Professional Documents
Culture Documents
This OBJECTION serves as the 21 day “SAFE HARBOR” provision of Rule 11, of the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring Plaintiff to give notice of an offending paper,
writing, or contention that is unwarranted by existing law, unwarranted on the evidence, or for
being matters immune from this proceeding, or for being matters that are irrelevant and
immaterial to this civil action. Therefore, to provide Counsel with an opportunity to withdraw,
1. On the 10th day of February, 2011, the Plaintiff did receive the Motion To Dismiss of the
2. When reviewing the Memorandum In Support of Motion to Dismiss, footnote #4, (pages 3-
4), of the Memorandum does introduce irrelevant and immaterial matters that are collateral
and unconnected to anything alleged in the EEOC investigation, or the complaint, and the
Defendant has not claimed these matters were its reasons to deny wage earning opportunity
1
to Plaintiff. In addition, the claim that Defendant informed Plaintiff that he was passed-up
3. By reference to irrelevant and immaterial matters, the Defendant has brought prejudice to this
proceeding, the Defendant intends to obstruct the administration of justice in this action, and
Defendant intends to prejudice the mind of the Court against the Plaintiff.
document that is not represented by the person asserting it; therefore, by authority of
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure (MRCP) 26.07, Plaintiff has no obligation to respond to
any unsigned or unverified statement not certified by the person asserting it; therefore, this
Memorandum is incompetent evidence that cannot represent the truth of the matter asserted
Radloff v. First American Natl. Bank, (MN App. 1991) 470 N.W.2d 154, 156-157.
workers compensation claim, and Defendant has not alleged that this claim is the reason for
denying wage earning opportunity to Plaintiff. Therefore, this Exhibit is without foundation
under MRCP 26.02(a), and this exhibit is a violation of 176.82(1) and creates another claim
against the Defendant State v. Phillip Morris Inc., (MN App. 2000) 606 N.W.2d 676, 690.
6. To Demonstrate matters immune due to being the work product privilege of Plaintiff,
(Exhibit F) is a matter still pending before the Administrative Review Board, of the USDOL,
and this matter is hereby exempt Henry v. Champlain Enterprises Inc. (U. S. Dist. 2003) 21
F.R.D. 73, 87-92; State v. Phillip Morris Inc., (MN App. 2000) 606 N.W.2d 676, 690.
Circuit Court Of Apeals, in May 2010, which is two years and 6 months after the Defendant
2
denied wage opportunity to Plaintiff; therefore, the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of Plaintiff are immune and cannot lead to discovery of admissible
evidence State v. Phillip Morris Inc., (MN App. 2000) 606 N.W.2d 676, 690.
8. To demonstrate matters exempt due to being the work product privilege of Plaintiff, (Exhibit
years and 4 months after Defendant denied wage opportunity to Plaintiff; therefore, this
exempt proceeding is unconnected to this case, and cannot lead to discovery of admissible
evidence Henry v. Champlain Enterprises Inc. (U. S. Dist. 2003) 21 F.R.D. 73, 87-92.
9. To demonstrate matters exempt due to being the work product privilege of Plaintiff, (Exhibit
L to Exhibit O) is a matter pending before the U. S. District Court, which occurred 1 year and
5 months after Defendant refused wage earning opportunity to Plaintiff; therefore, the mental
impressions, opinions, conclusions, or legal theories of Plaintiff are immune, and cannot
illuminate a legitimate reason to deny wage earning opportunity to Plaintiff State v. Phillip
10. To demonstrate matters exempt due to being the work product privilege of Plaintiff, (Exhibit
P to Exhibit S) is a matter pending before the Scott County District Court, which occurred 2
years and 8 months after Defendant refused wage earning opportunity to Plaintiff; therefore,
the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of Plaintiff are immune, and
cannot lead to discovery of admissible evidence State v. Phillip Morris Inc., (MN App. 2000)
11. As a result of all aforesaid Exhibits, Defendant has failed to demonstrate any legitimate
foundation for introduction of said Exhibits, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that said
exhibits are generally known by the Defendant, and no sworn affidavit from the (unknown)
3
person who searched and found said exhibits so as to certify that said exhibits were not
altered or edited, and to certify said exhibits are capable of accurate and ready determination
Ritchie, (9th Cir. 2003) 342 F.3d 903, 907-909; Franks v. Delaware, (S. Ct. 1978)438 U. S.
