Communitarian Realism

NIKOLAS K. GVOSDEV
The National Interest

This article argues that community-building efforts across borders are motivated by tradi-
tional realist concerns about security rather than idealistic beliefs in universal principles.
The creation of sustainable, cross-border institutions will come about because governments
recognize that they are unable to meet basic challenges without increased cooperation. The
emergence of common norms comes about through cooperation in coping with global chal-
lenges, not via the imposition of political systems or the exercise of hegemonic power.

Keywords: realism; international affairs; communitarian; foreign policy

Is a communitarian perspective on international relations really needed?

Those who style themselves as “liberal” or “progressive” internationalists might
be expected to answer in the negative. After all, they would argue, international-
ism is most likely to produce the type of global order that would be the aim of a
communitarian foreign policy: The development of the institutions and commu-
nal bonds required for establishing human primacy.
Yet although internationalists focus on establishing the primacy of interna-
tional law and institutions over domestic legislation and national governments,
communitarians understand that no global structure can endure unless it is based
on a convergence of interests. The constituents of any international order must
“buy into the evolving new global architecture because it addresses their inter-
ests” (Etzioni, 2004, p. 4). Indeed, as Amitai Etzioni (2004) noted in the intro-
duction to his new work, From Empire to Community: A New Approach to Inter-
national Relations, “A communitarian approach to international relations
concerns itself with the question of whether a group of nations can share a robust
common purpose and interest . . . without forming a community” (pp. 4-5). Tra-
ditional realism provides no answer to this question; it assumes that state actors
will assess whether the formation of a global community serves their national
interests. Communitarians, not surprisingly, would respond in the negative that
with time, the pursuit of shared interests should lead nations to form a global
community, just as the modern nation-state was forged from smaller political
and social units.

AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 48 No. 12, August 2005 1591-1606

DOI: 10.1177/0002764205278076
© 2005 Sage Publications

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But communitarians would agree with those who style themselves foreign
policy realists that lofty rhetoric about the unity of the human family is an insuf-
ficient basis for constructing an international order. And despite the existence of
international organizations and transnational associations, it is not axiomatic
that a global community qua community exists. Pang Zhongying (2002), of
Beijing’s Tsinghua University, made the case as follows:

It is necessary to draw the distinction between the concepts of “international com-

munity” versus “international society.” “Community” implies that its components
share many things in common, such as values, whereas “society” recognizes that,
while actors may have shared interests, there is no overarching common power or
universal standard. Former United Nations Secretary-General Butros Butros
Ghali has been a leading proponent of the notion of “the international commu-
nity.” I maintain that, at present, one can use the term “international community”
to describe something like the European Union, a community of nation-states
sharing common values, institutions, and procedures, but I do not believe that
Ghali’s vision applies to the reality of world politics. . . . I think that it is more use-
ful to conceive of global affairs taking place within the parameters of an “interna-
tional society” rather than an “international community.” (para. 1)

Nor can we assume that globalization and technological advances will lay the
basis for a new world order. The impact of the latest phase of the scientific-
technological revolution has helped to create what Zhongying has labeled an
“international society” by breaking down the geographic and communications
barriers that had fostered autarkic human communities in the past—but it is not
automatic that these trends will in turn create a single global community. As
James C. Bennett (2003/2004), an Internet entrepreneur and the president of the
Anglosphere Institute, observed,

Consider the visible effects of the current phase of the scientific-technological

revolutions: the Internet; the communication satellite and high-bandwidth fiber-
optic cable; fast, cheap intercontinental air travel; and all the rest. Even today,
these have brought geographically distant areas into close proximity for many
purposes. The acceleration of these technological and economic trends will
make this “tele-proximity” even more significant. Collaboration in all areas—
economic, educational, political—is becoming relatively easier at a distance. But
as the old natural barriers to trade and communication—mountain ranges, wide
oceans, and other natural barriers—no longer need be borders, the next most sig-
nificant set of barriers remains—differences in language, customs, legal sys-
tems, religions, and other significant values, and particularly things like trust.
(pp. 23-24)

