Professional Documents
Culture Documents
11 17:37
Since the last photo gallery was released, KHRG has continued to
document patterns of abuse consistent with those presented in
earlier editions. Villagers already under government control
continue to report abuses related to attempts by the Tatmadaw,
Burma's state army, and non-state armed groups (NSAGs) holding
ceasefire agreements with the Tatmadaw such as the Democratic
Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) to consolidate control and support
ongoing militarization of the countryside. Elsewhere, Tatmadaw
forces continue efforts to expand control of territory and civilian
populations, particularly in upland areas in northern Karen State.
Though the Northern Karen State Offensive ended in 2008, military
attacks on villagers in hiding, and their means of survival,
nonetheless continue.[2] According to the most recent figures, more than 70,000 villagers remain displaced and in
hiding in northern Karen areas, of whom more than 28,000 have been displaced or re-displaced within the past year;[3]
between August 2009 and July 2010, at least 95 more villages were destroyed, relocated or abandoned.[4] In 2010,
disagreements between the Tatmadaw and some sections of the DKBA over the latter's absorption into the Tatmadaw as
Border Guard battalions also increased insecurity for villagers in Pa'an and Dooplaya districts in central Karen State, as
civilians worried that open conflict would return to the region.[5] Despite the many challenges to civilian security and
livelihoods, however, villagers in eastern Burma continue to show bravery and resilience, employing a range of strategies
to protect their families and communities from abuse and the effects of abuse.
Photos included in the Photo Gallery are identified with alphanumeric characters shown below each image.
To view the first instalment of KHRG’s Photo Gallery 2010, click here.
SPDC State Peace & Development Council; military junta ruling Burma
PDC Peace & Development Council; SPDC local-level administration, (e.g. Village PDC [VPDC], Village Tract
PDC, Township PDC [TPDC])
Village An administrative unit of 5 to 20 villages in a local area, often centred on a large village
tract
Tatmadaw SPDC Armed Forces; Tatmadaw Kyi is the Army, often referred to here as the SPDC Army
IB Infantry Battalion (SPDC), supposed to be about 500 soldiers strong but at present most SPDC battalions
number under 200
LIB Light Infantry Battalion (SPDC) , supposed to be about 500 soldiers strong but at present most SPDC
battalions number under 200
LID Light Infantry Division (SPDC), consisting of 10 Light Infantry Battalions
MOC Military Operations Command (SPDC/SLORC); 10 battalions, for offensive operations, may be deployed
anywhere
Company Military unit of about 100 soldiers, though often under-strength in SPDC Army
Camp Army base or outpost; from remote hill posts of 10 soldiers to Battalion HQ camps of several hundred
soldiers
BGF Tatmadaw Border Guard Force
DKBA Democratic Karen Buddhist Army; Karen group allied with the SPDC
KPF Karen Peace Force, Nyein Chan Yay A'Pweh ("Peace Group") in Burmese; formed in 1997 by defected
KNLA officer Thu Mu Heh and allied with SPDC
loh ah pay Forced labour; literally it means traditional voluntary labour, but used by SPDC officers in reference to
short-term forced labour
Set tha 'Messenger'; forced labour as errand-runners, messengers, and for some odd jobs
viss Unit of weight measure; one viss is 1.6 kilograms or 3.5 pounds
milk tin Volume measure equivalent to the contents of a 200 ml condensed milk tin
bowl/pyi Volume measure equivalent to 8 small condensed milk tins; about 2 kg / 4.4 lb of rice
kyat Burmese currency; US$1=6 Kyat at official rate, 1200+ Kyat at current market rate
Rice Rice grain after pounding or milling, with the husk removed and ready to cook
Negotiations and internal DKBA disagreement about the extent of integration into the Tatmadaw, however, continued for
more than a year, with several deadlines for formal transformation passing.[9] In June 2010, a 'final' transformation
deadline of August 10th 2010 was declared along with threats of armed force for non-compliance, and Na Kha Mway, the
commander of DKBA forces variously referred to as Battalion #907, 'Klo Htoo Baw', and 5th Brigade, indicated that
troops under his command would not join the BGF with other DKBA factions.[10] On July 22nd Na Kha Mway formally
rejected the BGF proposal, and tensions between Tatmadaw and non-complying DKBA forces further escalated amid
speculation that Tatmadaw forces might attack and attempt to arrest Na Kha Mway, possibly in a joint-operation with
those DKBA forces that had decided to cooperate with the BGF plan. On July 25th, more than 600 villagers in
northeastern Kawkareik Township, Dooplaya District began to flee from their villages to Thailand's Phop Phra District in
