and "5") show that he was either
absent or worked at most two hours a day; that Sta. Rosa and Peggy Mills are interposing
counterclaims for damages in the total amount of P36,757.00 against complainant; that
complainant's monthly salary at Peggy Mills was P50,495.00 and not P60,000.00; that Peggy
Mills, does not have a retirement program; that whatever amount complainant is entitled should
be offset with the counterclaims; that complainant worked only for 12 years from 1980 to 1992;
that complainant was only hired as a consultant and not an employee by Sta. Rosa Textile; that
complainant's attendance record of absence and two hours daily work during the period of the
strike wipes out any vacation/sick leave he may have accumulated; that there is no basis for
complainant's claim of two (2) business class airline tickets; that complainant's pay already
included the holiday pay; that he is entitled to holiday pay as consultant by Sta. Rosa; that he has
waived this benefit in his 12 years of work with Peggy Mills; that he is not entitled to 13th month
pay as consultant; and that he is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees.
In his Reply, complainant alleged that all respondents being one and the same entities are
solidarily liable for all salaries and benefits and complainant is entitled to; that all respondents
have the same address at 12/F B.A. Lepanto Building, Makati City; that their counsel holds
office in the same address; that all respondents have the same offices and key personnel such as
Patricio Lim and Eric Hu; that respondents' Position Paper is verified by Marialen C. Corpuz
who knows all the corporate officers of all respondents; that the veil of corporate fiction may be
pierced if it is used as a shield to perpetuate fraud and confuse legitimate issues; that complainant
never accepted the change in his position from Vice-President and Plant Manager to consultant
and it is incumbent upon respondents to prove that he was only a consultant; that the Deed of
Dation in Payment with Lease (Annex "C") proves that Sta. Rosa took over the assets of Peggy
Mills as early as June 15, 1992 and not 1995 as alleged by respondents; that complainant never
resigned from his job but applied for retirement as per letters (Annexes "E-1", "E-2" and "F");
that documents "G", "H" and "I" show that Eric Hu is a top official of Peggy Mills that the
closure of Peggy Mills cannot be the fault of complainant; that the strike was staged on the issue
of CBA negotiations which is not part of the usual duties and responsibilities as Plant Manager;
that complainant is a British national and is prohibited by law in engaging in union activities;
that as per Resolution (Annex "3") of the NLRC in the proper case, complainant testified in favor
of management; that the alleged attendance record of complainant was lifted from the logbook of
a security agency and is hearsay evidence; that in the other attendance record it shows that
complainant was reporting daily and even on Saturdays; that his limited hours was due to the
strike and cessation of operations; that as plant manager complainant was on call 24 hours a day;
that respondents must pay complainant the unpaid portion of his salaries and his retirement
benefits that cash voucher No. 17015 (Annex "K") shows that complainant drew the monthly
salary of P60,000.00 which was reduced to P50,495.00 in August 1990 and therefore without the
consent of complainant; that complainant was assured that he will be paid the deduction as soon
as the company improved its financial standing but this assurance was never fulfilled; that
Patricio Lim promised complainant his retirement pay as per the latter's letters (Annexes "E-1",
"E-2" and "F"); that the law itself provides for retirement benefits; that Patricio Lim by way of
Memorandum (Annex "M") approved vacation and sick leave benefits of 22 days per year
effective 1986; that Peggy Mills required monthly paid employees to sign an acknowledgement
that their monthly compensation includes holiday pay; that complainant was not made to sign
this undertaking precisely because he is entitled to holiday pay over and above his monthly pay;
that the company paid for complainant's two (2) round trip tickets to London in 1983 and 1986 as
reflected in the complainant's passport (Annex "N"); that respondents claim that complainant is
not entitled to 13th month pay but paid in 1993 and all the past 13 years; that complainant is
entitled to moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees; that all doubts must be resolved in
favor of complainant; and that complainant reserved the right to file perjury cases against those
concerned.
In their Reply, respondents alleged that except for Peggy Mills, the other respondents are not
proper persons in interest due to the lack of employer-employee relationship between them and
complainant; that undersigned counsel does not represent Peggy Mills, Inc.
In a separate Position Paper, respondent Peggy Mills alleged that complainant was hired on
February 10, 1991 as per Board Minutes (Annex "A"); that on August 19, 1987, the workers
staged an illegal strike causing cessation of operations on July 21, 1992; that respondent filed a
Notice of Closure with the DOLE (Annex "B"); that all employees were given separation pay
except for complainant whose task was extended to December 31, 1992 to wind up the affairs of
the company as per vouchers (Annexes "C" and "C-1"); that respondent offered complainant his
retirement benefits under RA 7641 but complainant refused; that the regular salaries of
complainant from closure up to December 31, 1992 have offset whatever vacation and sick
leaves he accumulated; that his claim for unused plane tickets from 1989 to 1992 has no policy
basis, the company's formula of employees monthly rate x 314 days over 12 months already
included holiday pay; that complainant's unpaid portion of the 13th month pay in 1993 has no
basis because he was only an employee up to December 31, 1992; that the 13th month pay was
based on his last salary; and that complainant is not entitled to damages. 5
On 3 April 1998, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We hold all respondents as jointly and solidarily liable for
complainant's money claims as adjudicated above and computed below as follows:
6/80-11/30/93 = 14 years
P60,000-P50,495 = P9,505
TOTAL P5,528,996.55
SO ORDERED. 6
Filipinas Synthetic Fiber Corporation (Filsyn), Far Eastern Textile Mills, Inc. (FETMI), Sta.
Rosa Textiles, Inc. (SRTI), Patricio L. Lim (Patricio), and Eric Hu appealed to the NLRC. The
NLRC rendered its decision on 29 December 1998, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 3 April 1998 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a
new one is entered ORDERING respondent Peggy Mills, Inc. to pay complainant his retirement
pay equivalent to 22.5 days for every year of service for his twelve (12) years of service from
1980 to 1992 based on a salary rate of P50,495.00 a month.
SO ORDERED. 7
John F. McLeod (McLeod) filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC denied in its
Resolution of 30 June 1999. 8 McLeod thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals assailing the decision and resolution of the NLRC. 9
WHEREFORE, the decision dated December 29, 1998 of the NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that respondent Patricio Lim is jointly and solidarily liable with Peggy
Mills, Inc., to pay the following amounts to petitioner John F. McLeod:
1. retirement pay equivalent to 22.5 days for every year of service for his twelve (12) years
of service from 1980 to 1992 based on a salary rate of P50,495, a month;
No costs is awarded.
SO ORDERED. 10
The Court of Appeals rejected McLeod's theory that all respondent corporations are the same
corporate entity which should be held solidarily liable for the payment of his monetary claims.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the fact that (1) all respondent corporations have the same
address; (2) all were represented by the same counsel, Atty. Isidro S. Escano; (3) Atty. Escano
holds office at respondent corporations' address; and (4) all respondent corporations have
common officers and key personnel, would not justify the application of the doctrine of piercing
the veil of corporate fiction.
The Court of Appeals held that there should be clear and convincing evidence that SRTI,
FETMI, and Filsyn were being used as alter ego, adjunct or business conduit for the sole benefit
of Peggy Mills, Inc. (PMI), otherwise, said corporations should be treated as distinct and separate
from each other.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the Articles of Incorporation of PMI show that it has six
incorporators, namely, Patricio, Jose Yulo, Jr., Carlos Palanca, Jr., Cesar R. Concio, Jr., E. A.
Picasso, and Walter Euyang. On the other hand, the Articles of Incorporation of Filsyn show that
it has 10 incorporators, namely, Jesus Y. Yujuico, Carlos Palanca, Jr., Patricio, Ang Beng Uh,
Ramon A. Yulo, Honorio Poblador, Jr., Cipriano Azada, Manuel Tomacruz, Ismael Maningas,
and Benigno Zialcita, Jr.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that PMI and Filsyn have only two interlocking incorporators
and directors, namely, Patricio and Carlos Palanca, Jr.
Reiterating the ruling of this Court in Laguio v. NLRC, 11 the Court of Appeals held that mere
substantial identity of the incorporators of two corporations does not necessarily imply fraud, nor
warrant the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that when SRTI and PMI executed the Dation in Payment
with Lease, it was clear that SRTI did not assume the liabilities PMI incurred before the
execution of the contract.
The Court of Appeals held that McLeod failed to substantiate his claim that all respondent
corporations should be treated as one corporate entity. The Court of Appeals thus upheld the
NLRC's finding that no employer-employee relationship existed between McLeod and
respondent corporations except PMI.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Eric Hu, as an officer of PMI, should be exonerated from any
liability, there being no proof of malice or bad faith on his part. The Court of Appeals, however,
ruled that McLeod was entitled to recover from PMI and Patricio, the company's Chairman and
President.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that Patricio deliberately and maliciously evaded PMI's
financial obligation to McLeod. The Court of Appeals stated that, on several occasions, despite
his approval, Patricio refused and ignored to pay McLeod's retirement benefits. The Court of
Appeals stated that the delay lasted for one year prompting McLeod to initiate legal action. The
Court of Appeals stated that although PMI offered to pay McLeod his retirement benefits, this
offer for P300,000 was still below the "floor limits" provided by law. The Court of Appeals held
that an employee could demand payment of retirement benefits as a matter of right.
The Court of Appeals stated that considering that PMI was no longer in operation, its "officer
should be held liable for acting on behalf of the corporation."
The Court of Appeals also ruled that since PMI did not have a retirement program providing for
retirement benefits of its employees, Article 287 of the Labor Code must be followed. The Court
of Appeals thus upheld the NLRC's finding that McLeod was entitled to retirement pay
equivalent to 22.5 days for every year of service from 1980 to 1992 based on a salary rate of
P50,495 a month.
The Court of Appeals held that McLeod was not entitled to payment of vacation, sick leave and
holiday pay because as Vice President and Plant Manager, McLeod is a managerial employee
who, under Article 82 of the Labor Code, is not entitled to these benefits.
The Court of Appeals stated that for McLeod to be entitled to payment of service incentive leave
and holidays, there must be an agreement to that effect between him and his employer.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected McLeod's argument that since PMI paid for his two
round-trip tickets Manila-London in 1983 and 1986, he was also "entitled to unused airline
tickets." The Court of Appeals stated that the fact that PMI granted McLeod "free transport to
and from Manila and London for the year 1983 and 1986 does not ipso facto characterize it as
regular that would establish a prevailing company policy."
The Court of Appeals also denied McLeod's claims for underpayment of salaries and his 13th
month pay for the year 1994. The Court of Appeals upheld the NLRC's ruling that it could be
deduced from McLeod's own narration of facts that he agreed to the reduction of his
compensation from P60,000 to P50,495 in August 1990 to November 1993.
The Court of Appeals found the award of moral damages for P50,000 in order because of the
"stubborn refusal" of PMI and Patricio to respect McLeod's valid claims.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total award should
be given to McLeod under Article 2208, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code. 12
The Issues
1. Whether the challenged Decision and Resolution of the 14th Division of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on 15 June 2000 and 27 December 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No.
55130 are in accord with law and jurisprudence;
3. Whether the private respondents may avoid their financial obligations to the petitioner by
invoking the veil of corporate fiction;
4. Whether petitioner is entitled to the relief he seeks against the private respondents;
5. Whether the ruling of [this] Court in Special Police and Watchman Association (PLUM)
Federation v. National Labor Relations Commission cited by the Office of the Solicitor General
is applicable to the case of petitioner; and
6. Whether the appeal taken by the private respondents from the Decision of the labor
arbiter meets the mandatory requirements recited in the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended. 13
The Court's Ruling
McLeod asserts that the Court of Appeals should not have upheld the NLRC's findings that he
was a managerial employee of PMI from 20 June 1980 to 31 December 1992, and then a
consultant of SRTI up to 30 November 1993. McLeod asserts that if only for this "brazen
assumption," the Court of Appeals should not have sustained the NLRC's ruling that his cause of
action was only against PMI.
Records disclose that McLeod was an employee only of PMI. 14 PMI hired McLeod as its acting
Vice President and General Manager on 20 June 1980. 15 PMI confirmed McLeod's appointment
as Vice President/Plant Manager in the Special Meeting of its Board of Directors on 10 February
1981. 16 McLeod himself testified during the hearing before the Labor Arbiter that his "regular
employment" was with PMI. 17
When PMI's rank-and-file employees staged a strike on 19 August 1989 to July 1992, PMI
incurred serious business losses. 18 This prompted PMI to stop permanently plant operations and
to send a notice of closure to the Department of Labor and Employment on 21 July 1992. 19
PMI informed its employees, including McLeod, of the closure. 20 PMI paid its employees,
including managerial employees, except McLeod, their unpaid wages, sick leave, vacation leave,
prorated 13th month pay, and separation pay. Under the compromise agreement between PMI
and its employees, the employer-employee relationship between them ended on 25 November
1992. 21
Records also disclose that PMI extended McLeod's service up to 31 December 1992 "to wind up
some affairs" of the company. 22 McLeod testified on cross-examination that he received his
last salary from PMI in December 1992. 23
It is thus clear that McLeod was a managerial employee of PMI from 20 June 1980 to 31
December 1992.
However, McLeod claims that after FETMI purchased PMI in January 1993, he "continued to
work at the same plant with the same responsibilities" until 30 November 1993. McLeod claims
that FETMI merely renamed PMI as SRTI. McLeod asserts that it was for this reason that when
he reached the retirement age in 1993, he asked all the respondents for the payment of his
benefits. 24
What took place between PMI and SRTI was dation in payment with lease. Pertinent portions of
the contract that PMI and SRTI executed on 15 June 1992 read:
WHEREAS, PMI is indebted to the Development Bank of the Philippines ("DBP") and as
security for such debts (the "Obligations") has mortgaged its real properties covered by TCT
Nos. T-38647, T-37136, and T-37135, together with all machineries and improvements found
thereat, a complete listing of which is hereto attached as Annex "A" (the "Assets");
WHEREAS, PMI obtained cash advances from SRTC in the total amount of TWO HUNDRED
TEN MILLION PESOS (P210,000,000.00) (the "Advances") to enable PMI to consummate the
DDBO with APT, with SRTC subrogating APT as PMI's creditor thereby;
WHEREAS, in payment to SRTC for PMI's liability, PMI has agreed to transfer all its rights,
title and interests in the Assets by way of a dation in payment to SRTC, provided that
simultaneous with the dation in payment, SRTC shall grant unto PMI the right to lease the Assets
under terms and conditions stated hereunder;
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, and of the terms and
conditions hereinafter set forth, the parties hereby agree as follows:
As a rule, a corporation that purchases the assets of another will not be liable for the debts of the
selling corporation, provided the former acted in good faith and paid adequate consideration for
such assets, except when any of the following circumstances is present: (1) where the purchaser
expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the debts, (2) where the transaction amounts to a
consolidation or merger of the corporations, (3) where the purchasing corporation is merely a
continuation of the selling corporation, and (4) where the selling corporation fraudulently enters
into the transaction to escape liability for those debts. 26
Here, PMI transferred its assets to SRTI to settle its obligation to SRTI in the sum of
P210,000,000. We are not convinced that PMI fraudulently transferred these assets to escape its
liability for any of its debts. PMI had already paid its employees, except McLeod, their money
claims.
Consolidation is the union of two or more existing corporations to form a new corporation called
the consolidated corporation. It is a combination by agreement between two or more corporations
by which their rights, franchises, and property are united and become those of a single, new
corporation, composed generally, although not necessarily, of the stockholders of the original
corporations.
Merger, on the other hand, is a union whereby one corporation absorbs one or more existing
corporations, and the absorbing corporation survives and continues the combined business.
The parties to a merger or consolidation are called constituent corporations. In consolidation, all
the constituents are dissolved and absorbed by the new consolidated enterprise. In merger, all
constituents, except the surviving corporation, are dissolved. In both cases, however, there is no
liquidation of the assets of the dissolved corporations, and the surviving or consolidated
corporation acquires all their properties, rights and franchises and their stockholders usually
become its stockholders.
The surviving or consolidated corporation assumes automatically the liabilities of the dissolved
corporations, regardless of whether the creditors have consented or not to such merger or
consolidation. 27
In the present case, there is no showing that the subject dation in payment involved any corporate
merger or consolidation. Neither is there any showing of those indicative factors that SRTI is a
mere instrumentality of PMI.