In other words, the last set of barriers are precisely the ones that impede the for-
mation of communities. So, as Etzioni (2004) recognized, the first challenge
facing communitarians is to answer “the most challenging question of all: How,
if at all, might [a] global community come about?” (p. 5). 1

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One answer is to say that a communitarian foreign policy strategy grounded

in realism—a prudential and pragmatic approach to international affairs rooted
in concrete and achievable interests—is more likely than an idealistic approach
to achieve this end. Realism’s emphasis on making the world’s nations—partic-
ularly the great powers—stakeholders in a stable and predictable international
order intersects with the communitarian interest in constructing a viable global
architecture.
For some traditional realists, particularly American and British conservative
realists, the defense of national sovereignty is the prime national interest. Thus,
they would view the emergence of a global community with horror. Yet it is not
axiomatic that those who might consider themselves realists would, of neces-
sity, oppose the communitarian vision. Indeed, the emergence of a system of
global governance that effectively deals with transnational threats such as ter-
rorism and pandemics but safeguards many of the sovereign prerogatives of its
member states might be seen as a supremely realist outcome.
And to the extent that the national interest is served by participation in a
larger global community, then such an approach is perfectly justifiable by realist
criteria. Hans Morgenthau (1956) himself taught his students not to idolize the
nation-state as the final expression of the human political community, noting
that

while the realist indeed believes that interest is the perennial standard by which
political action must be judged and directed, the contemporary connection
between interest and the nation state is a product of history, and is therefore bound
to disappear in the course of history. Nothing in the realist position militates
against the assumption that the present division of the political world into nation
states will be replaced by larger units of a quite different character. (p. 9)

In fact, some American realists might even make the argument that the United
States, by deploying its power to foster partnerships and build a community of
interests with other states, will be able to retain its position of predominance in
the councils of the international system. As Clifford Kupchan (2004) recently
observed,

States are reluctant to balance against an order that provides them significant
returns. . . . By binding a hegemon’s power to other countries through formal or
informal commitments, alliances and partnerships are effective ways of reassur-
ing other states about preponderant power and thus of discouraging balancing.
(pp. 27, 29)

And I believe that the communitarian emphasis on shared interests and

norms as the basis for community, rather than force and coercion, provides the
starting point for what might be termed “communitarian realism”—a foreign
policy strategy that maintains that the emergence of a global community will

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come about through the voluntary coordination of the activities of nation-states

to combat transnational threats. And a foreign policy approach that encourages
the evolution of the current international order away from “coalitions of the will-
ing” dominated by a single major power to a “concert of powers”—where each
state knows why it is involved, what it hopes to gain from membership, and what
role it is expected to play—not only would produce a more stable world but also
would lay the foundation for a lasting global community.

THE INTERSECTION OF REALISM WITH COMMUNITARIANISM

It is true that communitarians and traditional realists have different criteria

for assessing the merits of foreign policy. For communitarians, a major factor is
whether, as Etzioni (2004) observed, a given policy action “advances the con-
struction of a new global architecture,” what he termed “community building.”
Following Morgenthau (1956), realists consider “prudence—the weighing of
the consequences of alternative political actions—to be the supreme virtue in
politics” (p. 9).
Yet both approaches would lead one to adopt a healthy skepticism about uto-
pian projects, no matter how noble their inspiration. Communitarians and real-
ists both believe that policy should be evaluated by its likely results, not by the
motives or intentions of its framers. The “morality of intentions” must never
trump the “morality of results.” Morgenthau (1956) counseled his students,
“Good motives give assurance against deliberately bad policies; they do not
guarantee the moral goodness and political success of the policies they inspire”
(p. 9). As Dimitri K. Simes (2003/2004), in commenting on how American for-
eign policy would be assessed, observed, “History will ultimately judge Ameri-
can leaders by what they were able to accomplish for the American people, not
by the purity of their hearts or the number of their military victories” (p. 172).
Attention should be paid to what is achievable, not what is most desirable. In
discussing policy steps taken in the aftermath of an outside intervention in a
failed or genocidal state, Etzioni (2004) stressed that although “it is not undesir-
able to achieve much more than detyrannization . . . in many countries, all that
can be achieved in the short order is opening up and detyrannizing” (p. 80).
Indeed, both traditional realists and communitarians look for sustainable,
viable policies. Walter Lippmann’s famous realist maxim,

Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and
its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its
purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its
commitments, it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs. (as quoted in
Harries, 1992/1993, p. 112)

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is echoed by Etzioni’s (2004) comments that “keeping down the costs of order-
ing the world is a prerequisite for the taxpayers of a democracy to be willing to
continue to foot the bill” (p. 81). Indeed, Etzioni maintained that a communi-
tarian approach “must address the question of prioritization” because “not all
global problems can be addressed at the same time, given the limitations of
resources, knowledge and will” (p. 81). This is in marked contrast to those who
adhere to more idealistic streams of thought, who assume that everything can be
done cheaply and easily. Jonathan Clarke (1995) criticized what he termed
“faux Wilsonianism,” a belief that “high-flown words matter more than ratio-
nal calculations” in assessing the feasibility of any given foreign policy initia-
tive (p. 5).
For both communitarians and realists, therefore, idealistic aspirations are
balanced by pragmatic realizations. Morgenthau (1956) noted,

Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political
ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the
desirable and the possible, between what is desirable everywhere and at all times
and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place. (p. 7)

This understanding—along with Lippmann’s maxim—leads one to a foreign

policy defined by restraint. Etzioni (2004), working from communitarian prin-
ciples, came to the same conclusion:

Such an approach recognizes that our powers are more limited than we often real-
ize, and that promises to deliver more than we can will backfire. Moreover, a
restrained approach argues that we are all better off when we hold back, when we
apply less power than we command, in order to win the collaboration of others and
build institutions that will serve us in the longer run. (p. 51)

A COMMON CRITIQUE? COMMUNITARIANS AND

REALISTS ON NEOLIBERALS AND NEOCONSERVATIVES

Given the intersection between realism and communitarianism, it is not sur-

prising that there has been a convergence in the realist and communitarian cri-
tiques of both neoliberal and neoconservative approaches to foreign policy.
The neoliberal approach is to create community by fiat, to assume that trea-
ties and transnational institutions create a rule-based international order that
contains national power, and to create consensus among states as to how the
“international community” is to be governed.
The problem is that the current web of institutions, although they might be
useful in harmonizing policies, is not capable of generating a real global com-
munity. Ralf Dahrendorf (2001) noted that “the nation-state is still the single

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most important political space at the beginning of the 21st century. It may have
lost some of its strength, but it remains the relevant inclusive community for
most people” (p. 21). Dahrendorf warned that “as we move beyond the nation-
state, we must beware the pretense of democracy when, in truth, the voice of the
people does not reach decision-makers in any regular and constitutional way”
(p. 21).
Indeed, one of the mainstays of the conservative critique of this approach is to
decry the erosion of popular sovereignty by transferring control of policy away
from accountable national institutions to international organs that do not require
the consent of the governed to enact policy. Nor can a true community emerge by
imposing an agenda from the top down or by justifying antidemocratic mea-
sures by appealing to vague universal standards. Writing in a recent issue of The
National Interest, John Fonte (2004) argued,

There is nothing particularly “universal” about the agenda of much of what passes
for the “international community.” On the contrary, their agenda (on group rights,
new definitions of “human rights,” limiting democratic sovereignty, abolishing
the death penalty, and so on) is, for the most part, simply the views of “progres-
sive” transnational elites. These are rarely the views of democratic majorities in
democratic nations. . . . This is not to imply that raw majoritarianism within a
nation-state is the ultimate moral position. But . . . democratic procedures within
democratic nation-states are a more effective, more comprehensive, and above all
more just way of deciding what are universal human values. (p. 126)

Communitarians have a similar concern, given their emphasis on a community

that is responsive to the needs of its members. Etzioni (2004) noted that govern-
ments are reluctant to transfer sovereignty to transnational institutions, fearing
that

the results may be well outside the consensus worked out in domestic politics and
in the institutions to which the executive branches of national governments are
accountable, especially legislatures. . . . To the extent that these transnational inter-
governmental networks gain a life of their own, each becoming something of a
transnational authority that marches to its own drummer rather than acting as a
collection of national agents, they are loose cannons that are not accountable to
anyone. (pp. 162-163)

