Bicycle Blitzkreig

The Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore 1941-1942

by Allen Parfitt

On the first day of 1941 a bespectacled Japanese staff Colonel named Tsuji Masanobu
reported to a modest building in Taipei. His job was to head a military small research
department. The task of this unit of 30 officers, enlisted men and civilian workers was to plan
a possible southward attack by the Japanese Army to conquer South Asia and the East
Indies. As the year passed Colonel Tsuji himself began planning an attack on the British
stronghold of Singapore.

The prospect was daunting. Singapore is an island off the southern coast of Malaya. The
seaward side was heavily fortified, and could hardly be taken by direct attack. The landward
side was vulnerable, but to get there an army would have to traverse the five hundred mile
length of the Malay peninsula. The peninsula is accessible from both sides at its narrowest
point, the Isthmus of Kra, where Malaya and Thailand meet. But further south the peninsula
widens out, and the center is rugged jungle. The route south lies along the west coast. The
Japanese would have to advance those hundreds of miles on the Indian Ocean side, where
their naval strength could not help them. They would have to cross rivers and fortified
positions. Then at the end of this odyssey, they would attack the Island of Singapore,
considered by the British to be the keystone of their defenses in the far east.

Tsuji himself was a controversial figure, and would become more so. He had been heavily
involved in the disastrous war with Russia in Nomonhon, on the borders of Mongolia and
Manchuria. By his own account he was thrown out of China because of his involvement in a
pan-Asian society. At the end of World War II he vanished to avoid the war crimes tribunal,
to surface several years later as an author and member of the post-war Japanese legislature.
A book has been written branding him as a war criminal ("The Criminal They Called a God",
by Ian Ward). Tsuji wrote a colorful and interesting account of the Malaya campaign, which
was translated into English as "Japan's Greatest Victory, England's Greatest Defeat", casting
himself in a leading role. This book is a great source on the campaign from the Japanese
side.. This article will assume that Tsuji's book is fairly accurate, keeping in mind that there
are some things he chose to leave out.

The Japanese would have some advantages. They were in the process of seizing control of
French Indochina, heedless of the fact that it was under the authority of an authoritarian
government nominally allied with their friends in Germany. This would give them air bases
that would allow their planes to reach Malaya and the surrounding waters, and a jump-off
place from which to invade Thailand. The Japanese had no intention of honoring Thai
neutrality. Japanese resources would be stretched, as they planned to attack numerous
locations in the South Pacific simultaneously, but Tsuji could expect to have experienced
troops and leaders assigned to the Singapore operation. Some armor might be available.

In September Tsuji was transferred to Indochina. War was obviously coming, and the plan
for attacking Malaya and Singapore had not been finalized. Desperate for information, Tsuji
went on two long reconnaissance flights over northern Malaya and southern Thailand.
Looking down he could see large British airfields at Alor Star and Kota Bharu, as well as an
airfield at Singora in Thailand. After he returned home he considered these airfields with a
mixture of fear and greed. Planes operating from northern Malaya could make a mess of an
invasion fleet if they were aggressively handled. On the other hand, if the fields could be
captured promptly, Japanese air power could be installed right in the British back yard.

Having looked the situation over, Tsuji created his plan for the attack. He proposed that the
Japanese land almost simultaneously at Singora, in Thailand, and Kota Bharu, just to the
south in Malaya in order to seize the airfields. Meanwhile a strong force would march through
Thailand. He flew to Tokyo to present his plan in late October. It was accepted. Tsuji reports
that Colonel Hattori, Chief of the Operations Section of the General Staff, told him that
"However excellent your opinions might have been, I would have hesitated to agree with
your intention to modify the plan determined by the Imperial General Staff according to your
own judgments based only on maps. But as the modifications were suggested as a result of
your own observations in the face of danger, no objections could be raised."

Command of the operation was given to General Yamashita Tomoyuki. General Yamashita
was an able and experienced officer, although mostly in staff positions. He earned the
sobriquet "Tiger of Malaya" in the ensuing operations. At the end of the war he was
convicted and executed for war crimes committed under his command. However, since
atrocities were a way of life for the Japanese Army during World War II, virtually every
senior officer could have been executed on that basis, and it is generally considered that
Yamashita was no more guilty than most, and less than many.

General Yamashita was given command of the 25th Army. It consisted of three divisions. The
5th Division had seen extensive service in China, and was considered one of the best in the
Japanese Army. The 18th was also an experienced and excellent unit. The third division was
the Imperial Guards Division. They were considered an "elite" formation, but had no combat
experience. Tsuji is dismissive: "Over a long period of years they had been trained for
elegant traditional ceremonies, but they had no taste for field operations and were unsuitable
for them. Their staff officers had a tendency to disobey their superior Army Commander."
The 25th Army also contained a tank regiment, which was to prove very useful, three
regiments of engineers, which were to prove invaluable, and various artillery and supply
troops. The total was about 60,000 men. The invasion troops were gathered at Hainan
Island, off the south coast of China, while the overland group was poised in Indochina. A
good understanding was reached with the navy, which would cover the landings, and army
and navy air units which would try to protect them.