Moreover, SRTI did not expressly or impliedly agree to assume any of PMI's debts. Pertinent
portions of the subject Deed of Dation in Payment with Lease provide, thus:
(e) PMI shall warrant that it will hold SRTC or its assigns, free and harmless from any
liability for claims of PMI's creditors, laborers, and workers and for physical injury or injury to
property arising from PMI's custody, possession, care, repairs, maintenance, use or operation of
the Assets except ordinary wear and tear; 28 (Emphasis supplied)
Also, McLeod did not present any evidence to show the alleged renaming of "Peggy Mills, Inc."
to "Sta. Rosa Textiles, Inc."
Hence, it is not correct for McLeod to treat PMI and SRTI as the same entity.
Respondent corporations assert that SRTI hired McLeod as consultant after PMI stopped
operations. 29 On the other hand, McLeod asserts that he was respondent corporations' employee
from 1980 to 30 November 1993. 30 However, McLeod failed to present any proof of employer-
employee relationship between him and Filsyn, SRTI, or FETMI. McLeod testified, thus:
ATTY. ESCANO:
WITNESS:
ATTY. AVECILLA:
May I request that the witness be allowed to go through his Annexes, Your Honor.
ATTY. ESCANO:
Yes, but I want a precise answer to that question. If he has an employment contract with
Far Eastern Textile?
WITNESS:
Can I answer it this way, sir? There is not a valid contract but I was under the impression
taking into consideration that the closeness that I had at Far Eastern Textile is enough during that
period of time of the development of Peggy Mills to reorganize a staff. I was under the basic
impression that they might still retain my status as Vice President and Plant Manager of the
company.
ATTY. ESCANO:
But the answer is still, there is no employment contract in your possession appointing you
in any capacity by Far Eastern?
WITNESS:
ATTY. ESCANO:
So, there is proof that you were in fact really employed by Peggy Mills?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. ESCANO:
Of course, my interest now is to whether or not there is a similar document to present that
you were employed by the other respondents like Filsyn Corporation?
WITNESS:
ATTY. ESCANO:
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
ATTY. ESCANO:
Q Yes. Let me be more specific, Mr. McLeod. Do you have a contract of employment from
Far Eastern Textiles, Inc.?
A No, sir.
Q What about Sta. Rosa Textile Mills, do you have an employment contract from this
company?
A No, sir.
Q And what about respondent Eric Hu. Have you had any contract of employment from Mr.
Eric Hu?
A Not a direct contract but I was taken in and I told to take over this from Mr. Eric Hu.
Automatically, it confirms that Mr. Eric Hu, in other words, was under the control of Mr.
Patricio Lim at that period of time.
It is a basic rule in evidence that parties must prove their affirmative allegations. While technical
rules are not strictly followed in the NLRC, this does not mean that the rules on proving
allegations are entirely ignored. Bare allegations are not enough. They must be supported by
substantial evidence at the very least. 34
However, McLeod claims that "for purposes of determining employer liability, all private
respondents are one and the same employer" because: (1) they have the same address; (2) they
are all engaged in the same business; and (3) they have interlocking directors and officers. 35
While a corporation may exist for any lawful purpose, the law will regard it as an association of
persons or, in case of two corporations, merge them into one, when its corporate legal entity is
used as a cloak for fraud or illegality. This is the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
The doctrine applies only when such corporate fiction is used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, 37 or when it is made as a shield to confuse the
legitimate issues, or where a corporation is the mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or
where the corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make
it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation. 38
Here, we do not find any of the evils sought to be prevented by the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil.
Respondent corporations may be engaged in the same business as that of PMI, but this fact alone
is not enough reason to pierce the veil of corporate fiction. 40
In Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union v. Calica, 41 the Court ruled, thus:
In the case at bar, petitioner seeks to pierce the veil of corporate entity of Acrylic, alleging that
the creation of the corporation is a devise to evade the application of the CBA between petitioner
Union and private respondent Company. While we do not discount the possibility of the
similarities of the businesses of private respondent and Acrylic, neither are we inclined to apply
the doctrine invoked by petitioner in granting the relief sought. The fact that the businesses of
private respondent and Acrylic are related, that some of the employees of the private respondent
are the same persons manning and providing for auxiliary services to the units of Acrylic, and
that the physical plants, offices and facilities are situated in the same compound, it is our
considered opinion that these facts are not sufficient to justify the piercing of the corporate veil
of Acrylic. 42 (Emphasis supplied)
Also, the fact that SRTI and PMI shared the same address, i.e., 11/F BA-Lepanto Bldg., Paseo de
Roxas, Makati City, 43 can be explained by the two companies' stipulation in their Deed of
Dation in Payment with Lease that "simultaneous with the dation in payment, SRTC shall grant
unto PMI the right to lease the Assets under terms and conditions stated hereunder." 44
As for the addresses of Filsyn and FETMI, Filsyn held office at 12th Floor, BA-Lepanto Bldg.,
Paseo de Roxas, Makati City, 45 while FETMI held office at 18F, Tun Nan Commercial
Building, 333 Tun Hwa South Road, Sec. 2, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C. 46 Hence, they did not have
the same address as that of PMI.
Eric Hu, on the other hand, was Director of Filsyn and SRTI. 49 He was never an officer of PMI.
Marialen C. Corpuz, Filsyn's Finance Officer, 50 testified on cross-examination that (1) among
all of Filsyn's officers, only she was the one involved in the management of PMI; (2) only she
and Patricio were the common officers between Filsyn and PMI; and (3) Filsyn and PMI are
"two separate companies." 51
Apolinario L. Posio, PMI's Chief Accountant, testified that "SRTI is a different corporation from
PMI." 52
At any rate, the existence of interlocking incorporators, directors, and officers is not enough
justification to pierce the veil of corporate fiction, in the absence of fraud or other public policy
considerations. 53
In Del Rosario v. NLRC, 54 the Court ruled that substantial identity of the incorporators of
corporations does not necessarily imply fraud.
In light of the foregoing, and there being no proof of employer-employee relationship between
McLeod and respondent corporations and Eric Hu, McLeod's cause of action is only against his
former employer, PMI.
On Patricio's personal liability, it is settled that in the absence of malice, bad faith, or specific
provision of law, a stockholder or an officer of a corporation cannot be made personally liable
for corporate liabilities. 55
To reiterate, a corporation is a juridical entity with legal personality separate and distinct from
those acting for and in its behalf and, in general, from the people comprising it. The rule is that
obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers, and employees, are
its sole liabilities. 56
Personal liability of corporate directors, trustees or officers attaches only when (1) they assent to
a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when they are guilty of bad faith or gross
negligence in directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to
the corporation, its stockholders or other persons; (2) they consent to the issuance of watered
down stocks or when, having knowledge of such issuance, do not forthwith file with the
corporate secretary their written objection; (3) they agree to hold themselves personally and
solidarily liable with the corporation; or (4) they are made by specific provision of law
personally answerable for their corporate action. 57
Considering that McLeod failed to prove any of the foregoing exceptions in the present case,
McLeod cannot hold Patricio solidarily liable with PMI.
The records are bereft of any evidence that Patricio acted with malice or bad faith. Bad faith is a
question of fact and is evidentiary. Bad faith does not connote bad judgment or negligence. It
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious wrongdoing. It means breach
of a known duty through some ill motive or interest. It partakes of the nature of fraud. 58
In the present case, there is nothing substantial on record to show that Patricio acted in bad faith
in terminating McLeod's services to warrant Patricio's personal liability. PMI had no other
choice but to stop plant operations. The work stoppage therefore was by necessity. The
company could no longer continue with its plant operations because of the serious business
losses that it had suffered. The mere fact that Patricio was president and director of PMI is not a
ground to conclude that he should be held solidarily liable with PMI for McLeod's money
claims.
The ruling in A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU v. NLRC, 59 which the Court of Appeals cited,
does not apply to this case. We quote pertinent portions of the ruling, thus:
"Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout
shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages."
"Any person violating any of the provisions of Article 265 of this Code shall be punished by a
fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos and/or imprisonment for not less than one (1) day nor
more than six (6) months."
(b) How can the foregoing provisions be implemented when the employer is a corporation?
The answer is found in Article 212 (c) of the Labor Code which provides:
"(c) 'Employer' includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or
indirectly. The term shall not include any labor organization or any of its officers or agents
except when acting as employer."
The foregoing was culled from Section 2 of RA 602, the Minimum Wage Law. Since RANSOM
is an artificial person, it must have an officer who can be presumed to be the employer, being the
"person acting in the interest of (the) employer" RANSOM. The corporation, only in the
technical sense, is the employer.
The responsible officer of an employer corporation can be held personally, not to say even
criminally, liable for non-payment of back wages. That is the policy of the law.
(c) If the policy of the law were otherwise, the corporation employer can have devious ways
for evading payment of back wages. In the instant case, it would appear that RANSOM, in 1969,
foreseeing the possibility or probability of payment of back wages to the 22 strikers, organized
ROSARIO to replace RANSOM, with the latter to be eventually phased out if the 22 strikers win
their case. RANSOM actually ceased operations on May 1, 1973, after the December 19, 1972
Decision of the Court of Industrial Relations was promulgated against RANSOM. 60 (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, in A.C. Ransom, RANSOM, through its President, organized ROSARIO to evade
payment of backwages to the 22 strikers. This situation, or anything similar showing malice or
bad faith on the part of Patricio, does not obtain in the present case. In Santos v. NLRC, 61 the
Court held, thus:
It is true, there were various cases when corporate officers were themselves held by the Court to
be personally accountable for the payment of wages and money claims to its employees. In A.C.
Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs. NLRC, for instance, the Court ruled that under the Minimum
Wage Law, the responsible officer of an employer corporation could be held personally liable for
nonpayment of backwages for "(i)f the policy of the law were otherwise, the corporation
employer (would) have devious ways for evading payment of backwages." In the absence of a
clear identification of the officer directly responsible for failure to pay the backwages, the Court
considered the President of the corporation as such officer. The case was cited in Chua vs. NLRC
in holding personally liable the vice-president of the company, being the highest and most
ranking official of the corporation next to the President who was dismissed for the latter's claim
for unpaid wages.
A review of the above exceptional cases would readily disclose the attendance of facts and
circumstances that could rightly sanction personal liability on the part of the company officer. In
A.C. Ransom, the corporate entity was a family corporation and execution against it could not be
implemented because of the disposition posthaste of its leviable assets evidently in order to
evade its just and due obligations. The doctrine of "piercing the veil of corporate fiction" was
thus clearly appropriate. Chua likewise involved another family corporation, and this time the
conflict was between two brothers occupying the highest ranking positions in the company.
There were incontrovertible facts which pointed to extreme personal animosity that resulted,
evidently in bad faith, in the easing out from the company of one of the brothers by the other.
The basic rule is still that which can be deduced from the Court's pronouncement in Sunio vs.
National Labor Relations Commission; thus:
We come now to the personal liability of petitioner, Sunio, who was made jointly and severally
responsible with petitioner company and CIPI for the payment of the backwages of private
respondents. This is reversible error. The Assistant Regional Director's Decision failed to
disclose the reason why he was made personally liable. Respondents, however, alleged as
grounds thereof, his being the owner of one-half (1/2) interest of said corporation, and his
alleged arbitrary dismissal of private respondents.
Petitioner Sunio was impleaded in the Complaint in his capacity as General Manager of
petitioner corporation. There appears to be no evidence on record that he acted maliciously or in
bad faith in terminating the services of private respondents. His act, therefore, was within the
scope of his authority and was a corporate act.
It is basic that a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those
of the persons composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be
related. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of
the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding the separate
corporate personality. Petitioner Sunio, therefore, should not have been made personally
answerable for the payment of private respondents' back salaries. 62 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the rule is still that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only when the
corporate fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend
crime. In the absence of malice, bad faith, or a specific provision of law making a corporate
officer liable, such corporate officer cannot be made personally liable for corporate liabilities.
Neither Article 212 (c) nor Article 273 (now 272) of the Labor Code expressly makes any
corporate officer personally liable for the debts of the corporation. As this Court ruled in H.L.
Carlos Construction, Inc. v. Marina Properties Corporation: 63
We concur with the CA that these two respondents are not liable. Section 31 of the Corporation
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68) provides:
"Section 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. — Directors or trustees who willfully
and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of
gross negligence or bad faith . . . shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting
therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders and other persons."
The personal liability of corporate officers validly attaches only when (a) they assent to a
patently unlawful act of the corporation; or (b) they are guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in
directing its affairs; or (c) they incur conflict of interest, resulting in damages to the corporation,
its stockholders or other persons.
The records are bereft of any evidence that Typoco acted in bad faith with gross or inexcusable
negligence, or that he acted outside the scope of his authority as company president. The
unilateral termination of the Contract during the existence of the TRO was indeed contemptible
— for which MPC should have merely been cited for contempt of court at the most — and a
preliminary injunction would have then stopped work by the second contractor. Besides, there is
no showing that the unilateral termination of the Contract was null and void. 64
McLeod is not entitled to payment of vacation leave and sick leave as well as to holiday pay.
Article 82, Title I, Book Three of the Labor Code, on Working Conditions and Rest Periods,
provides:
Coverage. — The provisions of this title shall apply to employees in all establishments and
undertakings whether for profit or not, but not to government employees, managerial employees,
field personnel, members of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support,
domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and workers who are paid by results
as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.
As used herein, "managerial employees" refer to those whose primary duty consists of the
management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision
thereof, and to other officers or members of the managerial staff. (Emphasis supplied)
As Vice President/Plant Manager, McLeod is a managerial employee who is excluded from the
coverage of Title I, Book Three of the Labor Code. McLeod is entitled to payment of vacation
leave and sick leave only if he and PMI had agreed on it. The payment of vacation leave and sick
leave depends on the policy of the employer or the agreement between the employer and
employee. 65 In the present case, there is no showing that McLeod and PMI had an agreement
concerning payment of these benefits.
McLeod's assertion of underpayment of his 13th month pay in December 1993 is unavailing. 66
As already stated, PMI stopped plant operations in 1992. McLeod himself testified that he
received his last salary from PMI in December 1992. After the termination of the employer-
employee relationship between McLeod and PMI, SRTI hired McLeod as consultant and not as
employee. Since McLeod was no longer an employee, he was not entitled to the 13th month pay.
67 Besides, there is no evidence on record that McLeod indeed received his alleged "reduced
13th month pay of P44,183.63" in December 1993. 68
Also unavailing is McLeod's claim that he was entitled to the "unpaid monetary equivalent of
unused plane tickets for the period covering 1989 to 1992 in the amount of P279,300.00." 69
PMI has no company policy granting its officers and employees expenses for trips abroad. 70
That at one time PMI reimbursed McLeod for his and his wife's plane tickets in a vacation to
London 71 could not be deemed as an established practice considering that it happened only
once. To be considered a "regular practice," the giving of the benefits should have been done
over a long period, and must be shown to have been consistent and deliberate. 72
In American Wire and Cable Daily Rated Employees Union v. American Wire and Cable Co.,
Inc., 73 the Court held that for a bonus to be enforceable, the employer must have promised it,
and the parties must have expressly agreed upon it, or it must have had a fixed amount and had
been a long and regular practice on the part of the employer.
In the present case, there is no showing that PMI ever promised McLeod that it would continue
to grant him the benefit in question. Neither is there any proof that PMI and McLeod had
expressly agreed upon the giving of that benefit.
McLeod's reliance on Annex M 74 can hardly carry the day for him. Annex M, which is
McLeod's letter addressed to "Philip Lim, VP Administration," merely contains McLeod's
proposals for the grant of some benefits to supervisory and confidential employees. Contrary to
McLeod's allegation, Patricio did not sign the letter. Hence, the letter does not embody any
agreement between McLeod and the management that would entitle McLeod to his money
claims.
Neither can McLeod's assertions find support in Annex U. 75 Annex U is the Agreement which
McLeod and Universal Textile Mills, Inc. executed in 1959. The Agreement merely contains the
renewal of the service agreement which the parties signed in 1956.
McLeod cannot successfully pretend that his monthly salary of P60,000 was reduced without his
consent.
McLeod testified that in 1990, Philip Lim explained to him why his salary would have to be
reduced. McLeod said that Philip told him that "they were short in finances; that it would be
repaid." 76 Were McLeod not amenable to that reduction in salary, he could have immediately
resigned from his work in PMI.
McLeod knew that PMI was then suffering from serious business losses. In fact, McLeod
testified that PMI was not able to operate from August 1989 to 1992 because of the strike. Even
before 1989, as Vice President of PMI, McLeod was aware that the company had incurred "huge
loans from DBP." 77 As it happened, McLeod continued to work with PMI. We find it pertinent
to quote some portions of Apolinario Posio's testimony, to wit:
Q You also stated that before the period of the strike as shown by annex "K" of the reply
filed by the complainant which was I think a voucher, the salary of Mr. McLeod was roughly
P60,000.00 a month?