International institutions, for the communitarian, must work to “build transna-

tional bonds and a sense of shared fate as well as the creation of shared values”
(Etzioni, 2004, p. 90) and not simply be the imposition of another layer of unac-
countable bureaucracy on a citizenry that feels alienated from the decision-
making process.
The neoconservative approach takes as its starting point the unprecedented
power that the United States wields, which has created a unipolar world in the
aftermath of the cold war. Whether alone or in conjunction with other Western

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allies, the United States, rather than an international organization, should take
the lead in establishing and enforcing global norms of behavior—norms that
generally reflect a Western/American, liberal perspective.
One of the more eloquent spokespersons for this point of view, Max Boot
(2003), wrote that American power “has helped spread liberal institutions to
countries as diverse as South Korea and Panama” (p. A15). Boot has advocated
imposing “the rule of law, property rights, free speech and other guarantees, at
gunpoint if need be” in places such as Iraq (p. A15). In turn, by creating an
“empire of liberty,” the United States not only advances the cause of peace but
also secures its own predominant position in the international order (Boot, 2003,
p. A15).
One can argue that this is simply an application of Napoleon Bonaparte’s
strategy for Europe on a global level. Napoleon’s vision (“There will be no rest
in Europe until it is under a single chief,” which he said in 1804; see Robinson &
Beard, 1907, p. 315) was to use the might of French arms to reorganize the conti-
nent and to spread French legal and commercial institutions throughout Europe.
Yet the highly artificial nature of the Napoleonic empire led to its complete col-
lapse within a few short years, due to the same factors that Etzioni (2004) identi-
fied as the “Vietnamesque effect,” namely,

(1) being mired in local guerilla-like wars, which will result in rising casualties
and costs; (2) facing growing alienation and opposition overseas as well as at
home; and (3) finding that this kind of strategy is ineffectual and in the longer-run
cannot be maintained. (p. 102)

Realists are cognizant of these precedents and of the risks that the United States
runs if it attempts to govern the world unilaterally. As Simes (2003/2004)
pointed out,

Realists generally believe that, in the long run, the laws of history work against the
indefinite and easy predominance of a single power—particularly if this power
desires not only to pursue its political and economic interests, but also to exert
hegemonic influence over the destinies of other states (which naturally do not uni-
formly react warmly to this notion). (p. 169)

After all, even a superpower such as the United States, although it may wield a
preponderance of power in the international system, nonetheless does not pos-
sess limitless or inexhaustible resources. Donald McHenry (1980), delivering
the third distinguished Council on Religion and International Affairs lecture,
reminded his audience, “We must admit that we cannot accomplish everything
alone” (p. 10). This prudential aphorism is shared both by realists and by
communitarians in their approach to foreign policy. Indeed, the late realist
statesman George F. Kennan (1985/1986) declared that the “acceptance of one’s

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limitations is surely one of the first marks of a true morality” in assessing foreign
policy decisions (p. 215).
Realists are also cautious in assuming that the United States or any other
power is capable of mandating global norms. Simes (2003/2004) continued,

Every American administration faces pressure to act as if the United States were
responsible for the affairs of others. Realists often argue that succumbing to this
pressure is both arrogant and dangerous. It is arrogant because it presumes that we
always understand the circumstances of others and are well equipped to offer
indispensable guidance on how they should conduct their affairs. (p. 169)

McHenry (1980) echoed this point, noting that Americans would prefer,

in the spirit of Woodrow Wilson, to see all countries adopt our own values and even
our institutions. But for the most part we recognize that we live in a pluralistic
world and that other countries have a right to determine what their own values and
institutions will be. In our relations with other countries we are limited to insisting
on observance of those principles that will allow us to live peacefully with one
another. (p. 3)