The British were not unaware of the threat to their far eastern possessions. In theory,
Singapore was the second most important point in the British Empire (after London), and
considerable money had been spent in the thirties developing and protecting the naval base
there. The plan was that if Singapore was attacked, a powerful fleet would be sent to the
rescue. However, from 1939 through the middle of 1941 Britain was fully occupied with the
struggle against Nazi Germany. The Royal Navy was heavily engaged in the Atlantic and
Mediterranean, and the only ships that could be spared for the Indian Ocean were a few
obsolete battleships and cruisers, and the old carrier Hermes. In his perceptive book "The
Command of History", David Reynolds points out how little mention there is of far eastern
affairs in the first two books of Winston Churchill's monumental history of the Second World
War. As 1941 wore on, however, Washington made the British aware of the deteriorating
diplomatic situation in the far east and the urgent need to prepare for possible war with
Japan The easiest thing to find was troops. Soldiers were available from that huge reservoir
of manpower: British India. The III Indian Corps was in Malaya, including the 9th and 11th
divisions, and the 28th and 45th brigades. There were also two British brigades, the 53rd
and 54th. The Australian government was watching the situation carefully, especially
concerned because all of their best divisions were fighting in North Africa. They agreed to
send their recently formed 8th division to Singapore. There were also plans to send a further
British division, and when it arrived, the army totaled about 120,000 men.

Britain's man on the spot was the commander of General Headquarters Far East, Air Chief
Marshall Sir Robert Brooke-Popham. As an airman he encouraged the development of the
airfields Tsuji had spotted, and the deployment of the army north to protect them. The army
commander did not quite see this, so he was replaced by Lt. General Arthur Percival. Percival
was a tall gawky man, with considerable military experience, but no charisma at all. He was
to prove completely unequal to the difficult task before him. Actually, the man who turned
out to be Britain's most capable combat leader of the war was available, commanding a
division in Syria. But Slim's time had not yet come, and it is possible that the British
situation in Malaya and Singapore was too dire for even his prodigious abilities, It would
have been unfortunate for him to have spent the war as a prisoner.

Although the British had plenty of men, equipment was another matter. There were no tanks
at all, and a shortage of anti-tank guns. There was some mechanized transport in the form
of lorries and bren carriers. The air force for whom those nice airfields had been built was
using the Brewster Buffalo as its first line fighter. Back in the thirties the United States Navy
was looking for a new fighter to replace its biplanes. The Buffalo was designed to this
specification, only to be rejected in favor of the Grumman F4F Wildcat. However the
Brewster company sold quite a few to other countries in need of a modern monoplane
fighter. The Finns bought some, and liked them. No one else did. By 1941 the Buffalo was
definitely obsolete. To make matters worse the Brewster people had supplied many of the far
eastern Buffalos with engines recycled from commercial transports. Some of the planes were
being flown by British pilots, some by Australians. They hated each other. When squadron
Leader W.J. Harper, veteran of the Battle of Britain, arrived to take command of the 453
RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force) squadron, he later reported that "I was amazed to notice
amongst many of the Australian personnel on the Station the prevalent dislike that some of
them bore for the English--Englishmen were spoken of as ‘Pommies' with an air of
contempt.....It should be noted in turn that RAF personnel elsewhere ostracized the
Australians." Harper was so unhappy with the quality of some of his men that he asked for
and received permission to go to Australia to beg for some more experienced pilots. For
heavier aircraft the RAF and RAAF squadrons were using Bristol Blenheims and Lockheed
Hudsons. The Blenheim was nothing special when it was new, and by 1941 had been
relegated to training on most fronts. The Hudson was a military version of the Electra
transport, and was useful mainly for reconnaissance. The British had capable planes--
Spitfires, Hurricanes, Beauforts, Halifax heavy bombers, the matchless Mosquito, but they
didn't feel they could spare any of them for Malaya. There was also a huge ignorance of the
capabilities of Japanese air power. It was generally felt that Buffalos and Blenheims were
good enough for the far east.