anticipation of an imminent Tatmadaw attack on Na Kha Mway's forces in the area.[11]
A-1 A-2
Photos A-1, A-2 and A-3, taken on July 25th 2010, show
residents of Lay Ghaw, Wah May Htar, U Gklay Htar, Hee
Ther Pler, Thay Baw Boh, and Bler Doh villages in
Kawkareik Township, Dooplaya District, crossing the Moei
River with their belongings to take refuge in Muh Luh
Chah village in Phop Phra District of Thailand's Tak
Province. Some villagers reported that DKBA 5th Brigade
officers under the command of Na Kha Mway had called a
meeting of village heads and instructed them to inform
all women and children in their villages to flee in advance
of the expected attacks. [Photos: KHRG]
A-3
A-4 A-5
Photos A-4, A-5 and A-6, taken on July 25th 2010, show
Lay Ghaw, Wah May Htar, U Gklay Htar, Hee Ther Pler,
Thay Baw Boh, and Bler Doh villagers arriving at Muh Luh
Chah[12] village in Phop Phra District, Thailand. Thai
soldiers checked the villagers' possessions and papers as
they arrived. Local residents of Muh Luh Chah provided
food for those refugees who were unable to bring
adequate provisions with them, and authorities from the
Thai Health Department tended to those in need of
medical assistance. Photos A-7 and A-8 show the
refugees, including many women and children, at a
temporary sheltering site in Muh Luh Chah. [Photos:
KHRG]
A-6
A-7 A-8
A-9 A-10
Photos A-9, A-10, A-11 and A-12, also taken on July 25th2010, show mothers and infant children taking shelter at
Muh Luh Chah. On July 26th 2010, at 11 am Thai army officials met with representatives of the displaced villagers
and Muh Luh Chah village leaders; the parties agreed that the refugees could return to their homes that day and that
they would be permitted to take shelter on the Thai side of the river in the event of future attacks on their villages.
In the months since this agreement was reached, conflict has flared in villages in Dooplaya District adjacent to
Thailand's Phop Phra and Tak Provinces as Tatmadaw forces have sought to dislodge some DKBA forces that have
continued to resist integration into the Tatmadaw from their former bases, prompting tens of thousands of villagers to
seek protection in Thailand. Refugees that spoke with KHRG cited a variety of protection concerns stemming from
conflict and conflict-related abuse; they also expressed fears for the security of their livelihoods and property.[13]
[Photos: KHRG]
A-11
A-12
three temporary sites in Tha Song Yang District: Nong Bua, Mae U Su and Mae Salit.[14] At the end of January 2010,
Royal Thai Army (RTA) officials announced their intention to repatriate the refugees, stating that the area from which
the refugees had fled was now safe for their 'voluntary' return. Although the assertion that returns would be voluntary
was disputed by the verbal testimony of numerous villagers and by local civil society and humanitarian groups, the first
three families were returned on February 5th. Though no further groups were forced into boats and returned to Burma
that day, RTA soldiers maintained consistent pressure on refugees to return, including repeatedly telling them it was
safe to return, restricting access to humanitarian services, and harassing residents of the sites. By April 1st 2010 the
Nong Bua and Mae U Su sites – which in January had hosted 2,409 refugees – were empty after their inhabitants had
gradually submitted to the two-month-long campaign of harassment and pressure by RTA soldiers.[15]
B-1 B-2
B-3 B-4
Photos B-1 and B-2, taken on February 12th 2010, show families from the Mae U Su refugee camp under guard on
the Thailand side of the Moei River, as the RTA prepared to return them to Burma. Photos B-3 and B-4, also taken
on February 12th 2010, show some of the families as they returned to the Burma side of the river, and began walking
back into Pa'an District. Paths like the one shown serve as the primary travel routes in the area; they also were
littered with unmarked landmines that posed a considerable risk to returned refugees. [Photos: Local source]
B-5 B-6
Photos B-5 and B-6, taken in March 2010, shows RTA soldiers based in Tha Song Yang District, Tak Province arriving
at Mae U Su temporary hosting site for refugees that fled Tatmadaw/DKBA attacks on KNLA positions near Ler Per
Her in Pa'an in June 2009. Refugees told KHRG that RTA soldiers assembled the refugees two to three times per day
to inform them that they could no longer remain in the site and that they should return to Burma. [Photos: KHRG]
B-7 B-8
B-9
B-10 B-11
Photos B-10, B-11, B-12 and B-13, taken in March 2010, show refugees leaving Mae U Su temporary refugee site
with their possessions, and waiting to cross the Moei River that forms the border between Pa'an District and Tak
Province in the area. Thai authorities had set the end of March as the deadline for refugees to depart the site.
