NAXALISM

Reader on Naxalism part 1

Chinmay Patil
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SEPTEMBER 2008
IPCS Research Papers
Naxal Movement in India: A Profile
Rajat Kujur
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies 1 New Delhi, INDIA
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CONTENTS
Executive Summary...............................................................
.............................................. 4 A Short History ...............
................................................................................
..................... 2 Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation .
................................................. 6 People’s War Group (PWG)......
................................................................................
........... 7 Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) & Communist Party of India (Maoist)
...................... 11 About the Author .....................................
...........................................................................14 Re
cent IPCS Publications .........................................................
.........................................14
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Executive Summary
In order to understand the current phase of Naxalism, we need to understand diff
erent aspects of organizational transformation that have occurred within the Nax
al movement, since the genesis and current phase of the movement is a reflection
of continuity and change. To understand its continuity over the decade, one has
to understand its dynamics of change, just as to understand the changing nature
of the Naxal movement, one has to understand the factors responsible for its co
ntinuity. And this reestablishes the dynamic character of the movement. The char
acteristic feature of the Naxal movement is its disorganized character which led
to some interesting formulations, quite uncommon in the history of Movement Org
anizations (MO)1. The fragmented character of the movement gave rise to a pletho
ra of possible trends and groupings and thereby, paved the way for new avenues o
f organizational conflict. Due
Historically socio-political movements whether extremist, revolutionary or peace
ful, operate through organizations which are known as Movement Organizations. Th
e movement organizations are mostly characterized as loosely structured, decentr
alized and prone to political challenges and counter cultural practices.
1
to its fragmented character, the movement witnessed the comeback of many past le
aders and cadres from oblivion. This aspect of Naxal organizational politics is
important to understand, as it enabled the reemergence of a whole range of quest
ions that were assumed to have been resolved once and for all.
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A Short History
To understand the genesis of the Naxal movement, one needs to locate it within t
he framework of the Communist movement in India. To be more specific, any study
on the Naxal movement cannot overlook the importance of the rise and fall of the
Telangana Movement (1946-51), since Telangana will always remain the glorious c
hapter in the history of peasant struggles for Indian communists. In fact, it wa
s the first serious effort by sections of the communist party leadership to lear
n from the experiences of the Chinese revolution and to develop a comprehensive
line for India’s democratic revolution. On the other hand, the experience in Telan
gana also facilitated the growth of three distinct lines within the Indian commu
nist movement. The line promoted by Ranadive and his followers, rejected the sig
nificance of the Chinese revolution, and advocated the simultaneous accomplishme
nt of the democratic and the socialist revolutions, based on city-based working-
class insurrections. The group drew inspiration from Stalin and fiercely attacke
d Mao as another Tito. The second line mainly professed and propagated by the An
dhra Secretariat, drew heavily on the Chinese experiences and the teachings of M
ao, in building up the struggle of Telangana. The Andhra leadership, while succe
ssfully managing to spearhead the movement against the Nizam, failed to tackle t
he complex question of meeting the challenge of the Government of India. The Neh
ru government embarked on the road to parliamentary democracy, conditioning it w
ith reforms like the ‘abolition of the Zamindari system’. All these objective condit
ions facilitated the dominance of a centrist line, put forward by Ajay Ghosh and
Dange. This line characteristically pointed out the differences between Chinese
2 and Indian conditions and pushed the party along the road to parliamentary de
mocracy. In 1957, the Communists succeeded in forming a government in Kerala, wh
ich however, was soon overthrown. Additionally, following the India-China war, t
he party split into two during 1964 – Communist Party of India (CPI) and Communist
Party of India (Marxist) (CPI [M]). While the CPI preached the theory of ‘peacefu
l road to non-capitalist development’, the CPI (M) adopted the centrist line. Thou
gh there were serious differences on ideological and tactical grounds, both the
parties went ahead with their parliamentary exercises and formed the United Fron
t government in West Bengal. In the backdrop of such organizational upheavals wi
thin the Indian Communist movement, an incident in a remote area transformed the
history of left-wing extremism in India. In a remote village called Naxalbari i
n West Bengal, a tribal youth named Bimal Kissan, having obtained a judicial ord
er, went to plough his land on 2 March 1967. The local landlords attacked him wi
th the help of their goons. Tribal people of the area retaliated and started for
cefully recapturing their lands. What followed was a rebellion, which left one p
olice sub inspector and nine tribals dead. Within a short span of about two mont
hs, this incident acquired great visibility and tremendous support from cross se
ctions of Communist revolutionaries belonging to the state units of the CPI (M)
in West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh
and Jammu and Kashmir. Though the United Front Government of West Bengal, heade
d by the CPI (M) was able to contain the rebellion within 72 days
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using all repressive measures possible, these units had a formal meeting in Nove
mber 1967, as a result of which the All India Coordination Committee of Communis
t Revolutionaries (AICCCR) was formed in May 1968. ‘Allegiance to the armed strugg
le and non-participation in the elections’ were the two cardinal principles that t
he AICCR adopted for its operations. However, differences cropped up over how an
armed struggle should be advanced and this led to the exclusion of a section of
activists from Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal, led respectively by T. Nagi Redd
y and Kanhai Chatterjee. On the question of the ‘annihilation of the class enemy’, t
he Kanhai Chatterjee group had serious objections, as they were of the view that
the annihilation of the class enemy should only be undertaken after building up
mass agitations. However, a majority in the AICCCR rejected this and the AICCCR
went ahead with the formation of the Communist Party of India (MarxistLeninist)
in May 1969. This led Chatterjee to join the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC). The
CPI (M-L) held its first congress in 1970 in Kolkata and Charu Mazumdar was for
mally elected its general secretary. Since then, both the CPI (M-L) and the MCC
continued with their respective forms of armed struggle for the next couple of y
ears. During this period, Charu Majumdar became the undisputed Naxalite guru and
with the organizational skills of Kanu Sanyal and Jaghal Santhal, the movement
spread to different corners of the country. The country witnessed the euphoria o
f a Maoist revolution. However, it was far more shortlived than expected. What w
as generally perceived by Indian as well as Chinese Communist revolutionaries as
the final enactment of the revolution, in reality, proved to be no more than a
dress rehearsal. As hundreds of CPI (ML) cadres lost their lives, and thousands
were put behind bars, the movement witnessed confusion, splits and disintegratio
n. Charu Majumdar’s
larger-than-life image also had its negative impact, for after his death in 1972
, the central leadership of CPI (ML) virtually collapsed. The history of the Nax
al movement postCharu Mazumdar, is characterized by a number of splits, brought
about by personalized and narrow perceptions about the Maoist revolutionary line
and attempts at course-correction by some of the major groups. Even Kanu Sanyal
, one of the founders of the movement, could not escape this. He gave up the pat
h of "dedicated armed struggle" by 1977 and accepted parliamentary practice as a
form of revolutionary activity. It was during 1974 that an influential group of
the CPI (ML), led by Jauhar (Subrata Dutt), Nagbhushan Pattnaik and Vinod Mishr
a, launched a major initiative, which they termed ‘course-correction’. This group re
named itself the CPI (M-L) Liberation in 1974, and in 1976, during the Emergency
, adopted a new line that called for the continuation of armed guerilla struggle
s along with efforts to form a broad antiCongress democratic front, consisting e
ven non-communist parties. The group also suggested that pure military armed str
uggle should be limited and there should be greater emphasis on mass peasant str
uggles, in an attempt to provide an Indianized version of Marxism-Leninism- Maoi
sm. However, during the next three years, the movement suffered further splits w
ith leaders, such as Kondapalli Seetharamaiah (Andhra Pradesh) and N. Prasad (Bi
har) dissociating themselves from the activities of the party. This led to Prasa
d forming the CPI (M-L) (Unity Organization) and Seetharamaiah started the Peopl
e s War Group (PWG) in 1980. While Seetharamaiah s line sought to restrict the ‘an
nihilation of class enemies’, the PWG s emphasis was on building mass organization
s, not developing a broad democratic front.
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Since then, the principal division within the Naxalite movement has been between
the two lines of thought and action, as advanced by the CPI (ML) Liberation and
the PWG. While Liberation branded PWG a group of "left adventurists”, the PWG cas
tigated the Liberation group as one of the "revisionists" imitating the CPI (M).
On the other hand, the growth of MCC as a major armed group in the same areas,
created the scope for multifarious organizational conflicts among the Naxal grou
ps. Liberation took a theoretical stand of correcting the past mistake of ‘complet
ely rejecting parliamentary politics’. On the other hand, PWG and MCC completely r
ejected the parliamentary democratic system of governance and vowed to wage ‘peopl
e’s war for people’s government’. In the process, while the Liberation group registere
d its first electoral victory in Bihar in 1989; Naxalite factions such as the CP
I (M-L) New Democracy, the CPI (ML) S.R. Bhajjee Group and the CPI (M-L) Unity I
nitiative, emerged in the state. The following years witnessed certain distinct
phenomena in the history of the Naxal movement. First, the intraorganizational c
onflict and rivalry among different groups touched several high points, resultin
g in the loss of a considerable number of cadres of rival groups. Secondly, desp
ite the large-scale inner conflicts, there were always ongoing efforts at variou
s levels to strive for unity. Thirdly, 1990 onwards, the affected state register
ed a considerable increase in the number of violent incidents and at the same ti
me, a considerable change in the policy approach of the government was also witn
essed. While the Naxal movement has mostly been characterized by fragmented grou
ps and innumerable splits; successive governments at the national and state leve
ls were never able to follow a uniform approach to deal with the problem of Naxa
lism, thus, leading to a marked impact in the growth of the Naxal movement.
There are three broad currents of the Naxal movement. For reasons which will bec
ome obvious from the following discussion, this paper will examine the Communist
Party of India (ML) Liberation, Peoples War Group (PWG), Maoist Communist Centr
e (MCC) and the Communist Party of India (Maoist). It will examine the circumsta
nces in which these groups were formed, their ideological bases and programmes,
and the similarities and dissimilarities between them. The paper, in particular,
will look into different aspects of organizational politics in relation to thes
e Maoist organizations and try to locate their impact on the course of the conte
mporary Naxal movement. The following are the main issues on which there appear
to be considerable differences among the Naxal groups and which are primary caus
es of conflict between them. • The analysis of the first phase (196771) of the Nax
alite movement and the line of annihilation that was followed The position that
armed struggle is the principal form of struggle and the armed guerilla squad, t
he primary unit of struggle Since the principal form of struggle is armed strugg
le, the entire activity of the agrarian struggle should be underground Whether t
he contradiction between feudalism and the Indian masses is the principal contra
diction in Indian society or whether India has emerged as a capitalist state and
hence, the contradiction between capitalism and general public is the principal
contradiction Whether it would be prudent to form a united front with various f
orces and movements like the dalit,
•
•
•
•
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farmers’, ethnic and regional, and ecological movements etc.2 However, these are n
ot the only issues; several other issues pertaining to groundlevel reality and c
ontrol of territory are crucially linked to the functioning of Naxalite organiza
tions.
Prakash Louis, People Power: The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar (New Delhi:
Wordsmiths, 2002) p. 277.
2
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Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation
Historically, the origin of CPI (ML) Liberation dates back to 1974. However, the
post-emergency phase of 1977, when most leaders of the Communist movement were
released from jail was the time when the activities of Liberation first came to
notice. The Party Central Committee (PCC), in a move to unite the splinter group
s which owed their origin to CPI (ML), called a meeting during 30 January-2 Febr
uary 1981. However, the meet did not deliver expected results. “From this point on
wards whereas the PCC group goes on to become irrelevant and splits up into vari
ous factions, the M-L movement begins to polarize between the Marxist-Leninist l
ine of CPI (ML) (Liberation) and the anarchist line of CPI (ML) (People s War).”3
During 1982, the Indian People s Front (IPF) was launched in New Delhi at a nati
onal conference. In due course, IPF became the party s open political platform,
actively intervening in national politics. Same year, the Third Party Congress t
ook place at Giridih, Bihar, where the issue of participation in elections was f
inalized. This shift in the outlook of CPI (ML) Liberation proved to be vital in
designing the subsequent course of activity of the Naxal movement. The Liberati
on group, according to Bhatia, “considers itself the true inheritor of the CPI (ML
) legacy, its political line has changed dramatically from that of the original
CPI (ML).”4 With this strategic shift in functioning, the CPI (ML) Liberation reco
rded its first electoral victory under the banner of the IPF in 1989 and Ara (on
e Lok Sabha Constituency in Central Bihar) sent the first "Naxalite" member to P
arliament.5 In a special conference convened in July 1990, the party decided to
resume open functioning. This decision was formalized at its fifth Congress in D
ecember 1992. In 1994, the Indian People’s Front was disbanded. The Election Commi
ssion recognized the party in 1995, and since then the CPI (ML) has been contest
ing successive elections at national and state levels. The CPI (ML) Liberation,
though functioning over ground within the parliamentary democratic setup, has no
t completely disbanded the path of armed rebellion. “The Party does not rule out t
he possibility that under a set of exceptional national and international circum
stances, the balance of social and political forces may even permit a relatively
peaceful transfer of central power to revolutionary forces. But in a country wh
ere democratic institutions are based on essentially fragile and narrow foundati
ons and where even small victories and partial reforms can only be achieved and
maintained on the strength of mass militancy, the party of the proletariat must
prepare itself for winning the ultimate decisive victory in an armed revolution.
A people s democratic front and a people s army, therefore, remain the two most
fundamental weapons of revolution in the arsenal of the Party.”6 This again point
s to the dilemmas within the ultra left movement, which is very often reflected,
in the unpredictable character of the Naxal movement.
Thirty Years of Naxalbari, an un-dated publication of CPI (ML) Liberation. Bela
Bhatia, Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar, Economic and Political Weekly, April
9 2005.
4
3
5 6
History of Naxalism, Hindustantimes.com
A Party document of CPI (ML) Liberation titled The General Programme.
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.
People’s War Group (PWG)
PWG is the most important among all the splinter groups representing the Naxal m
ovement because the dominant line within the Naxal politics today, is the PWG li
ne of thought. Though it is popularly known as PWG or PW, its official nomenclat
ure is Communist Party of India––MarxistLeninist (People’s War). If today, Naxalism is
considered as the greatest internal security problem and Naxals claim to be run
ning parallel government in different parts of the country, its credit mostly go
es to the PWG. “The CPI (ML) (People’s War) was formed on Lenin’s birth anniversary on
April 22, 1980.”7 Kondapalli Seetharamaiah, one of the most influential Naxalite
leaders from Andhra Pradesh and a member of the erstwhile Central Organizing Com
mittee of the Communist Party of India––MarxistLeninist (CPI-ML), is the founding fa
ther of the PWG; who later, was ironically expelled from the group. “The programme
of our Party has declared that India is a vast ‘semi-colonial and semifeudal coun
try’, with about 80 per cent of our population residing in our villages. It is rul
ed by the big-bourgeois big landlord classes, subservient to imperialism. The co
ntradiction between the alliance of imperialism, feudalism and compradorbureaucr
at- capitalism on the one hand and the broad masses of the people on the other i
s the principal contradiction in our country. Only a successful People’s Democrati
c Revolution i.e. New Democratic Revolution and the establishment of People’s Demo
cratic Dictatorship of the workers, peasants, the middle classes and national bo
urgeoisie under the leadership of the working class can lead to the liberation o
f
7
our people from all exploitation and the dictatorship of the reactionary ruling
classes and pave the way for building Socialism and Communism in our country, th
e ultimate aim of our Party. People’s War based on Armed Agrarian Revolution is th
e only path for achieving people’s democracy i.e. new democracy, in our country.”8 R
ejecting the parliamentary democratic system of the country and branding individ
ual annihilation as individual terrorism, PWG declared that people’s war was the o
nly path to bringing about a people’s government in the country. From the above qu
ote from an important PWG party document, it is clear that there were organizati
onal, strategic and tactical conflicts going on within the CPI (ML), which paved
the way for the split and creation of a more radical party. Broadly speaking, t
he party programmes of CPI (ML) Liberation were mostly focused on the cause of p
easants, while the group led by K. Seetharamaih wanted the party to be a platfor
m for peasants, workers, tribal and other weaker sections of society. It was the
prime agenda of Liberation to build up a political front focusing on peasant st
ruggles, whereas PWG was more interested in the formation of mass organizations
instead of any democratic front. One of the renowned guerrilla leaders of the er
stwhile PWG summarizes the essence of the conflict between CPI (ML) Liberation a
nd CPI (ML) People’s War. “In the Liberation group, which at one time was one of the
strong groups defending Charu Mazumdar’s revolutionary line, after the martyrdom
of
8
30 years of Naxalbari, An undated Maoist literature, Vanguard Publication, p.30.
Vanguard was the organ of PWG.
‘Path of People’s War in India – Our Tasks!’, a comprehensive PWG party document highlig
hting its aims, objectives and strategies. The document was adopted by All-India
Party Congress, 1992. We obtained this document from one of the principal ideol
ogue of the PWG.
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Com. Johar, with the leadership falling into the hands of Vinod Mishra, they beg
an betraying the Indian revolution. As part of a conspiratorial plan, a once rev
olutionary party was gradually changed into a revisionist party, like the CPI an
d CPM. The armed resistance struggles against the state’s attacks, taking place un
der the then leadership of Liberation, was ended. The armed struggle to crush th
e feudal private armies was made a secondary task. In this way, they diverted th
e entire group away from the basic path outlined by the unified CPI (ML), and pa
rticularly of its founder, Com. CM — that of protracted people’s war — into becoming a
gents of the ruling classes, by surrendering them to the parliamentary path. The
y converted the Com. Johar-led Liberation, from being a revolutionary movement,
into a legalist, reformist and parliamentary movement; and changed the undergrou
nd organization into an open opportunist and revisionist organization.”9 The above
two official statements of the PWG clearly suggest that the birth of PWG which
resulted from a split within the CPI (ML-Liberation) was on account of the dynam
ics of conflict among a host of its cadres. For a considerable period after its
birth, PWG’s activities were chiefly limited to Andhra Pradesh, while the CPI (ML)
Liberation continued to hold its turf in Bihar. It was during this period that
another organization came into existence on 1 January 1982. It was named the Com
munist party of India (ML) Party Unity, which came into existence due to a merge
r between CPI (ML) Unity Organizations and Central organizing Committee CPI (ML)
. Hereafter, left-wing extremism in India witnessed some of the worst-ever confl
icts which again forced many organizations to take a position and adopt new tact
ics. Bihar has always remained a strong battleground of Naxal
Sharvan, the then Secretary Bihar State Committee of CPI (ML) Peoples War, in an
interview given to People’s March, Volume 2, No. 3, March 2001.
9
operations and ironically, in Bihar, most of the clashes were between CPI (ML) P
arty Unity and CPI (ML) Liberation. When these conflicts were taking a toll on t
he cadres on both sides, another development was simultaneously taking place. In
August 1998, Party Unity merged with CPI (ML) People’s War Group and the group ca
me to be known as People’s War. “The merger of the two parties is the culmination of
the unity process which began in March 93 and continued for over five years du
ring which differences on several political, ideological and organizational ques
tions were resolved through thread-bare discussion.”10 The statement continues, “The
emergence of the united Party -- the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist
) [People s War] -does not mark the completion of the process of unification of
the genuine communist revolutionary forces in India. The newly Unified Party wil
l continue its efforts in right earnest to achieve this unification. We also cal
l upon the other genuine revolutionary elements in the various M-L parties in In
dia who are being led astray by both right and left opportunist leadership, to f
ight against these deviations and rally under the banner of the United Party. Th
e United Party pledges itself to avenge the death of thousands of martyrs who fe
ll in the course of the ongoing democratic revolution in India paved with blood
by these martyrs until their cherished goals are accomplished. This is the era o
f Revolutions.”11 With this merger, the PWG became a force to reckon with in Bihar
and in other areas where PU had a presence. Further developments suggest that w
ith the merger, the element of armed rebellion of the Naxal movement became stro
nger, while on the
People’s War literature titled ‘Joint Declaration by Communist Party of India (ML) P
eople’s War and CPI (ML) (Party Unity)’, August 1998.
11 10
Ibid.
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other hand, with its parliamentary practices, Liberation was loosing its turf to
PWG. Liberation, which once controlled the whole of central Bihar, was now loos
ing its territory and supporters to PWG and MCC. Not only in Bihar, but also els
ewhere, Liberation was systematically shrinking on the map of Naxalite politics.
By advocating electoral methods and not being able to make an impressive mark,
the Liberation’s way of movement became weak and the PWG’s armed operations started
gaining momentum. So while the Liberation, with its changed modus operandi was b
eing reduced to a small political party, the PWG in the same period, managed to
register its presence outside Andhra Pradesh and gradually gained strongholds in
different areas of Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Chattisgarh, and M
aharashtra. While the conflict between PU and Liberation made both groups suffer
the loss of considerable numbers of their cadres; as already stated, it also re
sulted in the merger of PU and PWG and ultimately the violent consolidation of t
he movement. The formation of People’s War also resulted in tactical changes in se
veral aspects of the Naxal movement in general. ‘In our agenda for a new democrati
c revolution, there are two aspects -- the agrarian revolution and fight for nat
ionality.’12 This statement shows the amount of organizational change witnessed by
the Naxal movement in all those years. In 1967 it started in the name of ‘agraria
n revolution’, which gradually took the stance of replacing the parliamentary form
of government; but the question of nationality was never raised. This reflects
the pattern of conflict between PW and Liberation. By questioning ‘nationality’, PW
wanted to make it clear that it wanted a broad revolutionary pattern and while ‘la
nd
12
to tillers’ could be a programme, it could not become the sole agenda of the revol
ution. Between 15-30 November 1995, the PW conducted an All India Special Confer
ence in some unknown locality of Dandakaranya. There, it adopted two important p
arty documents. The ‘Party Programme’ as adopted in the Conference reads, “India is a
semi-feudal, semi-colonial society; here the New Democratic Revolution (NDR) has
to be completed victoriously paving way to the Socialist Revolution and to adva
nce towards the ultimate goal of Communism. The Indian people are weighed down b
y three big mountains: feudalism, imperialism and comprador bureaucrat capital;
these are the targets to be overthrown in the present stage of NDR. The four maj
or contradictions in the present-day Indian society are: the contradiction betwe
en feudalism and the broad masses; the contradiction between imperialism and the
Indian people; the contradiction between capital and labour and the contradicti
on within the ruling classes. While the first two are fundamental contradictions
to be resolved through the NDR, the contradiction between feudalism and the bro
ad masses is the principal contradiction at the present stage. India is a multi-
national country--a prison-house of nationalities and all the nationalities have
the right to self-determination including secession. When NDR is victoriously c
ompleted, India will become a voluntary and genuine federation of all national p
eople s republics.”13 The second document, which was adopted in the conference, wa
s the document on the Strategy and Tactics . It reads, “The political
13 This report on the Special conference was posted in a website (www. cpimlpwg/
repression.html) which claimed itself as the unofficial website of PW. The websi
te has been withdrawn. During its existence the site claimed it to be the unoffi
cial website of PWG. But during my interaction with many PW rank and file I foun
d that it was no less then their official website.
Interview of Muppalla Lakshmana Rao alias Ganapathy, the then head of the Commun
ist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist People s War. http://www.rediff.com/news/199
8/oct/07gana.htm
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strategy to be pursued in the present stage of NDR in India is one of forming a
broad united front of all the anti-feudal, antiimperialist forces--the working c
lass, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie--under t
he leadership of the working class to overthrow the common enemies--feudalism, i
mperialism and comprador bureaucratic capital. The military strategy or the path
of Indian Revolution is the path of protracted people s war i.e., liberating th
e countryside first through area wise seizure of power establishing guerilla zon
es and base areas and then encircling the cities and finally capturing power thr
oughout the country. The unevenness in the economic, social and political develo
pment of Indian society calls for different tactics i.e., forms of struggle and
organization, to be pursued in different regions of the country, while the polit
ical tactic line throughout the country remains the same. In urban areas the pol
itical and mass work should be carried out observing utmost precaution and the o
rganizational work should proceed keeping in view the long-range perspective. Ca
ste is a peculiar problem in India; and appropriate forms of organization and st
ruggle should be evolved vigorously to fight out untouchability, caste discrimin
ation and to finally root out the caste system. The tactics of boycott of electi
ons have to be pursued for a long time in the prevailing conditions in India; an
d participating in parliamentary and assembly elections under any pretext only w
eakens the class struggle.”14 These two documents, containing different organizati
onal aspects of PW, make a clearcut demarcation for the issues pertaining to org
anizational conflict between the Liberation and PW. The People’s War, on the basis
of its assessment of the people’s level of preparedness for an armed struggle, di
scarded ‘annihilation of class enemies’ as the only form of struggle and stressed in
stead, on floating mass organizations. It established several front organization
s.
14
During the 1980s, the Radical Students’ Union and Rayatu Kuli Sangham emerged as o
rganizations with an impressive mass following and most of the PWG’s present base
and political cadres developed through that practice. However, during the 1990s,
the growth of militarization became the characteristic feature of the PWG. The
formation of People’s Guerrilla Army (PGA), special guerrilla squads, Permanent Ac
tion Team (PAT) and Special Action Team (SAT) were the distinctive features of P
WG activities for quite some time, before it merged with MCC to form the CPI (Ma
oist).15
15 In response to a government decision to launch coordinated action against the
Naxalites by police forces of the various Indian States affected by Naxal viole
nce, the PWG formed the PGA, its military wing in December 2000 by reorganizing
its guerrilla force. The PGA functions under a single operational command, the C
entral Military Commission. In the Indian State where the PGA has a presence, th
ere is a State Military Commission and in special guerrilla zones there is a Zon
al Military Commission. A Regional Military Commission supervises a group of Sta
te Military Commissions or Zonal Military Commission Each Regional Military Comm
ission reports to the Central Military Commission. All armed cadre of the PWG ar
e organized under the PGA. Ref: “People s Guerrilla Army”,
Ibid.
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terror istoutfits/peoples_guerrill
a_arms_left_wing_extre mists.htm
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Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) & Communist Party of India (Maoist)
The next important group within the broad spectrum of the Naxal movement is the
Maoist Communist Centre (MCC). It stands apart from a number of organizations, s
ince, conventionally speaking, it was never a part of the CPI (ML), which many c
laim as the mother of all Naxal organizations. “The MCC, while supporting the Naxa
lbari struggle, did not join the CPI (ML) because of some tactical differences a
nd on the question of Party formation.”16 The MCC was formed on 20 October 1969, a
round the same time that the CPI (ML) was formed, although during those days it
was known as Dakshin Desh. It was in 1975 that the group renamed itself the Maoi
st Communist Centre. In 2003, MCC merged with the Revolutionary Communist Centre
of India-Maoists (RCCI-M) to form the Maoist Communist Centre-India (MCC-I). Ri
ght from its inception, the MCC stood for taking up armed struggle as the main f
orm of resistance and waging a protracted people s war as the central task of th
e party. This position of the MCC has been repeatedly expressed and emphasized i
n a multitude of Maoist literature. “This armed revolutionary war is the war of th
e armed people themselves; it is Protracted People s War as shown by Mao Tse T
ung. The concrete economic and political condition of India leads to the very co
nclusion that the path shown by the great leader and teacher, Mao Tse Tung, the
path of the Chinese Revolution, that is, and to establish a powerful people s ar
my and people s militia and to establish dependable, strong and self-sufficient
base areas in the countryside, to constantly consolidate and expand the people s
army and the base areas, gradually to encircle the urban areas from the country
side by liberating the countryside, finally to capture the cities and
16
to establish the state system and political authority of the people themselves b
y decisively destroying the state power of the reactionaries -- this very path o
f the protracted People s War is the only path of liberation of the people of In
dia, the path of victory of the new democratic revolution."17 Communist Party of
India (Maoist) The Naxal movement in India entered yet another phase of organiz
ational transformation with the merger of two of the principal armed organizatio
ns, viz. People’s War (PW) and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCC-I), which
resulted in the formation of the Communist Party of India (Maoist). “The formatio
n of the unified Communist Party of India (Maoist) is a new milestone in the his
tory of the revolutionary communist movement of India. A unified Maoist party ba
sed on Marxism-Leninism-Maoism is a long delayed and highly cherished need of th
e revolutionary minded and oppressed people of the country, including all our ra
nks, and also all the Maoist forces of South Asia and internationally. Now, this
long-aspired desire and dream has been transformed into a reality.”18 This statem
ent, made by the first Secretary of CPI (Maoist) Ganapathy, assumes a great deal
of importance as it
Red Star, Special Issue, p. 20. Red Star is the English language organ of the MC
C, as quoted by Aloke Banerjee in a pamphlet titled “Inside MCC Country”, dated June
2003. Red Star was the English language organ of the MCC. Also quoted in ‘MCC Ind
ia Three Decades Leading Battalions of the Poor’, http://www.awtw.org/back_issues/
mcc_india.htm. Though it denies but many treat this as the unofficial organ of t
he Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM.) Ganapathy, in an Interview giv
en on the on the occasion of the formation of CPI (Maoist). People’s March, Vol. 5
, No.11-12, NovemberDecember 2004.
18 17
30 years of Naxalbari, p.36.
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reflects the organizational politics that was going on all these years between t
hese two organizations representing the Naxal movement. The improvised aim of th
e CPI (Maoist) as announced on the occasion of its formation is to establish a c
ompact revolutionary zone, stretching from Nepal to Bihar to Andhra Pradesh and
beyond. While continuing their pursuit of a people’s democracy; the ultimate aim o
f the CPI (Maoist) is to seize power through protracted armed struggle. The pres
s statement, issued on the event of announcing the merger, stated, “The immediate
aim and programme of the Maoist party is to carry on and complete the already on
going and advancing New Democratic Revolution in India as a part of the world pr
oletarian revolution by overthrowing the semi-colonial, semi-feudal system under
the neo-colonial form of indirect rule, exploitation and control. This revoluti
on will remain directed against imperialism, feudalism and comprador bureaucrati
c capitalism. This revolution will be carried out and completed through armed ag
rarian revolutionary war, i.e. protracted people s war with the armed seizure of
power remaining as its central and principal task, encircling the cities from t
he countryside and thereby finally capturing them. Hence, the countryside as wel
l as the PPW (Protracted People s War) will remain as the center of gravity of
the party s work, while urban work will be complimentary to it.”19 According to t
he same press release, the CPI-Maoists “will still seek to unite all genuine Maois
t groups that remain outside this unified party."20
It is important to examine the significance of the merger, particularly when ear
lier attempts had been unsuccessful. In fact, the merger is largely being seen a
s a result of the gradual convergence of views of these two groups on areas such
as the role of the party, approaches to revolution and adoption of strategies a
nd tactics. In the formative years, Charu Mazumdar and Kanhai Chatterjee represe
nted two irreconcilably different lines and approaches to ‘revolution’. At the time
of the formation of the Communist Party of India (MarxistLeninist) CPI-ML in 196
9, the Dakshin Desh (the earlier form of the MCC), remained opposed to the proce
ss due to sharp differences with the CPI-ML over issues such as the formation of
a communist party, existence of revolutionary mass struggle and preparedness of
the people to participate in it. The joint press statement released by the erst
while General Secretaries of PW and MCC (I) highlighted the essence of the merge
r. “In the past history there were many splits within the M-L movement. But splits
are only one side of the coin; the brighter side was that there were continuous
efforts to unify the revolutionaries. The CPI (ML) (PU), though it had its orig
ins in Bengal, it spread and strengthened by unifying several revolutionary grou
ps. The CPI (ML) (PW), though it originated in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, it
unified with revolutionaries in almost all the states where it was working. The
MCC too, had originated in Bengal, unified many revolutionaries groups in it in
many States and became the MCCI.”21 This statement underlines the continuous proc
ess of organizational politics within the broad spectrum of the Naxal movement,
which resulted from organizational conflict. Looking back, the need for a joint,
unified platform was felt by the leadership of both
Ganapathy, in an Interview given on the on the occasion of the formation of CPI
(Maoist). People’s March, Vol. 5, No.11-12, NovemberDecember 2004.
21
19
“Maoist-Influenced Revolutionary Organizations in India” available at <http://www.ma
ssline.info/India /Indian_Groups.htm> “Maoist-Influenced Revolutionary Organizatio
ns in India” available at <http://www.massline.info/India /Indian_Groups.htm>
20
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the parties as early as 1981. “The PW and MCC began unity talks from their very fi
rst meeting in 1981. However, the reason for the delay in the process was the la
ck of continuity of leadership. The arrest of Comrade Kondapally Seetaramaiah (K
S), the leader of the PW, and later the internal crisis of the PW and split in t
he Central Committee (CC) delayed the unity process for several years. In the ea
rly eighties, the MCC lost its two top leaders Comrades Amulya Sen (AS) and Kanh
ai Chatterjee (KC), which had some negative impact, resulting in further delay i
n the unity process.”22 However, this is not to suggest that the formation of the
CPI (Maoist) was the final stage of the Naxal movement. As one official Maoist d
ocument puts it, “Revolutions never proceed in a straight line. The history of all
successful revolutions shows this. The path is zig zag, there are ups and downs
, there is victory and defeat repeated a number of times.....before final victor
y. Of course, there is no final victory until the stage of communism is reached.”2
3 The above-mentioned analysis makes the forceful plea that since the Naxal move
ment is essentially a political problem, it needs to be examined from the perspe
ctive of organizational politics. From the above discussion we can derive the fo
llowing conclusions. First, the history of the Naxal movement is the history of
a continuous process of organizational conflicts, splits, and mergers. Second, t
he movement essentially represents simultaneous, though not necessarily peaceful
coexistence of many streams; and looking from this angle, the movement can be s
aid to have its presence in all parts of
22 23
the country. Third, the growth of the Naxal movement is closely linked with the
ongoing process of organizational conflict. This is because the ultimate politic
al objective behind all organizational exercise, as reflected by the statements
of various senior Naxalite leaders, is to build a leftist alternative and mobili
ze people against increased ‘imperialist intervention’ and ‘proimperialist policies’ pur
sued by the union government, in support of ‘revolutionary war’ based on the Chinese
leader, Mao’s theory of organized peasant insurrection. Similarly, the history of
the naxal movement, right from its first phase of 1967, demonstrates that even
if there has been a continuous evolution in terms of their understanding of the
Indian situation, the focus of the movement, its character, and the fighting cap
abilities and financial resources of these groups; they have remained more or le
ss consistent as far as their core ideology is concerned. Barring the Liberation
, they all reject the parliamentary system of governance and want to bring about
a fundamental change in the nature of the Indian state. For this, they have ado
pted the strategy of protracted armed struggle, which entails building bases in
rural and remote areas and transforming them first into guerrilla zones and then
liberated zones, besides area-wise seizures and encirclement of cities and fina
lly, the seizure of political power and achievement of nation-wise victory. Four
th, the history of the movement so far, has been the history of conflicts and sp
lits. However, one cannot deny that its history is also one of mergers.24
Ibid.
State Repression, this is the title of the document which was posted at www. cpi
mlpwg/repression.html. The website now has been withdrawn. During its existence
the site claimed it to be the unofficial website of PWG. But during my interacti
on with many PW rank and file I found that it was the official website.
For more information on integrated checkposts, see the website of the Ministry o
f Home Affairs (http://mha.gov.in/BM_Div/BM_IntCheck(E).pdf).
24
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naxalism_1
History, Evolution and Activities of Salwa Judum In as much as it is important t
o look at the status of Salwa Judum currently, the manner of its conception is a
particularly relevant in understanding the extent to which it may be considered
a spontaneous people’s movement. Salwa Judum is not the first attempt at armed mo
bilization against the Naxalites in Chhattisgarh. Throughout the 1990’s there were
several instances Chinmay in which groups that were fed up
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2
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naxalism_1
Preface
Since June 2005, Dantewada District (formerly part of Bastar district), Chhattis
garh, has been in the news for an alleged uprising of adivasis against the Commu
nist Party of India (Maoist). Most media and official reports described this mov
ement, known as Salwa Judum, as a spontaneous and self-initiated reaction to ‘Maoi
st oppression’, and hailed it as a turning point in the fight against Naxalism. At
the same time, a few reports indicated that people had been displaced in large
numbers and were living in miserable conditions in camps. While this was officia
lly attributed to Maoist threats and retaliation against those joining the Salwa
Judum, stray news also came in about the forcible emptying out of villages as p
art of the government’s anti-Maoist policy, and of excesses committed by members o
f the Salwa Judum and security forces. A fourteen-member team from five organiza
tions conducted an investigation between 28 November and 1 December 2005 in Bija
pur and Bhairamgarh blocks of Dantewada district, focusing specifically on the v
iolation of human rights and the impact on people’s everyday lives. The organisati
ons are: People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) Chhattisgarh, People’s Union For
Civil Liberties (PUCL) Jharkhand, People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) Delh
i, Association for the Protection of Democratic Rights (APDR) West Bengal, and I
ndian Association of People’s Lawyers (IAPL). The information in this report is ba
sed on: a) Discussions with government officials and paramilitary forces; b) int
erviews with people in Bhairamgarh, Matwada, Meertur and Gangaloor camps; c) dis
cussions with people we met in villages that we visited, d) interviews with lead
ers and members of the Salwa Judum; and e) discussions with fact-finding members
of a CPI team. We have also relied on the CPI’s Open Letter to the Prime Minister
dated 16 November 2005, detailing their findings, two CPI (Maoist) press releas
es dated 10 October 2005 and 20 November 2005, and their Dandakaranya Special Zo
nal Committee newsletter, Prabhat, dated July-December 2005, as well as press cl
ippings from June 2005 till the present. On the basis of the fact-finding, three
facts stood out strongly, all of which ran counter to the government’s assertions
: First, it is clear that the Salwa Judum is not a spontaneous people’s movement,
but a state-organized anti-insurgency campaign. Second, it is misleading to desc
ribe the situation as simply one where ordinary villagers are caught between the
Maoists and the military. The Maoists have widespread support and as long as pe
ople continued to live in the villages, it was difficult for the government to i
solate the Maoists. Rather than questioning its own nonperformance on basic deve
lopment, the government has resorted to clearing villages on a large scale. Tens
of thousands of people are now refugees in temporary roadside camps or living w
ith relatives with complete disruption of their daily lives. Prospects for their
return are currently dim. Third, the entire operation, instead of being a ‘peace
mission’ as it is claimed, has escalated violence on all sides. However, only the
murders by Maoists are recognized, and the Salwa Judum and paramilitary operate
with complete impunity. The rule of law has completely broken down.
3
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Contents
Chapter 1. The Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. Dantewada: Region and its People 2. Natur
al Resources and the Rhetoric of Development 3. Political Movements a. The Maois
t Movement b. Jan Jagran Abhiyan 1. The Emergence of the Salwa Judum 2. Mode of
Operation of the Salwa Judum 3. Attacks by Salwa Judum 4. CPI (Maoist)’s Violence
5. Displacement and Life in Camps 6. Non-registration of FIRs and Atrocities by
Security Forces 7. The Breakdown of Civil Administration 5 7 9 10 11 14 18 19 22
24 25 28
Chapter II. Salwa Judum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Chapter III. ‘Undeclared War’: The Militarization of Adivasi Society . . . . . . 29
Chapter IV. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 List of boxes 1. Deaths Due to Hunger and
Malnutrition 2. Indian Reserve Battalions 3. Malik Makbuja Scam 4. Mahendra Karm
a’s Colourful Career 5. The Ban on Sale of Tendu patta 6. Case of Kamlesh Paikra:
Threat to Independent Journalists 7. Excerpts from Home Ministry’s Annual Report 2
004-05 8. Excerpts from District Collector’s Work Proposal for Salwa Judum 2005 An
nexures I. Killings by the Security Forces/ Salwa Judum II. Killings by Maoists
during the Salwa Judum Operations 38 40 7 9 10 12 16 27 30 32
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naxalism_1
CHAPTER ONE
1. Dantewada: Region and Its People
Dantewada district, situated at the southern tip of Chhattisgarh, has borders wi
th Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Orissa, and was part of Bastar kingdom till 1
947. After independence, it was merged with Kanker kingdom to form Bastar, the l
argest district (39,114 sq km) in the state of Madhya Pradesh. In 1998, Bastar w
as divided into three districts, Kanker, Bastar and Dantewada, and in 2001 all t
hree districts became part of the newly formed state of Chhattisgarh. Recently,
Bijapur has been carved out as a new police district in Dantewada. With a popula
tion of 7.91 lakh, Dantewada district has the lowest population density in the s
tate at 40.8 persons per square kilometre (2001 census). Topographically, the re
gion is composed of an undulating plateau, with hill ranges cut by a number of r
ivulets that flow into the Indravati river. These riverbeds provide the space fo
r most rural settlements. Godavari and Mahanadi are two major rivers that arise
from the Bastar uplands. The district is divided into four tehsils: Bhopalpatnam
, Bijapur, Dantewada and Konta. The Salwa Judum and police operations originated
in Bijapur tehsil, but have now spread to Konta. The people inhabiting the dist
rict are predominantly tribal – mostly Maria Gonds and Dorla – accounting for 82% of
the rural population. Scheduled Castes account for about 3% of the population a
nd the rest are OBC communities like the Sundis, Kallars etc. A number of immigr
ants, mostly traders, but also lower level officials, school teachers, health wo
rkers etc., have settled in the small market towns like Bijapur, Sukma, Konta an
d Dantewada. The Bailadilla mines hardly employed any local adivasis, with the r
esult that the mining town of Kirandul is a non-tribal enclave, with little conn
ection to the surrounding countryside. This picture of a large number of fairly
small tribal villages, and a few large villages, with non-tribal households is s
upported by the cen-
The Background
sus data. Of the 1220 villages in the district, 455 are wholly tribal and anothe
r 458 are more than 90 per cent tribal, i.e. 75 per cent of the district’s village
s are almost completely tribal. Only 76 villages, or approximately 6 per cent of
the total, have less than 50% tribal population. The larger villages serve as l
ocal markets and it is these that tend to have greater non-tribal populations. A
bout 38 per cent of the rural area in the district is outside the village and pa
rt of ‘forest’ land. The 2001 Census states these forests have 202 villages, of whic
h about 90 are inhabited. What is pertinent is that these villages have no land
rights and are at the mercy of the forest department. [Dantewada has one Nationa
l Park (Indravati) and two wildlife sanctuaries (Bhairamhgarh and Pamed)]. Other
than these, the rest of the villages occupy 62% of the district, but again 46%
of this is also designated as ‘forest’. Hence in total, about two-thirds of the dist
rict belongs to the Forest Department, at least on paper. Some of these forest a
reas may have been village lands earlier. For instance, in the areas under the B
hopalpatnam and Kutru zamindaris, feudal oppression during colonial times forced
residents to flee their villages. After 1947 and the abolition of Zamindari, th
ese residents came back to find their lands notified as forests. The villagers a
re heavily dependent on both agriculture and forests. Of the total village land,
barely 29% land is cultivated, and as said earlier, nearly half is designated a
s forest and the rest is either uncultivable or is culturable waste. The average
landholding per household (2001 Census) works out to 1.01 hectare, i.e., 2.5 ac
res. Irrigation being by and large absent (barely 2% have some sort of irrigatio
n), only a single crop is possible. The shifting of villages due to economic rea
sons is therefore common. In the 2001 Census, there are 30 such villages that ha
ve become uninhabited (this is in addition to 112 uninhabited forest villages).
Some of these villages continue to practice shifting cultivation in forest areas
, a practice that has been banned by
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the government, except in the Abujhmarh areas to the north of the Indravati. The
land actually under cultivation may be significantly more than these figures su
ggest. Villagers have cleared significant areas designated as forest land within
the village for cultivation. Most of the people own land, thus 84% of the main
workers in rural Dantewada and 55% of the marginal workers are cultivators. Yet,
the paucity of land, and the low yields forces 6% of the main workers and 39% o
f the marginal workers to work as agricultural labour (in all, around 14% of the
total working population). Such employment is provided on the lands of those wh
o own larger and/or more fertile plots. They work either as naukar, i.e. free la
bour obtaining a seasonal wage, or as kabadi, i.e. attached labour with a larger
landowner, getting food in lieu of wages. Such sale and purchase of labour is c
oncentrated in some villages while being wholly absent in most others. Of the di
strict’s 1,220 villages, nearly 400 have no agricultural labourers and in all near
ly 800 villages have less than 10%, while 96 villages have more than 50% agricul
tural labour. Labourers also migrate to neighbouring areas in Andhra Pradesh and
Maharashtra for work. Given the rain-fed agriculture, the collection and sale o
f non-timber forest produce at weekly haats (markets) or to agents is an importa
nt source of local income, a fact that underlines the people’s dependence on the f
orest, and their forced interaction with Forest Department officials and traders
. At the village level, authority and respect is commanded by the patel/pedda/mu
khia (headman) and the priest. In some cases, the same person performed both fun
ctions. The next rung in the structure is the pargan manjhi, the head of a clust
er of villages, a person of considerable clout. The headmen, in many instances,
belong to households that are the oldest residents of the village, or those who
initially set up the village. The process of the shifting of populations led to
later settlements within existing revenue villages, with the newer settlers obta
ining lower amounts of land and less productive lands in
comparison to the earlier settlers. Thus, while cultural practices ensure that e
conomic differences are not visible in dress and size of dwelling, the older pra
ctice of collective labour has now become a means of garnering the labour of the
less well-off by those better-off. Literacy levels are low in rural areas at 29
% for men and 14% for women, with an overall rural literacy rate of 21%. Yet thi
s presents a partial picture. In Bijapur tehsil for instance, there are only 52
villages in which more than 25% of the population is literate, and 35 villages h
ave no literates at all. This is related to the availability and the quality of
schools in the district: out of the 1220 villages, 214 do not have even a primar
y school and, of these, for 107 villages the school is more than 5 kilometres aw
ay. The presence of a school building in the village, moreover, does not ensure
that teachers are available. In some cases, teachers use the excuse of the prese
nce of Maoist organisations in the village to remain absent. In any case, with t
he ongoing Salwa Judum, schools have come under attack. Security forces have bee
n using school buildings as temporary camps and Maoists have been blasting these
buildings to prevent security forces from finding pucca shelters in the village
s. The situation is distinctly worse regarding health facilities. Out of the 122
0 villages, there is no medical facility in 1161 villages. A primary health cent
re exists only in 26 villages; a private registered medical practitioner in 17 v
illages, a government subsidised one in 12 and a community health worker in 122
villages. A telling comment on the inadequacy of the health infrastructure and t
he health and well being of the people is provided through the studies conducted
by Chhattisgarh PUCL in earlier years. As early as 1987, an investigation into
repeated reports of blood dysentery in Bastar that claimed many lives each year
revealed that people had very limited access to potable water. A more recent stu
dy during 2004 revealed that things had not really improved very much in the las
t 18 years(See Box 1: Deaths due to Hunger and Malnutrition).
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Box 1
Deaths Due to Hunger and Malnutrition
A team from PUCL Chhattisgarh visited villages Burgum in Kuakopnda block and Hir
pal in Geedam block of Dantewada district following newspaper reports of hunger
deaths in south Bastar during March 2004.The following deaths due to hunger and
malnutrition were documented. Village Burgum Block Kuakonda Dist. Dantewada Bhim
a (7 years) Bidde (1.5 years) Podiya (35 years) Sunil Vinay Kumar Devmati Lassi
Dewa Kosa Esamti Buddhu Anda (55 years) Village Hirpal Block Geedam Dist. Dantew
ada Sukki (60 years) Pidde Bai (20 years) Sunita (9 months) Bachchi (12 days) Ma
ngli (60 years) Village Burgum Block Bastanar Dist. Bastar Pintu (2 years) Manga
y (40 years) Raju (40 years) Machi (2 years) Gonchand (1 year) Dhaniram (7 years
) Dole (60 years) Ayati (35 years) Diwar (2 years) Village Mutanpal Block Bastan
ar Dist. Bastar Sappe (50 years) Jagri (45 years) Laxmi (60 years) Payke (70 yea
rs)
The main findings of the team were: i) In the villages visited there is no effec
tive system of food security. There is no effective infrastructure for agricultu
ral production, and neither is there any other source of employment. So people l
ack the means to obtain the minimum food levels necessary for basic health. Cons
equently, a large proportion of the population is a victim of severe malnutritio
n. ii) There is no access to safe and potable drinking water. Even the water fro
m hand-pumps is contaminated, and foul. Village people are forced to obtain wate
r from small holes dug in riverbeds. Much illness is due to lack of access to sa
fe water. iii) Doctor and paramedical workers are deployed in the villages only
on paper. They do not go to the people. Their behavior is very unsympathetic, an
d often insulting. Their only concern is with their salaries. Some sources sugge
sted that health personnel in the areas under Naxalite influence are reluctant t
o go to villages because if they are residents of these areas, they are suspecte
d by the police of having sympathies for the Naxalites and consequently harassed
.
