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A Comparison of U.S. Corporate Governance and European Corporate Governance

Abigail Barnett, Balasundram Maniam. The Business Review, Cambridge. Hollywood:Summer 2008. Vol. 9,
Iss. 2, p. 23-30 (8 pp.)
HOW MUCH PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN GOVERNANCE?

Audrey A Gramling, Dana R Hermanson. Internal Auditing. Boston:Mar/Apr 2008. Vol. 23, Iss. 2,
p. 38-40 (3 pp.)
Corporate Governance (A Special Report); Where the Action Is: Forget the audit committee or
compensation committee; The new hot seat on boards is on the nominating committee
Judith Burns. Wall Street Journal. (Eastern Edition). New York, N.Y.:Jan 14, 2008. p. R.3
Counting Progress: The State of Boards Five Years After Sarbanes-Oxley

Subodh Mishra. The Corporate Governance Advisor. Englewood Cliffs:Jan/Feb 2008. Vol. 16, Iss. 1,
p. 12-20 (9 pp.)
THE ANTI-SARBANES-OXLEY MOVEMENT: HAVE CORPORATE-GOVERNANCE REFORMS GONE TOO

FAR?
Hank Boerner. Corporate Finance Review. New York:May/Jun 2007. Vol. 11, Iss. 6, p. 39-43 (5 pp.)
Investors' best protection

Jeff Pittman, Omrane Guedhami. CA Magazine. Toronto:Mar 2007. Vol. 140, Iss. 2, p. 43-44,48-49 (4 pp.)
Who is being served?

Marcel Côté. CA Magazine. Toronto:Dec 2009. Vol. 142, Iss. 10, p. 56 (1 pp.)
Transparency and accountability

Christina Schoelch, Yves Nadeau. CA Magazine. Toronto:Mar 2009. Vol. 142, Iss. 2, p. 37-39 (3 pp.)
Challenges in enhancing enterprise resource planning systems for compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and analogous Canadian legislation
Vinod Kumar, Raili Pollanen, Bharat Maheshwari. Management Research News. Patrington:2008. Vol. 31,
Iss. 10, p. 758-773
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Citation style: ProQuest Standard
Document 1 of 9
A Comparison of U.S. Corporate Governance and European Corporate Governance
1 of 10 04/03/2011 7:34 PM
Abigail Barnett, Balasundram Maniam. The Business Review, Cambridge. Hollywood:Summer 2008. Vol. 9, Iss. 2,
p. 23-30 (8 pp.)
Abstract (Summary)
This paper describes the corporate governance models of both the United States and Europe. The shareholder model of the
U.S. and the United Kingdom will be compared on terms of recent changes, as instituted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the
Combined Code on Corporate Governance, and various securities exchanges' listing rules. The stakeholder model of
Germany and how it differs from the shareholder model will also be discussed. Many of the recent changes in corporate
governance standards are the result of regulation changes in the area of director independence. There is a call to increase
the independence of the board of directors and specifically the audit committee to enhance directors' ability to perform their
duties and protect shareholders' investments. These changes have stemmed from recent corporate scandals and it will take
time to determine how effective these changes are. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
References
References (20)
Indexing (document details)

Subjects: Corporate governance, Comparative studies, Changes, Regulatory reform, Public Company
Accounting Reform & Investor Protection Act 2002-US
Classification Codes 9190, 9175, 9130, 2110, 4320
Locations: United States--US, Europe
Author(s): Abigail Barnett, Balasundram Maniam
Document types: Feature
Document features: References
Publication title: The Business Review, Cambridge. Hollywood: Summer 2008. Vol. 9, Iss. 2; pg. 23, 8 pgs
Source type: Periodical
ISSN: 15535827
ProQuest document ID: 1617904701
Text Word Count 6096
Document URL: http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1617904701&Fmt=3&clientId=14119&RQT=309&VName=PQD
Document 2 of 9
HOW MUCH PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN GOVERNANCE?