Villages in Dta Greh Township, Pa'an District from which refugees had fled included Htee Tha Htaw, WahMee Gklah,
Meh La Ah Kee, Meh La Ah Htar, Gklay Moh Kee, Gklay Poe Kee, Waw Gkyaw, Gkoh Gkwaw Lay, Gkyay Poe Kee and
Meh Gkeh; some returning refugees told a KHRG field researcher that they would not dare to work in their farm fields
because they feared landmine contamination and worried about food shortages. [Photos: Local source]
B-12 B-13
B-14 B-15
B-17
Abuses documented in such areas by KHRG include both willful and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including women
and children; attacks and other measures targeting food production and the food supply; the destruction of property
essential to civilian survival, including the heavy deployment of landmines in areas essential to civilian livelihoods; and
the active obstruction of humanitarian assistance, in particular food, medicine and health services to such areas.[16]
Despite the security and humanitarian challenges faced by civilians inhabiting areas beyond consolidated military control,
large civilian populations continue to hide in such areas, employing a range of self-protection strategies in order to avoid
forced relocation or SPDC Army attacks. Such 'strategic' displacement entails a range of protection measures employed
by individuals and communities to ensure adequate preparation for displacement; advance warning of threats; secure
removal of all family or community members to a different location; and collective survival for the duration of
displacement, including addressing problems related to physical insecurity, restricted movement and constrained access
to land, food and health services.[17]
C-1 C-2
Photos C-1 and C-2, taken on February 9th 2010, show abandoned huts in Leh Kee, once a major hiding site for
villagers in Lu Thaw Township, Papun District. Leh Kee has been abandoned since Tatmadaw forces active in Lu Thaw
Township increased their presence in the area, establishing a camp at Gkaw Daw Gkoh. The previous residents of Leh
Kee have since shifted to an alternative site and, according to a KHRG researcher, they do not date to return to Leh
Kee as long as it is within range of Tatmadaw military operations. [Photos: KHRG]
C-3 C-4
C-5
C-6 C-7
Photos C-6 and C-7, taken on April 22nd 2010, show Naw Pah Lah, a 27 year old woman from Khoh Lu village in Ler
Doh Township, Nyaunglebin District. Naw P--- was shot during an attack by Tatmadaw LIB #369 on Khaw Hta village
on March 22nd 2010. At 6:30 pm, Naw P--- was returning to her home in Kh--- with her infant son and 5-year old
daughter from visiting her father in Le---; as her family passed through Khaw Hta, they were fired upon by LIB #369
soldiers. Naw P--- was injured in her side; her 5-year-old daughter Naw Pa--- was shot in the head and killed; and
her 5-month old son Saw Ht--- was shot in the leg and buttock and died later that evening.[18] [Photos: KHRG]
C-8
C-9
C-10
On July 23rd 2010, soldiers from Tatmadaw LIB #370 under Battalion Commander Soe Myint Tun and based at Maw Poo
camp in Lu Thaw Township attacked Tha Dah Der village in Tay Mu Der village tract, northern Lu Thaw Township, Papun
District. The soldiers shelled more than 41 mortar rounds into Tha Dah Der before entering and setting fire to buildings,
destroying villagers' property including water containers, agricultural tools, rice stores and livestock. The unit slept one
night in the camp and continued burning buildings in the village the next morning, before returning to their camp at Maw
Poo. A KHRG field researcher reported that 34 out of 58 households in Tha Dah Der were burnt down, as was the village
church and school. Approximately 600 residents of Tha Dah Der fled to Tha Oh Der, joining approximately 300 other
villagers from nearby communities that feared attacks.[20]
C-11
C-12 C-13
C-14 C-15
Photos C-14 and C-15, also taken on July 27th 2010, show the remains of the church in Tha Dah Der village, which
was burnt down during the attack by Tatmadaw LIB #370. A KHRG researcher also reported that the burning of the
church damaged one side of a school the village which was located next to the church. [Photos: KHRG]
C-16 C-17
Photos C-16 and C-17, taken on July 27th 2010, show animals belonging to residents of Tha Dah Der that were
slaughtered by troops from Tatmadaw LIB #370. The KHRG researcher who visited Tha Dah Der just three days after
the attack said that pigs, chicken, goats and other animals had been killed and mutilated before Tatmadaw soldiers
withdrew from the village. [Photos: KHRG]
C-18 C-19
C-20
C-21 C-22
Photos C-21 and C-22, taken on 28th July 2010, show fields cultivated by villagers in the Tha Dah Der area that
were damaged by buffaloes while the villagers remained in hiding following the attack by Tatmadaw LIB #370 on Tha
Dah Der village. Photo C-21 shows a paddy field near Tha Dah Der in which buffaloes trampled and ate paddy plants.