2. Natural Resources and the Rhetoric of Development
While the people of Dantewada are extremely poor, their land is extremely rich,
both in terms of minerals and forests. When the government talks of ‘development’, i
t appears to have in mind the development of these resources for private profit
as against the development of its people. When organisations and movements have
pointed out that the two are not
synonymous, and that the way mining and other industrial activity has been pract
iced in the past has resulted in the displacement and consequent pauperisation o
f tribals in this region, they are called ‘anti-development’. The earliest commercia
l mining was for iron ore deposits, which are among the best quality in the worl
d. Some of this iron ore is currently mined at the Bailadilla mines at Kirandul/
Bacheli, wholly for export, located in the centre of
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Dantewada district. The only rail line in this region is from the port of Vishak
apatnam to Kirandul. The mines have provided no employment locally, what they ha
ve given the region is pollution of the rivers Sankini and Dankini. A considerab
le amount of iron ore from Bacheli is also illegally sold on the black market. I
n the 1970s, the widespread practice of non-tribal men working in the mines keep
ing adivasi women and then abandoning them was highlighted. Not much has changed
since then. There are also substantial deposits of tin, corundum, granite, lapi
dolite (lithium ore), marble and siliminite. Tin is illegally mined and smelted,
consuming vast amounts of timber for charcoal in the process. The business is r
un by the immigrant settlers who pay bribes to the police in order to conduct th
eir trade. These efforts at exploiting natural resources have gained momentum si
nce the formation of the state of Chhattisgarh in 2001. The new state government
has entered into agreements with several industrial houses such as the Tatas an
d Essar to set up steel plants on land leased from the state. Plans are afoot fo
r intensified mining with the Essar group setting up a pipeline to transport 8 m
illion tonnes of iron ore slurry per annum to the Vishakhapatnam port. A Nationa
l Mining Development Corporation (NMDC) steel plant has already been initiated a
t Nagarnar village in Bastar, despite local protests. Under the Panchayat Extens
ion to Scheduled Areas Act 1996 (PESA), it is necessary to consult the Gram Sabh
a before acquiring land in Fifth Schedule areas. To the contrary, in Nagarnar, t
he government used violence against protestors, and resolutions that were unfavo
urable to the government were simply replaced by pro-plant resolutions in the bo
oks. A sponge iron plant has already come up nearby in Raikot, emitting thick bl
ack fumes into the air. Complaints by the panchayat about the pollution have bee
n ignored. In 1992, when the Bharat Jan Andolan protested against a proposed ste
el plant at Maolibahat village, its leader and former Collector of Bastar, Dr. B
.D. Sharma was
paraded through Jagdalpur with a garland of shoes by BJP activists. The governme
nt is also proposing to revive the Bodhghat Hydroelectric project, which had yea
rs ago been stopped by the Indira Gandhi government following pressure from a lo
cal conservation group, BASCON. The Ministry of Environment and Forests approved
the diversion of 5,734 hectares of forestland for this in February 2004 on the
grounds that compensatory afforestation had already been carried out. The Polava
ram dam in Andhra Pradesh will also submerge some 2,335 families in Konta distri
ct. Other major changes planned for the Bastar-Dantewada region include the Dall
i-Rajhara-Raoghat- Jagdalpur railway line. The Mardum Defence Base and a Jungle
Warfare Training College near Kanker have entrenched a military presence in the
region. The latter has reportedly cut down a large number of trees in the reserv
e forest. But nearly six decades of official boast of ‘development’ has little to sh
ow for it. In fact, while literacy and health indicators are miserable, the one
indicator that is thriving is the ratio of police stations to population. A curs
ory look at the infrastructure for development shows that while Dantewada boasts
of 37 police stations across the district for its 374 panchayats (with 33 new p
olice stations to come up), there are only 26 primary health centers (PHCs), 26
Higher Secondary Schools, and four degree colleges in the district. More money i
s being allocated for security and anti-Naxal operations than for development. A
ccording to the Ministry of Home Affairs’ Annual Report 2004–05, Rs 150 crore will b
e reimbursed to the nine naxal-affected states, Rs 296 crore was released during
2003–04 for the modernisation of police forces in naxal-affected districts, Rs 47
5 crore has been set aside for raising 19 Indian Reserve Battalions (IRBs) (the
cost of raising one IRB is Rs 25 crore), (see Box 2: Indian Reserve Battalions),
Rs 825 crore has been allocated for 55 severely naxal-affected districts under
the Planning Commission’s Backward Districts Initiative for filling in “crit-
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Box 2
India Reserve Battalions
being built through the panchayats, and thus does not even provide local employm
ent. To summarise, the adivasis and other local inhabitants of the region have l
ittle possibility of actual development and are acutely aware of their marginal
and exploited status. For the overwhelming majority in the villages, agriculture
is unviable since plots are small and there is no investment in irrigation, the
re are severe restrictions on the use of forests partly due to the creation of w
ildlife reserves, the prices of forest produce are deliberately kept low by trad
ers and the government, and the government machinery treats them with apathy and
contempt. On the other hand, there is a small minority – mostly trading families,
shopkeepers, members of the bureaucracy, lawyers and others living in the small
towns, and some rich tribal leaders who have gained through politics or corrupt
ion involving illicit felling of trees (see Box 3: Malik Makbuja Scam) who want
large development projects. In a situation where the state claims rights to the
land and the people who live on that land are treated as peripheral to the natio
nal economy, a mass base of the Maoists challenging this status quo forms a thre
at to the state’s plans for heavy industry and profits in this region.
The Government of India raises one or more India Reserve Battalions [IRBs] in ea
ch state. The concept of IRBs was mooted by the Ministry of Home Affairs “in the b
ackground of increasing problems of law and order and emerging internal security
scenario in the country, which put considerable pressure on the Central Police
Forces”. As of 2004-05, there were 85 IRBs in the country, each having 1,007 perso
nnel. These battalions are trained by the CRPF and the BSF in fighting with mode
rn weaponry. The responsibility for recruiting and maintaining these battalions
rests with the state governments, but the central government bears the expenses
towards raising and training its personnel. However, the central government has
the power to deploy the IRBs anywhere on payment to the concerned state. Source:
Ministry of Home Affairs 2004-05. ical gaps in physical and social infrastructu
re” for a period of just one year. For the construction of rural roads, the Minist
ry of Rural Development is to provide Rs 37.5 crore per annum for naxal-affected
areas under the Prime Minister’s Grameen Swarojgar Yojana (PMGSY). Indeed, what p
asses for development in official parlance has a security imprint. The physical
infrastructure to be built includes - other than police stations - roads, bridge
s, etc. While roads, bridges and electrification will no doubt benefit ordinary
people, it is evident that their needs are hardly what is behind the bringing in
of the Border Roads Organisation for building roads in the region. An official
Work Proposal from the Collector’s office states that the real rationale of road b
uilding and widening is to flush the Maoists out from the jungles and make troop
movement in the area easier (Collector’s Work Proposal). The BRO road from Jagdal
pur to Dantewada, for instance, is not
3. Political Movements
The first political mobilisation in the former Bastar district under the aegis o
f a political party took place in the mid-1970s, by the Communist Party of India
(CPI). It created its organisation in the Bailadilla mines, around issues of co
ntrol over mineral resources and work opportunities for locals. The struggle in
the mines was brutally suppressed through state repression, including police fir
ing on protesting workers during 1976-77 that resulted in the death of several w
orkers and members of their families. The movement begun by the CPI spread throu
gh large areas of Bastar and brought the party electoral success in two of the t
hree legislative assembly seats. The other issues taken up by them centred aroun
d the lack of amenities and access to forests. The CPI had for long demanded an
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Box 3
Malik Makbuja Scam
The malik makbuja right refers to the right of peasants to cut trees on their ow
n land. A widespread scam in the 1990s led to the large scale illegal felling of
trees in Bastar. It’s a classic instance of how forest and timber resources in th
e region have been cornered by non-adivasi and adivasi elites. Ostensibly create
d to safeguard the interests of adivasis, the MP Protection of Scheduled Tribes
(Interest in Trees) Act 1956-57 requires the supervision of the sale of felled t
rees by the Collector, with the sale money being deposited in a joint account. H
owever, agents soon took over the process by offering to help adivasis with the
complex paperwork involved, only to cheat them. Timber merchants bought land in
order to fell the trees on it. Since land alienation laws restrict the purchase
of tribal land by non-tribals, timber merchants usually targeted the lands of po
or nontribals. However, rich tribal politicians such as Mahendra Karma were able
to buy land from other tribals as well. Both revenue and forest staff facilitat
ed this. Despite questions raised in the assembly by CPI MLA Manish Kunjam and o
thers, and complaints of the Collector against his own superior for collusion in
the malik makbuja scam, the MP government did nothing. Ekta Parishad and Samaj
Parivartana Samudaya, two local organisations, took the matter to the Supreme Co
urt (WP (Civil) No. 202 of 1995). In 1997, the Court banned all felling in the t
hen Bastar district of Madhya Pradesh. The Lokayukt held an independent enquiry
and the matter was handed over to the CBI. A CBI FIR dated 8.12.1998 states: “The
facts contained in the writ petition, reports of Lok Ayukta and its connected pa
pers, prima facie show that the above-named officials of Govt. of Madhya Pradesh
and land owners namely Mahendra Karma, Rajaram Todem, Suresh Chand Surana, Srin
ivasan Awasthi, Brij Mohan Gupta and others were party of criminal conspiracy du
ring 1992-96 to cause wrongful gain to the land owners in the matter of felling
trees. It is alleged that the accused public servants bestowed undue favours to
the said land owners and others and illegally accorded permission to fell a larg
e number of valuable timber trees on the basis of forged and fabricated document
s and in utter disregard of the provisions of the MP Protection of Aboriginal Tr
ibes (Interest in Trees) Rule 1957 and Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959.” Acc
ording to a CBI letter dated 14.10.1999, FIRs had been filed against ten people
for offences between 1992 and 1996 in 56 villages. However, no further action ha
s been taken against Mahendra Karma or any of the other accused.
autonomous council for the Bastar area to ensure a degree of independence in the
formulation and implementation of development policy. Movements against the dom
inant development paradigm and rampant corruption in the administration continue
d throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Many of these were local in character. These i
ncluded the movement against pine forestation to feed the Ballarshah Paper Indus
tries, the movement of the women of Asna near Jagdalpur against forest enclosure
and monoculture forestry, and the resistance of the tribals of Mawlibhata to a
proposed steel plant on their
land. In recent times, the most serious challenge to the dominant model of devel
opment has come from the CPI (Maoist) formations.
A. THE MAOIST MOVEMENT
The Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh, bordering Dantewada to the South, has a
long history of peasant struggles dating back to the 1940s. By the 1970s, the st
ruggles of the peasantry were led by a number of Marxist-Leninist parties, inclu
ding CPI (ML) People’s War (PWG), a precursor to the CPI (Maoist). Around 1980, PW
G started an organization in the area of present-day Dantewada district, called
the Dandakaranya Adivasi Kisan Mazdoor San-
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gathan (DAKMS). The earliest issues taken up by these organisations revolved aro
und oppression and exploitation by ‘outsiders’, primarily the forest and revenue dep
artments, the police, and moneylenders. They mobilized against the practice of f
orest officials levying fines and demanding illegal payments in money and in kin
d for collection of minor forest produce by locals, for use of village forest ar
eas for cultivation, or felling of trees for house-building. Revenue officials a
lso demanded similar payments for extending cultivation. Crimes listed under the
Forest Act 1980 provided police officials as well the opportunity to extort pou
ltry, meat, liquor and money. The sum total of the payments as well as the recur
rent need of food loans and seed loans led people to moneylenders. Another issue
was the people’s lack of a patta (ownership papers) on the forest lands brought u
nder cultivation, and on all cultivated land in forest villages. Mass organisati
ons such as the Adivasi Kisan Mazdoor Sangathan (AKMS) deployed methods of chasi
ng away forest and revenue officials from villages and attacking forest posts. M
any forest check-posts were abandoned. The organisations spread quickly and cove
red large parts of Konta, Bhopalpatnam and Bijapur tehsils in less than a decade
. By the late 1980s, internal contradictions in adivasi society started being ad
dressed. One of these was the inequality in land ownership. This inequality was
more marked in parts of Konta tehsil in the Godavari river valley. Distribution
of a part of larger holdings controlled by a few families in the village (often
including those of the headman and sarpanch) to those without land, and redistri
bution of the more fertile lands was carried out in some areas. Redistribution o
f grain was carried out in a similar manner. A second initiative was the creatio
n of sanghams in villages. These were intended to gradually replace the traditio
nal structures of authority at the village level, articulate issues of the villa
ge and settle disputes. Sanghams exist in many villages of Dantewada today. Thes
e sanghams are currently one of the major targets of the Salwa Judum as they cha
llenge the tradi-
tional structures of local authority, and are identified with the Maoists. Even
the District Collector states that the “real strength [of Maoists] lies in sangam
membership who are from among the villagers” and comprise none other than the “illit
erate common man who like others takes care of his family through earning daily
wages” (District Collector’s Workplan). There were also initiatives at fixing prices
of forest produce collected and sold to traders. The most celebrated among thes
e was the raising of prices in tendu patta (beedi leaf) collection. Struggles by
peasant organizations managed to raise the rates from barely Rs 2 for 100 bundl
es (of 100 leaves each) in the early 1980s to Rs 35 in 1989, to Rs 80 by the mid
-1990s (see Box 5: Ban on Sale of Tendu Patta). The period from the second half
of the 1990s onwards was marked by other initiatives: prevention of the appropri
ation and misuse of government funds by Sarpanches/headmen, mobilisation of labo
ur for the creation of irrigation facilities, creation of seed banks to tide ove
r the lack of access to seeds at harvest time, maintenance of land records for a
ll cultivated lands to counter governmental refusal to do so, efforts at rejuven
ation of forests, etc. The same period saw the creation of similar organisations
in neighbouring areas in the north: Abhujmarh and other areas in Bastar distric
t and parts of Kanker district. By 2000, when the state of Chhattisgarh was crea
ted, the CPI-ML (PW) had created substantial bases in the forest areas of Bastar
, Kanker, and Dantewada. Two decades later, the People’s War declared the entire t
ribal forest region that includes Bastar and extends into Maharashtra and Madhya
Pradesh as a guerrilla zone, i.e. a region where the Peoples War would attempt
to prevent the state officials and forces from maintaining their rule and create
alternative institutions of what it termed ‘people’s rule’.
B. JAN JAGRAN ABHIYAN
The region has a history of political opposition to the Maoists from the dominan
t sections of society (both tribal and non-tribal) in the form
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Box 4
Mahendra Karma’s Colourful Career
Mahendra Karma of the Congress (I) is one of the major tribal leaders of the Sal
wa Judum. He is a known figure in the region, politically and otherwise. Origina
lly from Pharasepal village, he belongs to the Kashyap clan. Pharasepal and its
surrounding villages are known to have several landed households (their wealth m
easured by the fact that they sell 3-4 truckloads of rice), many of which are re
lated to Karma. His father, Boodha Majhi, was a clan mukhia who also used to col
lect taxes for the raja. Karma first began his political work with the All India
Students Federation while he was in the Law College at Jagdalpur. His active po
litical career began around 1975. He went on to become a CPI MLA in 1978, but wa
s denied a CPI ticket in 1981 on the grounds of his poor performance. He joined
the Congress upon this, of which his brother was already a member. In the 1981 e
lections, which he contested as a Congress candidate, he lost the Dantewada seat
to the CPI. Following turmoil in the Congress party, he joined the new party fl
oated by Madhavrao Scindia, and was one of the two Members of Parliament elected
on this ticket. In the eighties, he is seen to have established close relations
with business interests in Dantewada and emerged as an opponent of the CPI-led
Swayatta Andolan Following the formation of Chhattisgarh state, Karma became a m
inister in Ajit Jogi’s cabinet. Karma is now the official ‘tribal leader’ of the Congr
ess (I) in the state. of the Jan Jagran Abhiyans. The acquiring of lands from la
rge holdings and their redistribution to landless households by peasant organiza
tions led to the creation of a section unhappy with the Maoists. Additionally, t
he downsizing of the role of the headman and the priest due to the creation of s
anghams also contributed to the backlash. Traders and contractors in trading tow
ns and tehsil headquarters such as Bijapur and Bhairamgarh - who were mostly non
-tribals - added to this constituency against the Maoists. In July-August 1990,
the residents of Bedre village near Kutru killed their headman. Large contingent
s of police forces were stationed in the area. The headman’s brother, along with p
olice forces, started organizing retaliatory attacks against Maoist sympathizers
. Within no time some political leaders, notable among them the present MLA Mahe
ndra Karma (see Box 4: Mahendra Karma’s Colourful Career) took over the leadership
of this operation which was called Jan Jagran Abhiyan. The method of the Abhiya
n was to threaten a village to hand over those most active with the organisation
, or else face an attack. Such attacks involved looting and sometimes the consum
ption of grain, poultry and animals, burning of houses and household goods, beat
ing and rapes. Those associating actively with the sanghams (village organisatio
ns) were arrested. In case of a surrender, before or after the attack, the surre
ndered were made part of the Jan Jagran Abhiyan and were required to participate
in attacks on other villages. This process lasted for over three months, starti
ng from close to the Bhopalpatnam-Bijapur road in the west and extending towards
Konta in the south of the district. The BJP government in Madhya Pradesh at tha
t time extended full support to the Abhiyan and an-all party committee was forme
d in its support, which included the Congress, BJP and the CPI. (The CPI has sin
ce held it to be a mistake on their part to have supported the Abhiyan.) The Abh
iyan was successful in its objective to the extent that a small cluster of villa
ges in Konta was all that was left of the tribal-peasant organisation. The erstw
hile People’s War then launched a counter-offensive targeting state forces, whom t
hey felt were the mainstay of the Abhiyan. The retaliation by the Maoists follow
ed the same strategy as the attacks by the Abhiyan: surren-
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der or suffer attack. However, only those headmen and others who had closely ass
ociated with the Abhiyan suffered attacks on their property. Within a short whil
e the Abhiyan ended and Maoist organisations were re-established. Many headmen w
ho ran away from their villages to escape Maoist retaliation were provided space
for a hut by the government, behind the Bijapur police station. During the 1990
s, one significant new issue around which people were mobilized was of land owne
rship. This was more contentious in cases where the villages were more economica
lly differentiated. In 1998, villages around Pharasapal, Mahendra Karma’s native v
illage, saw the birth of another Jan Jagran Abhiyan. These were villages where s
ome households produced substantial surpluses of grain for the market. Mahendra
Karma led this Abhiyan from its inception. The pattern of mobilizing for and aga
inst the Abhiyan were similar to that in 1991. This second Abhiyan, of 1998 was
however localized and short-lived. Since 2000, an increasing number of police an
d paramilitary forces have been deployed in Dantewada. The first battalion of th
e CRPF permanently stationed in 2001 was joined by two
more battalions. An India Reserve Battalion (IRB) from Nagaland was also station
ed here. Around May-June 2005, another mobilization against Maoist organisations
using local elites, both adivasi and non-adivasi, and the state forces began. M
ahendra Karma, the Congress MLA, was again at its forefront very soon. This time
round it was named Salwa Judum. Salwa is the Gondi word for the water that is s
prinkled on a patient to drive an illness out, while Judum is the word for colle
ctive hunts. Salwa Judum thus means the purification hunt, seemingly meant to cu
re tribal society of the Maoist ‘illness’. In official circles, this campaign is als
o referred to as Jan Jagran Abhiyan as well as Salwa Judum, probably indicating
both the continuities as well as differences from the Jan Jagran Abhiyans of the
past. The differences are crucial: For one, the Salwa Judum is over a wider are
a, involves much more intensive use of state power and is centrally part of the
central and state governments’ anti-Naxal policy. Two, the attacks and killings ar
e more frequent and far more brutal, and its impact on the daily life of the loc
al people far more devastating.
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CHAPTER TWO
The picture conveyed by the administration and dutifully picked up by the local
media is that the Salwa Judum is a ‘spontaneous’ and selfinitiated movement of local
tribals, having its immediate trigger in some of the Maoists’ recent policies suc
h as the ban on collecting tendu leaves and on participating in state elections.
However, none of the earlier reports treat the matter with the seriousness it d
eserves and some are even frivolous in nature. According to one report, “From a ha
ndful in number to thousands. This is how the anti-Naxal movement is gaining gro
und in the main heartland of Naxalites in Bastar...After keeping their mouths sh
ut for decades, the tribal people are getting united to battle against the Peopl
e’s War.” (Manjusainath, Hindu, 2005). However, the picture these accounts provide o
f the Salwa Judum is far from accurate. The fact is that the Salwa Judum is bein
g led by sections of local elites, contractors and traders, that it is officiall
y part of anti-naxal initiatives, and that it is being actively supported by sta
te agencies to an unprecedented degree. It’s far from being a “spontaneous” response t
o Maoist ‘tyranny’ by the local populace at large, as the government is making it ou
t to be. A lesser known truth is that, as a consequence of the Salwa Judum, the
lives of thousands of people in the region are being torn apart in the course of
what the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Dantewada, himself described as “aghosh
it yudh”, an “undeclared war”. In just the last few months, about 30,000 people have b
een displaced from their homes. Approximately 15,000 people from 420 villages ar
e living in temporary camps as refugees, as per official estimates. Perhaps an e
qual number are living with relatives in other villages or in rented accommodati
on. Some reports suggest that 96 people from about 34 villages have been killed
till November 2005. The experiences of the fact-finding team in Dantewada distri
ct itself conveys the sense in
Salwa Judum
which an undeclared war is gaining frightening proportions. The following quote
is from our notes: “In Dantewada district it is a common sight to see locals movin
g around with traditional weaponry such as bows and arrows. But to our team’s surp
rise and concern, we found the sight of heavily armed local surveillance parties
of not only security personnel, but also local people on their bicycles, in gro
ups of five (and often more), carrying three assault rifles, one 2 inch mortar l
auncher and a sten-gun, to be just as common. “Check points on the highway (NH 16)
that runs across the northern part of Dantewada district were often manned by a
rmed locals who demanded that they check our vehicles in case we were harbouring
arms or food for the Maoists, more popularly known in this area as ‘dada log’. Thes
e armed, non-military locals were members of what has come to be known as the Sa
lwa Judum. “A part of the team, on their way to Gangaloor via Bijapur, were not al
lowed by a Salwa Judum mob to proceed any further than Bijapur. This incident oc
curred in the presence of local government representatives and security forces,
who made no move to intervene. The team also witnessed a part of a village clear
ing operation conducted by the Naga Indian Reserve Battalion forces on 30 Novemb
er, where, among other instances of looting by the forces, some soldiers chopped
off the head of a cow – one among the herds of cattle that they claimed they were
rescuing from the Maoists – in full view of the villagers and of the vehicles tha
t were stranded on the road. There was also an ambulance from Geedum Hospital as
sisting in the operation.”
1. The Emergence of the Salwa Judum
There is an ambiguity about the Salwa Judum’s origins. There are two somewhat conf
licting explanations. The Salwa Judum is understood to have started either entir
ely as an anti-
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Maoist civilian initiative arising out of local social contradictions or alterna
tively, as an operation organized right from its inception as part of the admins
tration’s long-term counterinsurgency plans. Actually, the question about its orig
ins is secondary. What’s more important is one, the social basis of the Salwa Judu
m; two, the extent of state patronage it is currently getting as part of the Ind
ian state’s anti-Naxal agenda; and three, the brutality people are facing as a con
sequence. In fact, the Salwa Judum could not have reached its present dimensions
without the extent of state support it is getting. According to the Collector o
f Dantewada district, K.R. Pisda, the Salwa Judum, like the earlier Abhiyans, al
so started near Kutru. In May 2005, he heard that in interior villages falling u
nder Kutru tehsil mobilising was taking place against the Maoists. The people th
ere were apparently upset with the Maoists’ ban on collecting tendu leaves (see Bo
x 5: Ban on Sale of Tendu Patta ) and on laying roads in the area. Following thi
s, the administration got letters from Bedre (where the first Jan Jagran Abhiyan
had begun in 1990) and some other villages asking for police protection against
the Maoists. The Collector said he first encountered the Salwa Judum on 19 June
2005, when he saw a crowd of 5-6,000 people in Matwada village, on their way to
Kotarapal village, a Maoist stronghold. In a Salwa Judum meeting in Tadmendri v
illage around the same time, local sangham members were told to stop associating
with the Maoists. There was a stampede at this meeting, and some 80-90 people h
ad not returned home by evening. Fearing that Maoists were burning houses, crowd
s of people took to the road. Some 15,000 people, he claimed, gathered in differ
ent places and the administration opened camps wherever there were police statio
ns – Matwada, Naimed, Bhairamgarh, Kutru, etc. Soon after, a meeting was held ever
y alternate day in villages that were known to be pro-Naxalite. All the leaders
of the Salwa Judum whom we met also referred to having organised locally. Accord
ing to Lakshman Kashyap, a local leader of the Salwa Judum and a relative of
Mahendra Karma, meetings were fixed through notes passed between villages. Kashy
ap recalled that the first such note he received was from a teacher, Deva Sodhi
of Pharsegarh, inviting people to a meeting in Matwada. A Maoist document (Prabh
at, newsletter of the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee of CPI [Maoists]; Jul
y-December 2005) also points to some local mobilisation against them by village
headmen. The first action by Salwa Judum, according to them, occurred after some
land redistribution was conducted in about 25 villages between Kutru and the In
dravati river. People from these villages who had so far not been part of the Da
ndakaranya Area Kisan Mazdoor Sangathan (DAKMS) had now expressed a wish to join
. On 5 June, mukhiyas from Aveli village, Gannu Patel and Masa Gaital of Bandepa
rra reportedly invited local leaders of the DAKMS to Usikapatnam village to disc
uss problems faced by the local people. However, when the DAKMS members visited
Usikapatnam, they were detained, beaten up and handed over to Kutru police stati
on. These accounts from the three different sources suggest that the Salwa Judum
began at the local level over a variety of issues including opposition to the s
anghams, and redistribution of village land. The Salwa Judum leadership represen
ts those who consider themselves victims of Maoist violence. These include those
sections of tribal and non-tribal society who have been adversely effected by t
he Maoists’ policies eg those in traditional positions of authority within the vil
lage, those whose lands have been redistributed, those traders whose profits hav
e been hit by the struggles over tendu patta and forest produce etc. Lakshman Ka
shyap, a local Salwa Judum leader told us that the Salwa Judum leadership primar
ily consists of (a) some headmen, sarpanches, and panches along with their clans
people, and (b) non tribal immigrantsboth of whom (were) mobilized against the
Maoists. Even official accounts do not deny this composition of the leadership o
f the Salwa Judum (Collector’s Work Proposal). At the grass roots level it is also
apparent that contractors, trans-
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Box 5
The Ban on Sale of Tendu Patta
Among the various explanations being provided today by the administration and se
ctions of the media for the rise of the Salwa Judum, the ban on the sale of beed
i leaf (tendu patta) by Maoists is often mentioned. The year 2005 witnessed a st
rike call by the peasant organisation DAKMS that led to a boycott of tendu patta
collection, an important source of income for tribal households. In the Dantewa
da region, 2005 was also a year of drought. Some discontentment over the boycott
and the resultant loss in income among the adivasis is inevitable, but to say t
hat it led to the Salwa Judum is absurd. Such theories negate the wider context
for the ban, particularly of the long struggles fought by the adivasis and the M
aoists to improve the rates of tendu patta, and the dubious role played by the s
tate. For the large majority of Bastar’s people, as also in the neighbouring triba
l region of Gadchiroli in Maharashtra and Malkangiri in Orissa, incomes in cash
result entirely from the sale of minor forest produce. Tendu patta, in particula
r, has a short season yet provides this income in the lean summer months and vir
tually every family engages in tendu patta collection. Tendu patta and bamboo al
so differ from other minor forest produce in that their collection and purchase
is better organised, whether directly by the state or through contractors. Till
the early 1980s, the tendu patta trade was wholly controlled by private contract
ors, and collection rates were extremely low, barely a couple of rupees for 100
bundles each of 100 leaves (i.e. for 10,000 leaves). By 1984, struggles taken up
by adivasis and peasant organisations managed to raise the piece rates to Rs 17
per 100 bundles of 70 leaves each, i.e. Rs. 24 for every 10,000 leaves. At vary
ing times, state governments tried to abolish and replace private contractors. H
owever these attempts failed as the governments prescribed rates much lower than
those paid by contractors. In Maharashtra, the state government issued such an
order in 1985, but was forced to withdraw it in 1989, following a boycott of ten
du patta collection in the next three years. For Bastar, such a perverse order c
ame in 1989; rates that had reached Rs 35 per 10,000 leaves were reduced by the
government to a paltry Rs 25. ‘Cooperative societies’ were formed to oversee its col
lection and purchase. This governmental policy resulted in a strike and led to a
boycott of tendu patta collection for the next five years. From 1995, people in
Bastar again resumed collection. They presented certain basic demands to the st
ate government: a collection rate of Rs 100, establishment of a collection centr
e in each village, prompt payments, and the employment of local people as munshi
and watcher. These demands were rejected. It led to varied protests ranging fro
m mass petitions by villagers at forest range offices, to road blockades and des
truction of forest produce depots. Protests persisted, forcing the MP government
in 1999 to set up a committee to examine the fall in tendu patta collection. Th
is committee recommended the re-introduction of the contractor system. During th
is decade from 1989 to 1999, the MP government had raised rates from Rs 25 to Rs
40 per 100 bundles. The reintroduction of the contractor system in Bastar witne
ssed a rise in rates from Rs 40 to Rs 80. Over the same period, rates by private
contractors in Maharashtra had been hiked from Rs 60 to Rs 136. This was achiev
ed through villagers’ tendu patta struggle committees negotiating with contractors
. Police attempted to prevent negotiations and villagers were detained at many p
laces. Contractors too were pressurized by the government not to agree continued
on next page
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continued from last page with the demands. Despite this, rates in Maharashtra pr
esently are Rs 180 but in neighbouring Bastar, the demand for a rate of Rs 100 h
as not been met, leading to a boycott of tendu patta collection. The above descr
iption makes it clear that the various state governments have played a most dubi
ous role. They have viewed these struggles as increasing Maoists’ popularity and h
ave tried to sabotage struggles. Despite this, increases in collection rates hav
e occurred solely due to pressure from peasant organisations, which have used bo
ycott calls as a form of struggle in bargaining with contractors and pressurizin
g the government. Hence, notwithstanding some discontent to which it may have gi
ven rise, to say that the current ban led to mass support for the Salwa Judum is
far from the truth. A more likely explanation of the relation between the boyco
tt and the Salwa Judum is that the boycott further fostered the discontent of te
ndu patta traders and contractors, who had a grouse against the Maoists and who
therefore readily made common cause with the government in the shape of the Salw
a Judum. porters and traders from small towns of Dantewada district, who have mu
ch to gain from industrialization in the region, also play a prominent role in t
he Salwa Judum. However, what’s important is that the state promptly exploited the
situation. It’s crucial never to forget that the Salwa Judum could not become wha
t it has without the extent of state support it is getting. For instance, the di
strict collector told us that of the 150-200 Salwa Judum meetings that had been
held till December 2005, he himself had attended 75 per cent. Other sources also
make it evident that the state has played an active role in channelising and pr
opagating the anti-Maoist opposition among sec-
tions of the population, thus fuelling the Salwa Judum as part of its all India
anti-Naxal policy. According to a video (apparently made at a media training org
anisation, Jan Darshan, at the government’s request) the Salwa Judum started on 1s
t June 2005 in Kutru, where people were upset with the Maoist’s ban on collecting
tendu leaves, the frequent closure of haats due to their bandh calls, and the al
leged siphoning of development funds from the area. However, it also revealingly
states that ‘Operation Salwa Judum’ was preceded by months of ‘overt and covert opera
tions’ by the police (from January 2005 onwards) in which the police tried in a “sub
tle manner” to convince people of the ills of Maoism. The video shots of Salwa Jud
um meetings clearly show the Chief Minister, the Collector and politicians like
Mahendra Karma addressing these, and security personnel accompanying Salwa Judum
processions. The video mentions the government concept of ‘carpet security’, by whi
ch military camps are stationed across the district, village defence samitis (or
ganizations) created, and roadside settlements set up for those who can’t return t
o their villages, for fear of Maoist attacks. Our fact-finding found that the ‘car
pet security’ plan was well in place. Also pointing to the administration’s close an
d prompt links with the Salwa Judum is an audio CD released by the Maoists to th
e Chhattisgarh press in August 2005, in which the Superintendent of Police, Bija
pur district, is heard stating that Rs 2 lakhs would be given to every village t
hat joins the Salwa Judum. He is also heard announcing rewards for killing Maois
ts, and incentives for people with knowledge of weapons and land mines. It is in
structive to learn that fostering local resistance is part of the government’s all
-India policy to fight the Maoists. Annual reports of the Ministry of Home Affai
rs (MHA) for 200304 and 2004-05 refer specifically to the “creation” (pp 6), “raising” (
pp 46), encouraging, promoting, etc., of “local resistance groups” and the need to h
arness the “anti-naxal feeling among a section of the villagers” to “counter atrocitie
s committed by naxalite outfits”. This supports
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our view that the Salwa Judum has become part of conscious state policy. Without
the state functionaries’ presence at meetings conducted by the Judum, and the sta
te’s role in conducting training for local Special Police Officers (SPOs) from amo
ng members of the Salwa Judum, fortifying police stations, building roads, maint
aining camps, posting the Naga IRB in this region, etc., the Salwa Judum would n
ot have become as powerful as it has. To understand the Salwa Judum, it is essen
tial to look at the administration’s financial and other kinds of support for it a
nd the government’s long-term anti-Naxal plans (See Chapter 3: “Undeclared War”).
2. Mode of Operation of the Salwa Judum
“This is what happened in Bangapal, sir. On 3rd August we held a meeting in Munder
village. Villagers from Munder ran away to the hills. The Naga Batallion went t
o the hills, caught them and brought them back, and made them join the Salwa Jud
um. Those who were unwilling to join were arrested. I don’t know everything – I don’t
know how many people have been made to join and how many arrested.” – Lakshman Kashy
ap Local leader of Salwa Judum, in an interview No clearer account of what happe
ns during a Salwa Judum operation is available. Those who don’t join the Salwa Jud
um are forcibly brought in by the Salwa Judum members, the police and the Naga I
RB. Both our fact-finding and an earlier fact-finding report (November 2005) by
the Communist Party of India (CPI), point to a consistent pattern. First, Salwa
Judum meetings are organized in villages that are known to support the Maoists.
The audience for these meetings are transported by buses hired or procured by th
e administration. Money for this comes from the central government. Often, vario
us politicians address these meetings. Processions, called ‘padyatras’, go from the
larger villages where camps are located and are accompanied by the security forc
es and sometimes, by the Collector or the SP. In the course of these meetings, t
he houses of sangham members or ordinary villag-
ers are burnt and their cattle, pigs, poultry and other household goods looted.
Since the houses in these villages are scattered, villagers are often unable to
collectively resist these attacks. However, some villages do resist attacks, aid
ed by their own sangham members and other Maoists. Sometimes people are killed,
but no FIR is ever registered for those killed by the security forces. Maoist ki
llings are however, recorded and the family compensated in many cases (See Appen
dix II: Killings by Maoists). People from defeated villages are then forced to c
ome and live in the camps, of which the administration itself claims to have set
up seventeen. They are unable to continue with their agricultural activities an
d their normal existence, and are expected to go on Salwa Judum processions and
meetings in other villages and be part of other attacking parties. Additionally,
they are expected to keep an eye on people known to be associated with the Maoi
sts. The daily lives of thousands of ordinary people in this area have been affe
cted and their livelihoods hit by the Salwa Judum. In some places, such as Manke
li, in order to force the people to join, the Salwa Judum activists have prevent
ed villagers from visiting weekly haats to purchase edible oil and salt. Individ
ual families are sometimes split between the Salwa Judum and those who wish to r
emain in their villages or align with the Maoists. For instance, one of the men
arrested from village Satwas, Barsu Sudru, has a younger brother who is with the
Salwa Judum. The perma (priest) of Markapal is still in the village – the team wa
s not able to visit the village –, but his wife has come to live in the Bhairamgar
h camp. We came across instances (e.g., in Mankeli village) where the Salwa Judu
m took away young people from their village and their families were unaware of t
heir whereabouts. Since people who live in camps are forced to work as informers
against members of their own and neighbouring villages, and participate in atta
cks against them, villages are becoming increasingly divided. Such divisions are
of no small sig-
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nificance as either side is continuously engaged in violent attacks and killings
. Sangham members who are arrested are kept in camps next to police stations or
chowkis. According to the Collector, there are 1,500 surrendered sangham members
in the camps. In February 2006, Mahendra Karma claimed that more than 3,000 san
gham members had surrendered (The Hindu; February 6, 2006). The government has a
nnounced that it will give rehabilitation grants to these surrendered Maoists. T
he men whom we met in camps openly stated that those who surrendered or were liv
ing in the camps had to keep informing the administration about the activities o
f the Maoists. Those who are reluctant to surrender remain in custody. Sukhmati
of Taaki Lode village, north of the Indravati river was staying in Bhairamgarh c
amp because her husband had been locked up in the Bhairamgarh police station, lo
cated just behind the camp. This was when other men who lived in the camp were u
ndergoing SPO training. The SHO of the Bhairamgarh police station, however, deni
ed that there were any people locked up in the police station.
tire villages were completely empty, except for the occassional old person and w
omen in some cases. We also chanced upon villages where people had finally decid
ed to ‘surrender’ following repeated attacks by the Salwa Judum and the security for
ces. The following are accounts of some attacks on villages by the Salwa Judum.
KOTARAPAL VILLAGE
Kotarapal is a large village divided into Joona Kotarapal and Navin Kotarapal, w
hich was a stronghold of the Maoists. Kotarapal was attacked four times by the S
alwa Judum. The first was on 18 June 2005, following a Salwa Judum meeting at Ma
twada ( a large village where the weekly market is held) in which about 3,000 pe
ople participated. The meeting was addressed, among others, by Mahendra Karma Ma
jhi, mukhiya Korsa Sukulu and Lekam Jilaram. People from villages close to the I
ndravati such as Sattuva, Bail and Dharma also participated. From the meeting, a
bout a thousand people marched to Kotarapal village, a few kilometers away. Fore
warned villagers had already sent the aged and the children out of the village;
young men and women stayed back. When the Salwa Judum procession neared the vill
age, it was attacked by the villagers and sangham members. In the melee that ens
ued, 2 people (Micha Dashru of Bandeparre and Mohan Singh of Naimed) died. Sangh
am members detained 12 people, of whom 11 were later released. Bhuvneshwar Thaku
r of Jangla remained in their custody and he was killed on 26 June. Following th
e 18 June incident, a Salwa Judum meeting took place in Bijapur, called by Mahen
dra Karma, Prabhari mantri (Minister incharge of Dantewada district) Kedar Kashy
ap and Rajendra Pambhoi, MLA. It was here that the Jan Jagran Abhiyan became ‘Salw
a Judum’. On 1 July, Kotarapal was attacked, for the second time, by a combined fo
rce of the District Armed Force and the CRPF, which was led by the Inspector-Gen
eral, Bastar region, the S.P. Bijapur, as well as Mahendra Karma. Since most of
the villagers and sangham members had escaped to the jungle, the attackers loote
d and
3. Attacks by Salwa Judum
Unlike the Jan Jagrans of 1990 and 1998, when some mukhiyas were mobilised again
st the Maoists, now the attacks by the Salwa Judum on villages are being carried
out with the assistance of the CRPF and the Naga IRB, accompanied by a small co
ntingent of civilians. The Naga IRB, feared by the locals, are in fact known to
prefer to conduct their raids by themselves. While we do not have any independen
t confirmation of this, there are serious allegations of rapes by security force
s and Salwa Judum activists. Maoists have listed 31 cases of rape, of whom six w
omen were also murdered since the Salwa Judum began in June 2005 (Prabhat, JulyD
ecember 2005). There also are reports that children and old people are being bea
ten. Villages are forcibly cleared of people and their cattle. In most villages
that had been attacked, we found that en-
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burnt their houses and killed their cattle and livestock. Two elderly peasants,
Uikay Sannu and Vanjam Mangu, were killed and an old woman was fatally injured.
The third attack took place on 11 August, in which Lekam Budhram (35) and Aatam
Bodhi (30), both sangham members, were killed by Naga IRB soldiers. It appears t
hat in this attack, as well as a fourth attack that followed on 12 September, Na
ga IRB soldiers took a large number of people to Matwada camp. According to the
CPI fact-finding report, 48 youths who were allegedly sangham members were picke
d up from Kotarapal and made to surrender before Mahendra Karma on 13 October. S
ince then they have been detained in Bhairamgarh police station. According to so
me people from the village, whose families had refused to live in the camps, the
ir mukhiya had been pressurizing them to leave the village. Many people had alre
ady run away into the forests. The last two families from this village were atta
cked by the Naga IRB and the men taken away to nearby Jangla and tortured. The v
illage now lies completely empty.
lage was again attacked. Three more attacks took place. In the first of these, o
n 28 August, Boggam Sannu (18 years) was killed. Then a meeting was called on 3
September in Munder by the Salwa Judum. Once again the villagers escaped to the
forest. According to Lakshman Kashyap, who was the local organizer of this attac
k, 10 girls and 11 boys escaped to the forest. This time, the Naga soldiers ente
red the forest, killed Kadli Kummal (a DAKMS member) and captured the rest, who
were asked to join the Salwa Judum. Twelve people who refused were detained with
out being charged. On 10 September, in yet another attack, Kadli Kamlu (DAKMS me
mber) was killed by Naga soldiers while they were on a patrol in the now-deserte
d village.
MANKELI VILLAGE
Mankeli is a large forest village, with several smaller hamlets off the road bet
ween Bijapur and Gangaloor. This village too has been repeatedly attacked. Out o
f approximately 112 houses in six hamlets, about 60 houses have been burnt by th
e Salwa Judum and several have been looted. The Murias of this village originall
y came from the Pinkonda area. Of all these households, only about 25 households
had pattas given by the forest department. The rest cultivated encroached land.
The Maoists redistributed land within the village for instance, 5 acres of one
man’s holding of 25 acres was taken for collective cultivation. The seeds from thi
s farm were given to those who didn’t have any seeds for cultivation the following
year. The Forest Department officials have not visited this area for two years.
People here, like in many other places, complained about the ban on tendu leave
s. In fact they said they were warned that their hands would be cut off if they
sold tendu leaves, but all in all, they came across as being neither with the Ma
oists, nor with the Salwa Judum. The first time the Salwa Judum came, on 15 Sept
ember, the CRPF set fire to people’s homes, including their pigsties. The Salwa Ju
dum took away people’s goats, pigs, poultry, and the mahua, tora and grain they ha
d stored. They set
MUNDER VILLAGE
Munder village, another known Maoist stronghold, was almost entirely empty when
we reached there. Road construction activity, which was on in full swing stopped
about half a kilometre before Munder. In the village, we met one very old man w
ho told us that everyone was out working on their fields. We found, strangely, t
hat field after field was being harvested only by women. One woman told us that
all men of working age from the village had been taken away by the Salwa Judum t
o Bangapal, which has a large SPO training camp, and had not returned home. Mund
er is eight kilometers from Pharasapal, Mahendra Karma’s village. Munder village h
ad been attacked five times. Munder was first looted on 22 July. Pigs, goats and
chicken were slaughtered and made a feast of and ten houses were burnt. There w
ere no casualties because the villagers, many of whom are sangham members, were
expecting an attack and had escaped to the nearby forest. Three days later, the
vil-
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fire to the anganwadi building after looting the mahua, imli and other things th
at had been stored in it. They also killed 20-year old Modiyam Bhadru (DAKMS mem
ber). The villagers buried his body and after this incident, no one wanted to jo
in the Salwa Judum. Expectedly, the village was attacked again. This time, on 25
September, the Naga IRB soldiers came on their own and killed Korsa Suklu and P
unem Kanda, both sangham members. The Naga forces also took away some 5-6 boys a
nd one girl, who were forced to work as informers. The village headman was also
taken away. The third time, on 3rd October, the Naga soldiers came with two of t
he boys they had taken away earlier, who identified two sangham members Kosa Ait
u and Emla Kova. They were killed while working in their fields. The villagers w
ere also told by the Salwa Judum, in turn, that since they gave shelter to the M
aoists, they would not be allowed to purchase anything from the haats (markets).
As a result, they could no longer buy even basic necessities like salt from Bij
apur. Villagers also said that all the sangham members from Naya para (hamlet) h
ad been captured while those in other paras of the village were in hiding. In To
ng para, everyone, not just sangham members had fled. The Maoists broke down a s
chool in this village in which Naga soldiers had spent a night. The villagers sa
id that the Maoists had warned the sangham members that if they joined the Salwa
Judum, they would be killed. The villagers had been sent a letter to join the S
alwa Judum in September, and had already displayed some readiness to join the Sa
lwa Judum by attending Salwa Judum meetings at Dhanar (1 October) and Korrepal v
illage (4 October). These two villages had been spared because they had indicate
d a readiness to join in. When we met the villagers, three attacks by the Salwa
Judum on the village had already taken place. They were extremely tense and were
deliberating on whether and how to surrender to the police in Bijapur. Three pa
ras/ hamlets had resolved to do this and thought that the others would join them
. They were hoping that once
they had officially surrendered they would be allowed to live normally. Even as
we were in Mankeli, we heard gunshots, whose source we had no way of confirming.
In front of us, three terrified men ran for their lives. What’s happened in Manke
li illustrates the manner in which villages with a Maoist mass base are, through
coercive means, being annexed to the Salwa Judum campaign. A news report quotes
a Dantewada DSP as saying, “Rebels have been fast losing base in their stronghold
in Dantewada district. Around 35 senior sangham members surrendered at a functi
on in Mankeli village, 412 km south from state capital. Over 5,000 local people
attended the function from 22 villages” (IANS, 28 December 2005), completely hidin
g the brutal process by which this has been achieved. Several such accounts such
as Mankeli or Munder could be given, but we were unable to visit many villages
because of the difficulty we faced in travelling freely in this region. Much of
the information we have may be incomplete, simply because the administration kee
ps no account of the people killed or displaced by the security forces and the S
alwa Judum. Nevertheless, we met people from different villages in camps who spo
ke about their displacement. For instance, in Bhairamgarh camp, we were told by
the people of Halur village that they had been brought there by the Naga soldier
s. Maoist documents claim that many attacks of the Salwa Judum and the security
forces have gone unrecorded. For instance, village Ariyal, a forest village whic
h is a Maoist stronghold, where tensions had been brewing for long, was attacked
on 2 September. The mukhiya of Ariyal, Dorru Mangu, who had joined the Salwa Ju
dum led the attack in which ten sangham members, including a 12-year old bal san
gham member were detained, made to stand in a row and shot dead. Amongst those w
ho were killed, were relatives of the mukhiya himself (Prabhat, July-December 20
05). A CPI fact-finding team had visited several villages, where they were told
of the Salwa Judum’s looting, burning and killing. In village
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Mundbedi, the CRPF had come accompanied by 50 Salwa Judum members. They took 40
kg rice from the house of Nandu, along with chickens, pigs, goat and whatever th
ey could lay their hands on. The Salwa Judum burnt four of Kavad village’s 36 hous
es, and cooked within the village some of the things they looted 20 kg of rice,
20 chickens and one pig. The villagers hid in the forests. While leaving, the Sa
lwa Judum burnt 2 quintals of kosra and 40 kg of rice. After emerging from Kavad
village, the Salwa Judum attacked villages Pidiya and Andri. Thirty houses were
burnt in village Pidiya, and Santu, son of Aitu, was shot dead by the CRPF. In
village Burji, the Salwa Judum forces came on 30 September and killed and ate 6
pigs and 6 chickens. They also took away 10 goats, 30 vessels, mahua, and grain.
Lemon and sulphi trees were cut and one cycle was broken. People from 60-70 hou
ses ran away and the Salwa Judum looted Rs 10,000 from their houses. In village
Mallur, a thousand-strong Salwa Judum procession came in October along with the
CRPF. They beat up 17 youths badly and took them away, forcing them to join the
Salwa Judum. Mallur, Palnar and Tamodi villages also suffered burning and lootin
g. In Palnar, 30 people were forcibly taken away, of whom Sukhram, son of Godi,
was killed. In the first week of August, in Manjhimendari village, a combined fo
rce of Salwa Judum and the police burnt all the houses as well as pigsties and c
hicken coops. All the pigs, goats and chickens were killed and eaten. The villag
e was empty because when the attack began, the villagers ran away to the forests
to escape the attack but didn’t have time to take all their belongings. Our team
also met some villagers from these villages such as Burji, Pusnar, Palnar and Ma
llur in Gangaloor camp. Half the villages had come to live in camps while the ot
her half was hiding in the jungles. Once in the camp, they are unable to do othe
r work or return to cultivate their fields. They were also expected to turn up f
or Salwa Judum processions whenever they were called in other words, they were c
aptive.
4. CPI (Maoist)’s Violence
The Salwa Judum has led to an increasing spiral of violence, in which both sides
are now fighting an almost full-fledged war. This is in contrast to two people
who are listed as killed in 2004, according to official documents. During our fa
ct-finding, we heard that in some cases, the Maoists had killed people simply fo
r attending Salwa Judum meetings. One man from Palnar told us at Gangaloor camp
that after a Salwa Judum meeting on 24 August in Gangaloor, the Maoists called a
meeting in Palnar the next day and told people not to join the Salwa Judum, and
noted the names of ten people, including him, who were taking others to join th
e Salwa Judum. He explained to the Maoists that he had taken people to avoid hav
ing the village burnt down. He was however threatened by people present from Sao
nar village for joining the Salwa Judum and as a result, had left the village ou
t of fear. On 4 September, some Maoists came to Palnar and told people they had
to leave their houses and camp in the hills to escape attacks by the Salwa Judum
. (Sure enough, some days later on 21 September the Salwa Judum and forces went
to attack Palnar and found the whole village empty.) At 8 pm that night of 4 Sep
tember, the sarpanch, the village patel and 7 SC boys were asked about their rel
ationship with the Gangaloor Majhi and told that if they joined the Salwa Judum,
they would not be allowed to come back and live in the village. The sarpanch, p
atel and two others were killed, while the remaining SC boys escaped to Gangaloo
r. Later, some of the people from Palnar who had camped in the hills came to Gan
galoor. Of the 350 households in Palnar, about 50 went to Gangloor (250 househol
ds here, according to the man from Palnar we spoke to, are with the Maoists). Th
ey had left the Maoist camp on the pretext that they wanted to come back to the
village to restock grain. Following this, their houses were raided and the schoo
l and hospital in Palnar destroyed by the Maoists. In Gongla, the 70-year old fo
rmer sarpanch Gaita Budu took people from the village to a
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Salwa Judum meeting in Gangaloor on 21 September. The following night, Maoists c
ame to his house and killed him. After this incident, the whole village (110 hou
seholds, 600 people) went to Gangaloor. In Kotarapal village on 18 June, Bhuvnes
hwar Thakur of Jangla was first detained for being a Salwa Judum organiser and t
hen killed by sangham members while he was already in their custody (See Kotarap
al account, earlier). We talked to people in Bhairamgarh camp, where there were
about 2,000 people from around 25 villages. Some ordinary people who attended Sa
lwa Judum meetings from curiosity or a desire to avoid having their villages att
acked by Salwa Judum have also come into camps either out of fear of Maoists or
specifically after being threatened by them. Individual families and villages ar
e sometimes split between those joining the Salwa Judum and those who wish to re
main in their villages or align with the Maoists. For instance, while half the r
esidents of Markapal village chose to stay on in the village, the other half had
fled to the camp after sangham members threatened the men for attending a Salwa
Judum meeting in Bhairamgarh. Those who had come to the camp had sold their mah
ua and left with whatever they had. Several people in Bhairamgarh camp and elsew
here told us of instances of threats and beatings when people chose not to ally
with the Maoists. Pramod Kumar and Lakmibai from Maramatta village told us that
the Maoists took away 30 quintals of their last crop along with Rs 15,000. He al
so said that his entire village was threatened. Those who did not become sangham
members or those who were sympathetic to the government’s policies were driven aw
ay. Villagers from Dharma village said they had heard that the Maoists would bea
t those who had come to camps, and were therefore scared of returning. The Maois
ts have since put out notices asking people in the camps to come back to their v
illages, assuring them that they will not be harmed Besides fear of Maoist viole
nce, some issues of coercion came up during our interviews.