154, 158-160, 164-165; Illinois v. Gates, (S. Ct. 1983) 462 U. S. 213, 228-230.
12. As a result, since the unidentified person who learned, discovered, and obtained possession
of these Exhibits have failed to demonstrate its veracity and its relevance to this proceeding,
the “work product doctrine,” the doctrine of “incorporation by reference,” the doctrine of
“basis of knowledge,” and the doctrine of “judicial notice” cannot support the introduction,
or the consideration, of any aforesaid Exhibit for any purpose in this case U. S. v. Ritchie, (9th
Cir. 2003) 342 F.3d 903, 907-909; Franks v. Delaware, (S. Ct. 1978)438 U. S. 154, 158-160,
164-165; State v. Phillip Morris Inc., (MN App. 2000) 606 N.W.2d 676, 690.
13. By the introduction of collateral matters (Exhibits, A-S) unconnected to this proceeding, the
Defendant has engaged in “bad faith” to prejudice to the administration of justice herewith;
because, said collateral matters are unwarranted by existing law Roadway Express v. Piper,
14. Therefore, Counsel for the Defendant is afforded the 21 day “safe harbor” provision of Rule
11, to withdraw, remove, or correct footnote 4, and Defendant has 21 days before the
hearing, on 3/10/11, to withdraw the exhibits that are unwarranted by existing law, and
By: _________________________________________
Joshua J. Israel / Plaintiff-Pro-se
X. X. xxx XXX
SXXXXX, XX XXXXX
4
STATE OF MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT
vs. Complaint
Wrongful Discharge
FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEMS INC.,
Defendant. Judge, ______________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
PROOF OF SERVICE
Plaintiff, Joshua J. Israel, certifies that a copy of his 1st Amended Complaint, his Motion To
Amend Complaint, his Objection to Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss, and Objection to
Defendant’s Evidentiary Exhibits are served to the Defendant, and Defendant’s Counsel, by
placing said Motions and Complaint in an envelope, addressed to said counsel, and delivered to
said counsel, by first class mail through the U. S. Postal Service, on the 16th day of February,
2011, at the address listed below:
By: ____________________________________
Joshua J. Israel / Plaintiff-Pro-Se
5
STATE OF MINNESOTA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
TO: the DEFENDANT, FEDEX Ground Package Systems, and Clerk of Court.
NOTICE OF MOTION
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 10, 2011, at 9:00 A. M., in reply to the
must be present at a hearing, scheduled by Defendant, and the opportunity to be heard and to
defend, of Plaintiff, must include a Motion For Leave To Amend the original Complaint.
Pursuant to Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15.01, this Motion for Leave to Amend
resolve discrepancy issues, and to fulfill the “fact-finding” and “issue-forming” functions of Rule
15.01. In addition, this motion is fair to both parties because the court calendar in this action will
NOT be disturbed, and neither party will be prejudiced by delay; and, this reply is served and
By: ____________________________________
Joshua J. Israel / Plaintiff-Pro-Se
6
STATE OF MINNESOTA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
moves the court for leave to amend his original complaint, filed herewith, due to notice from the
Defendant, FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEMS, INC., regarding errors in the original
complaint, and regarding corrections necessary to adequately Answer the complaint, and to
15. On the 8th day of February, 2011, Plaintiff received an information statement from the
Defendant detailing a proposed calendar in this action, and Defendant noted that its true
name is FEDEX Ground Package System, Inc.; therefore, Plaintiff moves the Court for leave
16. On the 10th day of February, 2011, Plaintiff received the Motion to Dismiss of the Defendant,
with a supporting Memorandum of Law, and with numerous Evidentiary Exhibits to support
the Motion To Dismiss. Consequently, the Defendant did set forth errors and discrepancies
that made the original complaint insufficient for Defendant to Answer. Therefore, Plaintiff
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17. The Defendant found that the complaint had several date errors, therefore, Plaintiff moves
the Court for Leave to Amend the pleadings to correct said errors in date and time.