A Yes, sir.
Q And as shown by their annex "L" to their reply, that this was reduced to roughly
P50,000.00 a month?
A Yes, sir.
Q You stated that this was indeed upon the instruction by the Vice-President of Peggy Mills
at that time and that was Mr. Philip Lim, would you not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Of your own personal knowledge, can you say if this was, in fact, by agreement between
Mr. Philip Lim or any other officers of Peggy Mills and Mr. McLeod?
A If I recall it correctly, I assume it was an agreement, verbal agreement with, between Mr.
Philip Lim and Mr. McLeod, because the voucher that we prepared was actually acknowledged
by Mr. McLeod, the reduced amount was acknowledged by Mr. McLeod thru the voucher that
we prepared.
Q In other words, Mr. Witness, you mean to tell us that Mr. McLeod continuously received
the reduced amount of P50,000.00 by signing the voucher and receiving the amount in question?
A Yes, sir.
Q As far as you remember, Mr. Posio, was there any complaint by Mr. McLeod because of
this reduced amount of his salary at that time?
Q At least, that is in so far as you were concerned, he said nothing when he signed the
voucher in question?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, you also stated that the reason for what appears to be an agreement between Peggy
Mills and Mr. McLeod in so far as the reduction of his salary from P60,000.00 to P50,000.00 a
month was because he would have a reduced number of working days in view of the strike at
Peggy Mills, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that this was so because on account of the strike, there was no work to be done in the
company?
A Yes, sir. 78
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, you also stated if you remember during the first time that you testified that in the
beginning, the monthly salary of the complainant was P60,000.00, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And because of the long period of the strike, when there was no work to be done, by
agreement with the complainant, his monthly salary was adjusted to only P50,495 because he
would not have to report for work on Saturday. Do you remember having made that explanation?
A Yes, sir.
Q You also stated that the complainant continuously received his monthly salary in the
adjusted amount of P50,495.00 monthly signing the necessary vouchers or pay slips for that
without complaining, is that not right, Mr. Posio?
A Yes, sir. 79
Since the last salary that McLeod received from PMI was P50,495, that amount should be the
basis in computing his retirement benefits. McLeod must be credited only with his service to
PMI as it had a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the other respondent
corporations.
Since PMI has no retirement plan, 80 we apply Section 5, Rule II of the Rules Implementing the
New Retirement Law which provides:
5.1 In the absence of an applicable agreement or retirement plan, an employee who retires
pursuant to the Act shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month
salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one
whole year.
5.2 Components of One-half (1/2) Month Salary. — For the purpose of determining the
minimum retirement pay due an employee under this Rule, the term "one-half month salary"
shall include all of the following:
(a) Fifteen (15) days salary of the employee based on his latest salary rate. . . .
With McLeod having worked with PMI for 12 years, from 1980 to 1992, he is entitled to a
retirement pay equivalent to 1/2 month salary for every year of service based on his latest salary
rate of P50,495 a month.
Moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is
guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligations. The breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious, or in bad faith, oppressive or
abusive. 81 From the records of the case, the Court finds no ultimate facts to support a
conclusion of bad faith on the part of PMI.
Records disclose that PMI had long offered to pay McLeod his money claims. In their Comment,
respondents assert that they offered to pay McLeod the sum of P840,000, as "separation benefits,
and not P300,000, if only to buy peace and to forestall any complaint" that McLeod may initiate
before the NLRC. McLeod admitted at the hearing before the Labor Arbiter that PMI has made
this offer —
ATTY. ESCANO:
. . . According to your own statement in your Position Paper and I am referring to page 8,
your unpaid retirement benefit for fourteen (14) years of service at P60,000.00 per year is
P840,000.00, is that correct?
WITNESS:
ATTY. ESCANO:
WITNESS:
ATTY. ESCANO:
The question I want to ask is, are you aware that this amount was offered to you
sometime last year through your own lawyer, my good friend, Atty. Avecilla, who is right here
with us?
WITNESS:
ATTY. ESCANO:
WITNESS:
ATTY. ESCANO:
And, of course, the reason, if I may assume, that you declined this offer was that,
according to you, there are other claims which you would like to raise against the Respondents
which, by your impression, they were not willing to pay in addition to this particular amount?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. ESCANO:
The question now is, if the same amount is offered to you by way of retirement which is
exactly what you stated in your own Position Paper, would you accept it or not?
WITNESS:
Not on the concept without all the basic benefits due me, I will refuse. 82
ATTY. ROXAS:
Q You mentioned in the cross-examination of Atty. Escano that you were offered the
separation pay in 1994, is that correct, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS:
A I was offered a settlement of P300,000.00 for complete settlement and that was I think in
January or February 1994, sir.
ATTY. ESCANO:
WITNESS:
ATTY. ESCANO:
WITNESS:
ATTY. ROXAS:
Q You mentioned that you were offered for the settlement of your claims in 1994 for
P840,000.00, is that right, Mr. Witness?
A During that period in time, while the petition in this case was ongoing, we already filed a
case at that period of time, sir. There was a discussion. To the best of my knowledge, they are
willing to settle for P840,000.00 and based on what the Attorney told me, I refused to accept
because I believe that my position was not in anyway due to a compromise situation to the
benefits I am entitled to. 83
Hence, the awards for exemplary damages and attorney's fees are not proper in the present case.
84
That respondent corporations, in their appeal to the NLRC, did not serve a copy of their
memorandum of appeal upon PMI is of no moment. Section 3 (a), Rule VI of the NLRC New
Rules of Procedure provides:
Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. — (a) The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary
period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the
required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 5 of this Rule;
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal . . . and proof of service on the other party of
such appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
The "other party" mentioned in the Rule obviously refers to the adverse party, in this case,
McLeod. Besides, Section 3, Rule VI of the Rules which requires, among others, proof of service
of the memorandum of appeal on the other party, is merely a rundown of the contents of the
required memorandum of appeal to be submitted by the appellant. These are not jurisdictional
requirements. 85
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 55130, with the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) the retirement pay of John F.
McLeod should be computed at 1/2 month salary for every year of service for 12 years based on
his salary rate of P50,495 a month; (b) Patricio L. Lim is absolved from personal liability; and
(c) the awards for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees are deleted. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Dumpit then demanded reinstatement as well as her backwages, service incentive leave pays and
other monetary benefits.
ABC said they could only pay her backwages but her other claims had no basis as she was not
entitled thereto because she is considered as a talent and not a regular employee.
Dumpit sued ABC. The Labor Arbiter ruled against Dumpit. The National Labor Relations
Commission reversed the LA. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and ruled that as per the
contract between ABC and Dumpit, Dumpit is a fixed term employee.
HELD: Yes. Dumpit was a regular employee under contemplation of law. The practice of
having fixed-term contracts in the industry does not automatically make all talent contracts valid
and compliant with labor law. The assertion that a talent contract exists does not necessarily
prevent a regular employment status.
The duties of Dumpit as enumerated in her employment contract indicate that ABC had control
over the work of Dumpit. Aside from control, ABC also dictated the work assignments and
payment of petitioner’s wages. ABC also had power to dismiss her. All these being present,
clearly, there existed an employment relationship between Dumpit and ABC.
In addition, her work was continuous for a period of four years. This repeated engagement under
contract of hire is indicative of the necessity and desirability of the Dumpit’s work in ABC’s
business.
SECOND DIVISION
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DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition seeks to reverse and set aside both the Decision dated January
30, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63125 and its Resolution
dated June 23, 2004 denying the motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
had overturned the Resolution dated August 30, 2000 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) ruling that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
On December 20, 1999, petitioner filed a complaint against ABC, Mr. Javier
and Mr. Edward Tan, for illegal constructive dismissal, nonpayment of salaries,
overtime pay, premium pay, separation pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave
pay, vacation/sick leaves and 13th month pay in NLRC-NCR Case No. 30-12-00985-
99. She likewise demanded payment for moral, exemplary and actual damages, as
well as for attorney’s fees.
The parties agreed to submit the case for resolution after settlement failed
during the mandatory conference/conciliation. On March 29, 2000, the Labor
Arbiter dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter in a Resolution dated August
30, 2000. The NLRC held that an employer-employee relationship existed between
petitioner and ABC; that the subject talent contract was void; that the petitioner was a
regular employee illegally dismissed; and that she was entitled to reinstatement and
backwages or separation pay, aside from 13th month pay and service incentive leave
pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. It held as follows:
Thereafter, the appellate court ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse
of discretion, and reversed the decision of the NLRC. The appellate court reasoned
that petitioner should not be allowed to renege from the stipulations she had
voluntarily and knowingly executed by invoking the security of tenure under the
Labor Code. According to the appellate court, petitioner was a fixed-term
employee and not a regular employee within the ambit of Article 280 of the Labor
Code because her job, as anticipated and agreed upon, was only for a specified
time.
II.
THE PRO-FORMA TALENT CONTRACTS, AS CORRECTLY FOUND BY
THE NLRC – FIRST DIVISION, ARE “ANTI-REGULARIZATION DEVICES”
WHICH MUST BE STRUCK DOWN FOR REASONS OF PUBLIC POLICY[;]
III.
BY REASON OF THE CONTINUOUS AND SUCCESSIVE RENEWALS OF
THE THREE-MONTH TALENT CONTRACTS, AN EMPLOYER-
EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP WAS CREATED AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER
ARTICLE 280 OF THE LABOR CODE[;]
IV.
BY THE CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL OF HEREIN PETITIONER, AS A
REGULAR EMPLOYEE, THERE WAS A DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS THUS ENTITLING HER TO THE MONEY
CLAIMS AS STATED IN THE COMPLAINT[.]
The issues for our disposition are: (1) whether or not this Court can review
the findings of the Court of Appeals; and (2) whether or not under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in its Decision.
On the first issue, private respondents contend that the issues raised in the
instant petition are mainly factual and that there is no showing that the said issues
have been resolved arbitrarily and without basis. They add that the findings of the
Court of Appeals are supported by overwhelming wealth of evidence on record as
well as prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.
Petitioner however contends that this Court can review the findings of the
Court of Appeals, since the appellate court erred in deciding a question of
substance in a way which is not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of
this Court.
On the second issue, private respondents contend that the Court of Appeals
did not err when it upheld the validity of the talent contracts voluntarily entered
into by petitioner. It further stated that prevailing jurisprudence has recognized and
sustained the absence of employer-employee relationship between a talent and the
media entity which engaged the talent’s services on a per talent contract basis,
citing the case of Sonza v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation.
Further, the Sonza case is not applicable. In Sonza, the television station did
not instruct Sonza how to perform his job. How Sonza delivered his lines, appeared
on television, and sounded on radio were outside the television station’s control.
Sonza had a free hand on what to say or discuss in his shows provided he did not
attack the television station or its interests. Clearly, the television station did not
exercise control over the means and methods of the performance of Sonza’s work.
In the case at bar, ABC had control over the performance of petitioner’s work.
Noteworthy too, is the comparatively low P28,000 monthly pay of petitioner vis
the P300,000 a month salary of Sonza, that all the more bolsters the conclusion that
petitioner was not in the same situation as Sonza.
In Manila Water Company, Inc. v. Pena, we said that the elements to determine
the existence of an employment relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of
the employee, (b) the payment of wages, (c) the power of dismissal, and (d) the
employer’s power to control. The most important element is the employer’s control of
the employee’s conduct, not only as to the result of the work to be done, but also as to
the means and methods to accomplish it.
In our view, the requisites for regularity of employment have been met in the
instant case. Gleaned from the description of the scope of services
aforementioned, petitioner’s work was necessary or desirable in the usual business
or trade of the employer which includes, as a pre-condition for its enfranchisement,
its participation in the government’s news and public information dissemination.
In addition, her work was continuous for a period of four years. This repeated
engagement under contract of hire is indicative of the necessity and desirability of
the petitioner’s work in private respondent ABC’s business.
The contention of the appellate court that the contract was characterized by a
valid fixed-period employment is untenable. For such contract to be valid, it should
be shown that the fixed period was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the
parties. There should have been no force, duress or improper pressure brought to bear
upon the employee; neither should there be any other circumstance that vitiates the
employee’s consent. It should satisfactorily appear that the employer and the
employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance
being exercised by the employer over the employee. Moreover, fixed-term
employment will not be considered valid where, from the circumstances, it is apparent
that periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the
employee.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that the employer and employee dealt with
each other on equal terms. Understandably, the petitioner could not object to the terms
of her employment contract because she did not want to lose the job that she loved and
the workplace that she had grown accustomed to, which is exactly what happened when
she finally manifested her intention to negotiate. Being one of the numerous
newscasters/broadcasters of ABC and desiring to keep her job as a broadcasting
practitioner, petitioner was left with no choice but to affix her signature of conformity
on each renewal of her contract as already prepared by private respondents; otherwise,
private respondents would have simply refused to renew her contract. Patently, the
petitioner occupied a position of weakness vis-à-vis the employer. Moreover, private
respondents’ practice of repeatedly extending petitioner’s 3-month contract for four
years is a circumvention of the acquisition of regular status. Hence, there was no valid
fixed-term employment between petitioner and private respondents.
While this Court has recognized the validity of fixed-term employment
contracts in a number of cases, it has consistently emphasized that when the
circumstances of a case show that the periods were imposed to block the
acquisition of security of tenure, they should be struck down for being contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.`
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
This is an appeal to reverse and set aside both the Decision 1 dated August 29,
2003 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution 2 dated March 15, 2004 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 69639. The appellate court had reversed the decision 3 dated December 29,
2000 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment which ordered the holding of a
certification election among the rank-and-file promo employees of respondent
Burlingame Corporation. ACaTIc
The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It argued that there exists no
employer-employee relationship between it and the petitioner's members. It further
alleged that the petitioner's members are actually employees of F. Garil Manpower
Services (F. Garil), a duly licensed local employment agency. To prove such
contention, respondent presented a copy of its contract for manpower services with
F. Garil.
On June 29, 2000, Med-Arbiter Renato D. Parungo dismissed 4 the petition for lack
of employer-employee relationship, prompting the petitioner to file an appeal 5
before the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
On December 29, 2000, the Secretary of Labor and Employment ordered the
immediate conduct of a certification election. 6
A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the respondent on
January 19, 2001, but the same was denied in the Resolution 7 of February 19, 2002
of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Respondent then filed a complaint with the Court of Appeals, which then reversed 8
the decision of the Secretary. The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration,
9 which the Court of Appeals denied 10 on March 15, 2004.
The resolution of this issue boils down to a determination of the true status of F.
Garil, i.e., whether it is an independent contractor or a labor-only contractor.
The case of De Los Santos v. NLRC 14 succinctly enunciates the statutory criteria:
Job contracting is permissible only if the following conditions are met: 1) the
contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on
his own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and
method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all
matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results
thereof; and 2) the contractor has substantial capital or investment in the form of
tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other materials which are
necessary in the conduct of the business. 15
The "right to control" shall refer to the right reserved to the person for whom the
services of the contractual workers are performed, to determine not only the end to
be achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in reaching that end.
Given the above criteria, we agree with the Secretary that F. Garil is not an
independent contractor.
First, F. Garil does not have substantial capitalization or investment in the form of
tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other materials, to qualify as an
independent contractor. No proof was adduced to show F. Garil's capitalization.
Second, the work of the promo-girls was directly related to the principal business or
operation of Burlingame. Marketing and selling of products is an essential activity to
the main business of the principal.
The "four-fold test" will show that respondent is the employer of petitioner's
members. The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship
are: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages;
(c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the employee's
conduct. The most important element is the employer's control of the employee's
conduct, not only as to the result of the work to be done, but also as to the means
and methods to accomplish it. 17
A perusal of the contractual stipulations between Burlingame and F. Garil shows the
following:
5. The CLIENT shall report to the AGENCY any of its personnel assigned to it if
those personnel are found to be inefficient, troublesome, uncooperative and not
observing the rules and regulations set forth by the CLIENT. It is understood and
agreed that the CLIENT may request any time the immediate replacement of any
personnel(s) assigned to them. 18
It is patent that the involvement of F. Garil in the hiring process was only with
respect to the recruitment aspect, i.e. the screening, testing and pre-selection of
the personnel it provided to Burlingame. The actual hiring itself was done through
the deployment of personnel to establishments by Burlingame.