Some people from Gongla village complained that they were forced to give contrib
utions to the Maoists in the form of one day’s tendu leaf collection and one day’s p
runing wages, as well as rice contributions. Phulmati, whom we met in Jagdalpur
Hospital (see Phulmati’s account below in the section Non-registration of FIRs) to
ld us that she was forcibly taken away by Maoists to harvest grain elsewhere and
her aged father who protested was beaten. People from Gongla said that no panch
ayat work was allowed in their area. The educated youth are unhappy with the Mao
ist opposition to government programmes. They want government programmes to be i
mplemented as these are a source of employment. Not being able to participate in
elections is also an issue for some people. There has been an intensification o
f the conflict – by both sides – in recent weeks. CPI (Maoist) squads have begun att
acking and killing security forces stationed in Dantewada and elements that they
perceive are in alliance with these forces. On 28 February, at least 26 persons
were killed when Maoists used a landmine to blow up a truck near Konta, which w
as carrying people returning from a Salwa Judum meeting. In yet another landmine
blast, 14 people were killed in Kanker district on 24 March 2006 when Maoists a
ttacked a jeep in which a group of tribals and local tradesmen were returning ho
me from the local market. The Maoists targeted the private vehicle, mistaking it
to be a police jeep. In the second incident the Maoists have apologized for the
landmine blasts. The actual scale of Maoist violence tends to be exaggerated by
the administration, helped by an ideologically bent and largely pliant media, t
o suggest the illegitimacy of the movement. A point repeated to us by everyone,
including many Salwa Judum activists, was that the Maoist movement had a mass ba
se among the poor for whom some very real victories have been won, especially ag
ainst a corrupt officialdom. It is however a fact that the escalation in violenc
e has had certain unfortunate fall outs. In an area where medical and health fac
ilities are already
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lacking, schools and hospitals are either rendered dysfunctional by their use as
bases by the security forces, or are consequently destroyed by the Maoists. In
the prevailing warlike situation the Maoists have used coercion and fear for pur
poses of intimidation, and shown a general intolerance of dissent. More disturbi
ngly, the escalation in violence has resulted in a number of killings by the Mao
ists when the victims were in their custody and hence isolated and unarmed. The
maintenance of democratic practices by people’s movements are particularly importa
nt in furthering a progressively democratic society.
lages. In many cases people were made to leave their villages soon after sowing
and crops now lie rotting and uncut in the fields. People living in camps that w
ere relatively close to their villages trekked all the way everyday to work on t
heir fields. Those who are under SPO training, however, spend their days being t
rained in the camp. They had been promised a monthly allowance of Rs 1,500. When
people already are at the margins of poverty and then have their livelihoods hi
t, this becomes a despicable way the government is inducing people to take up ar
ms in its offensive against the Maoists. However, recent reports indicate paymen
ts to SPo’s have not been regular leading to some dissatisfaction. Many others hav
e started working on earthworks under the Food for Work programme of the central
government. According to women from Markapal village we spoke to, the men got R
s 50 for doing coolie work; other reports suggest that people are getting Rs 55–60
a day for Block level or PWD work and Rs 60 for forest work. The roads that loc
als are working on lead to police stations off the highway. Locals are not emplo
yed in the construction of the national highway NH 16, as the work was given to
the Border Roads Organisation (BRO), which prefers to bring in workers from outs
ide. Most people the team met said that they were surviving on whatever they bro
ught with them initially or on meagre government rations. At Meertur, one of the
largest camps, we were told by the Meertur mukhiya that food for the camp’s popul
ation was provided for free by the government. People living in other camps told
us that the government had provided free rations only up to August or September
. By the time we visited these camps, only old people still got some rice a mont
h, dal, potatoes and onions free. Living conditions in the camps are abysmal. We
saw blanket distribution ceremonies in Gangaloor and Meertur camps, but little
else to suggest that the government was interested in the welfare of the people
staying in them. There is no proper shelter. People live in tents erected
5. Displacement and Life in Camps
The government has set up several camps in Dantewada for all those villagers who
have had to vacate their homes, as a consequence of the Salwa Judum campaign. W
e found that these camps house five groups of people: those sarpanches, their fa
milies and allies who have a stake in working with the administration and who ha
d decided to live in the camps because of Maoist threats; ordinary villagers who
have been forced by the Salwa Judum to leave their villages and live in the cam
ps; those who had fled their homes because of real incidents of or rumours about
Maoist retaliatory violence; the SPOs and in some cases, their families; and la
stly, surrendered sangham members and their families. All these camps have been
set up near police stations. According to the Collector, Dantewada, there are 17
such camps, with approximately 15,000 people living in them in Bhairamgarh and
Bijapur tehsils alone. In one camp in Bhairamgarh alone that we visited, there w
ere 2,000 people from around 25 villages in the camp. Some of these consisted of
entire villages such as Belnar, Bangoli, Sattuwa, while in other cases a few fa
milies from a village had come in. It is difficult to overstate the extent to wh
ich the daily lives of thousands of people have been turned upside down and thei
r livelihoods destroyed due to the ongoing evacuation of vil-
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by the administration, or in little shacks made of plastic sheets and sticks tha
t they have put up themselves. The tents were bare as people have few or no poss
essions. Sanitation and health conditions in the camps are very poor. Though we
did see two health workers in Bhairamgarh camp, reports of Medicin Sans Frontier
s suggest that health conditions in the camps are at crises levels. Some of the
details of the Bhairamgarh camp highlighted by the CPI’s open letter to the Prime
Minister underline this situation: The camp is located close to the police stati
on and the Bhairamgarh block headuarters. As many as 107 people from Sattuva vil
lage had been staying in a 5x16 metre space (less than 900 sq. feet) for three m
onths. The administration gave no help in setting up the tents and people had to
get sticks from the forest to build their tents. All the relief work was being
done under the supervision of the administration and not through the local panch
ayat. People from camps were every now and then forced by the police to attend S
alwa Judum rallies. One thing that bound people across camps was their anxiety a
s to whether they would ever be able to return home. Many people in camps would
alternate between fear of Salwa Judum attacks and fear of Maoists while telling
us about their reasons for being there. Many are there because of Salwa Judum at
tacks. There also prevails, among others, a vague fear of Maoist retaliation aga
inst those who join the Salwa Judum, willingly or under pressure, and then retur
n to their villages. This fear is fuelled by the administration and Salwa Judum
members, thus maintaining the pressure on people to keep living in camps, so muc
h so that all outsiders not in uniform, like the fact-finding team, are viewed w
ith suspicion. This is not all. The administration plans to make some of these c
amps permanent. (When we posed this question to the home secretary of Chhattisga
rh he felt that while some may be able to return to their villages many may not
be able to until such time as Maoists are not wiped out from the area.) About 20
0 people have been al-
lotted land for houses along the highway in Kutru. This is part of the governmen
t’s plan to create roadside villages, attached to police stations. While some of t
hese villages may house people unable to return to their homes because of fear o
f Maoist retaliation the plan seems to be much wider in scope. Clearly, the gove
rnment’s agenda seems to be to empty out the villages, attack the Maoist mass base
, and deny Maoists the food, shelter and other material support that enables the
movement to function and grow. Salwa Judum leader Lakshman Kashyap admitted to
having no idea about how people in these roadside villages would survive.
6. Non-registration of FIRs and Atrocities by the Security Forces
Combing operations and attacks on villages by the Naga IRB, CRPF and the Salwa J
udum leave many people dead and injured ( see Appendix I: People Killed in Attac
ks by Salwa Judum/ Security Forces). Almost all these killings are unrecorded. A
part from killings, the administration is arresting a number of people suspected
of being Maoists or Maoist sympathisers. Most of these detentions are completel
y illegal and unrecorded. This is not to mention the ill treatment meted out to
locals by the security forces stationed there. Whether it was a Naga soldier we
spoke to or a CRPF officer, the sense of their superiority over the people they
were meant to protect was overwhelming and shameful. The people at the end of su
ch treatment are those with absolutely no access to, and perhaps no knowledge of
, legal aid. In a Jagdalpur hospital, we met two young girls - referred to as ‘Nax
alites’ by the nurses recovering from serious bullet injuries. One of them, Sambat
ti from Wanger village, refused to speak to us as she was either too scared or i
n too much pain to speak. The other, Phulmati, a resident of Belnar village, tol
d us she had not been in touch with her family since she was arrested. She said
she had been forcibly taken by some Maoists to harvest abandoned fields in Karka
wada, near Nelasnar on the main highway just before Bhairamgarh. There were twen
ty of
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them - including some members of a Maoist squad - working on the fields when pol
ice found them and opened fire at them. The Maoists returned fire. This led to t
he deaths of three boys, including two from Kodenar village, who died of police
bullets. We found no record of the three boys’ deaths anywhere. We heard these boy
s have been buried in the grounds of Geedum police station. Whether this is true
or not, this shows that the police are expected to commit the worst excesses. S
onia, an anganwadi worker in village Kamaloor was beaten, stripped and dragged b
y her hair and detained by some Naga IRB soldiers on 9 March. She is among the v
ery few who have spoken up against the security forces. We could not meet her, b
ut the mainstream media has covered her story. In Mankeli village, villagers sai
d that they dared not go to the police station to file FIRs against the security
forces for the five deaths that occurred there (see Mankeli account above), fea
ring that they would be forced to live in camps and because they felt that the p
olice had no interest in filing FIRs against their own crimes! There was no post
mortem of those killed, the bodies were left in the village by the police and t
he last rites were performed by the villagers. This was reported to us in Kotara
pal as well. The police only recorded crimes committed by the Maoists, and the d
istrict administration only maintained records of compensation paid to the victi
ms of Maoist violence. A senior correspondent in Raipur told us that there is a
government directive to keep silent over any killing by the Naga IRB. We could n
ot confirm this, but the facts on the ground do indicate that non-registration o
f crimes by Salwa Judum and the security forces across Dantewada is so routine t
hat this amounts to giving them carte blanche. Such selective recording of crime
s also makes it appear that the only killings and violence are those committed b
y Maoists. This enables the government to fuel ill-feeling against them and crea
te an opinion in favor of a crackdown.
In addition, such non-registration of FIRs in cases of killings by security forc
es denies compensation to the families of those killed. In an audio CD released
by the Maoists to the Chhattisgarh press in August 2005, the SP Bijapur is heard
complaining that the Jangla police station had foolishly allowed the deaths of
two of the 9 ‘Maoists’ killed by the police in Kotarapal village to be incorrectly r
egistered as killings by Maoists. This, he said, would allow the dead people’s rel
atives to claim compensation, which in turn would be used to post bail for Naxal
ite sympathisers in jail. On the night of 30 November, while returning to Dantew
ada, we saw five people being loaded onto a truck. Villagers told us that the Ma
oist Abujhmarh secretary had been arrested. We followed them to the Geedam polic
e station where we met the detainees, which included two old and infirm people,
a one-eyed man, and a young girl. They all said that they happened to be in Satt
uva village, from where most people had already fled to camps. The river was in
flood, one said, and they had been left behind because no more boats were availa
ble (boats had been stopped by the security forces for two days, as we discovere
d when we tried to cross the Indravati to reach Markapal village). He had an old
mother, wife and three small children whom he had to take across. The girl said
she had been grazing cattle when she was picked up. Another old man, a resident
of Jhadka village, said he had come to stay with his brother in Sattuva and cul
tivate his fields there. They said they had been sitting in a house discussing h
ow to go across the river when they were detained. The police claimed that these
five had been arrested while possessing tiffin bombs the earlier evening (29 No
vember). There was no FIR showing the charges against them, let alone any arrest
warrant. When we again visited Geedum police station on 1 December, the detaine
es complained that they had been beaten in custody. When we asked the station-in
-charge whether an FIR had been filed, he said that the ‘operation’ was still on, an
d they were waiting for it to conclude to register the FIR. This appears to be
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Box 6
Case of Kamlesh Paikra: Threat to Independent Journalists
Kamlesh Paikra, 27, is a local journalist from Cherpal village, who till recentl
y was working as Bijapur correspondent of Hindsatt (a daily published from Jagda
lpur), when he fell foul of the administration. Since he had been regularly repo
rting about the naxals in Dantewada, the SP Bijapur began to pressurize him abou
t his naxal connections, and in April 2005, proposed that he reveal his sources
to the police in complete violation of accepted journalistic practice the world
over. When Kamlesh refused, the SP warned him of dire consequences. In September
2005, Salwa Judum gangs burnt down approximately 50 houses in Mankeli village,
near Bijapur. There were unconfirmed reports of several deaths. Following Kamles
h’s reporting of the incident (Hindsatt , 8 September), a CPI team visited Mankeli
. After this, Kamlesh’s harassment by the administration and Salwa Judum took a se
rious turn. In addition to being a journalist, Kamlesh ran a fair price shop in
Bijapur. He used to buy rice from the Food Corporation of India at the BPL rate
of Rs 5.70 a kilo and sell it at the ‘saptahik bazaar’ for Rs. 6.15. For this, he ha
d to renew a permit every week. After his 8 Sept news report, first his quota of
rice for the weekly bazaar was refused him. Then his permit was cancelled. No r
eason was given. Despite approaching the Food Inspector, the Assistant Collector
, and the police, the permit was not renewed. His movement around Bijapur was al
so restricted. He was not allowed to visit the villages affected by Salwa Judum
and the camps where displaced people are living. A PUCL team visited Dantewada b
etween 26- 29 November. They asked Kamlesh to accompany them; in spite of their
presence, he was prevented from visiting the effected villages and camps. He was
directly blamed for inviting both the CPI and the PUCL teams. Then they began t
o target his family. His elder brother Tarkeshwar Singh was a ‘prabhari’ in Cherpal
High School. The police claimed that naxal literature and uniforms were recovere
d from Tarkeshwar’s house and jailed him on 1 Dec 2005. He was later charged in a
bomb explosion case that happened in Padera village in which 1 jawan was injured
. Tarkeshwar was released on bail two weeks later, but the case is still on. Aft
er further harassment, and fearing for his life, Kamlesh moved to Dantewada town
in the third week of December with his wife and parents. He does not have a job
nor his fair price shop..This seems to be the price for being a honest journali
st. Kamlesh Paikra is a member of the Chhattisgarh Shramjivi Patrakar Sangh. The
y submitted an application on his behalf to the Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh,
the Governor and the leader of the opposition. Nothing came of it. He is still a
fraid for his life. Kamlesh is not the only one. Another journalist, Lakshman Si
ngh Kusram, also from Bijapur, reported on the molestation of some adivasi women
by the CRPF jawans in Kutru. Now the police has reached his house, and have bee
n threatening him. Shockingly, this violation of journalistic freedom is explici
tly part of the administration’s policy. The workplan of the Dantewada Collector m
aintains that there is need to institute restrictions on the media. This documen
t argues that “media coverage of Naxalite attacks makes it look as if they are gai
ning the upper hand. By reporting what the Naxalites are doing as against report
ing how ordinary people [read salwa Judum] are responding, the media indirectly
gives the Naxalites a voice.” It advocates controls on the media, beginning with a
meeting between the administration and all news publishers/media channels remin
ding them of their accountability to the people.
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the norm being followed in Dantewada. The DSP Dantewada also told us that FIRs s
howing arrests are recorded only when an operation concluded. When he was remind
ed that such delays in registering FIRs amounted to flouting the binding directi
ve of the Supreme Court (in the D.K. Basu judgment) to record arrest within 24 h
ours of detention, he claimed, shockingly, that in the midst of an ‘undeclared war’
such delays are not unusual.
japur. The police simply look on at the checkpoints where Salwa Judum activists
operate. While we were in Bijapur, Salwa Judum leaders kept walking into the SDM’s
house and shouting at him for letting us visit the villages. The Salwa Judum ma
de every effort to see that we did not go to Mankeli village. They also did not
let us take local journalist Kamlesh Paikra with us (see Box 6: The Case of Kaml
esh Paikra). Also, the civilian population is being provided arms and training b
y the government, an alarming militarization of civil society. At all the camps
we visited between Geedam and Bijapur, namely Matwada, Bhairamgarh, Meertur, Nel
asnar, Bijapur and Gangaloor, young men were undergoing training to become speci
al police officers (SPOs). The SPOs, according to the District Collector and the
station-in-charges at Bhairamgarh and at Meertur, comprised either former sangh
am members or young adivasi men related to the Salwa Judum activists. It is not
clear whether these SPOs will be provided guns or not (the District Collector is
clearly opposed to it), but their training involves learning to handle a gun. T
he District Collector told us that village defence committees (VDCs) are being s
et up and that some of these young men will become SPOs attached to VDCs. As men
tioned, SPOs under training have been promised Rs 1,500 per month, a honorarium
set by central government for the SPOs as part of its counter-insurgency operati
ons. We observed that some SPOs have been armed with guns, while bows and arrows
have been distributed on a large scale to villages that join the Salwa Judum. T
he administration claims that these are the people’s traditional weapons, but the
Collector’s work plan makes it clear that distributing bows and arrow is part of t
he administration’s plans (Collector’s Work Plan). All this calls into question the
very notion of a civil administration; an administration that has failed to be a
ccountable to the people is covering up its failures by co-opting common people.
The local civil authority in Dantewada is unable to assert itself before the Sa
lwa Judum activists. The government has consciously al-
7. The Breakdown of Civil Administration
The civil administration is expected to be the interface between the people and
the government. It is supposed to, apart from enforcing the policies and program
mes of the government, act as a grievance redressal mechanism for ordinary peopl
e. It has not done that nor provided anything that can be seen as development fo
r ordinary people. And due to the intensified conflict in recent times between t
he Maoists and the Salwa Judum, the police, which in theory is meant to be the c
ivil institution for the prevention and detection of crime and the maintenance o
f rule of law, has become part of the war-like operations here, a euphemism for
para-military formations. The situation we found in Dantewada has serious and fr
ightening consequences for the formal functioning of democracy because the civil
administration now operates on the whims of the Salwa Judum activists and the s
ecurity forces, against common people. Although the District Collector assured u
s that our team members were free to move anywhere, it was apparent that on the
highway (NH 16) the situation was different. While the CRPF or the Naga Battalio
n or the District Armed Police manned some checkpoints, it was even more disconc
erting to note that Salwa Judum activists were manning their own checkpoints in
full view of the government forces. They carried out searches of our vehicle and
demanded to know the purpose of our visit. Salwa Judum members man checkpoints
on roads, search people’s belongings and control the flow of transport. We heard r
eports of how they had earlier been harassing bus drivers and had looted shops i
n Bi-
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lowed the local civilian authority to be weakened at the hands of the Salwa Judu
m leadership. When the SDM of Bijapur did not assert his authority despite appea
ring visibly uncomfortable by the unruly behaviour of the Salwa Judum activists
who entered his house at will, we realized that he exercised little control over
them. In contrast, at Meertur, the local thanain-charge sent a word to the vill
age mukhia (a Salwa Judum member) to collect people so that we could talk to the
m! Clearly, police and official state forces work closely with the Salwa Judum f
orces. That the police officers brazenly explain that whatever is taking place i
s because of the state of “undeclared war” not only contributes to the breakdown of
civil administration but is also conducive to creating a climate of impunity.
CHAPTER THREE
The Militarisation of Adivasi Society
It is as though a new chain of command exists on the ground in Dantewada. This i
s based on a policy that considers groups such as the Salwa Judum of critical im
portance to fight the Maoists, and in which the security forces call the shots.
There is evidence to show that the degree of lawlessness that operates in Dantew
ada district is a direct result of an all-India policy to fight “Naxalism”. Annual r
eports of the Ministry of Home Affairs provide some insights into what passes fo
r official policy. Read together with a work proposal prepared by the district c
ollector of Dantewada the logic of the prevailing lawlessness becomes evident. I
n chapter 1, we had briefly narrated some attempts in the past to promote a ‘Jan J
agran Abhiyans’. Some of the dramatis personae remain much the same, such as Mahen
dra Karma. What is new is the overt involvement of the district administration t
his time. The presence
Undeclared War
of the district collector in most Salwa Judum meetings, the fact that Salwa Judu
m camps are set up next to police stations, that the training of SPOs takes plac
e in close proximity to the camps their family members live in these camps, and
food and work is offered to them under various government schemes makes this an
unequal but symbiotic relationship between the administration and the Salwa Judu
m. In keeping with this, the administration is even turning a blind eye to the c
riminal pasts of some of the Salwa Judum leadership, such as Mahendra Karma, Aja
y Singh, Vikram Mandavi etc, who have been implicated in corruption and even mur
der. In an interview given to us, Lakshman Kashyap in fact confirmed the rampant
corruption among the local leadership. However, they form part of the section w
hich is “anti-naxal” and hence their chequered past is of little consequence for the
administration.
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Box 7
Excerpts from Home Ministry’s Annual Report 2004-05
“3.122 Keeping in view the overall dimension of naxalism in nine States, a high le
vel coordination Centre headed by the Union Home Secretary with Chief Secretarie
s and DsGP of naxalite affected States meets regularly and reviews and coordinat
es steps taken by the States to check naxal activities (p. 45).. “3.123 The import
ant decisions taken by the Coordinate Centre include … long-term deployment of Cen
tral Police Forces, inclusion of more districts and items under the Security Rel
ated Expenditure (SRE) Scheme, modernisation and upgradation of State Police for
ces and fortification of Police Stations for anti naxalite operations, … effective
implementation of various developmental schemes in the affected areas and creat
ion of Local Resistance Groups (p. 45). “3.129 Nineteen IRBns. [Indian Reserve Bat
talions] have so far been sanctioned to the states affected by naxalism (Andhra
Pradesh,-5, Bihar-2, Orissa-2,Chhattisgarh-2,Maharashtra-2, West Bengal-2, Jhark
hand-2 and Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh-1 each). The state governments are b
eing advised to expedite raising of IR Bns. (p. 47). “3.134 To enable the States t
o undertake more effective anti-naxalite action, the Ministry of Home Affairs [M
HA] has a scheme since April1 1996 namely, Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Sc
heme. … Presently, 76 districts in nine states are covered and the Ministry reimbu
rses 75-100% of the expenditure incurred on security related items, such as ex-g
ratia grant paid to families of the victims of naxal violence, providing logisti
cs and camp facilities to the CPFs, amount spent on special training given to St
ate Police personnel, provision of insurance for State Police personnel involved
in anti-naxalite operations, a lump sum grant to Village Defence Committees (VD
Cs)/ Nagarik Suraksha Samitis (NSSs) for security related expenditure, honorariu
m to the Special Police Officers (SPOs), lump sum amount per naxalite surrendere
e, expenditure incurred on publicity material, and hiring of vehicles including
helicopters, weapons or communications equipment etc. Up to February 2005, a sum
of Rs 125.56 cr under the SRE scheme has been reimbursed to the affected State
Governments (pp. 47-48). “3.137 The MHA took special initiative in getting the bad
ly naxal affected districts (55) included under the Backward Districts Initiativ
e component of the Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana scheme of Planning Commission whic
h provides Rs 15 crore per year per district for a period of 3 years to fill in
the critical gaps in physical and social infrastsructure. This works out to Rs 2
,475 crore, which will help accelerate the pace of development in the naxal affe
cted districts. While 35 districts were covered in 2003-04, the remaining 20 are
being taken up in the current fiscal year” (p. 49). “3.138 [Additionally], for cons
truction of roads in naxal-affected areas, the Ministry of Rural Development has
given a special allocation of Rs 37.50 crore per annum for naxal -affected Stat
es under the PMGSY” (p. 49). Note: Paragraph numbers and page numbers refer to the
original document.
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Moreover, when this patronage is read together with the central government’s advoc
acy of: (a) “creation”, “promotion”, “encouragement” of “local resistance groups”; (b) its
ng between 75-100% of the expenditure incurred by states fighting this war again
st the naxalites, and (c) the formation of VDCs, recruiting of SPOs etc, it beco
mes evident that this is part of an all-India policy to fight the so-called “menac
e” of “naxalism” militarily, financed and coordinated by the central government. So mu
ch so that even posters and pamphlets put up along the highway between Geedam to
Bijapur are funded by the central government under re-imbursement of “expenditure
incurred on publicity material” (See Box 7: Ministry of Home Affaris [MHA], Annua
l Report 2004-05). The Dantewada district collector’s work proposal (see Box 8: Ex
cerpts from the Collector’s Work Proposal) also reveals the symbiotic relationship
between the administration and the Salwa Judum. According to the proposal, Dant
ewada is an “entirely naxalite affected district”, and people from “200 villages” (the n
umber of villages had gone up to 400 by the time he spoke to us in end-November
2005) have started “a people’s awareness campaign against them”. But the Collector als
o says “it is imperative that the campaign receive administrative support” and ident
ifies three areas, namely “a common leader”; “adequate security”; and provision for “trans
port” as well as “food and a place to stay”. It appears that this is being undertaken
in so far as Mahendra Karma is projected as the leader, and the district adminis
tration is providing transportation, food and camps to put up people. While this
can be glossed over by the officials as relief and rehabilitation of displaced
people what cannot be ignored is the other aspect of this policy. This concerns
the formation of Village Defence Committees (VDCs) and training of Special Polic
e Officers (SPOs). VDCs and SPOs have been a part of the counter-insurgency poli
cy followed by the Indian government for many years. These have been tried out a
nd fine-tuned over the years in
various places as far apart as the North-East, Jammu & Kashmir, and Jharkhand (w
here they are called Nagarik Suraksha Samitis). These are funded through lump su
m grants provided by the MHA every year. In Chhattisgarh these are coming up now
and forms part of the government’s answer to the sanghams, the basic units of the
Maoists at the village level. The Collector’s work proposal states that the “real s
trength [of Maoists] lies in sangham membership who are from among the villagers….
who help in operations of the naxalites” . And insists that “it is not enough to kil
l naxalites but more important to crush and destroy their system”. Constituting VD
Cs comprising “village head person, panch, sarpanch as well as young men” ( in oppos
ition to the sanghams) is considered vital to the success and consolidation of t
he war against the Maoists. Not only is physical annihilation of naxalites consi
dered necessary, it is “only when people see naxalites fleeing or getting killed” wi
ll they side with the administration. The manner in which VDCs are constituted s
hows their counter-insurgency roots. Information about a village’s population, the
number of families, and distance from the police station is first collected. Th
en the entire area is divided into sectors of 8-10 villages. Security forces are
deployed in these, with each sector having a VDC as well. Each VDC in a cluster
will have between 40-50 members. The VDCs’ composition overlaps with that of the
Salwa Judum in so far as the VDCs comprise “village headperson, panch, sarpanch as
well as young men”. Surrendered sangham members and young men and women from vill
ages get trained to become SPOs. These SPOs are vital to this plan because they
will be located in the villages and “used for regular searches”. In other words, the
official policy seeks to build up the fighting capability of the administration
by creating a network of informants and combatants from the villagelevel upward
s. Salwa Judum is an intrinsic part of this because this enables the administrat
ion to: (a) establish its authority in Maoist strongholds, in villages to which
entry was hitherto difficult; (b) identify whom to enlist/recruit in
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Box 8
Work Proposal for Salwa Judum, 2005
“Common Man’s Awareness Raising Campaign against Naxalites, 2005. Work Plan to Make
the Campaign Successful; District South Bastar, Dantewada (Chhattisgarh)”
Excerpts from the District Collector’s
“Dantewada district is an entirely naxalite-affected district. The district has 11
development blocks. Currently, in two out of 11 blocks, namely Bhairamgarh and
Bijapur people from 200 villages falling within Kutru, Farsegarh, Bedre, Jangla,
Bijapur, Bhairamgarh and Nelsnar police stations, fed up with naxalite excesses
, have started a people’s awareness campaign against them. This campaign has now s
pread to 60 villages from Bade Tumnar and Barsur area of Geedam block and people
from these areas too are present at meetings. In the coming days this campaign
will spread to three other development blocs namely Usur, Bhopalpatnam and Konta”(
p. 2). “Naxalites prohibited all their (villagers) activities and tyrannise them o
n a daily basis. They demand that villagers hand over young boys and girls to jo
in their dalam. Refusal carries threat to their lives. Those working hard are le
ft with ten sacks of paddy and rest is forcibly taken away. They do not let any
development work take place, oppose all administrative work thus progress of vil
lages is halted, and basic amenities cannot reach villages, people do not get jo
bs, all this has resulted in the problem of starvation”(p. 3). “So far, the campaign
has held meetings in thirty places and in six places rallies have been held. In
the meetings people from 30-35 villages meet on an agreed date at a designated
place”(p. 4). “Considering the village by village conditions operating it is imperat
ive that the campaign receive administrative support. … Firstly, the campaign need
s a common leader who can direct the campaign in a planned way. Secondly, adequa
te security must be provided to the participants so that they can overcome press
ure from the naxalites. And thirdly, during the campaign, villagers must be prov
ided transport as and when needed, as well as food and a place to stay at govern
ment expense”(p. 5). “(C)ollecting information about village population, number of f
amilies, distance from police station to the village”; “of constituting village defe
nse committees which should comprise village headperson, panch, sarpanch as well
as young men…”(p. 9). “It is proposed that young men and women from the villages be m
ade Special Police Officers. Depending upon the size of the village 5-10 SPOs wo
uld be needed. These SPOs will receive Rs 1,500 per month as honorarium”(pp. 9-10)
. “Apart from imparting training to the villagers, providing them with traditional
weapons such as bow and arrow, farsa, axe, stick, ballam, etc is extremely impo
rtant. Although such weapons are with most villagers but to encourage them peopl
e should either be given arrows or iron to prepare arrows. While villagers are a
sking for guns or license to use them, this is not advisable. Even if licensed g
uns are provided they can be looted by naxalites or the licensee could be killed
to get his gun … Besides, an armed person can later on join a naxalite organizati
on which will enhance the strength of the naxalites. Therefore, the villagers’ req
uest [for guns] is not worth accepting and they should only be provided traditio
nal weapons”(pp. 10-11). continued on next page
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naxalism_1
continued from last page “If we look minutely at police work in naxalite affected
areas, it is more defensive and less aggressive. Now the time has come when the
police … have to become more aggressive. Although sometimes because of reasons bey
ond one’s control some excesses do take place and some innocents do get affected.
But keeping in mind the overall context of major operations, it is important tha
t the higher-ups remain silent” (pp. 13). … Only when people see naxalites fleeing o
r getting killed will they side with the administration. Therefore, this policy
must be pursued strictly. And for this police officers should be given a target”(p
p. 14). … (A)ppointing, temporarily, a DIG for Bijapur police district who can ove
rsee the progress of the campaign on a daily basis…”(pp 16). The work plan argues fo
r widening the definition of “naxalite” for the purpose of rehabilitation of surrend
ered naxalites, to include “sangam members”. The current definition restricts it to
those in uniform, carrying arms or a member of a dalam. The “real strength [of Mao
ists] lies in sangam membership who are from among the villagers. … Villagers are
common people who side with whoever is powerful and follow whatever is demanded
of them. Sangam membes are the actual workers of the naxalites who help in opera
tions of the naxalites. … To end the problem of naxalites, it is not enough to kil
l naxalites but more important to crush and destroy their system operating at th
e village level”(pp. 15–16). The work plan proposes to divide the area into sectors
comprising 8-10 villages (pp17). These clusters of villages will have deployment
of security forces. It suggests a company for each cluster. And each cluster wi
ll contain village defence committees and the newly enlisted SPOs would be used
for regular searches (pp 18). The collector also argues that “media coverage of Na
xalite attacks makes it look as if they are gaining the upper hand. By reporting
what Naxalites are doing as against reporting how ordinary people (read Salwa J
udum) are responding, the media indirectly gives the Naxalites a voice”. He advoca
tes controls on the media, beginning with a meeting between the administration a
nd all news publishers/media channels reminding them of their accountability to
the people (p. 25). Note: Page numbers refer to the original document their war
against the Maoists and finally (c) to gather information vital for fighting the
‘war’. Besides, with 400 villages already “combed” (by November) according to the Comma
ndant of the IRB in Dantewada, the administration proposes to recruit 5-10 SPOs
for each village (totalling 2,000-4,000 SPOs for the district). Further, each se
ctor of 8-10 villages will have a deployment of a company of roughly 100 police
personnel. Each VDC in a sector will have SPOs attached to them. The total known
strength of paramilitary forces provided by the central government (and other s
tates) as of now is 7,000 and is likely to increase as there is a demand to depl
oy more troops. Thus a total force strength of roughly 13-16,000 is currently de
ployed to fight naxalism in a district with a total population of merely 7.2 lak
hs (2001 census); in other words, a forces to people ratio of 1:45! And this is
not just any police, but armed police. (In comparision, the total police to peop
le ratio for an already highly policed Delhi is 1:179. That too, 2/ 3rd of this
police force in Delhi are civil police.) Alongside this, other developments are
taking pace in Dantewada. The District Armed Police Force is being upgraded. Exi
sting police stations are being reinforced, and new camps and police stations be
ing set up all across the district. While Dantewada and Bijapur police districts
have 37 police stations, 33 new police sta-
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tions are being set up. According to the MHA annual report 2004-05, apart from t
he District Force (DF), two India Reserve Battalions have been sanctioned for Ch
hattisgarh. There are currently already five battalions of CRPF, one Naga IRB an
d at least one battalion of the Gujarat Armed Police. If Lakshman Kashyap is to
believed, then the Salwa Judum has been requesting a few more batallions of the
Naga IRB. The Home Minister of Chhattisgarh had informed the state assembly on 1
6 May 2005 that his government had sought five battalions of armed police from G
ujarat and Punjab. The Chhattisgarh Home Secretary too has stated that the admin
istration has requested a few more battalions of the Naga armed police. (See ‘Naxa
lwatch’ weblog, 23 January 2006). Even this by no means completes the picture. Chh
attisgarh now boasts of a new Jungle Warfare Training School at Kanker, headed b
y an army Brigadier. The GOC-in-C of the army’s Southern Command is now involved i
n regular meetings with the administration in Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and Andh
ra Pradesh to monitor the progress of anti-naxal operations. Helicopters and aer
ial surveillance have been mentioned in official statements. There is talk of de
ploying helicopter gun ships and/or using them for ferrying combat troops. Just
to give an idea of the extent of deployment of troops in Dantewada, the 23 kms o
f road from Bijapur to Gangaloor has three CRPF camps and two of the Naga IRBs.
Each camp comprises between 20-50 jawans. Squads of five
CRPF jawans, armed with three assault rifles, one 2-inch mortar launcher and a s
tengun, cycle up and down the road between their camps. At Meertur, the police s
tation appeared to be a fortified area with barbed wire fences and a watch tower
, and with security force personnel carrying light machine guns, posessing morta
r launchers etc.. This conforms to providing “carpet security” cover in this area. E
ven road building has a security angle more than anything else. Work on the high
way (NH 16) between Jagdalpur and Nizamabad (via Bhopalpatnam) is being carried
out by the Border Roads Organization (BRO), the road construction wing of the Ar
my. As the name suggests, it’s meant to build and maintain roads in border areas o
f the country. Its involvement in “difficult and militancy prone areas of Maharash
tra and Chhattisgarh” (www.bro.nic.in) reveals the mindset of the administration w
hich perceives the situation in Bastar – a region with no international border – to
be one which requires the services of the army’s road construction agency. To advo
cate the physical annihiliation of Maoists and giving police officers a “target” to
fulfil and/ or to seek to destroy “their system operating at the village level” is t
o pursue and promote blood-letting. The militarization of society through the fo
rmation of VDCs and SPOs and arming them indicates that what is going on in Bast
ar is not remotely a “peace campaign” but the government is waging a war on its own
people.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The team’s observations on the fact- finding can be briefly summed up as follows:
1. Several villages are virtually deserted. The few we came across said they com
e to the villages during the day to harvest the paddy crop and return to their c
amps as evening falls. Those who are now kept in camps some distance from their
homes can’t even do this. Many people are accommodated in houses built close to th
e highway and not too far from a police station. While some are being offered jo
bs on daily wages for construction work/schemes of the government and others are
being trained to become SPOs, nothing is said about their land and fields left
behind in their villages. 2. There is a pattern in evicting people from their vi
llages. Sometimes the entire village is evacuated; in other instances, only a fe
w families are moved out. A meeting is announced to be held in a targeted villag
e. On that date, a Salwa Judum crowd accompanied by security forces descends on
the village and asks people to come to the camp and sangham members to surrender
. If villagers show reluctance, they are attacked, belongings looted, houses bur
nt and some people either lynched or killed by soldiers. Thus if ‘guerillas’ are lik
e fish in the water then evacuation/forced migration of some or all families see
ms to be to drain the water or to force people out from precisely those villages
where naxalites enjoyed support, in order to deny them sustenance. 3. Across Da
ntewada and Bijapur police districts and especially all along the national highw
ay, security forces and Salwa Judum members man checkpoints. The Salwa Judum act
ivists question people, check their belongings and even enjoy the power to stop
a person from traveling in this area. 4. Police stations do not maintain records
of or investigate crimes committed by the DF, Naga IRB, CRPF and Salwa Judum me
mbers, fostering a situation of complete impunity..
Conclusion
5. While ‘development’ is said to be the flip side of the security approach towards
naxalites, ‘development’ in this area is nothing more than an appendage of security.
Road building in Dantewada, both on the highway and in interior areas, repairin
g culverts and small bridges, etc is geared towards easy accessibility for secur
ity forces into forest areas. 6. The administration is undertaking a systematic
militarization of Dantewada through the arming of the village population, settin
g up of VDCs, training SPOs, and financing such operations as part of the centra
l government’s antiNaxal policy, of which the Salwa Judum is an integral part. Thi
s kind of militarization of sections of village society in the form of the Salwa
Judum on the one hand, and the brutal attacks on Maoist strongholds on the othe
r, make for an incendiary situation. The atmosphere reeks of coercion. In such a
climate anyone who does not accept the official point of view is automatically
suspect and is regarded as being pro-naxal, and therefore, an enemy who brooks n
o respect as a fellow citizen. The District Collector does not deny that Maoists
have been successful in organising local villagers, and yet people’s political ch
oices are being completely negated. Sanghams, states the Collector’s document, hav
e to be “crushed and destroyed” as they form the strength of the Maoists at the vill
age level. There is the conspicuous absence of any attempt by the government to
understand the context of what are the genuine problems of the people of the reg
ion, and why and how Maoists took roots here. The reference in the district coll
ector’s work proposal to the pathetic conditions of the tribals who are “uneducated”, “e
xtremely poor”, “lack basic facilities”, amounts to an indictment of successive govern
ments, that have wilfully remained oblivious of this for six decades! It is only
when the Maoists entered this area and began to organize the tribals that the a
dministration awoke from its stupor. The little
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development work by the government has been prompted by or caused by umpteen str
uggles: against forest officials, strikes for better price for plucking tendu le
af, wages under government schemes, etc. A confrontation under the prevailing co
nditions is to exploit the resulting divide within tribal society in such a way
that the already privileged sections of the tribal and settler communities are a
rrayed against fellow tribals who are sympathetic towards Maoists. By promoting
through Salwa Judum precisely that section of tribal and non-tribal society whic
h benefited from the debilitating conditions imposed on the tribals, the ordinar
y villagers are once again being pushed back into a situation of being manipulat
ed and exploited. By arming one section of society against another, all the gove
rnment is doing is legitimising the need for resorting to violence as a means of
resolving political differences. We have referred in the report to the fact tha
t, unlike in the past, the Salwa Judum is part of a war-making exercise of which
officials in Dantewada openly speak. Why is the war taking place now? Besides t
he political motivation of defeating the Maoists, there appears to be another in
creasingly pressing reason. Bastar comprises some of the largest untapped minera
l resources in the country and recent months and years has witnessed an intense
opening out of mineral resources to domestic and foreign capital in Chhattisgarh
, MP and Orissa. The Industrial Policy (2004-09) announced by the Chhattisgarh g
overnment also seeks to invite investments to exploit the mineral and other reso
urces of Bastar as part of its development strategy. It has signed a number of M
OUs with large private companies, a number of which are located in Dantewada dis
trict. With Orissa and Jharkhand opening up its tribal areas to attract huge pri
vate investments there is additional pressure
to open up Bastar. Targeting the Maoists through the Salwa Judum is also targeti
ng some of the potential resistance to this pattern of forced ‘development’, of whic
h most poor locals have always been only the victims. In this sense, the conflic
t in Dantewada gets pushed to a higher plane where the war against the Maoists a
lso ties in with the struggle over ownership and control over land, water, fores
ts and mineral wealth. The vagueness of an-all India policy hiding behind “securit
y” and “development” reveals itself as nothing but a crude struggle for occupying trib
al land. Chhattisgarh has been the scene in the past of several important strugg
les of the tribals against projects that sought to usurp control over their land
, forest and mineral wealth unmindful of their interests. Under these circumstan
ces, we fear that what the central and state governments are preparing to prosec
ute in Bastar is a bloody, brutal and a long war. The maintenance of democratic
practices by people’s movements is particularly important in furthering a progress
ively democratic society. However, the Maoist movement, with significant numbers
of people backing it in this region, cannot be dealt with as a law-and-order si
tuation through what is essentially a counter-insurgency approach. To resolve th
is civil war-like situation, the issues of the life and livelihoods of the ordin
ary public need to be addressed seriously, not undermined even further as the go
vernment is doing now. The government ought to create a situation in which progr
essive demilitarization can be sought and conflict replaced by political dialogu
e. The importance of dialogue – which ought to incorporate a way to address people’s
root problems – cannot be overstressed in this situation in which people’s lives, s
ocial, economic and political structures, their cultures, and indeed their very
survival is at stake.
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WE DEMAND
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. That the government stop using people as a shield and creat
ing armed Village Defence Committees as part of its anti-naxal operations; That
paramilitary forces be withdrawn from the area and the civil administration be r
estored; That all killings by the state, the Salwa Judum and the Maoists be stop
ped. That sincere dialogue with the Maoists be initiated, and a political resolu
tion to the situation be found; That FIRs be registered for all crimes committed
by the Salwa Judum and security forces and the culprits be prosecuted; That the
government and the CPI (Maoist) ensure that people return to their homes in pea
ce and security; That people be assisted in regaining their livelihoods in their
villages and camps be dismantled.
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Annexure I:
Village
*Hiril (* also told to CPI) Dumri Paralnar
Killings by the Salwa Judum / Security forces
Date
01.09.05 11.08.05 1-2.9.05
Killed
Karam Pandu (45)
Detail
Paralnaar Aakwa Pullum / Pulladi Aalvoor Hindri Pottem / Polem
01.10.05 11.10.05 01.09.05 1.09.05 31.08.05 1.09.05 3.09.05 05.09.05
Karremarka Jangla
16.08.05 27.08.05
Gongla Kotarapal
12.09.05 02.09.05 20.09.05 01.07.05 12.09.05 11.08.05 (?) 28.08.05 03.09.05 10.0
9.05 15.09.05 02.09.05
Munder
Ariyaal / Iriyaal
Killed by Naga IRB after burning houses Aatam Boda DAKMS Tamo / Lamo Sukhram (20
) DAKMS Maadvi Kopaal (35) Budhu (35) Unknown (30) Markam Channu Sangham member
Baarse Somu ABS President Name Unknown (12) Kadli Payyaal (45) Emla Rekaal (50)
Madkaam Kummaal (40) Sangham member Tellam Bugru (55) Madvi Messa (35) Sangham m
ember Lekham Lakhmu (50) Sangham member Madvi Somu / Somara (35) Sangham member
Aalam Mahadev (30) Sangham member Modium Boddaal Sangham member Lamo/Tamo Rama (
35) Committee president Lekham Lakku (35) Baal Sangham member Maadvi Paaklu (35)
Sangham secretary name unknown (18) Sangham member Four unnamed Two unnamed Pod
daam Sonu Sandeev Gullu DAKMS secretary Uike Sannu (50) Vanjam Mangu/Manda (55)
Lekam Budhram (35) Sangham member Aatam Bodi (30) Three unnamed Boggam Sannu (18
) Sangham member Kadli Kummal DAKMS Kadli Kamlu DAKMS Kalmu Badru DAKMS Kadli Ch
inna (40) Sangham member Kadli Sannu (35) Sangham member Kadli Kamlu (35) Sangha
m member Kadli Aaylu (40) Sangham member Kadli Raamaal (45) Sangham member Kadli
Kummaal (12) Baal Sangham Uji Masaram (40) Sangham member Uji Jayraam (40) Sang
ham member Emla Shukku (40) Sangham member Kadli Badru (35) Sangham member
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Dorum Dokham Mankeli
01.09.05 01.09.05 15.09.05 25.09.05
Tamo Kotlal (40) His wife (36) Bogmi Kislal (40) Bogmi Sobari (36) Modium Badhru
(20)
03.10.05 Pulgatta Mookavelli 02.09.05 05.10.05
Korsa Shuklu Punem Kanda Emla Kova Kosa Aaytu (45-50) Santo Korsa Salo (20) Vedi
nje Nangi Vedinje Malli
DAKMS SJ meeting held here. 30-40 houses burnt 5 women and 2 children taken by p
olice Sangham member GPC secretary Sangam member KMS Committee The two wives of
Vedinje Chinnal shot while tending to field. One year child also shot at. One wo
man was pregnant. She was killed after removing her foetus. 10 houses burnt. Vil
lage looted.
Belnar Pooslakka Markapaal Kiringed Karkawada Pallewaya Dimdi Pusnaar Kondam Ped
da Korma Etepaar Pabeda Gornaam Punwaar Paamra Mosla Bomra Keshlulul Rajug Kutru
08.10.05 June 05 July 05 July 05
Bokkaal Gulaab Somaru Manku Budhram Buggur Madvi Laxman Mellam Dagur Poddaam Cha
rri Vesa Joga Mudiami Shukko Kursaam Lekhten Madkam Channi Aapka Seenu Sodi Kosa
Punem Budhu Paaklu (Aasa Channu) Emla Lakshu Dugga Guruji (Teacher) Madvi Reeja
Five women and one man
22.09.05 01.09.05 12.09.05 03.09.05 01.10.05 05.10.05 13.09.05 15.09.05 01.09.05
02.09.05 09.10.05 11.07.05 1-7.10.05
Father of Dalam member Sangham member Committee member KAMS pres. on RPC KAMS CS
Killed by Nagas (also told to CPI) Sangham member Militia Militia Militia Range
Committee
SJ and police raped and killed the 5 women. Salwa Judum getting people to this c
amp, where they are tortured and killed.Dead bodies thrown nearby or in Indravat
i.river. Four headless bodies have been thus found.
(Source: Press Statements of CPI [Maoist] Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee,
issued on 10 October, and 20 November, 2005.)
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naxalism_1
Annexure-II Killings by Maoists during the Salwa Judum Operation
This is the list given to us by the Collector, Dantewada; According to the Colle
ctor, each of these deceased’s families have been compensated with a sum of Rs 1 l
akh.
Name of Deceased
Miccha Dishru Mohan Singh Bhuvneshwar Thakur Kotadu Potti Murami Sodi Barre Vija
y Giri Kohrama Kanglu Evda Vacham Vacham Gunda Arki Gangaram Telam Pijja Todsam
Ganpat Kishore Enka Budhram Badrinath Vacham Chaitu Satish Sai Betti Lalu Kohram
i Ramsingh Hemla Lakhu Poonam Lakhu Kadti Aaytu Poonem Mangalram Kadti Mangu Kad
ti Koya Barsa Nehru Karam Kanhaiya Podiyami Dhandhu Sukku Karma Sukhram
Village
Bandeparre Naimed Jangla Rekhavaya Dunga Nendur Chintagupha Bijapur Kotarapal Ka
rkeli Karkeli Uskapatnam Uskapatnam Ambeli Ambeli Ambeli Aalnaar Jaramarka Tumla
Pondum Karremarka Karremarka Bodlui Kothrapara Pharasmundal Pinconda Pharasmund
al Kodli Pondum Arjunli Bodenar Pharaspal Pharaspal
Tehsil
Bhopalpatnam Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Konta Bijapur Bijapur Bijap
ur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Dantewada Bijapur Bijapur Bij
apur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bho
palpatnam Bijapur Dantewada Dantewada
Date of Incident
19/6/05 19/6/05 26/6/05 28/6/05 29/6/05 29/6/05 5/7/05 7/7/05 11/7/05 15/7/05 15
/7/05 16/7/05 16/7/05 16/7/05 16/7/05 16/7/05 18/7/05 19/7/05 21/7/05 23/7/05 27
/7/05 27/7/05 28/7/05 28/7/05 28/7/05 28/7/05 28/7/05 28/7/05 28/7/05 5/8/05 6/8
/05 9/8/05 9/8/05
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Pandru Ramu Jaggu Kadiyam Rajendra Shrinath Potam Budhu Suryapal Mahadev Manjhi
Madvi Jagra Anthas Kispota Darshils Minjh Hemla Pandu Anil Mudiyam Budhram Paspu
l Linga Poyami Budhu Mehtar Hapka Mangu Hemla Sannu Hemla Dashrath Jumdi Lakshma
iyya Kodiyam Lakhmu Pujari Budhram Hapka Aaytu Munnaram Vetti Beko Chaitu Kumar
Ella Samlu Hemla Budhram Purushum Mangu Fagnu
Jangla Jangla Chidrapal Manjhiguda Pusnar Gongla Gongla Padiharpara Padiharpara
Padiharpara Padiharpara Gangaloor Kodoli Saagwahi Cherpal Ambeli Chihka Ghumra G
angaloor Bhogamguda Cherpal Koyaeetpal Gongla Hallur Gumalnaar Badepotenaar Pade
da Padeda Gangaloor Pedapal Ketulnaar
Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur
Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur
Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Dantewada Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapur Bijapu
r Bijapur
14/8/05 14/8/05 23/8/05 3/9/05 22/9/05 22/9/05 22/9/05 29/9/05 29/9/05 29/9/05 2
9/9/05 29/9/05 29/9/05 1/10/05 3/10/05 14/10/05 16/10/05 22/10/05 23/10/05 23/10
/05 28/10/05 3/11/05 3/11/05 5/11/05 6/11/05 6/11/05 6/11/05 10/10/05 10/10/05 1
7/11/05 22/11/05
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naxalism_1
1 From the People proceeds the power of the State. –But where does it proceed to?
Yes, where is it proceeding to? There’s some place it’s proceeding to. The policeman
proceeds through the station gate. –But where does he proceed to? etc. 2 Look, th
ere’s the whole lot on the march. –But where are they marching to? Yes, where are th
ey marching to? There’s some place they are marching to. They wheel through the ga
te and under the arch. –But where are they heeling to? etc. 3 The power of the Sta
te turns right about. Something is in the air. –What can be in the air? There’s some
thing in the air. The power of the state gives a piercing shout And yells: Get m
oving there! –But moving why and where? It yells: Get moving there! 4 There’s someth
ing standing in a crowd Something which queries that. Why should it query that?
What cheek to query that! The State just shoots-for that’s allowedAnd something fa
lls down flat. What was it fell down flat? What made it fall like that? 5 The po
wer of the State sees something spill. Something lies in the shit. What’s lying in
the shit? Something’s lying in the shit. There’s something lying deadly still –The Pe
ople, why, that’s it! Can that really be it? Yes, that is really it.
-Bertolt Brecht
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INDEX
S.No.
Particulars of Document
Page Nos
1.
Annexure A/1 Report of the Planning Commission Expert Group
2.
AnnexureA/2 Report by Human Rights Watch, Being Neutral is our Biggest Crime
3.
Annexure A/3 Report by Human Rights Watch, Dangerous Duty, Children and the Chha
ttisgarh Conflict
4.
Annexure A/4 Complaint by Shri Raghu, Action Aid, on intimidation by Salwa Judum
and SPOs
5.
Annexure A/5 News report in Hindustan Times „Village Fears Judum Threat‟
6.