18. The Defendant claimed that Plaintiff did make an admission on findings made by the EEOC
to agree that Plaintiff was not an employee of Defendant; however, since Plaintiff did NOT
make such admission, and since the EEOC officially determined that it could not conclude
that there was a violation of its statute (CA-3), Plaintiff must clarify the words in his
pleadings to demonstrate a rebuttal of EEOC evidence. Therefore, Plaintiff moves the Court
19. The Defendant raised the issue of Statute of Limitations, and demonstrated that the two year
limitation for intentional torts has expired and that this action is time-barred; however, since
the Defendant has used this excessive delay process, of the EEOC, to its advantage, the
20. Moreover, the mandate from the Minnesota Supreme Court has declared that the Statute of
Limitations begins to run, on an employment discrimination claim, at the time the employer
gives the employee Notice of termination; and, if the job termination and the Notice of
employment termination are two separate events, the statute of limitation begins to accrue on
the date of Notice of employment termination; because, the employer could change its mind,
and decide not to terminate the employee Turner v. IDS Financial Services, (MN S. Ct. 1991)
21. As a result, since the Defendant has claimed that Plaintiff is Not its employee; and therefore,
since Defendant has NOT given Notice of termination, the statute of limitations begins to
accrue when this Court determines that Plaintiff was the employee of Defendant, and the
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given to Plaintiff. Therefore the Statute of Limitations in this action will begin to accrue
22. To assist this court in making its determination upon said employment relationship, the
relationship does exist, and Plaintiff has set forth pleadings demonstrating that the adverse
employment action and the Notice of termination are two separate events; therefore, Plaintiff
23. The Defendant has claimed that Plaintiff has failed to plead or has failed to allege that he was
that Plaintiff has failed to establish that his statutorily protected activity is connected to the
employer’s conduct. Therefore, Plaintiff moves the Court for leave to Amend the complaint,
and to set forth allegations demonstrating that statutorily protected conduct is connected to
24. Since the Defendant has demonstrated that Count 2 in the complaint is an error that is
unsupported by law, Plaintiff has eliminated Count 2 in the complaint; therefore, Plaintiff
25. Wherefore, Plaintiff pleads with the Court for Leave to Amend the complaint, and to accept
By: ___________________________________
Joshua J. Israel / Plaintiff-Pro-Se
X. X. XXX xxx, SXXXXXX, XX XXXXX
9
STATE OF MINNESOTA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
vs. ORDER
FOR LEAVE
FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEMS, INC., TO AMEND COMPLAINT
Defendant.
_____________________________________________________________________________
The above entitled matter having come forward for hearing before the undersigned Judge
of the First Judicial District Court, of Scott County, for the Motion of Plaintiff to Amend the
original complaint.
The PLAINTIFF, Joshua J. Israel, appeared pro-se. Andre Lamere and Nadge Souvenir
from Maston Edelman Borman & Brand, LLP appeared on behalf of Defendant, FEDEX
The Court having read and taking notice of the Amended pleadings and have heard
arguments of Plaintiff, and the arguments of Defendant’s counsel, and being duly advised in the
1. The Plaintiff’s Motion To Amend his original complaint is hereby GRANTED for the
following reasons:
2. Plaintiff has demonstrated that the Statute of Limitations is dependent upon Notice of
sufficiently set forth, and this case controversy must be determined in further proceedings.
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4. That a Pre-Trial Order of an Administrative Law Judge requiring an employee to
participate in the Judge’s inquiry into evidentiary matters regarding the public safety and
welfare, or the public interest, on matters concerning a violation of law, is an adequate pleading
for statutorily protected conduct, under 181.932(1)(2), and such matters must proceed to trial.