The contract states that Burlingame would pay the workers through F. Garil,
stipulating that Burlingame shall pay F. Garil a certain sum per worker on the basis
of eight-hour work every 15th and 30th of each calendar month. This evinces the
fact that F. Garil merely served as conduit in the payment of wages to the deployed
personnel. The interpretation would have been different if the payment was for the
job, project, or services rendered during the month and not on a per worker basis.
In Vinoya v. National Labor Relations Commission, 19 we held:
The Court takes judicial notice of the practice of employers who, in order to evade
the liabilities under the Labor Code, do not issue payslips directly to their
employees. Under the current practice, a third person, usually the purported
contractor (service or manpower placement agency), assumes the act of paying the
wage. For this reason, the lowly worker is unable to show proof that it was directly
paid by the true employer. Nevertheless, for the workers, it is enough that they
actually receive their pay, oblivious of the need for payslips, unaware of its legal
implications. Applying this principle to the case at bar, even though the wages were
coursed through PMCI, we note that the funds actually came from the pockets of
RFC. Thus, in the end, RFC is still the one who paid the wages of petitioner albeit
indirectly. 20
The contract also provides that "any personnel found to be inefficient, troublesome,
uncooperative and not observing the rules and regulations set forth by Burlingame
shall be reported to F. Garil and may be replaced upon request." Corollary to this
circumstance would be the exercise of control and supervision by Burlingame over
workers supplied by F. Garil in order to establish the inefficient, troublesome, and
uncooperative nature of undesirable personnel. Also implied in the provision on
replacement of personnel carried upon request by Burlingame is the power to fire
personnel. DTcACa
These are indications that F. Garil was not left alone in the supervision and control
of its alleged employees. Consequently, it can be concluded that F. Garil was not an
independent contractor since it did not carry a distinct business free from the
control and supervision of Burlingame.
Under this circumstance, there is no doubt that F. Garil was engaged in labor-only
contracting, and as such, is considered merely an agent of Burlingame. In labor-only
contracting, the law creates an employer-employee relationship to prevent a
circumvention of labor laws. The contractor is considered merely an agent of the
principal employer and the latter is responsible to the employees of the labor-only
contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal
employer. 21 Since F. Garil is a labor-only contractor, the workers it supplied should
be considered as employees of Burlingame in the eyes of the law.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 29,
2003 and the Resolution dated March 15, 2004 denying the motion for
reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment ordering the holding of a certification election among the
rank-and-file promo employees of Burlingame is reinstated.
SO ORDERED.
FAR EAST AGRICULTURAL SUPPLY, INC., ET AL. vs. JIMMY LEBATIQUE, ET AL.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 162813. February 12, 2007.]
FAR EAST AGRICULTURAL SUPPLY, INC. and/or ALEXANDER UY, petitioners, vs.
JIMMY LEBATIQUE and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
Petitioner Far East Agricultural Supply, Inc. (Far East) hired on March 4, 1996 private
respondent Jimmy Lebatique as truck driver with a daily wage of P223.50. He
delivered animal feeds to the company's clients.
On January 26, 2000, Lebatique sought the assistance of the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) Public Assistance and Complaints Unit concerning the
nonpayment of his overtime pay. According to Lebatique, two days later, he
received a telegram from petitioners requiring him to report for work. When he did
the next day, January 29, 2000, Alexander asked him why he was claiming overtime
pay. Lebatique explained that he had never been paid for overtime work since he
started working for the company. He also told Alexander that Manuel had fired him.
After talking to Manuel, Alexander terminated Lebatique and told him to look for
another job. HCETDS
On March 20, 2000, Lebatique filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
nonpayment of overtime pay. The Labor Arbiter found that Lebatique was illegally
dismissed, and ordered his reinstatement and the payment of his full back wages,
13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and overtime pay. The dispositive
portion of the decision is quoted herein in full, as follows:
SO ORDERED. 5
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit. The NLRC held that there was no dismissal to speak of since Lebatique
was merely suspended. Further, it found that Lebatique was a field personnel,
hence, not entitled to overtime pay and service incentive leave pay. Lebatique
sought reconsideration but was denied. ASTIED
Aggrieved, Lebatique filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, in reversing the NLRC decision, reasoned that Lebatique was
suspended on January 24, 2000 but was illegally dismissed on January 29, 2000
when Alexander told him to look for another job. It also found that Lebatique was
not a field personnel and therefore entitled to payment of overtime pay, service
incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay.
SO ORDERED. 6
Hence, the instant petition wherein petitioners assign the following errors:
Simply stated, the principal issues in this case are: (1) whether Lebatique was
illegally dismissed; and (2) whether Lebatique was a field personnel, not entitled to
overtime pay.
Petitioners contend that, (1) Lebatique was not dismissed from service but merely
suspended for a day due to violation of company rules; (2) Lebatique was not
barred from entering the company premises since he never reported back to work;
and (3) Lebatique is estopped from claiming that he was illegally dismissed since
his complaint before the DOLE was only on the nonpayment of his overtime pay.
Also, petitioners maintain that Lebatique, as a driver, is not entitled to overtime pay
since he is a field personnel whose time outside the company premises cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty. According to petitioners, the drivers do not
observe regular working hours unlike the other office employees. The drivers may
report early in the morning to make their deliveries or in the afternoon, depending
on the production of animal feeds and the traffic conditions. Petitioners also aver
that Lebatique worked for less than eight hours a day. 8
Lebatique for his part insists that he was illegally dismissed and was not merely
suspended. He argues that he neither refused to work nor abandoned his job. He
further contends that abandonment of work is inconsistent with the filing of a
complaint for illegal dismissal. He also claims that he is not a field personnel, thus,
he is entitled to overtime pay and service incentive leave pay.
After consideration of the submission of the parties, we find that the petition lacks
merit. We are in agreement with the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining that
of the Labor Arbiter.
It is well settled that in cases of illegal dismissal, the burden is on the employer to
prove that the termination was for a valid cause. 9 In this case, petitioners failed to
discharge such burden. Petitioners aver that Lebatique was merely suspended for
one day but he abandoned his work thereafter. To constitute abandonment as a just
cause for dismissal, there must be: (a) absence without justifiable reason; and (b) a
clear intention, as manifested by some overt act, to sever the employer-employee
relationship. 10
The records show that petitioners failed to prove that Lebatique abandoned his job.
Nor was there a showing of a clear intention on the part of Lebatique to sever the
employer-employee relationship. When Lebatique was verbally told by Alexander
Uy, the company's General Manager, to look for another job, Lebatique was in effect
dismissed. Even assuming earlier he was merely suspended for illegal use of
company vehicle, the records do not show that he was afforded the opportunity to
explain his side. It is clear also from the sequence of the events leading to
Lebatique's dismissal that it was Lebatique's complaint for nonpayment of his
overtime pay that provoked the management to dismiss him, on the erroneous
premise that a truck driver is a field personnel not entitled to overtime pay.
DaEcTC
An employee who takes steps to protest his layoff cannot by any stretch of
imagination be said to have abandoned his work and the filing of the complaint is
proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus negating any suggestion of
abandonment. 11 A contrary notion would not only be illogical but also absurd.
On the second issue, Article 82 of the Labor Code is decisive on the question of who
are referred to by the term "field personnel." It provides, as follows:
ART. 82. Coverage. — The provisions of this title [Working Conditions and Rest
Periods] shall apply to employees in all establishments and undertakings whether
for profit or not, but not to government employees, managerial employees, field
personnel, members of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for
support, domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and workers
who are paid by results as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate
regulations.
In Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. v. Bautista, 12 this Court emphasized that the
definition of a "field personnel" is not merely concerned with the location where the
employee regularly performs his duties but also with the fact that the employee's
performance is unsupervised by the employer. We held that field personnel are
those who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business
of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined
with reasonable certainty. Thus, in order to determine whether an employee is a
field employee, it is also necessary to ascertain if actual hours of work in the field
can be determined with reasonable certainty by the employer. In so doing, an
inquiry must be made as to whether or not the employee's time and performance
are constantly supervised by the employer. 13
Note that all money claims arising from an employer-employee relationship shall be
filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise, they
shall be forever barred. 16 Further, if it is established that the benefits being
claimed have been withheld from the employee for a period longer than three
years, the amount pertaining to the period beyond the three-year prescriptive
period is therefore barred by prescription. The amount that can only be demanded
by the aggrieved employee shall be limited to the amount of the benefits withheld
within three years before the filing of the complaint. 17
Lebatique timely filed his claim for service incentive leave pay, considering that in
this situation, the prescriptive period commences at the time he was terminated. 18
On the other hand, his claim regarding nonpayment of overtime pay since he was
hired in March 1996 is a different matter. In the case of overtime pay, he can only
demand for the overtime pay withheld for the period within three years preceding
the filing of the complaint on March 20, 2000. However, we find insufficient the
selected time records presented by petitioners to compute properly his overtime
pay. The Labor Arbiter should have required petitioners to present the daily time
records, payroll, or other documents in management's control to determine the
correct overtime pay due Lebatique.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated September
30, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76196 and its Resolution dated
March 15, 2004 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the effect that the case is
hereby REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings to determine the
exact amount of overtime pay and other monetary benefits due Jimmy Lebatique
which herein petitioners should pay without further delay. EAaHTI
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
This case is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74104, entitled, Rowell Industrial Corp., and/or Edwin
Tang vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Joel Taripe, dated 30 September
2004 and 1 April 2005, respectively, which affirmed the Resolutions 3 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 7 June 2002 and 20 August
2002, finding herein respondent Joel Taripe (Taripe) as a regular employee who had
been illegally dismissed from employment by herein petitioner Rowell Industrial
Corp. (RIC), thereby ordering petitioner RIC to reinstate respondent Taripe with full
backwages, subject to the modification of exonerating Edwin Tang, the RIC General
Manager and Vice President, from liability and computing the backwages of herein
respondent Taripe based on the prevailing salary rate at the time of his dismissal.
The NLRC Resolutions reversed the Decision 4 of the Labor Arbiter dated 29
September 2000, which dismissed respondent Taripe's complaint. aIAEcD
The controversy of the present case arose from the following facts, as summarized
by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals:
[Petitioner RIC], for [its] part, claim[s] that [respondent Taripe] was a contractual
employee, whose services were required due to the increase in the demand in
packaging requirement of [its] clients for Christmas season and to build up stock
levels during the early part of the following year; that on [6 March 2000],
[respondent Taripe's] employment contract expired. [Petitioner RIC] avers that the
information update for union members, which was allegedly filled up by [respondent
Taripe] and submitted by the Union to [petitioner] company, it is stated therein that
in the six (6) companies where [respondent Taripe] purportedly worked, the latter's
reason for leaving was "finished contract," hence, [respondent Taripe] has
knowledge about being employed by contract contrary to his allegation that the
document he was signing was not explained to him. [Petitioner RIC] manifest[s] that
all benefits, including those under the [Social Security System], were given to him
on [12 May 2000]. 5
[Petitioner RIC and Mr. Edwin Tang] are hereby ordered to reinstate [respondent
Taripe] and to jointly and severally pay him full backwages from the time he was
illegally dismissed up to the date of his actual reinstatement, less the amount of
P1,427.67. The award of P894.00 for holiday pay is AFFIRMED but the award of
P5,811.00 for financial assistance is deleted. The award for attorney's fees is hereby
adjusted to ten percent (10%) of [respondent Taripe's] total monetary award. 7
Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals with the following
assignment of errors:
II. THE [NLRC] GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND IS IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED [EDWIN TANG] TO (sic) JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
LIABLE FOR MONETARY CLAIMS OF [RESPONDENT TARIPE].
III. THE [NLRC] GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND IS IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED PAYMENT OF MONETARY CLAIMS COMPUTED ON
AN ERRONEOUS WAGE RATE. 8
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision on 30 September 2004,
affirming the Resolution of the NLRC dated 7 June 2002, with modifications. Thus, it
disposed —
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated [7 June 2002] and [20 August 2002] of [the
NLRC] are affirmed, subject to the modification that [Edwin Tang] is exonerated
from liability and the computation of backwages of [respondent Taripe] shall be
based on P223.50, the last salary he received. 9
A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision was filed by petitioner RIC,
but the same was denied for lack of merit in a Resolution 10 of the Court of Appeals
dated 1 April 2005. acCTSE
Petitioner RIC comes before this Court with the lone issue of whether the Court of
Appeals misinterpreted Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, and ignored
jurisprudence when it affirmed that respondent Taripe was a regular employee and
was illegally dismissed.
Petitioner RIC, in its Memorandum, 11 argues that the Court of Appeals had
narrowly interpreted Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, and disregarded a
contract voluntarily entered into by the parties.
In declaring that respondent Taripe was a regular employee of the petitioner and,
thus, his dismissal was illegal, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated in this manner:
The purported contract of employment providing that [respondent Taripe] was hired
as contractual employee for five (5) months only, cannot prevail over the
undisputed fact that [respondent Taripe] was hired to perform the function of power
press operator, a function necessary or desirable in [petitioner's] business of
manufacturing tin cans. [Herein petitioner RIC's] contention that the four (4) months
length of service of [respondent Taripe] did not grant him a regular status is
inconsequential, considering that length of service assumes importance only when
the activity in which the employee has been engaged to perform is not necessary or
desirable to the usual business or trade of the employer.
"In the instant case, there is no doubt that [respondent Taripe], as power press
operator, has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in [petitioner RIC's] usual business or trade of manufacturing of tin cans
for use in packaging of food, paint and others. We also find that [respondent Taripe]
does not fall under any of the abovementioned exceptions. Other that (sic)
[petitioner RIC's] bare allegation thereof, [it] failed to present any evidence to prove
that he was employed for a fixed or specific project or undertaking the completion
of which has been determined at the time of his engagement or that [respondent
Taripe's] services are seasonal in nature and that his employment was for the
duration of the season." 12
The aforesaid Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, classifies employees into
three categories, namely: (1) regular employees or those whose work is necessary
or desirable to the usual business of the employer; (2) project employees or those
whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the
completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is
seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season; and (3)
casual employees or those who are neither regular nor project employees. 13
Regular employees are further classified into: (1) regular employees by nature of
work; and (2) regular employees by years of service. 14 The former refers to those
employees who perform a particular activity which is necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, regardless of their length of service; while
the latter refers to those employees who have been performing the job, regardless
of the nature thereof, for at least a year. 15
The aforesaid Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, however, does not
proscribe or prohibit an employment contract with a fixed period. It does not
necessarily follow that where the duties of the employee consist of activities usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, the parties are
forbidden from agreeing on a period of time for the performance of such activities.
There is nothing essentially contradictory between a definite period of employment
and the nature of the employee's duties. 16 What Article 280 of the Labor Code, as
amended, seeks to prevent is the practice of some unscrupulous and covetous
employers who wish to circumvent the law that protects lowly workers from
capricious dismissal from their employment. The aforesaid provision, however,
should not be interpreted in such a way as to deprive employers of the right and
prerogative to choose their own workers if they have sufficient basis to refuse an
employee a regular status. Management has rights which should also be protected.
17
In the case at bar, respondent Taripe signed a contract of employment prior to his
admission into the petitioner's company. Said contract of employment provides,
among other things:
4. That my employment shall be contractual for the period of five (5) months
which means that the end of the said period, I can (sic) discharged unless this
contract is renewed by mutual consent or terminated for cause. 18
Based on the said contract, respondent Taripe's employment with the petitioner is
good only for a period of five months unless the said contract is renewed by mutual
consent. And as claimed by petitioner RIC, respondent Taripe, along with its other
contractual employees, was hired only to meet the increase in demand for
packaging materials during the Christmas season and also to build up stock levels
during the early part of the year. SaDICE
Although Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, does not forbid fixed term
employment, it must, nevertheless, meet any of the following guidelines in order
that it cannot be said to circumvent security of tenure: (1) that the fixed period of
employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, without any
force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and
absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or (2) it satisfactorily appears
that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms
with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former on the latter. 19
In the present case, it cannot be denied that the employment contract signed by
respondent Taripe did not mention that he was hired only for a specific undertaking,
the completion of which had been determined at the time of his engagement. The
said employment contract neither mentioned that respondent Taripe's services
were seasonal in nature and that his employment was only for the duration of the
Christmas season as purposely claimed by petitioner RIC. What was stipulated in
the said contract was that respondent Taripe's employment was contractual for the
period of five months.