Annexure A/6 Letter from Manish Kunjam on use of translators etc.
7.
AnnexureA/7 Testimony of Smt Muchaki Mutti and ors, regarding killing of husband
, son
8.
AnnexureA/8 Testimony of Kalmu Bhima s/ Kalmu Waga, r/o Arlampalli
9.
Annexure A/9 Testimony of Sodi Bandi w/o Sodi Masa, r/o Arlampalli
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Response to the NHRC (Investigation Division) Chhattisgarh Enquiry Report
Table of Contents A. B. Background to NHRC Investigation Comments on Findings by
NHRC Investigation Division I. Corroboration of Complaints a. Burning of Villag
es by Salwa Judum b. Complicity of State police and administration in arson and
looting of property c. Political leadership and government sponsorship of Salwa
Judum rallies d. Salwa Judum and security forces have forced villagers into camp
s e. Inhibition of freedom of movement f. Extra-judicial killings by SPOs g. Blu
rred boundary between Salwa Judum and SPOs h. SPOs are civilians who are armed a
nd bent on revenge i. Minors were recruited initially j. Forced disappearances k
. Suspect encounters, non-recording of deaths and arson l. Killing of sangham me
mbers by SPOs m. Disruption of education II. Conclusions by NHRC Team which are
not supported by their own evidence regarding: a. Punishment and Intimidation of
suspected Naxalites b. Withdrawal of services to villages not with Salwa Judum
c. Continuing violations by Salwa Judum and security forces d. Conditions in cam
ps e. Basis of allegations f. Illegal checking of vehicles g. Efficacy of Salwa
Judum h. State justification of Salwa Judum
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III. Findings by NHRC Team which call for rigorous judicial enquiry a. Allegatio
ns of Killing b. Allegations of Rape IV. Shortcomings of the NHRC Team‟s investiga
tion process and appreciation of evidence a. Wrong village visited b. Drawing co
nclusions on denial of services based on wrong villages c. Contradicting evidenc
e ignored d. Evidence of IDPs in Andhra Pradesh discounted e. Statement of villa
gers or camp residents who allege killing by Naxalites taken at face value f. St
atement of villagers or camp residents who allege killing by Salwa Judum/SPOs tr
eated skeptically g. Statements by police accepted at face value h. Statements b
y SPOs accepted at face value i. Seeming condonation of killings of sangham memb
ers C. D. Conclusions Chart with detailed analysis of NHRC Team‟s Investigation
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A.
BACKGROUND TO NHRC INVESTIGATION
In May 2007, three citizens filed a writ petition titled as Nandini Sunder & ors
vs. State of Chhattisgarh (WP 250 of 2007) in the Supreme Court based on four f
act-finding reports, including one in which they themselves had been involved (I
ndependent Citizens Initiative, War in the Heart of India). During the course of
this fact-finding, the members of the Independent Citizens Initiative (includin
g the petitioners, Nandini Sundar, Ramachandra Guha and EAS Sarma) had themselve
s been victims of the intimidation and looting of the Salwa Judum, and had their
camera taken away by SPOs and Salwa Judum leaders. WP 250/2007 was followed by
another writ petition titled as Kartam Joga & Ors vs State of Chattisgarh in Aug
ust 2007, filed by three residents of Dantewada who had suffered beating, arson,
looting and intimidation by the Salwa Judum (being a WP 119 of 2007). The facts
and incidents set forth in both petitions were based on accounts from the victi
ms given directly to the petitioners, as well as the personal experience of the
petitioners at the hands of the Salwa Judum activists and SPOs. In WP 119/2007,
testimonies from 111 villages had been annexed, on the basis of which lists of v
illagers killed, houses burnt and women raped had been prepared.
The Independent Citizens Initiative of which Nandini Sundar, Ramachandra Guha an
d EAS Sarma were members, along with Mr BG Verghese (former Editor,
Indian Express and Hindustan Times, Mr. Harivansh, Editor Prabhat Khabar, and
Farah Naqvi (Writer and Journalist) spoke to 8 government representatives, sever
al Salwa Judum leaders, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and residents of 33
villages in 7 camps and 6 villages, a person stated to be a spokesperson of Maoi
sts and several others like shopkeepers, journalists, and NGO workers. Petitione
r No. 1 (Nandini Sundar), had spoken to villagers from 29 villages, before the p
etition was filed.
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Corroboration of rape, arson and killing by Salwa Judum came from the National C
ommission for the Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR), which carried out investig
ations in Dantewada in December 2007. The NCPCR report based on a fact-finding b
y Prof. Shanta Sinha, Mr. JM Lyngdoh (former CEC) and Mr Venkat Reddy, which inv
olved visits to camps and public hearings at Cherla and Kirandul, noted that “many
people shared accounts of family members being killed and women raped by the Sa
lwa Judum.” (Cherla) as well as “There were numerous accounts of family members bein
g killed for resisting the Salwa Judum” (Kirandul). (See WP 250/2007, Annexure P 2
5). Support against vigilantism by Salwa Judum also came from the National Commi
ssion for Women, and reported statements by senior people in government, such as
the Chairman of the Administrative Reforms Commission, Mr. Veerappa Moily, the
former Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh, Mr. Ajit Jogi, the Union Minister for Com
merce, Mr. Jairam Ramesh, the Minister for Tribal Welfare, Mr. PR Kyndiah and in
vestigative news reports by independent journalists from reputed Indian as well
as foreign media, such as Outlook, LiveMint, the BBC, Guardian, Economist, Le Mo
nde Diplomatique and so on.
In 2008, an Expert Committee on Development Challenges to end Extremism set up b
y the Planning Commission, and an internationally reputed NGO, Human Rights Watc
h, also indicted the Salwa Judum for killing, arson and rape, and pointed out th
at arming civilians, especially children, even under the guise of Special Police
Officers, is no solution to the Naxalite problem. The report of the Planning Co
mmission Expert Committee which notes “Encouragement of vigilante groups such as S
alwa Judum and herding of hapless tribals in make-shift camps with dismal living
conditions, removed from their habitat and deprived of livelihood as a strategy
to counter the influence of the radical left is not desirable. It delegitimizes
politics, dehumanizes people, degenerates those engaged in their „security‟, and ab
ove all represents abdication of the State itself,” Copy of the report of Planning
Commission Expert Committee is annexed
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hereto as Annexure A/1. The reports of the Human Rights Watch on Government, Vig
ilante and Naxalite abuses in Chhattisgarh, Being Neutral is our
Biggest Crime,
and on the violations of Child Rights in particular, by both
Naxalites and Salwa Judum, Dangerous Duty: Children and the Chhattisgarh
Conflict, are annexed here as Annexure A/2and A/3 respectively.
The petitioners asked for an independent enquiry into the actions of the Salwa J
udum, SPOs and security forces in Dantewada, as well as an enquiry into killings
by Naxalites (See prayer (b) in both Writ Petition No. 250/2007 and Writ Petiti
on No. 119/2007). While not individually listing the cases of Naxalite violence
since it was presumed that the government was already providing compensation to
the NOK of victims of Naxalites, they pointed to the fact that the people of Dan
tewada are suffering from Naxalite, state and vigilante violence, and asked for
compensation to the victims of Salwa Judum violence on par with that provided to
victims of Naxalite violence. The fact-finding team constituted by the NHRC has
provided details of human rights violations by the Naxalites as well as the Sal
wa Judum and the security forces. Victims of violence by Salwa Judum are no doub
t entitled to similar consideration as that given to victims of Naxalite violenc
e.
In its response the Chhattisgarh government denied any violation by the Salwa Ju
dum, claiming that it was a “peaceful movement”, and “any peaceful movement which resi
sts the violent methods definitely gets support of States” (See Rejoinder Affidavi
t in the Writ Petition No. 250/2007 at pg 308) that “the villagers are never force
d to join the camps” (See sur-rejoinder Affidavit, para c). “It is also denied that
any minors are being appointed as SPOs.” (See, Rejoinder Affidavit in Writ Petitio
n No. 250/2007, para 5 (e) ). It also resisted any independent enquiry, saying “Th
ere is no failure on part of state of Chhattisgarh and therefore independent inv
estigation is uncalled for and unwarranted.” (See para 15, sur-rejoinder Affidavit
in Writ Petition No. 250/2007). The Government
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of Chhattisgarh also noted “Salva Judum is a voluntary, peaceful initiate of the p
eople and if there is any coercion involved in the matter, the State shall take
appropriate action.” (See, Rejoinder Affidavit in Writ Petition No. 250/2007, para
12).
On 31st March 2008, this Hon‟ble Court allowed the petitioners to file an applicat
ion asking for an independent enquiry. The petitioners provided the names of ind
ependent and well known persons including former justices of the Supreme Court,
former CEC, and members of the Planning Commission, including senior women with
experience of investigating sexual violence in situations of conflict. On 15th A
pril 2008, the Supreme Court assigned the task of forming an independent fact-fi
nding committee to the NHRC:
"After hearing both sides, we feel that in view of the serious allegations relat
ing to violation of human rights by Naxalites and Salwa Judum and the living con
ditions in the refugee settlement colonies, it will be
appropriate if the National Human Rights Commission examines/verifies these alle
gations. We leave it to the NHRC to appoint an appropriate fact finding Committe
e with such members, as it deems fit and make available its report to this Court
within eight weeks. We request the State of Chhatisgarh and the Union of India
to render all cooperation to the NHRC and the Committee appointed by it. List af
ter two months."
The “appropriate fact finding Committee” that the NHRC deemed fit to make a report t
o this Hon‟ble Court comprised entirely of police personnel. The Team did not have
any representative of the local tribal communities or any independent „non-police‟
observer. It is submitted, that the fact-finding team being constituted solely o
f police personnel would have received inhibited responses especially if the loc
al populace felt victimized by the Salwa Judum and
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the local police.. That the local administration including the police and the pa
ramilitary forces have already been implicated in cases of arson, rape and killi
ngs is borne by the several testimonies before this Hon‟ble Court as well as those
given to the NCPCR.
The intimation by the petitioners that an arrival of a convoy of ten four-wheele
d drives and an anti-mine tank, along with road clearing exercises which precede
d the visit, would do little to instill confidence in villagers, used to running
away at the sight of the Salwa Judum and police at whose hands they have suffer
ed severe trauma, were also fully borne out by the findings of the investigating
team itself. During the course of the investigation, IDPs from Andhra Pradesh w
ho had come to depose before the NHRC team were intimidated and threatened at Ko
nta by the Salwa Judum leaders in collusion with the Konta police. A copy of the
complaint by P. Raghu, Program Manager, Action Aid, who had accompanied the IDP
s is annexed hereto as Annexure A/4 . A copy of a
news report in the Hindustan Times on intimidation of villagers for speaking out
against Salwa Judum is annexed hereto as Annexure A/5
The intimation by the petitioners that language barriers would prove to be an im
pediment in arriving at the truth also appears to be borne out, especially becau
se SPOs and Salwa Judum activists were being used as translators. A letter from
Manish Kunjam, one of the petitioners, noting the presence of Salwa Judum activi
sts and SPOs as translators to the NHRC team is annexed hereto as Annexure A/6 .
The NHRC team notes that Hindi speakers in the camps and villages were picked u
p randomly to act as interpreters, (See page 6 of the report) while also noting
that “At present the relief camps are occupied mostly by the leaders/activists of
Salwa Judum, ordinary villagers who support Salwa Judum and SPOs family members.”
(see para 61.5 of the report)
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The NHRC team declined the offer of NGOs to accompany it, to create an atmospher
e conducive for villagers to talk freely. Given that the situation is one of con
flict between Naxalites and the police, with villagers caught in the middle. In
fact the petitioners, and members of the core group of NGOs associated with the
NHRC, amongst others, had made several representations to the NHRC, that an inde
pendent team of people drawn from all walks of life (so as to investigate issues
of sexual violence, living conditions in camps and so on) should be constituted
. They were assured by the Chairman of the NHRC that there would be opportunity
for them to depose before the Commission itself. However, this did not happen.
The NHRC filed its report in a sealed cover to the Supreme Court on August 26th.
However, on the morning of August 26th itself, before the Court had seen the re
port, the Economic Times published a report by the reporter Devesh Kumar headlin
ed, „NHRC gives thumbs-up to Salwa Judum movement‟. The selective leak remains a dis
turbing issue since the reporter claimed that his source was not the NHRC, there
by implying that someone else had access to the report before it was filed befor
e this Hon‟ble Court.
It can be reasonably said, that a prominently all police team in armoured vehicl
es accompanied by SPOs and Salwa Judum activists would inhibit complaints agains
t the state police and state police supported Salwa Judum. The fact that some al
legations were found un-substantiated by such a team is therefore not surprising
. Even so, the assumption of state sanctioned force by Salwa Judum and its resul
tant proneness to crime and excess, without the checks that attend state power,
comes through from the report of the NHRC team. Seen in the context of the NHRC‟s
own findings on extra-judicial killings by SPOs, and the NCPCR (Lyngdoh/Shanta S
inha) report, the distinction between legally recruited SPO‟s and vigilante Salwa
Judum activists becomes illusory.
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B.
COMMENT ON FINDINGS BY NHRC’S INVESTIGATION DIVISION
I.
Corroboration of Complaints: The NHRC team has corroborated the complaints of th
e petitioners in the following respects: a. Burning of villages by Salwa Judum:
Allegations leveled in the petition against Salwa Judum are prima facie true to
the extent of burning of houses and looting of property. (see para 6.25 of the r
eport ). The NHRC team has found that “in some places where the movement encounter
ed resistance from the villagers, atrocities like burning of houses and beating
up of people were committed by the Salwa Judum activists. Reportedly, many of th
ose who did not join Salwa Judum were branded as supporters of naxalites.” (see pa
ra 1.39 of the report) Salwa Judum activities consist of holding pre-announced m
eetings in villages, marching to villages, exhorting people to stand up to naxal
ites, and persuading sangham members to „surrender‟… Those who joined Salwa Judum beca
me targets of Naxalites, who killed the leaders while those who did not became t
argets of Salwa Judum, which burnt their houses down (see para 6.05 - 6.09 of th
e report). These are cases of violence that warrant the registration of criminal
cases. A judicial enquiry should be instituted to determine the responsibility
of the State administration in not taking action in this matter and the action t
o be taken against them.
b. Complicity of state police and administration in arson and looting of propert
y: Since, in order to provide security to Salwa Judum, “the component of security
personnel, including SPOs, accompanying the villagers during their movements and
rallies became a regular feature” (see para 1.37 of the report) one can
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presume they were participants or at least silent onlookers in this process. Cri
minal cases were seldom registered in connection with any incident of arson. (se
e para 6.09 of the report). These are cases which display the commission of cogn
izable offences and call for initiation of prosecution. A judicial enquiry shoul
d be instituted to determine the responsibility of the State administration in n
ot taking action in this matter and the action to be taken against them.
c.
rallies:
Political Leadership and State Sponsorship of Salwa Judum
The NHRC report notes that Mahendra Karma provided political leader ship to the
movement. “Under the leadership of Shri Mahendra Karma, many rallies and processio
ns were organized and efforts were made to persuade the villagers to join the mo
vement and stand up against the Naxalites.” (see para 1.38 of the report).
NHRC‟s report thus recognises that Salwa Judum is a violent movement and not a pea
ceful people‟s movement as the government has consistently claimed, right from 200
5 till date, even though repeatedly violations by the Salwa Judum were brought t
o its notice. The fact that the investigating team itself has reported that Salw
a Judum and the SPOs had prima facie committed acts of violence against the trib
als under the very nose of the State administration corroborates the close nexus
between Salwa Judum and the State administration.
d. Salwa Judum and security forces have forced villagers into camps: A number of
tribals were forced to shift to the camps or flee from their villages (to Andhr
a Pradesh or forests) by Salwa Judum activists (see para 1.40, 1.48 of the repor
t), while others who supported Salwa Judum went to camps with them. Para 1.40 of
the Report mentions that in villages where Salwa Judum meetings were held, a nu
mber of villagers used to flee before such meetings were held. The villagers obv
iously feared both the Naxalites as well as the Salwa Judum.
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There are documented cases in the report itself which state that not only the Sa
lwa Judum but paramilitary and police forces were also involved in this forceful
dislocation. Some Nelasnar camp residents, for example, “left the village due to
atrocities committed by the Naga police.” (see para 8.01 of the report). “Not all tr
ibals came to these camps willingly.…..though some villagers had been forcibly tak
en to the camps in 2005-6, they subsequently came back.” (see para 1.48, 6.12 of t
he Report). The NHRC notes that as far as most villagers are concerned, the „Judum‟
is identified with camp existence. (see para 1.57; 6.50.2, footnote 1 of the rep
ort).
These are cases of violence that warrant the registration of criminal cases, and
a gross violation of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(e) of th
e Constitution. A judicial enquiry should be instituted to determine the respons
ibility of the State administration in not taking action in this matter and the
action to be taken against them.
e. Inhibitions on freedom of movement and continuing constraint by Salwa Judum:
The continuing constraint on villagers by Salwa Judum is evident from the follow
ing statement: “The enquiry team also came across a few instances where though the
families have shifted to their village, the able bodied males are compulsorily
asked by Salwa Judum leaders to come and sleep in the camps. This is being done
in order to keep them away from the influence of the naxalites and also to maint
ain the strength of numbers in Salwa Judum (see para 1.51 of the report).” The rep
ort notes that most of the current inmates of the camps are those who are closel
y associated with the Salwa Judum, such as its leaders and SPOs, and they cannot
return for fear of Naxalites, (see para 1.49 of the report) while others are co
nstrained by fear of Salwa Judum or so that “they are not deprived of the facility
of free rations available to the camp dwellers
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only.” (see para1.50 of the report) It is clear from the Report that the Salwa Jud
um in effect is as harmful for the tribals and their right to live freely and un
molested as the Naxalite militants.
f. Extra-judicial killings by SPOs: The NHRC investigation revealed that SPOs ha
ve been involved in “certain incidents of atrocities against the tribals.” (see para
1.54 of the report) and in some instances (.e.g Matwada camp killings), the sec
urity forces and SPOs seemed to be prima-facie responsible for extra judicial ki
llings (see para 6.24 of the report). Many tribals refer to the SPOs as Judum (s
ee para 1.62 of the report). SPOs are accountable to the State police under the
State police
regulations. These regulations define their responsibilities. The very fact that
they, in league with Salwa Judum, had committed extra-judicial violence shows (
i) the nexus between the State administration and Salwa Judum and (ii) the compl
icity of the State police in such violence.
Although the state government reported to the NHRC that 1579 SPOs had been dismi
ssed on disciplinary grounds (see para 1.54 of the report), as late as April 200
7, according to a letter filed by the State Government in response to an RTI, no
t a single criminal case had been registered against the SPOs. (see Nandini Sund
ar, WP No. 250/2007, Annexure P 30). Further, the information supplied to the NH
RC fact-finding team is contradicted by the DGP‟s article in The Pioneer, 17th Sep
tember 2008, in which he says 3250 SPOs have been discharged. The total number o
f SPOs is also unclear: Rahul Sharma, SP Dantewada told Human Rights Watch there
were 3500 SPOs in Bijapur and Dantewada, while DGP
Viswaranjan said there were 3800 SPOs in the same area. (Human Rights Watch Repo
rt, foot note 381). Either way, if more than half the number of SPOs have been d
ischarged on disciplinary grounds, this does not speak much for the SPOs as a di
sciplined force nor does it exonerate the State police to whom the SPOs are acco
untable under the police regulations.
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g. Blurred boundary between Salwa Judum and SPOs: The NHRC team alleges that the
petitioners use the term Salwa Judum loosely to include SPOs and security force
s. Due to this casualties by the SPOs and Security forces during operations are
attributed to Salwa Judum (see para 6.04 of the report). In several testimonies
to the NCPCR as well as to the NHRC, villagers have said that Salwa Judum activi
sts, SPOs and security forces jointly burnt the villages. The gravamen of the pe
titioners‟ grievance has been that the Salwa Judum is a state sponsored strategy,
with the state exercising both overall and effective control and endorsing its a
cts. With the logistical support of the police and paramilitary forces, the Salw
a Judum has attacked villages and forced the villagers to move into camps. The a
ctivities of the Salwa Judum has been described by the NHRC in its report as pri
marily holding pre-announced
meetings in which Salwa Judum activists are accompanied by the security forces (
See para 6.05-6.09 of the report). The NHRC team itself notes that as far as mos
t villagers are concerned, the „Judum‟ is identified with camp existence. (see para
1.57; 6.50.2, footnote 1 of the report). The NHRC team admits that many tribals
refer to the SPOs as Judum (see para 1.62 of the report).
In Nandini Sundar, WP No, 250/2007, the petitioners have clearly distinguished S
alwa Judum and SPOs while showing the symbiotic relationship between the two: “Far
from being a peaceful campaign, „Salwa Judum‟ activists are armed with guns, lathis
, axes, bows and arrows. Up to January 2007, 4048 “Special Police Officers” (SPOs) h
ad been appointed by the Government under the Chhattisgarh Police Regulations. T
hey actively participate in the „Salwa Judum‟ movement and are given military and we
apons training by the security forces as part of an official plan to create a pa
ramilitary vigilante structure parallel to that of the Naxalites.” (synopsis and l
ist of dates). Chhattisgarh Home Minister Ram Vichar Netam has also defined the
relationship between SPOs and Salwa Judum in an interview to Forces magazine: “Som
e members of Salva Judum have been
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trained by the police as Special Police Officers (SPOs).” (Annexed as P/8 in Karta
m Joga, WP. No. 119/2007). The NCPCR report notes that “According to a government
official the criteria for selecting SPOs is that: (a) they should be above 18 ye
ars of age; (b) their families should be resident within the camp; and (c) they
should be victims of Naxal violence.”
Thus it is clear from the reports of the NHRC, the NCPCR, the statement of the H
ome Minister as well as popular perception by the villagers that the SPOs curren
tly form the core of Salwa Judum, and they have come out of the ranks of those w
ho joined Salwa Judum and are currently resident in camp. The blurred boundary b
etween SPOs and Salwa Judum Lyngdoh report to find that SPOs are in fact has bee
n noted by the
often a euphemism for Salwa Judum.
Besides human rights violations whether committed by SPO‟s or others must be check
ed.
h. SPOs are civilians who are armed and bent on revenge: The NHRC team notes tha
t “SPOs play a vital role. Initially they were not armed, but later when attacks o
n camps increased, they were armed. (see para 6.196.20 of the report). “Since many
of them are victims or NOK of victims of Naxalite violence in the past, they ar
e a highly motivated lot in the fight against the Naxalites.” (see para 1.53, 6.19
of the report). The NHRC team has justified recruiting SPOs in the initial phas
es to protect camps, (see para 1.52, 1.53 of the report) but now that there are
at least 10 battalions of paramilitary forces in the district, it is best to dis
band the armed civil populace. When the Naxalites have attacked camps, as in Ran
i Bodli in 2007, the SPOs have been unable to protect the camps, and have been t
he first to suffer casualties. A police force based on personal revenge, can als
o easily turn into a vigilante force. The role that should have been played by t
he State in safeguarding the interests of the tribals has been obviously abdicat
ed.
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i. Minors were recruited as SPOs, at least initially: The NHRC team has stated t
hat “the enquiry team did not come across any minors working as SPOs now. There we
re some instances in the initial period, but they were sent back. (see para 6.21
of the report). As late as 2007, however, police memorials to SPOs killed in th
e Maoist attack on Rani Bodli showed that some of them were minors (see Nandini
Sunder, WP No. 250/2007, Annexure P 33). Since those recruitments took place und
er the State police regulations, the State police had complicity in making such
recruitments that were not only illegal but also violative of human rights. In a
ddition, the State Government has consistently denied that there were ever any m
inors (See, Rejoinder Affidavit, Writ Petition No. 250/2007, para 5 e). It amoun
ts to obfuscation of the facts to suppress information on an illegal process of
recruitment and violation of human rights.
j. Forced disappearances: The NHRC report notes that “There are many villagers mis
sing. It is not clear whether they have joined the Naxalites, or are hiding in t
he jungles or have moved out of Chhattisgarh, or have since been killed.” (see par
a 6.27 of the report) NHRC has accordingly, recommended creating a register of
missing persons. Against this background, on the basis of NHRC‟s own investigating
team‟s report of a large number of missing persons in Dantewada district, this ma
tter calls for a judicial intervention. There are international conventions such
as the
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced or Involuntary Disapp
earance, adopted by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 47/133 of 18 Decem
ber 1992. According to its preamble, enforced disappearances occur when persons
are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of t
heir liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government or
by organized groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the supp
ort, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government, followed by
a refusal
to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to ack
nowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the
protection of the law. Enforced disappearance when “committed as part of a
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widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with k
nowledge of the attack” has been defined as a crime against humanity in article 7
(1) (i) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The Indian stat
e, as a signatory to these Conventions, is committed to treat this matter with u
tmost seriousness. It appears that the fundamental rights of such displaced and „d
isappeared‟ tribals have been grossly violated. It is incumbent upon the State to
investigate the matter.
k. Suspect encounters, non-recording of deaths and arson: In a number of cases,
the NHRC team found suspicious circumstances under which encounters were reporte
d (e.g. see paras 6.38.1/2, 6.47.3, 6.61.1, 6.61.2, 6.63.5/7, 6.70.5 of the repo
rt). It also noted that in a number of cases regarding deaths and arson, whether
by Salwa Judum or Naxalites, that no record had been filed. The Enquiry Team ha
s brought to light “confusion” regarding the killings recorded and the dead bodies d
iscovered (see Para 6.36.6, 6.42.7, 6.44.2, 6.48.1, 6.51.6, 6.72.13, 6.73.6 of t
he Report), cases of deaths not registered (see para 6.41.2, 6.48.1 of the repor
t) and cases of arson not registered (see Para 6.09, 6.39.1, 6.43.1 of the repor
t). This shows that extrajudicial use of force by the Salwa Judum, Police and Se
curity Forces, as well as violence by Naxalites, has been going on a large scale
without the filing of cases and identification of bodies, as required under the
law. Each incident of this kind, whether done by Naxalites or Salwa Judum and s
ecurity forces involves gross violation of human rights of the worst kind and no
n-compliance with the judicial process. Each incident thus deserves a full-scale
enquiry by a judicial authority. The enquiry into such serious incidents cannot
be glossed over by conducting a quick executive enquiry of this kind.
l. Killings of sangham members by SPOs: Pointing to the fact that many of the SP
Os are themselves former sangham members and therefore “they play a
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very important role in spotting „sangham members‟ and Naxalites.” (5.03) the NHRC repo
rt notes that “The enquiry team has come across instances where some of these vill
agers (sangham members and dalam members) were even killed (no criminal cases we
re, however, either reported or registered). Though the State has taken action a
gainst SPOs in some cases for violations like murder and attempt to murder, but
these cases do not pertain to the violence let loose on innocent villagers durin
g operations against Naxalites.” (5.04) The NHRC accepts that sangham members are
different from Naxalites, (5.03) they are unarmed and do not wear uniforms (6.63
.5). See also Collectors Work Report, annexed as Annexure P 3 in 250 of 2007, Na
ndini Sundar and ors), which defines sangham members as ordinary villagers.
m. Disruption of education: The NHRC report notes that the State Government has
allowed the security forces to occupy school and ashram buildings which were bei
ng used to provide education. “This needs to be checked”. (see para 6.30 of the repo
rt) We agree with this as well as the finding that Naxalites have damaged many s
chools. It is urgent that education be prioritized and schools re-started in all
the villages. The low literacy rate cannot be attributed only to the Naxalites
or the recent conflict, but is symptomatic of the long term neglect by the state
and local administration .
As the NHRC report has brought out the general trend of use of illegal force by
the Salwa Judum, criminal proceedings must be instituted to find out the persons
responsible for such violence. A judicial enquiry should be instituted to deter
mine the responsibility of the State administration in not taking action in this
matter and the action to be taken against them.
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II.
Conclusions by the NHRC Team which are not supported by their own evidence
There are a number of instances, where the evidence collected by the NHRC team p
oints in a different direction from their conclusions:
a. Punishment and intimidation of suspected Naxalites: The NHRC team‟s conclusion
that “Salwa Judum is not involved in asserting the right to control, intimidate an
d punish any one they consider to be a suspected Naxalite.” (see para 6.28 of the
report) is contradicted by the Team‟s findings in which it itself notes that those
tribals who did not join Salwa Judum “were branded as supporters of Naxalites… the
Salwa Judum activists too retaliated by burning down houses of known Sangham mem
bers who did not join the movement against the Naxalites”. (see para 6.06 and 6.09
of the report). Talking about the first phase, “in some places where the movement
encountered resistance from the villagers, atrocities like burning of houses an
d beating up of people were committed by the Salwa Judum activists. Reportedly,
many of those who did not join Salwa Judum were branded as supporters of naxalit
es.” (see para 1.39 of the report) This clearly amounts to intimidation, if not ou
tright and brutal repression.
b. Withdrawal of services to villages which are not with Salwa Judum: The NHRC r
eport says that the enquiry team did not find that the district administration h
ad deliberately withdrawn services from those not living in camps or not support
ing the Salwa Judum (see para 6.29 of the report). It is not clear how NHRC come
s to this conclusion when it notes that rations are available only in camps, (se
e para 1.50 of the report) and that Salwa Judum is identified with the camps, (s
ee para 1.57; 6.50.2, footnote 1 of the report ) and that “the only government age
ncy active in the area is the police” (see para 8.08 of the report) The NHRC team
only visited two villages in Sukma block to demonstrate this point, which is har
dly convincing since
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Sukma block is among those blocks not as badly affected by Salwa Judum as compar
ed to other blocks. It is surprising that the investigating team did not choose
to address similar questions to the tribals in the villages which had been affec
ted by Salwa Judum which the NHRC team visited. The NCPCR report, which concentr
ated specifically on children and their education, states that „A big problem is t
hat schools and Anganwadi teachers have been shifted from the villages to the ca
mps leading to a concentration of service-providers in camps and no services ava
ilable to those who are still living in villages.‟ Since the Salwa Judum is identi
fied with camps, it would be fair to say that all villages which are not in the
Salwa Judum are not getting any services. The NHRC report notes that “In many vill
ages where houses were burnt around two years ago, when Salwa Judum processions
and meetings were common, the tribals have rebuilt their houses and are living t
here. (see para 7.01 of the report). This indicates that while people are living
in the villages, they do not have access to any services, including rations. c.
Continuing Violations by Salwa Judum and security forces/SPOs: The NHRC team no
tes that the Darbhaguda blast of February 2006 stopped Salwa Judum (see para 6.1
3 of the report), which is now largely identified with the 23 relief camps manag
ed by state government. NHRC, however goes on to show that many of the killings
and incidents of arson its investigation revealed, occurred in 2007 and even 200
8. Even just before or during the course of the enquiry in the summer of 2008, t
here were complaints made of arson (as in Nendra), extra-judicial killings by SP
Os (Matwada, see para 6.24, FN 2 of the report) and killings by CRPF (Cherpal ca
mp, see para 6.24, FN 3 of the report). As shown above, many villagers are under
continuing constraint to sleep in Salwa Judum camps.
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d. Conditions in camps: The NHRC team concluded that overall conditions in camps
are satisfactory, though lacking in certain respects. However, as the NHRC repo
rt itself notes, these lacking conditions include employment, sanitation, health
, education, rations, i.e. all essential aspects. Most villagers are clearly kee
n to go back if security conditions improve, as corroborated by NHRC‟s report itse
lf.
e. Basis of allegations: The NHRC team says that petitioners have hardly verifie
d any of the cases themselves, and their allegations are based on hearsay (See p
ara 6.23, 7.08 of the NHRC report). Comment: Kartam Joga, Dudhi Joga and Manish
Kunjam are not only adivasis themselves and resident in the district but have pe
rsonally suffered at the hands of the SPOs and the Salwa Judum. The NHRC team ac
cepts that Dudhi Joga‟s house was burnt by the Salwa Judum (see para 6.32 of the r
eport). At the time of filing the petition, Dudhi Joga was a refugee in Miriwada
, but has since returned for the sowing season. (The NHRC report accepts that ma
ny villagers have returned in the last 1.5 years (see para 1.48 of the report).
While it is accepted that Kartam Joga had a hernia operation, the NHRC report do
es not deal with the question of his severe beating and torture before the opera
tion which may or may not have affected it. Being the President of the All India
Adivasi Mahasabha and a former MLA, Manish Kunjam has the advantage of close in
teraction with a large number of people on a daily basis, many of whom are also
his relatives, and therefore, a better appreciation of the ground realities. It
would have been appropriate had the investigating team taken note of this before
summarily disposing of their complaints.
The NHRC team notes that it carried out its enquiries in the face of difficult c
onditions. Other fact-finding groups and the petitioners would agree with them a
s they themselves have traversed the very same distances across
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Dantewada under similar conditions, but without any security. However, these oth
er fact-finding teams had the advantage of interacting with the tribals in an en
vironment in which the tribals did not feel threatened. The tribals, knowing tha
t the petitioners and others were not from the government nor did they seek prot
ection from anybody, came forward and disclosed the facts in a fearless manner.
The NHRC team discounted all the evidence from IDPs and almost all the evidence
in camps and villages which went against the Salwa Judum and SPOs (see detailed
chart) and also did not take into account the evidence collected by different fa
ct-finding teams, including the National Commission for the Protection of Child
Rights, Human Rights Watch, PUCL-PUDR, MedicoFriends Circle, a team of students
from Delhi University, TISS and NALSAR, as well as reports by NDTV, Mint, Outloo
k and others. Apart from the villages and camps visited by other members of the
Independent Citizens Initiative, including the other two petitioners, Petitioner
No. 1 (Nandini Sundar) who is an anthropological expert on this area with knowl
edge of local languages, had accounts from 29 villages, before the petition was
filed. She had personally visited: 3 villages when Salwa Judum was at its peak a
nd the vigilantes and SPOs prevented travel; 5 camps in which she spoke to IDPs
from 13 villages; 1 police station where she spoke to 5 villagers in custody; Ja
gdalpur jail where she spoke to women from 7 villages; IDPs from 5 villages, cur
rently in AP and elsewhere in Bastar. After filing the petition, she subsequentl
y visited 5 villages, and spoke to IDPs from 13 villages. This detailed list of
villages, IDPs and the dates on which she met/visited them was made available to
the NHRC. The allegations were thus not based on hearsay.
Some mistakes could reasonably have been made, with regard to the age and date,
as illiterate villagers do not keep good records of what happened to
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them, particularly when they are fleeing from attack, and villages and even fami
lies have been scattered between camps, forests and refugee settlements in AP. H
owever, wherever these came to their attention, they provided a corrected list t
o the NHRC team.
The current composition of the relief camp (SPOs and their families, Salwa Judum
leaders and those supporting them) also explains why the NHRC police team got m
ainly pro-Salwa Judum accounts from the relief camp (see detailed analysis villa
ge by village), compared to the much wider range of responses received by the pe
titioners and other fact-finding teams.
f. Illegal checking of vehicles: The NHRC team notes that during the enquiry the
team did not come across any complaints of Salwa judum carrying out illegal che
cking of vehicles etc. (see para 7.03 of the report) Comment: All the petitioner
s have personally suffered illegal checking by the Salwa Judum, including lootin
g of camera, and intimidation while returning from a rally in Cherla, which has
been detailed in the petitions and fact-finding reports. The NHRC team admits th
at in the first phase SPOs
were not armed and did not have uniforms which made it impossible to distinguish
between SPOs and civilians. Further, the NHRC team were being escorted by a hea
vy security detail and thus were not in the same position as an ordinary person
on the road.
g. Efficacy of Salwa Judum: The NHRC report states that due to Salwa Judum, many
areas which were previously inaccessible have come under police control. (see p
ara 6.17 of the report) Comment: This appears to be wishful thinking by the poli
ce, because all local evidence suggests to the contrary, that Maoist recruitment
has increased exponentially among victims of Salwa Judum. Before Salwa Judum be
gan,
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schools, anganwadis and other services were running in the villages. The Adminis
trations‟s own lists (Annexure P/41 in Nandini Sunder in WP No. 250/2007) indicate
that schools and other services have been shut down and shifted to the camps, f
ollowing Salwa Judum. Government presence does not imply only the police; it als
o implies health, education and so on, none of which are working in the villages
after Salwa Judum started.
Law and order is the legitimate function of the State and it is illegal to outso
urce it to a private vigilante force, that too, several of whom are nontribals i
n an area that has a substantial tribal population. It also shows the tacit supp
ort given by the State to Salwa Judum.
h. State justification of Salwa Judum: The NHRC report argues that „The State cann
ot be said to have sponsored Salwa Judum but it certainly has extended support t
o it by way of providing security to the processions and meetings of Salwa Judum
and also to the inmates of the temporary relief camps (see para 7.06 of the rep
ort)
Comment:
The
state
government‟s
continued
justification
and
encouragement to Salwa Judum, is expressed in their counters to the petition. Ev
en passive support by the State to a vigilante force‟s violent activities amounts
to outright complicity.
III.
Findings by NHRC Investigation Team which call for rigorous judicial enquiry
a. Allegations of killing: According to the NHRC, allegations of large number of
killings by Salwa Judum are not true. (see para 6.25 of the report) Many of the
villagers whose names figure in the list of those allegedly killed
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naxalism_1
by Salwa Judum were actually killed by Naxalites; Many of the villagers in the l
ist of those allegedly killed by Salwa Judum or security forces are naxalites ki
lled in encounters with security forces; some people died of natural causes or d
isease. (see para 7.08 of the report) Comment: In many cases, the Enquiry Team h
as listed out the witnesses it had examined, documents it had perused and discus
sed the evidence gathered at site. In most cases, the evidence gathered is not s
ufficient but the Enquiry Team has chosen to summarily reject the complaints in
the petition by saying that they have “not been substantiated”. Our own detailed ana
lysis of each of the findings, annexed at the end of this response, reveals that
almost every single case regarding killing requires further judicial enquiry. F
or example, in see para 6.36.11/ 12 & 13 of the report, the Enquiry Team (ET) ca
me to the summary conclusion that Salwa Judum had not been involved in any extra
-judicial killing, even though the Petitioners have complained about extra-judic
ial killings. A reading of see Para 6.36 of the report, shows that deaths due to
disease are usually recorded in the village records, as evident from see paras
6.36.5, 6.36.10 of the report, whereas, the deaths referred in see paras 6.36.7/
8 of the report, aid to be deaths due to disease do not find place in the villag
e record. In see para 6.36.10 of the report, the case of reported “suicide” of an er
stwhile camp inmate does not figure in police record, as it ought to. The ET has
not investigated these patent discrepancies that pertained to loss of human lif
e.
The incentives offered by the State Govt. to next-of-kin of those killed by Maoi
sts are substantial, as evident from the report itself. Such incentives are not
available to the kin of those killed by Salwa Judum or Security Forces. This has
prima facie tended to influence the kin in their evidence. For
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example, the kin of those killed as mentioned at See paras 6.34.3, 6.37.3, 6.37.
4, 6.40.3, 6.42.6, 6.44.3, 6.56.3 of the report) were paid compensation at the r
ate of Rs 1 lakh per person killed by Maoists, whereas the kin of those killed a
s mentioned at see Paras 6.39.2 of the report, (SPO killed Madkam Soma), see par
a 6.43.1 of the report (Korsa Santo killed, whether it was by SJ not clear; no c
ase; no compensation), see para 6.44.7 of the report (Madvi Anda killed by Naga
Police; no case; no compensation), see para 6.44.8 of the report (Vanjam Iriya k
illed by Naga Police; No case; no compensation) were not given similar compensat
ion. It is possible that in all such cases where complaints are not being filed
and compensation not being paid, the Security forces or Salwa Judum or both are
involved. Also, the very fact that the NHRC team has found some complaints of ex
trajudicial killings to be true, and pointed to the need for an independent inve
stigation into the encounters in Santoshpur (in which 6 villagers were killed) H
irapuram (in which 3 villagers were killed), a prima facie false FIR in killings
by SPOs in Matwada camp, and one case where a villager has been prima facie kil
led by Salwa Judum and no FIR has been registered (Kawasi Chaitu, Jangla) points
to the possibility of many other similar incidents having taken place in the di
strict. (see para 7.08 of the report) An independent judicial enquiry alone will
reveal the truth. Even one extra-judicial killing is far too serious a matter t
o be allowed to be taken lightly. Further, a detailed enquiry may reveal that th
e incidents in which the NHRC team has found that Salwa Judum has been involved
in killings and violence may just be the tip of the iceberg. Village Needs furth
er Killed forces prima by by SPOs/security
investigation (though facie
killed
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naxalism_1
SJ/SPO) Jangla Bhogamguda Kawasi Chaitu Madkami Soma s/o Vello
(compensation not paid) Ponjer Kotrapal Markami Deva Markami Mudda Madvi Hidma V
anjam Iriya Maraiguda Kadti Dula Killing of 5 people by SPOs
b. Allegations of rape: The enquiry team did not come across any case of rape wh
ich could be substantiated. (see para 6.25 of the report) Comment: The NHRC‟s conc
lusions were based on two villages, Polampalli and Potenar. As it happened, in t
he case of Polampalli (Usur thana), despite the correct details being mentioned
in the petition, the NHRC team visited Polampalli (Dornapal thana). And thus it
is not as though the allegations were found to be false, since the wrong village
was visited. Even taking into account the evidence elicited by the investigatin
g team on rape, in Potenar in see para 6.76 of the report, the allegations by fi
ve women of rape have been summarily disposed of, despite some prima facie evide
nce, whereas a complaint of this nature (that involved assault and molestation o
f young tribal girls, many of them minor at the time) is such a serious matter t
hat it calls for a full-fledged independent judicial enquiry. The manner in whic
h the investigating team has tried to arrive at the finding is somewhat hasty. S
hortcomings of the NHRC investigation process and appreciation of evidence
V.
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naxalism_1
This section is an illustration and summary of the detailed analysis presented i
n the chart appended to the end of this response, responding to the findings of
the NHRC investigation team in the case of every village and every individual. A
s shown in the chart every case requires further judicial enquiry. a. Wrong vill
age visited: In at least two and maybe three instances, NHRC team states that th
e petitioners complaints were not substantiated after visiting the wrong village
, despite the correct particulars being given in the petition. Karemarka (NHRC t
eam visited Karemarka in Jangla PS, rather than Karremarka, NP) Polampalli (NHRC
team visited Polampalli Dornapal PS, rather than Polampalli Usur PS) Kurti (pos
sibly since names of clans in the village as given to NHRC did not match names o
f clans in testimony. Apart from Peddakurti (near Dornapal camp) to whose reside
nts the NHRC team spoke, there is also Chinnakurti and Kurti para of Nendra). b.
Drawing conclusions on denial of services based on wrong villages: The petition
ers‟ contention that services (medical help, education, anganwadi) were withdrawn
from villages which had not joined Salwa Judum is said by the NHRC team to be di
sproved by visits to villages in Sukma block. This is patently erroneous, since
Sukma block is out of the conflict area. This also ignores earlier fact-findings
by the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights that all services had
been confined to camps. c. Contradicting evidence ignored: In at least 2 cases,
the NHRC team has ignored the evidence provided by independent journalists and
others which contradicted the police version and accepted the police version at
face value. Santoshpur: 4 independent journalists (from ETV, CG Net/Daily Chhatt
isgarh, Christian Science Monitor and Indian Express) testify to killing of Kodi
ya Bojja
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by SPOs, based on interview with NOK and other villagers, soon after incident. N
HRC team accepts police version that he was killed by Naxalites. Hariyal Cherli:
5 different sources (fact-finding reports by the Independent Citizens Initiativ
e, PUCL-PUDR, Asian Centre for Human Rights, Forum for Fact-finding, Development
and Advocacy) as well as the DGP‟s press release reported in Hitvad have been ign
ored by the team, namely that 9 bodies recovered belonged to ordinary villagers/
Naxalites killed by security forces. Instead, the internally contradictory polic
e FIR has been taken at face value, and 7 killings attributed to Naxalites inste
ad. No allowance is made for the fact that compensation is given to relatives of
Naxalite victims (as against no compensation given to relatives of SJ/police vi
ctims), the fact that the NOK in this case had accepted compensation, and this m
ight influence some testimonies. d. Evidence of IDPs in State of Andhra Pradesh
inexplicably discounted: In many cases, NHRC team seemed to assign differential
weights to the evidence tendered by the tribal villagers, and IDPs in Andhra Pra
desh, compared to Salwa Judum activists, the SPOs, and the camp inmates supporti
ng Salwa Judum and the police. All testimonies – including those provided in perso
n – by refugees/IDPs in Andhra Pradesh have been discounted. On the other hand, al
most all statements made by Salwa Judum camp residents and SPOs have been accept
ed, especially when they allege that a person was killed not by Salwa Judum but
by Naxalites. Kottacheru: Testimonies personally given by IDPs in Andhra to NHRC
team regarding burning of village and killing of persons discounted because no-o
ne was available in village or camp to corroborate. The lack of such persons is
itself circumstantial corroboration of the IDP claim. Lingagiri: Testimonies per
sonally given by villagers to NHRC team in AP of
arson and killings by Salwa Judum discounted because there was nobody in
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the village to corrorborate, as the entire village was destroyed and abandoned.
Hirapuram, Pisaipara, Pusbak, Chirpur Bhatti (Chikurubhatti) – all cases
where IDP testimony to NHRC team was corroborated by evidence of burnt villages
on the ground, but their testimony was not accepted. Onderpara, Gorkha, Bheji – al
l cases where testimonies before SC of
widespread burning were corroborated by ground evidence, but were discarded as „co
uld not be substantiated‟ because village was empty. Nendra – Despite Next of Kin (N
OK) giving testimonies, and even sending
photos of the bones of their relatives killed by SPOs in camp, the version of ca
mp residents that they went „missing‟ has been accepted. The testimony sent by Smt.
Muchki Mutti and ors to NHRC is annexed hereto as Annexure A /7 e.Statements by
villagers or camp residents which allege killings by Naxalites accepted at face
value: Even if the body is not found and no case is registered, these statements
are treated as substantiated, even where they contradict testimony given by oth
er villagers or even NOK. Similarly, statements collected in villages and camps
which blame Naxalites for burning houses are treated as substantiated, even thou
gh there appear to be some internal contradictions, and there are no police reco
rds. The petitioners condemn all killings and violence, whether by the Maoists o
r by Salwa Judum or by the State agencies. However, to attribute killings by Sal
wa Judum or by the State agencies to Maoists will amount to obfuscating the acts
of violence by Salwa Judum or the State agencies. The same standards of evidenc
e need to be applied across the board. Some examples: Poyam Lachu, Jangla camp;
Korsa Santo, Pulgatta; Uike Sannu Kotrapal, Vanjam Mangu, Kotrapal; Madvi Vira‟s s
on, Neelamadgu; the people killed by Naxalites in Gangalur village; camp residen
ts of Hirapuram alleged Naxalites killed 3, although only one got compensation;
3 killings
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attributed to Naxalites in Asirguda even though only one is registered and has g
ot compensation. Gaganpali and Asirguda camp residents say village was burnt by
naxalites, but no police records was registered;
f.Statements
by
villagers
and
camp
residents
indicting
Salwa
Judum/SPOs treated as unsubstantiated: Such statements, including by NOK which a
llege killing by Salwa Judum or SPOs or security forces are treated as unsubstan
tiated if the body is not found, or there is no police record. The investigating
team itself has found that police records were silent on several cases of killi
ngs and several cases of missing bodies, including alleged killings by Naxalites
. To say that, on that ground, the petitioners‟ complaint has not been substantiat
ed is highly misleading. It amounts to ignoring the strong possibility of an act
of violence.

Some examples of villager testimony ignored: Kawasi Chaitu, Jangla; Ponjer state
ments about fake encounter; Bhogam Kamlu, Bhogamguda (testimony given to NHRC te
am by his father), Testimony of Muchaki Mutti of Nendra and other NOK regarding
killing of 4 persons in Errabor camp; Dallu Raut, Markapal; Kalmu Waga, Sodi Mas
a of Arlampalli; Punem Madamayya of Pusbak; Toynar villagers; 3 month old Madvi
Kosa and Sodi Joga of Nendra, Muchaki Bhima/so Singa, Nendra

Some examples of camp resident testimony ignored: Gorgonda camp resident who sai
d her father in law was killed by Naxalites; Padeda camp residents on Korsa Budh
ram
Testimonies given to NHRC by NOK of Kalmu Waga and Sodi Masa in Arlampalli, are
annexed hereto as Annexure A/8 and A/9 respectively.
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g. All statements by the police are accepted at face value: except two (Matwada,
and Hirapuram in which an SPO raises doubts), even when they contradict village
rs testimony, e.g. Modiyam Somlu, Padeda; Korsa Budhram, Padeda; Nendra house bu
rning in July 2008.
In almost all cases, the NHRC team accepts police version of encounter killings.
The report does not mention the violation of the NHRC‟s own guidelines on encount
er killings, according to which in all cases where the police officer involved i
n the encounter killing is from the same PS as the encounter being investigated/
registered, such cases should be handed over to an independent investigating age
ncy like the state CB-CID. The fact that the team itself found suspicious circum
stances under which encounters were reported (e.g. see paras 6.38.1/2, 6.47.3, 6
.61.1, 6.61.2, 6.63.5/7, 6.70.5 of the report) should raise doubts about the pol
ice statements on encounters, as NHRC itself has repeatedly expressed concern at
all cases of encounter and issued landmark guidelines on how to deal with them.
10. The NHRC team appears to condone killings of Sangham members (see para 6.44.
2 of the report) despite noting in one case that an SPO told them that sangham m
embers are not armed and wear no uniforms, and that many sangham members have be
en killed by SPOs (5.04).
C.
CONCLUSION
1. Tribal society in Dantewada district stands divided today into two groups, na
mely, those that are with the Maoists and those that are with the Salwa Judum (p
ara 6.69.7). There are others who do not belong to either of these two groups bu
t they stand intimidated to speak out the truth. It is in this context that an i
ndependent judicial enquiry is necessary to arrive at the truth about atrocities
by the Maoists and those by Security forces and SJ.
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2. The NHRC team had elicited logistic support from the State police, SPOs and p
ara-military forces for providing security to them during their visits. The pres
ence of these along with some Salwa Judum leaders created a sense of intimidatio
n among the tribal witnesses, as documented by the team more than once. In Para
6.65.1, the Team reported that villagers in Puspaka village had run away on seei
ng police accompanying the Team. In Para 6.66.1, the investigating team has admi
tted in a forthright manner that the Enquiry Team could not verify the truth of
the allegation on a visit to Chikurubatti village because all the villagers ran
away on seeing the police/ CRPF (possibly even SJ leaders) accompanying the Enqu
iry Team. A credible enquiry is not possible when the prospective witnesses are
intimidated.