5. That statutorily protected conduct has been established by the EEOC investigation,
where Defendant did Notify Plaintiff, through the EEOC investigation, of its true reason for
“letting Plaintiff go,” and thereby, statutorily protected conduct is connected to the Defendant, by
WHEREFORE, the Amended Complaint of Plaintiff is sufficient for the Defendant to file
its Answer thereto within (14) days from this hearing date, from the 10th day of March, 2011.
____________________________________________
The Honorable
________________________________
Judge of First District Court
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STATE OF MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT
vs. Complaint
Wrongful Discharge
FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEMS INC.,
Defendant. Judge, ______________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
PROOF OF SERVICE
Plaintiff, Joshua J. Israel, certifies that a copy of his 1st Amended Complaint, his Motion To
Amend Complaint, his Objection to Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss, and Objection to
Defendant’s Evidentiary Exhibits are served to the Defendant, and Defendant’s Counsel, by
placing said Motions and Complaint in an envelope, addressed to said counsel, and delivered to
said counsel, by first class mail through the U. S. Postal Service, on the 16th day of February,
2011, at the address listed below:
By: ____________________________________
Joshua J. Israel / Plaintiff-Pro-Se
12
STATE OF MINNESOTA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
vs. Complaint
Joshua J. Israel, did bring a Charge Of Discrimination against the Defendant, FEDEX GROUND
PACKAGING SYSTEMS, INC., and where Defendant failed to give warning prior to denying
wage earning opportunity to Plaintiff, and where Defendant failed to give notice after taking
adverse action against Plaintiff; and then, Defendant did wait 28 months before giving notice of
employment termination. Since the EEOC investigation is statutorily protected activity that is
connected to the Defendant, Plaintiff will set forth pleadings for relief from wrongful discharge,
PARTIES
26. Plaintiff, Joshua J. Israel, is a Minnesota Resident who resides at the address of X. X. xxx
xxx, xxx xxx xxxxx xxxx, xxxxxx, xx xxxxx, xx. xxx-xxxx-xxxxx xxx.
27. Defendant, FEDEX GROUND, is a parcel package courier company, where its principle
place of business is at the address of 5800 12th Ave. East, Shakopee, MN 55379, Ph. (952)
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
28. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, pursuant to Minn. Stat. 363A.33(6)
29. This action arose in Scott County, Minnesota, at the Defendant’s Shakopee, Minnesota,
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
30. Since the deprivation of the wage earning opportunity, and the actual notice of employment
termination, are two separate events; and, since Defendant did not change its mind about its
adverse action, Plaintiff did receive notice of employment termination on the 19th day of
August, 2010, and the (2) year statute of limitation began to run theretofore Turner v. IDS
31. At all times herewith, the Defendant has engaged in ambiguities and deceptive practices that
32. Plaintiff responded to an employment job advertisement placed in the Star Tribune
Newspaper, this job opportunity was posted by FEDEX Ground, Plaintiff was greeted by
FEDEX Staff, Plaintiff used FEDEX Computers to apply for said job advertisement, Plaintiff
was interviewed by FEDEX Staff, and FEDEX paid for the drug test of Plaintiff.
33. Thereafter, Plaintiff was trained, tested, and qualified by FEDEX Staff who exercised control
over all pre-employment activity; therefore, Kelly Management Services is also employed by
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34. During orientation and training, Plaintiff was trained to believe that Plaintiff would perform a
service that is in the interests of FEDEX, where the physical conduct and employment
subject to the right to control by the Defendant; hence, the Defendant did control what was to
be done, how it was to be done, and the timing for which it must be done; as a result, and
Defendant Frankle v. Twedt, (MN S. Ct. 1951) 234 Minn. 42, 47-48.
35. On the 19th day of December, 2007, after failing to warn or notify Plaintiff of reasons for
denial of wage earning opportunity, the Defendant (Scott) did inform Plaintiff that his
potential courier services were no longer needed and we’ll see you next year.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
36. Since the Defendant failed to give Notice of termination, Plaintiff was compelled to assume
his denial of wage earning opportunity was either race or age discrimination.