Audrey A Gramling, Dana R Hermanson. Internal Auditing. Boston:Mar/Apr 2008. Vol. 23, Iss. 2, p. 38-40 (3 pp.)
Abstract (Summary)
Corporate governance has been a hot topic since the early 1990s, when several corp orate boards stepped forward and fired
their underperforming CEOs. Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed, it certainly feels as if the US business community is
more heavily focused on sound governance, reliable financial reporting, and conservative behavior. While some progress has
been made on the governance front over the past decade, Robert Monks provides a sobering reminder that corporate
governance in the US is far from perfect, especially as it relates to CEO power, executive compensation, and shareholders'
ability to nominate directors. As internal auditors support the efforts of the audit committee, the authors believe that it is
important for internal auditors to appreciate the broader governance landscape in the organization. This broad perspective
may influence how more specific risks and controls are evaluated and mitigated.
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Subjects: Corporate governance, Internal auditing, Chief executive officers

Classification Codes 4130, 2110, 9190
Locations: United States--US
Author(s): Audrey A Gramling, Dana R Hermanson
Document features: References
Section: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INTERNAL AUDITING
Publication title: Internal Auditing. Boston: Mar/Apr 2008. Vol. 23, Iss. 2; pg. 38, 3 pgs
ISSN: 08970378
Document 3 of 9
Corporate Governance (A Special Report); Where the Action Is: Forget the audit committee or compensation
committee; The new hot seat on boards is on the nominating committee
Judith Burns. Wall Street Journal. (Eastern Edition). New York, N.Y.:Jan 14, 2008. p. R.3
Abstract (Summary)
In addition to setting governance policies and evaluating sitting board members, these committees have the delicate task of
finding directors who will fit in well in the boardroom and satisfy both management and shareholders. Audit committees came
into the spotlight when the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act made the hiring and firing of a company's outside auditor their
responsibility, amid a backlash against corporate accounting scandals.
Full Text
(1637 words)
(c) 2008 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. Reproduced with permission of copyright owner. Further reproduction or distribution
is prohibited without permission.
If you can't stand the heat, forget serving on a corporate board's nominating and governance committee.
In addition to setting governance policies and evaluating sitting board members, these committees have the delicate task of
finding directors who will fit in well in the boardroom and satisfy both management and shareholders. Now, that work is
becoming even more complicated, as activist investors have gained more of a voice in the nominating process and
increasingly strive to impose their will on the selection of board members.
Other committees have taken most of the heat from investors in recent years. Audit committees came into the spotlight when
the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act made the hiring and firing of a company's outside auditor their responsibility, amid a backlash
against corporate accounting scandals. Compensation committees then drew attention, thanks to investors' complaints about
lavish compensation packages for executives.
Nominating committees are now headed for the hot seat. The pressure on them is building as new board candidates and
incumbents up for re- election increasingly are subject to rejection if they don't win a majority of shareholder votes cast, and as
shareholders push for the right to nominate their own board candidates. Richard Koppes, an attorney with the law firm of
Jones Day in Sacramento, Calif., who advises boards and companies on governance matters, says he's convinced "it is the
next committee in the spotlight." Mr. Koppes also is a director of two public concerns.
3 of 10 04/03/2011 7:34 PM
The nominating process has been evolving for several years. In the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley, U.S. stock exchanges adopted
listing rules requiring nominating and governance committees to be made up wholly of independent directors. That took much
of the power in shaping boards away from chief executive officers, who previously had driven the nominating process at most
companies. And in many cases it has given more of a voice to shareholders.
"It's really been quite a revolution in the boardroom," says Susan Shultz, a Phoenix-based recruiter for OakBridge Executive
Search International Ltd., and nominating-committee chairwoman for privately held Amazon Bank, also in Phoenix. "Now, the
CEO often isn't in the loop until the selection process is well under way."
While CEOs usually view other CEOs as ideal directors, nominating committees now tend to cast a broader net, seeking
diverse candidates with specific relevant experience, recruiters say. A study by recruiters Spencer Stuart based on corporate
data through last May 31 shows that at companies in the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index, some 33% of directors are
CEOs and other high-level officials, down from 53% in 2000.
"Consultants are being told [by nominating committees] to widen their searches, and that's a good thing," says William
Patterson, executive director of CTW Investment Group, an arm of Change to Win, a Washington-based coalition of labor
unions. He applauds nominating committees for looking "beyond the usual suspects" and seeking input from major
shareholders, which can solidify support for director candidates and prevent campaigns to withhold votes for an unpopular
choice.
American International Group Inc., for instance, now has its nominating committee meet with investors to discuss desirable
qualities for directors and to float the names of potential candidates. While disaffected institutional investors had assailed the
company in the past, complaining that its board was too beholden to management, Mr. Patterson says that with its new
approach the nominating committee hasn't picked any candidates objectionable to labor-union investors. AIG doesn't discuss
such matters publicly but it is committed to good corporate governance, says Robert Willumstad, chairman of the board of
AIG.
Some nominating committees are going so far as to recruit shareholders to serve as directors. Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International enlisted its largest shareholder, San Francisco money manager G. Mason Morfitt, for its board after its nominating