Indeed, communitarians no less than realists are suspicious of what Etzioni

(2004) called “the Wilsonian daydream” (p. 133)—the belief that the world can
be quickly, easily (and cheaply) remade in the image of Western liberalism.
Instead, communitarians and realists alike are aware that promoting democracy
may prove to be an expensive proposition and take away resources needed to
maintain global order, the necessary prerequisite for the establishment of more
open societies. No less than realists, communitarians are well aware of the limits
of social engineering, especially in providing instant results.
Being realistic—concentrating on opening rather than on “democratizing”
societies—is the hallmark of both the realist and the communitarian critiques of
current neoconservative and neoliberal approaches to American foreign policy.
Etzioni (2004) echoed traditional realists when he cast doubt about the feasibil-
ity of a policy of democracy promotion the world over: “No earthly power is
capable of changing the world to such an extent. To claim otherwise invites dis-
appointment, breeds cynicism, wastes resources and generates a political back-
lash on the home front” (p. 78).
Ultimately, realists and communitarians share a suspicion of both the neo-
liberal and the neoconservative foreign policy approaches because of their reli-
ance on coercion (whether via regulation or by military force) to achieve com-
pliance with their directives. This is not to argue that the former eschew the use
of force; both realists and communitarians understand the need to rely on “hard
power,” that the threat of or actual use of force may be necessary, as a last resort,
to defend vital interests. But realists and communitarians alike prefer a system
based on mutual interests, whereas countries, and especially the great powers,
believe that they have a major incentive to join in shared global enterprises.

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WHAT ABOUT DEMOCRACY?

Neoliberal and neoconservative proponents of the “democratic peace” thesis

have argued that the aggressive promotion of democracy, either by international
institutions or by the United States (or the United States and Europe in alliance)
through active measures (whether economic or military), enhances the long-
term security of the United States and will lay the foundation for a more coher-
ent international community. As a proponent of this thesis, the Council for a
Community of Democracies (n.d.) has argued that

a prime example of cooperation among democracies was the creation of the

United Nations and the Atlantic alliance and those institutions that contributed to a
strong, prosperous and European Union. We are convinced the time has arrived for
the democracies of the world to build upon the experience of these organizations, a
new institutional framework for global cooperation among democratic nations
and those who aspire to govern themselves in accordance with democratic
principles. (CCD’s Vision section)

There are two problems with this approach, which although commendable in its
idealism is rooted more in a view of the world “as it could be” rather than the
world “as it is.”
The first is to conflate the Euro-Atlantic community with the world. NATO’s
intervention in 1999 in Kosovo is sometimes cited as an “international” effort,
yet as former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov (2002) noted, the three
states that most actively opposed NATO’s action—Russia, China, and India—
represented more than half of the world’s population (p. 51). Forty years ago,
Lippmann (1957) was already warning that the “Atlantic community was no
longer the political center of the world” (p. 8); although it remained a major
player in international society, it was no longer the sole center.
The second is that, as Etzioni (2004) pointed out, “short-order democratiza-
tion” is “unable to deliver on a strategy that seeks to establish world peace” (p.
134). There are threats in the world that need to be addressed now and cannot
wait for the establishment of viable, long-term democratic institutions. Ivanov
(2002) echoed Etzioni when he wrote,

Democratization, as such, is not the answer for other international challenges.

Indeed, the process of democratization must be protected from such threats as
international terrorism and organized crime. (p. 42)

This is not an argument for doing nothing to promote reform and development.
But both realists and communitarians can agree that “doing good at home and
abroad whenever possible,” as Simes (2003/2004) noted, needs to be based on a
“hierarchy of . . . priorities rather than a long and therefore meaningless laundry
list incorporating objectives, preferences and hopes” (p. 169). Indeed, both real-
ists and communitarians agree that the development of more open societies,

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1600 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST

leading to governments that are responsive to the concerns of the governed, is a

long-term process that requires realistic time frames for development and most
important, realistic expectations for specific countries, rather than the adoption
of a one-size-fits-all standard.
It is instructive, therefore, to see how a traditional realist and a communi-
tarian come to similar conclusions about U.S. policy toward China. From a real-
istic perspective, Simes (2003/2004) wrote,

Most realists are well aware that China remains a one-party state with limited free-
dom of expression. Nevertheless, realists generally also appreciate that China has
made remarkable progress in expanding both its citizens’ well-being and their
ability to control their lives. Realists further appreciate that China’s influence in
Asia is growing, particularly under Beijing’s pragmatic new leadership, and that
constructive relations with it are essential both to maintaining America’s presence
in the region without unnecessary conflict and to addressing the challenges of ter-
rorism and proliferation, most notably in dealing with North Korea’s attempted
nuclear blackmail. (p. 171)