Photo C-22 shows one of four hill fields belonging to residents of T'Kaw Toh Baw, near Tha Dah Der, in which
villagers reported that paddy plants were eaten and trampled by buffaloes. Paddy and hill field farmers would
normally spend long hours at their agricultural projects, but most communities in the area fled during the attacks on
Tha Dah Der on July 23rd and 24th, and did not feel safe to return to their homes immediately afterwards. [Photos:
KHRG]
KHRG's research strongly indicates that the forced extraction of significant financial, material, and labour resources from
civilian populations under control of Tatmadaw and ceasefire NSAG forces is an established, widespread practice
throughout eastern Burma. Military personnel who engage in these practices do not appear to be punished or otherwise
held accountable for their actions, suggesting that the practice of Tatmadaw units supporting themselves via local
extraction is ignored or tacitly condoned, if not explicitly mandated in policy.[22] Extractive demands require villagers to
divert crucial time, energy and resources away from their own, typically subsistence, livelihoods.
KNLA forces also remains active in some areas under Tatmadaw or ceasefire NSAG control, staging guerrilla-style attacks
and placing landmines and booby traps.[23] In response, villagers are frequently placed under tight movement
restrictions, with those violating the restrictions risking fines, detention, being shot on sight outside villages or at
checkpoints, and abuse as suspected KNU/KNLA members or supporters. Individuals suspected of communicating with or
supporting the KNU/KNLA may face detention and questioning, as well as fines, torture, the destruction of their property
and enforced disappearance. Movement restrictions restrict the amount of time villagers can spend at their agricultural
projects or engaged in livelihoods activities, such as trade or daily labour outside their home village, exacerbating the
strain on livelihoods and food security caused by exploitative abuse.
It is important to note that rural villagers employ a variety of strategies to minimise or avoid complying with exploitative
orders and other abuses. These strategies range from simple requests for reductions in 'taxation' quotas or an alleviation
of movement restrictions, to aggressive challenges for military personnel to withdraw their demands. Utilising firsthand
knowledge of and experience with local military personnel – and repression – local villagers are often skilled at discerning
how much or how little space exists to oppose particular abuses. Strategies which villagers employ in areas under the
consolidated control of the Tatmadaw or ceasefire NSAGs include, amongst other techniques complaints and negotiation;
bribery or payment of 'fines' to avoid fulfilling a demand, including negotiations to reduce payments; lying; refusing;
confronting; seeking intervention or mediation from alternate mutually-recognised authorities or respected figures;
various forms of discreet partial or false compliance; and evasion.[24]
D-1 D-2
Photo D-1,taken on February 4th 2010, shows a major Tatmadaw camp in Gkaw Thay Der village, Tantabin
Township, Toungoo District. Information from KHRG's field researchers indicates that battalions from Tatmadaw
Military Operation Command (MOC) #7 have been active in Toungoo since the end of 2009. Villagers in the Gkaw
Thay Der area report that Tatmadaw troops have rotated between camps as frequently as twice a month this year,
and that whichever unit is based at Gkaw Thay Der camp makes frequent demands for forced labour from residents
of nearby villages, including Gklay Soh Kee, Gkaw Thay Der, Kler La and Gkaw Muh Der.[25] Photo D-2, also taken
on February 4th 2010, shows villagers passing in front of the Tatmadaw camp in Gkaw Thay Der on their way back
from collecting firewood in the forest. [Photos: KHRG]
D-3 D-4
Photos D-3 and D-4, taken on March 19th 2010, show villagers from B--- village, Bu Tho Township, Papun District
clearing roadside brush as ordered by soldiers from Tatmadaw LIB #340 based in M--- village. According to local
sources, all of the villages located near the vehicle road in Meh Gklaw village tract, including Boh Htar, Meh T'Ru, Ta
Bpoh Gklah, Bweh Gklah and Gkaw La Gklah villages, are required to clear roadside brush and grass every year and
do not receive food or payment for their work. This labour entails high physical security risks for villagers, as
roadways in northern Karen State are frequently mined by Tatmadaw, DKBA, and KNLA forces with each party
seeking to disrupt the others' operations, secure territory for themselves while denying territory to their adversaries.