37. Therefore, Plaintiff filed a CHARGE of DISCRIMINATION with the EEOC (CA-1) against
the Defendant on the 7th day of January, 2008, and the Defendant did enter its Appearance in
this action (CA-3), and did respond this Charge of Discrimination, on 6/8/2010.
38. After deciding that it was unable to conclude whether a violation of the statute had occurred,
this Charge was dismissed by the EEOC (CA-4); and later, the MDHR dismissed this Charge
39. After 28 months of delay, Plaintiff was contacted by EEOC Investigator, Andre Susan Taylor
on 6/8/2010, and during this first investigation interview, on 6/10/2010, the initial evidence
produced by said investigator was that Defendant said that Plaintiff was not its employee.
15
40. However, in rebuttal to said EEOC investigation, on 6/10/10, Plaintiff produced evidence
demonstrating that Plaintiff was greeted by FEDEX Staff for the first informational meeting,
in St. Paul, MN, that Plaintiff used the FEDEX Computer System to complete an
employment application in St. Paul, MN, on 9/25/07, then a 2nd application was completed
with FEDEX Ground, in Shakopee, MN, on date 10/1/07; and, Plaintiff produced additional
41. Furthermore, Plaintiff produced evidence that Defendant did pay for the (2) two pre-
and, that (the FEDEX employee named Wade) did report a problem with the background
investigation of Plaintiff that caused a (2) week delay in the training of Plaintiff. In addition,
Plaintiff reported that he had never met, nor was contacted, by anyone from Kelly Services.
42. After said rebuttal, and during the second EEOC interview, on 8/19/2007, EEOC
Investigator, Andre Susan Taylor, produced additional evidence that Defendant did inform
her that Defendant decided to deny driver job assignments to Plaintiff because of a telephone
call that Plaintiff participated in, on Friday 10/26/2007, and that Defendant did determine this
lengthy telephone call was so unprofessional that said telephone call warranted its denial of
driver job assignments, and that Defendant decided to let Plaintiff go.
43. In rebuttal to said Investigator’s evidence, Plaintiff brought forth evidence that Defendant,
Chris Costello, allowed the driver-trainees to take telephone calls during the training class,
and that Chris Costello did give such permission due to its short notice provided for the re-
schedule of training sessions; and, because Chris Costello’s short notice to re-schedule
training will interfere with the schedules and personal appointments of driver-trainees.
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44. In further rebuttal to EEOC evidence, Plaintiff brought forth that he was coerced to
participate in this official telephone call because the Defendant did re-schedule its training
(3) times, and Defendant gave only two (2) days prior notice of its re-schedule, and that this
short notice did place FEDEX Ground Training on the exact same day, and time, that
45. In additional rebuttal to EEOC evidence, Plaintiff brought forth that when the Judge’s official
pre-trial conference call did commence, Plaintiff did advise Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ), Thomas F. Phalen, that Plaintiff was at his place of employment; however, the ALJ
ordered Plaintiff to move to an isolated location where ambient noise would not be recorded.
In addition, Plaintiff did advise, Defendant, Chris Costello, that the telephone call was an
official pre-trial hearing before an Administrative Law judge, and that the ALJ required
Plaintiff to move to a quiet location, where others would not hear the conversation.
46. Moreover, in an additional rebuttal to EEOC evidence, Plaintiff brought forth that Defendant,
Chris Costello, did give permission to Plaintiff to complete the official telephone conference
call, Chris was advised that the telephone pre-trial conference concerned official matters of
public interest, and Chris Costello did allow Plaintiff to move to a quiet location.
47. Thereafter, in additional rebuttal to EEOC evidence, Plaintiff did produce evidence that when
the ALJ did finally conclude the official telephone pre-trial conference, Chris Costello did re-
schedule the driver road-test, of Plaintiff, for Tuesday 11/30/2007, and Chris Costello did not
48. In addition to EEOC evidence, Plaintiff produced evidence that he did report to Chris
Costello for the driver road-test, on Tuesday, 11/30/2007, at 9:30 AM; that Plaintiff did drive
the FEDEX courier van through the city streets of Shakopee, MN; and that thereafter,
17
Plaintiff did drive the FEDEX courier van through an obstacle course in Defendant’s parking
lot, and that Plaintiff did pass the Defendant’s driver road-test.