Etzioni (2004), for his part, observed,

A self-restrained foreign policy best focuses on promoting whatever element that

a given society is leaning toward building up (say, economic liberties in China)
instead of insisting that the society has to make more or less equal progress on all
three fronts at once (e.g., boycotting trade with China—undermining both
engagement and opening up—because of a lack of sufficient progress in human
rights, as some advocate). . . . China’s respect for rights and democratic develop-
ment are lagging and, indeed, it occasionally suffers a setback, but still it is pro-
gressing significantly beyond what it was when it first began scaling back com-
mand and control of the economy. (p. 78)

A step-by-step approach, starting with more basic goals, is one that is more real-
istic and, thus, more sustainable. It also helps to create a more realistic basis for
conducting relations with other states. In an ideal world, Russia and China
would be full-fledged pluralist democracies and open societies. But the fact that
they may not be at present does not mean that we cannot live with these regimes.
In today’s world, a policy that promotes national interests and leads to genu-
ine community building is one where a country searches for accord and com-
mon interests with other states and international organizations to tackle threats
that no one country can hope to solve on its own recognizance.

INTERESTS, NOT IDEALS

Realism starts from the premise that the guiding motive of any country’s for-
eign policy is the pursuit of vital interests, beginning with national security but
extending to ensuring peace and prosperity for its citizens. The “Foreign Policy

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Concept” of the Russian Federation takes as its “uppermost priority” the estab-
lishment of a policy that can guarantee the “protection of the interests of the indi-
vidual, society, and the state” by “ensuring reliable security for the country” and

creating favorable external conditions for the progressive development of Russia,

for its economic growth, for raising living standards, for the successful imple-
mentation of democratic change, for strengthening the foundations of the con-
stitutional system, and for respect for human rights and freedoms. (Ivanov,
2002, p. 166)

Although traditional realists have placed a great deal of emphasis on state

sovereignty, other realist thinkers understand that there are new transnational
challenges that require a greater degree of interstate coordination and coopera-
tion. Zhongying (2002), discussing the sea change in the Chinese approach to
the international system, noted,

No country can unilaterally guarantee its own security in a globalized world.

China needs to change its outdated concept of security. We no longer view the
national and the other dimensions of security in military terms, but have to under-
stand it in all of its multidimensional aspects, including economic security and
ecological security. Moreover, China must re-examine its situation vis-à-vis its
security needs versus what it can provide for itself. (para. 9)

No one state is capable of combating international terrorism, stemming the pro-

liferation of weapons of mass destruction, combating the spread of narcotics,
and putting the global supply of energy on a more secure footing. Moreover, a
series of recent crises—including the “Asian flu” that infected the world eco-
nomic system in 1997 to 1998, the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) across national boundaries, and the attacks of 9/11—demonstrated the
very real threats to the existing international system, a system characterized, as
Charles Krauthammer observed, by “open seas, open trade and open societies
lightly defended” (The Nixon Center, 2001, p. 68). These shocks forced
national policy makers to acknowledge that their countries’ interests—includ-
ing their national security and economic prosperity—rested on forging closer
cooperative ties with other states.
During the past several years, states have begun to pool resources and to
coordinate their actions. Now, the intelligence and police forces of some 170
nations cooperate to share information, track the movement of terrorists, break
up plots before they are brought to fruition, and arrest, detain, and interrogate
suspects. Slowly but surely, a global coordinating system for combating interna-
tional terrorism is taking place. Its building blocs include not only a series of
bilateral relationships (such as between the American and Jordanian intelli-
gence services) but also a growing number of multilateral associations. For
example, Russia coordinates its antiterrorism strategy with China and the states
of Central Asia via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, interfaces with the