[Photos: KHRG]
D-5 D-6
Photos D-5 and D-6, taken on March 19th 2010, show a paddy field controlled by Tatmadaw LIB #340 in Meh Gklaw
village tract, Bu Tho Township. Local villagers told a KHRG field researcher that this paddy field is four acres in size,
and that LIB #340 forces residents of B--- village to plant and plough the paddy every year. [Photos: KHRG]
D-7 D-8
Photos D-7 and D-8, taken on March 19th 2010, show residents of B--- village, Bu Tho Township fabricating and
delivering thatch shingles to fulfill an order issued by soldiers from Tatmadaw LIB #340 based in the area. Local
sources report that the local Tatmadaw camp to which the thatch was to be delivered is approximately one hour from
B--- on foot. Thatch is a common building material in eastern Burma, typically used for roofing buildings. [Photos:
KHRG]
D-9
D-10
D-11
D-12 D-13
In areas beyond permanent military control, these practices are oriented towards making such areas uninhabitable for
civilians and include: staging military attacks on villagers engaged in farming activities; forcibly relocating accessible
civilian populations away from land; sending patrols to pre-burn damp fields to prevent a complete burn; deploying
landmines in agricultural areas; and destroying paddy and other crops and paddy storage facilities. Restrictions on
humanitarian support to communities in such areas, including military attacks on support providers, mean that villagers
are in many cases entirely dependent on acutely constrained livelihoods activities.
In mixed administration or areas of consolidated military control, including relocation sites, practices are oriented
towards control of and extraction of resources from civilian populations and include: a range of forced labour demands
that divert time and resources from civilian livelihoods; arbitrary taxation on trade and small-scale industry; and
movement restrictions that geographically and temporally constrain villagers' livelihoods activities.
The tension between military practices and civilian efforts to pursue livelihoods severely undercuts the human security of
communities across eastern Burma. Consequences include widespread and persistent economic insecurity and cyclical
household indebtedness, food shortages and high rates of malnutrition, and a range of health vulnerabilities. In the face
of such direct challenges to their livelihoods, villagers have responded by adopting supplementary occupations, migrating
in search of work, hiding food storage bins in the forest, and operating small covert hill fields and 'jungle' markets in
order to evade restrictions and harmful practices of the Tatmadaw and other armed groups seeking to consolidate or
expand control of civilian populations.
E-1 E-2
E-3 E-4
Photos E-3, taken on March 22nd 2010, shows villagers from a hiding site in the Sh--- area of Nyaunglebin District,
working as day labourers carrying bamboo near Shwegyin town. Faced with acute food insecurity across much of
northern Karen State, many villagers in hiding must perform such daily labour in order to be able to feed themselves
and their families.[26] Photo E-4, also taken on March 22nd 2010, shows a hut where villagers from hiding sites in
Sh--- sleep while they are away from their homes performing daily labour. [Photos: KHRG]
E-5
E-6 E-7
Photos E-6 and E-7, taken on March 30th 2010, show villagers who live in Tatmadaw relocation sites in T'Naw Tha
Ree Township, Mergui-Tavoy District travelling outside of the relocation sites to pursue livelihoods activities
elsewhere in the Ma Noh Roh area. In photo E-6, villagers cut fish caught in the local river; in photo E-7 villagers
engaged in trading wood are loading bamboo rafts to ship wood along the river. Residents of the area told KHRG that
they are required to buy permission documents if they need to travel in the area for any purpose. [Photos: KHRG]
E-8 E-9
Photos E-8, taken in April 2010, shows a field hut and burned rubber trees belonging Saw M--- that were destroyed
by mortars launched by IB #548 on April 23rd 2010 in P---village, Waw Raw (Win Yaw) Township, Dooplaya District.
Saw M---'s entire plantation of 1,600 trees is now damaged and needs to be replanted. Photo E-9, also taken in April
2010, shows rubber trees in a plantation belonging to Saw T--- that were burned and destroyed in the same
incident; all 1,370 trees on his plantation will need to be replanted. [Photos: KHRG]
E-10
E-11 E-12
E-13 E-14
Landmines
Landmines are used extensively by the Tatmadaw and all non-state armed groups active in eastern Burma, and pose a
range of threats to civilians. Tatmadaw, DKBA and KNLA forces, and sometimes villagers themselves, use landmines on
roads, paths and around camps and villages in shoot-on-sight areas, as well as in some mixed-administration areas.
None of these actors have the capacity to comprehensively map and de-mine contaminated areas when camps are
vacated or mines are no longer needed.
State and non-state armed groups have also used landmines to control movements by the civilian population,
particularly between mixed-administration and shoot-on-sight areas. In areas where these forces have attempted to
expand control or drive populations into lowland relocation sites, landmines have been placed in abandoned villages to
prevent return by villagers in hiding. Landmines have also been used to prevent access to agricultural land for villagers
in hiding, and to prevent villagers from leaving forced relocation sites or returning to abandoned villages and agricultural
land. Landmines are not always clearly marked, nor are communities always warned of new dangerous landmine areas.