In Para 6.63.7, relating to Hirapuram, the investigating team has rightly taken
note of this basic limitation and stated that “though as per police records, Vetti
Masa ……..were killed in an encounter and Case FIR No. 3/08 PS Basaguda has been reg
istered in this regard, the same needs to be verified by an independent agency “du
e to the complaint received in this regard and the other reason mentioned above”
Added to this, the scheme of compensation granted by the State to NOK of those t
hat were killed weighed in favour of those killed by the Maoists. The police rec
ords did not register cases of violence by Salwa Judum and State agencies. All t
hese factors together had the effect of distorting the weight of the evidence ga
thered in favour of the version of Salwa Judum and State agencies, thereby makin
g it difficult for the team to arrive at the truth.
3. Despite these limitations, the very fact that the NHRC Team could not but hel
p reporting numerous cases of extra-judicial violence including fake encounters,
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killings, rape and arson points to the state of affairs prevailing in Dantewada
district and the complicity of the State in it. What the petitioners had brought
to light in their petition represented only a small sample and, in reality, the
magnitude and extent of human right violations taking place in the district are
expected to be substantial. Since the Petitioners‟ complaints involve serious off
ences such as arson, looting of property, killings and rape and since many of th
ese are complaints against the State itself, the veracity of the complaints shou
ld not be ignored because such a team has been unable to substantiate it. Such c
omplaints should be enquired into by an independent judicial enquiry. For exampl
e, in Para 6.76, the allegations by five women of rape have been summarily dispo
sed of, despite some prima facie evidence, whereas this is such a serious matter
that calls for a judicial enquiry. 4. The NHRC team argues that “The argument tha
t Naxalite violence has increased after Salwa Judum and has further aggravated t
he problem is a very narrow view of this complicated problem. Surely the petitio
ners would not support the subjugation and killings of tribals by Naxalites for
years before Salwa Judum. The tribals cannot be denied the right to defend thems
elves against the atrocities perpetrated by Naxalites, especially when law enfor
cers are themselves ineffective or not present. (7.04) Comment: Indeed the petit
ioners oppose all instances of violence and their outright condemnation of all k
inds of violence including violence by the Maoists is well known. Nor is it deni
ed that there were Naxal killings before Salwa Judum. The point is that the Naxa
lite killing has exponentially increased following Salwa Judum and thus even the
expediency and efficacy of the operation is completely negatived. Salwa Judum i
s fomenting Naxalite violence and must be stopped forth with.
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Defence would imply only self- defence in one‟s own village, and not going out and
burning villages and beating up villagers to force them to join the Salwa Judum
movement. Hence, going by the NHRC‟s description of Salwa Judum, it can in no way
be called a self-defence movement.
Most importantly, killings of tribals by Maoists do not justify killings by a pr
ivate vigilante force such as Salwa Judum. The tribals have a right to be safe a
nd secure from violence from all parties, and it is the responsibility of the St
ate to ensure their safety. The NHRC itself notes that while the Naxalites have
been involved in violations of human rights, there have been instances where SJ,
SPOs and security forces have also been involved in similar violations. “The latt
er violations are more serious, since the state must abide by its own law, no ma
tter how serious the threat to its stability is.” (7.05)
5. There are a number of non-tribal persons among the second-order leadership of
Salwa Judum (after Mahendra Karma), such as Ram Bhuwan Kuswaha, Ajay Singh, Mad
hukar and so on. The Enquiry Team has not reported this. Dantewada district is a
Schedule V district under the Constitution and the active presence of such non-
tribals in a movement like Salwa Judum can lead to the inference that some of th
em have a vested interest in continuing their presence in the district. It is no
t just a coincidence that the police and SPOs launched their offensive against t
he Naxalites at the same time as Salwa Judum (1.43), but it points to the close
nexus between the police, SPOs and non-official persons like Mahendra Karma and
Salwa Judum activists.
SPOs being officers appointed under the State police regulations are de jure acc
ountable to the police authorities but de facto work under the control of Salwa
Judum leaders, as is evident from the representation made by Shri Raghu, after b
eing confined in Konta. The investigating team has been far too simplistic
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in brushing aside the complaint that Salwa Judum is indeed a State-sponsored, St
ate-supported vigilante force engaged very often in acts of violence.
6. In the several findings by the NHRC investigating team, the complaints of the
petitioners on acts of violence by Salwa Judum, State agencies and Central para
military forces have been prima facie corroborated.* (see list at end of this do
cument; and also chart). In all these cases, the State Government should (i) lau
nch criminal prosecution proceedings against those responsible, if necessary, by
instituting an independent judicial enquiry (ii) order withdrawal of state supp
ort, direct or indirect, to Salwa Judum and (iii) wind up Salwa Judum camps, eff
ectively rehabilitate those who wish to return to their own villages; and rehabi
litate others in places of their choice (iv) disband SPOs and replace them with
well trained police to prevent further acts of extra-judicial violence and viola
tion of human rights, (iv) compensate victims of killing and arson by Salwa Judu
m, and unrecorded killings/arson by Naxalites.
7. Since the report of NHRC team has found such a large number of prima facie in
cidents of acts of violence on investigating the limited number of complaints ma
de by the petitioners, a full-fledged judicial enquiry needs to be instituted to
determine the full extent of human right violations including false encounters,
killings, rapes, arson, employment of minors that have taken place and continue
to take place in Dantewada district.
8. The NHRC team has found several cases of encounters in which there have been
violation of NHRC guidelines themselves. In all such cases, the complicity of th
e State agencies cannot be ruled out. The proposed judicial enquiry should cover
this so that those responsible may be identified and action initiated.
Summary: There are certain shortcomings in (i) the composition of the team which
consisted solely of police, given that the primary conflict in this area is
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between police and Naxalites, with villagers caught in between and unable to spe
ak freely (ii) the presence of SPOs and Salwa Judum leaders along with police du
ring the enquiry intimidated a large number of villagers (iii) appreciation of e
vidence and (iv) the summary manner in which conclusions have been arrived at by
the NHRC‟s investigating team. Nevertheless, it is evident that there have been e
xtra-judicial killings, arson, looting of property and possibly rape by SPOs, se
curity forces and SJ activists. It is obvious that atrocities have also been com
mitted by the Maoists too. These cases were not individually listed by the petit
ioners since it was presumed that the government was already dealing with compen
sation to the NOK of victims. There have been many cases of missing persons, fak
e encounters, non-recovery of dead bodies, failure to file FIRs etc. The incenti
ves offered by the government have had an unhealthy influence on potential witne
sses who could have helped the NHRC team in arriving at the truth.
The Government of Chhattisgarh is directly or indirectly responsible for these i
ncidents, The State has reneged on protecting the rights of the tribals under Sc
hedule V of the Constitution. When human rights are violated on such a large sca
le, it is imperative that each of these allegations is enquired into through an
independent judicial enquiry.
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*Some instances where allegations of petitioners have been prima facie corrobora
ted:
i. ii. iii. iv.
Para 6.09 (Arson by SJ; Criminal cases seldom registered) Para 6.12 (Some inmate
s of Camps have done so unwillingly) Para 6.21 (Minors were employed by SJ durin
g initial period) 6.22 (Criminal cases had to be registered against SPOs, some h
ad to be dismissed)
v.
6.24 (Security forces/ SPOs prima facie responsible for extra-judicial killings-
This needs to be further enquired into, especially as they were acting on behal
f of the State)
vi.
6.25 (Allegations in Petition against SJ prima facie true, to the extent of arso
n & looting of property)
vii. viii. ix. x.
6.27 (Many persons found to be “missing”, could have even be killed) 6.30 (security
personnel camping in school buildings) 6.32 (Dudhi Joga‟s house burnt by SJ) 6.36.
6 (Kawasi Chaitu was killed in an encounter, his dead body not found, no mention
in police record)
xi. xii.
6.36.12 (Kawasi Chaitu: need for an enquiry) 6.38.1/2 (Evidence showed six perso
ns killed in a fake encounter on 31-307 in Ponjer village- SHRC is conducting an
enquiry)
xiii. xiv. xv. xvi. xvii.
6.38.3 (SJ has burnt 10 houses in Ponjer V) 6.40.2 (Evidence: SJ has killed Kors
a Budhram & Kosra Laku in 2006) 6.44.7 (Evidence of killings by Naga batallion)
6.44.8 (Evidence of killings by Naga batallion) 6.47.3(Death of Kadti Dula, Soya
m enka, Bogo Sanna should be enquired into)
xviii. xix.
6.51.4, 6.51.6 (arson by Police) 6.60.1 (Villager beaten by SJ in Pakela village
)
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naxalism_1
xx.
6.61.1/6.61.2 (Kadti Budhru killed in Keshkutul village by SJ, death of two othe
rs in explosions/ encounter not recorded in police records)
xxi. xxii. xxiii. xxiv. xxv. xxvi. xxvii.
6.62 (Arson, killings and rape by SJ in Lingagiri village) 6.63/ 6.63.1/ 6.63.2
(SJ killed and committed arson in Hirapuram village) 6.63.4 (missing persons in
Hirapuram village) 6.63.5 (Encounter killing suspicious) 6.63.6 (Arson substanti
ated) 6.65.3 (SJ/ Security forces beat up villagers) 6.65.6/ 6.65.9 (Torture and
killing of Poonam Mandamayya in
Gurganguda village by SPO/ Security forces) xxviii. 6.67.1 (Punam Budhi, a woman
of Toynar village went to nearby SJ camp in search of her nephew but never retu
rned. Her body has not been recovered) xxix. 6.67.2/6.67.3/6.67.4/ 6.67.6 (Kadti
Sannu killed when SJ activists visited his village. Kakem Sukda/ Kakem Kosa not
similarly traced. Enquiry called for ) xxx. 6.68.1 to 68.4 (Arson in Palamadgu
substantiated. Villagers forcibly shifted to camps; villagers used by SJ in cros
sfire with Maoists) xxxi. Para 6.69.1 to 6.69.8 (Arson, looting of property and
beating up of villagers by SJ substantiated) xxxii. xxxiii. xxxiv. 6.70.5 (Encou
nter reported; no police record) 6.71.1 (Gorgonda village; Rengapara hamlet; ars
on by SJ reported) 6.71.6 (Present inmate of Dornapal camp stated that her fathe
r-in-law was killed by SJ in February, 2008 and 12 houses torched xxxv. 6.73.4 (
Tati Dulla and Tati Kanna of Gaganpalli village killed by SPOs on 28-7-06; bodie
s not recovered) xxxvi. xxxvii. 6.75.14 ( Killing by SPOs; further investigation
recommended) Page 102 (Santoshpur and Hirapuram incidents to be investigated)
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The Adivasis of Chhattisgarh: Victims of Naxalite Movement and Salwa Judum Campa
ign (Excerpts from the main report) Since the launch of Salwa Judum, an anti-Nax
alite campaign, in Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh in June 2005, the Adivasis
, who constitute 78.51% of the total population of Dantewada, have become victim
s of the conflict between the Naxalites and the State government of Chhattisgarh
. Though majority of the cadres of the Naxalites are Adivasis, they are not the
decision makers. “Commander” Kosa, the secretary for the Naxals in Chhattisgarh hail
s from Andhra Pradesh. The apology by the Maoists for the killings of innocent A
divasis on 28 February 2006 at Darbhaguda was also issued from Andhra Pradesh .
Similarly, the Salwa Judum campaign has been taken over by the State as a full-p
ledged counter-insurgency programme. The Adivasis are the pawns of both the part
ies of the conflict. They are also the perpetrators as well as the victims of th
e undeclared civil war. In 1980s, the Naxalites, the ultra-left wing armed oppos
ition group, made inroads into Bastar region from neighbouring Andhra Pradesh. T
hen Madhya Pradesh government had little semblance of presence in the Bastar reg
ion. The plight of the dispossessed and exploited Adivasis provided the classica
l situation for starting a communist revolution. As the Naxalites took over the
tasks meant to be done by the State and provided protection to the Adivasis agai
nst exploitation by the corrupt officials, police, forest department officials,
timber mafia, money-lenders etc, it was not difficult for the Adivasis to relate
to the ideology of the Naxalites. The Naxalites gradually increased their influ
ence day by day. At present, at least nine out of 16 districts of Chhattisgarh i
.e. Kanker, Dantewada, Bastar, Surguja, Balrampur, Rajnandgaon, Koriya, Kawardha
and Jashpur are affected by low intensity armed conflict with the Naxalites. Ho
wever, the Naxalites also came with the baggage associated with communist armed
insurrections - execution of petty bourgeois amongst the most impoverished, exto
rtion, and other harsh punishments. The Adivasis became victims of gross violati
ons of human rights such as “violence to life and person, in particular murder of
all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; taking of hostages; outrages
upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment; and
passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgmen
t pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarant
ees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples”, at the hands of t
he Naxalites. Some of those who were injured in the landmine blast on 28 Februar
y 2006 at Darbhaguda village were allegedly stabbed and clubbed to death by the
Naxalites. The policy of the Naxalites of forcibly recruiting one cadre from eac
h Adivasi family compelled many families to give the female members to the Naxal
s. Hence, traditional Adivasi social taboos were challenged and destroyed by the
Naxalites and resentment against the Naxalites grew. But, any rebellion against
the rebels was quelled with brutality. In 1992-93, a rebellion against the Naxa
lites was silenced after the Naxals killed 70 Adivasis. Since June 2005, episodi
c resentments against the Naxalites took organized shape under the leadership of
Mr Mahendra Karma, the Member of Legislative Assembly and Leader of the Opposit
ion in the Chhattisgarh State Legislative Assembly. Mr Karma christened it as Sa
lwa Judum, Peace Initiative. It soon received the State sanction and became part
of Chhattisgarh government s
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experiment with counter-insurgency operations to tackle the Naxalites. The civil
war began in earnest. The Salwa Judum has been far from a peaceful campaign wit
h hundreds of the cadres being given full military training as Special Police Of
ficers. It has created a civil war where one is either with the Naxalites or wit
h the Salwa Judum . As the Naxalites followed the policy of forcibly recruiting
one cadre from each family, in numerous cases, members of the same family have b
een pitted against each other. The Adivasis do not necessarily share the Naxalit
es dream of surrounding “ Delhi one day with Red Army”, but they want their plight
to improve and bring an end to exploitation by the corrupt government officials,
police, money lenders, contractors etc. Instead, they find themselves in the mi
dst of a civil war. The Naxalites responded with violence against the Salwa Judu
m cadres irrespective of whether they are joining on their own volition or by fo
rce. Between 5 June 2005 and 6 March 2006 , at least 138 Salwa Judum activists h
ave been allegedly killed by the Naxalites. Even the children of the Salwa Judum
cadres were not spared. Swayam Mala , Ex-Sarpanch of Darbhaguda village told As
ian Centre for Human Rights, “On the night of 23 February 2006 , Sangham people (N
axalites) came to my residence searching for me on the accusations that I was in
itiating development projects in the village. Not finding me, they killed my son
Swayam Kanna, who was studying in class eight.” Although the Naxalites have been
responsible for more killings, the response of the State government to involve t
he civilians directly in the conflict and recruiting children as Special Police
Officers is morally and legally untenable. As on 4 March 2006 , a total of 45,95
8 Adivasi villagers from 644 villages in 6 blocks of Dantewada district have com
e under Salwa Judum programme. The security forces and Salwa Judum activists hav
e been responsible for gross violations of international human rights and humani
tarian laws including torture, killings and rape especially during joint operati
ons to bring scattered villages under the Salwa Judum. But the police do not reg
ister such complaints of atrocities as they also commit these crimes. Those who
are victims of violations by the security forces and the Salwa Judum activists t
herefore are not given any compensation. Only the alleged victims of Naxalite vi
olence are given compensation. The displaced Adivasis have been living as inmate
s in temporary camps. Many have been living in the houses, roofed with the leave
s of trees. The camp conditions are deplorable and no provisions are provided ex
cept for a square meals with watery dal. There are also no educational facilitie
s in the camps but the government claims that it is providing business education
! Many government schools including Government Higher Secondary School at Konta,
Girls High School, Janpad Middle School, Girls Ashram and Boys Ashram at Dondra
have been converted into relief camps. Students who have been appearing for the
High School and Higher Secondary School Board examinations in March 2006 have b
een badly affected. The temporary relief camps have been turned into centres for
military training and anti-Naxalite indoctrination education. As on 4 March 200
6, 3,200 Adivasi boys and girls have been recruited as Special Police Officers (
SPO) in Dantewada district alone at a fixed honourarium of Rs 1500 to each
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per month. Many SPOs have not been paid any honourarium. Many have joined in the
SPO with the promise of regularization in the State Police Force. Both the secu
rity forces and the Naxalites have been responsible for the recruitment and use
of children in hostilities. ACHR interviewed 9 SPOs at Bangapal Relief Camp with
in the Bangapal Police Station who claimed that they were below 16 years. As on
4 March 2006, there were 1999 surrendered Naxalites in Dantewada alone. Many of
them have been kept in chains and they do not have the right to freedom of movem
ent. As many as 227 persons have been killed between 5 June 2005 and 6 March 200
6 including 47 security personnel and 30 alleged Maoists, 150 civilians out of w
hich 138 at the hands of the Maoists and 12 at the hands of security forces and
Salwa Judum activists. Out of these, 63 persons including 33 security forces and
30 civilians were killed in landmines planted by the Naxalites. There is an urg
ent need to bring an end to the armed conflict in Chhattisgarh and the suffering
of the innocent persons caught in the conflict. All actors of the conflicts i.e
. State governments and the Naxalites must find peaceful solutions.
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Journalists in trouble when reporting on tribes Situation of freedom of expressi
on in India’s Tribal State of Chhattisgarh The low intensity insurgency, which has
waged for over 30 years in India’s once peaceful State Chhattisgarh, has increase
d in conflict and violence since 2005, threatening the democratic nature of this
society. Illegal detention, forcible eviction, rape and murder of women, fake e
ncounters and summary executions are intensifying and over 1000 tribal people ha
ve been killed. Over 45000 people are displaced and compelled to stay in state-r
un relief camps. FFDA’s primary study found that another almost 60000 tribal peopl
e have been forced to move to the neighboring States of Orissa, Andhra Pradesh a
nd Maharastra. Police and security forces have raped over 200 tribal women in th
e area. As of 2nd of March 2007, 4048 young people have been recruited as Specia
l Police Officers. FFDA identified 70% of them as under-aged/children. Nearly 25
0 school buildings have been demolished and security forces have captured anothe
r 150. Over 1000 innocent tribal villagers, including women have been falsely ch
arged and imprisoned. The ongoing conflict is destroying the livelihood of innoc
ent tribal people. The police and security forces steal their livestock (e.g. go
ats, chickens etc). Attempts by journalists to document these various violations
and the lack of investigation into such matters have led to threats on their li
ves and subsequent media censorship. When reporting on conflicts, journalists ar
e in a precarious position between combatant parties. Only when they are allowed
to report independently and without fear, can a genuine democracy be said to be
in place, stated the IFJ president Christopher Warren. Freedom of information a
nd expression are some of the most fundamental human rights needed to build and
sustain a successful and competent democracy. India ranked 105th in the World Pr
ess Freedom Index of 2006[1]. Most high-ranking countries are democratic, howeve
r; it is the presence conflict in democratic countries, such as India, that have
a negative influence on their rank. In the state of Chhattisgarh, where insurge
ncy has waged for over 30 years, the threat to press freedom is very real.
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Conflict coverage by journalists: Curbs on the Press Attempts to silence journal
ists are intermittent throughout India and not confined to specific conflict zon
es. Journalists in the Naxal Conflict area in the state of Chhattisgarh can pay
the ultimate price for telling the truth. They are prevented from reporting and
investigating by corrupt politicians, police and Salwa Judum members, many recei
ving harassment, intimidation and beating. Reporting on the Maoist conflict in t
his area is restricted to press releases by government officials and on occasion
statements issued by the Maoists. There are heavy restrictions on the freedom o
f movement and expression causing many victims not to speak out. Underneath the
one-sided government press releases and gagged journalists; the war rages on. Is
sues of Chhattisgarh; case studies I. On the 15th of November 2006, Afzal Khan a
journalist for the publication Hindisatt in Bhopalpatnam, Chhattisgarh, was att
acked by members of the Salwa Judum movement. At a public meeting in Bhopalpatna
m leaders of the Salwa Judum movement called all journalists to the stage, accus
ing them of providing logistic support to the Maoists, and threatening them. Lat
er that day Khan was summoned to meet with the leaders of Salwa Judum and Specia
l Police offices, who beat him. Khan survived with head injuries and a fractured
hand. Through fear for their lives, Khan and his family were forced to leave th
e village after continuous death threats from Salwa Judum. II. On the 8th Septem
ber 2006, Kamlesh Paikra also a Bijapur correspondent for Hindsatt wrote a story
raising suspicions of Salwa Judum members burning down villages in Dantewara. T
he article explained that Salwa Judum members burnt 50 houses in the village of
Mankeli and how the movement had caused displacement on a large scale. The artic
le generated wide concern and the Communist Party of India visited the village.
Kamlesh Paikra was pressured to claim that the story was false, which he refused
to do. Due to the article, Parikra was made to suffer. The permit for his ‘fair p
rice’ shop was cancelled causing financial hardship to his family. The harassment
became more serious when Salwa Judum members prevented him from traveling out of
Bijapur. He was unable to visit the villages and camps of the displaced tribals
and therefore was prevented from reporting objectively on the conflict. A fake
report led to the administration lodging a false case against Paikra’s brother Tar
keshwar Singh who was arrested on the 1st of December 2006 because the report al
leged he possessed Naxalite literature and uniforms. Although Singh was released
after two weeks, the case is still pending. After receiving
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information that the police were planning to murder him in a ‘fake encounter’, Kamle
sh Paikra moved to Dantewara with his family, paying a high price for telling th
e truth and his life still at risk. III. Mr Sanjay Reddy, Mr Anwar Khan and Mr L
iladhar, are all journalists who have been threatened by Salwa Judum activists d
uring 2005-2006, none have received justice and they continue to work in fear. I
V. The previous Superintendent of Police in Dantewara, Mr Das, threatened journa
list, N.R.K. Pille, the President of Dantewara Journalist Association in 2005. V
. On the 31st of August 2004, Senior Correspondent Ruchir Garg and cameraman Vis
hwanath Sahu and their driver Maqbool were threatened and beaten by the Thana in
charge of Tilda and other police officers. The journalists were held at gunpoin
t, verbally and physically abused until they managed to flee the scene. All thre
e journalists suffered mental trauma from the incident and Ruchir Garg’s health wa
s seriously affected by the stress. "Journalists working in zones where the Maoi
sts are active come under huge pressure from the security forces.”[2] Garg said. O
n 29th July 2005, the Chhattisgarh State Human Rights Commission hearing the cas
e of Garg directed the general of police to take department action against the p
olice officers involved in the attack and to direct all police officers not to p
articipate in any violation in future. He also directed that the media personnel
should have their rights implemented and protected. Unfortunately the police au
thorities still have not conducted any action against the perpetrators found gui
lty by the State Human Rights Commission. While talking to FFDA the joint secret
ary of the State Human Rights Commission, Mr. D. K. Bhatt claimed that the Commi
ssion is concerned about violations of the freedom of expression, and that they
have received many complaints on the subject and have issued notice for a govern
ment response to the matter. VI. FFDA has evidence of violations of the Freedom
of Movement in the Naxal Conflict area in Chhattisgarh, where journalists and th
eir support staff need to have written permission from the District Collector to
enter the villages affected by the conflict. This is a blatant violation of hum
an rights, in particular the freedom of movement. There is also evidence of jour
nalists and human rights activists being prevented from entering public areas by
security forces and SPOs, which is illegal. Salwa Judum activists and police of
ficers censor the
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release of information and journalists are threatened and are therefore not comi
ng forward with their stories or seeking justice. Many journalists wanting to re
main anonymous for their safety have contacted FFDA with evidence that police au
thorities are suppressing incidents of human rights abuses by the police, securi
ty forces and Salwa Judum. Currently journalists report from press releases prod
uced by the government or risk their life and career by reporting objectively bo
th sides of the struggle. “This blatant attempt to silence journalists through hum
iliation, intimidation and direct attack is a clear indication of deep lack of r
espect for press freedom in India, particularly in Chhattisgarh,” said the IFJ Pre
sident Christopher Warren[3] Official Secrets against the Right to Information T
he Official Secrets Act of 1923 was developed from a colonial British law. Accor
ding to published reports, journalists who are reporting or investigating allege
d corruption or questioning authorities can be frequently beaten or arrested on
charges that they are endangering national security. Government officials have u
sed the Official Secrets Act to both restrict publication of sensitive stories a
nd suppress criticism of government policies. India’s National Constitution has ma
ny provisions that claim to protect Press Freedom and Freedom of expression, but
there are also some Indian laws, which contradict and impede these rights. The
Right to Information Act 2005 gives the civil right of Indians to access Governm
ent records. Information can be attained from any public authority and such gove
rnment bodies are required to computerize and publish their records. The enactme
nt of the Contempt of Courts Bill in 2006 is a positive step for democracy and f
reedom of the press. It introduces truth as a justification for contempt of cour
t, thus allowing journalists a legal defence for their investigative articles. H
owever, ongoing evidence of gagged journalists and censorship of the media prove
s much more is needed to combat these human rights violations. The Gagging Law “Yo
u can’t fight an armed rebellion by stopping journalists from talking about it,” say
s Worldwide press freedom organisation[4]. India’s world index press freedom score
by no means reflect the severe censorship
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and oppression of the media in the Naxal conflict state of Chhattisgarh. The sta
te of Chhattisgarh passed a law banning the Maoist Communist Party of India (CPI
-Maoist) making the job of local journalists to report extremely difficult and d
angerous. The Special Public Security Act was adopted in September 2006, which p
rohibits the media from reporting any activities that can be seen as ‘unlawful act
ivities’[5], the effect of which bars the media from reporting on the banned Maois
t party. Journalists can be jailed for up to three years for covering the Maoist
rebellion and media outlets can get their property confiscated for supporting t
he rebels.[6] The state claims that the law was passed to protect lives and to t
ry and sustain peace, however in truth it is a violation of International Standa
rds and the National Constitution, violating the rights of journalists and civil
ians throughout the state. States obligation to international human rights stand
ards Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that India is in co
ncurrence with, states that: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and exp
ression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and t
o seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardles
s of frontiers.” All citizens have this right and it is the Indian Government’s resp
onsibility to protect the rights if its citizens. The restriction of journalist’s
movements is a violation of Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rig
hts, which state, “Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence wit
hin the borders of each state.”[7] India is a state party to International Covenan
t on Civil and Political Rights. Article 19 of ICCPR, which protects the freedom
of expression, states: 1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions withou
t interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of
all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in t
he form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 3. The exercise of the
rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duti
es and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, bu
t these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For res
pect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national
security or of public order (order public), or of public health or morals.
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Domestic guarantees Freedom of Expression is also guaranteed under article 19 as
one of its fundamental rights in the constitution of India, which states: (1) A
ll citizens shall have the right(a) to freedom of speech and expression (2) Noth
ing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing l
aw, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reas
onable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-claus
e in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of th
e State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morali
ty, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.
While passing an order in the year 1982, the Supreme Court of India stated, “The
concept of an open Government is the direct emanation from the right to know whi
ch seems implicit in the right of free speech and expression guaranteed under Ar
ticle 19(1)(a). Therefore, disclosures of information in regard to the functioni
ng of Government must be the rule, and secrecy an exception justified only where
the strictest requirement of public interest so demands. The approach of the Co
urt must be to attenuate the area of secrecy as much as possible consistently wi
th the requirement of public interest, bearing in mind all the time that disclos
ure also serves an important aspect of public interest. The fundamental rights c
annot be taken away by any legislation; a legislation can only impose reasonable
restrictions on the exercise of the right. Out of the several rights enumerated
in clause (1) of Article 19, the right at sub-clause (a) is not merely a right
of speech and expression but a right to freedom of speech and expression. The en
umeration of other rights is not by reference to freedom. In the words of the th
en Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India Patanjali Sastri (in State of Wes
t Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and Ors., 1954 SCR 587), these rights are great an
d basic rights which are recognized and guaranteed as the natural rights, inhere
nt in the status of a citizen of a free country. Recommendations India is juxtap
osed by its secrecy legislation preventing the free flow of information alongsid
e modern and progressive attempts to stabilize a
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democracy and promote freedom of expression and information throughout the count
ry. The Indian media is active and protective of its freedoms and plays a crucia
l role in the country s democratic system. However, in states unsettled by Naxal
insurgency, journalists are caught in the crossfire both on the battlefield and
in the office. The Indian Government needs to revoke or re-clarify the Official
Secrets Act and its effect on the Right to Information Act and to educate and i
nform the public of their right to information and freedom of expression. The St
ate Government of Chhattisgarh needs to revoke the Special Public Security Act t
o ensure full, independent and objective coverage by the media and total press f
reedom. The state and national government need to be accountable for the non-vio
lent and violent threats made by officials and seek justice and provide compensa
tion for the victims. The State of Chhattisgarh needs to prosecute those who are
attacking journalists and violating their right to freedom of expression. The F
orum for Fact-finding Documentation and Advocacy urges authorities to respect jo
urnalists’ rights and the rule of law. [1] Reporters sans Frountieres: Annual Worl
dwide Press Freedom Index 2006 – www.rsf.org [2] Reporters sans frontières (RSF), Pa
ris 2005 http://www.rsf.org [3] http://www.newswatch.in/?p=6501 [4] Reporters sa
ns Frountieres: www.rsf.org [5] RSF report; www.rsf.org [6] http://www.freemedia
.at/cms/ipi/freedom_detail.html?country=/KW00 01/KW0005/KW0116/ [7] Internationa
l Declaration of Human Rights: http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html
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Salwa€Judum:€A€People’s€Movement?€ [Salwa€Judum€is€an€indigenous€movement,€a€challenge€thro
uppets€ in€the€hands€of€international€powers€for€vested€personal€interests.€It€will€go€down
s€a€unique€example€of€the€latent€potential€that€every€society€carries€but€does€not€have€the
t€will€shine€like€a€guiding€star€for€the€coming€generations,€a€lesson€as€ to€what€an€awaken
ey€realise€and€utilise€the€power€they€hold‐€ Shachi€Rairikar,€Salwa€Judum€the€Heroic€Uprisi
r€southern€counter‐parts€in€Andhra€Pradesh,€[the€state€of€Chhattisgarh]€never€succeeded€ in
y€brutal€police€force€that€would€fight€the€State’s€battle€with€the€naxalites.€€ Therefore€e
ictims€of€Maoist€political€strategies€to€group€for€attack.€€ This€is€in€many€ways€the€worse
es,€if€one€is€forced€to€express€a€choice.€€ The€first€criminalizes€the€State€whereas€the€se
laves€of€freedom€and€ dignity€may€survive€in€a€criminalized€State€but€not€in€a€criminalized
nd€Deprivation€The€war€in€Dantewara:€A€Report,€Human€Rights€Forum]€ € Surprisingly,€the€abo
ring€to€the€same€campaign€aimed€at€combating€Naxalites€ in€India’s€state€of€Chhattisgarh.€€
ation€of€inhabitants€of€the€Bastar€region€of€ Chhattisgarh€in€response€to€Naxalism€called€“
ontaneous€ people’s€movement”€by€its€supporters,€including€the€national€and€state€governmen
s€of€academia,€civil€society€and€the€politics€have€suggested€that€Salwa€Judum€is€not€in€fac
e€representation€is€covering€up€and€deferring€responsibility€for€ illegal€acts€reportedly€c
udum€participants.€ € This€paper€seeks€to€first€establish€working€qualifications€for€what€c
vement”€ based€on€past€movements€and€intuition.€€It€then€aims€to€understand€to€what€extent€
lifications€through€exploring€various€aspects€of€the€campaign€including€its€ conception€and
s€relationship€with€other€organs€of€society,€and€its€affects€on€the€people€ for€whom€it€is€
ation€notes€relevant€domestic€provisions€and€ international€standards€violated€and€challeng
f€Salwa€Judum.€€The€report€then€ revisits€the€qualifications€laid€out€at€the€beginning€to€u
um€truly€is€a€ people’s€movement.€ € € € € € € €
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€ People’s€Movements:€Examples€and€Definitions€ There€does€not€appear€to€be€an€accepted€def
wever,€the€ apparent€absence€of€a€working€definition€does€not€presuppose€that€there€is€not€
cation.€€One€need€only€look€into€history€to€understand€the€types€of€movements€that€might€be
t.€€There€are€a€variety€of€accepted€people’s€movements€which€both€ establish€and€reflect€ch
guish€them€from€other€types€of€mass€mobilization.€€A€ brief€survey€of€movements€that€have€g
nition€and€acceptance€as€people’s€ movements€can€help€to€distill€the€general€criteria€for€a
ven€popular€ mobilization.€€The€following€are€a€few€movements€that€vary€both€in€geography€a
e€to€be€seen€by€the€international€community€as€bona€fide€people’s€movements.€ € Free€Tibet€
ession€in€Tibet€remain€geographically€dispersed,€from€Bhutan,€to€ India,€to€Europe€and€Amer
ommon€territory€and€thus€a€common€aim:€to€ protect€their€right€to€a€nationality€and€a€count
n€international€ movement,€but€it€began€as€a€struggle€by€those€forced€out€of€Tibet,€a€group
ht€to€be€free€of€Chinese€rule€and€oppression.€€The€Dalai€Llama€is€the€most€commonly€ accept
eographic€dispersal€of€exiles€makes€organization€and€ coordination€of€the€movement€difficul
s€more€or€less€the€same,€and€the€activities,€ including€protests,€rallies€and€various€forms
terize€pockets€of€the€movement€ all€over€the€world.€ € American€Civil€Rights€Movement€ The€
ement€aimed€to€claim€equality€for€African€Americans€in€America€and€ emerged€in€the€1960’s.€
on€continued€to€enforce€already€existing€ segregationist€norms,€African€Americans€began€to€
riety€of€activities€including€ marches,€rallies€and€sit‐ins.€€The€movement€began€at€a€local
s€of€the€ African€American€community€asserting€their€equality€with€small€acts€which€undermi
ture€(such€as€drinking€from€a€water€fountain€marked€explicitly€for€whites).€€The€movement€g
f€Martin€Luther€King€Jr.€and€others,€who€aimed€to€raise€awareness€of€the€ plight€of€African
outhern€states,€and€change€policies€that€reinforced€ norms€of€inequality.€€The€movement€eve
mbers€of€all€races,€though€the€vast€ majority€remained€African€Americans€fighting€for€their
o€Andolan€ One€people’s€movement€within€India€that€gained€international€recognition€was€the
n€in€the€1970’s,€the€villagers€in€a€region€at€the€foot€of€the€Himalayas€mobilized€in€respon
urrounding€land€to€a€local€sporting€goods€company.€€The€sporting€ goods€company€had€little€
ubsequently€beginning€heavy€logging€of€its€ newly€acquired€property.€€As€the€local€villager
s€to€fell€trees€on€the€land€in€order€ to€make€agricultural€tools€and€been€denied,€they€rese
ion€ went€into€the€forest€to€the€sights€of€deforestation€and€formed€circles€around€each€tre
m€chopping€it€down.€€With€the€help€of€local€NGO’s€and€under€the€leadership€of€
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activist€Chandi€Prased€Bhatt,€the€movement€spread€throughout€local€areas€in€India€that€were
ected€by€tree‐felling€schemes€which€did€not€benefit€the€local€population.€€The€ movement’s€
ar€Ban€on€Treefelling€which€went€into€effect€in€1980,€ exacting€a€significant€effect€on€the
s€allocating€natural€resources.€ € Narmada€Bachao€Andolan€ In€1986,€the€Narmada€Valley€Rive
y€the€World€Bank€and€the€United€States€aimed€ to€commence€the€construction€of€30€large€damn
er€the€Narmada€ Valley€River.€€Two€of€these€dams,€Sardar€Sarovar€and€Narmada€Sargar,€which€
0,000€local€tribal€people€in€addition€to€exacting€ecological€damage€on€the€area,€sparked€th
cal€population€under€the€leadership€of€a€social€activist€and€researcher€named€ Medha€Patkar
e€people€regarding€their€land€rights€and€their€impending€ future€if€the€dam€project€went€ah
ee€for€Dam‐Affected€People,€who€ voiced€their€non‐violent€opposition€to€the€dams€and€subseq
re€lands.€€The€ movement€grew,€activists,€academics,€journalists€and€more€villagers€joined,
ard€and€ capturing€an€international€audience.€€Eventually,€an€alliance€formed€among€variati
e€movement€and€it€was€entitled€Narmada€Bachao€Andolan.€ € Characteristics€of€a€people’s€mov
istics€shared,€fulfilled€by€and€reflected€in€the€preceding€movements€which€have€ been€named
th€notions€intuitive€to€the€name€“people’s€movement”,€the€ following€rough€criteria€may€be€
essing€the€level€to€which€a€ mobilization€of€people€is€a€“people’s€movement”:€ € 1.€€The€mo
ization€such€that€it€is€a€mechanism€for€ the€creation€of€new€norms€or€structures,€not€in€de
nsequence,€the€people€for€whom€the€movement€is€claiming€to€fight€must€be€free€and€ active€p
.€ 3.€The€movement€must€seek€to€fulfill€a€defined€objective€which€aims€to€improve€the€ultim
p€of€people,€specifically€those€who€have€initiated€the€movement.€ 4.€The€movement€must€be€a
round€this€objective,€such€that€there€is€an€ awareness€of€the€activities€of€the€other€membe
ration€and€ coordination€of€resources€so€that€the€objective€might€be€pursued€in€a€unified€m
an€operate€within€the€confines€of€the€law€or€outside€of€it.€€Its€placement€with€ regard€to€
s€a€people’s€movement,€though€it€may€affect€the€ legitimacy€of€the€movement.€€Thus,€the€fac
ay€resort€to€ violence€(either€spontaneously€or€in€response€to€state€violence)€does€not€und
e’s€movement,€though€spontaneous€violence€will€likely€change€the€character€and€dynamic€of€
t€to€be€viewed€as€a€terrorist€group€or€insurgency€as€well.€€The€status€of€a€ people’s€movem
ut€as€its€tactics,€membership,€and€support€ change€the€movement€may€become€more€or€less€of€
teria€ described€above.€€It€is€important€to€continue€to€acknowledge€these€criteria€througho
ploration€of€the€contentious€anti‐Naxalite€campaign€“Salwa€Judum.”€
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The Marxist Volume: 3, No. 1 January- March 1985
Naxalism Today; At an Ideological Deadend
Prakash Karat
IT is nearly two decades since the phenomenon popularly known as naxalism manife
sted itself on the Indian political scene. What is the state of naxalism today?
What has happened to the ideology and politics of the groups, which comprised th
e naxalite movement? An answer to these questions for the recent period will be
instructive, as it confirms the time-lested experience of the international comm
unist movement that left – sectarianism and ultra-left adventurism is the observe
of right-reformism and revisionism and ends up serving the interests of the ruli
ng classes. Ultra – leftism of any variety of which naxalism is type, contains wit
hin itself the seeds of disruption and self-destruction.
It is well known that the naxalite movement disintegrated into myriad groups and
factions in the early seventies within five years of its birth. Along with this
organizational disintegration, and preceding it, was the ideological disarray a
nd confusion. In this article, the focus is on the ideological deadend these gro
ups have reached, which is the basis for the continuing derailment of the left-a
dventurist stream. After continuously grappling with the ideologically bankrupt
positions taken at the outset, the naxalite groups are nowhere near resolving th
e problems, which began when they abandoned their Marxist-Leninist moorings. Eve
ry theoretical and political issue, which confronts them, leads of further ideol
ogical confusion and consequent organisational splintering. Despite their decade
-long struggle to “reorient and rectify” their positions none of these groups have c
ome anywhere near correcting their dogmatic errors. On the other hand, these gro
ups have further degenerated into anti-left anarchic groups subject to the worst
forms of pettybourgeois deviations.
The purpose in this article is not give an historical account of the theory and
practice of these groups since the disintegration began in the early seventies.
The emphasis is on analyzing their ideological and theoretical positions and the
inner contradictions and conflicts between the groups, based on their own docum
ents and publications. Without understanding their current positions on ideologi
cal questions, the splintering and kaliedescope merging and splitting of the gro
ups cannot be comprehended. The analysis also shows how the naxalities have had
to abandon most of the basic positions adopted by them when they challenged the
CPI(M)’s ideological-programmatic-tactical line in 1967-68. Where they have persis
ted in clinging to some of the original positions, they have landed themselves i
n irreconcilable contradictions between their theory and practice.
Finally, the article points out that despite the failure of the ultra-left chall
enge in the ideological sphere, the left-opportunism pursued by these groups is
dangerous for the left movement. Despite the political–organisational splintering
of naxalism, the potential for mischief by ultra-leftism in new forms remains al
ong with the necessity to continuously
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fight against petty-bourgeois revolutionism, which finds fertile soil in India d
ue to the crisis and the impact of bourgeois-landlord rule.
The Current State of Naxalism The much publicized claim of the naxalities that t
he CPI(ML), launched in 1969, heralded the new revolutionary party, collapsed in
shambles in 1971-72. Even before this the movement had begun to splinter. A bri
ef recounting of the organizational disintegration is necessary to get a full pi
cture of the state of the naxalite groups today.
Even before the announcement of the formation of the CPI(ML) in 1969, the splint
ering had begun. In 1968 when the various naxalite groups which split away from
the CPI(M) formed the All India Coordination Committee of communist Revolutionar
ies (AICCR), two groups broke away that year itself in West Bengal-the Parimal D
asgupta and Asit Sen groups. The latter formed the Maoist Coordination Centre. T
his was followed by the AICCR led by charu Mazumdar disaffiliating the Andhra gr
oup led by Nagi Reddy, DV Rao and Pulla Reddy. In 1969, the following groups als
o disassociated from the Charu Maxumadar-led naxalites-the BB Chakraborty group
which is known currently as the Liberation Front, the Moni Guha group, and the K
unnikal Narayanan group in Kerala which maintained a distinct identity.
In September, 1970 a few months after the ‘First Congress’ of the CPI(ML) which elec
ted Charu Mazumdar as its General Secretary, the faction led by Satyanarian Sing
h revolted and in 1971 formed their own CPI(ML) Central Committee. In 1971, Ashi
m Chaterjee, Santosh Rana and other split away from the Charuite group. While th
e SNS group opposed the line of individual annihilation pursued by the Charu-led
party the Ashim Chatterjee group also opposed the CPI (ML) of opposing the libe
ration struggle in Bangladesh.
In 1972, after Mazumdar’s death, the Charuite committee was led by Sharma and Maha
dev Mukherjee and during this time, the CPI (ML) totally disintegrated. From thi
s point onwards, the CPI (ML) Central Committee, which succeeded Charu Mazumdar
no longer represented the mainstream of the naxalite movement. The Khokan Mazumd
ar group in West Bengal, the Saraf group in Jammu and Kashmir, the Punjab, Tamil
Nadu and Kerala factions all began to function independently without any coordi
nation.
The CPI (ML) charuite group spilt two with Mahadev Mukherjee expelling Sharma. T
he Mahadev Mukherjee group itself spilt into two-the anti-Lin Biao and pro-Lin B
iao groups. The anti-Lin Biao group which was also pro-Charuite, based in Bhojpu
r district, Bihar, later evolved into the CPI (ML) ked by Vinod Mishra. The pro-
Lin Biao group led by Mukherjee saw him ousted from leadership and after the eme
rgency the group was led by by Nishit Banerjee and Azisul Haq, and is based in W
est Bengal.
Meanwhile, Sharma who had parted ways with Mukherjee, along with the Suniti Ghos
h group, the Andhra Committee and some others formed the central Organising Comm
ittee (COC) in 1974. However, this unity did not last long. The October 1975 res
olution “Road to Liberation” was a compromise one which soon led to new disagreement
s. In 1976, the Andhra Committee split away. This was followed by the COC breaki
ng up with the groups parting ways. The northern India group for sometime formed
the Communist League of India but later became defunct.
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Among the major pro-Charu groups existing today, apart from the Vinod Mishra gro
up, there is the People’s War group led by Kondapalli Seetharamiah in Andhra Prade
sh. This group originated in the Andhra Committee, which spilt away from the COC
in 1976. From this committee the Kondapali group combined with the Kothandarama
n pro-Charu group of Tamilnadu and formed the CPI (ML) People’s War group in 1980.
The decided to persist in armed struggle while also working in mass organisatio
ns.
Another pro-Charu group existing today is the Central Reorganising Committee (CR
C) led by Venu. A section of the Kerala pro-Charu naxalites and a splinter group
from Andhra formed this group in 1979. This group also defends the Charuite lin
e while accepting the need for mass work.
Among the anti-Charu Mazumdar groups also a process of splits and realignments h
as been going on. In Andhra the naxalites who from the beginning refused to acce
pt the CPI (ML) understanding and tactics, were led by Nagi Reddy, Pulla Reddy a
nd DV Rao. This group spilt into two in 1971 with Pulla Reddy forming his own gr
oup. after the death of Nagi Reddy in 1976, DV Rao assumed the leadership of thi
s group in Andhra. In 1975 the Negi Reddy group had joined with the Moni Guha gr
oup of West Bengal and the North Zone unity center to form the UCCRI (ML). In 19
76, they divided again with Moni Guha and DV Rao expelling each other from the o
rganizations, and resumed separate functioning. The DV Rao-led UCCRI also underw
ent various splits.
In the meantime, the other major anti-Charu stream led by SN Singh had been join
ed in 1977 by the Unity committee comprising the Khokan Manzumdar (N Bengal) and
Vaskar Nandy groups. They constituted the Central committee led by SN Singh. In
1975, the Chandra Pulla Reddy group from Andhra united with the SNS group and t
hey formed from West Bengal, Maharashtra and Punjab revolted from the SN Singh g
roup and formed what is known as the Central Team. The SNS-Pulla Reddy group whi
ch became a major group in the Naxalite movement broke up in 1980 with the Pulla
Reddy group walking off and resuming independent functioning.
Another formation of naxalite groups, which opposed the Charuite line originated
with the leaders lodged in the Vizag jail. Kanu Sanyal, the erstwhile lieutenan
t of Charu Mazumdar, took the initiative to form the Organisng Committee of Comm
unist Revolutionaries (OCCR). Nagabhusanam Patnaik also out of jail, formed his
own group. Both these leaders have been trying without success to forge some uni
ty among the warring groups.
Moni Guha after the debacle of the UCCRI, has been advocating the pro-Albanian l
ine and is considered anathema by other groups. The onlyothe rpro-Albanian facti
on is the Ghadar Party which is Punjab. The Saraf group plouged a lonely furrow
and after being decimated in Jammu and Kashmir has formed its own party titled t
he ‘Proletariat Party.’
From the above maze of splits and realignments, it can be said that the major gr
oups, which have not become defunct are: Pro-Charu groups; 1 CPI (ML)-Vinod Mish
ra group 2. CPI(ML)-People’s War group 3. CPI(ML)-CRC(Venu group) 4. CPI(ML) Secon
d Central Committee groups (Pro Lin Biao)
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Anti-Charuite groups: 1. CPI(ML)-SN Singh group 2. CPI(ML)-C. Pulla Reddy group
3. CPI(ML)-COC groups 4. OCCR (Kanu Sanyal) 5. UCCRI (ML)-(Nagi Reddy DV Rao) 6.
Maoist Communist Center 7. Liberation Front 8. CPI(ML)-Central Team.
Apart from these, there are minor ones which still maintain some existence such
as: 1. Shanti Pal group (West Bengal) 2. Kunnikal Narayanan group (Kerala) 3. B
P Sharma group (Rajisthan, UP) 4. Chelapati Rao group (AP) 5. Tamil Nadu splinte
rs AOC and SOC 6. Ghadar party 7. Proletariat Party-Saraf group 8. Revolutionary
Communist Party (Punjab)
However, it must be remembered that the situation is not static. The above group
s constantly divide and re-form. For instance in 1984, splits have occurred in t
he major groups of SN Singh and Chandra Pulla Reddy committees. In the S N Singh
-led group before his death in September 1984, a serious split developed between
the S N Singh-led minority in the PCC, and the majority led by Vaskar Nandy and
Santosh Rana leading to the formation of parallel committees. Similarly in the
Pulla Reddy led group also a split occurred a few months before his death with a
faction led by Palia Vasudeva Rao Splitting off. The political-ideological base
s for these splits are being dealt with in a later section.
Futile Quest For Unity Alongside the endless splintering of the groups, an equal
ly endless but futile for unity has also been going on. The earliest move was in
March 1975 when the SNS group united with the Pulla Reddy group and formed the
Provisional Central Committee of the CPI (ML). This broke up in 1980 because of
sharp differences between the two groups on the question of united front tactics
at the international and national levels against ‘social imperialism’ and ‘Indian fas
cism’. During the emergency in 1975 the SNS-Pulla Reddy group had initiated a meet
ing with the COC the unity Committee and the UCCRI and a joint declaration was i
ssued for the formation of an ‘anti-fascist united front’. However, soon after the C
OC and UCCRI denounced the declaration and the move failed. This was allowed, as
stated, with the COC itself breaking up into four groups.
In 1979, the Vinod-Mishra group and the SN Singh-Pulla Reddy group issued a join
t statement and agreed to take up joint activities. But quarrels, in December 19
81, Nagabhushanam Patnaik and other took he initiative to call a meet in which 1
3 groups attended. This meet also ended in mutual recriminations and the unity e
ffort ended in a fiasco. In April 1982, a conference was held in Delhi initiated
by the Vinod Mishra group, which the Pulla Reddy, Nagabhushanam Patnaik groups
and others attended. The conference sought to achieve organizational coordinatio
n and to build up a ‘national alternative’. The Conference announced the formation o
f an Indian People’s Front (IPF). Predictably the front and its concept of nationa
l alternative came in for bitter attack from the SN Singh group, CRC Saraf, and
others. The SNS group saracastically commented, “NO sane political creature believ
es that any single political party can emerge as the National Alternative to Ind
ira fascism right now… Recently one group and its supporters held a national confe
rence in Delhi and formed the Indian People’s Front… Utpoian dreams based on exagger
ated self-esteem is a disease that drives a victim to commit suicide. So the Ind
ian People’s Front led by one revolutionary group has become the National Alternat
ive!” (For a new democracy, May Day, 1982)
The failure to unite is not surprising given their ideological difference and in
ability to come to any common asseements regarding the past theories and practic
e of naxalism. There are some group like the Vinod Mishra group, CRC and People’s
War group which
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refuse to renounce the Charu Mazumdar line and defend his basic positions with s
ome minor criticisms. On the other hand the SNS-led group, UCCRI and Pulla Reddy
groups consider the Charuite line disastrous and responsible for the debacle of
naxalism. Some like the OCCR and Nagabhusganam Patnaik group are attempting org
anizational coordination unity, skirting these divisive issues and hoping for un
ity through united work and struggle.
The obstacle to unity is not only on pro and anti-Charuite lines. Within these t
wo broad camps, there are innumerable difference on the content of Mao Zedong th
ought, attitude to the Chinese Communist Party application of the three world th
eory, participation in parliamentary activities, individual annihilation and arm
ed struggle tactics and the concept of mass work and mass organizations. It is n
ecessary therefore, to look at the ideological and political controversies which
hold these groups in a barren and vice-like grip.