committee met with investors to discuss candidates.
"They asked me: 'Who do you think should be on the board?'" recalls Mr. Morfitt. His answer? "Me."
Mr. Morfitt's firm, ValueAct Capital Partners LP, seeks to hold big stakes in a few companies and put its partners on their
boards. Mr. Morfitt says ValueAct partners have seats on the boards of eight companies, which is about half the firm's
portfolio.
Governance experts say consensus seeking makes sense at a time when many shareholders have a new tool to exert
pressure on nominating committees: majority voting. Until recently, nearly all boards were elected by plurality -- those
candidates who got the largest number of votes were elected, or re-elected. That meant a board member could be elected
with a single vote, since there was rarely any competition for seats. But many companies now subject candidates to the
possibility of being rejected or dismissed from the board if they don't win the majority of votes cast by shareholders.
Two-thirds of S&P 500 firms had some form of majority-vote requirement for directors in place by November 2007, up from
just 16% in early 2006, says Claudia Allen, chairwoman of the corporate- governance practice at the law firm of Neal, Gerber
& Eisenberg in Chicago.
This tool is often blunted, though, because many companies give the board the final say on candidates who fail to win a
majority of votes. Shareholders in those cases are able to express their dissatisfaction with a candidate but can't force the
candidate's rejection. Ms. Allen estimates that of the companies that have adopted some form of majority voting, only about
38% require the rejection of a candidate who doesn't win enough votes.
For example, at Gen-Probe Inc., a San Diego maker of medical diagnostic tests, the board declined to accept the resignation
of board member Mae Jemison last summer after she failed to win a majority of votes for re-election. ISS Governance
Services, a proxy- advisory service owned by RiskMetrics Group Inc., had recommended that shareholders vote against Ms.
Jemison because she missed two of the board's four annual meetings in 2006.
Gen-Probe's board told major shareholders that it planned to reject Ms. Jemison's resignation, citing her faithful attendance in
prior years and her contributions to the board. Abraham Sofaer, who chairs Gen-Probe's nominating and governance
committee, cites what he describes as a communications mix-up that kept investors and ISS from receiving an explanation of
Ms. Jemison's absences before the vote. Mr. Sofaer says that because Ms. Jemison missed only one regularly scheduled
meeting in 2006, and had a pre-existing conflict that precluded her attendance at a rescheduled meeting, "it was clear to me
where we should end up."
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"I think we dealt with it very responsibly," says Mr. Sofaer. He adds that none of the major shareholders objected to the
board's call, and there have been no public protests.
"This is the way the process is supposed to work," says Patrick McGurn, special counsel at RiskMetrics Group. The attention
focused on Ms. Jemison's absences should prevent them from recurring, he says, resolving the matter to everyone's
satisfaction without ejecting the director.
A proposal by NYSE Euronext's New York Stock Exchange to bar "broker voting" could add a new wrinkle to director
elections, particularly at companies with a majority-vote requirement. The NYSE proposal would bar brokers from voting
shares they hold on behalf of customers who don't give voting instructions before a company's annual meeting. The Securities
and Exchange Commission has yet to act on the proposal, leaving in place votes that typically support a company's chosen
slate of directors. Any change, however, could shift the balance of power in future elections.
Broker voting was at issue in a closely watched "vote no" campaign against CVS Caremark Corp. director Roger Headrick,
who stepped down in July, citing personal reasons. Mr. Headrick received 56% of votes cast, a level that was reached only
because of broker votes, says Mr. Patterson, the CTW Investment Group official -- a contention he stressed to the nominating
committee.
CVS Caremark Chief Financial Officer David Rickard disagrees, saying brokers voted uninstructed shares for and against Mr.
Headrick. He says campaigns like the one directed against Mr. Headrick are making the job of nominating committees "way
more difficult than even five years ago."
Mr. Rickard views the campaign against Mr. Headrick as unwarranted and driven by unfounded claims of stock-option-
backdating abuses. Mr. Headrick says that those claims were groundless and that his resignation from the board "had nothing
to do with any of this."
Shareholder proxy access -- which would permit shareholders to place names of their own board nominees on company-
printed proxy ballots -- could pose other problems for nominating committees. A federal court opened the door to proxy
access in a 2006 ruling, saying the SEC failed to adequately explain its position that companies may bar shareholders from
considering proxy-access proposals.
The SEC responded last fall by affirming its stance that companies may block shareholders from considering matters related
to nominating and electing directors. Further legal wrangling is possible, as some public pension plans are seeking to have
proxy-access measures put to a vote by shareholders at Bear Stearns Cos. and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Richard Ferlauto,
director of corporate governance for the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, says the SEC's
action is a flawed, ill-considered move that won't withstand a legal challenge.
All the attention to board elections could start to affect the composition of nominating committees. Despite the growing
importance of these committees, directors have often wound up on them by default, not design. Ms. Shultz, the
Phoenix-based recruiter and nominating- committee chairwoman, says the nominating committee is "where directors who
don't have particular expertise typically end up."
That could change as the limelight requires directors who are comfortable playing a leading role. Says Mr. Patterson: "There's
greater conviction that the board matters, and the nominating committee matters, and the nominating-committee chair matters
and is key to protecting shareholder value."
---
Ms. Burns is a reporter for Dow Jones Newswires in Washington. She can be reached at judith.burns@dowjones.com.