Although he was focused on the struggle with Nazi Germany, in late August Winston
Churchill gave some thought to what could be done to strengthen the British position in
south Asia. He came up with a very Churchillian idea: send a battleship. Better yet, send
two, and maybe a carrier. Call it "Force Z". Admiralty was very dubious, feeling that all the
Royal Navy's battleships were needed in European waters, but Churchill was insistent, and,
as usual, he got his way. Orders were given for the newest battleship in the navy, HMS
Prince of Wales to proceed to Singapore. Prince of Wales had been launched in May, and was
a 32,000 ton ship mounting 10 14" guns. She had already been in action. So new that
civilian workers were still aboard, she had proceeded in company with HMS Hood on a
mission to intercept the German battleship Bismarck. Having successfully done so, her crew
watched in horror as the Hood blew up after an exchange of salvos. Prince of Wales' captain
decided to withdraw, making her perhaps the only Royal Navy battleship in history to refuse
combat with an enemy battleship. There was not a lot of adverse comment:, the untried
condition of the Prince of Wales, the fact that the Bismarck was accompanied by the powerful
heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, and the eventual destruction of the Bismarck by other units of the
Royal Navy may have helped mute criticism. Joining Force Z was the battle cruiser Repulse.
Repulse had been built during the First World War, but unlike many older ships she was very
speedy. She was armed with 6 15" guns. Her main defects were comparatively light armor,
and a lack of anti-aircraft weapons. She was already in the Indian Ocean on convoy duty.
The old battleship Revenge was also in the Indian Ocean, but was too slow to keep up with
Prince of Wales. The carrier Indomitable was supposed to be part of the Force Z, but she
accidentally grounded near Jamaica, and the need for repairs made it impossible for her to
arrive on time. No other carrier could be spared, so none was sent. At that time the carrier
Hermes was operating in the Indian Ocean, and, in fact, crossed paths with the Prince at
Capetown. Hermes was an old ship, the first ship ever built as a carrier, but she was quite
fast and could have kept up with the battleships. Her tiny and obsolescent air group could
not have provided much protection from Japanese bombers, but she would have given the
task force much needed reconnaissance capability. The failure to include her in Force Z was
probably a mistake, especially since she was pounced on and overwhelmed by Japanese
carrier aircraft near Ceylon the following year. Command of the force was entrusted to
Admiral Sir Tom Phillips. He was a very short man, with a reputation for being opinionated
and autocratic. He and General Percival must have looked like Mutt and Jeff together. Phillips
had very little sea experience, having served most of the war in staff positions. His orders
were not specific. Churchill said later that his squadron was "....sent to these waters to
exercise that kind of vague menace which capital ships of the highest quality whose
whereabouts is unknown can impose on all hostile naval calculations." However, the
Japanese had a pretty good idea where Force Z was, and Admiral Yamamoto ordered an
additional 40 bombers to southern Indochina to deal with it. Force Z arrived in Singapore on
December 2, 1941. Prince of Wales immediately underwent boiler repairs, but waited a week
to inform the RAF that her surface radar was not working. It was not until December 8th that
technicians came aboard, and were unable to fix the radar on short notice. Phillips himself
flew to the Philippines on December 4th to confer with the Americans, and did not return to
Singapore until December 7th.

Unlike the navy, the army had a specific plan. It was called Operation Matador. As soon as
the Japanese invaded Thailand, units south of the border would also enter Thailand and
occupy a strategic position called the "Ledge", where the road was cut through a high ridge.
Unlike the Americans in Hawaii, the RAAF was flying reconnaissance over the Gulf of Siam.
About midday on December 6th, they discovered the Japanese attack convoy, which had left
Hainan Island the day before. This would have been a good time to sortie Force Z and start
Operation Matador. But Admiral Phillips was still in Manila, the Prince was not ready to sail,
and Brooke-Popham was not prepared to violate Thai neutrality until the Japanese did so. He
did notify London, which in turn notified Washington, but somehow the significance of this
Japanese convoy did not make it to Pearl Harbor.

At 4 AM on December 8th, local time, Japanese troops went ashore at Singora. Colonel Tsuji,
was there with the first wave. Because of the time difference, this was actually a couple of
hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor, so this landing may be considered to have started
what the Japanese refer to as "The Pacific War". The Japanese had hoped that the Thais
would not resist, but the troops at Singora were met with machine gun fire, and the first
Japanese officer to enter Bangkok was pulled from his car and killed by an angry mob. But
soon elements of the Guards division were marching into the city, and the Thai government
accepted the inevitable. First came the cease-fire, then an alliance with the Japanese.
Although this was extorted by force, Thailand did have strong irredentist feelings about land
in Malaya and Indochina, and hoped that the Japanese would help them to recover it. By
being a co-belligerent, Thailand was spared some of the worst features of Japanese
occupation. Thai military units did not do much actual fighting.

Almost at the same time as the landing at Singora, Japanese troops came ashore fifty miles
south at Kota Bharu. They met a warm reception. The British had prepared positions
covering the airfield, and they resisted the Japanese landings effectively. RAAF and RAF
bombers attacked the transports at low level, and in spite of having several aircraft shot
down by anti-aircraft fire, they sank one transport and set two others on fire. Now that
hostilities had definitely started, quick action was needed from Singapore. But nothing much
happened. General Percival found time to attend a meeting of the Legislative Assembly in
Kuala Lumpur, Brooke-Popham couldn't decide whether Operation Matador was on or off,
and Force Z was still at anchor. By afternoon the Japanese had penetrated to the edge of the
Kota Bharu airfield against heavy resistance, and attacks by Japanese aircraft operating from
Indochina had made flight operations there impossible. At 6 PM British and Indian troops
were ordered to retreat. The Japanese had suffered about a thousand casualties, the British
about five hundred.

