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Notes on Ethics

Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is the view that what one ought to do in any situation is whatever will
result in the greatest total balance of happiness to unhappiness (John Stuart Mill called ..
this the Greatest Happiness Principle), According.to.ntilitarianaeveey single person's
(some say every single sentient creature's) interests must be considered equally, so that
our actions do not give preference to-anyone, including family, friends; fellow ,"
countrymen; or even oneself. Utilitarianism, then, is an extremely demanding view. It
implies that, for example; if we assume all else to be equal (that is to say, if we assume .
that nothing morally significant differentiates the individuals involved), if one could sav~
the lives of three people by allowing herself to be killed so that her heart, lungs, and liver
could each be transplanted into someone who would otherwise die, then she must
sacrifice herself in order: to save the three. It also has the implication that; all else equal,
if the only way to' save the three.isto kill someone else for her organs,then that is what
one must do.

Since utilitarianism assesses the moral rightness or wrongness of acts only in terms of the
outcomes of those acts, and not at all in terms of the motives ot-intentions with which the
acts are done, some have objected that it allows too much room for what philosophers .
call "moralluck". For example, someone who just happens to feel like killing someone,
and who picks a random person off the street and shoots him, might happen to' shoot
someone who was on his way to kill three other people. The shooter, then,' prevented
three deaths by causing one, so by the utilitarian criterion she did the right thing. But of
, course the fact that she did the right thing.is just a matter of extraordinary luck, and is
certainl y not something that she should be praised for. In fact; her conduct seems. quite
blameworthy. The utilitarian response to this complaint-is that assessments of one's.
character will often diverge.isometimesquitesharply, from assessments of the rightness
or wrongness of her acts. Someone with a bad-character, who.acts from motives
associated. with that bad. character, andwho intends to bring about a.bad result, might
sometimesget lucky and bring about the best possible.outcome (utilitarians call this
"blameworthy right-doing"); at the same time, someone with all admirable character, who
acts from the best of motives and with the intention to do nothing but good, might get
unlucky and bring. about a!very bad result (this is known as "blameless wrong-doing").
For example.imagine a doctor who, prescribes a.medicine to a patient that all medical
evidence suggests should. cure her, but for some unknown reason it ends up killing her;
According to utilitarianism, prescribing the medicine was wrong; but the doctor couldn't
have known that it would kill the patient, so she's not at fault for her death.

Another objection to utilitarianism is that if everyone attempted to perform utilitarian

reasoning in deciding what to do, the result would be very bad, since we're usually not
that good at foreseeing all of the consequences of our actions. But this objection misses
a
the point of utilitarianism. The utilitarianism that some philosophers endorse is view'
about how to assess the rightness or wrongness of actions, not a prescription for how to
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go about deciding what to do. These philosophers distinguish between objective

utilitarianism and subjective utilitarianism. Objective utilitarianism is the view that
actions ought to be assessed in terms of their consequences, and that the consequences of
an act are the sole determining' factor in that act's rightness or wrongness. A number of
philosophers hold this view. Subjective utilitarianism is the view that individuals ought
to perform utilitarian calculations when making decisions about what to do. And no one
believes this; there is not a single philosopher that I know of who endorses subjective
-------.utiHtarianism-fand-if-there-araany, they're absolutely nuts!).

Despite the fact that many believe the distinction between objective and subjective
utilitarianism clears up the seeming decision procedure problem, some have thought that
there should be a closer link between the criterion of right action and the correct decision
procedure, even while thinking that morality should be concerned (almost) exclusively
with the consequences of actions. These people have tended to endorse rule
utilitarianism. Rule utilitarianism is the view that what one should do is to always follow
the set of rules which, if universally followed, would lead to the greatest overall balance
of happiness to unhappiness. This view has been criticized due to the fact that it requires
us to assume universal compliance with the best set of rules, even though in the real
world very few people comply with those rules. Because of this rule utilitarianism might
say that, for example, it would be right to invest a lot of time and energy supporting a
certain sort of political arrangement (whatever the best arrangement would be), even
though in the actual world doing so would be futile, since so few others (if anyone at all)
is actively supporting that arrangement. Rule utilitarianism,then, would have us doing
many things that would be great if everyone were doing them, but would be useless or
worse in the actual world.

Finally, many people who think that morality should only be concerned with the
consequences of actions reject the utilitarian view that the balance of happiness to
unhappiness is what should be maximized. The problem, they say, is that happiness is a
subjective matter, and what makes individuals happy differs radically from person to
person. If enough people take great pleasure in watching a lion devour a Christian (to
take an example from Roman history) that more happiness is gained by the onlookers .
than is lost by the victim, utilitarianism says that the victim should be sacrificed. But this
seems crazy! Surely the onlookers shouldn 't gain any happiness from watching
something so horrific! The solution, according to some, is to reject utilitarianism and
endorse consequentialism. Consequentialism says that what should be maximized is not
happiness, but the objective good, and that a lot of people are simply mistaken about what
is objectively good. Sacrificing the Christian is wrong because it is not in fact good that
the fans gain happiness from watching him die. Among today's philosophers, there are
many consequentialists, but very few utilitarians.