Likewise, as the NLRC mentioned in its Resolution, to which the Court of Appeals
agreed, other than the bare allegations of petitioner RIC that respondent Taripe was
hired only because of the increase in the demand for packaging materials during
the Christmas season, petitioner RIC failed to substantiate such claim with any
other evidence. Petitioner RIC did not present any evidence which might prove that
respondent Taripe was employed for a fixed or specific project or that his services
were seasonal in nature.
Also, petitioner RIC failed to controvert the claim of respondent Taripe that he was
made to sign the contract of employment, prepared by petitioner RIC, as a condition
for his hiring. Such contract in which the terms are prepared by only one party and
the other party merely affixes his signature signifying his adhesion thereto is called
contract of adhesion. 20 It is an agreement in which the parties bargaining are not
on equal footing, the weaker party's participation being reduced to the alternative
"to take it or leave it." 21 In the present case, respondent Taripe, in need of a job,
was compelled to agree to the contract, including the five-month period of
employment, just so he could be hired. Hence, it cannot be argued that respondent
Taripe signed the employment contract with a fixed term of five months willingly
and with full knowledge of the impact thereof. aDSTIC
With regard to the second guideline, this Court agrees with the Court of Appeals
that petitioner RIC and respondent Taripe cannot be said to have dealt with each
other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by the former
over the latter. As a power press operator, a rank and file employee, he can hardly
be on equal terms with petitioner RIC. As the Court of Appeals said, "almost always,
employees agree to any terms of an employment contract just to get employed
considering that it is difficult to find work given their ordinary qualifications." 22
Therefore, for failure of petitioner RIC to comply with the necessary guidelines for a
valid fixed term employment contract, it can be safely stated that the aforesaid
contract signed by respondent Taripe for a period of five months was a mere
subterfuge to deny to the latter a regular status of employment.
Settled is the rule that the primary standard of determining regular employment is
the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the
employee in relation to the casual business or trade of the employer. The
connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and
its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. 23
Given the foregoing, this Court agrees in the findings of the Court of Appeals and
the NLRC that, indeed, respondent Taripe, as a rectangular power press machine
operator, in charge of manufacturing covers for "four liters rectangular tin cans,"
was holding a position which is necessary and desirable in the usual business or
trade of petitioner RIC, which was the manufacture of tin cans. Therefore,
respondent Taripe was a regular employee of petitioner RIC by the nature of work
he performed in the company.
Respondent Taripe does not fall under the exceptions mentioned in Article 280 of
the Labor Code, as amended, because it was not proven by petitioner RIC that he
was employed only for a specific project or undertaking or his employment was
merely seasonal. Similarly, the position and function of power press operator cannot
be said to be merely seasonal. Such position cannot be considered as only needed
for a specific project or undertaking because of the very nature of the business of
petitioner RIC. Indeed, respondent Taripe is a regular employee of petitioner RIC
and as such, he cannot be dismissed from his employment unless there is just or
authorized cause for his dismissal. CTAIHc
Well-established is the rule that regular employees enjoy security of tenure and
they can only be dismissed for just cause and with due process, notice and hearing.
24 And in case of employees' dismissal, the burden is on the employer to prove that
the dismissal was legal. Thus, respondent Taripe's summary dismissal, not being
based on any of the just or authorized causes enumerated under Articles 282, 25
283, 26 and 284 27 of the Labor Code, as amended, is illegal.
Before concluding, we once more underscore the settled precept that factual
findings of the NLRC, having deemed to acquire expertise in matters within its
jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but finality especially when
such factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals; 28 hence, such factual
findings are binding on this Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 and 1
April 2005, respectively, which affirmed with modification the Resolutions of the
NLRC dated 7 June 2002 and 20 August 2002, respectively, finding herein
respondent Taripe as a regular employee who had been illegally dismissed from
employment by petitioner RIC, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner RIC.
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J p:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77584 as well as its Resolution 2 dated August 11,
2005. HCIaDT
3) Arnel Amor May 24, 1995 Helper Mechanic June 30, 1998
4) Wilson Nuay May 16, 1995 Service Driver June 30, 1998
5) Roberto Renzal January 25, 1995 Pipe Fitter June 30, 1998
On May 29, 1998, petitioner submitted reports 3 to the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) Regional Sub-Branch No. VII in Dumaguete City, stating that six
of its employees were being terminated. CSIDEc
On October 29, 1998, the six employees, herein respondents, filed before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for illegal dismissal
against petitioner. Aside from reinstatement, respondents sought the payment of
backwages, salary differential, collective bargaining agreement benefits, damages
and attorney's fees. cETDIA
In their Position Paper, respondents averred that they had rendered continuous and
satisfactory services from the dates of their respective employment until illegally
dismissed on June 30, 1998:
SERVICE
For its part, petitioner asseverated that respondents were contractual employees;
as such, they cannot claim to have been illegally dismissed because upon the
expiration of the term of the contract or the completion of the project, their
employer-employee relationship also ended. cDIHES
After evaluating the evidence presented, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint for lack of legal and factual basis. 4 The Labor Arbiter
ruled that respondents were not dismissed from work; the employer-employee
relationship between the parties was severed upon the expiration of the respective
contracts of respondents and the completion of the projects concerned. ASTIED
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May 31, 1999 is SET ASIDE and
a new one is rendered ORDERING the respondent the following: SEHACI
a) LEONORA TORRES
b) ARNEL AMOR
c) WILSON NUAY
e) ALEJANDRO TABAÑERA;
(2) to pay each of the complainants his/her backwages from July 1, 1998 until
actual reinstatement at the rate of P116.00 per day plus his/her 13th month pay
and service incentive leave pay for the same period. acCDSH
(3) to pay attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total award.
SO ORDERED. 5
The NLRC ratiocinated that respondents were regular non-project employees for
having worked for more than one year in positions that required them to perform
activities necessary and desirable in the normal business or trade of petitioner. The
NLRC further ruled that the employment contracts of respondents were not for a
specific project or for a fixed period. According to the NLRC, the dismissals made on
June 30, 1998 under the pretext of project completion were illegal, being founded
on an invalid, unjust, and unauthorized cause. DAaIEc
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which the NLRC denied with
modification in a Resolution 6 dated March 19, 2003. Only respondent Rosela
Calimpong was granted relief. ICDSca
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking to have the
NLRC decision reversed. It claimed that respondents were engaged for one definite
phase of petitioner's geothermal project, the execution and implementation of the
civil works portion of the Fluid Collection and Disposal System (FCDS) and
Associated Work Projects. Petitioner averred that at the time of respondents'
termination, the projects had already been substantially if not fully completed.
cDCSTA
On August 31, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed May
23, 2001 Decision and March 19, 2003 Resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission, Fourth Division of Cebu City are AFFIRMED. aCcEHS
SO ORDERED. 7
The CA ruled that respondents were performing activities necessary and desirable
in the normal operations of the business of petitioner. The appellate court explained
that the repeated re-hiring and the continuing need for the services of the project
employees over a span of time had made them regular employees. The motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the CA in its Resolution 8 dated
August 11, 2005. HDIaST
Petitioner sought relief from this Court via petition for review on certiorari.
The pivotal questions involved in this case for our resolution are: (a) whether
respondents were project employees or regular employees; and (b) whether or not
they were illegally dismissed from employment. cDaEAS
Petitioner argues that respondents are project employees because as gleaned from
their standard contracts of employment, they were hired for a specific project or
undertaking, the completion or termination of which had been determined at the
time of their engagement. Their contracts clearly indicated the completion or
termination of the specific project or of the specific phase thereof at the time they
were engaged.
For their part, respondents posit that they were undeniably performing activities
which are necessary or desirable in the usual trade or business of petitioner. They
aver that the completion of their individual employment was not determined at the
time of their engagement due to the fact that their contracts were renewed and
extended over and over again. They claim that had the periods of their employment
been determined, then their work with petitioner would not have lasted beyond the
three-month period provided in their respective initial employment contracts. They
likewise theorized that the contracts they signed were short-term contracts
covering a long period of the same activity, not for a specific project or undertaking.
CAaSHI
Customarily, the findings made by the NLRC are afforded great respect and are
even clothed with finality and considered binding on this Court, except that when
such findings are contrary to those of the Labor Arbiter, this Court may elect to re-
examine the same, as we shall do in this case now.
The principal test for determining whether particular employees are properly
characterized as "project employees," as distinguished from "regular employees," is
whether or not the project employees were assigned to carry out a "specific project
or undertaking," the duration and scope of which were specified at the time the
employees were engaged for that project. 11 cSEaDA
As defined, project employees are those workers hired (1) for a specific project or
undertaking, and (2) the completion or termination of such project or undertaking
has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee. 12 However,
petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that respondents were hired merely as
project employees. A perusal of the records of the case reveals that the supposed
specific project or undertaking of petitioner was not satisfactorily identified in the
contracts of respondents. To illustrate, the following is a list of the names of
respondents and the projects written in their employment contracts:
PAL I Operations 14
Maintenance Section 29
Unmistakably, the alleged projects stated in the employment contracts were either
too vague or imprecise to be considered as the "specific undertaking" contemplated
by law. Petitioner's act of repeatedly and continuously hiring respondents to do the
same kind of work belies its contention that respondents were hired for a specific
project or undertaking. The absence of a definite duration for the project/s has led
the Court to conclude that respondents are, in fact, regular employees. CHDAaS
Another cogent factor which militates against petitioner's insistence that the
services of respondents were terminated because the projects for which they were
hired had been completed is the fact that respondents' contracts of employment
were extended a number of times for different or new projects. It must be stressed
that a contract that misuses a purported fixed-term employment to block the
acquisition of tenure by employees deserves to be struck down for being contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy. 34 HaTISE
As regular workers, respondents are entitled to security of tenure under Article 279
of the Labor Code and can only be dismissed for a just or authorized cause. Article
279 of the Labor Code provides:
Since respondents were illegally dismissed from work, they are entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time
their compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual
reinstatement, pursuant to Article 279 of the Labor Code. 40
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77584 and the Resolution are AFFIRMED. No
costs. STIHaE
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
NACHURA, J p:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the July 29, 2002 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals and its Resolution 2 dated November 14, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No.
67474, which, respectively, denied the petition for certiorari and the motion for
reconsideration filed by Olongapo Maintenance Services, Inc. (OMSI). cCSTHA
For its part, OMSI denied the allegations in the complaint. It averred that when
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) awarded to OMSI the service contracts
for the airport, OMSI hired respondents as janitors, cleaners, and degreasers to do
the services under the contracts. OMSI informed the respondents that they were
hired for the MIAA project and their employments were coterminous with the
contracts. As project employees, they were not dismissed from work but their
employments ceased when the MIAA contracts were not renewed upon their
expiration. The termination of respondents' employment cannot, thus, be
considered illegal. EcHaAC
In a Decision 3 dated November 19, 1999, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the
complaint, viz.:
SO ORDERED. 4
On appeal by the respondents, the NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter's ruling. It held
that respondents were regular and not project employees. Hence, they are entitled
to separation pay:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by granting in addition
to the grant of service incentive leave pay, payment of separation pay equivalent to
half-month pay per [every] year of service or one month pay, whichever is higher.
SO ORDERED. 5
OMSI sought reconsideration of the ruling, but the NLRC denied the motion on July
30, 2001. TDESCa
Petitioner went up to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari, imputing
grave abuse of discretion to the NLRC for reversing the factual findings and the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
The appellate court agreed with the NLRC that the continuous rehiring of
respondents, who performed tasks necessary and desirable in the usual business of
OMSI, was a clear indication that they were regular, not project employees. The
court added that OMSI failed to establish that respondents' employment had been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which
had been determined at the time of their engagement or hiring. Neither had it
shown that respondents were informed of the duration and scope of their work
when they were hired. Furthermore, OMSI did not submit to the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) reports of termination of the respondents, thereby
bolstering respondents' claim of regular employment. OMSI filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied it on November 14, 2002. IcHTCS
Aggrieved by the resolutions of the Court of Appeals, OMSI comes to this Court
theorizing that:
OMSI insists that respondents were project employees. Respondents, on the other
hand, maintain that they were OMSI's regular employees.
In the instant case, the record is bereft of proof that the respondents' engagement
as project employees has been predetermined, as required by law. We agree with
the Court of Appeals that OMSI did not provide convincing evidence that
respondents were informed that they were to be assigned to a "specific project or
undertaking" when OMSI hired them. Notably, the employment contracts for the
specific project signed by the respondents were never presented. All that OMSI
submitted in the proceedings a quo are the service contracts between OMSI and the
MIAA. Clearly, OMSI utterly failed to establish by substantial evidence that, indeed,
respondents were project employees and their employment was coterminous with
the MIAA contract. HcDSaT
In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the
dismissal is for a just cause. Thus, employers who hire project employees are
mandated to state and, once its veracity is challenged, to prove the actual basis for
the latter's dismissal. 16 Unfortunately for OMSI, it failed to discharge the burden.
All that we have is OMSI's self-serving assertion that the respondents were hired as
project employees.
Having been illegally dismissed, the NLRC cannot be considered to have acted
whimsically in granting respondents separation pay in lieu of their reinstatement.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error nor grave abuse of
discretion in denying OMSI's petition for certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED. 4
The Labor Arbiter ruled that by the very nature of respondents' business and the
nature of petitioners' services, there is no doubt as to the employment status of
petitioners. aADSIc
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The NLRC denied the motion in its 9
August 2001 Resolution. 6
In its 27 June 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and
affirmed the NLRC's 9 May 2001 Decision and 9 August 2001 Resolution.
The Court of Appeals held that respondents' manpower requirement varies from
month to month depending on the demand from their clients for their products.
Respondents' manpower requirement determines the period of their employees'
services. Respondents employed petitioners for the purpose of addressing a
temporary manpower shortage.
The Issues
Under Article 280 of the Labor Code, a regular employee is (1) one who is engaged
to perform activities that are necessary or desirable in the usual trade or business
of the employer, or (2) a casual employee who has rendered at least one year of
service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which he is
employed. 7
In Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, 8 this Court ruled that the contract, which was
entered into before the effectivity of the Labor Code on 1 November 1974, was valid
under Republic Act No. 1052 or the Termination Pay Law, as amended. Although the
contract was entered into before the effectivity of the Labor Code, the Court traced
how the present Article 280 of the Labor Code, which deleted employment with
fixed or definite period, evolved. In sustaining the validity of fixed-term
employment, the Court explained in Brent:
Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation
culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have
been, as already observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be
secure in his tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling
out all written or oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular
employment as defined therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil
that the Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to
circumvent security of tenure. It should have no application to instances where a
fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the
parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon
the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it
satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on
more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the
former over the latter. Unless thus limited in its purview, the law would be made to
apply to purposes other than those explicitly stated by its framers; it thus become
pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and
unintended consequences. 9
The Court thus laid down the criteria under which fixed-term employment could not
be said to be in circumvention of the law on security of tenure, thus:
1. The fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon
by the parties without any force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to
bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent;
or HEDSCc
2. It satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt with each
other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by the former
or the latter. 10
We agree with the Court of Appeals that in this case, the fixed period of
employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties. The Court
of Appeals noted that there was no indication of force, duress, or improper pressure
exerted on petitioners when they signed the contracts. Further, there was no proof
that respondents were regularly engaged in hiring workers for work for a minimum
period of five months to prevent the regularization of their employees.
At most, petitioners' employment for less than six months can be considered
probationary. Article 281 of the Labor Code provides:
Petitioners were hired on 11 May 1999, initially for three months. After the
expiration of their contracts, petitioners were hired on a month-to-month basis.
Their contracts of employment ended on 8 October 1999. Hence, they were
employed for a total of five months. Their employment did not even exceed six
months to entitle them to become regular employees.
This Court has ruled that "if from the circumstances it is apparent that periods have
been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they
should be disregarded for being contrary to public policy." 11 In this case, it was not
established that respondents intended to deny petitioners their right to security of
tenure. Besides, petitioners' employment did not exceed six months. Thus, the
Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining petitioners' dismissal from employment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 27 June 2002 Decision and 30
September 2002 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 67156. aEcADH
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J p:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the reversal of the March
29, 2005 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88253, entitled
The Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission and Gregorio V. Tongko. The assailed decision set aside the Decision
dated September 27, 2004 and Resolution dated December 16, 2004 rendered by
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No. 040220-04.