Force Z had missed its chance. The Japanese troops were ashore, their attack was
underway, and they could bring up supplies and reinforcements by land. In London Churchill
convened a meeting on the evening of December 9th to "review the naval position." The big
question was what to do with Force Z. Churchill tells us that he favored sending the ships
across the Pacific to join the American Fleet. Heading south for Australia was also a
possibility. But it was all academic.

Admiral Phillips was unwilling to leave Singapore without taking some action, but the city had
already been bombed, and it was obviously unsafe just to sit in the harbor. He decided to
head north along the east coast of Malaya. It is unclear what he was hoping to accomplish.
Perhaps he thought that there would be further landings, although the Japanese had no need
to put troops on the relatively isolated east coast. He requested fighter cover and
reconnaissance off Singora, but since he was determined to maintain radio silence at sea,
and the RAF and RAAF were in full retreat in northern Malaya, it is hard to see how this could
have been practical, even if the airmen were willing to try. The two battleships and four
destroyers sailed the evening of the 8th, and made their way north all the next day. The
weather was bad, rainy and cloudy, which hid the force from Japanese aircraft, but made it
hard for it to find anything. They were spotted by a Japanese submarine, which reported
their position but was unable to get in position to attack. At about 8 PM Force Z turned back
to the south. Admiral Phillips did not know it, but he was very close to Japanese cruisers that
were covering the flank of the invasion. Had Phillips any idea that the Japanese task force
was so close to him, there would have been a major battle. It might not have turned out well
for the British. Although the Japanese force was composed of cruisers and destroyers,
visibility was very poor, and the Japanese were armed with the famous Long Lance
torpedoes.

During the night Admiral Phillips received a message that the Japanese were invading at
Kuantan, about halfway down the east side of the peninsula. He decided to slow the task
force so he could investigate. Although this proved to be a fatal mistake, it is hard to see
how he could have done otherwise. Having sortied to interfere with the Japanese invasion,
he could hardly ignore one that might be happening right under his nose. He probably
thought that he was already out of range of torpedo bombers, not knowing that the Japanese
had provided their very long-legged medium bombers with that ability. At 8 AM a destroyer
was off Kuantan. Nothing at all was happening. There have since been varying accounts of
what happened: a water buffalo blundered into a minefield, some fisherman were fired on.
The nervous garrison had been spooked, but not by Japanese. Force Z headed for Singapore.

Early that morning almost a hundred Mitsubishi G3M and G4M twin-engined bombers, later
code named "Nell" and "Sally" took off from bases in Indochina in search of Force Z. About a
third were armed with bombs, two-thirds with torpedoes. About 11 AM the bombers, at the
end of even their prodigious range, sighted the Force Z. The level bombers attacked first,
scoring a hit on the Repulse. Then came the torpedo planes. Two torpedoes hit the Prince of
Wales, one doing fatal damage to her propellers. The next group of attackers focused on the
Repulse. She maneuvered desperately, evading 20 torpedoes, but with Japanese planes
attacking from every angle, it was just a question of time. She was hit first about noon; four
other hits followed, and she quickly rolled over and sank. Now the Japanese could
concentrate on the already crippled Prince of Wales. Six more torpedo hits, and she too was
on her way to the bottom. None of the accompanying destroyers was damaged, and they
managed to rescue many survivors, but not Admiral Phillips. British sea power in the far east
was temporarily extinguished. Churchill says, "in all the war, I never received a more direct
shock.". And, "Over all this vast expanse of waters, Japan was supreme, and we were
naked."

With the navy and the air force defeated, the defense of Malaya was now up to the army.
They planned to resist the Japanese advance at Jitra, just south of the Thai border on the
west side of the peninsula. A column had been finally sent to try and occupy the "Ledge", but
it was too late. Japanese forces accompanied by light tanks had beaten them to it, and sent
them tumbling back into Malaya. After driving in British forces screening the Jitra position in
a pouring rain, the Japanese arrived in front of the main positions the evening of December
10th. A Japanese officer, Lieutenant Oto, penetrated the British positions, killed a sentry,
and reported that there were gaps in the defenses, and a night attack was advisable. But
when the Japanese tried to advance, they were met with severe resistance and turned back.
British artillery fire began falling about them and the attack seemed to be in trouble. Colonel
Tsuji went back to hurry reinforcements forward. But as morning dawned the British and
Indian troops were looking over their shoulders. The airfield at Alor Star which was covered
by the Jitra position was being abandoned by the RAF, and the soldiers couldn't help
wondering why they were defending it. General Heath, commanding the III Corps, went back
to Singapore to request permission for his forces to withdraw. Percival was reluctant, but as
the Japanese began forcing the British defenses, the order to retreat was given. A position
which was expected to hold out for weeks, or even months, was lost in a few hours. How
could this happen? The most important cause was the Japanese troops, who were
experienced in combat and advanced with the elan which characterized their operations
throughout the war. The British and Indian soldiers, by contrast, were seeing the elephant
for the first time. The British commanders were also caught wrong-footed by the failure of
their operations in southern Thailand, and had not carefully prepared their defenses at Jitra.
Finally, the British forces were unsettled by the possibility of being outflanked by Japanese
forces coming over from the east coast. They also greatly overestimated the forces against
them, as they were to do throughout the campaign.