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 Deontology .

Deontologists believe that morality ought to be concerned mainly with motives, and only
very indirectly with consequences. Kant, the most well-known deontological thinker,
said that the only acts that have moral worth are those are done purely from a sense of '
duty. This means that, for example, if one takes care of her sick mother.because she
loves her, and not because it's her duty to do so, her act, though it has obviously good
consequences, has no moral, worth. The idea behind this thought-is that individuals- .
should only be morally praised. for acting in the right way when they do so because they·
have thought about and consciously acted on true beliefs about what morality· requires.
Since someone who loves her mother would care for her regardless of whether or not she
had a duty to do so, she does not deserve moral praise for caring for her, This makes for
an interesting contrast with utilitarianism. Despite the utilitarian requirement that every
person's interests be considered equally important, most thinkers who endorse objective
utilitarianism and reject subjective utilitarianism think that it is morally good for people
to acton their love for particular individuals at least some of the time (this is,because we
are often ina position to benefit-those-to whom we have close personal ties in ways that
we cannot benefit others). On this view, it is often better to act on established motives
such as love or loyalty, than to consciously attend to what morality requires in every
situation. Doing this will lead us, according to those who hold this. view, to do the right
thing at least most of the time. Deontology, on the other hand, says that individuals
.• .should always consciously attend to what their moral duties are, and attempt only to act
from a sense of duty; Not only utilitarians, but those who hold a:variety of other ethical
views, have criticized this aspect of.deontclogical theories for being excessively
puritanical, and failing to-take into account' the realities of human emotion, attachment to
others, and the.limits on our psychological ability to constantly attend to considerations
of moral duty.

Most deontologists endorse Kant's belief that the way to determine what one's moral
duties are is through the categorical imperative test. This testis designed to determine
whether the maxim on which one acts is universalizable. A maxim is universalizable if it
can be rationally willed to bea.universallaw. Maxims such as "I will lie in order to get
some ready cash" (this is an example that Kant discussesjare determined to not be
universalizable because if everyone acted on it, then no one could .. 'That is.to say, if
everyone made a habit.of lying in order to get some ready cash,people would not be able
to trust each other, and so lying would not bean effective way of getting ready cash.
There is, then, a serious contradiction that arises when attempting to universalize bad
maxims. It's not enough for a maxim to fail the test that it involves doing something that
one finds distasteful. So, for example, someone opposed to homosexuality can't say that
homosexual sex fails the test just because she wouldn 't want it to be a universal law
followed by everyone. There is no contradiction of the sort described in the lying to get
ready cash case, so homosexual sex passes the categorical imperative test.

If a maxim passes the categorical imperative test, then the act in question is permitted.
This test allows that, at least in certain situations, many different possible actions are
morally acceptable. This contrasts with utilitarianism, which says that multiple possible
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acts are morally acceptable only if they all would result in the same total balance of
happiness, and that this balance is the maximum possible in the situation. In most
situations, then; utilitarianism will only allow one act to be chosen. Deontologists see
this as a significant advantage of their view over utilitarianism, since most people think
that most situations provide for multiple morally acceptable options. For example,
imagine that you have an extra ticket to a concert, and are deciding which of two friends
to invite to go. While utilitarianism says that, all else equal, you should choose whoever
--wouid-gain-the-most-happiness--from seeing.the concert, deontology says that you can
choose either friend, regardless of who would enjoy the concert more. And most people-----·-·-
think that this is right.

There is a question among deontologists about how the maxim of an action is to be

specified. Contrary to popular belief (and most Intro classes), most deontologists don't
think that lying, cheating, and stealing are always wrong. Christine Korsgaard, a
contemporary deontologist, claims that maxims must include both an act and a purpose,
and that inclusion of the purpose allows deontology to avoid problems such as banning
lying to the murderer at the door about your friend's whereabouts. The maxim "I will lie
in order to prevent my friend from being murdered" is, according to Korsgaard,
universalizable. If the purpose is valuable enough, then at least sometimes lying,
cheating, stealing, and the like will be morally acceptable.

Some utilitarians have responded to this deontological approach by arguing that so long
as an action can be described as being done in order to bring about the best overall
consequences, then it will pass the categorical imperative test. They claim that even if
deontology is true, utilitarianism will be a theorem of deontology, and so the practical
consequences of the two theories will be the same; they will both recommend exactly the
same actions. Deontologists claim that this is false, because it is the immediate purpose
of an action that mustbe described in the maxim to be tested. The maxim "I will lie to
get some ready cash" cannot be re-described as "I will lie in order to achieve the best
consequences", even iflying really will bring about the best consequences.
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Some people claim that the fact that there is no general agreement among deontologists
regarding how the maxims of actions should be described in order to be analyzed by the
categorical imperative test shows that deontology is a fundamentally misguided way to
think about ethics. One reason that they think this is that individuals often have very
different reasons or purposes in mind when they engage in very similar acts that have
very similar consequences. Because deontologists are concerned first and foremost with
motives, it seems that whether an act will pass the categorical imperative test might
depend on facts about the actor's psychology. But we often can't know what's in another
person's head, so many times we won't know whether someone's act was right or wrong,
even after seeing all of the consequences of the act. On the other hand, if instead of
including the purpose of the act in the maxim, we include the consequences of the act,
then the result is utilitarianism.
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Distributive Justice