Ideological Disarray In 1968, when the naxalite left-adventurist deviation chall
enged the CPI(M)’s MarxistLeninst-based stand on ideological and programmatic issu
es, they put up a left-sectarian position on a whole range of question pertainin
g to the international communist movement and the path of the Indian revolution.
The naxalite condemned the CPI(M) as ‘neo-revisionists’ on the question of the char
acter of the Indian state, stage of the revolution, strategy tactics, assessment
of the Soviet Union and the international correlation of class forces.
Their stand then could be summed up as follows: India is not politically indepen
dent it is semi-colonial, semi-colonial, semi-feudal; the Indian state is contro
lled by imperialists, compradore bureaucratic capital and feudal landlords, the
stage of revolution is national liberation against imperialism, compradore capit
alism and feudalism; people’s war based on armed struggle of the peasantry is the
tactical line for liberation; the Soviet Union is revisionist (later modified to
social imperialist) which is collaborating with US imperialism; adherence to Ma
o Zedong thought is the test of a communist party. They condemned participation
in parliament as reformist and adopted boycott as a strategic slogan; they denie
d the role of mass organizations and abandoned trade unions as reformist organiz
ations, further in the sphere of tactics, they negated the role of united fronts
, branding them as class collaborationist.
The CPI(M), countering the left-adventurist positions, has stated: ”If we take all
the arguments of the critics of the ideological document what do they amount to
? They amount to a total repudiation of the understanding of the epoch. They imp
ly liquidation of the socialist camp; they convey that capitalism has been resto
red in the USSR leading to imperialist policies; that the major fight of the wor
king class of the world is not against American imperialism but against Soviet a
nd American imperialism. The fight against the revisionist leaders of the Soviet
Union is replaced by the fight against the “imperialism” of the Soviet State.” (Ideol
ogical Debate Summed Up by Polit Bureau, p.173)
This was the package of left-infantilism which characterized the various naxalit
e groups who challenged the revolutionary credentials of the CPI(M). Today after
nearly two decades of naxalite activity, when we assess where this platform has
taken them, it is clear that they have been forced to abandon most of these pos
ition. In fact they have retreated pell-mell from the ‘revolutionary’ platform they
adopted. Where they cling to such positions their own makes it difficult to reco
ncile it with the theories they espouse.
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Let us look some of these key positions and their derailment.
Mao Zedong Thought and-Attitude to CPC The distinctive characteristic of the nax
alite groups since their inception has been their advertised allegiance to Mao Z
edong thought was the essence of Marxism-Leninism of our epoch. Except for the p
ro-Albanina groups who were denounced Mao Zedong thought, all our groups extant
continue to swear allegiance. However, their perceptions of its content and role
differ and each accuses the other of distorting or revising Maoist ideology. Th
e pro-Charu groups, except the Vinod Mishra group, continue to hail the Revoluti
on and refuse to accept the CPC’s critical revaluation of this period and the dama
ge it cause the party and socialist construction. The whole gamut of left-sectar
ian positions on the international situation and building of socialism is consid
ered by these groups to be the main content of Mao Zedong thought. On the other
hand the SN Singh, C Pulla Reddy and DV Rao groups accept the CPC evaluation as
presented in the eleventh congress and the sixth plenum of the C C and the denun
ciation of the gang of four. The pro-Charu People’s War group, after initially acc
epting the CPC positions, has now come round to considering them revisionist. Th
e CPC’s own assessment of some of the erroneous concepts upheld by the party under
Mao’s leadership is not acceptable to the CRC, People’s War and Saraf groups. These
groups now maintain that the CPC has become a revisionist party. At the extreme
, the pro-Lin Biao group has taken the absurd stand that China has become a soci
al imperialist power.
From the naxalite groups who held that China was the center of the world revolut
ion, a substantial number now have gone over to the position that the CPC has be
trayed world revolution. The CPC’s authoritative documents produced in the sixth p
lenum of the CC, the eleventh and twelfth congresses, have become for them the b
edrock of revisionism and betrayal of Mao Zedong thought. The blind and dogmatic
adherence to Mao Zedong thought as the essence of Marxism-Leninism of the epoch
- a position which the CPC itself does not maintain now-is the key to the ideolo
gical disarray these groups have reached.
Three World Theory Another important aspect of the differences between the group
s on the content of Mao thought concerns the Three world Theory. Some of the bit
terest polemics are directed as to whether it forms an integral part of Mao Zedo
ng thought or not. Most of the groups whether anti-Charu or pro-Charu, the SNS g
roup, the Pulla Reddy group, the Vinod Mishra group. D V Rao, etc., uphold the T
hree World Theory as a component part of Mao Zedong thought and creative applica
tion of Marxism Leninism. It is on this basis that they work out their political
line on international and national questions. The CPI(M) had in 1947 itself, wh
en this theory was put out by the CPC, criticized it as anti-Marxist not being b
ased on class analysis. The division of the world into three- the first world of
the two superpowers; the second world of other imperialist countries and the th
ird world of the underdeveloped countries-went against the basic analysis of cla
ss relations in the international sphere and eliminated the central contradictio
n between imperialist system and the socialist system. Now, some of the naxalite
groups like the CRC (Venu group). Saraf group (and of course the pro-Albanian s
plinters) have launched a bitter attack on the Three World Theory. They argue th
at no such theory was formulated by Mao Zedong and such a bogus theory has been
smuggled in by the ‘revisionist clique’ headed by Deng Xiaoping. In order to defend
their version of Mao thought, they argue that Mao had only talked of differentia
ting the three worlds for purposes of foreign policy tactics and had never elabo
rated and elevated the three worlds into a full-fledged theory. Exposing the gro
ups who uphold this thesis, they point out that this theory has led to the formu
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powers, the Soviet Union’s social imperialism is more aggressive and dangerous. Th
is has led to these groups becoming soft on US imperialism and ending up allying
with US imperialist forces and the parties that represent them in India. For in
stance the CRC group states, “Opportunists like Satyanarain Singh in India advance
d the thesis of building a united front with pro-American ruling classes. The Th
ree World Theory’ has come as a born to these opportunists who were already well a
head on this path of collaborating with the pro-US section of the ruling classes”
(K Venu: Mao Zedong and Three World Theory’ p. 29)
Further, it exposes the international implications of this line while talking ab
out ASEAN. Three World Theories shows great enthusiasm in holding up this organi
zation as united front against Soviet social imperialism and as one of the facto
rs conducive to the building of a broad front of the third world countries. In r
eality however this organization has been formed, with the full backing and bles
sings of US imperialism by the imperialist lackeys the compradore feudal states
of Philippines Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore with the objective of
chalking out schemes for suppressing the people’s revolutionary struggles.” (Venu:
Mao Zedong and Three World Theory’ p. 32)
But the CRC naxalite group’s fierce denunciation of the Three World Theory is only
partial, as they do not dispute the existence of two super-powers and Soviet so
cial imperialism. Their only difference is that the Soviet Union should not as a
general principle be considered the more aggressive imperialist power. Both the
‘imperialisms’ are dangerous and which is more dangerous will depend on country and
situation to situation. As an illustration, according to them, US imperialism i
s more dangerous in Latin America, while the Soviet Union poses a greater threat
in Afghanistan and Kampuchea.
Even in the interpretation of the Three World Theory there are differences betwe
en those who uphold it, on how to implement it. For instance the People’s War grou
p interprets it in a different way from the SN Singh group. on building united f
ronts based on this theory also the SN Singh and Pulla Reddy groups got divided.
In 1980 the unity of these two groups was disrupted on the question of building
an anti-Soviet front on the basis of the Soviet Union being the main enemy of t
he Indian people and the necessity of forgoing a united front against Indira fas
cism by including even pro-US allies. After the split the SNS-led group claimed:
“it was our party which initiated and forged a broad united front against Russian
aggression on Afghanistan, and united Gandhites and Royists, Socialists and Sar
vodayites. BJP and the Moslem League on the same platform to oppose hegemonism a
nd aggression.” (For a New Democracy, March-April, 1982)
The crux of the matter lies in the fact that the various naxalite groups are for
ced to stick to the erroneous ideological positions put out by the CPC during th
e left-sectarian phase of the cultural revolution. To justify their existence, w
ith all their dogmatic position being rejected by life and experience, leads the
m to cling to those very concepts which eyen the CPC has critically abandoned.
Strategy & Programme: Disorientation Given their distorted loyalty to a dogmatic
‘Mao Zedong thought’ it is but natural that in the sphere of strategy and programma
tic formulations these groups show the same variety of left opportunism, sectari
anism and hopeless confusion. In recent years, particularly after the emergency
was lifted, most of the groups have been undertaking the exercise of holding ‘part
y’ congresses and ‘special conferences’ preparing draft programme and resorting to int
erminable discussions within their groups and amongst the
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different groups. The SNS group held its party congress in 1982 and prepared a p
rogramme; the Vinod Mishra group held a party congress in January 1983; the CRC
group held a party conference in January 1982; the Andhra groups have also held
a series of conferences; the Saraf group held a party congress with 14 delegates
and formed a Proletariat Party in 1983. simultaneously all the groups have been
analyzing each other’s efforts and subjecting them to bitter polemics, and at tim
es abuse.
In 1970, the CPI(ML)-led by Charu Mazumdar had adopted its programme by which In
dia was termed semi-colonial and semi-feudal. The state was characterized as imp
erialistcompradore bureaucratic capitalist and feudal. The stage of the revoluti
on was national liberation and the principle contradiction had been termed as th
at between feudalism and the broad masses of the people. In reassessing the prog
rammatic formulations and tasks, sharp differences have arisen. The Andhra group
which did not join the CPI(ML) in 1969 continues to differ from the 1970 propos
itions. According to DV Rao of the UCCRI group, India is a neo-colony, which is
exploited by both superpowers India is not a semi-colony and had achieved politi
cal independence in 1947. It lost its independent status and became a neo-colony
of the superpowers. As for the compradore bourgeoisie, he has his own peculiar
interpretation. He states that there is a compradore class in the industrial bou
rgeoisies; the compradore class is part of the Indian bourgeoisie, thereby recog
nizing that there are sections of the bourgeoisie, which are not compradore. The
n he goes on to further confuse the issue by stating, “Compradore bourgeoisie clas
s means a bourgeoisie class having a compradore character, not a mere commission
agent.” (DV Rao: People’s Democratic Revolution in India, p. 24)
While most groups pay lip service to the principle contradiction being between f
eudalism and the Indian people, Saraf violently disagrees. According to him the
principle contradiction should be termed as that between the alliance of imperia
lism, the compradire bourgeoisie and feudalism on the one hand, and the Indian p
eople on the other. He inveighs against the other groups for not understanding t
he key role of alliance of these forces in state power. (A Revolutionary view po
int, Jan-March 1978, Saraf p. 83)
J P Dixit who runs his own journal (People’s Power) pounces on the alliance theory
and attacks: “a suggestion of alliance between the native classes and imperialism
means an end of the economic and political subjugation of imperialism…. The theor
y is dangerous as it supports the imperialist fraud that their lackeys are not l
ackeys but their friends and allies.” (People’s Power, Jan –June 1982, p.5) The S N Si
ngh group is also subjected to this attack as in their draft programme they amen
ded the principle contradiction on the lines of the alliance of imperialism, com
pradore bourgeoisies and feudalism.
Not content with this attempt to stretch all logic and credulity to maintain the
semblance of a lackey bourgeoisie in the state power, the CRC (Venu) group has
also made its creative contribution. “We have to recognize that clas relations are
undergoing change in differing degrees and that new classes like the rural bour
geoisie and the local bourgeoisie in the industrial sector are emerging. If the
observations are proved correct we will have to make substantial changes in the
programme. The character of the New Democratic Revolution will remain to be anti
-imperialist and anti-feudal, but the emphasis will shift on to the anti imperia
list aspect. The main target of attack be both the imperialist blocs and their I
ndian allies, the bureaucratic compradore bourgeoisie.”(Mass Line, May 1984, Inter
view with Venu)
Like a specter, the original sin committed in the 1970 prograame continues to ha
unt them
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and there seems to be nothing available to put them out of their endless misery
of interminable and divisive discussions. The CRC group is still formulating the
new CPI(M) programme and it seems to be a protracted affair. This group and som
e others including the recently formed Nandy-Santosh Rana faction of the SNS-CPI
(ML), are unable to reconcile the evidence of capitalist development with a semi
-colony/semi-feudal model. The escape route sought by the CRC group to maintain
the fiction is to bring about the theory of imperialist-sponsored ‘capitalist deve
lopment’ in India, plagiarizing the GunderFrank/Samir amin theories. The other att
empt as by DV Rao is to term India a neo-colony. Yet some others, like the Santo
sh Rana-Vaskar Nandy faction’s special congress held in 1984, attempts to state th
at imperialism is directly sharing power in the Indian state as opposed to the r
ival faction’s stand that imperialism is indirectly ruling through the big bourgeo
isie and landlords. Whatever the effort, the naxalites are caught in the trap of
the ‘compradore bourgeoisie’ from which they find so salvation!
The CPI(M) has pointed out at the very outset that the naxalite version of the p
rogramme “leads to left sectarian and adventurist errors, and overestimation of th
e situation. What is the implication of a stooge government in a period when imp
erialist is collapsing all over the world? It implies that the state and governm
ent is already completely isolated, universally hated and armed struggle is the
only from left to the people; it has only to be called for to be started. This f
ormulation ignores the existing class realities underestimates the ideological a
nd organizational hold of the ruling classes and their parties on the people the
illusions nurtured and undermines the preparations for the requisite class alig
nment for building the People’s Democratic Front.” (On Left Deviation: Resolution of
the Central Committee, CPI(M), August, 1967, p.5)
Who is the main enemy of the Indian revolution? Here the villain in the form of
the Three World Theory has further confused the naxalites. While some staunchly
maintain that the Soviet social imperialists are the main enemy, others vehement
ly disagree and put forward the alternative theories that ‘both imperialist powers
are joint enemies; feudalism is the main enemy; the imperialist-backed big bour
geoisie and landlords are the main enemy and so on and so forth. D V Rao comment
ing on these group states: “Even while claiming revolutionaries some are unable to
see the difference between the two superpower and he upper hand off the Soviet
Union. As a result whenever the Soviet Union is exposed, they call such an attit
ude pro-US.” (DV Rao: “People’s Democratic Revolution in India, forward, p.24). The sa
me difference in perception of the Soviet Union as the main enemy divides the ot
herwise pro-Charu Vinod Mishra and CRC groups.
This difference in perception of the main enemy creates insuperable problems for
them to agree on a common united front strategy of the classes in the revolutio
n. The S N Singh group, Vinod Mishra group and the anti-Charu Andhra groups (Pul
la Reddy and D V Rao groups) pivot their strategic class front on fighting “Soviet
social imperialism” which is claimed to be the dominant imperialist power having
a stranglehold on the Indian state and economy. This programmatic position is re
jected by other groups which see this as the basis for class collaboration with
the pro-US section of the ruling classes. While both sides maintain that the Ind
ian ruling classes (compradore bourgeois and feudals) are divided into two facti
ons, being lackeys of either Soviet or US imperialism, they are also divided on
the primacy of the former and the nature of strategic class fronts to be develop
ed. In a perversion of Marxist analysis, all the groups subscribe to the positio
n that there are four oppressor enemy classes to be overthrown to make the new d
emocratic revolution –Soviet social imperialism,’ US imperialism, compradore capital
and feudalism. While united in their determination to deny the reality of an In
dian national bourgeoisie led by the big bourgeoisie and its dual character, the
se groups have engendered further disintegration by forcing class analysis to fi
t into a mythical anti-communist ‘social imperialism.’
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Tactics-Hall Mark of Opportunism and Aiding Ruling Class Disruption Naxalite tac
tics had been characterized by a dogmatic and sole reliance on armed struggle in
its first phases. This was based on the sectarian ‘people’s war thesis put forward
by Lin Biao at the ninth congress of the CPC. In India this brand of adventurism
was interpreted by Charu Mazumdar to be the tactic of individual terrorism. Aft
er the debacle of this tactic in 1970-71 many group split away condemning the ‘ann
ihilation theory’. However the pro-Charu groups have persisted in defending this r
evolutionary line’ and continue to be practitioners of terrorism. The pro Lin Biao
groups in West Bengal, the Vinod Mishra group in Bhojpur the People’s War group i
n Andhra Pradesh and the Venu group in Kerala have all in some form or another c
ontinued to rely on the line of annihilation. The difference exists only in the
emphasis. The CRC (Venu group) began talking of a ‘revolutionary mass line in 1979
, by which they mean that annihilation of any which enemy must be part of the ma
ss struggle and resorted only which the masses of an area approve of it. Except
for the extreme fringe of the pro-Lin Biao groups the other groups who uphold he
Charuite line currently talk of annihilation of the class enemy as an extension
of the mass line.
Though many groups have denounced the past practices as wrong, the condemnation
has stemmed more from the failure of the tactic rather than any honest self-intr
ospection as to its anti-Marxist character. Even those who renounce it as anti-M
arxist, still cling to the theory of permanent armed struggle’. The OCCR led by Ka
nnu Sanyal states: “the terrorism pursued by the struggles against revisionism. Th
at is, the new process of forming a Marxist-Leninist party which was set in moti
on after the Naxalite uprising of 1967 was again nipped in the bud and communist
revolutionaries were split up into various groups.” (Voice of Naxalbari July 1982
). However, the OCCR has no clear programme or tactics to break with this old ad
venturism. All that has been modified is that mass work must be combined or lead
to armed struggle. By the debacle of individual annihilation all the naxalite g
roups have had to abandon their original tactical position that work in mass org
anisation is reformist and the trade union movement means economism. Self-critic
ism by the group is, however, combined with the contradictory chant about the ‘rev
olutionary situation’ obtaining in the country. The subjective assessment that Ind
ia is on the brink of revolution and the corollary that the Indian ruling classe
s are totally isolated continues to be sanctified dogma.
Participation in Election All naxalite groups at the inception had vehemently de
nounced the CPI(M) for participating in parliament and elections. Boycott of the
parliament was the sine qua non of naxalism. However, the retreat from this asp
ect of petty bourgeois revolutionism has led to acrimonious divisions among the
naxalites.
Condemning this infantile-left position, the party had state: ‘Using parliamentary
institutions, according to them, is remaining bogged down at the level of mass
consciousness. The added argument is that parliaments are obsolete and hence par
ticipation is no good. Thus in the name of a revolutionary struggle this importa
nt form is rejected in principle. This is nothing but an anarchist deviation, wh
ich underestimates the fight against the state in the concrete. This has nothing
to do with Leninism. It seeks to reduce the working class and the masses to imp
otent spectators in the elections; bypasses the stage of their consciousness; ad
vances slogans which delink the party from vast sections particularly in the ele
ction and hands them over to the tender mercies of the Congress and the other bo
urgeois parties.” (On Left Deviation p. 10)
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The first group to violate this ‘revolutionary boycott’ was the S N Singh-Pulla Redd
y-led which contested the assembly elections in June, 1977. since them, even aft
er they spilt up they have continued to participate in elections both to the par
liament and state assemblies. In this they were joined by the OCCR and the DV Ra
o group. This plunge into bourgeois election has led to the worst abuse heaped u
pon them by the CRC group the, People’s War faction and the Saraf group. The CRC i
s convinced that the other major pro-Charu group led by Vinod Mishra is also pre
paring to join the ‘pig-sty’ of parliament. The V M group in its party congress in 1
983 had cleared the way for such an eventuality. This was confirmed with the Vin
od Mishra group led IPF putting up a large number of candidates in Bihar in the
recent assembly elections.
Refusing to accept the use of the bourgeois parliamentary system as it could neg
ate their ‘revolutionary situation’, the strategic boycottists such as Saraf Vainly
assert, “the prospect for the compradore parliamentary system is one of confusion
uncertainty, one crisis followed by another, ultimately leading to the proletari
an revolution.” (Saraf: Current national and international situation; A Revolution
ary View Point, July-Sep. 1978,p. 64)
If the boycottists’ continuous calls for boycott have gone unheeded by the people
the participationsts electoral tactics have been just as disruptive. For instanc
e the SNS-led group has not hesitated to support the worst communal and reaction
ary forces including BJP-RSS candidates in many states in the name of defeating
the pro-social imperialist parties, which by definition include the left parties
. In West Bengal they allied with forces like the Jharkhand Party and Mukti Morc
ha to fight Left Front candidates in the assembly polls.
When the majority of groups not averse to participation in elections at differen
t levels, the naxalite stance of fighting revisionism by abjuring parliament has
been given a quiet burial.
Mass Work And Mass Organisations On the abandoning of mass organizations by naxa
lite the CPI(M) had joined out: “Thus neglecting the main task of building mass or
ganizations by refusing to fight for every little relief for the workers and pea
sants by not paying serious attention to the immediate demands and to simultaneo
usly raising political consciousness, by a mere reliance on organizations of for
ce once more leads to a band of select individuals indulging in militant actions
, under the pretext of defending or revolutionising the struggles and bringing d
isaster to the mass movement.” (On Left Deviation, p. 12)
The S N Singh-Pulla Reddy CPI(ML) were the first to float the IFTU to organize t
rade union work. But the other naxalite groups kept away from this set-up as it
was led by ‘neo-revisionists’ and ‘liquidationists’. The Andhra groups outside the CPI(M
L) mainstream had never theoretically denounced work in mass organizations. They
, along with those who have now joined the bandwagon of mass work’, conceive of wo
rk and tactics in the mass organisations in an extremely disruptive fashion whic
h helps the ruling classes. One favourtie tactics is to raise immediate burning
issue and organize protests and then launch a confrontation with the landlord, p
olice, and capitalists without taking into account the correlation of forces and
the consequences of such actions. Prematurely inviting police and enemy class a
ttacks leads to crushing of the movement and disorganising the people completely
.
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In Bhojpur district in 1975-76, such tactics led to severe repression and decima
tion of struggling peasants. In Andhra the debacle of Srikakulam has been repeat
ed on a minor scale in various places which leaves these areas firmly under land
lord/police domination. In Wynad, in 1981 the ‘annihilation’ of a ‘class enemy’ led to r
epression. The CRC group which boasts of this action states: “The guerilla action
here was done really as the exercise of the people’s political will after mobilizi
ng and consolidating it using the method ‘from the people, to the people’. Though th
e party was not completely smashed in the repression led those by the state, it
could not effectively overcome the enemy’s encirclement and suppression”. (Though a
New Phase of Spring Thunder, p. 154)
Given their adveturist political line, for the naxalite groups every trade union
and mass struggle is seen as an onslaught against the state power and its agent
s; in the name of fighting economism, no compromise in struggle is possible-whic
h leads to anarchism and disruption. The efforts to prettify these disruptionist
tactics in the mass movement as ‘building people’s political power’, mass line to def
eat revisionism and so on cannot hide the basis truth that naxalite tactics toda
y are geared to disorient mass movements, foil united struggles and isolate the
Left forces.
The number of student, youth, peasant and cultural organizations, which have bee
n floated by the various naxalite groups must be seen for what they are and comb
ated with correct tactics among the people along with ideological exposure.
Having no correct class approach, most of these groups have foiled to develop an
y mass base and only succeed in creating temporary disruptions in some pockets l
ike tribal areas, though their mass organisational activities. They are unable t
o organise the basic classes with a correct political tactical line. Given their
petty-bourgeois character, they are unable to do sustained hard work to build u
p united class organizations of workers and peasants. Therefore in the post-emer
gency period, many groups have concentrated on two spheres in their mass work-ci
vil liberties and culture. For some of the naxalite groups, civil liberties orga
nizations have become the mass front to conduct their partisan activities.
The history of he PUCL, which originated during the emergency, needs no recounti
ng here. But its nature and composition is instructive-it has become a forum con
sisting of a specific group of political elements-naxalite sarvodayites of the G
andhi Peace Foundation variety a sprinkling of pro-western liberals and some BJP
-RSS activists. This is probably why the S N Singh-led CPI(ML) has made this for
um its main front of activity as it tallies with their anti-Soviet, anti-fascist
front line,. However, other naxalite have refused to subscribe to this concept
of a civil liberties platform. So there are also civil liberties fronts floated
by other naxalite groups, some together and some separately. The People Union fo
r Democratic Rights (PUDR) broke away from the PUCL. Apart from this there is th
e Association for Production of Democratic Rights run by naxalite in West Bengal
and the Organization for the Protection of Democratic Right (OPDR) run by the D
V Rao group in Andhra. The A P Civil Liberties committee is dominated by the Peo
ple’s War (Kondapalli groups). Such organizations also exist in Maharashtra and Ta
mil Nadu. This in the sphere of civil liberties also, the naxalites have their d
ifferent tactics and different organization. All these organizations naturally s
how a marked preference for taking up cases of victimized naxalite and helping i
n their legal battles. They also specialize in taking up so-called violations of
civil liberties by the Left Front governments of West Bengal and Tripura. In al
l civil liberties forums, the naxalite introduce their partisan politics of slan
dering the Left Fronts, thereby reducing the whole exercise to a mockery.
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As for their excursions into culture, the main aim of the numerous cultural grou
ps and squabs has so far been to propagate the politics of the various naxalite
groups. However in 1983 a more ambitious effort was made when after a conference
in Delhi an All India League for Revolutionary Culture (AILRC) was announced Cu
ltural squads from the Vinod Mishra Pulla Reddy and People’s War groups participat
ed. The AILRC’s declared aim is to fight, amongst other things revisionist culture
and the social imperialist danger. This attempt to project a ‘revolutionary cultu
re’ has been scoffed at by the CRC Saraf groups who do not believe any such front
is possible without clinching political differences.
Naxalite Version of Fascism Another curious aspect of their tactical slogans is
the insistence of the fallacious belief that Congress rule represents fascism, a
nd raising slogans on this basis. The S N Singh group has been the loudest in de
nouncing ‘Indira fascism’ propped up by Soviet ‘social imperialism’. At the other end of
the ideological spectrum, the CRC (Venu group) is also very liberal with the us
e of the term to describe Indian conditions. In fact it termed the assassination
of Mrs Gandhi as the death of a fascist’. It sees every move of the Congress (I)
government as a move to impose fascism and calls for resisting fascism. It is a
very pecular form of fascism in India indeed which allows revolutionaries of the
SNS group of maintain legal offices and participate in elections; that enables
the leaders of the CRC groups to come out on bail and conduct vigorous anti-fasc
ist propaganda in the capital of the country by publishing a paper!
Stand on Nationalities Question One theoretical position which none of the group
s have abandoned is the right to self –determination for the various nationalities
in India. Programmatically they all extend support to secessionist movements as
part of the new democratic revolution. Only is its application they sometimes d
iffer. For the naxalite with the semi-colony and semi-feudal thesis the right of
self-determination is to be exercised against a compradore state exploited by s
uperpowers. By advocating this dangerous and erroneous stand, in practice most o
f the groups are supporting and participating in the movements led by the divisi
ve forces bent upon breaking up the country and dividing the working people with
the backing of US Imperialism. In no other current question as the national que
stion is the treacherous and pro-imperialist character of naxalite seen.
In the case of both Assam and Punjab, various naxlaite groups have declared supp
ort for the separatist movements and where possible are participating in them. W
ith the exception of the SNS group, which had some reservations, naxalite groups
have hailed the Assam chauvinist movement as a national movement. DV Rao opines
: “To say that there is the invisible hand of the US behind the national movements
going on in the state of the North-East is only to divert the real issue.” He pro
ceeds to exonerate the USA and targets the Soviet Union; “The United States, weake
ned as it is (is) contenting itself with the export of its capital… But as for the
Soviet Union, it is attempting to grip not only the country as a whole, but all
the strategic area within it. The North East is one among them.” (D V Rao: People’s
Democratic Revolution, pp. 25-26). So flying in the face of all facts of US imp
erialist subversion in the North East, a theory is invented to project the Assam
chauvinist movement as fighting Soviet domination!
On Punjab most groups categorically state that the extremists activities in Punj
ab are a fight ‘national oppression’. “In the case of Punjab the situation has develop
ed to the demand for national independence involving armed struggle against nati
onal oppressors.”
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(Mass Line, June, 1984). This is how the CRC group gives the Bhindranwale groups
the status of fighter for national liberation. Not to be left behind, the Peopl
e’s War group states: “if now leadership (of Akalis) betrays the movement for the im
plementation of the Anandpur Sahib resolution demands half-way, if will be the p
roletariat who will be primarily to blame. From a bourgeois leadership we could
not have expected otherwise… It is for the proletariat to take the movement forwar
d, stick to the Anandpur Sahib resolution and other democratic demands expose th
e leadership, fight the fundamentalists … and enhance the struggle against the cen
ter and the police.” (Varguard, April-May, 1984) As for as this group naxalites is
concerned it is the proletariat which has to champion the Anandpur Sahib resolu
tion! They also support the Akali stand on Article 25 of the constitution. Their
only complaint is that some naxalites have joined the Bhindranwale gangs and me
rged their identity, instead of joining the movement independently.
The SNS-led CPI(ML) while inveighing against the chauvinist aspects of the Assam
movement is not above combining with tribal separatism. SN Singh writes, “Is it n
ot a matter of proletarian pride that our party has been struggling hard to resc
ue the separate Jharkhand movement from the opportunist this disruptive hands. W
ith ‘separate Jharkhand on the basis of adivasi –non-adivasi people’s unity’ as our slog
an are we not preventing the careerists and opportunists from dividing the explo
ited people … True to their colour some among the ultra-‘left’ fraternity can be found
championing the chauvinist line of driving out all the non-adivasis from the Jh
arkhand region.” (SN Singh: For a New Democracy, March-April 1982) While S N Singh
himself states that they have joined the movement to rescue it from chauvinist
elements, he also0 admits that those belonging to his ‘ultra-left fraternity’ are bu
sy fanning the flames of tribal chauvinism. The difference in practices is only
one of degree.
Various seminars are being organised by the different groups of naxalites to esp
ouse dangerous stand on nationalities. A typical example is the seminar organise
d in August 1981 in madras by the A P Radical Studies Union where papers were pr
esented supporting the ‘national movements’ of Assam, Nagaland, Chattisgarh, Jharkha
nd Vidharba Tamil Nadu.
It is in the matter of facing the challenge of the divisive forces that we see t
he naxalite at their disruptive worst today. Blinded to the threat of US imperia
lism by their hatred for the Soviet Union and the socialist camp, they are easy
prey for recruitment into the imperialist-backed divisive movements, which can b
e covered with pseudo-revolution rhetoric about anti-centre national movements.
Imperialist Infiltration It is this dark side of imperialist infiltration into t
he naxalite movement that requires further highlighting. The recent episode of t
he vertical split in the S N Singh-led CPI(ML) have confirmed the facts already
available. In mid-1984 the Provisional Central Committee led by S N Singh split
down the middle with the Santosh Rana - Vaskar Nandy group and the faction led b
y S N Singh parting ways after a bitter inner quarrel. It is significant as the
bankruptcy of naxalite politics once again surfaces sharply with mutual accusati
ons of betrayal of Mao Zedong thought, softness to US imperialism and divisive m
ovements being bandied about.
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The S N Singh minority faction in its document makes serious charges against Vas
kar Nandy and company. “In our organisation also, Nandy’s close associates establish
ed contacts with a foreign voluntary agency and a native voluntary agency financ
ed by Western monopoly capital, keeping it secret from the POC and the general s
ecretary of the party, S N Singh. They established contact with Rural Aid Consor
tium of Tagore Society which is financed by West European countries and the USA
and with one Danish Organisation on the Plea of providing relief to the people o
f Gobiballabpur in West Bengal and some areas in Bihar. Lakhs of rupees were rec
eived for digging tanks, constructing school building opening a sewing training
center and distributing chickens and cattle to the needy. It also came to our no
tice that money was being received by some of our leaders from the Lutheran Chur
ch. When it came to light to the PCC members, an intense ideological struggle bu
rst forth in the party on this issue.” (Our differences with Nandy-Rana group, PCC
-CPI(ML), p. 29)
It goes on to state: “We thoroughly investigated (among the cadres and people) in
Gobiballapur and Bhargora, where relief work was carried on through money from t
he “Tagore Society”, Rohtas Channpatia and Mushhari, where schools were built up by
the Dabes, and party and doubted our bonafides … Several cadres have been exposed
to these agencies.” It concludes with the damming indictment: “It does not require i
ntelligence of a high order to find out why some of the former members of the PC
C adopted particular policies on the question of caste, tribe, Assamese and non-
Assamese.” Following a blind anti-Soviet line, Satyanarian Singh found out a few m
onths before his death that the majority of his PCC members sided with Nandy and
company in whitewashing its links with the imperialist funded voluntary agencie
s, most having been, corrupted with foreign money.
Attitude to the CPI(M) If there is one tenet has not been abandoned by any of th
e groups, it is their implacable hatred for the CPI(M). Most of the groups chara
cterise the CPI(M) not only as revisionist party but also a party of the ruling
classes- that section which is allied to Soviet Social imperialism. Though the p
hase of annihilating CPI(M) cadres has been abandoned as an official policy, wit
h some exceptions as in Warrangal district the same aim of liquidating the CPI(M
) is sought to be pursued by opportunity alliances with reactionary political fo
rces and outright slander against the CPI(M) and the Left Front governments.
As an observer who was earlier not unsympathetic to their movement has noted, “Oft
en the affirmation of the revolutionary identity of naxalism means singling out
the CPM and CPI for an onslaught because, according to their theory, those parti
es can be nothing but obstacles to the popular movement … the anti CPM and CPI asp
ect of naxalism is not new. The point is that it has become increasingly more im
portant over the recent past as the naxalite survival has been threatened.” (Prafu
l Bidwai, “From Thunder to a Whimper”, The Times of India January 11, 1983)
Unable to explain how the compradors in a semi colony are able to maintain a via
ble parliamentary regime, the common rationalization is to blame the ‘revisionist’ C
PI(M). “The reason why this compradore Parliamentary system sustai9ned for 31 year
s, does not lie in its viability created illusions about the reactionary Indian
state…. adopted the parliamentary road…. blunted the edge of class struggle and prev
ented the growth of a genuine revolutionary party – thus helping the perpetuation
of this rotten system for such period”. (Saraf, A Revolutionary view point, July-S
ept, 1978, p.64)
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The anti-Soviet /anti-Fascist theorists include the CPI(M) as one of the forces
to be isolated, as according to them the party supports Soviet hegemonism and is
therefore a lackey of the Congress party too. The newly formed IPF in the recen
t parliament elections conducted propaganda calling on people to defeat both the
Congress(I) and the Left Front in West Bengal! Two naxalite groups in Tripura h
ave openly allied with the separatist TUJS to fight the Left Front there. The on
ly difference between the boycottists and participationsist in elections is that
while those who boycott blame the ‘revisionist parties’ for giving a lease of life
to the ‘decaying parliamentary system’, the participationsis consider that more effe
ctive propaganda can be made against the CPI(M) by intervening in the elections.
The hostility is but natural, for as Praful Bidwai points out: “This is one side o
f contemporary nxalism. The other side cynical and devious real politic; covert,
and now increasingly overt collaboration with the most rabidly right wing polit
icians, class and casts, behind the scene maneuvers and collusion with the polic
e and communal or regionalist parties.”
The experience of naxalism in the two Left-Front states of West Bengal and Tripu
ra fully bear out this truth.
The Future of Ultra-Leftism-Potential for Disruption The disorganised and anarch
ic state of naxalism indicates that this variety of ultra leftism is doomed to e
xtinction. Naxalism had arisen in the sixties in the background of pettybourgeoi
s frustrations at the deepening crisis of the bourgeois-landlord system and the
left-sectarian line advocated by the CPC during the cultural revolution phase in
China. With the elimination of the latter, the ideological steam for naxalism h
as petered out. However, the first factor has not disappeared. As Lenin pointed
out, “A petty bourgeois driven to frenzy by the horrors of capitalism is a social
phenomenon which, like anarchism is characteristic of all countries. The instabi
lity of such revolutionism, its barrenness, and its tendency to turn rapidly int
o submission, apathy, phantasma, and even a frenzied infatuation with one bourge
ois fad or another-all this is common knowledge. However at all rid revolutionar
y parties of old errors, which always crop up at unexpected occasion, in somewha
t new forms, in a hitherto unfamiliar garb or surroundings, in an unusual-a more
or less unusual-situation.” (Lenin, Left Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder, s
elected Works vol. III p. 358)
The horrors of capitalism and feudal remnants still plague Indian society and af
fect the vast petty-bourgeois sections. Ultra leftism finds fertile soil in such
conditions. The farcical and at times agonizing disintegration of the naxalite
ultra-left trend bears the potential for revival in other forms.
The struggle against the left-deviation which the CPI(M) waged alongside the fig
ht against revisionism has scored major success. However, the Party has to conti
nue to vigilantly note the continuing efforts to revive ultra-leftism and must e
ffectively combat these trends in whichever garb they appear. The CPI(M) has bee
n the only party which recognized the counter revolutionary content of naxalism
and resolutely waged a political ideological battle without naxalism and resolut
ely waged a political ideological battle without compromise. The current dead-en
d of naxalism is a vindication of its line.
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Print
Posted: Thu, Jul 10 2008. 12:20 AM IST
Conflict between the militia and Naxalites in the past 3 years has displaced tho
usands of tribals in Chhattisgarh Krishnamurthy Ramasubbu
Dantewada, Chhattisgarh: It took five days for Gantala Baby and people from the
60 families in her small village in mineral-rich southern Chhattisgarh to cross
the Dandakaranya forests and arrive at their destination, Khammam in Andhra Prad
esh. Several people died during the 260km trek through unfriendly terrain, and B
aby’s son Aadavi Ramudu was born en route. That was in 2006. Baby, now all of 18,
is still struggling to make ends meet at Charla in Khammam. She is among at leas
t 150,000 tribals who have been forced to leave home in Chhattisgarh. Some have
moved to Andhra Pradesh. Others live in camps run by the Salwa Judum, a state-ba
cked militia formed around three years ago to fight Maoists (or Naxalites) in th
e region. After criticism from several entities, including human rights organiza
tions and India’s top court, the Chhattisgarh government, a Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) one, is disbanding Salwa Judum, which is translated as peace force by som
e people and cleansing water by others. Mahendra Karma, a Congress legislator fr
om Dantewada who played a role in the creation of Salwa Judum, announced recentl
y that it will soon cease to exist. Both the Congress and the BJP supported Salw
a Judum, which essentially functioned as the local government’s deterrent against
the growing influence of the Maoists. Formed in 2005—the result of a secret deal b
etween the state and a giant conglomerate that wanted to set up a steel plant at
a cost of Rs10,000 crore or roughly $2.3 billion, according to a popular rumour
prevailing among the mostly illiterate tribals in southern Chhattisgarh—Salwa Jud
um sought to conscript villagers, moved entire villages to what were essentially
detention camps so as to cut the support base for Maoists, and engaged in pitch
ed battles with the insurgents. Over three years, the Maoists and Salwa Judum ha
d an equal hand in displacing tribals such as Baby from their homes and destroyi
ng local economies. Many of these tribals now live in camps in Chhattisgarh or i
n settlements in Andhra Pradesh. The state government is trying to lure them bac
k with the promise of free forest land and elections are due in November. That,
and the disbanding of Salwa Judum could see some tribals returning to the state,
although the issues that resulted in the growing influence of Maoists in the re
gion—a model of industrialization that doesn’t factor in the tribals as stakeholders
and government-sponsored inward migration where people from other northern stat
es have been brought in, settled, and often given free land—are yet to be addresse
d. Large-scale displacement
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Nobody knows how many people have abandoned their homes and villages in the thre
e years Salwa Judum has fought the Maoists. “Displacement is a big challenge for u
s. Five out of the 11 development blocks in Dantewada and Bijapur districts are
severely affected,” says a local government official who asked not to be named. Co
llectors of some districts have begun visiting settlements in Khammam to assess
just how many people have been displaced. “We will be making more field visits and
we will try to gather data so that the forest land rights due to these people c
an be granted,” adds the official. Activists claim the government has no idea of t
he extent of displacement. “Some abandoned villages are not recognized by the gove
rnment. The displacement has happened in 800 villages out of the 1,354 villages
in Dantewada and Bijapur districts, while the government claims that displacemen
t has happened in only 644 villages,” says Himanshu Kumar of Vanvasi Chetna Ashram
, an activist group that works with tribals. Government officials admit that the
re isn’t enough data on new settlements in Andhra Pradesh, spread mainly across Kh
ammam, Warangal, Adilabad and Karimnagar districts. Shashi Bhushan Kumar, the di
strict collector of Khammam says there are around 20,000 internally displaced pe
ople in his area but P. Janardhan Reddy, the district collector of Warangal, has
no clue on how many there are in his. Other local officials contacted in Andhra
Pradesh declined to comment. Forced migration The tribals who have moved out of
Chhattisgarh to Andhra Pradesh live a hard life but it is better than what they
faced back home. A fact-finding mission headed by the National Commission for t
he Protection of Child Rights, a government body, that visited the new settlemen
t areas, says: “Each testimony included a narrative of extreme violence committed
against them, families and property—by the Maoists, Salwa Judum and the security f
orces. Many people shared accounts of family members being killed and women rape
d.” And a report by the International Association of People’s Lawyers, or IAPL, an o
rganization of human rights lawyers based in the Netherlands, released in Octobe
r 2007, says: “The Salwa Judum campaign intends to concentrate tribal people in Da
ntewada in so- called ‘relief camps’ with the acquiescence and even blessings of the
Chhattisgarh state. Only a few villagers reportedly moved voluntarily to the ca
mps. Those that refused to leave their villages have apparently been forced by S
pecial Police Officers, or SPO, militias from the Salwa Judum campaign that did
not hesitate to use coercion, threats, intimidation, deception and violence for
this purpose. Serious atrocities have been reportedly committed by these forces.
..” Andhra Pradesh is the default destination for some tribals from Chhattisgarh b
ecause in the past many have worked in the state that borders their own. Sodi Sa
mmaya, a farmer, ran into Deva, who uses only one name and his family at a borde
r post between Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh. “They were sitting under a tree an
d crying. The forest guard had brought them to the police, who were asking them
to go back to Chhattisgarh. They were pleading that they be permitted to stay in
Andhra. So I brought them with me, as labourers in my fields and gave them a pi
ece of land to build their houses.” Life in Sammaya’s farm isn’t bad. A nun visits the
place thrice a week and puts Deva’s children through their letters. “It is not too
bad here. We earn Rs50 a day.
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But it was better at home before all this began,” says Deva. Still, Deva and his f
amily have had better luck than many others. Some tribals are still hiding in th
e forests, in Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh—they can’t go back to their villages a
nd don’t want to live in Salwa Judum camps. A dying way of life The clashes betwee
n the Maoists and Salwa Judum, and the large-scale displacement has affected the
life of tribals in Chhattisgarh. “We know that these displaced people are severel
y traumatized but we don’t know how to deal with it. It will need the intervention
of specialized medical anthropologists. Due to this trauma, marriages have not
taken place for the past two years in these affected areas and fertility rates h
ave fallen,” says J.P. Rao, a sociologist from Osmania University, who has conduct
ed research on tribals in southern Chhattisgarh. Gangalur, in the region, used t
o be a prosperous trading town. After Salwa Judum set up a camp there, the town’s
markets downed shutters. Gangalur also used to have two hospitals that have both
closed down. Locals walk to nearby towns to buy even salt. Meanwhile, industria
l projects in the region either continue to languish or have run into organized
opposition. On 5 January this year, 50 people were injured in clashes with the p
olice during a public hearing held by Jindal Steel and Power Ltd, or JSPL, at Kh
amaria village in Raigarh district of Chhattisgarh. JSPL wants to mine coal in t
he resource-rich region and the company’s executive vice-chairman Naveen Jindal sa
ys that most people in the region are in favour of the project. He adds that aro
und 10% of the people are “causing trouble”. Most projects require land and the firs
t the tribals hear of them is when the government or a private company wants to
acquire their land. That helps the cause of the Maoists who have convinced triba
ls that development means a loss of land. *********** The appeal of Naxalism In
early 2007, the Naxalites, officially known as the Communist Party of India (Mao
ist), held a conference, the 9th Unity Congress, in the forests near the OrissaJ
harkand border. This was the first such conference in 30 years and its objective
was “to call on all forest dwellers to resist till the end the massive displaceme
nt taking place and protect their land and forests from the robbers and looters
seeking to seize them.” It isn’t just the Naxalites that oppose development based on
land acquisition, other parties such as the Communist Party of India, or CPI, d
o too. “Adivasis (tribals) will be ruined...killed if these factories come up,” says
Manish Kunjam of the CPI. “Why would an Adivasi who is self-sufficient for the mo
st part, living off his land, want to give that up by selling this land to compa
nies for mining and industry.... (and then) become an unskilled labourer?” he asks
. He adds that the tribals will not be able to work in factories, a view that is
endorsed by others as well. “Who will give jobs to Adivasis? It is difficult to g
et work done by them. All they want to do is drink all day long,” says Ranvir Sing
h Chauhan, a contractor in Kirandul where Essar Steel is building a plant. “The go
vernment asks us how we are happy (without economic development), but
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we are happy... Except for salt, we get everything from the land we live on...,” s
ays Sachdev Sori, the head of a panchayat that oversees a region close to the Ba
iladila iron mines. Chauhan’s father migrated from Uttar Pradesh. Most migrants co
me from this state and Gujarat, although Chhattisgarh also has its share of Bang
ladeshis who were resettled here in the 1970s. Today, in some parts of Chhattisg
arh, migrants outnumber tribals. “I recently visited Korba. It used to have a migr
ant population of 10-15%. Now, the tribal population is only 42% (and the) rest
are migrants,” says Kunjam. The migrants, like the government (and the opposition,
the Congress) want industrial development. The tribals don’t. Nor do the Naxalite
s. That explains the support for the Naxalites among tribals. However, a politic
al analyst says the rise of the CPI and other communist parties will curb the in
fluence of the Naxalites. “The Left parties speak the same language as the Naxalit
es but they believe in parliamentary democracy unlike them. The rise of the Left
parties will ... put an end to Naxalism,” says Mallika Joseph, assistant director
of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, a Delhi-based security think ta
nk. ************ Salwa Judum camps Shanty towns of huts covered with aluminium a
nd asbestos roofing mark Salwa Judum camps such as this one at Dornapal, located
along NH 221, one of the arterial national highways running through Chhattisgar
h. Cattle, mostly emaciated, roam the surrounding sal forests untended—their owner
s have long since moved to camps. The camp at Dornapal is the largest of around
23 Salwa Judum camps. And many of the people who live there have had their homes
and livelihoods destroyed by Salwa Judum. Kosdeva is one such, and his days in
the camp have made him a supporter of the very organization that destroyed his v
illage. “Salwa Judum is a good thing,” he says. Deva, a tribal who works as a farm l
abourer in Andhra Pradesh, isn’t so sure. “We had our chicken, cattle, pigs, and fie
lds. Then why would we want to go there? What would we do there?” he asks. Kosdeva
says he mostly does nothing. “The government gives us rice; I have been living li
ke this for three years,” he adds. That kind of inactivity and dependence is just
what the government wants, says a government official who does not wish to be id
entified. This will help the government gain the trust of tribals who have thus
far supported Naxalites, this official adds. “We admit that these tribals have not
seen the face of the government except for the forest officers. It is our mista
ke. But now it is time to get them to our side.” That view is echoed by Rahul Shar
ma, superintendent of police of the Dantewada district. “Now people know what the
government has to offer. We give them education, health care, we take care of th
em. What do the Naxals offer them?” ************* Migration and its fallout Andhra
Pradesh is an ideal sanctuary for tribals driven out of their homes in southern
Chhattisgarh. The two states share a border. Some tribals, such as the Khoyas,
a sub-group of the Gond tribe, speak Telugu and actually have members of their e
xtended family in the state. Others have worked in Andhra Pradesh, in
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tobacco and chilli farms, in the past. And still others prefer to live in forest
s in the state where they are unlikely to be bothered by either Salwa Judum or t
he Maoists as long as they keep out of sight. “Nearly 30% of the (tribal) populati
on (in southern Chhattisgarh) has been displaced at various times during this co
nflict (between Salwa Judum and the Maoists), with half of them in the camps and
, half in the forests and in Andhra Pradesh,” says Himanshu Kumar of Vanvasi Chetn
a Ashram, a non-governmental organization. The Madia settlement in the forests i
n the Khammam district houses people belonging to the third category. The Madias
are expert woodcutters who can clear large swathes of forests rapidly. Unlike o
ther tribals who live in mud huts, Madias live in those made from rough-hewn pla
nks. The men in this settlement work in farms in the area. Such settlements do c
ause the occasional conflict with locals, typically over the cutting of trees. “In
Khammam, out of the 100 hamlets that we know about, conflicts with locals have
occurred in 10-15. But these people (the tribals) are a source of much needed ch
eap agricultural labour in these parts, so locals generally don’t oppose” their pres
ence, says P. Raghu of ActionAid, a non-governmental organization. *************
Why the Judum fell The Salwa Judum’s violent methods and corruption in camps has
led to the organization’s decline. “The governments of India and Chhattisgarh spend
Rs100 a day on every camp inmate. So they (Salwa Judum) are inflating the number
of people in camps and siphoning off money...,” alleges Ajit Jogi, a former Congr
ess party chief minister of the state. “Disposable plastic drinking cups that cost
20 paise each are being bought for Rs9,” alleges an activist who does not wish to
be identified. Both the Congress and the BJP are now distancing themselves from
Salwa Judum. “The Salwa Judum has only caused damage... How is it beneficial to u
s?” asks Satyanarayana Sharma, a Congress legislator from Chhattisgarh. “The governm
ent has begun to consciously distance itself from Salwa Judum. It has even repla
ced the earlier collector of Dantewada district who was actively pro-Judum. The
current collector is trying to set right the excesses of Salwa Judum,” says a gove
rnment official who does not wish to be identified. This change in the governmen
t’s stance has resulted in a decline in Salwa Judum’s activities. Earlier this year,
the organization asked the government for permission to restart the ‘padayatras’, o
r marches, through villages, rustling up support and conscripting members. The g
overnment declined permission. ************ Fight for resources Chhattisgarh is
one of the most resource-rich states in India: 18% of India’s coal, 20% of its iro
n ore, and almost all its tin deposits are to be found here. In all, the state h
as enough mineable resources of around 28 minerals and metals, including diamond
s. Last year (2007-08) alone, around 206,780 tonnes of iron ore was mined in the
nine months to December and the state government earned around Rs700 crore in t
he same period from royalty payments on mining, according to Chhattisgarh’s direct
orate of mining. Locals claim they do not benefit from this mining activity. “If y
ou are going to mine and export our minerals the world over, at least give us a
chance (through education) to get there. It’s been 40 years since the mining began
(here). What
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has changed?” asks Sachdev Sori, the head of a panchayat that oversees a region cl
ose to the Bailadila iron mines. Sori further claims that the state’s residents ra
rely get to know what’s happening. “If you are going to bring projects, at least tel
l us what is going to happen and how.” That seems to be a larger problem. In March
, the Union government granted an in-principle approval for the new National Min
eral Policy. Ten days later, the chief ministers of five mineral-rich states— Chha
ttisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Jharkhand, and Rajasthan—protested the policy sa
ying they had not been consulted. The five states account for much of India’s mine
ral wealth and are also governed by either the Bharatiya Janata Party or its all
ies (the Centre is ruled by a Congress-led United Progressive Alliance governmen
t). Photos 1. Life on a street in Dornapal camp seen in the rear-view mirror of
a car. 2. A memorial for a special police officer who died fighting Naxalites, i
n Errabore village in Dantewada district. 3. Migrants from Chhattisgarh now livi
ng in Charla village in Andhra Pradesh during an enactment of alleged torture by
paramilitary forces. 4.Special police officers on a search operation near Dorna
pal. 5.A family at their home in the interior village of Adpal in Dantewada. 6.A
pamphlet left by Naxalites on the highway near Dornapal calling for Salwa Judum
to be disbanded and people living in camps to be returned to their homes. (Phot
ographs by Harikrishna Katragadda / Mint)
Copyright © 2007 HT Media All Rights Reserved
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Date:26/06/2006 URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2006/06/26/stories /200606260326100
0.htm Back Opinion - Leader Page Articles
The saga of Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh
E.A.S. Sarma The government s anti-Maoist strategy has pitted brother against br
other and village against village. Civil strife is rife in Dantewada. THE RULERS
of Chhattisgarh are euphoric. They have just "celebrated" the anniversary of Sa
lwa Judum that had its beginnings last year near Kutru village in Bijapur tehsil
of Dantewada district. According to its protagonists, Salwa Judum is a "spontan
eous peoples movement" against the repressive Maoist diktats such as the ban on
collection of tendu leaves and the embargo on participation in State elections.