EIAaDC
The Facts
a) The Agent shall canvass for applications for Life Insurance, Annuities, Group
policies and other products offered by the Company, and collect, in exchange for
provisional receipts issued by the Agent, money due or to become due to the
Company in respect of applications or policies obtained by or through the Agent or
from policyholders allotted by the Company to the Agent for servicing, subject to
subsequent confirmation of receipt of payment by the Company as evidenced by an
Official Receipt issued by the Company directly to the policyholder.
The Company may terminate this Agreement for any breach or violation of any of
the provisions hereof by the Agent by giving written notice to the Agent within
fifteen (15) days from the time of the discovery of the breach. No waiver,
extinguishment, abandonment, withdrawal or cancellation of the right to terminate
this Agreement by the Company shall be construed for any previous failure to
exercise its right under any provision of this Agreement. cACEHI
Either of the parties hereto may likewise terminate his Agreement at any time
without cause, by giving to the other party fifteen (15) days notice in writing. . . .
2001 - 6,214,737.11
2000 - 8,003,180.38
1999 - 6,797,814.05
1998 - 4,805,166.34
1997 - 2,822,620.00 3
The issues around agent recruiting are central to the intended objectives hence the
need for a Senior Managers' meeting earlier last month when Kevin O'Connor, SVP-
Agency, took to the floor to determine from our senior agency leaders what more
could be done to bolster manpower development. At earlier meetings, Kevin had
presented information where evidently, your Region was the lowest performer (on a
per Manager basis) in terms of recruiting in 2000 and, as of today, continues to
remain one of the laggards in this area. TIAEac
While discussions, in general, were positive other than for certain comments from
your end which were perceived to be uncalled for, it became clear that a one-on-
one meeting with you was necessary to ensure that you and management, were on
the same plane. As gleaned from some of your previous comments in prior
meetings (both in group and one-on-one), it was not clear that we were proceeding
in the same direction.
Kevin held subsequent series of meetings with you as a result, one of which I joined
briefly. In those subsequent meetings you reiterated certain views, the validity of
which we challenged and subsequently found as having no basis.
With such views coming from you, I was a bit concerned that the rest of the Metro
North Managers may be a bit confused as to the directions the company was taking.
For this reason, I sought a meeting with everyone in your management team,
including you, to clear the air, so to speak.
This note is intended to confirm the items that were discussed at the said Metro
North Region's Sales Managers meeting held at the 7/F Conference room last 18
October. ESITcH
Issue # 2: "Some Managers are unhappy with their earnings and would want to
revert to the position of agents."
This is an often repeated issue you have raised with me and with Kevin. For this
reason, I placed the issue on the table before the rest of your Region's Sales
Managers to verify its validity. As you must have noted, no Sales Manager came
forward on their own to confirm your statement and it took you to name Malou
Samson as a source of the same, an allegation that Malou herself denied at our
meeting and in your very presence.
This only confirms, Greg, that those prior comments have no solid basis at all. I now
believe what I had thought all along, that these allegations were simply meant to
muddle the issues surrounding the inability of your Region to meet its agency
development objectives!
Issue # 3: "Sales Managers are doing what the company asks them to do but, in the
process, they earn less." SAcaDE
All the above notwithstanding, we had your own records checked and we found that
you made a lot more money in the Year 2000 versus 1999. In addition, you also
volunteered the information to Kevin when you said that you probably will make
more money in the Year 2001 compared to Year 2000. Obviously, your above
statement about making "less money" did not refer to you but the way you argued
this point had us almost believing that you were spouting the gospel of truth when
you were not. . . .
All of a sudden, Greg, I have become much more worried about your ability to lead
this group towards the new direction that we have been discussing these past few
weeks, i.e., Manulife's goal to become a major agency-led distribution company in
the Philippines. While as you claim, you have not stopped anyone from recruiting, I
have never heard you proactively push for greater agency recruiting. You have not
been proactive all these years when it comes to agency growth. SaCIDT
I cannot afford to see a major region fail to deliver on its developmental goals next
year and so, we are making the following changes in the interim:
1. You will hire at your expense a competent assistant who can unload you of
much of the routine tasks which can be easily delegated. This assistant should be so
chosen as to complement your skills and help you in the areas where you feel "may
not be your cup of tea".
You have stated, if not implied, that your work as Regional Manager may be too
taxing for you and for your health. The above could solve this problem.
2. Effective immediately, Kevin and the rest of the Agency Operations will deal
with the North Star Branch (NSB) in autonomous fashion. . . .
I have decided to make this change so as to reduce your span of control and allow
you to concentrate more fully on overseeing the remaining groups under Metro
North, your Central Unit and the rest of the Sales Managers in Metro North. I will
hold you solely responsible for meeting the objectives of these remaining groups.
cHESAD
The above changes can end at this point and they need not go any further. This,
however, is entirely dependent upon you. But you have to understand that meeting
corporate objectives by everyone is primary and will not be compromised. We are
meeting tough challenges next year and I would want everybody on board. Any
resistance or holding back by anyone will be dealt with accordingly.
Subsequently, De Dios wrote Tongko another letter dated December 18, 2001, 5
terminating Tongko's services, thus:
It would appear, however, that despite the series of meetings and communications,
both one-on-one meetings between yourself and SVP Kevin O'Connor, some of them
with me, as well as group meetings with your Sales Managers, all these efforts have
failed in helping you align your directions with Management's avowed agency
growth policy. cIDHSC
Therefrom, Tongko filed a Complaint dated November 25, 2002 with the NLRC
against Manulife for illegal dismissal. The case, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 11-
10330-02, was raffled to Labor Arbiter Marita V. Padolina.
Such control was certainly exercised by respondents over the herein complainant. It
was Manulife who hired, promoted and gave various assignments to him. It was the
company who set objectives as regards productions, recruitment, training programs
and all activities pertaining to its business. Manulife prescribed a Code of Conduct
which would govern in minute detail all aspects of the work to be undertaken by
employees, including the sales process, the underwriting process, signatures,
handling of money, policyholder service, confidentiality, legal and regulatory
requirements and grounds for termination of employment. The letter of Mr. De Dios
dated 06 November 2001 left no doubt as to who was in control. The subsequent
termination letter dated 18 December 2001 again established in no uncertain terms
the authority of the herein respondents to control the employees of Manulife.
Plainly, the respondents wielded control not only as to the ends to be achieved but
the ways and means of attaining such ends. 6 IDcAHT
Tongko bolstered his argument by citing Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. NLRC
(4th Division) 7 and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation v. NLRC, 8 which
Tongko claimed to be similar to the instant case.
Tongko further claimed that his dismissal was without basis and that he was not
afforded due process. He also cited the Manulife Code of Conduct by which his
actions were controlled by the company.
Manulife then filed a Position Paper with Motion to Dismiss dated February 27, 2003,
9 in which it alleged that Tongko is not its employee, and that it did not exercise
"control" over him. Thus, Manulife claimed that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over
the case. aIHSEc
In a Decision dated April 15, 2004, Labor Arbiter Marita V. Padolina dismissed the
complaint for lack of an employer-employee relationship. Padolina found that
applying the four-fold test in determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, none was found in the instant case. The dispositive portion thereof
states:
SO ORDERED.
Tongko appealed the arbiter's Decision to the NLRC which reversed the same and
rendered a Decision dated September 27, 2004 finding Tongko to have been
illegally dismissed. TcADCI
All other claims are hereby dismissed for utter lack of merit.
From this Decision, Manulife filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the NLRC First Division in a Resolution dated December 16, 2004. 12 aATEDS
Thus, Manulife filed an appeal with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88253.
Thereafter, the CA issued the assailed Decision dated March 29, 2005, finding the
absence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties and deeming
the NLRC with no jurisdiction over the case. The CA arrived at this conclusion while
again applying the four-fold test. The CA found that Manulife did not exercise
control over Tongko that would render the latter an employee of Manulife. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GRANTED and the
writ prayed for accordingly GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated September 27,
2004 and Resolution dated December 16, 2004 of the National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-10330-2002 (NLRC NCR CA No. 040220-
04) are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated April 15, 2004 of
Labor Arbiter Marita V. Padolina is hereby REINSTATED. IcAaEH
Hence, Tongko filed this petition and presented the following issues:
The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in annulling and setting
aside the Decision dated September 27, 2004 and Resolution dated December 16,
2004 in finding that there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner
and respondent.
The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in annulling and setting
aside the Decision dated September 27, 2004 and Resolution dated December 16,
2004 which found petitioner to have been illegally dismissed and ordered his
reinstatement with payment of backwages. 13 EATcHD
Restated, the issues are: (1) Was there an employer-employee relationship between
Manulife and Tongko? and (2) If yes, was Manulife guilty of illegal dismissal?
The basic issue of whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case resolves
itself into the question of whether an employer-employee relationship existed
between Manulife and Tongko. If no employer-employee relationship existed
between the two parties, then jurisdiction over the case properly lies with the
Regional Trial Court. AEDCHc
The NLRC, for its part, applied the four-fold test and found the existence of all the
elements and declared Tongko an employee of Manulife. The CA, on the other hand,
found that the element of control as an indicator of the existence of an employer-
employee relationship was lacking in this case. The NLRC and the CA based their
rulings on the same findings of fact but differed in their interpretations.
The NLRC arrived at its conclusion, first, on the basis of the letter dated November
6, 2001 addressed by De Dios to Tongko. According to the NLRC, the letter
contained "an abundance of directives or orders that are intended to directly affect
complainant's authority and manner of carrying out his functions as Regional Sales
Manager." It enumerated these "directives" or "orders" as follows:
1. You will hire at your expense a competent assistant who can unload you of
much of the routine tasks which can be easily delegated. . . . DaEcTC
2. Effective immediately, Kevin and the rest of the Agency Operations will deal
with the North Star Branch (NSB) in autonomous fashion . . . .
I have decided to make this change so as to reduce your span of control and allow
you to concentrate more fully on overseeing the remaining groups under Metro
North, your Central Unit and the rest of the Sales Managers in Metro North. . . .
4. I have been straightforward in this my letter and I know that we can continue
to work together. . . but it will have to be on my terms. Anything else is
unacceptable! SaICcT
The NLRC further ruled that the different codes of conduct that were applicable to
Tongko served as the foundations of the power of control wielded by Manulife over
Tongko that is further manifested in the different administrative and other tasks
that he was required to perform.
The NLRC also found that Tongko was required to render exclusive service to
Manulife, further bolstering the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
Finally, the NLRC ruled that Tongko was integrated into a management structure
over which Manulife exercised control, including the actions of its officers. The NLRC
held that such integration added to the fact that Tongko did not have his own
agency belied Manulife's claim that Tongko was an independent contractor.
An impasse appears to have been reached between the CA and the NLRC on the
sole issue of control over an employee's conduct. It bears clarifying that such
control not only applies to the work or goal to be done but also to the means and
methods to accomplish it. 16 In Sonza v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, we
explained that not all forms of control would establish an employer-employee
relationship, to wit:
Further, not every form of control that a party reserves to himself over the conduct
of the other party in relation to the services being rendered may be accorded the
effect of establishing an employer-employee relationship. The facts of this case fall
squarely with the case of Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. vs. NLRC. In said case, we
held that:
Logically, the line should be drawn between rules that merely serve as guidelines
towards the achievement of the mutually desired result without dictating the means
or methods to be employed in attaining it, and those that control or fix the
methodology and bind or restrict the party hired to the use of such means. The first,
which aim only to promote the result, create no employer-employee relationship
unlike the second, which address both the result and the means used to achieve it.
17 (Emphasis supplied.) TcSaHC
It is, therefore, usual and expected for an insurance company to promulgate a set of
rules to guide its commission agents in selling its policies that they may not run
afoul of the law and what it requires or prohibits. Of such a character are the rules
which prescribe the qualifications of persons who may be insured, subject insurance
applications to processing and approval by the Company, and also reserve to the
Company the determination of the premiums to be paid and the schedules of
payment. None of these really invades the agent's contractual prerogative to adopt
his own selling methods or to sell insurance at his own time and convenience, hence
cannot justifiably be said to establish an employer-employee relationship between
him and the company. 18 caEIDA
The respondents limit themselves to pointing out that Basiao's contract with the
Company bound him to observe and conform to such rules and regulations as the
latter might from time to time prescribe. No showing has been made that any such
rules or regulations were in fact promulgated, much less that any rules existed or
were issued which effectively controlled or restricted his choice of methods or the
methods themselves of selling insurance. Absent such showing, the Court will not
speculate that any exceptions or qualifications were imposed on the express
provision of the contract leaving Basiao ". . . free to exercise his own judgment as to
the time, place and means of soliciting insurance." 19 (Emphasis supplied.)
HECTaA
There is no conflict between our rulings in Insular and in Great Pacific Life Assurance
Corporation. We said in the latter case:
[I]t cannot be gainsaid that Grepalife had control over private respondents'
performance as well as the result of their efforts. A cursory reading of their
respective functions as enumerated in their contracts reveals that the company
practically dictates the manner by which their jobs are to be carried out. For
instance, the District Manager must properly account, record and document the
company's funds spot-check and audit the work of the zone supervisors, conserve
the company's business in the district through 'reinstatements', follow up the
submission of weekly remittance reports of the debit agents and zone supervisors,
preserve company property in good condition, train understudies for the position of
district manager, and maintain his quota of sales (the failure of which is a ground
for termination). On the other hand, a zone supervisor must direct and supervise
the sales activities of the debit agents under him, conserve company property
through "reinstatements", undertake and discharge the functions of absentee debit
agents, spot-check the records of debit agents, and insure proper documentation of
sales and collections by the debit agents. 20 (Emphasis supplied.) IcHTED
Based on the foregoing cases, if the specific rules and regulations that are enforced
against insurance agents or managers are such that would directly affect the means
and methods by which such agents or managers would achieve the objectives set
by the insurance company, they are employees of the insurance company.
In the instant case, Manulife had the power of control over Tongko that would make
him its employee. Several factors contribute to this conclusion.
In the Agreement dated July 1, 1977 executed between Tongko and Manulife, it is
provided that:
The Agent hereby agrees to comply with all regulations and requirements of the
Company as herein provided as well as maintain a standard of knowledge and
competency in the sale of the Company's products which satisfies those set by the
Company and sufficiently meets the volume of new business required of Production
Club membership. 21
Under this provision, an agent of Manulife must comply with three (3) requirements:
(1) compliance with the regulations and requirements of the company; (2)
maintenance of a level of knowledge of the company's products that is satisfactory
to the company; and (3) compliance with a quota of new businesses. cETDIA
Among the company regulations of Manulife are the different codes of conduct such
as the Agent Code of Conduct, Manulife Financial Code of Conduct, and Manulife
Financial Code of Conduct Agreement, which demonstrate the power of control
exercised by the company over Tongko. The fact that Tongko was obliged to obey
and comply with the codes of conduct was not disowned by respondents.
Thus, with the company regulations and requirements alone, the fact that Tongko
was an employee of Manulife may already be established. Certainly, these
requirements controlled the means and methods by which Tongko was to achieve
the company's goals.
More importantly, Manulife's evidence establishes the fact that Tongko was tasked
to perform administrative duties that establishes his employment with Manulife.
DICcTa
In its Comment (Re: Petition for Review dated 15 April 2005) dated August 5, 2005,
Manulife attached affidavits of its agents purportedly to support its claim that
Tongko, as a Regional Sales Manager, did not perform any administrative functions.
An examination of these affidavits would, however, prove the opposite.
In an Affidavit dated April 28, 2003, 22 John D. Chua, a Regional Sales Manager of
Manulife, stated:
While Amada Toledo, a Branch Manager of Manulife, stated in her Affidavit dated
April 29, 2003 23 that:
While Ma. Lourdes Samson, a Unit Manager of Manulife, stated in her Affidavit dated
April 28, 2003 24 that:
3. In 1977, I was assigned as a Unit Manager ("UM") of North Peaks Unit, North
Star Branch, Metro North Region;
b. To coordinate activities of the agents under my Unit in their daily, weekly and
monthly selling activities, making sure that their respective sales targets are met;
A comparison of the above functions and those contained in the Agreement with
those cited in Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation 25 reveals a striking
similarity that would more than support a similar finding as in that case. Thus, there
was an employer-employee relationship between the parties. TADIHE
Additionally, it must be pointed out that the fact that Tongko was tasked with
recruiting a certain number of agents, in addition to his other administrative
functions, leads to no other conclusion that he was an employee of Manulife.
In his letter dated November 6, 2001, De Dios harped on the direction of Manulife of
becoming a major agency-led distribution company whereby greater agency
recruitment is required of the managers, including Tongko. De Dios made it clear
that agent recruitment has become the primary means by which Manulife intends to
sell more policies. More importantly, it is Tongko's alleged failure to follow this
principle of recruitment that led to the termination of his employment with Manulife.