The defeat at Jitra started a trend which continued clear down the five hundred miles of the
Malay Peninsula. The British would try to make a stand, the Japanese would attack, the
British would retreat. It is often true that soldiers retreating toward their base can move
faster than their pursuers. Supply lines shorten, and the advancing enemy must contend
with blown bridges and obstructed roads. However, in the Malaya campaign the Japanese
were able to stay right behind the retreating British, never giving them time to catch their
breath. There were at least two reasons for this. First, the British abandoned vast quantities
of stores and supplies. Tsuji refers to theses as "Churchill Supplies", and the Japanese
helped themselves to food, transport, and munitions, which greatly eased their somewhat
tenuous logistical situation. The second reason was that the Japanese had issued their
soldiers thousands of bicycles. Western Malaya had good hard surfaced roads, and the
Japanese soldiers rode down them, as much as twenty hours at a stretch. The Japanese had
sold many bicycles in Malaya before the war, so they were able to find parts and repairs in
most towns and villages. When they could no longer repair the tires, they rode on the rims.
If the Japanese soldiers came to an unbridged stream, they slung their bikes over their
shoulders and waded through. When larger bridges were blown, the Japanese engineers
performed prodigies of quick repair, so that not only bicycles, but tanks and lorries as well
could pass over in a surprisingly short time. "Even the long-legged Englishmen could not
escape our bicycles", says Tsuji, "This is the reason they were continually driven off the
roads and into the jungle where, with their retreat cut off, they were forced to surrender".

What could General Percival have done? The most obvious thing would have been to move
replacement troops up to man defense lines well to the rear. There were plenty of troops
available in Singapore. But Percival was concerned, especially after the demise of British sea
power, that the Japanese might bypass the whole Malay Peninsula and attempt a landing
directly on Singapore. He also seemed gripped by a sort of lassitude where problems
upcountry seemed far away, and the idea that the defense of Malaya was absolutely
essential to the holding of Singapore never really penetrated. In theory, although the British
did not have strong naval forces available, they should have owned the sea flank, since the
Japanese did not have a single vessel in the Indian Ocean. But the threat of air power
deterred the Navy, and it was the Japanese who managed to make amphibious end runs,
often using captured small boats.

The next possible defensive position after Jitra was on the Slim River. It was overrun in a
matter of minutes by a Japanese tank charge. The Japanese tanks were not very good--their
medium tank mounted a 57mm gun, their light tank a 37mm, and neither was very well
armored. The Japanese tankers were lucky they did not have to face the Russian T34's, with
their 76mm cannon and powerful sloped armor. But the Japanese tanks were too much for
the British, who had none, and the Gotenda Regiment roared down the road for several
miles, spreading panic and destruction.

Squadron Leader Harper returned from Australia in mid-December. He did not have any new
pilots with him. The Australians quite sensibly felt that the few experienced pilots they had
were needed as instructors and cadres, and should not be wasted in what was shaping up to
be a hopeless battle. He found his squadron in complete disarray. They had been sent up to
Ipoh, about halfway up the peninsula, to assist another squadron that had been severely
handled by the Japanese. Morale was terrible, logistics were a mess, and one maintenance
group was trying to do the work of two. The only possible way the Buffalo could fight with
the Japanese planes was by using zoom and boom tactics, diving through enemy formations
from a great height, and using the speed gained to climb again. Dogfighting with Zeros was
suicide. But there was a total lack of any warning system at Ipoh, and Buffalos were being
destroyed on the ground, or shot down while taking off and landing. The success that
American P-40s and F4F's of the Cactus Air Force on Guadalcanal had later in the year was
due in large part to the devoted effort of coastwatchers up the Slot, who were able to give
warning of Japanese raids. Without such a network in Malaya, Harper's men were helpless.
He also commented that "The ex civil Airline engines on the Buffalos were quite unsuited to
the treatment they were getting in combat and on the ground..." Just about the time Harper
began to establish an observer system and bring some order to the situation, the squadron
was forced to retreat again. The one saving grace to the air situation was that the Japanese
air units were not coordinated with the army, and tended to raid civilian targets. There was a
horrific raid on Penang City on December 11, and daily attacks on Singapore. In mid January
a reinforcement convoy brought in 60 Hurricane fighters in crates. The arrival of these planes
was greeted with great optimism, but although the Hurricane was a capable fighter, certainly
a big improvement on the Buffalo, it was not better than the Zero. The Japanese had over
four hundred planes available by that time, and the Hurricanes were too few in number to
make much of a difference. However Colonel Tsuji notes, "...the Hurricanes flying low over
the rubber forest were a serious challenge. Their intrepid pilots continually machine-gunned
our roads, shooting up our motor transportation and blocking traffic....."