49. Thereafter, to rebut evidence produced by EEOC investigator, Plaintiff produced evidence
that on Tuesday, 11/30/10, at 11:15 A.M., Chris Costello, and Scott (?), did inform Plaintiff
50. However, on 11/01/2007, after an Owners Meeting was held, the Defendant changed its mind
about the Bloomington driver route assignment and Chris Costello, and Scott, did refuse to
51. In addition, Defendant, Chris Costello, and Scott, engaged in conduct which created the
of its true reason for denying wage earning opportunity, even after Plaintiff made (12) twelve
52. In disregard of said clear admission of reprisal for statutorily protected conduct, EEOC
Investigator, Andre Susan Taylor, did inform Plaintiff that his Charge would still be
dismissed (CA-3); however, before the Charge was dismissed, Plaintiff did request a copy of
the EEOC Final Investigation Report (which was refused), and Plaintiff did request a hearing
before an administrative law judge (which was refused), and Plaintiff did make an audio
Count 1
(Wrongful Discharge In Breach of Public Policy)
53. To establish a prima facie tort of wrongful discharge, it must be established that Defendant
(1) engaged in an intentional unlawful act to harm Plaintiff; that (2) Defendant intended to
harm Plaintiff; that, (3) the unlawful act did cause injury to Plaintiff; and (4) that there was
18
no justification for Defendant’s unlawful action; in addition, to establish wrongful discharge
in reprisal for statutorily protected conduct, Plaintiff must establish that (1) he engaged in
statutorily protected conduct, that (2) the employer is aware of the protected conduct and still
took adverse employment action against Plaintiff soon thereafter, and that there (3) is a
casual connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action Bersch v. Rgnonti &
54. Therefore, the protected conduct that Plaintiff was ordered to participate in (1) is set forth by
the Pre-Trial Order of ALJ, Thomas F. Phalen, requiring Plaintiff to participate in an official
Judicial investigation on evidentiary matters regarding the public safety and welfare, or the
55. This aforesaid protected conduct applies when a third party requests an employee to
inquiries, when requested to do so by a public body, or office, without fear that their
that the employee engaged in conduct protected by 181.932(1)(2) Bersch v. Rgnonti &
56. The Defendant’s (1) knowledge of statutorily protected activity is established by Plaintiff
informing Defendant, Chris Costello, that the official telephone conference call was a pre-
trial hearing before an Administrative Law Judge concerning matters of public interests, and
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57. The adverse action suffered by Plaintiff is a (2) denial of a job assignment and wage earning
opportunity, after Plaintiff did qualify to become a FEDEX Ground courier driver, and after
being promised a Bloomington, MN route assignment; and then, the willful refusal to inform
58. The (3) casual connection between the statutorily protected activity and the adverse action, is
the four business days soon after Defendant obtained imputed knowledge that Plaintiff
additionally, a casual connection is established by the one business day soon after the weekly
59. Since the deprivation of wage earning opportunity, and the notice of employment termination
are two separate events, (separated by 28 months), the Defendant did not change its mind
about its adverse employment actions, and Defendant decided to give notice of employment
termination to the EEOC Investigator, who informed Plaintiff of his employment termination
on 8/19/2010 Turner v. IDS Financial Services, (MN S. Ct. 1991) 471 N.W.2d 105, 108.