With this, it is inescapable that Tongko was an employee of Manulife.
In its Petition for Certiorari dated January 7, 2005 26 filed before the CA, Manulife
argued that even if Tongko is considered as its employee, his employment was
validly terminated on the ground of gross and habitual neglect of duties,
inefficiency, as well as willful disobedience of the lawful orders of Manulife. Manulife
stated: DHETIS
In the instant case, private respondent, despite the written reminder from Mr. De
Dios refused to shape up and altogether disregarded the latter's advice resulting in
his laggard performance clearly indicative of his willful disobedience of the lawful
orders of his superior. . . .
As private respondent has patently failed to perform a very fundamental duty, and
that is to yield obedience to all reasonable rules, orders and instructions of the
Company, as well as gross failure to reach at least minimum quota, the termination
of his engagement from Manulife is highly warranted and therefore, there is no
illegal dismissal to speak of.
It is readily evident from the above-quoted portions of Manulife's petition that it
failed to cite a single iota of evidence to support its claims. Manulife did not even
point out which order or rule that Tongko disobeyed. More importantly, Manulife did
not point out the specific acts that Tongko was guilty of that would constitute gross
and habitual neglect of duty or disobedience. Manulife merely cited Tongko's
alleged "laggard performance", without substantiating such claim, and equated the
same to disobedience and neglect of duty. DHTCaI
When there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of
employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal and the burden
is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause.
This burden of proof appropriately lies on the shoulders of the employer and not on
the employee because a worker's job has some of the characteristics of property
rights and is therefore within the constitutional mantle of protection. No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Apropos thereto, Art. 277, par. (b), of the Labor Code mandates in explicit terms
that the burden of proving the validity of the termination of employment rests on
the employer. Failure to discharge this evidential burden would necessarily mean
that the dismissal was not justified, and, therefore, illegal. 27 IcTEaC
The law mandates that the burden of proving the validity of the termination of
employment rests with the employer. Failure to discharge this evidentiary burden
would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified, and, therefore, illegal.
Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations and conclusions of employers do not
provide for legal justification for dismissing employees. In case of doubt, such cases
should be resolved in favor of labor, pursuant to the social justice policy of our labor
laws and Constitution. 28
This burden of proof was clarified in Community Rural Bank of San Isidro (N.E.), Inc.
v. Paez to mean substantial evidence, to wit:
The Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate the services of an
employee for just cause and this must be supported by substantial evidence. The
settled rule in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings is that proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required in determining the legality of an employer's
dismissal of an employee, and not even a preponderance of evidence is necessary
as substantial evidence is considered sufficient. Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla of evidence or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might
conceivably opine otherwise. 29 CDHaET
Here, Manulife failed to overcome such burden of proof. It must be reiterated that
Manulife even failed to identify the specific acts by which Tongko's employment was
terminated much less support the same with substantial evidence. To repeat, mere
conjectures cannot work to deprive employees of their means of livelihood. Thus, it
must be concluded that Tongko was illegally dismissed.
Moreover, as to Manulife's failure to comply with the twin notice rule, it reasons that
Tongko not being its employee is not entitled to such notices. Since we have ruled
that Tongko is its employee, however, Manulife clearly failed to afford Tongko said
notices. Thus, on this ground too, Manulife is guilty of illegal dismissal. In Quebec,
Sr., we also stated:
Furthermore, not only does our legal system dictate that the reasons for dismissing
a worker must be pertinently substantiated, it also mandates that the manner of
dismissal must be properly done, otherwise, the termination itself is gravely
defective and may be declared unlawful. 30 ITECSH
For breach of the due process requirements, Manulife is liable to Tongko in the
amount of PhP30,000 as indemnity in the form of nominal damages. 31
Finally, Manulife raises the issue of the correctness of the computation of the award
to Tongko made by the NLRC by claiming that Songco v. National Labor Relations
Commission 32 is inapplicable to the instant case, considering that Songco was
dismissed on the ground of retrenchment.
An examination of Songco reveals that it may be applied to the present case. In that
case, Jose Songco was a salesman of F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc. which terminated the
services of Songco on the ground of retrenchment due to financial losses. The issue
raised to the Court, however, was whether commissions are considered as part of
wages in order to determine separation pay. Thus, the fact that Songco was
dismissed due to retrenchment does not hamper the application thereof to the
instant case. What is pivotal is that we ruled in Songco that commissions are part of
wages for the determination of separation pay. TCaADS
Article 279 of the Labor Code on security of tenure pertinently provides that:
In cases of regular employment the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who
is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from
the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.
In Triad Security & Allied Services, Inc. v. Ortega, Jr. (Triad), we thus stated that an
illegally dismissed employee shall be entitled to backwages and separation pay, if
reinstatement is no longer viable: AHaETS
As the law now stands, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs,
namely: backwages and reinstatement. These are separate and distinct from each
other. However, separation pay is granted where reinstatement is no longer feasible
because of strained relations between the employee and the employer. In effect, an
illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or
separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable and backwages. 33
Taking into consideration the cases of Songco and Triad, we find correct the
computation of the NLRC that the monthly gross wage of Tongko in 2001 was
PhP518,144.76. For having been illegally dismissed, Tongko is entitled to
reinstatement with full backwages under Art. 279 of the Labor Code. Due to the
strained relationship between Manulife and Tongko, reinstatement, however, is no
longer advisable. Thus, Tongko will be entitled to backwages from January 2, 2002
(date of dismissal) up to the finality of this decision. Moreover, Manulife will pay
Tongko separation pay of one (1) month salary for every year of service that is from
1977 to 2001 amounting to PhP12,435,474.24, considering that reinstatement is not
feasible. Tongko shall also be entitled to an award of attorney's fees in the amount
of ten percent (10%) of the aggregate amount of the above awards. EAaHTI
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed March 29, 2005
Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 88253 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated September 27, 2004 of the NLRC is REINSTATED with the following
modifications:
(1) Full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent from January 2, 2002 up to the finality of this Decision;
(2) Separation pay of one (1) month salary for every year of service from 1977
up to 2001 amounting to PhP12,435,474.24;
(3) Nominal damages of PhP30,000 as indemnity for violation of the due process
requirements; and
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
NACHURA, J p:
The case before this Court raises a novel question never before decided in our
jurisdiction — whether a newspaper columnist is an employee of the newspaper
which publishes the column. AHCaES
In this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure,
petitioner Wilhelmina S. Orozco assails the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 50970 dated June 11, 2002 and its Resolution 2 dated September
11, 2002 denying her Motion for Reconsideration. The CA reversed and set aside the
Decision 3 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which in turn had
affirmed the Decision 4 of the Labor Arbiter finding that Orozco was an employee of
private respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI) and was illegally dismissed as
columnist of said newspaper.
In March 1990, PDI engaged the services of petitioner to write a weekly column for
its Lifestyle section. She religiously submitted her articles every week, except for a
six-month stint in New York City when she, nonetheless, sent several articles
through mail. She received compensation of P250.00 — later increased to P300.00
— for every column published. 5
On November 7, 1992, petitioner's column appeared in the PDI for the last time.
Petitioner claims that her then editor, Ms. Lita T. Logarta, 6 told her that respondent
Leticia Jimenez Magsanoc, PDI Editor in Chief, wanted to stop publishing her column
for no reason at all and advised petitioner to talk to Magsanoc herself. Petitioner
narrates that when she talked to Magsanoc, the latter informed her that it was PDI
Chairperson Eugenia Apostol who had asked to stop publication of her column, but
that in a telephone conversation with Apostol, the latter said that Magsanoc
informed her (Apostol) that the Lifestyle section already had many columnists. 7
SCaTAc
On the other hand, PDI claims that in June 1991, Magsanoc met with the Lifestyle
section editor to discuss how to improve said section. They agreed to cut down the
number of columnists by keeping only those whose columns were well-written, with
regular feedback and following. In their judgment, petitioner's column failed to
improve, continued to be superficially and poorly written, and failed to meet the
high standards of the newspaper. Hence, they decided to terminate petitioner's
column. 8
On October 29, 1993, Labor Arbiter Arthur Amansec rendered a Decision in favor of
petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Respondent company is also ordered to pay her 13th month pay and service
incentive leave pay.
SO ORDERED. 9
[R]espondent company exercised full and complete control over the means and
method by which complainant's work — that of a regular columnist — had to be
accomplished. This control might not be found in an instruction, verbal or oral, given
to complainant defining the means and method she should write her column.
Rather, this control is manifested and certained (sic) in respondents' admitted
prerogative to reject any article submitted by complainant for publication. aIcHSC
PDI appealed the Decision to the NLRC. In a Decision dated August 23, 1994, the
NLRC Second Division dismissed the appeal thereby affirming the Labor Arbiter's
Decision. The NLRC initially noted that PDI failed to perfect its appeal, under Article
223 of the Labor Code, due to non-filing of a cash or surety bond. The NLRC said
that the reason proffered by PDI for not filing the bond — that it was difficult or
impossible to determine the amount of the bond since the Labor Arbiter did not
specify the amount of the judgment award — was not persuasive. It said that all PDI
had to do was compute based on the amount it was paying petitioner, counting the
number of weeks from November 7, 1992 up to promulgation of the Labor Arbiter's
decision. 11
The NLRC also resolved the appeal on its merits. It found no error in the Labor
Arbiter's findings of fact and law. It sustained the Labor Arbiter's reasoning that
respondent PDI exercised control over petitioner's work.
PDI then filed a Petition for Review 12 before this Court seeking the reversal of the
NLRC Decision. However, in a Resolution 13 dated December 2, 1998, this Court
referred the case to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to our ruling in St. Martin
Funeral Homes v. National Labor Relations Commission. 14
The CA rendered its assailed Decision on June 11, 2002. It set aside the NLRC
Decision and dismissed petitioner's Complaint. It held that the NLRC misappreciated
the facts and rendered a ruling wanting in substantial evidence. The CA said:
The Court does not agree with public respondent NLRC's conclusion. First, private
respondent admitted that she was and [had] never been considered by petitioner
PDI as its employee. Second, it is not disputed that private respondent had no
employment contract with petitioner PDI. In fact, her engagement to contribute
articles for publication was based on a verbal agreement between her and the
petitioner's Lifestyle Section Editor. Moreover, it was evident that private
respondent was not required to report to the office eight (8) hours a day. Further, it
is not disputed that she stayed in New York for six (6) months without petitioner's
permission as to her leave of absence nor was she given any disciplinary action for
the same. These undisputed facts negate private respondent's claim that she is an
employee of petitioner. cIaHDA
Moreover, with regards (sic) to the control test, the public respondent NLRC's ruling
that the guidelines given by petitioner PDI for private respondent to follow, e.g., in
terms of space allocation and length of article, is not the form of control envisioned
by the guidelines set by the Supreme Court. The length of the article is obviously
limited so that all the articles to be featured in the paper can be accommodated. As
to the topic of the article to be published, it is but logical that private respondent
should not write morbid topics such as death because she is contributing to the
lifestyle section. Other than said given limitations, if the same could be considered
limitations, the topics of the articles submitted by private respondent were all her
choices. Thus, the petitioner PDI in deciding to publish private respondent's articles
only controls the result of the work and not the means by which said articles were
written.
As such, the above facts failed to measure up to the control test necessary for an
employer-employee relationship to exist. 15
In a Resolution dated April 29, 2005, the Court, without giving due course to the
petition, ordered the Labor Arbiter to clarify the amount of the award due petitioner
and, thereafter, ordered PDI to post the requisite bond. Upon compliance therewith,
the petition would be given due course. Labor Arbiter Amansec clarified that the
award under the Decision amounted to P15,350.00. Thus, PDI posted the requisite
bond on January 25, 2007. 16 ACaTIc
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in not dismissing outright PDI's Petition for
Certiorari for PDI's failure to post a cash or surety bond in violation of Article 223 of
the Labor Code.
This issue was settled by this Court in its Resolution dated April 29, 2005. 17 There,
the Court held:
But while the posting of a cash or surety bond is jurisdictional and is a condition sine
qua non to the perfection of an appeal, there is a plethora of jurisprudence
recognizing exceptional instances wherein the Court relaxed the bond requirement
as a condition for posting the appeal. ASIETa
In the case of Taberrah v. NLRC, the Court made note of the fact that the assailed
decision of the Labor Arbiter concerned did not contain a computation of the
monetary award due the employees, a circumstance which is likewise present in
this case. In said case, the Court stated,
As a rule, compliance with the requirements for the perfection of an appeal within
the reglamentary (sic) period is mandatory and jurisdictional. However, in National
Federation of Labor Unions v. Ladrido as well as in several other cases, this Court
relaxed the requirement of the posting of an appeal bond within the reglementary
period as a condition for perfecting the appeal. This is in line with the principle that
substantial justice is better served by allowing the appeal to be resolved on the
merits rather than dismissing it based on a technicality. IEaATD
The judgment of the Labor Arbiter in this case merely stated that petitioner was
entitled to backwages, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay without
however including a computation of the alleged amounts.
In the case of NFLU v. Ladrido III, this Court postulated that "private respondents
cannot be expected to post such appeal bond equivalent to the amount of the
monetary award when the amount thereof was not included in the decision of the
labor arbiter". The computation of the amount awarded to petitioner not having
been clearly stated in the decision of the labor arbiter, private respondents had no
basis for determining the amount of the bond to be posted.
Thus, while the requirements for perfecting an appeal must be strictly followed as
they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for
orderly discharge of judicial business, the law does admit of exceptions when
warranted by the circumstances. Technicality should not be allowed to stand in the
way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.
But while this Court may relax the observance of reglementary periods and
technical rules to achieve substantial justice, it is not prepared to give due course to
this petition and make a pronouncement on the weighty issue obtaining in this case
until the law has been duly complied with and the requisite appeal bond duly paid
by private respondents. 18 aSIHcT
Records show that PDI has complied with the Court's directive for the posting of the
bond; 19 thus, that issue has been laid to rest.
The main issue we must resolve is whether petitioner is an employee of PDI, and if
the answer be in the affirmative, whether she was illegally dismissed.
It is true that petitioner herself admitted that she "was not, and [had] never been
considered respondent's employee because the terms of works were arbitrarily
decided upon by the respondent". 22 However, the employment status of a person
is defined and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it should be. 23
This Court has constantly adhered to the "four-fold test" to determine whether there
exists an employer-employee relationship between parties. 24 The four elements of
an employment relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the
employer's power to control the employee's conduct. 25
Of these four elements, it is the power of control which is the most crucial 26 and
most determinative factor, 27 so important, in fact, that the other elements may
even be disregarded. 28 As this Court has previously held:
the significant factor in determining the relationship of the parties is the presence
or absence of supervisory authority to control the method and the details of
performance of the service being rendered, and the degree to which the principal
may intervene to exercise such control. 29 DCHaTc
In other words, the test is whether the employer controls or has reserved the right
to control the employee, not only as to the work done, but also as to the means and
methods by which the same is accomplished. 30
Petitioner argues that several factors exist to prove that respondents exercised
control over her and her work, namely:
a. As to the Contents of her Column — The PETITIONER had to insure that the
contents of her column hewed closely to the objectives of its Lifestyle Section and
the over-all principles that the newspaper projects itself to stand for. As admitted,
she wanted to write about death in relation to All Souls Day but was advised not to.
As a columnist, the PETITIONER's writings had a definite day on which it was going
to appear. So she submitted her articles two days before the designated day on
which the column would come out.
This is the usual routine of newspaper work. Deadlines are set to fulfill the
newspapers' obligations to the readers with regard to timeliness and freshness of
ideas.
The PETITIONER was disciplined to submit her articles on highly relevant and
significant issues on time by the PRIVATE RESPONDENTS who have a say on
whether the topics belong to those considered as highly relevant and significant,
through the Lifestyle Section Editor. The PETITIONER had to discuss the topics first
and submit the articles two days before publication date to keep her column in the
newspaper space regularly as expected or without miss by its readers. 31
Given this discussion by petitioner, we then ask the question: Is this the form of
control that our labor laws contemplate such as to establish an employer-employee
relationship between petitioner and respondent PDI?
It is not.
Petitioner has misconstrued the "control test", as did the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC.