For many innocent tribals who have lost their parents, brothers and sisters, so
ns, and daughters, this was a year of murders and rape, arson and loot, and a ci
vil war that has torn apart the otherwise tranquil Gond landscape. For the unfor
tunate and bewildered tribal woman (identity not disclosed) who was gang-raped,
who saw her own brother being brutally murdered in broad daylight, and who, inst
ead of the culprits, was forcibly put into a jail in Bastar on false charges, th
is is an occasion to wonder whether the world around her can ever be called a ci
vilised democracy. Dantewada district is sparsely populated, has an undulating t
errain, and is generously endowed with forest and mineral resources. Adivasis, p
redominantly Gonds, account for more than 80 per cent of its rural population, d
istributed along the riverbeds of the Indravati and the Sabari. Agriculture and
forest produce are their mainstay. There are 90 inhabited "forest" villages wher
e the Adivasis have no land rights. Even though the Adivasis have been the origi
nal residents of this entire region, it is the forest officials who dominate ove
r two-thirds of the district. Dantewada has remained cut off from any developmen
t activity worth its name. Two hundred and fourteen villages in the district hav
e no primary schools. Where there are schools, the teachers are absent. The non-
tribal teachers collect their pay cheques regularly and cite the Maoist problem
as an excuse for their absence. Since schools have become dysfunctional, the sec
urity forces, during their occasional visits, camp at the school buildings where
ver they exist. In turn, the Maoists use this as a ploy to blast the school buil
dings to keep the security men away from the villages. In this vicious cycle of
retribution, it is the Adivasi who has suffered. Ninety five per cent of the vil
lages in Dantewada have no basic medical facilities. Only 23 have government-spo
nsored ration shops. Malnutrition and hunger deaths are commonplace. The entire
district of Dantewada has been notified under Schedule V of the Constitution tha
t enjoins upon the President and the Governor of the State to ensure good govern
ance for the Adivasis. It empowers the Government to enact special laws or amend
the existing ones to safeguard the interests of the Adivasis. These extraordina
ry powers are yet to be fully understood and invoked. For decades, unethical lan
d-grabbers, wily traders, and exploitative contractors, all non-tribals, have do
minated the lives of the Adivasis in this area, undeterred. The National Mineral
Development Corporation (NMDC) has a long presence in Dantewada
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but it is the non-tribals that have benefited from it. The evolution of Salwa Ju
dum makes an interesting case study. During the last two decades, the Maoists ga
ined a mass base among the Adivasis by taking up cudgels on their behalf against
corrupt government functionaries, exploitative traders, and moneylenders. The t
rouble began for the Maoists when they started dismantling the traditional polit
ical structures of the Adivasis at the village level and began tinkering with la
nd ownership. Those that did not belong to their "sanghams" in the villages were
considered anti-Maoist and dealt with firmly, sometimes brutally. The headmen o
f the villages and others intimidated by the Maoists, along with the non-tribals
, started grouping together and working out ways to sabotage the Maoists effort
s. Hoping to get a better price for the Adivasis, the Maoists imposed an indefin
ite ban on tendu leaf collection that temporarily deprived the Adivasis of their
meagre incomes. This gave an opportunity to their detractors. The leader of the
se anti-Maoist forces was Mahendra Karma, an astute Adivasi politician, now with
the Congress. He is the Leader of the Opposition in the Chhattisgarh Assembly t
oday. Jan Jagran Abhiyan (JJA), that failed to take off for some reason, was his
first attempt to hit out at the Maoists. On their part, the Maoists failed to t
ake note of the impending surge of anger against them. Mr. Karma was shrewd enou
gh to realise that the State Government could be conveniently persuaded to step
in with its full might to break the mass base of the Maoists on the ostensible g
round that it would facilitate economic development through the entry of many pr
ivate investors who were eager to exploit the precious mineral and forest wealth
of Dandakaranya. Casting aside party affiliations, Mr. Karma and the ruling par
ty in Chhattisgarh joined hands and launched Salwa Judum in June 2005. It is cer
tainly not a "peoples movement" as it has been made out to be. It is a State-sp
onsored campaign in which unsuspecting Adivasis are used as ammunition in a war
that will serve the private interests of a few. Mr. Karma alone has championed S
alwa Judum. None of the other elected representatives in Dantewada has lent him
support. The second rung leadership of this campaign is largely in the hands of
non-tribals. It is possible that some of them were violators of the laws of the
land and were perhaps now trying to legitimise their past sins. Many of them fun
ction outside the framework of the law and are thus not accountable to any insti
tution. These non-tribals control 3,200 armed Adivasis, many of them minors, app
ointed as Special Police Officers (SPOs) under the Chhattisgarh Police Regulatio
ns (CPRs). These SPOs are not clear about their role. Evidently, there are unwri
tten instructions that the local police and the paramilitary forces should suppo
rt the Judum workers in whatever they do. Salwa Judum s overall aim is to reloca
te the Adivasis at any cost, from their villages to roadside relief camps. Today
, there are 17 such camps, housing an estimated 46,000 Adivasis. The living cond
itions in these camps are sub-human. The inmates, having left their houses, thei
r livestock, and all their belongings in their villages, lead an uncertain life
at the camps. Neither Salwa Judum nor the government machinery is clear about ho
w long the camps will be run and whether the Adivasis will ever be allowed to re
turn to their villages. The Salwa Judum activists treat all Adivasis who do not
join the camps as Maoists. There have been instances of houses being burnt, tort
ure, killing. Unfortunately, the Maoists too consider those not with them as bei
ng supporters of the Salwa Judum and deal with them in their own brutal ways. Th
e recently enacted Chhattisgarh Public Security Act is a draconian one that has
given scope for large-scale human rights violations by the state. The Adivasis i
n the camps are eager to return home and lead an independent, dignified existenc
e in their villages. As of now, the once well-knit Gond society stands verticall
y split,
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village by village, family by family. Some Koyas in the Sukma-Konta area have al
ready begun migrating to the neighbouring villages of Andhra Pradesh. The counte
r-insurgency strategy of the Chhattisgarh Government, with Salwa Judum at its co
re, has unleashed civil strife in Dantewada. It has already pitted brother again
st brother and village against village. Unless the Adivasis are brought to the c
entre stage of policy and their well being perceived as the primary requirement,
any strategy to deal with the Maoist problem is bound to fail. Violence cannot
be the answer to violence. Socio-economic and political issues are at the root o
f the Maoist problem. They need to be addressed first. The Centre can no longer
afford to be ostrich-like in dealing with such a perilous problem as this one. T
hese issues cut across the States. Therefore, they call for a collective respons
e from the Centre and the States. Upfront, both the Centre and the States need t
o announce confidence building measures that recognise the entitlements of Adiva
sis to their local resources, namely, land, minerals, forest produce, water etc.
The Public Security Act, 2006, needs to be suspended forthwith and Salwa Judum
disbanded. Past instances of killings and rapes need to be subject to a judicial
enquiry. Preceded by such CBMs, a ceasefire and a national dialogue need to be
declared without delay. Otherwise, Salwa Judum will soon spin out of the hands o
f the government. (The author was formerly Secretary to the Government of India.
) © Copyright 2000 - 2009 The Hindu
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Salwa Judum: A People’s Movement? [Salwa Judum is an indigenous movement, a challe
nge thrown to those who have become puppets in the hands of international powers
for vested personal interests. It will go down in the history of mankind as a u
nique example of the latent potential that every society carries but does not ha
ve the courage to explore and apply. It will shine like a guiding star for the c
oming generations, a lesson as to what an awakened people can accomplish only if
they realise and utilise the power they holdShachi Rairikar, Salwa Judum the He
roic Uprising Jan 7, 2007] [Unlike their southern counter-parts in Andhra Prades
h, [the state of Chhattisgarh] never succeeded in creating a completely brutal p
olice force that would fight the State’s battle with the naxalites. Therefore effo
rts were on to encourage the victims of Maoist political strategies to group for
attack. This is in many ways the worse of the two repressive strategies, if one
is forced to express a choice. The first criminalizes the State whereas the sec
ond criminalizes society. Enclaves of freedom and dignity may survive in a crimi
nalized State but not in a criminalized society- Death Displacement and Deprivat
ion The war in Dantewara: A Report, Human Rights Forum] Surprisingly, the above
quotations are referring to the same campaign aimed at combating Naxalites in In
dia’s state of Chhattisgarh. The controversial mobilization of inhabitants of the
Bastar region of Chhattisgarh in response to Naxalism called “Salwa Judum” has been
labeled a “spontaneous people’s movement” by its supporters, including the national an
d state governments. However, members of academia, civil society and the politic
s have suggested that Salwa Judum is not in fact a “people’s movement”, and this false
representation is covering up and deferring responsibility for illegal acts rep
ortedly committed by Salwa Judum participants. This paper seeks to first establi
sh working qualifications for what constitutes a “people’s movement” based on past mov
ements and intuition. It then aims to understand to what extent Salwa Judum fulf
ills these qualifications through exploring various aspects of the campaign incl
uding its conception and activities, its relationship with other organs of socie
ty, and its affects on the people for whom it is meant to fight. A brief legal e
xploration notes relevant domestic provisions and international standards violat
ed and challenged by members of Salwa Judum. The report then revisits the qualif
ications laid out at the beginning to understand whether Salwa Judum truly is a
people’s movement.
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People’s Movements: Examples and Definitions There does not appear to be an accept
ed definition of a “people’s movement”. However, the apparent absence of a working def
inition does not presuppose that there is not some standard of qualification. On
e need only look into history to understand the types of movements that might be
considered a people’s movement. There are a variety of accepted people’s movements
which both establish and reflect characteristics that distinguish them from othe
r types of mass mobilization. A brief survey of movements that have gained inter
national recognition and acceptance as people’s movements can help to distill the
general criteria for assessing the status of any given popular mobilization. The
following are a few movements that vary both in geography and in subject which
have come to be seen by the international community as bona fide people’s movement
s. Free Tibet While refugees of Chinese oppression in Tibet remain geographicall
y dispersed, from Bhutan, to India, to Europe and America, the people share a co
mmon territory and thus a common aim: to protect their right to a nationality an
d a country. The movement is often called an international movement, but it bega
n as a struggle by those forced out of Tibet, a group of people working for thei
r right to be free of Chinese rule and oppression. The Dalai Llama is the most c
ommonly accepted leader of the movement. While the geographic dispersal of exile
s makes organization and coordination of the movement difficult, the aim remains
more or less the same, and the activities, including protests, rallies and vari
ous forms of disobedience characterize pockets of the movement all over the worl
d. American Civil Rights Movement The American civil rights movement aimed to cl
aim equality for African Americans in America and emerged in the 1960’s. As more r
epressive legislation continued to enforce already existing segregationist norms
, African Americans began to participate in a variety of activities including ma
rches, rallies and sit-ins. The movement began at a local level, with various me
mbers of the African American community asserting their equality with small acts
which undermined the racial structure (such as drinking from a water fountain m
arked explicitly for whites). The movement grew under the leadership of Martin L
uther King Jr. and others, who aimed to raise awareness of the plight of African
Americans, especially in the southern states, and change policies that reinforc
ed norms of inequality. The movement eventually included members of all races, t
hough the vast majority remained African Americans fighting for their own equali
ty. Chipko Andolan One people’s movement within India that gained international re
cognition was the Chipko Andolan. Begun in the 1970’s, the villagers in a region a
t the foot of the Himalayas mobilized in response to a government order selling
the surrounding land to a local sporting goods company. The sporting goods compa
ny had little need for the land itself, but subsequently beginning heavy logging
of its newly acquired property. As the local villagers had requested rights to
fell trees on the land in order to make agricultural tools and been denied, they
resented the new order. The women of the region went into the forest to the sig
hts of deforestation and formed circles around each tree in order to keep logger
s from chopping it down. With the help of local NGO’s and under the leadership of
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activist Chandi Prased Bhatt, the movement spread throughout local areas in Indi
a that were significantly affected by tree-felling schemes which did not benefit
the local population. The movement’s success culminated in the 15 Year Ban on Tre
efelling which went into effect in 1980, exacting a significant effect on the na
ture of national policies allocating natural resources. Narmada Bachao Andolan I
n 1986, the Narmada Valley River Project sponsored by the World Bank and the Uni
ted States aimed to commence the construction of 30 large damns and hundreds of
smaller ones over the Narmada Valley River. Two of these dams, Sardar Sarovar an
d Narmada Sargar, which alone would displace over 300,000 local tribal people in
addition to exacting ecological damage on the area, sparked the mobilization of
the local population under the leadership of a social activist and researcher n
amed Medha Patkar. She worked to educate the people regarding their land rights
and their impending future if the dam project went ahead. Locals formed a Commit
tee for Dam-Affected People, who voiced their non-violent opposition to the dams
and subsequently refused to leave there lands. The movement grew, activists, ac
ademics, journalists and more villagers joined, propelling it forward and captur
ing an international audience. Eventually, an alliance formed among variations b
ranches of the movement and it was entitled Narmada Bachao Andolan. Characterist
ics of a people’s movement Based on characteristics shared, fulfilled by and refle
cted in the preceding movements which have been named such in conjunction with n
otions intuitive to the name “people’s movement”, the following rough criteria may be
used as a working framework for assessing the level to which a mobilization of p
eople is a “people’s movement”: 1. The movement must be grass roots, a bottom up mobil
ization such that it is a mechanism for the creation of new norms or structures,
not in derivation of current ones. 2. As a consequence, the people for whom the
movement is claiming to fight must be free and active participants in the movem
ent. 3. The movement must seek to fulfill a defined objective which aims to impr
ove the ultimate welfare of a specific group of people, specifically those who h
ave initiated the movement. 4. The movement must be at least loosely organized a
round this objective, such that there is an awareness of the activities of the o
ther members of the “movement” and a basic generation and coordination of resources
so that the objective might be pursued in a unified manner. A people’s movement ca
n operate within the confines of the law or outside of it. Its placement with re
gard to the law does not determine its status as a people’s movement, though it ma
y affect the legitimacy of the movement. Thus, the fact that members of a people’s
movement may resort to violence (either spontaneously or in response to state v
iolence) does not undermine it’s status a people’s movement, though spontaneous viol
ence will likely change the character and dynamic of the movement, causing it to
be viewed as a terrorist group or insurgency as well. The status of a people’s mo
vement is not a mutually exclusive status, but as its tactics, membership, and s
upport change the movement may become more or less of a “people’s movement” in light o
f the criteria described above. It is important to continue to acknowledge these
criteria throughout the subsequent exploration of the contentious anti-Naxalite
campaign “Salwa Judum.”
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History, Evolution and Activities of Salwa Judum In as much as it is important t
o look at the status of Salwa Judum currently, the manner of its conception is a
particularly relevant in understanding the extent to which it may be considered
a spontaneous people’s movement. Salwa Judum is not the first attempt at armed mo
bilization against the Naxalites in Chhattisgarh. Throughout the 1990’s there were
several instances in which groups that were fed up with Maoist tactics (particu
larly the redistribution of land of the wealthy and the construction of parallel
structures of authority which detracted power from the traditional village head
s) mobilized against them. A large contingent of these was comprised of non-trib
al contractors and traders as well as the wealthier members of both the tribal a
nd non-tribal communities. The tactics of these anti-Naxalite campaigns known as
Jan Jagran Abhiyans (which bare a stark resemblance to those currently used by
the Salwa Judum) involved requesting villages to surrender those most involved w
ith the Naxalites, threatening attack if they refuse. It is only the most recent
of these Jan Jagran Abhiyans in 2005 that was named Salwa Judum, and has since
become a movement much larger and far more successful than any of its predecesso
rs. The official date of the commencement of Salwa Judum, according to the Distr
ict Collector’s Office in Dantewada is June 2 2005, though some independent source
s date it back as early as the end of 2004. The district report states that it b
egan in the village of Kutru, in the Bijapur Police District, though it is diffi
cult to confirm the exact nature of the initiation of Salwa Judum, as there are
a variety of stories detailing its emergence. The most commonly cited version cl
aims that a Naxal ban on tendu leaf collection (the leaves used for rolling popu
lar Bidi cigarettes) exacerbated already existing frustrations with Naxal polici
es, which were increasingly draconian. As a consequence, the people organized th
emselves to fight back, and thus in June 2005 Salwa Judum was born. Mahendra Kar
ma, local politician and member of the Congress Party remains the leader of the
movement. While it is indisputable that the story is more complex than this, the
details are difficult to confirm and vary with each rendition. Variations of a
Narrative Journalist 1: One seasoned journalist in Dantewada suggests a more nua
nced version of the story and one that is among the most elaborate and comprehen
sive explanations for the campaign’s emergence. According to him, a severe drought
in the 2004-2005 crop season prompted the government to provide basic necessiti
es such as rice to the tribals most affected by the drought. However, those char
ged with distributing the government provisions, many of them local traders and
contractors, did not do so, selling them instead on the black market and to Naxa
lites. The resulting conditions for Adivasi tribals were exacerbated by a halt i
n the collection and sale of tendu leaves, a main source of livelihood for the A
divasis. The Naxalites of the area had demanded a higher price for the collectio
n and sale of the tendu leaves – Rs 100 per packet as opposed to the Rs 45 per pac
ket that the government offered. The same contractors and traders that had sold
the government provisions for their own profit, spread the rumor that the Naxali
tes had banned the collection of tendu leaves as a protest against the governmen
t’s low prices. It was this rumor that
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led to an actual halt in tendu leaf collection, and the Adivasis of the area wer
e left with the enduring shortage of food and water due to the drought, as well
as a the inability to generate income for obtaining either. As many Adivasis bel
ieved the cessation of tendu leaf collection to be the result of a real Naxalite
-issued ban, their dire situation was fertile ground for rising anti-Naxal senti
ments. Further rumors that Naxalites continue to take money from wealthier contr
actors and traders, levy taxes on Adivasis, as well as demand that a member from
every family fight as a Naxalite cadre nurtured the emerging anti-Naxal sentime
nt, though according to the journalist, there is no evidence to confirm any of t
hese allegations against the Naxalites. As anti-Naxal sentiments grew more visib
le, Naxalites that were attacked by the police began to believe the villagers ha
d informed the police of their whereabouts, and thus punished them. At the same
time, when Naxalites succeeded in accurately detonating a landmine to attack pol
ice, the police suspected villagers of being Naxal sympathizers. Though these at
tacks alienated tribals from both sides, both Naxals and the police continue to
vie for the support of the masses of Adivasis. It is here, caught between the Na
xalites and the police, suspected by both of supporting the other, that some Adi
vasis sought an alternative. However, it was not without the contractors and tra
ders, those who had already robbed the Adivasis of government provisions, that S
alwa Judum was born. Those contractors and traders, threatened by Naxalites (esp
ecially the Naxal policies regarding development), hijacked the Adivasi cause in
order to harness their numbers into an armed movement against the Naxalites. Th
ere is also an important political dimension to the journalist’s story of the Salw
a Judum emergence, which compromises the “spontaneous nature” of the movement. In 19
91, the BJP and Congress party led an Anti-Naxal program, whose failure sparked
fear of growing support of the Communist Party of India (CPI). In an effort to u
ndermine this trend, the BJP and Congress party staged a joint campaign against
the Naxalites, seeking the participation of the CPI as well. However, the BJP an
d Congress backed out of the campaign, meeting secretly with Naxal leadership to
inform them of the CPI campaign against them. Consequently, the Naxalites fough
t back, killing the brother of a Congress Party ember in the process. Appalled a
t the bungled CPI campaign and the Naxal brutality, the CPI lost support and the
people were infuriated. Then in 2004, the Congress Party lost its seemingly imp
erturbable hold among tribals in Baster, as the BJP won in landslide Assembly el
ections. It is suggested that Mahendra Karma, a former CPI member and now the Op
position Leader in the state took to leading the Salwa Judum movement in order t
o revive the image of the Congress Party and his place in it. Consequently, he l
ed a mass rally, garnering support for the peace campaign, entitled “Salwa Judum” as
of June 2005. Journalist 2: According to another journalist (who was subsequent
ly threatened by Salwa Judum members), the movement had its beginnings six month
s before the official June 2005 date. In January 2005, a group of people near Ge
edam armed themselves and set out to kill sangham members (those taking part in
a parallel structure of village-level power set up by the Naxalites). They appre
hended a few who were subsequently tortured, after which the armed band called a
meeting. Members of the police force attended the meeting, as did a few local p
oliticians, including Mahendra Karma, who
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intervened to assume control of the movement. A propaganda campaign followed, pu
shing the new movement as a nonviolent, Ghandian people’s movement though its tact
ics suggest otherwise. Other reports including People’s Union for Civil Liberties “W
here the State makes War on its Own People,” the Independent Citizen’s Initiative “War
in the Heart of India,” and Human Rights Forum’s “Death, Displacement and Deprivation
: the War in Dantewada” also describe versions of the initiation of Salwa Judum wh
ich contain small variations on the above stories. The versions included here we
re obtained first hand from journalists in Dantewada. Common Threads While the v
ersions of Salwa Judum’s conception vary slightly, many are based on the same coll
ection of sources suggesting a strong government role in the movement’s initiation
. The following sources and the versions above case doubt over assertion that th
e movement is entirely grass roots based. Work proposal The District Collector’s W
ork Proposal on Salwa Judum 2005 is a document containing the plan for the suppo
rt and sustenance of Salwa Judum by local authorities. It indicates a surprising
level of governmental awareness regarding the details of the campaign and its a
ctivities including the number of meetings and rallies held and their locations.
This proposal was issued in 2005, and though it is unclear whether it was writt
en before the June 2 commencement date (sources suggest it was written before No
vember), the authorities have a suspicious awareness of the campaigns activities
in its short lifespan. The proposal also claims that “this campaign will spread i
n the coming days,” an unfounded prediction for a spontaneous and nascent movement
. Upon recent request for a copy of this document, the District Collector refuse
d to provide one, claiming that such a proposal did not exist. Video Brigadier P
onwar of the Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare College in Kanker gave a vide
o to the Independent Citizen’s Initiative during the course of their fact-finding
mission to Dantewada. The video traces the roots of what was dubbed “Operation Sal
wa Judum” to January 2005, about six months before the ‘official’ initiation of the pe
ople’s peaceful mobilization. False Reporting Upon the initiation of Salwa Judum,
the first press releases were issued by a tribal named Sodi Deva. His writings a
imed to galvanize the people into mobilizing to fight against the Naxalite threa
t. However, it was later found that the name Sodi Deva was in fact a fabrication
and the press releases were coming from the Inspector General of Police in Jagd
alpur. Compact Disks Another group conducting a fact-finding mission in the Dant
ewada district obtained an audio recording from Maoists in August of 2005. The r
ecording is of the Superintendent of Police of Bijapur offering Rs 2 Lakh for an
y village that participates in Salwa Judum, as well as additional incentives for
killing Naxalites and providing information regarding their weapons and whereab
outs. Pre-existing Jan Jagran Abhiyans
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Before the commencement of Salwa Judum, the several prescient Jan Jagran Abhiyan
s suggest that Salwa Judum may have been a continuation and rekindling of past (
and failed) efforts to mobilize and arm tribals against Naxalites. The involveme
nt of local politicians, local traders and contractors in these past movements (
and their subsequent involvement in the latest version, Salwa Judum) suggest tha
t the thrust of the movement is far from the spontaneous outcry of the masses th
at it is said to be. The existence of Jan Jagran Abhiyans constitutes the establ
ishment of preexisting sentiments and efforts to mobilize against Naxalites and
the involvement of local officials in their execution suggests the state involve
ment before the acknowledged date of initiation. These sources and narratives co
ntain a central theme. Regardless of whether a ban on tendu leaf collection was
in fact initiated by Naxalites or whether the government had begun operations to
launch Salwa Judum in 2004, it is clear that the vast portion of mass mobilizat
ion of people and the naming of such movement occurred in the summer of 2005. It
is also clear that at or soon after its inception, the movement was publicly ch
ampioned by local politicians, specifically Mahendra Karma. The presence of gove
rnment support in the initiation of Salwa Judum does not negate the fact that th
ere were masses of Adivasis that resented the power and increasingly harsh tacti
cs of many Naxalite cadres. It is more accurate to say that the campaign began o
ut of a convergence of two forces: dissatisfaction with Naxal policy (among both
poor Adivasis and wealthier members of both the tribal and non-tribal community
) and various, often ill-seated political intentions. The hijacking of the resen
tments and insecurities of the masses for the benefit of an elite group (such as
politicians and wealthy tribals and non tribals) is not a new phenomenon. Howev
er, its existence in a variety of other historical instances makes it more recog
nizable in this case. Most importantly, while the ignition of the movement may b
e described as a collision of people’s resentment and political opportunism, the c
urrent character of the movement can reveal to what extent the movement is drive
n by the masses and their desire to unify against the Naxalites. Present Salwa J
udum Activities As of the end of January 2007, the Salwa Judum campaign is activ
e in 644 villages in six development blocks (five development blocks in the regi
on remain unaffected). According to the report, every single village in both the
Bairamgarh and Bijapur district participate in Salwa Judum. In total there have
been 139 foot processions and 47 meetings since the campaign’s beginning, though
the report does not explain what exactly these marches and meetings entail. The
District Collector of Dantewada said that as a result Salwa Judum’s initiation, th
e intensity of violence has increased. Independent reports on the situation in B
astar suggest that the Salwa Judum’s activities are not limited to foot procession
s and meetings. Multiple fact-finding missions have spoken to villagers who have
confirmed that Salwa Judum activists accompany official security forces on thei
r missions, guard government sponsored relief camps, patrol checkpoints along th
e roads, and provide information about the local villages and sangham members to
the security forces. While performing these various tasks, Salwa Judum activist
s reportedly terrorize villagers, burning their villages, torturing those they b
elieved to be Naxalites or Naxalite supporters, raping women, and committing sum
mary executions. As of April 2006, the campaign was supposedly suspended, though
it appears this is only a de jure
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abeyance. In fact, few people - scholars, reporters, or officials - seemed to ev
en know of the suspension. When questioned, local authorities claim that as the
government has no official role in Salwa Judum, it does not have the power to su
spend it. Reports of Salwa Judum activities continue and a recent fact-finding m
ission found that civilians move about with AK-47’s in Dantewada town, patrol road
s throughout the district, and guard government relief camps, suggesting that th
e campaign remains active.
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Vol:23 Iss:05 URL: http://www.flonnet.com/fl2305/stories/20060324007613300.htm B
ack
THE STATES
People s war
PURNIMA S. TRIPATHI in Dantewada Even as people are killed by naxalites, a popul
ar movement against them is gaining momentum in parts of Chhattisgarh.
AKHILESH KUMAR
Tribal villagers searching for Maoist rebels in Dantewada. CHHATTISGARH is witne
ssing an unprecedented and unique mobilisation of people against naxalite violen
ce. Called Salwa Judum (people s movement), it was initiated in late 2004 and ha
s armed villagers roaming the jungles and patrolling the roads in search of naxa
lites and guarding potential targets of attack. Sometimes security personnel acc
ompany Salwa Judum members, but mostly they are on their own. The level of popul
ar support is evident from the fact that the movement is backed by both the ruli
ng Bharatiya Janata Party and the Opposition Congress - it is led by Congress Le
gislature Party leader Mahendra Karma. An increasing number of people are associ
ating themselves with Salwa Judum despite the threat of naxalite retaliation and
the fact that once they become activists they have to leave their villages and
stay in relief camps. Entire villages are being vacated because even family memb
ers of activists do not feel safe there and prefer to shift to these camps. The
exodus began after the killing of 29 villagers in a mine explosion on February 2
8 near Konta village in Dantewada district. The villagers were returning from a
Salwa Judum camp at nearby Dornapal. According to survivors, while 10 to 12 vill
agers were killed in the blast, the rest were killed with swords by the naxalite
s. More than 50 people sustained injuries in the attack. After the attack, the n
axalites abducted a villager. His body was later recovered from Inzerram near Ko
nta on March 4, with a letter attached to his shirt. The letter warned the villa
gers against participating in Salwa Judum and ordered them to return to their ho
uses. The incident spread panic among villagers and so far over 50,000 have fled
their homes and are
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living in camps in Dantewada district and adjoining Bijapur district. Senior pol
ice officers and even Chief Minister Raman Singh admit that naxalite violence ha
s increased after Salwa Judum started operations, but adds there is no other way
out to fight the extremists. Raman Singh said: "The ultras drew their strength
from the people. If we have to tackle this problem, the villagers themselves hav
e to rise against them. We will try our best to provide them security but this i
s our ultimate weapon to fight them after all else has failed." Besides, Raman S
ingh said, if the people, fed up with violence over the past 15 years, now had r
ealised that they were on the wrong side of the fence, it was a good signal. "If
we lose this opportunity to root out naxalism, we will never get another," he s
aid. Mahendra Karma agrees. He said: "There is no other way to tackle the naxali
te menace. I do not care what my critics say. This is a people s problem and bei
ng a people s representative, I have to fight for their problems." He was alludi
ng to criticism within his own party. The Congress, as usual, is divided on the
issue. Some of its State leaders have held the Chief Minister responsible for th
e death of many villagers in naxalite violence. Importantly, the villagers who a
re part of Salwa Judum are not scared. Instead, they are full of hope that the m
ovement will pave the way for a peaceful future for their children even if they
lose their lives in the process. This correspondent visited three camps - Dornap
al where 5,600 tribal people from 26 adjoining villages are staying; Errabore, w
here over 1,000 people have taken shelter; and Konta, where over 15,000 villager
s are staying. During an extensive interaction, not even one villager said he or
she was afraid of naxalites. In fact, they have become so used to violence that
the fear factor does not matter now. "Earlier too we were getting killed by nax
alites. Now at least we have the consolation that we will die fighting," said Sh
yam Singh Sinna of Dubbatota village at the Dornapal relief camp. Sinna, who lef
t behind his wife and three children to join Salwa Judum, said what motivated hi
m was the hope that it would lead to peace in the area and a better future for h
is children. "Even if I get killed, my children will be safer and better off," h
e said. Hinga Tollai, Kutturam Deva Tatrai and Soyam Mokka expressed similar fee
lings. Tollai and Tatrai said they had been members of a dalam (the core group o
f naxalites) and had participated in some killings but got fed up with violence
and now wanted to lead a peaceful life. Interestingly, there were many girls too
who wanted to join Salwa Judum and had come to Dornapal. Soryam Raje, like Toll
ai and Tatrai, was a dalam member and used to go around with Maoists singing rev
olutionary songs. She too wanted to get back to normal life and hence was in Sal
wa Judum. Similarly, other girls such as Madkam Adme, Kottam Chinge and Kottam L
achchi, all in their teens, had fled the dalam to join Salwa Judum. For all of t
hem, it was the only hope of coming back to a peaceful and normal life. At Konta
camp too, people had similar stories to tell. Apparently, the naxalites have be
en rattled by the growing number of villagers associating themselves with Salwa
Judum. This is reflected in the sudden spurt in attacks. On March 4, naxalites b
lew up a portion of the Bhansi railway station in Dantewada district and attacke
d a railway engine. It was the first such attack on railway property. "This obvi
ously shows their desperation," said the Chief Minister. They also attacked vill
agers near Bansagudda in the early morning on March 5, killing eight people and
injuring over 40. The naxalites took 15 hostages, whose whereabouts are not yet
known. Pamphlets warning villagers against participating in Salwa Judum were rec
overed from all the sites of attack. Even human rights groups such as the People
s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) admit that the spurt in attacks shows the na
xalites desperation to assert their supremacy. "These senseless killings are un
fortunate and must stop and both sides should sit down to talk and find a way to
peace," said Vinayak Sen, a PUCL activist in Raipur. Raman Singh, however, rema
ins convinced that Salwa Judum is the only way in which the naxalite problem can
be solved. He has a rehabilitation package for those participating in Salwa Jud
um. "I have 70,000 land pattas ready to give them the moment the Centre passes t
he Tribal Land Rights
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Bill. Besides, I can give them employment for 250 to 300 days a year with help f
rom various government schemes. Then there are other welfare packages. In three
years, if I keep getting people s support, I will change the face of Bastar," he
says. For the moment, he said, able-bodied members of Salwa Judum would be give
n arms training and employed as special police officers on a salary of Rs.1,500
a month. The rest would be employed as labourers. Raman Singh said that while ab
out 1,000 pucca houses were ready for those displaced, over 2,000 more would be
built in a few months so that these people can be relocated in groups at one pla
ce. Counter-insurgency experts agree that policing or military action alone cann
ot solve the naxalite problem. No matter how effective such action is, it will h
ave to be accompanied by socio-economic development. "This has to be a militaril
y, politically, administratively, economically and psychologically synchronised
action," said Brigadier (retd) B.K. Ponwar, who has been brought in to set up a
counter-terrorism and jungle warfare college at Kanker in Chhattisgarh, on the l
ines of the Grey Hound Academy in Andhra Pradesh. According to Ponwar, Salwa Jud
um is an exceptionally good idea because when people turn against naxalites, the
ir main support base is eroded. Then it would become easier for the police to ta
ckle it. "I m here to teach the policeman to fight the guerilla like a guerilla,
" he said. He has already trained 600 Chhattisgarh policemen and 600 others from
Orissa and Jharkhand, the two other States that face the naxalite problem.
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Vol:25 Iss:23 URL: http://www.flonnet.com/fl2523/stories/20081121252308800.htm B
ack
CONTROVERSY
Far from fair
V. VENKATESAN A team appointed by the National Human Rights Commission says that
naxalites are to blame for Salwa Judum activists’ use of force.
BY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT
At a Salwa Judum training camp at Kasoli village of Dantewada district in Chhatt
isgarh. SALWA JUDUM, a vigilante group formed to prevent naxalite attacks in the
districts of Dantewada and Bijapur in Chhattisgarh, is at the centre of a contr
oversy involving the state, civil society and human rights groups. A fact-findin
g team of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), in its report submitted t
o the Supreme Court, has justified the armed resistance to naxalism. The 16-memb
er inquiry team, headed by Deputy Inspector General of Police Sudhir Chowdhary a
nd comprising police officers, concluded its report thus: “Selective killings by n
axalites of Salwa Judum [meaning “peace mission”] leaders and activists and attacks
by naxalites on Salwa Judum leaders were responsible, to a large extent, for cha
nging the complexion of the movement from a non-violent one to an armed resistan
ce” (paragraph 7.02). In April 2008, the Supreme Court expressed serious misgiving
s about the legitimacy of such resistance and directed the NHRC to appoint a com
mittee to inquire into the “allegations of large-scale human rights violations by
Salwa Judum activists, naxalites and security forces in the State of Chhattisgar
h”. A Supreme Court Bench comprising the Chief Justice of India, Justice K.G. Bala
krishnan, and Justice Aftab Alam warned the State government that it could not s
upply arms to private persons and abet murder. It made the observations while he
aring two writ petitions alleging human rights violations by Salwa Judum and the
security forces. The petitioners included a Delhi-based academic, Nandini Sunda
r, and the historian Ramachandra Guha.
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What is disturbing is the NHRC-appointed team’s attempt to absolve the State gover
nment of any role in building up the armed resistance. The report observed: “The S
tate government cannot be said to have sponsored Salwa Judum but it certainly ha
s extended support to it by way of providing security to the processions and mee
tings of Salwa Judum [activists] and also to inmates of the temporary relief cam
ps” (paragraph 7.06). Ironically, this observation stands somewhat contradicted by
the preceding paragraph, which clearly admits that the distinction between Salw
a Judum activists, on the one hand, and the Special Police Officers (SPOs) and t
he security forces, on the other, has been blurred. In paragraph 7.05, the repor
t says: “While the naxalites have been involved in violations of human rights, the
re have been instances where Salwa Judum activists, the SPOs and the security fo
rces have also been involved in the violation of human rights. The violations on
the part of the latter being more serious as the State must act within the four
corners of the law even in the face of grave provocation.” The inference that Sal
wa Judum activists – in contrast to the SPOs and the security forces – are not under
any legal obligation to respect human rights is indeed ominous. The Police Act,
1861, empowers a local magistrate to appoint temporarily civilians as SPOs to p
erform the roles of “ordinary officers of police”. The provisions of this Act are cl
ear – that the SPOs can be appointed only where the police force is felt to be ins
ufficient and where there has been a disturbance of peace, or its reasonable app
rehension, and that they cannot be appointed indefinitely. AMPLE EVIDENCE The di
stinction the team has sought to draw between sponsoring Salwa Judum and support
ing its activities in the form of provision of security, is misleading. The peti
tioners have given ample evidence to suggest that the State government’s support t
o Salwa Judum was more than just provision of security. A report brought out in
July by Human Rights Watch (HRW), a non-governmental organisation (NGO), and tit
led “Being Neutral is Our Biggest Crime”, has revealed certain incontrovertible fact
s, which have not been disproved in the NHRC’s report. According to the HRW report
, in June 2005, some local protest meetings against naxalites in Bijapur distric
t resulted in the creation of Salwa Judum. The Central and State governments saw
in the protests an opportunity to challenge the naxalite influence in the area.
They provided support, primarily through the security forces, and permitted the
protesters to function as a vigilante group aimed at eliminating naxalites. Thi
s dramatically transformed the protest meetings into raids against villages beli
eved to be pro-naxalite. The NHRC report also ignores the fact that the State go
vernment initiative to form Salwa Judum coincided with a prescription to do so f
rom the Centre. The 2005-06 annual report of the Ministry of Home Affairs states
: “The States have also been advised to encourage formation of Local Resistance Gr
oups/Village Defence Committees/Nagrik Suraksha Samitis (civilian protection com
mittees) in naxalite-affected areas. In 2005, Chhattisgarh witnessed significant
local resistance against naxalites in some areas.” The Dantewada Collector’s propos
al of 2005 – cited in the HRW report as well as by the petitioners – illustrates how
the State government encouraged and assisted Salwa Judum. The work proposal sta
tes: “So far the people have been conducting the abhiyan [campaign] on their own.
The naxalites are trying to dissuade them through persuasion or through threats.
If they are not given support from the administration, the abhiyan will die out
. In addition to training the villagers, they should be given traditional weapon
s like bows and arrows, axes, hoes and sticks. Although most villagers
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already have such weapons, it would be good to encourage them by distributing re
ady-made arrows or iron to make arrows.” The petitioners alleged that there had be
en several incidents of killing, abduction, rape and arson by Salwa Judum activi
sts in Chhattisgarh and that many youngsters were being given arms by the State
government, which had led to an increase in the crime rate. One of the petitione
rs, Kartam Joga, also provided the names of some 500 persons who had been allege
dly killed by Salwa Judum activists or the security forces. The petition highlig
hted the miserable living conditions in the settlement camps. The State governme
nt claimed that the peculiar circumstances arising from naxalite activities had
necessitated certain remedial steps to save the lives of people from naxal attac
ks and that the government had designated willing local people as SPOs under the
Police Act. The government submitted that appropriate action would be taken if
any crime or violation by any SPO was brought to its notice. The Central governm
ent supported the State government’s submissions in this regard. It is in this con
text that the Bench directed the NHRC to appoint a committee to ascertain the fa
cts and report to the court. WORRYING IMPLICATIONS
BY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT
At a base camp run by Salwa Judum at Dornapal in Konta tehsil, Dantewada distric
t. The committee’s justification of vigilantism has worrying implications. In para
graph 7.04 of its report, it says: “The allegation of the petitioners that naxalit
e violence has increased after Salwa Judum and further aggravated the problem, w
hich shows that this experiment has failed, is a very narrow view of this compli
cated problem. Surely, the petitioners would not support the subjugation and kil
lings of tribals by naxalites for years before Salwa Judum. The tribals cannot b
e denied the right to defend themselves against the atrocities perpetrated by th
e naxalites, especially when the law-enforcers are themselves ineffective or not
present.” The Campaign for Peace and Justice in Chhattisgarh (CPJC), an NGO campa
igning against Salwa Judum, has observed in a press release that the NHRC team’s f
indings do not reflect the ground realities and the need to enforce the rule of
law and human rights. It has deplored the composition of the team, given the fac
t that the primary conflict in this area is between the police and naxalites, wi
th villagers caught in the crossfire.
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The CPJC has alleged that the presence of Salwa Judum leaders, SPOs and the Supe
rintendent of Police of Dantewada in the armed convoy of the NHRC team during it
s visit to the affected areas made an impartial and independent inquiry impossib
le. Whatever the truth in these allegations, some facts revealed in the NHRC tea
m’s report must cause concern. One of them is that a large number of civilians hav
e been displaced since Salwa Judum’s formation. Some of them are at present stayin
g in camps in Bijapur and Dantewada districts, while the others have gone to And
hra Pradesh. The NHRC team has observed that those who moved to Andhra Pradesh c
ontinued to live there and did not feel safe enough to return to their villages.
The reasons for their reluctance to return, as speculated by the team, include
apprehensions about Salwa Judum activists, the SPOs, the security forces and nax
alites, and the better economic opportunities available for them in the neighbou
ring State. The team has rejected the petitioners’ claim that 537 villagers were k
illed by Salwa Judum and the security forces. After looking into a representativ
e sample of 168 of these cases, the team concluded that most of the allegations
were based on hearsay and that many of the villagers were killed by naxalites. T
he team found the living conditions in the 23 temporary relief camps with regard
to health, education and employment opportunities and the public distribution s
ystem inadequate. Yet, it found the overall conditions “satisfactory”. These camps a
re inhabited mainly by the SPOs, their relatives and Salwa Judum activists, who
are the prime targets of naxalites and are unable to return home. The NHRC team
has recommended the facilitation of their safe return to their villages and prov
ision of adequate security in the camps. The team’s finding that many tribal peopl
e are missing vindicates the petitioners’ apprehensions. The report said: “It is not
known whether they are inside the jungles with the naxalites, or they have migr
ated to some other place, or perhaps even dead. Most of the allegations in the p
etitions pertain to these missing persons who, on hearsay, are alleged to have b
een killed.” The committee, therefore, recommended preparation of a villagewise li
st of all those who went missing and the circumstances under which they disappea
red. It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court accepts all the conclusions
and recommendations made by the NHRC committee in the light of the CPJC’s misgivi
ngs about the report.
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Vol:22 Iss:21 URL: http://www.flonnet.com/fl2221/stories/20051021006700400.htm B
ack
COVER STORY
THE NAXALITE CHALLENGE
VENKITESH RAMAKRISHNAN in New Delhi Left extremists have regrouped under the one
-year-old Communist Party of India (Maoist) and expanded their area of operation
. The state is planning a crackdown, but success may not come easily.
MUSTAFA QURAISHI/AP
At the memorial of extremists killed in police encounters, in the Nallamalla for
est in Andhra Pradesh. ON September 19, administrative heads and senior official
s of 12 States, including Chief Ministers, Home Secretaries and Directors-Genera
l of Police, met in New Delhi under the auspices of the Union Home Ministry and
decided to set up inter-State joint task forces to "facilitate coordinated and s
ynergised anti-naxalite operations across State boundaries" and "strengthen inte
lligence networks" for this mission. Home Minister Shivraj Patil announced that
"these forces would be made functional quickly", in the context of the developin
g situation in various naxalite-affected States. A number of politicians and sec
urity officials who attended the meeting rated the decision as historic, essenti
ally because the "Union Home Ministry had for the first time accepted the need t
o raise a special joint task force that can operate across State borders to coun
ter the naxalite threat". Even as the "historic", albeit somewhat contentious, d
ecision was being circulated and officials of the administration and security ag
encies were working out the details of its implementation, Home Departments of v
arious States received reports about scores of naxalite conventions across large
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tracts of forest land, stretching from Andhra Pradesh in south India to Orissa a
nd Bihar in the east. The professed objective of the conventions, which took pla
ce throughout the last week of September, was to observe the first anniversary o
f the Communist Party of India (Maoist). The CPI (Maoist) was formed on Septembe
r 21, 2004, with the merger of two prominent naxalite outfits, the People s War
Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC). The meetings, Home Ministry r
eports pointed out, were not confined to commemorating the formation of the part
y. They also considered plans to counter the proposed government offensive using
the "military unit" of the organisation, the People s Guerilla Army (PGA). Catc
hing up with a number of PGA cadre who attended the anniversary deep inside the
Saranda forests of the Singhbhum region in Jharkhand, Frontline gathered that th
is was indeed the case. The PGA cadre said the celebrations "marked a resolve to
continue with people s war against the Indian state, uphold the gains made so f
ar, especially by protecting guerilla zones, where the party, its police, admini
stration and army controlled day-to-day life, and counter the new aggressions th
at the state would make". The pronouncements of the Home Minister and the assert
ions of the PGA left little doubt that the "climate of accommodation and dialogu
e" that the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government had sought to build up
was over. In a sense, the new developments marked a significant dilution of the
socio-economic-political approach, as opposed to a militaristic approach, promis
ed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in tackling militancy-related issues. The ea
rlier intent of the Congress-led UPA manifested itself in the form of discussion
s between the naxalite leadership and the Andhra Pradesh government in October l
ast year. This had marked a major shift from the approach adopted by several Sta
te governments, including the erstwhile Telugu Desam Party (TDP) Ministry in And
hra Pradesh and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) governments in Chhattisgarh and
Madhya Pradesh, which had branded naxalites as mere lumpen outlaws causing harm
to local communities and their development. These governments and their politic
al leaderships highlighted how some naxalite leaders had become multi-millionair
es through extortion and other criminal activities. The Congress obviously perce
ived that lumpenisation was not the dominant feature of naxalites, or that this
trend was not as widespread as it was made out to be. The peace process in Andhr
a Pradesh did seem to make some progress before collapsing over two issues. One
was the naxalite position that "the question of carrying arms and conducting arm
ed struggle were non-negotiable". This assertion was in response to the governme
nt suggestion that the situation would be more conducive to talks if the naxalit
es gave up armed struggle. The second was the inability and hesitation of the go
vernment to take up land reforms on the scale and in the manner suggested by the
naxalites. The extremists had presented details of agricultural lands including
land on the outskirts of the State capital, Hyderabad, allegedly grabbed by ind
ustrial houses and influential persons, and demanded that the government distrib
ute the 30,000 acres (12,000 hectares) among the landless. The State government
rejected this demand.
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Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil (centre) with Chief Ministers of various State
s and Bihar Governor Buta Singh (fourth from right) at the meeting that discusse
d ways to counter naxalism. The fact that naxalites were continuing with their a
rmed struggle in States other than Andhra Pradesh (they engineered landmine blas
ts in eastern Uttar Pradesh killing 15 policemen) and the political pressures th
ey placed on the Congress also contributed to the failure of the talks. It was i
n this context that Chhattisgarh raised the demand for inter-State joint securit
y exercises. Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh pointed out at the New Delh
i meeting that his government had been stressing the need for a joint task force
but the UPA government had consistently ignored the demand saying that the naxa
lite problem can and should be tackled by the affected States independently. In
spite of their ultimate failure, the talks were apparently motivated by good int
entions on both sides. Former Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister and Congress leader
Digvijay Singh, whose tenure in power saw a number of naxalite operations, told
Frontline in the context of the talks that no government committed to the welfar
e of the people could afford to ignore the growing influence of extremist politi
cal alternatives and their negative impact on mainstream polity. The leadership
of the CPI (Maoist), including Ramakrishna, the head of the party delegation at
the talks in Andhra Pradesh, had around the same time said that "it is wrong to
classify naxalism as a problem, especially in the context of the faith and alleg
iance that lakhs and lakhs of oppressed and deprived people show towards us and
our path" and added that his party was, in fact, more interested than any other
party in peaceful solutions to the people s socio-economic problems At a practic
al level, the Andhra Pradesh government, through the talks, sought to get some r
elief from the violence perpetrated by naxalites against the state apparatus, wh
ile the CPI (Maoist) made apparent an urge to spread its ideological and organis
ational influence by aggressively advocating land reforms and getting them imple
mented in various States, starting with Andhra Pradesh. It has been a rapid down
hill trip after the collapse of the talks at the end of last year. Naxalite atta
cks on state machinery intensified through many of the affected regions. The CPI
(Maoist) also complained that government atrocities had risen in various parts
of the country affecting both its activists and its support base, which consist
of "unarmed well-wishers". Statements released by the party leadership alleged t
hat 150 activists and supporters were killed by various security forces in the p
ast one year. Notwithstanding these claims, naxalite attacks have been in greate
r focus throughout the past 10 months. Armed activists attacked security forces
at several places during the Assembly elections in Bihar and Jharkhand in Februa
ry. The Superintendent of Police of Munger district in Bihar was killed, and 38
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and State Special Forces personnel were kill
ed in April-June in the Dandakaranya forests in Andhra Pradesh. One of the most
intense operations during this period took place in Madhuban town in north Bihar
, close to the Nepal border. In a synchronised attack, over 150 naxalites hit va
rious instruments of the state - the police station,
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banks, district offices and the house of Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) Member of Pa
rliament Sitaram Singh. Closer to the September 19 meet, naxalites gunned down 1
5 persons in Jharkhand and triggered a landmine blast near Bijapur in Chhattisga
rh killing 24 policemen, including 22 from the CRPF. In the context of these dev
elopments, the Centre naturally assessed that naxalites had increased their stri
ke power and influence. According to the Home Ministry s estimation, they have "
9,300 hardcore underground cadre and they hold around 6,500 regular weapons besi
des a large number of unlicensed country-made arms". The naxalite infrastructure
includes sophisticated weapons such as Kalshanikov rifles and Claymore landmine
s, modern wireless equipment and electronic gadgets. It has also been assessed t
hat the naxalites sphere of influence has spread in the past year and a half fr
om 76 districts across nine States to 118 districts in 12 States. The security f
orces involved in anti-naxalite operations are convinced, especially in the back
ground of the Madhuban attack, which apparently involved Maoists from Nepal too,
that the CPI (Maoist) is steadily building up a wider network involving associa
tes in neighbouring countries. The Home Ministry is of the view that the wider s
trategic motive is that of carving out a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) or wha
t is called a "Red Corridor of armed struggle" spreading from Nepal through Biha
r up to the Dandakarnaya region of Andhra Pradesh. Obviously, these perceptions
have contributed in a big way to the Union government giving up its reluctance t
o have unified inter-State anti-naxalite operations. However, as of now, the mod
alities of coordinating and carrying out such operations have not been worked ou
t. Naturally, there is some uncertainty about the impact on the ground too. At t
he same time, the naxalite leadership is certain that the new plan of the govern
ment would not make much difference on the ground situation in the 12 States whe
re the organisation has varying degrees of influence. A middle-level leader of t
he party, not actively involved in PGA operations, told Frontline that this asse
ssment was based mainly on three factors. One, the strike power of the party has
increased considerably in the past year. Two, the socioeconomic problems that h
ave contributed to the steady growth of the party have only accentuated in vast
parts of the country, especially in the rural, tribal and forest regions where n
axalite influence is the most conspicuous. Three, in the background of the above
-mentioned factors, the government s intelligence gathering would not be effecti
ve. All this, the leader said, would make the planned operations a non-starter.