At the end of December Brooke-Popham was relieved, probably much to his relief. General
Henry Pownell was appointed to take his place, but soon after that the Far Eastern Command
was shut down, and everything from India east was placed under the command of Field
Marshal Earl Wavell. Pownell became his Chief of Staff. Wavell and Pownell flew to Singapore
in January. They were not impressed with Percival. "He is an uninspiring leader, and rather
gloomy…" noted Pownell in his diary. But they couldn't think of anyone to replace him, so he
was left in charge. Meanwhile the Japanese continued to move south. Kuala Lumpur, capital
of Malaya, fell on January 11th.

The onrushing Japanese received a check on January 14th. The Australians were finally in
action. Their flamboyant commander, General Gordon Bennett, was anxious for his men to
have a crack at the enemy, and the 27th Brigade was given responsibility for blocking the
main road south through Lohore. At a hamlet called Gemas the Australians ambushed the
Japanese, letting several bicycle-riding groups ride by, then catching them from the rear.
The Japanese 5th Division suffered casualties, but it is still not clear how many--certainly
more than a hundred The tanks also took a beating. Australian Sergeants Ken Harrison and
Charlie Parsons set up a pair of anti-tank guns near the main road. They remained there in
spite of being told by the commander on the spot, Lt. Colonel Galleghan, that the Japanese
wouldn't be attacking with tanks, and that the guns were not needed or wanted. Sure
enough, the tanks of the Gotanda Detachment came roaring up the road in their usual
aggressive style. T-34's, American Grants, or German PkW IV's would have laughed at the
sergeants' 2 pounder popguns, but the thin-skinned Japanese tanks were vulnerable, and the
Australians shot them to pieces. "The Gotanda Tank Detachment came under heavy fire in a
mined zone", says Tsuji, "and lost its ten tanks one after the other..."

But although the Australians had a strong position astride the main road, their flanks were
shaky. Japanese advancing up the coast, and along the jungle were able to force them out.
This would have been a great time for General Percival to commit some of those troops he
was saving in Singapore, but, like all generals who are getting licked, he was convinced that
he was heavily outnumbered, and that falling back was the only option. Another problem
with operations in the southern part of the Malay peninsula was the vast rubber plantations
on either side of the main road. Crisscrossed with little access roads, they made it very hard
to establish a flank. Of course, this could have worked both ways, but the Japanese were
going forward, and the British were going back. On the last day of January the Argyll
regiment filed across the causeway to Singapore, which was blown up behind them. The
battle of Malaya was over. The battle of Singapore was about to start.

The RAF and the RAAF were just about at the end of their strength. The last major operation
was on January 26th, when the decision was made to attack a Japanese reinforcement
convoy landing on the lower east side of the peninsula using Hudsons and antiquated biplane
Vildebeest torpedo bombers, escorted by the remaining Buffalos and Hurricanes. Some
damage was done to the Japanese shipping, but the Vildebeests in particular were
massacred by Japanese fighter cover. Early in February all remaining flyable planes were
flown off to Sumatra. Ground crews were instructed to remain to be issued weapons and
fight as infantry. Flight Lieutenant Harper remained with the ground crews, who were upset
at being abandoned this way, and at Harper's stiff upper lip attitude. A couple of days later it
occurred to someone that trained ground crew were as necessary to flight operations as
trained pilots, and the whole unit was evacuated by ship. The Japanese also transferred a
major part of their air strength to the attack on the Netherlands East Indies. Colonel Tsuji
was very indignant about this, ascribing it to jealousy at General Headquarters. This may
have been true, but it was also possible that GHQ saw the Singapore campaign as almost
over, and while the capture of Singapore was an important objective, it was even more vital
to capture the oil fields of Sumatra and Borneo quickly, before they could be destroyed by
the allies.

At this point the situation on Singapore was hopeless. If there was one lesson from World
War II, it was that islands could not be held under determined attack when air control above
them was lost. Crete, Pantellaria, Tarawa, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, it was the same story
every time. And the one occasion--Wake--when the attack was fought off, the Japanese
simply returned with enough strength to do the job. And Singapore had several
disadvantages that many of islands listed above did not have. Although General Percival's
strategy, if he had one, seemed to be to husband his strength for a final defense of
Singapore, surprisingly little had been done to fortify the beaches on the landward side. No
pillboxes dug and poured, little wire strung, etc. Singapore is not very far from Malaya, so
the entire island could be commanded by artillery sited on the mainland. And worst of all
there was a huge number of civilians, maybe as many as a million, all needing food and
water. The British kept pushing in reinforcements: the British 18th division, the 44th Indian
Brigade, 7000 Indian replacements, and 1700 Australian replacements all came in on
convoys. The ships that brought them in also took refugees out, mostly Europeans, but only
a tiny percentage of Singaporeans could leave. The rest were just another worry for an
already very worried General Percival.