Subjects: Shareholder voting, Appointments & personnel changes, Series & special reports, Nominations,
Boards of directors, Corporate governance, Committees
Classification Codes 9190, 2110
Author(s): Judith Burns
Publication title: Wall Street Journal. (Eastern edition). New York, N.Y.: Jan 14, 2008. pg. R.3
Source type: Newspaper
ISSN: 00999660
5 of 10 04/03/2011 7:34 PM

Document 4 of 9
Counting Progress: The State of Boards Five Years After Sarbanes-Oxley

Subodh Mishra. The Corporate Governance Advisor. Englewood Cliffs:Jan/Feb 2008. Vol. 16, Iss. 1, p. 12-20 (9 pp.)
Abstract (Summary)
Five years after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was signed into law, US corporate boards are far more independent
and responsive to the governance concerns of shareholders, though more needs to be done in some key areas, including
independence, leadership, and structure. What is most notable, however, is that boards have gone further than some
originally had expected by taking the initiative to implement key board-level governance improvements, or, more often, doing
so in response to such requests from investors. The primary focus of SOX was reform of the audit committee. Chief among
the legislation's goals was to ensure independent oversight of corporate accounts, as well as improved transparency and
disclosure, by requiring independent audit committees. While corporate boards have changed decidedly since enactment of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act five years ago, gaps remain, with diversity being one notable area where boards have remained
static.

Subjects: Public Company Accounting Reform & Investor Protection Act 2002-US, Corporate governance, Roles,
Trends, Boards of directors
Classification Codes 9190, 4120, 4320, 2110
Locations: United States--US
Author(s): Subodh Mishra
Document features: Graphs, Tables
Section: BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
Publication title: The Corporate Governance Advisor. Englewood Cliffs: Jan/Feb 2008. Vol. 16, Iss. 1; pg. 12, 9 pgs
ISSN: 10676163
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Document 5 of 9
THE ANTI-SARBANES-OXLEY MOVEMENT: HAVE CORPORATE-GOVERNANCE REFORMS GONE TOO FAR?