K. RAMESH BABU
Ramakrishna, People s War leader.
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This confidence is indeed a reflection of the current balance of power dominated
by naxalites. But the history of this Left extremist movement since 1967 has sh
own that an element of cocksureness has repeatedly brought stinging reverses. In
the early 1970s, the movement seemed to be reaching the peak of its influence w
ith the creation of vast guerilla zones from West Bengal to Bihar to Uttar Prade
sh to Andhra Pradesh. But the might of the state machinery was able to disrupt a
ll these within a couple of years. The PWG and the MCC did of course rebuild the
movement, but the fact remains that the naxalites are facing opposition even fr
om the common people in States such as Chhattisgarh and Bihar. The opposition ha
s stemmed both from disagreement with their aggressive ideological positions and
from the revulsion caused by the lumpenisation of some of the cadre. Given this
background, the confidence about retaining the guerilla zones and support bases
may not be entirely realistic. As some naxalite activists have pointed out, the
task of retaining people s support is a daunting one in all guerilla activities
. The larger view of the UPA government on the issue of extremism also emphasise
s the need to strengthen people s support to mainstream polity through effective
socio-economic interventions. The September 19 meeting, which had representativ
es of State governments run by political parties of divergent views, too had poi
nted out that a lasting solution to Left extremist politics cannot be achieved w
ithout addressing the socio-economic factors that contribute to its rise and gro
wth. Some of the measures identified by the Home Ministry in this context includ
e, "strengthening of administrative machinery to make it more responsive, transp
arent and sensitive to facilitate effective redressal of public grievances", "de
velopment of an improved delivery mechanism aimed at accelerated integrated deve
lopment" and "enhancing employment opportunities in naxaliteaffected districts",
especially to the local and indigenous population. Specifically, the government
has mooted plans to raise a special tribal battalion with 1,200 members from th
e naxalite-affected areas. But proclamations such as this have not, by themselve
s, generated any great hope about a turnaround. Prakash Singh, former Director-G
eneral of the Border Security Force (BSF) and the author of the book The Naxalit
e Movement in India, says, on the strength of his close observation of the movem
ent as well as the initiatives to counter it, that successive governments have t
alked about this multi-pronged approach - combining security offensives with soc
io-political initiatives since the 1970s without any concrete result on the grou
nd. "Unless the governments and their leaders show the commitment to effect land
reforms, weed out corruption and provide a semblance of fair and just governanc
e in the interests of the poor, naxalite ideology will continue to grow," he tol
d Frontline. According to a former Home Ministry official associated with anti-n
axalite operations in the 1970s and 1980s, the only State government that steadf
astly advanced socio-economic initiatives to counter Left extremism was the Left
Front government in West Bengal, the State where naxalism originated. "That gov
ernment, right from its first stint in office, consistently used the administrat
ive and legal machinery to protect the rights of the tiller as opposed to the (a
bsentee) landlord, and thus brought about far-reaching changes in the rural soci
o-economic set-up," he said. The results, he added, were there for all to see, i
n the form of the near-total collapse of naxalism in the State and the repeated
return of the Left Front to power through the past two decades. The appeal of th
e CPI (Maoist) evidently lies in the foibles of mainstream politics. Campaign ma
terial circulated by its activists in various parts of the country lampoons the
mainstream as follows: "Maoists demand humanity for the poverty-stricken masses,
not the dirty politicking of the mainstream. Maoists demand decent life for all
, not just for the elite and their hangers-on that thrive on the mainstream. The
vultures of the system demand that the Maoists give up not merely their guns, b
ut their self-respect, humanity, sense of justice and the struggles for a decent
existence. They want the Maoists to join the gutter mainstream." The conditions
that exist in vast parts of
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rural India impart a special appeal to this kind of language. In theoretical ter
ms, naxalites justify their actions as the political programme to overthrow the
Indian state, comprising the big landlord-comprador, bureaucratic, bourgeoisie c
lasses and the imperialism that backs them, through armed struggle and establish
a people s democratic state under the leadership of the proletariat. It states
that the principal and immediate task of the present stage of the revolution is
to arouse and organise people for agrarian revolutionary guerilla war in the cou
ntryside - specially in the remote countryside - and to build the people s army
and a rural base through guerilla warfare. There are indications that the immedi
ate manifestation of this theoretical projection would be in the form of struggl
es and strikes against the corporatisation of agricultural land. The specific de
mand for redistribution of land in Andhra Pradesh during the talks last year had
this dimension. Jharkhand, where the National Democratic Alliance government is
busy signing memorandums of understanding with industrial houses such as the Mi
ttals, the Jindals and the Tatas for mining and related activities, could well b
ecome the next major naxalite target. There is a view in a section of observers
that the current multi-pronged initiative against naxalites is linked to the eff
orts to "ensure safe passage" to liberalisation and globalisation policies in la
rge parts of rural India. If that is the case, the battle between naxalites and
the state apparatus will acquire more intense proportions in the days to come.
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MAINSTREAM, VOL XLVII, NO 25, JUNE 6, 2009
Saturday 6 June 2009, by J.J. Roy Burman
The Naxalite Movement that was Not in Naxalbari
Peasant movements have drawn a lot of attention among academics and social activ
ists. The Naxalite movement too has gained a lot of acclaim as a peasant movemen
t. The movement at present is very active in the tribal belts of Chotanagpur, Ma
harashtra, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. It is active in some places of Bihar as we
ll, where the lower castes and under-classes have been mobilised. The name ‘Naxali
te’ draws its antecedence from the movement that emerged in 1967 at the Naxalbari
area of Darjeeling district in West Bengal. “The term comes from Naxalbari, a smal
l village in West Bengal, where a section of the Communist Party of India-Marxis
t (CPI-M) under the leadership of Charu Mazumdar and Kanu Sanyal led a violent u
prising in 1967, trying to develop a ‘revolutionary opposition’ in opposition to the
CPI-M leadership. The insurrection started on May 24, 1967 in Naxalbari village
when a peasant was attacked by hired hands over a land dispute. Local peasants
retaliated by attacking the landlords and the violence escalated. Mazumdar great
ly admired Mao Zedong of China and advocated that Indian peasants and lower clas
ses must follow in his footsteps and overthrow the government and upper classes
whom he held responsible for their plight. He engendered the Naxalite movement t
hrough his writings, the most famous being the ‘Historic Eight Documents’ which form
ed the basis of the Naxalite ideology.” (Wikipedia) The Communist Party of China h
ailed the movement as the “Spring Thunder of India”. It is commonly stated that “the o
bjective of the new movement was ‘seizure of power’ through an agrarian revolution.
The strategy was the elimination of the feudal order in the countryside to free
the poor from clutches of the oppressive landlords and replace the old order wit
h an alternative one that would implement land reforms. The tactics to achieve i
t was through guerrilla warfare by the peasants to eliminate the landlords and b
uild resistance against the State police force.” (Internet: Asia Mass Media links)
. Chadha (nd) writes similarly: “On May 24, 1967, the first incident came to light
when there was a clash between a poor peasant and a landlord over land which pr
obably belonged to the peasant.... The next incident after this was a clash betw
een guards of a tea estate and peasants.” The Naxalite movement spread in the West
Bengal State as a wildfire and particularly the urban elite youth and the bhadr
alok class got attracted to it. As of now the movement has attained a strong foo
ting in many States outside West Bengal, though the movement petered out in Naxa
lbari within a short time. The purpose of this paper is not to enter into theore
tical polemics linked to the concept of peasantry or social movement, but to bri
ng out the truth that affected the indigenous Rajbansi people which became appar
ent through the review of secondary literature and first-hand field experience.
First of all, it needs to be
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questioned what was the background of the ‘peasants’ who got mainly involved into fi
ghts with the landlords and who were the peasant leaders? References from the se
condary sources clearly indicate that the first skirmish that began in May 1967
involved no one but a Santal and a so-called Rajbansi ‘jotedar’. The next day too th
e mob that attacked the police party with bows and arrows and killed a police of
ficer were mostly Santals and other tribal tea plantation labourers. (Mukherjee:
1978, Duyker: 1987, Bonner: 1990) It is not known to a majority of the scholars
and the laity that the demographic composition of Naxalbari and the involvement
of Santals and other tribes they mention, are in reality mostly migrants from C
hotanagpur who arrived in the region when the tea plantations were established.
Many of the plantation workers started cultivating on either the surplus lands w
ithin the tea plantations or on the fallow lands adjoining the plantations as ow
ners or as sharecroppers. The original owners of these lands were usually the Ra
jbansi ‘jotedars’ —landlords. Rajbansis are the autochthones of the region. (Sarkar: 2
006: 154) Partho Mukherjee (1978, 1987) writes that at the time of Naxalbari mov
ement there were 32 tea gardens in the three adjoining police stations, Naxalbar
i, Phansidewa and Khoribari, covering 274 sq. miles, that were affected. There w
ere 32 revenue units and 90 jotes or settlements in the area. It is also to be n
oted that the tribes (migrants) comprised of almost 30 per cent of the populatio
n. Sarkar (op.cit.: 2006) writes that right now there are 30 legal and 25 illega
l tea estates in Phansidewa and Khoribari Blocks respectively. Ray (1988) had cl
early stated that the Naxalites had taken their name from an organised uprising
by tea garden labourers near Naxalbari in 1967. Mukherjee (op.cit.) states that
there was a very high percentage of share-croppers in the region. Among those ow
ning five acres or less land, the percentage of sharecroppers in Naxalbari, Phan
sidewa and Khoribari were 60 per cent, 65 per cent and 50 per cent respectively.
In comparison to the sharecroppers, the area had few landless agricultural labo
urers. It was 4.6 per cent in Naxalbari, 6.1 per cent in Phansidewa and 5.4 per
cent in Khoribari. Thus the agrarian structure was not very inequatious. It is s
urprising that Biplab Dasgupta (Dasgupta: 1974: 13) gave credence to the support
of the landless labourers. Even now there are very few landless agricultural la
bourers among the Rajbansis. Chattopadhyay and Ghosh (1983) have brought to ligh
t that owing to lack of irrigation facilities, cropping pattern, intensity of cr
opping etc., operational holdings of up to even 7.5 acres can hardly be called ‘hi
gh’ in view of the extremely low return from land. MOST studies covering the movem
ent and the region indict the Rajbansi landlords who exploited their ‘adhiars’ or th
e sharecroppers. But almost all the studies baring a few miss out that the Rajba
nsis were in reality a tribal community and their settlements were lineage based
. Sarkar (2006) directly ascribes the Rajbansis as tribes. While in West Bengal
they have been assigned the Scheduled Caste status, across the border in Assam,
Hiteswar Saikia, the late Chief Minister, had recommended them to be given the S
cheduled Tribe status. Most of the Rajbansi
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adhiars in the past were kin relations of the jotedars and the ‘jotedar’ represented
a corporate entity. It is very clearly evident in the case of Rajbansis in the
Duars where the jotedars collected the share from the adhiars and parcelled part
of it to the Bhutan Subah—the intermediary of the Bhutan king (Karlsson: 2000). I
ncidences of such revenue collectors were replete all over the tribal belt of Ch
otanagpur. These tax collectors helped retaining the corporate character of the
community. The material condition of the ‘jotedar’ and the local adhiars was hardly
discernable. The situation continues to be so even now. The jotedar at the most
possesses a doublestoried mud house with thatched roofing as compared to the sin
gle-storied mud houses of the adhiars. A recent study by Enika Basu (2007) revea
ls that at Rambala village near Naxalbari (which was at the centre of the moveme
nt), while a jotedar owning 10 acres of land cultivates only six bighas of land
himself, the rest 30 bighas have been shelled out to six sharecroppers. The jote
dars used to be called ‘Giri’, the respected one, who had social responsibilities to
wards the adhiars, a majority of whom were his kinsmen. Usually the Giri and his
kinsmen together occupied small mounds surrounded by agricultural plots. Such h
amlets are often marked by sacred bamboo groves collectively worshipped by all.
The situation changed drastically with intrusion of the British who introduced t
heir land revenue system and conferred proprietory right to the jotedars, ignori
ng the stewardship they enjoyed over land and forests. It needs to be pointed ou
t that as compared to other areas of Bengal most of the Rajbansi jotedars were n
ot absentee landlords and that they cultivated their lands mainly through family
labour. Mukherjee (1987: 1611) states: “The structure of jotedari system was base
d on a patrimonial-feudal culture of the Rajbansis. It is generally accepted tha
t the original jotedars, who are almost exclusively Rajbansis, settled down on a
tract largely forest or fallow land. They possessed both working capital and fi
xed capital (instruments of production). They brought with them fellow caste-men
who had only labour at their disposal. These were the adhiars. Initially both t
he jotedar and the adhiar would clear forest land and engage in settled cultivat
ion. The jote was named after the jotedar. (This sort of system is to be found i
n most tribal areas where the land used to be recorded in the name of the first
settling family; but the family is considered to be only a steward or custodian
and not owner—the British brought in the Roman law of proprietory right and distor
ted the system to turn the custodians into owners.) Unfortunately the Naxalites
followed this very alien law to identify jotedars among the Rajbansis. Jotedar i
n Bengali nomenclature usually connotes absentee landlords. But in the Terai reg
ion of Bengal they were considered to be the ones directly paying landrevenue to
the government. Under the British land revenue system, this did not make them a
class of substantial landholders, but in fact, admitted of considerable heterog
eneity. The majority of the jotedars had holdings of moderate size.” It is only wi
th the massive influx of outsiders that the things changed. There emerged some M
arwari and upper-caste Bengali landlords who did not till the land by themselves
and introduced an exploitative relationship with the adhiars. Some of the Rajba
nsi jotedars too became influenced by this. “Jotedari system was transformed into
jotedar-adhiari system with an increasing contradiction between capital and labo
ur.” (Mukherjee: 1978: 79) Initially, the
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relationship between the jotedars and his adhiars—members of the same lineage—were q
uite cordial. The Rajbansi adhiars used to have free access to the precincts of
the Giri household. Cases of jotedars without sons bringing adhiars into their f
amilies as sons-in-law was not frequent but an institutionalised practice. Mukhe
rjee (1987) states that prior to the emergence of the Britsh, the Rajbansis used
to have a single egalitarian structure. The intrusion of the market had a disas
trous effect and many erstwhile jotedars were reduced to the status of marginal
peasants in bondage. THE migrant Chotanagpur tribes gained a strong footing into
the region through the Krishak Sabha and the Communist dominated Tea Garden Tra
de Union. “The Krishak Sabha did not contemplate bringing about structural change
in the feudal system—it was merely trying to get better share of produce for the m
arginalised peasant a better share of the produce, and where he was being denied
a share of the surplus land, it tried to give a patch of land, even if need be,
by force.” (Mukherjee: 1978: 81) The question then arises who are these marginali
sed peasants mentioned time and again? Personal field visits while guiding resea
rch scholars proved that a majority of the so-called ‘peasants’ involved in the upri
sing were the migrant tribal labourers many of whom got employed in the tea gard
ens and did share-cropping seasonally. Some of them also acquired land permanent
ly for cultivation. Now the question that arises is: who are these peasants and
peasant leaders who have been repeatedly praised for their active role in the mo
vement? As already indicated, the main skirmishes that started the agitation inv
olved tea garden labourers and migrant tribes of Chotanagpur, who dwelt on the f
ringes of the plantations. It will be a misnomer to term them as peasants; they
were mostly plantation workers. Unfortunately, the main figures of the local mov
ement—Charu Mazumdar, Kanu Sanyal and Jangal Santal were similarly all immigrants.
While Charu Mazumdar came from an affluent Bengali peasant background and lived
in the adjoining town called Siliguri, Kanu Sanyal was a high-caste Bengali ref
ugee. Jangal Santal too was a migrant tribal leader. All of them were trade unio
n leaders of the tea gardens and had nothing to do with the peasantry. There wer
e several other Bengali middle class people involved in the movement, a majority
of whom too were refugees from erstwhile East Pakistan or Bangladesh. It is not
that there were no Rajbansi adhiars and jotedars involved in the movement, but
they were sporadic individual cases. Our field survey revealed that many of the
Rajbansis who participated in the uprisal were Bangladeshi refugees. Also, many
of the Rajbansi adhiars (sharecroppers) also sided with the Rajbansi jotedars du
ring the height of the movement. No wonder Jangal Santal, the Communist leader,
lost in the election from the area in 1967. The votes got polarised on ethnic li
nes. The Naxalbari movement created an ethnic divide similar to the Tebhaga move
ment in the neighbouring region where even the middle-peasants or small tribal j
otedars joined the anti-landlord movement (led by the migrant tribals or adivasi
s), resulting in an
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‘adivasi’ mobilisation on ethnic lines rather than pure class antagonism (as stated
by Sharit Bhowmik: 1986). Hence it will be wrong to brand the Naxalbari movement
as a peasant movement. It was an outsiders’ movement whose main intention was to
grab lands of the indigenous Rajbansis. In no way was the movement based on agra
rian class antagonism. Mukherjee (op.cit.: 1987) writes that ethnic antagonism g
ot consolidated among the tribal adhiars as they felt discriminated by the Rajba
nsi jotedars as compared to the Rajbansi adhiars who enjoyed close social ties w
ith their masters and carried out many of the social activities like marriage an
d religious rituals together. While the Rajbansi jotedars and the Rajbansi adhia
rs could share water from the same well, the migrant tribal adhiars were debarre
d. Thus it makes it difficult to accept the Naxalbari episode as a class war or
an agrarian movement as proclaimed by the Naxalites. The so called class enemies
annihilated were mostly Rajbansi landowners. It rather led to a kind of ethnoci
de. This inherent lacuna mainly resulted in an early exit of the movement. Even
the Santals realised about the fallacy of the Naxalite leaders who were trying t
o take advantage of their hideouts. Naturally the movement could not sustain gen
uine mass participation by the tribals with a sense of solidarity. (Adhikari and
Bhattacharya: 1983) Today there is hardly any trace of the movement in the area
. Kanu Sanyal, a prominent leader of the movement presently lives in one of the
tribal settlements close to Naxalbari and is engaged in trade union activities i
n the tea gardens of North Bengal. It would not be out of place to refer to Rabi
ndra Ray (1988) at this juncture: “The first fact of this history is that it rests
on a myth, namely, Charu Mazumdar’s contention (offered much later than the event
, as also Kanu Sanyal’s Report) that in Naxalbari in mid-1967 poor and landless pe
asants had fought for political power and not for land. There is little doubt th
at apart from the mistrusted respect that these radicals received from the popul
ation, there were no on-going institutions of political authority.” Referring to S
umanta Banerjee, Ray also critiqued those who were reporting from the areas of s
truggles, viewing everything through the eyes of landless peasants. In some quar
ters, tribes have been depicted as peasants. Jaganath Pathy (1984: 43), for inst
ance, writes: “All the major tribes of India are actually peasant societies existi
ng within the broad political economy of the state. Their existence and motion c
an only be understood in terms of a class analysis of the societies and the arti
culation of the different modes of production within their structures.” Ramchandra
Guha similarly brands the Khasas of Garhwal as peasants (1989). It is feared th
at such a nomenclature will not be tolerated by the tribes themselves. There are
very few tribes in India who operate as underclasses within zamindari system. I
n most agricultural areas, though some of the tribes hold larger holdings, they
do not form a zamindari class. Besides, there is a substantial number of tribes
who are not into agriculture. This apart, the notion of peasantry is much more c
onstricted as compared to ethnicity or nationality. Peasants enjoy much lesser r
ights compared to the other categories. Bhowmik’s study on the Tebhaga
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movement, as already referred to, indicated ethnic mobilisations transcending cl
ass positions among the migrant tribals. IT is a pity that none of the communist
leaders raised a finger at the expropriation of the Rajbansi lands by the tea e
states—they are owned by the Marwaris, big business houses and multinational compa
nies. The tea estates also had 65,000 acres of surplus land. (Bonner: 1990) The
planters are much bigger landlords than the petty Rajbansi jotedars. Sarker (200
6: 160) has very clearly indicated the damage inflicted by the tea gardens in No
rth Bengal: (a) The tea planters of colonial and free India hardly invested any
of the profits of the plantation in the development of the region. (b) The capit
al formed out of the profits from the tea gardens did not in any way benefit the
local market; rather it dislocated the agrarian economy of the region and cripp
led the purchasing capacity of the people in general and of the tribe in particu
lar. As a cash crop, tea determined the price level of essential goods in the lo
cal market. (c ) These capitalists neither thought of nor encouraged an alternat
ive base of economic growth for the agrarian and toiling people of North Bengal.
Nothing has also been spoken about the vast stretches of forest lands which, we
re appropriated by the British during the colonial period. Also, no-body showed
any concern about the large areas of land acquired by the Army, Air Force and th
e Border Security Force. The Bagdogra airport and Artillery Training Centre in t
he region too has abrogated large chunks of land. The state itself has been a mu
ch greater oppressor than the individual jotedars. No government data is availab
le to establish the exact area under State control. A partial data of the govern
ment control in Darjeeling district as the following does provide some indicatio
n. It is apparent that more than 50 per cent of the district is under government
forests and tea gardens. In Hectares Total Geographical area 3,25,469 Net area
under cultivation 1,47,986 Area under Area Tea forest and others 1,24,574 52,909
Total Population 7,79,576 Per capita agri. land 0.19
Source: Directorate of Agriculture, Government of West Bengal (As referred by E.
Basu) It also needs to be pointed out that the urban oriented Naxalite leaders
followed the same Roman laws introduced by the British in the land revenue syste
m. They
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ignored the traditional corporate land tenure system of the Rajbansis who should
have been recognised as Scheduled Tribes. The leaders instead stuck to the 1953
West Bengal Land Acquisition Act leading to fragmentation of the lands owned by
the Rajbansis. This has turned their lives even more vulnerable and more so due
to the massive influx of refugees from erstwhile East Pakistan, migrants from B
ihar and Nepal. A rapid study carried out by Enika Basu (op.cit.) during 2006-07
revealed that Rambala village near Naxalbari has 20 migrant households out of a
total of 32– of which 12 are Santals. There are only 12 Rajbansi households. A ma
jority of the migrants are adhiars. (Rambala was originally an exclusively Rajba
nsi settlement.) It is no wonder that the area, which once harboured the Naxalit
e movement, has turned into a hub of the ‘Kamtapur’ movement and enjoys support from
Rajbansis irrespective of their class background. Hence it would perhaps not be
wrong to draw a conclusion that the Naxalbari movement was more of an ethnic mo
bilisation than an agrarian peasant movement. Mukherjee (1978) had indicated tow
ards the end of his article the need to undertake a thorough research to probe i
nto the true nature of the Naxalite movement in Naxalbari. It can be sensed that
he had serious doubts about branding the Naxalbari movement as a peasant moveme
nt and the outcome of a class war. REFERENCES Adhikari, A. and Bhattacharya, R.
(1983), “The Extremist Movement: An -Appraisal of the Naxalite Movement with speci
al References to its Repercassions Among Tribes” in K.S. Singh (ed), Tribal Moveme
nts in India; New Delhi: Manohar. Basu, E. (2007), “Change in Land Tenure System i
n Naxalbari Area since 1967: A Case Study of Rambala Village”, M.A. Dissertation,
Mumbai: TISS. Bhowmik, S. (1986), “Tebhaga Movement in Dooars” in EPW, May 31. Bonne
r, A. (1990), “Averting the Apocalypse”, Duke University Press. Chadha, V. (nd), “Low
Intensity Conflicts in India”, United Service Institute of India. Chattopadhyay, M
. and Ghosh, S.K. (1983), “Tenurial Contracts in a Peasant Movement Belt: Field Su
rvey Data on Naxalbari, Kharibari and Phansidewa Regions”, EPW, June 25. Dasgupta,
B. (1974), The Naxalite Movement, Bombay: Allied Publishers. Duyker, E. (1987),
Tribal Guerrillas: The Santals of West Bengal and the Naxalite Movement, New De
lhi: OUP. Guha, R. (1989), The Unquiet Woods, Delhi: OUP. Karlsson, B.G. (2000),
Contested Belonging: An Indigenous People’s Struggle For Forest and Identity in S
ub-Himalayan Bengal, Surrey: Curzon Press. Mukherjee, P.N. (1978), “Naxalbari Move
ment and the Peasant Revolt in North Bengal” in M.S.A. Rao (ed.), Social Movements
in India, New Delhi: Manohar. Mukherjee, P.N. (1987), “Study of Social Conflicts:
Case of Naxalbari Peasant Movement” in EPW, September, 19. Ray, R. (1988), Naxali
tes and their Ideology, New Delhi: OUP Sarkar, I. (2006), “The Kamtapur Movement:
Towards a Separate State in North Bengal” in G.C. Rath (ed.), Tribal Development I
n India: The Contemporary Debate, New Delhi: Sage.
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Whose democracy is this? Speech at Berkeley by Mr.Sunil Kumar,Editor,Daily Chhat
tisgarh, Raipur India. Bastar region of central India, the home of several primi
tive tribes, is suffering a bloodbath since the last several decades, more in re
cent years. While writing this, I am sure that I might repeat some of the detail
s which other speakers might have raised before I speak, at the same time it wou
ld be so totally incomplete to skip the context. I will try to keep the referenc
e to the minimum and reach to a level where I could say what I personally feel v
ery strongly. Naxalism in Chhattisgarh and in several other states was started b
y urban leaders who still call the shots largely from urban hide-outs. The gover
nments of the affected states and the center are totally governed by urban or ur
banized leaders and enforce an urban form of democracy. The fight against Naxali
sm is designed and executed by urban leaders of security forces. The conflicts a
re covered, analyzed and highlighted by the media, owned and run by another set
of urban people. What is most shocking is a huge casualty of people from the tri
bal communities, or as they would be called here – indigenous people or natives. T
hey are being killed in hundreds in Bastar alone, every year. Most of them are j
ust caught in the cross-fire. Their only fault was to remain a voiceless exploit
ed community since the inception of democracy in India. The height of their expl
oitation was well documented even in the pre-independence period and more so sin
ce then, by the writers of contemporary history, media and some of the more sens
itive people in the government machinery. They remained badly exploited by corru
ption in the government, harassed by political process, by democracy through its
different forms, by outsiders whocaptured their resources and by a state which
relentlessly pursued the principle of “eminent domain” to grab the forests over whic
h they had complete ownership. It is for this reason Naxals found a fertile grou
nd to enter and flourish. This might sound an oversimplification of the scene, b
ut as far as the tribal communities are concerned, this was probably the only fr
uit of democracy, or counter-democracy, they got to enjoy while doing nothing to
earn it. All they wanted from the urban rulers was salt and a bit of kerosene,
and now they get bullets, knives and explosives; torture and terror. I feel very
strongly that the tribal communities had been adding everything to keep the urb
an life better by saving the forests, adding nothing to carbon emissions, not ca
using another hole in ozone layer, and asking for only the common salt from urba
n society, the only commodity that linked urban communities with the tribal peop
le for centuries. They were getting this essentially by barter of chicken or oth
er more precious forest produces. And the different forms and pillars of urban d
emocracy, and ideologies have now given them massdeaths, uncertain life, humilia
tion, human rights violation and a dangerous future. In this new and small state
of Chhattisgarh the parliamentary machinery has failed politically to realize a
nd highlight the plight of people of Naxal and Salwa Judum affected areas. In Ch
hattisgarh, the two main political parties, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party an
d the main opposition party, Congress, are partners in launching and promoting S
alwa Judum. The so called people’s movement designed by these two political forces
under their urban or urbanized leaderships and with over-enthusiastic senior of
ficers.
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Salwa Judum is like a Frankenstein of urban democracy. I consider it a big failu
re or at least tragedy of democracy in this state that there was no voice agains
t Salwa Judum in the state assembly. A very insignificant vocal protest by the l
eft parties who have no presence in a 90 seat assembly, a small, very small sect
ion of media, which had no impact on the combined Herculean muscle power of both
the main political parties, could not stop Salwa Judum. Both the main political
parties are largely convinced that it is a war of tribals, and they too have to
fight it. The political understanding of the state is that without the active i
nvolvement of the tribals, the Naxals cannot be defeated. The huge loss of innoc
ent lives is considered an inevitable collateral damage! To many people in Ameri
ca, this may be familiar as a George Bush doctrine. But we have our own variant
back home as well as you can see. This blood is not urban, not elite, not of the
ruling class and has no voice. The names and faces don’t matter to the urban soci
ety and urban democracy, except as numbers in newspaper headlines. The judiciary
in India is almost necessarily made of urban society and a few of the judges wh
o come from deprived backgrounds, very quickly get converted to an urban elite c
aste and become arrogant enough to declare that no judge with self respect shoul
d declare their properties which is compulsory for all public servants. Such an
arrogant elite urban caste is responsible to maintain the rule of law and justic
e in this country. The judges who launch a suo moto legal proceeding in their ow
n courts when they get stuck in a traffic jam or find a railway platform not cle
an enough for them, found nothing wrong in the thousands of killings in Chhattis
garh within a few years. Not a single case of public interest was initiated by t
he judiciary of the state on its own, when newspages were overflowing with blood
. The judges of the state high court were busy in all these years to get a more
expensive high court premises, a lavish and palatial luxury in a state where mor
e than fifty percent of the population lives below the poverty line, and can eat
twice a day only after a huge subsidy on rice. Such a self centered judiciary i
s busy making its new paradise, and unable to think of an intervention to soothe
the bleeding wounds of the tribals. Another assault of urban democracy was from
the media. Very few newspapers and media organization could realize the complex
ities of Salwa Judum, and related issues. No media organization of any significa
nce allotted even a month of any of its journalists to study the state of affair
s in Naxal and Salwa Judum areas. The media of the state had very little concern
, except the routine news reports of killing of one side or the other, and usual
ly the innocent unrelated people. The so called mainstream media remained conven
iently noncommittal, noncommittal to such historical butchery. But the media was
not criticized by anyone, because media-watch has died down in India. Owners, e
ditors and journalists have almost no one from the tribal community among them a
nd so is the understanding of tribal tragedies in the so called fourth column. W
hen the political bosses and the government repeatedly said that anyone who oppo
ses Salwa Judum, is with Naxals or supporting their cause, almost no one in the
state media commented on it. We repeatedly compared this with the arrogant state
ment of Bush that whoever was not with the attack on Saddam, was with Al Qaeda.
But the liberal space for a difference of opinion is lost on the political canva
s of Chhattisgarhpolitics.
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This is the state of urban Indian democracy. I would also like to mention that h
ardly anyone anywhere mentioned the horrible memories of a similar movement like
Salwa Judum in the early nineties. In a part of Bastar a few political people a
nd a few overenthusiastic police officers had started and promoted a Mass Awaren
ess Campaign against the Naxals. When it died an early death, the police and pol
itical leaders could not save a single participant of that Jan Jagaran Abhiyan.
It is a painful but well documented fact in the state government’s records that ev
ery one of the campaigners was taken out of villages and killed by the Naxals, p
ublicly, one by one. There were hundreds of them who lost lives after calling of
f the campaign. We repeatedly raised our fears that once Salwa Judum would be ca
lled off, the government agencies and political powers could be equally incapabl
e of saving any one of Salwa Judum participants if Naxals decided on mass murder
s. That part of history, which is only a decade and a half old, is very convenie
ntly forgotten by all urban people. And now huge amount of money is flowing in t
o Salwa Judum or the relief camps established to accommodate people displaced du
e to this movement and Naxal-attacks on participants. Big pilferage in this mone
y has become another reason behind its continuation. Now I would like to come do
wn to the last pillar of democracy, which is not officially considered a pillar
so far. Social activists, human rights organizations and non governmental organi
zations etc. In the last five years we have witnessed a flood of them. They are
active on papers, in roadside demonstrations and run to courts with public inter
est petitions, giving voice to voiceless people. In Chhattisgarh the common perc
eption of this sector is of Naxal-sympathizers. This was generated with human ri
ghts organizations criticizing the government for even the first information of
the smallest human rights violation, but did nothing when Naxals killed people,
innocent people, dozens in one explosion. And when contacted, several of them ha
d to say that it is their official agenda to fight only against state atrocities
. This was unacceptable to the little political understanding of the people of C
hhattisgarh. They could not make the difference between violation by the state a
nd by the Naxal. The fine difference between the state and the other forces coul
d be accepted in some societies where these agendas are designed and drafted, bu
t not in an area like Chhattisgarh. Many years back, human rights organizations
lost complete respect in this state as a judicious sector. Now their movements a
re largely like convincing the converts. It is like religious chanting by the pe
ople of the same faith. I feel that the loss of credibility of a sector, which i
s so important to democracy, is a great loss. But I hardly see anyone trying to
change public perception. In a democracy, how can any democratic institution fun
ction with such total disregard to public sentiments? People could be ignorant o
f the finer aspects of democracy and human rights, but an insensitivity to their
ignorance, sounds very undemocratic. It is a great loss to the democracy that t
he civil society movement is detached from the common people. Now most of the pe
ople in Chhattisgarh don’t differentiate between a human rights activist and a nax
al-sympathizer. Such loss of credibility was taken to greater height, or depth,
by several social activists of national repute. Chhattisgarh government was blam
ed for suppression of freedom of expression when its agencies arrested an ex jou
rnalist with huge prima facie evidence of his working for Naxals, along with his
son. When I tried to explain the truth to such campaign to the so called nation
al media carrying that, I didn’t find a place in the ‘letters to editor column’. So th
e people in Chhattisgarh, which includes
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the media of the state, are a witness to the false propaganda which is doing mor
e harm to democracy while shouting for saving it. Such celebrity activists from
Delhi have further destroyed a democratic space, which was, and is, very much ne
eded as a safe-guard. I would also like to mention an endless criticism of the g
overnment for its action or inaction on the Naxal front by social activists and
others, even when the government itself is a victim. It is not only Chhattisgarh
which is suffering Naxal violence; at least half a dozen other states are also
victims of this attack on Indian democracy. A government of an Indian state is a
fter all a democratically elected government, answerable to the people, the judi
ciary, the Human Rights Commissions and other institutions of democracy. They ar
e a lot better than kangaroo courts and landmines that are on offer from the Nax
als as a better substitute. Governments didn’t start the fight with the Naxals, an
d demoralizing them endlessly, needlessly, and even baselessly at times, while i
t is losing its police personnel every passing day in blasts, is like defeating
the cause of democracy. This Maoist war, fought largely with landmines is not a
normal situation for the police or the government. The government could be bad,
its agencies could be making a number of mistakes, but at the same time this is
the only democratic tool we have, not the Maoist-violence. We recently carried a
n interview of Mr. Kanu Sanyal, the old Maoist stalwart who had started Naxalbar
ee movement from the state of West Bengal of India many decades back, and he now
condemns the Naxalism of today as pure terrorism. Naxals cutting throats throug
h endless kangaroo-courts are not taking the country anywhere except to an age o
f darkness. It was very shocking and painful to see Naxals demolishing electrici
ty towers and putting millions of people living in the jungles of Bastar, in dar
k for more than a week, killing the workers who had gone there to restore electr
icity. Probably none from the civil society movement spoke against it, till the
chief minister of the state pointed it out publicly and condemned the otherwise
hyper-vocal activists. How could the people of Chhattisgarh have any respect for
such people who select dead bodies to pay respect? The common people in urban C
hhattisgarh or the people who are a bit far from the Naxal violence have almost
no concern for the war-zone, and a whole community being crushed for none of its
fault. We are very often told by many of our readers that no one is interested
in news reports of Naxal-violence or tribals getting killed. Civil society movem
ent, which should have been doing some mass political education of people, has b
ecome irrelevant and untrustworthy to the majority of the people. I feel that su
ch an indifference to a great human tragedy among majority of common people is a
great danger to democracy. Urban people, who have a voice, are comfortable beca
use they feel that their turn would never come. In a nutshell, to close my state
ment I would like to repeat that through Salwa Judum all players of democracy in
the state of Chhattisgarh have either created a buffer of innocent tribals as a
human shield to fight Naxals, or have allowed this horrible thing to happen by
being indifferent to it, by over looking it while busy carving a new capital, or
palatial high court buildings. Some campaigners of democracy have also damaged
the scene by demolishing their own credibility. The history of future might witn
ess one day an apology by the people who are in the positions of democratic powe
rs today. It could be to the future generations of the tribals slaughtered today
, just the way stolen generations of aborigines are getting an apology in Austra
lia. In India tribal children are being used as child soldiers in hundreds by Na
xals, and could be in a small numbers by security forces. But most rulers of urb
an democracy would have preferred to have them as bonded child
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laborers, so no big deal for the urban and powerful society if tribal kids are l
aying landmines or carrying weapons. Various kinds of failure in different areas
of urban democracy, is killing voiceless people in hundreds who were very happy
and contended without this urban tool to rule. I don’t mean to say that they woul
d have been better without a democracy. But urban democracy and also the urban M
aoist violence have proved themselves totally insensitive to this non-urban part
of humanity. Could there be a greater urban-non urban divide? I might sound cyn
ical, but I would like to know, whose democracy is this? Sunil Kumar Editor Dail
y Chhattisgarh Raipur India editor.chhattisgarh@gmail.com www.dailychhattisgarh.
com
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Posted online: Friday , Jun 30, 2006 at 0055 hrs
In our tribal dialect “Gondi”, “Salwa Judum” means the “Path of Peace”. But this “Path of P
e” is becoming more often the path to bloodshed, destruction and displacement. Har
dly a day goes by when the media do not report brutal killings of innocent and u
narmed tribals deep in Bastar by this “peaceful” movement. Popular movements, as a r
ule, are anti-establishment, which Salwa Judum is not. With the exception of Pol
Pot’s Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, one cannot think of any other mass struggle in con
temporary history in which the state has played such a pivotal role. Now, in a f
irst, over 60,000 tribals have been uprooted from their ancestral villages and s
ent to live in makeshift camps. The state government views this an “unfortunate” but
necessary phase in the fight against Naxals. To me, it smacks of Hitler’s “Lebensra
um”—his effort to repopulate an area with pure-bred Aryans. There can be no justific
ation for displacing thousands of tribals from over 700 villages they have inhab
ited for thousands of years. No pragmatism can defy the fundamental and inviolat
e principle that it is the state’s first duty to protect the lives and property of
its citizens. The failure to do so cannot justify the uprooting of an entire pe
ople. I feel aggrieved, deceived and cheated when the present collector of Dante
wada, a tribal himself, tells a magazine, “either they are Salwa Judum or they are
Naxalites”. The third option of just going about the business of living no longer
exists for the tribes of Bastar. They must fight or die. When a correspondent a
sked the then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao how could he justify deployment of 3,
00,000 troops to Kashmir, he curtly replied that it is for the state to decide w
hat it takes to protect its citizens. He did not say that he expected untrained
and unarmed Kashmiri civilians to do battle with the militants. Here, instead of
tribals taking the law in their hands, the state has virtually handed it over t
o them. Instead of the state protecting its people, it has pitted untrained, una
rmed tribals against a remarkably sophisticated militant organization, in effect
, condemning them (206 according to official estimate but thousands if first han
d reports are to be believed) to their deaths. A large number of tribals kept in
the Salwa Judum camps now wish to go back to their villages. They are told that
they would be shot if they did. By whom—Naxalites or SPOs of Salwa Judum? That is
not made very clear. It is ironic that Medha Patkar should be fighting the disp
lacement of tribals in the name of development and Salwa Judum justifies it in t
he name of death. Why is this government so keen on keeping them in camps? More
than security concern, this has to do with the politics—and economics—of displacemen
t. Camps no doubt, are
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remarkably convenient incubators for the Sangh Parivar to indoctrinate thousands
of unsuspecting tribals. RSS-run Shakhas, I’m told by a correspondent of a leadin
g national daily, have already become a common camp feature as have Saraswati Sh
ishu Mandirs, Ekal-vidyalayas and Vanwasi Kalayan Ashrams. Furthermore, camps ha
ve given birth to their own peculiar industry: to sustain 60,000 tribals, the st
ate has budgeted a daily expenditure of crores of rupees in the form of food, he
althcare and education. As with every other government welfare scheme for tribal
s, its real beneficiaries are the middlemen. To maximize their profits, they are
only too happy to inflate the number of “refugees”—this is precisely what the hon’ble h
ome minister of Chhattisgarh called them. Naturally, the living conditions in th
ese camps is atrocious, and in direct proportion to the “refugees” desire to risk re
turn. Thus, hitherto united tribals stand vertically divided—in every habitat, eve
ry village and every family. The dense rain forests of Bastar, small, inaccessib
le villages inhabited by tribals (scared of or sympathetic to Naxalites) make in
telligence gathering well nigh impossible. Hence the oft-repeated abductions and
killings of tribals from the “well guarded and safe” Salwa Judum camps. The strateg
y should be to reclaim territory from the Naxalites and not to hand it over to t
hem. This cannot be achieved if the state thrusts the innocent tribals into the
illusory safety and comfort of these camps. To make matters worse, the state is
recruiting Special Police Officers (SPOs) mostly from surrendering Naxalites and
unemployed tribal youths of the camps. They are paid a monthly salary of Rs 1,5
00 and the state hopes against hope that one day these SPOs will move into their
abandoned territory for an eyeball to eyeball combat with Naxalites. The state
erroneously presumes that the SPOs are better than the armed forces, because the
later can differentiate between Naxalites and innocent tribals. But the fact is
that these relatively untrained, armed men with an almost blanket license to ki
ll, are busy settling personal scores, extortion and harassment. Reminds me of H
iteshwar Saikia’s SULFA (Surrendered United Liberation Front of Assam) which, in t
he not so long run, came to be more dreaded than ULFA. This has turned Salwa Jud
um into a campaign wherein innocent adivasis are being used as ammunition in a S
tatesponsored civil war. One of the most popular folk songs of bison horn Maria
tribes says is all: “Heaven is miles and miles of forest of Mahua trees and hell i
s miles and miles of forest of mahua trees with one forest guard in it”.. The most
famous and successful peaceful mass movement was our struggle for freedom led b
y the Mahatma. National historian Bipin Chandra postulates the concept of STS (S
truggle Time Struggle), describing the Gandhian strategy of freedom struggle. Th
e protagonists and supporters of Salwa Judum, as a mark of respect to the master
and pioneer of the most successful mass movement ever, should realize that afte
r the killing of thousands of tribals, it is now time to call off the Salwa Judu
m. It is unfortunate that our governance of tribal areas is mostly based on the
presumption of dichotomy between tribals and their habitats. It reduces tribals
to exiles in their own homes. It has also given rise to a new genre of environme
ntalism, that has become the greatest hurdle to the welfare and development of t
ribals. This, more than anything else, explains the profligacy of Naxalism in re
cent times—from less than 100 districts in 1995 to over 170 districts in 15 states
by April, 2004. Which is why, I have strongly supported setting up of a new ste
el plant in Bastar, resumption of Bodhghat hydel power project, construction of
Dondi Lohara—Jagdalpur railway line and most significantly, the enactment of new t
ribal bill already introduced in the parliament. The bottom line is—restore tribal
s of Bastar as masters of their own destinies.
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Debabrata Mohanty Posted online: Friday , Oct 31, 2008 at 2329 hrs
Bhubaneswar, October 30 : Taking a leaf out of the much-criticised Salwa Judum c
ampaign of neighbouring Chhattisgarh, the Orissa Government would start a simila
r scheme of deploying 2,000 armed tribal youths as special police officers in fi
ve Maoist-infested districts to fight the Naxals. Salwa Judum, an anti-Maoist mo
vement, was started by the Raman Singh Government in 2005 to bring the area domi
nated by Naxals back under government control. Chhattisgarh Police employ SPOs,
essentially tribal civilians who have been armed with .303 rifles. The Orissa ca
mpaign which is yet to be named, possibly due to the controversy surrounding the
three-year-old Salwa Judum, got the official stamp in a state Home Department r
esolution (No 47958 dated October 25, 2008) last week. The resolution says triba
l men and women in the age group of 18-25 years from Maoist-infested districts o
f Malkangiri, Koraput, Gajapati, Raygada and Kandhamal would be appointed on a c
ontractual basis for the first three years. Required to pass at least Std VIII,
they would be made to undergo training in arms and ammunition like a regular pol
iceman. As special police officers, they would be paid Rs 4,000 in the first two
years and Rs 4,500 in the third year after which they might be absorbed as sepo
ys or constables in the regular police vacancies, said a senior home department
official. “It’s just like Salwa Judum. They will be doing the same things that the S
POs in Chhattisgarh are doing. The aim is to let the tribals defend themselves a
gainst the onslaught of Maoists,” said the Home Department official on condition o
f anonymity. While a senior police officer posted in the Maoist-affected distric
ts said there was nothing wrong with Salwa Judum, Orissa Director General of Pol
ice Manmohan Praharaj said there was no ad-hocism in Orissa Government’s plan of r
ecruiting tribal youths unlike the Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh. “The SPOs are not
extra-judicial appointments and can’t be compared to Salwa Judum of Chhattisgarh,” h
e added. Orissa has seen the maximum casualties in Naxalite-related violence thi
s year among all the Naxalite-affected states with three daring attacks on the p
olice, including the one on Greyhound police of Andhra Pradesh whose motorboat w
as sunk in the Balimela reservoir of Malkangiri district in June this year. Thir
ty-eight policemen, most of them Greyhounds, died in the attack. In March this y
ear, the Supreme Court had expressed its disapproval of Salwa Judum formation by
the Chhattisgarh Government and giving them arms to tackle the Naxal menace.
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Joseph John Posted online: Thursday , Jun 25, 2009 at 2357 hrs
Now into its fifth year, controversial anti-Naxalite campaign Salwa Judum is tra
nsforming into a “non-cooperation movement” in the tribal Bastar region of Chhattisg
arh with its top activists changing strategy from direct conflict to creating aw
areness among tribals to isolate the rebels. Senior Congress leader Mahendra Kar
ma, a frontline anti-Naxalite campaign leader who stood with the ruling BJP in i
ts fight against the rebels, speaks to Joseph John about the changing face of Sa
lwa Judum. Salwa Judum observed its fifth foundation day on June 5. For the past
two-and-a-half years, there have been virtually no activities like rallies or p
ublic meetings on the ground in Bastar. What is the future of this movement? Aft
er serious thought, we have changed the decision on how to go about our campaign
against the Maoists. A new strategy has been worked out during the foundation d
ay meetings where it was decided that anti-Naxal campaign activists would visit
the villages and make the people aware that they should not extend any cooperati
on to the Naxalites. We don’t want any direct fight or conflict. We want to create
such awareness so that the villagers themselves will request the Maoists with f
olded hands: “Let us be, leave us to our conditions”. This non-cooperation campaign
is in its preliminary stage and is confined to few villages. It will be graduall
y extend to other Naxalite affected villages. What prompted Salwa Judum to chang
e its strategy? The objective of Salwa Judum is to isolate the Maoists and conti
nues to remain the same. Only the strategy and action plan to achieve this goal
has changed. Whether it is in Bastar or in West Bengal’s Lalgarh, Maoists thrive o
n support from the local people — who provide them food and shelter and also atten
d their meetings — either due to fear or other reasons. Naxalites cannot take a si
ngle step forward without local support. This campaign for non-cooperation is to
strike at the root of the problem and finally isolate the rebels. What went wro
ng with the previous form of Salwa Judum —which started in June 2005 as a spontane
ous movement against Maoists and later became controversial? As such, there is n
othing wrong with Salwa Judum. We, being from Bastar, are well aware about the N
axal network, their over ground wings functioning in the guise of NGOs and other
so-called pro-people and human rights outfits — who enjoy considerable influence
in the media. While they unleashed a systematic campaign to defame Salwa Judum a
nd made it controversial, both the state Government and the anti-Naxalite campai
gn activists could not match their propaganda skills. I have no qualms in admitt
ing that the propaganda by the Maoists and their supporters was a complete succe
ss. Yet, Salwa Judum has been successful in challenging the authority of the Mao
ists and to a great extent uprooting their support base. The rebels retaliated w
ith violence and killings, putting the civil administration under tremendous pre
ssure. It was what the rebels wanted and they succeeded in creating an atmospher
e of fear. You mean to say that it’s the end of the road for the original form of
Salwa Judum? I don’t think so. It’s passing though a phase of stagnation as this peo
ples’ movement did not get the proper backing from the Government in terms of deve
lopment initiatives in Bastar. Any such campaign has to be promptly backed
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with development which has to be periodically reviewed so as to win the confiden
ce of the masses. Besides, Salwa Judum did not get unanimous support of all poli
tical parties. Being a top anti-Naxalite campaign activist, do you think that a
peoples’ movement — like the Salwa Judum — was essential to counter rebels in all Naxa
l affected states? As I said, whether it is in Bastar, Lalgarh, or any other reg
ion, Maoists always try to keep the local people with them, projecting themselve
s as their well-wishers. Every state has to ensure active involvement of the peo
ple — both in the campaign against Maoists as well as in development of the area — t
o bring about a change in the attitude of the people of the problem areas. Once
the rebels lose their core support base, it is the end of the game for them. Sta
te Govt records show good response to National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(NREGS) in Bastar. Did NREGS make any difference in problem areas of Bastar? Be
ing the implementing agency for centrally sponsored schemes, it is not a difficu
lt task for the state Government to claim credit for good work under schemes lik
e NREGS. Many such schemes are being implemented in non-Naxal affected villages.
As NREGS has proved its potential in generating jobs, an effort is required to
take such schemes to villagers where they are actually required. The state Gover
nment has to take development to the Naxal affected areas.
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