Therefore, another casual connection is established between the EEOC protected activity, of
Plaintiff, and the notice of employment termination, by Defendant, where the EEOC
Investigation, on 6/10/10, did inform the Defendant that Plaintiff has demonstrated an
60. As a result of aforesaid prima facie elements, when an employer discharges an employee for
reasons that contravene a clear mandate of public policy Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining
Corp., (MN S. Ct. 1987) 408 N.W.2d 569, 570-571, the employee has a cause of action for
20
wrongful discharge, and this clear mandate of public policy is set forth by the following
cause harm to Plaintiff, because Defendant was intentionally depriving Plaintiff of wage
earning opportunity (CA-5) and any prospective future employment; and because, Defendant
was deceptively and ambiguously terminating the employment of Plaintiff. In addition, the
Defendant did know that it was causing harm to Plaintiff because Defendant refused to
inform Plaintiff of its true reason for refusing wage-earning opportunity, after (12) separate
62. After (28) months of delay, the Defendant made an admission of a material fact that
63. Since the Order to participate in a telephone pre-trial hearing before an ALJ is statutorily
protected conduct that is connected to Defendant by imputed knowledge from Plaintiff, and
since Plaintiff had no prior notice of any prohibition to an official telephone conference call
from an Administrative Law Judge, and since Plaintiff had no prior notice as to the length of
the ALJ conference call, and since Defendant failed to give any warning to Plaintiff about
the Defendant is ambiguous, and suspicious, and any ambiguity in the notice and knowledge
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Railway Co. v. Blaylock, (Ark. S. Ct. 1915) 175 S.W. 1170, 1175-1177. Therefore, Defendant
is without justification for refusing wage earning opportunity to Plaintiff, and Defendant is
without justification to delay notice of employment termination for (2) years and (8) months.
64. Furthermore, since no other driver-trainee, who answered their telephone calls, suffered the
adverse action that Plaintiff was subjected to, the Defendant has made a clear admission of a
material fact that disparate treatment actions were taken against the Plaintiff, Johnson v.
Canadian Pacific Ltd., (MN App. 1994) 522 N.W.2d 386, 389-392.
65. As a result of said wrongful discharge, Plaintiff suffered $5,600.00 in denied wages; Plaintiff
suffered $2,800.00 in personal property losses, and Plaintiff suffered $620.00 in out of
pocket expenses. Since the Defendant’s actions were intentionally egregious, a triple sum
total of punitive damage assessments does bring the total damage claim of Plaintiff to the
66. Furthermore, Plaintiff moves the Court to Subpoena EEOC Records in this case, and to
Subpoena EEOC Investigator, Andrea Susan Taylor, for verification of evidence obtained
during her investigation, and for the reason to delay this matter for 28 months.
67. Wherefore, Plaintiff does plead with the Court for relief from wrongful discharge that has
By: ________________________________________
Joshua J. Israel / Plaintiff
XXX XXXX , XXXX xxxx xxxxx xxxx
xxxxxxx, xxx xxxxxx
(xxx) xxxx-xxxxxx
22
STATE OF MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT
vs. AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF MINNESOTA )
) SS
COUNTY OF HENNEPIN )
Plaintiff, Joshua J. Israel, have read this document. To the best of my knowledge, information, and belief,
the information contained in this document is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law, and
there is no issue of military service as to any of the parties.
I have not been determined by any court in Minnesota, or in any other state to be a frivolous litigant, and I
am not a subject of an Order precluding me from serving or filing this document.
I am not serving this document for any improper purpose, such as to harass the other party, or to cause
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation, or to commit fraud on the Court.
I understand that if I am not telling the truth, or if I am misleading or deceiving the Court, or if I am
serving this complaint for an improper purpose, the Court can order me to pay money to the other party,
including the reasonable expenses incurred by the other party because of the serving or the filing of this
complaint, court costs, and reasonable attorney fees.
______________________________
Notary Public
207-39-0/347097
23
STATE OF MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT
vs. Complaint
Wrongful Discharge
FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEMS INC.,
Defendant. Judge, ______________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
PROOF OF SERVICE
Plaintiff, Joshua J. Israel, certifies that a copy of his 1st Amended Complaint, his Motion To
Amend Complaint, his Objection to Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss, and Objection to
Defendant’s Evidentiary Exhibits are served to the Defendant, and Defendant’s Counsel, by
placing said Motions and Complaint in an envelope, addressed to said counsel, and delivered to
said counsel, by first class mail through the U. S. Postal Service, on the 16th day of February,
2011, at the address listed below:
By: ____________________________________
Joshua J. Israel / Plaintiff-Pro-Se
24