The Tatmadaw appears to have shared landmines with the DKBA, which has placed these landmines in civilian areas
without providing warnings to local communities.
KHRG has also documented incidents of DKBA and Tatmadaw soldiers using civilians to clear landmines, as well as
forcing civilians to walk in front of patrols to trigger mines, booby-traps or ambushes laid by KNLA. Civilians have been
forced to clear brush and debris from roadsides known to be mined by all parties to the conflict, an activity which
amount to de facto dangerous and involuntary mine-clearance. Unexploded remnants of war remain a significant threat
to civilian populations, particularly children, in many parts of eastern Burma.[29]
F-1 F-2
Photos F-1 and F-2, taken on March 26th and March 29th 2010 respectively, show two civilians after they were
injured by landmines while engaging in regular livelihoods activities outside Wo--- village Tantabin Township,
Toungoo Distirct. Saw Pu---, 46, stepped on a landmine while returning from his betelnut plantation to his home in
Wo--- village on March 29th. Just three days earlier, on March 26th Naw Le---, 40, stepped on a mine while
collecting firewood with other women from Wo--- at forested hill near the local SPDC Army camp. Both villagers
injured their right legs and were assisted by their fellow villagers, who constructed stretchers and carried them to the
nearest medical facility, approximately two hours away on foot. Villagers in Wo--- believed that the mines had been
planted by SPDC LIB #427, which had been active in the area and maintained a camp near Wo--- since the
beginning of 2010. The unit had reportedly been planting landmines carelessly around the village since it arrived in
the area.[30] [Photos: KHRG]
F-3
Photo F-4, also taken on May 29th 2010, shows Saw Qu-
--, 27, a gher der member from G---village, Lu Thaw
Township. Saw Qu--- was familiar with the locations of
some landmines planted by the KNLA and local gher der,
but was injured when walking in an area he did not
realise had been mined.[31] [Photo: KHRG]
F-4
F-5
F-6
measures to seek greater physical security for family members and working together to strengthen livelihoods and food
security , even in the face of great adversity.
G-1
G-2
G-3
G-5
G-6
G-7
G-8 G-9
Photos G-8 and G-9, taken on March 19th 2010, shows young boys from Gk--- village in Meh Gklaw village tract, Bu
Tho Township, Papun District performing forced labour near their village. According to a KHRG field researcher who
spoke with villagers in the area, soldiers from Tatmadaw LIB #340 that were based at a camp next to a vehicle road
in Meh T'Ru village ordered Gklaw Bper village to clear brush from sections of the road near their village. The boys
were not provided money or food for this labour. [Photos: KHRG]
G-10
Top of Gallery
Establishment of Border Guard Forces and strategic displacement
Involuntary repatriation of refugees in Tha Song Yang District
Surviving with dignity beyond military control
Life under military control
Livelihoods under strain
Landmines
Children in armed conflict
Terms and Abbreviations | Map Room
Footnotes
[1] For the first installment of our 2010 photo gallery, containing 131 photos taken since July 2009, see: KHRG Photo
Gallery 2010, KHRG, June 2010.
[2] A comprehensive account of the situation in one township of northern Karen State is available in: Self-protection
under strain: Targeting of civilians and local responses in northern Karen State, KHRG, August 2010.
[3] Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) figures from a survey that is conducted annually to estimate the
displaced population in conflict areas of eastern Burma. The survey is widely recognised as the authoritative source of
figures for civilian displacement in the region. See: Protracted Displacement & Chronic Poverty in Eastern
Burma/Myanmar, TBBC, November 2010, p.60. The figure of 70,100 civilians in hiding in northern Karen State was
obtained at by adding TBBC's estimates for 'IDPs in Hiding' in Thandaung, Papun, Shwegyin and Kyaukkyi townships;
these are SPDC-drawn administrative areas that approximately correspond to Toungoo, Papun and Nyaunglebin districts,
which are Karen designations used by Karen villagers and KHRG. The figure of 28,110 civilians displaced in the past year
was obtained by the same formula, using TBBC's figures for 'Population displaced in past 12 months.' Note that the
figure of 70,100 displaced in northern Karen areas does not account for the 29,250 villagers in the same areas that are
estimated to have been forcibly relocated from their lands and homes.
[4] Protracted Displacement & Chronic Poverty in Eastern Burma/Myanmar, TBBC, November 2010, pp.61-62. Figure
calculated as explained in footnote 3.