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European Union via the Wider Europe initiative, and takes part in the work of
the G-8. NATO interfaces with the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Orga-
nization via the Partnership for Peace program and the Russia-NATO council,
whereas talks are under way for China to formalize a consultative relationship
with the Atlantic Alliance.
The formation of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in May 2003 was
another example of this new approach. The 11 member states of the PSI have
stepped up intelligence sharing on proliferation matters and have coordinated
air, land, and sea interdiction efforts to try to prevent the spread of technologies
and materials that could be used to construct weapons of mass destruction. The
PSI, in turn, has had a multiplier effect. Ilan Berman (2003/2004) concluded,

The October 2003 Bali summit of ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asia

Nations] saw the creation of an Asian “security community” designed to
strengthen and coordinate regional efforts against terrorism, maritime piracy and
transnational crime—mirroring in part the intentions of the PSI. Similarly, since
the establishment in 2001 of the six-member Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
both Moscow and Beijing have attempted to sue it to create a common regional
approach to the problems of terrorism and narcotics trafficking in Central Asia.
These and other new constructs in Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe (as
well as adaptations of existing alliances now underway) suggest that the core prin-
ciples undergirding the . . . Proliferation Security Initiative have begun to gain
global currency. (p. 57)

These are not ad hoc arrangements. As time goes on, they create and expand a
web of institutional ties between nations. More important, they lay the basis for
shared institutions.
Ivanov (2002) believes that the construction of a new architecture of interna-
tional relations can proceed only along more cooperative lines. In keeping with
the perspective outlined by communitarians, Ivanov argued,

One of the main directions of this strategy is for the world community to develop a
method of crafting collective responses to the challenges posed by the modern
world . . . the tasks we face today are much more diverse and complex. Above all,
we must ensure humanity’s continued progress by providing reliable security for
all. (p. 71)

Ivanov’s call for “effective institutions to regulate international processes” paral-

lels Etzioni’s (2004) proposals for the formation of global authorities to handle
various transnational challenges such as security (terrorism and de-proliferation)
and health. And Ivanov concurred that the widening and deepening of such
associations contributes to the establishment of a new international architecture,
noting, “The more nations that participate in the process, the stronger an interna-
tional agreement will be in a given area, and thus, the international system as a
whole will be stronger” (pp. 47-48). With time, the challenge is to create an

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 Gvosdev / COMMUNITARIAN REALISM 1603

“integrated system that will mesh the needs of individual states with the interests
of the entire global community” (Ivanov, 2002, pp. 47-48).
Yet the question remains whether states would be prepared to surrender some
degree of sovereignty to these global authorities in return for security. The com-
munitarian gamble is that the “convergence of interests” among the nations of
the world for coping with transnational challenges that are proving too difficult
for any one nation-state to solve alone will lay the foundation for an emerging
global community. A rational assessment of national security needs, in other
words, will lead countries to take steps toward forming effective supranational
authorities. Global governance, therefore, will evolve out of interests, not
idealism.

COMMUNITARIAN REALISM

In domestic policy, communitarians are famous for pioneering “third way”

approaches that balance individual rights with communal responsibility. In dis-
cussions about the emergence of global norms, communitarians have called for
a synthesis between personal autonomy (and the rights that guarantee personal
liberties) and social obligations designed to promote the common good.
One would therefore expect that a communitarian approach to international
affairs would likewise be a third way, a synthesis between different perspectives.
Communitarian realism is such an attempt—viewing the emergence of a global
community arising out of concerns for security and protection of interests rather
than out of any ideological sentiment for the unification of the human family.
Of course, communitarian realism would differ in its approach from country
to country. It might have more appeal in smaller countries and among middle
powers who would more readily embrace the greater political and economic
security that a more communitarian international order might bring. As
Zhongying (2002) pointed out,

It is . . . important to note that the international environment that affects a country

and its foreign policy decisions not only consists of an abstract international sys-
tem and its institutions, rules and practices, but is also a concrete environment in
which a country exists. (para. 2)

This raises the question, In the current condition of American unipolarity, is

there an American version of communitarian realism? One may be emerging,
out of a synthesis between a desire to promote liberal values balanced by a realist
approach to foreign policy. Kupchan’s (2004) “Real Democratik,” for example,
has emerged out of a recognition that “under liberal or neoconservative
policymaking,” the world has not been made safer, nor has the spread of democ-
racy around the world been enhanced (p. 35).