Not all rules imposed by the hiring party on the hired party indicate that the latter is
an employee of the former. Rules which serve as general guidelines towards the
achievement of the mutually desired result are not indicative of the power of
control. 32 Thus, this Court has explained:
It should, however, be obvious that not every form of control that the hiring party
reserves to himself over the conduct of the party hired in relation to the services
rendered may be accorded the effect of establishing an employer-employee
relationship between them in the legal or technical sense of the term. A line must
be drawn somewhere, if the recognized distinction between an employee and an
individual contractor is not to vanish altogether. Realistically, it would be a rare
contract of service that gives untrammeled freedom to the party hired and eschews
any intervention whatsoever in his performance of the engagement. IASEca
Logically, the line should be drawn between rules that merely serve as guidelines
towards the achievement of the mutually desired result without dictating the means
or methods to be employed in attaining it, and those that control or fix the
methodology and bind or restrict the party hired to the use of such means. The first,
which aim only to promote the result, create no employer-employee relationship
unlike the second, which address both the result and the means used to achieve it. .
. . . 33 ISDCaT
The main determinant therefore is whether the rules set by the employer are meant
to control not just the results of the work but also the means and method to be used
by the hired party in order to achieve such results. Thus, in this case, we are to
examine the factors enumerated by petitioner to see if these are merely guidelines
or if they indeed fulfill the requirements of the control test.
Petitioner believes that respondents' acts are meant to control how she executes
her work. We do not agree. A careful examination reveals that the factors
enumerated by the petitioner are inherent conditions in running a newspaper. In
other words, the so-called control as to time, space, and discipline are dictated by
the very nature of the newspaper business itself.
We agree with the observations of the Office of the Solicitor General that:
Petitioner has not shown that PDI, acting through its editors, dictated how she was
to write or produce her articles each week. Aside from the constraints presented by
the space allocation of her column, there were no restraints on her creativity;
petitioner was free to write her column in the manner and style she was
accustomed to and to use whatever research method she deemed suitable for her
purpose. The apparent limitation that she had to write only on subjects that befitted
the Lifestyle section did not translate to control, but was simply a logical
consequence of the fact that her column appeared in that section and therefore had
to cater to the preference of the readers of that section. HTCSDE
The perceived constraint on petitioner's column was dictated by her own choice of
her column's perspective. The column title "Feminist Reflections" was of her own
choosing, as she herself admitted, since she had been known as a feminist writer.
35 Thus, respondent PDI, as well as her readers, could reasonably expect her
columns to speak from such perspective.
Contrary to petitioner's protestations, it does not appear that there was any actual
restraint or limitation on the subject matter — within the Lifestyle section — that
she could write about. Respondent PDI did not dictate how she wrote or what she
wrote in her column. Neither did PDI's guidelines dictate the kind of research, time,
and effort she put into each column. In fact, petitioner herself said that she received
"no comments on her articles . . . except for her to shorten them to fit into the box
allotted to her column". Therefore, the control that PDI exercised over petitioner
was only as to the finished product of her efforts, i.e., the column itself, by way of
either shortening or outright rejection of the column. cSaCDT
The newspaper's power to approve or reject publication of any specific article she
wrote for her column cannot be the control contemplated in the "control test", as it
is but logical that one who commissions another to do a piece of work should have
the right to accept or reject the product. The important factor to consider in the
"control test" is still the element of control over how the work itself is done, not just
the end result thereof.
In contrast, a regular reporter is not as independent in doing his or her work for the
newspaper. We note the common practice in the newspaper business of assigning
its regular reporters to cover specific subjects, geographical locations, government
agencies, or areas of concern, more commonly referred to as "beats". A reporter
must produce stories within his or her particular beat and cannot switch to another
beat without permission from the editor. In most newspapers also, a reporter must
inform the editor about the story that he or she is working on for the day. The story
or article must also be submitted to the editor at a specified time. Moreover, the
editor can easily pull out a reporter from one beat and ask him or her to cover
another beat, if the need arises.
This is not the case for petitioner. Although petitioner had a weekly deadline to
meet, she was not precluded from submitting her column ahead of time or from
submitting columns to be published at a later time. More importantly, respondents
did not dictate upon petitioner the subject matter of her columns, but only imposed
the general guideline that the article should conform to the standards of the
newspaper and the general tone of the particular section. aHECST
Where a person who works for another performs his job more or less at his own
pleasure, in the manner he sees fit, not subject to definite hours or conditions of
work, and is compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount
thereof, no employer-employee relationship exists. 36
Aside from the control test, this Court has also used the economic reality test. The
economic realities prevailing within the activity or between the parties are
examined, taking into consideration the totality of circumstances surrounding the
true nature of the relationship between the parties. 37 This is especially appropriate
when, as in this case, there is no written agreement or contract on which to base
the relationship. In our jurisdiction, the benchmark of economic reality in analyzing
possible employment relationships for purposes of applying the Labor Code ought to
be the economic dependence of the worker on his employer. 38 IEDHAT
The inevitable conclusion is that petitioner was not respondent PDI's employee but
an independent contractor, engaged to do independent work.
In our jurisdiction, the Court has held that an independent contractor is one who
carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes to perform the job,
work, or service on one's own account and under one's own responsibility according
to one's own manner and method, free from the control and direction of the
principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the
results thereof. 45 aHESCT
We find that ABS-CBN was not involved in the actual performance that produced the
finished product of SONZA's work. ABS-CBN did not instruct SONZA how to perform
his job. ABS-CBN merely reserved the right to modify the program format and
airtime schedule "for more effective programming". ABS-CBN's sole concern was
the quality of the shows and their standing in the ratings. Clearly, ABS-CBN did not
exercise control over the means and methods of performance of SONZA's work.
SHacCD
SONZA claims that ABS-CBN's power not to broadcast his shows proves ABS-CBN's
power over the means and methods of the performance of his work. Although ABS-
CBN did have the option not to broadcast SONZA's show, ABS-CBN was still
obligated to pay SONZA's talent fees. Thus, even if ABS-CBN was completely
dissatisfied with the means and methods of SONZA's performance of his work, or
even with the quality or product of his work, ABS-CBN could not dismiss or even
discipline SONZA. All that ABS-CBN could do is not to broadcast SONZA's show but
ABS-CBN must still pay his talent fees in full. TAacIE
Clearly, ABS-CBN's right not to broadcast SONZA's show, burdened as it was by the
obligation to continue paying in full SONZA's talent fees, did not amount to control
over the means and methods of the performance of SONZA's work. ABS-CBN could
not terminate or discipline SONZA even if the means and methods of performance
of his work — how he delivered his lines and appeared on television — did not meet
ABS-CBN's approval. This proves that ABS-CBN's control was limited only to the
result of SONZA's work, whether to broadcast the final product or not. In either
case, ABS-CBN must still pay SONZA's talent fees in full until the expiry of the
Agreement.
In Vaughan, et al. v. Warner, et al., the United States Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that vaudeville performers were independent contractors although the management
reserved the right to delete objectionable features in their shows. Since the
management did not have control over the manner of performance of the skills of
the artists, it could only control the result of the work by deleting objectionable
features. cCAIDS
SONZA further contends that ABS-CBN exercised control over his work by supplying
all equipment and crew. No doubt, ABS-CBN supplied the equipment, crew and
airtime needed to broadcast the "Mel & Jay" programs. However, the equipment,
crew and airtime are not the "tools and instrumentalities" SONZA needed to
perform his job. What SONZA principally needed were his talent or skills and the
costumes necessary for his appearance. Even though ABS-CBN provided SONZA
with the place of work and the necessary equipment, SONZA was still an
independent contractor since ABS-CBN did not supervise and control his work. ABS-
CBN's sole concern was for SONZA to display his talent during the airing of the
programs.
Furthermore, respondent PDI did not supply petitioner with the tools and
instrumentalities she needed to perform her work. Petitioner only needed her talent
and skill to come up with a column every week. As such, she had all the tools she
needed to perform her work.
Considering that respondent PDI was not petitioner's employer, it cannot be held
guilty of illegal dismissal.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J p:
This petition for review under Rule 45 assails and seeks the reversal of the
Amended Decision and Resolution dated March 3, 2003 and March 24, 2003,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 67568. The assailed
amended decision and resolution effectively set aside and reversed the
consolidated resolutions dated July 30, 2001 and September 24, 2001 rendered by
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and reinstated the July 24, 2000
Decision of Labor Arbiter Ermita T. Abrasaldo-Cuyuca in NLRC NCR Case Nos. 00-01-
00571-99, 00-02-01429-99, and 00-02-01615-99. aHATDI
In December 1998, ETS experienced financial difficulties when Uniwide, its client at
the time, failed to pay for the plumbing work being done at its Coastal Mall. As a
result, ETS was only able to pay its employees 13th month pay equivalent to two
weeks' salary.
Unhappy over what they thought was ETS' failure to release the balance of their
13th month pay, private respondents brought their case before the Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-01-00571-99 and entitled
as Alex Albino, Renato Dulot, Miguel Alinab, Marcelito Gamas, Julius Abanes,
Christopher Biol, Sammy Mesagal, Conrado Sulibaga, Floro Pacundo v. Equipment
Technical Services or Joseph James Dequito. ASEIDH
Later, two other cases were filed against ETS for illegal dismissal and payment of
money claims when the complainants thereat were refused work in another ETS
project, i.e., Richville project, allegedly because they refused to sign individual
employment contracts with ETS. These two other cases were Nelson Catong, Roger
Lamayon, Christopher Lamayon v. Equipment Technical Services or Joseph James
Dequito, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-01429-99; and Rey Albino, Ernesto
Padilla, Reynaldo Lima v. Equipment Technical Services or Joseph James Dequito,
docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-01615-99.
The three cases were consolidated before the labor arbiter. Following failed
conciliation efforts, all concerned, except Roger and Christopher Lamayon,
submitted, as the labor arbiter directed, their respective position papers.
ETS' position 3 may be summed up as follows: (1) private respondents were its
contractual/project employees engaged for different projects of the company; (2)
they were not illegally dismissed, having been hired on a per project basis; (3) ETS
was unable to fully release private respondents' 13th month pay because Uniwide
failed to pay for its contracted plumbing project; (4) ETS was forced to abandon the
Uniwide project and undertake another project, the Richville project, because the
chances of being paid by Uniwide were dim; (5) ETS asked private respondents to
sign employment contracts to formalize their previous agreement but said private
respondents refused; and (6) as a result, ETS was constrained to deny employment
to private respondents as it considered the execution of employment contracts part
of management prerogative before employment commences.
On July 24, 2000, Labor Arbiter Abrasaldo-Cuyuca issued a Decision, holding that
private respondents were ETS' regular, not merely project, employees. Accordingly,
ETS was adjudged liable for illegal dismissal and directed to pay private
respondents their money claims plus 10% of the total award as attorney's fees. The
fallo of the subject decision reads as follows: TCSEcI
Further, respondents are further ordered to pay the complainants their backwages,
proportionate 13th month pay, [holiday] and service incentive leave pay.
The complaints of Roger and Christopher all surnamed Lamayon are dismissed
without prejudice.
SO ORDERED. 4
ETS appealed from the above labor arbiter's decision. On July 30, 2001, the NLRC
rendered a resolution which, while reversing the labor arbiter's holding with respect
to the nature of private respondents' employment and the illegality of their
dismissal, nevertheless upheld the validity of the monetary award extended by the
labor arbiter, part of which included the award of backwages. The pertinent portion
of the modificatory resolution reads as follows: HcISTE
SO ORDERED.
Following the denial on September 24, 2001 of ETS' motion for reconsideration, ETS
elevated its case to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the recourse
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67568. As its principal contention, ETS ascribed on the
NLRC the commission of grave abuse of discretion in affirming the monetary award
in favor of private respondents, despite its finding that there was no illegal dismissal
in this case.
The case is hereby REMANDED to Labor Arbiter Ermita T. Abrasaldo-Cuyuca for the
computation of the same.
The complaint against petitioner Joseph James Dequito is hereby DISMISSED, for
lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition on the submission that, contrary to the findings of the CA, but
conformably with the determination of the NLRC, private respondents are seasonal
or project workers; the duration of their employment is not permanent but
coterminus with the project to which they are assigned and from whose payroll they
are paid. As project employees, private respondents cannot, according to
petitioners, validly maintain an action for illegal dismissal with prayer for
reinstatement and payment of backwages, both reliefs being usually accorded
following a finding of illegal dismissal.
The petition is without merit. As we see it, as did the CA and the NLRC, the primary
question to be resolved and to which all others must yield is whether or not private
respondents are project employees. The CA, siding with the labor arbiter, as
indicated earlier, answered the poser in the affirmative, while the NLRC resolved it
in the negative.
As the Court has consistently held, the service of project employees are coterminus
with the project and may be terminated upon the end or completion of that project
or project phase for which they were hired. Regular employees, in contrast, enjoy
security of tenure and are entitled to hold on to their work or position until their
services are terminated by any of the modes recognized under the Labor Code. 7
ITSaHC
It bears to stress at the outset that ETS admits hiring or employing private
respondents to perform plumbing works for various projects. Given this postulate,
regular employment may reasonably be presumed and it behooves ETS to prove
otherwise, that is, that the employment in question was contractual in nature
ending upon the expiration of the term fixed in the contract or for a specific project
or undertaking. But the categorical finding of the CA, confirmatory for the most part
of that of the labor arbiter, is that not a single written contract of employment fixing
the terms of employment for the duration of the Uniwide project, or any other
project, was submitted by ETS despite the latter's allegations that private
respondents were merely contractual employees. Records of payroll and other
pertinent documents, such as job contracts secured by ETS showing that private
respondents were hired for specific projects, were also not submitted by ETS. 9
CDEaAI
[The employer] should have filed as many reports of termination as there were
construction projects actually finished if petitioners [employees] were indeed
project employees, considering that petitioners were hired and again [hired] for
various projects or phases of work therein. Its failure to submit reports of
termination cannot but sufficiently convince us further that petitioners are truly
regular employees. Just as important, the fact that petitioners had rendered more
than one year of service at the time of their dismissal overturns private
respondent's allegations that petitioners were hired for a specific or fixed
undertaking for a limited period of time. 14 aHTDAc
The Court can allow that, in the instant case, private respondents may have initially
been hired for specific projects or undertaking of petitioner ETS and, hence, may be
classified as project employees. Their repeated rehiring to perform tasks necessary
to the usual trade or business of ETS changed the legal situation altogether, for in
the later instance, their continuous rehiring took them out from the scope of
workers coterminus with specific projects and had made them regular employees.
We said as much in Phesco, Inc. v. NLRC that "where the employment of project
employees is extended long after the supposed project had been finished, the
employees are removed from the scope of project employees and they shall be
considered regular employees." 15
Based on the foregoing criteria, the factual findings of the labor arbiter on the
regular nature of private respondents' employment, juxtaposed with ETS' failure to
support its "project-workers theory", impel us to dismiss the instant petition. This is
as it should be for, to paraphrase Asuncion v. NLRC, if doubt exists between the
evidence of the employers and the employees, the scales of justice must be tilted in
favor of the latter — the employers must adequately show rationally adequate
evidence that their case is preponderantly superior. 20
As did the CA, the Court holds that private respondents are regular employees
whose services were terminated without lawful cause and effected without the
requisite notice and hearing.
In view of the illegality of the dismissal, the fallo of the Decision of Labor Arbiter
Abrasaldo-Cuyuca, as reinstated by the CA in its assailed Amended Decision, has to
be modified in the sense that private respondents are entitled to reinstatement to
their previous positions as pipe fitters or threaders, as the case may be, without loss
of rank and seniority rights and with full backwages.
At this juncture, the Court wishes to state that it is taking judicial notice of the fact
that no corporation is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
under the name "Equipment Technical Services". It is thus but fair that both
petitioners' liability under this Decision be joint and several. IAcTaC
Petitioners ETS and Joseph James Dequito are ordered jointly and severally to
reinstate private respondents ALEX ALBINO, REY ALBINO, JULIUS ABANES, MIGUEL
ALINAB, CHRISTOPHER BIOL, NELSON CATONG, RENATO DULOT, FLORO PACUNDO,
MARCELITO GAMAS, REYNALDO LIMA, SAMMY MESAGAL, ERNESTO PADILLA, and
CONRADO SULIBAGA to their respective positions without loss of rank and seniority
rights with full backwages from the date of dismissal up to the date of actual
reinstatement. Petitioners are likewise jointly and severally liable to private
respondents for proportionate 13th month pay, holiday pay, and service incentive
leave pay. SHIcDT
Ten percent of the total award shall be paid to the counsel of private respondents
as attorney's fees.
The complaints of Roger and Christopher, both surnamed Lamayon, are dismissed
without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.