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Obama Surrenders on Settlements
By Ian Williams, March 1, 2011 Foreign Policy in Focus
Susan RiceThe recent U.S. veto of a UN Security Council resolution denouncing Is
rael's settlement policy is a tragicomic way for the Obama administration to aba
ndon its claim to global leadership. But that is what Ambassador Susan Rice’s “nay” vo
te on February 18 signifies. The battle for a rational foreign policy in Washing
ton has been over for some time. This veto represents surrender.
In George W. Bush’s days, such a veto would have been much less fraught. No one wo
uld have expected any better from that administration. And the erosion of U.S. e
conomic, military, and diplomatic leverage, although underway, had not been made
manifest. In those days, the United States did not pretend to care what the res
t of the world thought, and there was even less that anyone else could do about
it.
How things have changed! The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan might not represent de
feat but they are Pyrrhic victories at best, with huge military, financial, and
political costs. At the same time, the self-inflicted financial disaster has cer
tainly dulled the luster of the U.S. economic model as the U.S. global position
is crumbling BRIC by BRIC.
Across the Middle East, popular uprisings are removing the kleptocrats whose com
pliance with U.S. policy could be bought. They are also empowering a citizenry w
hose visceral reaction to U.S. support of Israel is on a par with African reacti
on to U.S. backing of South Africa’s former Apartheid regime. Indeed, the ouster o
f Mubarak removed one of the main U.S. levers on the Palestinians. Although Obam
a did not go to the aid of his ally, his hesitation, influenced by pro-Israeli i
nterests, hardly garnered much street credibility in the region.
This veto also dramatically overturns the pledges that Obama made in his Cairo a
nd Istanbul speeches about a renewed relationship with the Arabs and Muslims in
the region. It not only abandons the Palestinians, it also abandons those Israel
is who had been fighting for a peace settlement and the growing number of Americ
an Jews who have been combating Likudnik belligerence.
U.S. and Israel Isolated
The United States defied no fewer than 130 nations who had sponsored the resolut
ion. Those voting for it included France, India, Germany, Brazil, the United Kin
gdom, and even Colombia. Given its desperate attempts to avert the resolution, t
he administration cannot claim ignorance of the significance of the vote or, ind
eed, the consequences of the veto.
The force with which UN Ambassador Rice attacked the Israeli settlement policy i
n her explanation of the U.S. vote was perhaps designed to mitigate the internat
ional effect of the veto. But it did nothing for U.S. standing, since it simply
highlighted the surrender to Netanyahu, who ignored Rice’s stern admonitory statem
ent with the same insouciance that he has brushed off Obama’s pleas. For U.S. frie
nds and allies, the veto sent a strong message that Washington would ignore thei
r wishes and interests when tweaked by a powerful domestic lobby – and that U.S. c
oncern for democracy and international law does not extend to itself or Israel.
The veto also reveals how much the Obama administration s Middle Eastern policy
reflects the influence of the former Clinton administration. At that time, the U
nited States shifted from considering settlements “illegal” to labeling them “unhelpfu
l.” Also under Clinton, the United States abandoned support of international law t
o state that the way forward for Israeli-Palestinian peace must be by “bilateral n
egotiations.” After such negotiations in Oslo, Israel achieved the normalization o
f relations with much of the Arab, Islamic, and non-aligned world, and built set
tlements regardless. Palestinians gave up tangible international diplomatic leve
rage in return for an interminable process, a road map folded into a Mobius stri
p that circled around endlessly.
With most Palestinians realizing the inefficacy of armed resistance, the PLO beg
an to build its last line of defense: international law. The Palestinian mission
to the UN emphasized the corpus of UN decisions and international conventions a
gainst the occupation and the settlements. The parties to the Fourth Geneva conv
ention, the International Court of Justice, the UN General Assembly, all venues
where the United States had no veto, reaffirmed the Palestinian position.
Israel was deeply concerned by such moves. That is why, prodded by Israel, the C
linton administration composed the mantra now being recited by Obama’s team, that
in effect, international law could and should be disregarded, and the Palestinia
ns should cut a deal. Palestinian leaders have consistently pretended that the U
nited States was an honest broker, even as Washington kept strong-arming them in
to more and more concessions. Between the veto and the WikiLeaks revelations, th
ey can no longer pretend that this is so.
Wider Consequences
In the wake of the UN vote, the Palestinians will likely mount a more vigorous c
ampaign for world public opinion, which will throw Washington’s subservience to Is
raeli interests into greater relief. At the UN, speaker after speaker, even the
British, looked forward to welcoming Palestine as a member state by this Septemb
er. In a polite way, U.S. allies were throwing down the gauntlet for another con
frontation with Washington.
Israel, meanwhile, finds itself in a more fragile position. If it rejects the ne
w Palestinian state, it will be much more vulnerable to calls for international
sanctions, boycotts, and divestments. Significantly, the EU is a much more signi
ficant trading partner than the United States, and European publics are signific
antly more inclined to such measures. So, European politicians will find themsel
ves squeezed between pressure from the public to further isolate Israel and pres
sure from the United States to back off. After the flotilla conflict with Turkey
, Israel has lost whatever friends it has in the Muslim world. There is little p
rospect of Arab forces marching on Tel Aviv, but clearly the peace is about to g
et even colder, with less cooperation on policing the border between Gaza and Eg
ypt and even more pressure for a regional nuclear free zone.
The Palestinians can, and very likely will, take up other options to isolate the
United States and Israel. It could reconvene the meeting of signatories to the
Geneva Convention, or more tellingly, it could reconvene the Emergency General A
ssembly under the Uniting for Peace resolution that the United States moved to b
ypass the Soviet veto during the Korean War. That session is currently adjourned
, but it would once again emphasize the U.S. isolation.
The more the United States is isolated in its unqualified defense of Israel, the
less amenable governments in the region will be to cooperation with Washington,
except when it clearly meets their own interests. The future of U.S. military b
ases in the region – in Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait – will for instance become more tenuou
s. On a wider level, Obama has lost much of the ground for public diplomacy he h
ad seized when he replaced George W. Bush.
The veto – combined with the tepid and belated response to Egypt, Tunisia, and Bah
rain – has also complicated U.S. response to the emerging civil war in Libya. Gadd
afi’s regional unpopularity would likely ensure some local cooperation in enforcin
g a no-fly zone, for instance. But even if it went ahead, it would leave the wor
ld with the big question: why does the United States fly to stop hundreds of Lib
yans being killed from the air, but supplies the planes, drones, bombs, and shel
ls for Israel to kill a thousand Palestinians? Regional public opinion, now poli
tically important, is as likely to assume that U.S. sorties against Libya were f
lown on behalf of Israel as much as to support Libyan protestors.
Senior Foreign Policy In Focus analyst Ian Williams is a journalist and author.
Much of his work can be found on his blog, Deadline Pundit