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1604 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST

Most American realists identify three overarching foreign policy priorities:

Waging the war against international terrorism, advancing the nonproliferation
regime, and ensuring secure energy supplies. Given that the United States does
not have sufficient resources to ensure favorable outcomes, a pragmatic
approach would counsel close cooperation with other states. Kupchan (2004),
for example, advocated that “U.S. grand strategy should take an expansive view
of America’s interests, one which includes and serves the interests of other
nations as well” (p. 37), in pursuit not only of these three principal interests but
also other critical ones, such as “advancing democracy and human rights,
strengthening great-power relations, preventing conflicts and combating dis-
ease, drugs, crime and trafficking in people” (p. 37). To the extent that the
United States can become the leading force behind the formation of global
authorities to pursue these ends, while making other powers stakeholders in the
success of these institutions, both realist concerns (assuring the safety of the
United States) and communitarian aspirations (laying the foundation for effec-
tive interstate cooperation with an eye to community building) can be satisfied.
And because realists recognize that America’s unipolar moment may not last
indefinitely, they might conclude that American interests are best served by
using its power to cement rising powers into cooperative partnerships with the
United States.
In closing, it may help us to return to some of the principles that Morgenthau
(1956) laid out and to determine whether a communitarian approach to interna-
tional affairs is compatible with realism.
To the extent that the formation of global authorities and the move toward a
more effective global community enhances the well-being of Americans, to the
extent that the embrace of such a course of action minimizes risk and maximizes
benefits, it can be argued that a communitarian approach “complies both with
the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of success”
(Morgenthau, 1956, p. 7).
And if the emergence of a global community based on the protection of com-
mon interests brings a greater degree of security and minimizes the potential for
conflict, so be it. Morgenthau (1978) did not believe that realism dictated the
maintenance of an international system perpetually defined by hostile powers
balancing against each other to provide security under the threat of mutually
assured destruction. Morgenthau noted,

Political realism does not assume that the contemporary conditions under which
foreign policy operates, with their extreme instability and the ever present threat
of large-scale violence, cannot be changed. The balance of power, for instance, is
indeed a perennial element of all pluralistic societies, . . . yet it is capable of operat-
ing, as it does in the United States, under the conditions of relative stability and
peaceful conflict. If the factors that have given rise to these conditions can be
duplicated on the international scene, similar conditions of stability and peace will
then prevail there. (part 4, para. 1)

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 Gvosdev / COMMUNITARIAN REALISM 1605

Finally, the communitarian looks for the emergence of a new global order based
on shared interests rather than on forcible conversion or the wholesale transfor-
mation of the human being. Morgenthau counseled, “The realist cannot be per-
suaded that we can bring about that transformation by confronting a political
reality that has its own laws with an abstract ideal that refuses to take those laws
into account” (point 3, para. 9).
Communitarianism in international affairs espouses what appears to be the
goal of idealists—an effective form of global governance buttressed by the
emergence of a global community. But it endorses realist methods to achieve
this end.
In a recent article for The National Interest, Etzioni (2004/2005) noted,

Ever since I was a student in the early 1950s, I have been told that world govern-
ment is a dream of starry-eyed idealists. But a form of world government is com-
ing into being, although not the one that Immanuel Kant, Bertrand Russell or the
United World Federalists had envisioned. It is not the vast web of rules and norms
embodied by the United Nations and the European Union. It is not based on shared
ideology, race or religion. Nor is it a byproduct of the Wilsonian daydream of a
world rapidly democratized by the application of American power. It is motivated,
rather, by realism. (p. 81)

NOTE

1. Religion has, in the past, offered its own vision for the establishment of a global community
based on shared norms. Universal religions, such as Buddhism, Christianity, or Islam, have preached
the superiority of the community of faith (the sangha, the church, or the umma) with regard to other
forms of association (familial, tribal, or national) and have maintained that this community of faith
may one day become coterminous with the entire human race.

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NIKOLAS K. GVOSDEV is the editor of The National Interest and a senior fellow for strate-
gic studies at The Nixon Center. He has published widely on questions of foreign policy,
international affairs, and Russian and Eurasian affairs.

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