Having said that, however, there is no reason why Singapore could not have held out for
weeks, perhaps even months. While their morale was sky high, the Japanese troops were
exhausted from their long trek down the peninsula. The 5th Division had been given two
days rest, which it badly needed. There were few if any reserves. The Japanese army was
committed to operations in the Philippines, East Indies, and as far as New Britain and the
Solomons, and had no troops in the area to spare. There was a serious shortage of artillery
ammunition, and, as indicated above, a major part of their air support had been moved. And
the Japanese were still outnumbered two to one. General Yamashita Tomoyuki stood in the
glass-enclosed observation tower in the palace of the Sultan of Johore looking out over
Singapore. He wanted it. He wanted it now. He knew all the problems that have just been
listed, but he was determined to assault the island as soon as possible. Nothing he had seen
of the British impressed him, and he felt that a sharp attack might lead to success. He
approved a simple but effective plan. The Guards Division would carry out a feint to the
northwest, the 5th and 18th Divisions would cross the straits at their narrowest point and
attack the east and north coasts of Singapore. The Guards would follow. The commander of
the Guards Division objected to this plan on the grounds that his troops did not have a
prominent enough role, and it was adjusted to give them a little more to do.

On the other side, General Percival was clueless. Singapore is a fairly large island, with a
circumference of about 70 miles. Unable to discern where the attack might come from,
Percival decided to to spread his troops out along the entire coast, thus insuring that
wherever the Japanese attacked, the defenders would be too weak to resist them. Nor would
there be any significant reserve available to counterattack. He was convinced as always that
the Japanese were far more numerous than they were, but this made his failure to put his
troops where they could be concentrated at need all the more puzzling. He was never able to
lose his fear that the enemy would swoop in from the seaward flank, and he told Wavell, that
he thought the Japanese would probably attack from the northwest, down the Johore River.

Troops sent to the northeast coast were discouraged by what they found. Not only was there
nothing in the way of fortifications, but the terrain was unsuitable for coastal defense, since
mangrove swamps limited visibility and field of fire. The Japanese were shelling the island,
and soon set fuel dumps ablaze, but the British were conserving artillery ammunition for
what Percival was hoping would be an extended siege. When Australian General Bennett was
asked privately by one of his brigadiers about the garrison's chances, he gave them about
ten days. However, he didn't seem to have any ideas about how to improve that, and
ignored the brigadier's request to have at least some reserve available.

On February 8th the Japanese shelling increased, and the Guards carried out their feint. This
did not affect Percival's depositions in any way, serving merely to confirm his opinion that
the blow would not fall in the obvious place. That night the 5th and 18th divisions crossed
over to the east and northeast coasts of Singapore in several waves, as all the small boats
available to the Japanese plied back and forth. The thinly spread defenders on the coast
were overwhelmed, in some cases fighting bravely, in others fleeing. By dawn the Japanese
were firmly lodged on the shore, and no British troops were available to drive them off. The
next night the Guards division attacked near the broken causeway, further to the west. Soon
Yamashita's headquarters received reports that the attack was a failure, and that the British
had flooded the water with burning petroleum. However, the report turned out to be false,
and Tsuji was given another opportunity to dismiss the Guards: "Did not this incident show
the true nature of the Kanoe [Guards] Division?", he asks rhetorically.

Having succeeded in crossing the water, Yamashita was not in a great hurry. He knew that
time was on his side. The Japanese advanced deliberately toward the center of the island
over the next two days. Their goal was the village of Burkit Timah, and control of the island's
reservoir. The British attempted to establish a defensive line along the Jurong Creek, but
although there was sporadic heavy fighting, most of the defending troops lacked enthusiasm.
At British headquarters plans were made and orders were given for counterattacks and
heavy resistance, but on the front lines not much was done. The smell of defeat was in the
air, along with the burning oil tanks, and everyone had a strong whiff of it. Deserters, those
unfortunate Australian "replacements", and desperate civilians were all running around
Singapore town getting drunk rioting, or looking for a way out. The harbor was still full of
ships, and they began leaving. Most made it to some destination, although several were sunk
with great loss of life. Some attempt was made to evacuate military specialists, such as
Squadron Leader Harper's ground crews. It took General Percival a few days to accept the
inevitable, but on February 15th he agreed to surrender. Most books on the subject have
pictures of the surrender at the damaged Ford Motor Company factory: Percival gaunt,
unhappy, Yamashita sleek, triumphant.

In the short interval before the Japanese were able to establish control quite a number of
people attempted to escape on anything that would float. Some were lucky. General Gordon
Bennett wandered down to the waterfront with his aide and a couple of other officers, and
managed to commandeer a junk. They climbed aboard, later changed to another vessel,
made it to Sumatra, and from there back to Australia. General Bennett said he had fled to
give the Australian government the benefit of his expertise in fighting the Japanese, but no
one was impressed. There was considerable criticism of his having left his men, but he
probably felt that was a small price to pay for being able to spend the war in Australia
instead of a Japanese prison camp. He eventually wrote a fulsome introduction for the
English translation of Colonel Tsuji's book. Some were not so lucky. Mr. Vivian Bowden, the
Australian Trade Commissioner for Shanghai, been instructed to close the consulate there in
September and go to Singapore because of the increasing threat of war with Japan. He
requested permission to return to Australia, but was told to "stick to his post." On February
14th he succeeding in finding a place on a small launch, but the craft was intercepted by a
Japanese naval vessel and forced to return to Singapore. He was seen arguing with a
Japanese guard, was taken outside the movie house where civilians were being held, and
shot.