Philosophical discussion of distributive justice began with John Rawls' 1971booka

Theory of-Justice. In that book, Rawls advance.da~yersionofsocial-contractth~ry·that,
unlike theworkof earlier.writers such as Hobbes; Locke-and Rousseau, addressed
distributive issues in addition, to issues about political organization, Rawls was
concerned to determine: what sort of distribution of rights, opportunities, and wealth is
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wa¥-1cu:letennine-this,aGeording-to-Rawls;is-to-~telI1iine what mdfVfduaIs
would agree to if they were in a:fair initial choice situation in which they had to agree on'
political and distributive principles; The social contract of Rawls, then, isbased on a
hypothetical, rather than an actual' agreement among the parties to the contract. .
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Rawls calls.theinitial choice situation.from which individuals must agree on how to

organize society, the, original position. In the original position.dndividualsare behind
what Rawls calls the veil 0/ ignorance. From the original position and behind the veil of
ignorance; .individualsdon't know anything about themselves: they de not know their
race or gendentheir nationalcr.religious background.their social or economic standing
in society, their level of intelligence: and physicalstrength, their talents (or lack thereof),
or even whether they live in a wealthy OT! poor country., Without knowing any of these
things, and with the equal likelihood of being any individual in society, the parties in the
original position are to agree on a distribution of rights, opportunities, and wealth.
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One of the reasons that Rawls constructs-the original position in the way that.hedoes is
that in the actual world individuals who are,say, bom into, a wealthy familyhave self-·
interested reasons to support a very unequal distribution of wealth. But these reasons are
not ones that should count, in-favor of such' a distribution, nor should they contribute to
the continuation of unjust policies regarding distribution. Because the parties in the .
original position do not know whether they are, for.exampleewealthy.or poor, Rawls, '
argues that they win take the value of equality very seriously, Noone would want to be
at the bottomof the socioeconomic ladder ina society with a very' unjust distribution of
wealth, and since from the-original position one has an equal chance of being anyone in
society (arid remember, societies with very unequal distributions have many times more
people at the bottom than at the top); Rawls thinks that individuals in the,original position
wouldbe concerned to maximize the: prospects of those' who will be.worst.off (this is .
known as the maximin principle). '

The result of the concern to maximize the prospects of the worst off, according to Rawls,
is that individuals in the original position would deterniine that the only inequalities in
wealth distribution that are acceptable are those that are required to improve the prospects
of the worst off (Rawls calls this the difference principle). This means that everyone
must be given an equal share of society's wealth, except if giving some a greater share
would mean that there would be both more wealth overall and more wealth in the hands
of the worst off. So, for example, if a particularly talented group of people would work
harder only if they are given financial incentives to do so, society can provide those
incentives only if doing so would create enough wealth to both cover the incentives and
provide enough extra to distribute to the worst off such that they too are better off with
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the incentives for the talented than without.

Rawls' view has been criticized by utilitarians because Rawls' account of what individuals
would choose in the original position differs from standard rational choice theory.
Rational choice theory implies that individuals in the original position would choose
utilitarianism, because that would maximize the expected value of their position in
society. There might be more risk involved, because the worst offunder utilitarianism
might be much worse of'flllan theworst off under-the-difference.principle.iMgny
utilitarians, however, would dispute this on the basis of the doctrine of diminishing
marginal utility. This doctrine states that an increase in wealth of $1 0 for someone who
is badly off has greater utility than increase in wealth of $10 for someone who is well off.
If this doctrine is right (which almost everyone thinks it is), then, these utilitarians argue,
utilitarianism will turn out to require a very equal distribution of wealth, perhaps as equal
as the difference principle.

The difference principle has also been criticized by egalitarians (philosophers who think
that equality is a fundamental value). G.A. Cohen, for example, has said that Rawls
should not allow inequalities based on incentives to the talented to work harder, since
whether or not to work hard is a choice, and the talented could simply choose to work
hard without the extra incentives.

Besides being concerned with the distribution of wealth, Rawls was also concerned with
fairness in opportunities to pursue one's career of choice. He believed that from the
original position and behind the veil of ignorance, individuals would choose to institute a
system that guaranteed what he called fair equality of opportunity, which he
distinguished fromJormal equality of opportunity. Formal equality of opportunity is
what we have now in America. It requires only that there are no formal barriers, such as
laws or official private enterprise policies, barring members of any particular group from
holding any particular job. So, for formal equality of opportunity, it is enough that there
is no law stating that blacks, or women, or atheists, or French people, can't hold a
particular job, even if no blacks, women, etc. are ever chosen for that job. Fair equality
of opportunity, on the other hand, requires that everyone be given a genuinely fair chance
to get any job that they want. So, for example, everyone must have equal access to
quality education, health care, and everything else necessary to develop one's talents and
compete on an equal playing field with the rest of society.