Hank Boerner. Corporate Finance Review. New York:May/Jun 2007. Vol. 11, Iss. 6, p. 39-43 (5 pp.)
Abstract (Summary)
6 of 10 04/03/2011 7:34 PM
Anti-SOX forces are mounting a vigorous assault on the numerous statutes, rules, and regulations adopted since 2002.
Count among them US Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson, a former managing partner of the New York-based
investment bank, Goldman Sachs; New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) CEO John Thain (also a former Goldman Sachs
banker); and John Thornton, chairman of the board of the Brookings Institution and co-chair of the Committee on Capital
Markets Regulation. The issues in focus will be shaped further in the debate by the powerful forces on all sides of the reform
issues. The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation set out thirty-two specific recommendations in its November report
framing four key areas for debate - these recommendations will be the focus of both pro-reform and anti-reform corporate-
governance interests in the months ahead. (In late July we will be entering the sixth year of the SOX reform era.) Some
reforms continue to be evolved through shareholder advocacy, with or without statutes or rules to empower their actions.
These are important to watch: There is no specific "law" to be repealed.
References
References (1)

Subjects: Public Company Accounting Reform & Investor Protection Act 2002-US, Corporate governance,
Criticism, Regulation, Accountancy
Locations: United States, US
Author(s): Hank Boerner
Section: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Publication title: Corporate Finance Review. New York: May/Jun 2007. Vol. 11, Iss. 6; pg. 39, 5 pgs
ISSN: 1089327X
Document 6 of 9
Investors' best protection

Jeff Pittman, Omrane Guedhami. CA Magazine. Toronto:Mar 2007. Vol. 140, Iss. 2, p. 43-44,48-49 (4 pp.)
Abstract (Summary)
Recent prominent financial reporting failures in several countries have renewed regulators' interest in improving corporate
disclosure by imposing civil and criminal penalties on auditors for issuing clean opinions on materially misleading financial
statements. Jurisdictions outside the US, including Canada, have begun enacting similar legislation as the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 meant to restore investor confidence in the capital markets. Importantly, the large private benefits of control that
accompany high ownership concentration stern from poor external corporate governance. Consequently, accounting
transparency plays a natural role in alleviating the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders given that the
expropriation of corporate resources hinges on these private benefits remaining hidden. However, recent evidence suggests
that mandating better disclosure standards to improve accounting transparency will be largely ineffective without surrounding
legal institutions that hold auditors more liable for materially misleading financial statements.

Subjects: Financial reporting, Accounting irregularities, Disclosure, Corporate governance, Accounting standards
Locations: Canada
7 of 10 04/03/2011 7:34 PM
Author(s): Jeff Pittman, Omrane Guedhami

Document features: Illustrations, References
Section: education
Publication title: CA Magazine. Toronto: Mar 2007. Vol. 140, Iss. 2; pg. 43, 4 pgs
ISSN: 03176878
Document 7 of 9
Who is being served?

Marcel C�t�. CA Magazine. Toronto:Dec 2009. Vol. 142, Iss. 10, p. 56 (1 pp.)
Abstract (Summary)
The fiduciary responsibility of a board of directors requires its members to act in the best interests of the company. This was
reaffirmed in last year's well-known Supreme Court of Canada decision in the BCE and Bell Canada case. The highest court
in the land ruled that when board members must decide between the interests of various stakeholders, they should be guided
by the interests of the company and all its stakeholders. Governance that is concerned only with minority shareholders is poor
governance, which unfortunately is what the Globe ranking reflects. The reality of every business is complex, and its
governance must take this into account.

Subjects: Fiduciary responsibility, Boards of directors, Corporate governance
Classification Codes 9172, 2110
Locations: Canada
Author(s): Marcel C�t�
Document types: Commentary
Section: Outlook
Publication title: CA Magazine. Toronto: Dec 2009. Vol. 142, Iss. 10; pg. 56, 1 pgs
ISSN: 03176878
Text Word Count 590
Document 8 of 9
Transparency and accountability
8 of 10 04/03/2011 7:34 PM
Christina Schoelch, Yves Nadeau. CA Magazine. Toronto:Mar 2009. Vol. 142, Iss. 2, p. 37-39 (3 pp.)
Abstract (Summary)
Regulations adopted by the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA), specifically Multilateral Instrument 52-109, set
standards that certifying officers of public corporations must comply with to ensure they have clearly understood and fulfilled
their public disclosure responsibilities. For some years now, the CSA has sought to harmonize its regulations with those
adopted in the US to avoid creating market difficulties and to maintain the quality of their own market system. However, the
harmonization of Canadian regulations has been delayed because the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted in 2002, constitutes
the core of the securities regulations Canada has tried to parallel. This delay, however, gave Canadians a chance to watch
what was happening south of the border and capitalize on their neighbors' experience. The result is increased responsibility
for management, especially the reporting entity's audit committee. The new guidance is basically premised on management's
commitment and a concern among companies with integrating internal control monitoring into their operations.