[5] Since November 2010 these concerns have become reality as fighting has begun in Pa'an and Dooplaya; civilians in
this context have expressed a range of concerns including physical danger from the fighting, abuse by armed groups and
a limited capacity to deal with that abuse, disruptions to livelihoods activities, and problems accessing protection in
Thailand. See: "Displacement Monitoring: Regular updates on protection concerns for villagers in Dooplaya District and
Tak Province," KHRG, February 2011.
[6] See McCartan, B., "Democracy plan fuels war in Myanmar ," Asia Times Online, February 25th 2009. The move to
disarm or bring ceasefire armed groups under direct authority or the national armed forces, or Tatmadaw, can be traced
to Article 338 of the 2008 Burmese constitution which stipulates that "All the armed forces in the Union shall be under
the command of the Defense Services [Tatmadaw]." See, Ministry of Information, "Constitution of the Republic of the
Union of Myanmar (2008)" English version, Chapter VII Article 338.
[7] Myanmar: Towards the Elections, International Crisis Group, August 20th 2009, p.14.
[8] Leaked minutes of the May 2009 are retained by KHRG on file. For more background on the DKBA's decision and
steps to become a Border Guard Force, including a reported upsurge in forced recruitment to increase the DKBA's troop
strength to 9,000 soldiers in accordance with the BGF plan, see: "Forced recruitment of child soldiers: An interview with
two DKBA deserters," KHRG, August 2009.
[9] Deadlines were pushed back in October 2009, December 2009, February-March 2010, and June 2010, when a 'final'
deadline of August 10th 2010 was declared. See: "Will the BGF Deadline Delay the Election?" The Irrawaddy, March 3rd
2010; "Junta Extends BGF Deadline for DKBA," The Irrawaddy, June 9th 2010. For more on internal fissures in the DKBA
regarding BGF transformation, see: "Pro-junta Karen militia 'splits'," Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), May 3rd 2010.
[10] "Junta Extends BGF Deadline for DKBA," The Irrawaddy, June 9th 2010. In August and September 2010,
ceremonies attended by Tatmadaw commanders officially announced the transformation of large portions of the DKBA
into a Border Guard Force. See, "Border Guard Forces of South-East Command formed in Paingkyon of Kayin State,"
New Light of Myanmar, August 22nd 2010; "Border Guard Force formed at Atwinkwinkalay region, Myawaddy Township,
Kayin State," New Light of Myanmar, September 2010.
[11] See "DKBA commander's defiance nudges Karen State towards war," DVB, July 26th 2010; "Villagers Flee in Fear of
Attack on DKBA," The Irrawaddy, July 26th 2010; "Karen people welcome Brigade (5) decision on BGF," Karen
Information Center (KIC), August 9th 2010.
[12] The Thai village of Muh Luh Chah is also known as Thay Baw Boh in Karen, not to be confused with Thay Baw Boh
village located in the adjacent area of Kawkareik Township, Dooplaya District.
[13] See especially: "Displacement Monitoring: Regular updates on protection concerns for villagers in Dooplaya District
and Tak Province" KHRG, February 2011.
[14] Note that Nong Bua and Mae U Su are the Thai names for sites referred to in Karen as Noe Boh and Oo Thu Hta,
respectively.
[15] For a step-by-step account of the circumstances of the refoulement of Tha Song Yang refugees, see: "Functionally
Refoulement: Camps in Tha Song Yang District abandoned as refugees bow to pressure," KHRG, April 2010.
[16] For a comprehensive account of SPDC Army practices in areas beyond consolidated military control, and the
resulting humanitarian impact on civilian populations, see generally: Self-Protection under strain: Targeting of civilians
and local responses in northern Karen State, KHRG, August 2010; also: Submission for the UN Universal Periodic
Review: Human rights concerns in KHRG research areas, KHRG, July 2010.
[17] For analysis of protection strategies employed by villagers in hiding in upland northern Karen State to address
physical security, livelihoods, health and education challenges during displacement, see: "Self-Protection under strain",
KHRG, August 2010.
[18] Further details on this incident can be found in "Attacks and displacement in Nyaunglebin District," KHRG, April
2010; "Children Shot and Killed by the Burma Army," FBR, March 2010; "Follow-up story: to story of Children Shot and
Killed by the Burma Army," FBR, March 2010.
[19] For more on protection strategies utilized by communities in hiding in northern Karen State, see: Self-protection
under strain: Targeting of civilians and local responses in Northern Karen State, KHRG, August 2010.
[20] The attack on Tha Dah Der was first reported in English by the Free Burma Rangers; see: "FBR REPORT: Burma
Army burns villages and chases over 900 people into the jungle, attacks continue in Northern Karen State," FBR, July
2010.