Subjects: Compliance, Internal controls, Regulatory agencies, Responsibilities
Locations: Canada
Companies: Canadian Securities Administrators (NAICS: 926150 )
Author(s): Christina Schoelch, Yves Nadeau
Document features: Illustrations
Section: ASSURANCE: NEW GUIDANCE
Publication title: CA Magazine. Toronto: Mar 2009. Vol. 142, Iss. 2; pg. 37, 3 pgs
ISSN: 03176878
Document 9 of 9
Challenges in enhancing enterprise resource planning systems for compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
analogous Canadian legislation
Vinod Kumar, Raili Pollanen, Bharat Maheshwari. Management Research News. Patrington:2008. Vol. 31, Iss. 10,
p. 758-773
Abstract (Summary)
This paper examines major challenges faced by companies in enhancing their enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems
for compliance with regulatory internal control requirements, specifically those imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of
2002 and analogous Canadian legislation. Data were collected through case studies of four medium-sized and large
companies that use ERP systems and that have operations in the USA and Canada, thus being subject to SOX and/or similar
Canadian regulations. The companies faced some technical, process and cultural challenges in implementing regulatory
control compliance. In all companies, existing ERP systems were not able to meet all control requirements without some
modifications or add-on applications. Control implementations have been long, complicated and costly processes, which are
not fully completed. Detailed analyses and documentation of existing systems, controls and processes were required in all
companies. The protection of systems security and the segregation of duties were perceived to be major technical
obstacles. Cultural factors resulted in additional challenges, notably resistance to change. The findings of this study enhance
the understanding of ERP systems design features, processes and challenges in implementing regulatory controls. As such,
they provide a foundation for further empirical studies and for building models of ERP systems effectiveness in implementing
9 of 10 04/03/2011 7:34 PM
effective controls.
References
Cited by (1)

Subjects: Studies, Enterprise resource planning, Public Company Accounting Reform & Investor Protection Act
2002-US, Compliance, Internal controls, Manufacturing resource planning
Classification Codes 9172, 9190, 4320, 5310, 9130
Locations: United States--US, Canada
Author(s): Vinod Kumar, Raili Pollanen, Bharat Maheshwari
Document types: Feature, Case Study
Document features: References, Tables
Publication title: Management Research News. Patrington: 2008. Vol. 31, Iss. 10; pg. 758
ISSN: 01409174
DOI: 10.1108/01409170810908516
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10 of 10 04/03/2011 7:34 PM

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A Comparison of U.S. Corporate Governance and European Corporate Governance

HOW MUCH PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN GOVERNANCE?

Counting Progress: The State of Boards Five Years After Sarbanes-Oxley

THE ANTI-SARBANES-OXLEY MOVEMENT: HAVE CORPORATE-GOVERNANCE REFORMS GONE TOO

Investors' best protection

Who is being served?

Transparency and accountability

Citation style: ProQuest Standard

A Comparison of U.S. Corporate Governance and European Corporate Governance

Indexing (document details)

HOW MUCH PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN GOVERNANCE?

Indexing (document details)

Subjects: Corporate governance, Internal auditing, Chief executive officers

Indexing (document details)

Text Word Count 1637

Counting Progress: The State of Boards Five Years After Sarbanes-Oxley

Indexing (document details)

THE ANTI-SARBANES-OXLEY MOVEMENT: HAVE CORPORATE-GOVERNANCE REFORMS GONE TOO FAR?

Indexing (document details)

Investors' best protection

Indexing (document details)

Author(s): Jeff Pittman, Omrane Guedhami

Who is being served?

Indexing (document details)

Transparency and accountability

Indexing (document details)

Indexing (document details)

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