[21] See: Supporting local responses to extractive abuse: Commentary on the ND-Burma report 'Hidden Impact', KHRG,
September 2010. An overview of extractive practices confronted by villagers is available in: Village Agency: Rural rights
and resistance in a militarized Karen State, KHRG, November 2008, pp.40-76. This overview also describes additional
forms of forced labour not listed above, such as mandatory attendance at meetings. See also: Submission for the UN
Universal Periodic Review: Human rights concerns in KHRG research areas, KHRG, July 2010.
[22] The Tatmadaw's consistent reliance on forced extraction of resources, labour and material support from the civilian
population has been referred to as the 'live off the land' or 'self-reliance' policy by KHRG as well as respected scholars of
Burma's military history. Andrew Selth, for example, dates the policy to 1997, when Burma's War Office reportedly
issued an order instructing the country's Regional Commanders that troops "were to meet their basic logistical needs
locally, rather than rely on the central supply system." See, Andrew Selth, Burma's Armed Forces: Power Without Glory,
Norwalk: Eastbridge, 2002 p. 136. See also, Mary Callahan, "Of kyay-zu and kyet-zu: the military in 2006," pp. 36-53
in Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson (eds.), Myanmar: The State, Community and the Environment, Canberra: Asia
Pacific Press, 2007 p. 46.
[23] The KNLA formally adopted the use of guerrilla tactics in 1998 at a military conference in Mae Hta Raw Tha,
Dooplaya District. See, Ashley South "Ethnic politics in Burma: States of conflict," New York: Routledge, 2009 (2nd ed.),
p.56.
[24] For more on these strategies, see; Village Agency: Rural rights and resistance in a militarized Karen State, KHRG,
November 2008; Supporting local responses to extractive abuse: Commentary on the ND-Burma report 'Hidden Impact',
KHRG, September 2010.
[25] For further background on the situation in Toungoo District, see: "Attacks on cardamom plantations, detention and
forced labour in Toungoo District," KHRG, May 2010; "Forced labour, movement and trade restrictions in Toungoo
District," KHRG, March 2010.
[26] For more on food insecurity in eastern Burma, and particularly in northern Karen State, see: Food crisis: The
cumulative impact of abuse in rural Burma, KHRG, April 2009; Self-protection under strain: Targeting of civilians and
local responses in northern Karen State, KHRG, August 2010.
[27] Full details on this incident are available in "SPDC shelling destroys villagers' rubber plantations in Dooplaya
District," KHRG, May 2010.
[28] For more on the destruction of cardamom plantations in Toungoo, see: "Attacks on cardamom plantations,
detention and forced labour in Toungoo District," KHRG, May 2010.
[29] For further information on landmine use by all parties in Karen areas, see: Self-protection under strain: Targeting of
civilians and local responses in northern Karen State, KHRG, August 2010; Submission for the UN Universal Periodic
Review: Human rights concerns in KHRG research areas, KHRG, June 2010; Grave Violations: Assessing abuses of child
rights in Karen areas in 2009, KHRG, January 2010; "Insecurity amidst the DKBA – KNLA conflict in Dooplaya and Pa'an
Districts," KHRG, February 2009. Landmine Monitor's 2009 country report for Burma notes that the Tatmadaw, DKBA
and KNLA all manufacture and use landmines widely, and that "every township" of Karen State is hazardous for civilians;
see, Landmine Monitor Report 2009, Landmine Monitor, 2009, pp.1029-1040.
[30] Further information on the incidents in Wo--- village is available in: "Villagers injured by landmines, assisted by
neighbours in southern Toungoo," KHRG, October 2010.
[31] Gher der or 'home guard' groups have been organized locally in parts of northern Karen State threatened by
Tatmadaw operations targeting civilians, and the resulting acute food insecurity. Villagers interviewed by KHRG have
reported that gher der were established with the objective of providing security for communities of civilians in hiding ,
particularly when those communities engage in food production or procurement activities, and when other modes of
protection are unavailable. For more on the gher der see: Self-protection under strain: Targeting of civilians and local
responses in northern Karen State, KHRG, August 2010, especially pp.88-95.
[32] For more on Tatmadaw military practices that entail targeting of civilians in northern Karen State, see: Self-
protection under strain: Targeting of civilians and local responses in northern Karen State, KHRG, August 2010,
especially pp.88-95.
[33] See especially: Self-protection under strain: Targeting of civilians and local responses in northern Karen State,
KHRG, August 2010, pp.73-81.
[34] For more on factors undermining food security among displaced communities in northern Karen State, see: Self-
protection under strain: Targeting of civilians and local responses in northern Karen State, KHRG, August 2010, pp.52-
63.