Once the Japanese did establish control, they moved in to stay. They renamed the city
Shonan "Light of the South", requisitioned various buildings and facilities, later established
the Southern Army headquarters there, and used its magnificent port facilities to base
various units of the Imperial Fleet. The dreaded military police under the leadership of Lt.
Colonel Oishi took control of the city, and immediately rounded up tens of thousands of
Chinese men. They were screened by kempaitai officers against lists of known supporters of
the Nationalist Chinese. In addition anyone with a tattoo, indicating tong membership,
teachers, lawyers, other professionals, community leaders, or anyone else who gave a wrong
answer or had the wrong face was taken outside town, shot, and dumped into mass graves.
Estimates of the number killed range from 5000 to 50,000. General Yamashita said at his
trial that he was unaware that this was going on, but it seems hard to believe that civilians
could be killed on that scale totally unbeknownst to the man who was nominally in charge of
the whole island. More likely the General chose to be unaware of proceedings he did not
approve of but could not control. There was, of course, no paper trail, but there is
considerable testimony that Colonel Tsuji was involved in the planning the massacre. Soon
he was off to the Philippines, where the defeat of American forces there was behind
schedule, and the "war planning god" was needed.

Not quite every British serviceman in Malaya was a Japanese captive. Some were still
blundering around in the jungle waiting to be picked up, but the British had also authorized a
few "stay behind" parties to serve as the nucleus for resistance. One of these was headed by
Lt. F. Spencer Chapman. Chapman's group attempted one ambush, then realized that
pinpricks like this were futile once Singapore had surrendered. They went to ground in the
wilds of the central peninsula. Chapman himself joined up with communist insurgents, who
were doubtful about his politics, but liked his military skills and used him as an instructor.
After many adventures, including being captured and escaping, and an abortive attempt to
set up an intelligence network in Singapore, Chapman was evacuated by submarine in 1945
and wrote a book about his experiences.

The day after the surrender a large number of Indian Army personnel, officers and men,
were taken to a large open area called Farrer Park. Here they were addressed briefly by a
British officer, and then at length by Captain Mohan Singh, an officer who had been captured
in northern Malaya. He told the assembled Indians. that they were invited to join the Indian
National Army, a military organization that would, under Japanese auspices, liberate India
from British rule. Reaction was mixed, some enthusiastic, some skeptical. But the Japanese
had no plans to invade India immediately. The Burma campaign was just under way, so they
were patient. Eventually quite a large force--a division and a good part of another--was
recruited. Readers interested in the story of the Indian National Army should read Peter
Ward Fay's objective, detailed and sympathetic book "The Forgotten Army.": Many other
sources are either dismissive (traitors!) or fulsome (heroes!)

What lessons were learned? The British learned that the Japanese, far from being
contemptible little buck-toothed losers, were dangerous, tenacious, and aggressive enemies.
They learned that the Japanese Army and Navy could strike far and fast, on the surface and
in the air. They also learned that the Japanese could be extremely cruel and vicious.

The Japanese learned that the Western soldiers and their Asian allies were poorly led and
poorly motivated, and that the Japanese could conduct operations with inadequate numbers
on a logistic shoestring, counting on their matchless elan and on capturing supplies as they
went. When they attempted to apply these lessons against better soldiers with better leaders
at places like Guadalcanal and Imphal, the results were disastrous.

Perhaps the people of Asia learned the most. They learned that these British who had been
walking around as if God had chosen them to colonize the world could be beaten and
humiliated just like anyone else. But the Asians also learned that being ordered around by
the Japanese could be even more annoying, and often much more painful. What, they
thought, if we were able to run our own affairs? That thought had to stay on hold for a few
years, but it would eventually come into its own.

***

Bibliography
Primary:

Warren, Allen. Singapore. Talisman. 2002. (A detailed and well researched account of the
campaign).

Tsuji, Masanobu. Japan's Greatest Victory Britain's Worst Defeat. Sarpedon. 1993, 1997 (The
mysterious colonel's story, with himself in the leading role).

Secondary:

Bayley, Christopher and Harper, Tim. Forgotten Armies. Belknapp Press, 2005.

Chant, Chis. Aircraft of World War II. Barnes and Noble, 1999.

Chapman, F Spencer. The Jungle Is Neutral. Chatto and Windus, 1949.

Churchill, Winston. The Grand Alliance. Houghton Mifflin 1950.

Churchill, Winston. The Hinge of Fate . Houghton Mifflin, 1950.

Dunnigan, James F. and Nofi, Albert A. The Pacific War Encyclopedia. Checkmark, 1998.

Fay, Peter Ward. The Forgotten Army. University of Michigan Press, 1995.

Ienaga, Saburo. The Pacific War 1931-1945. Pantheon, 1978.

Reynolds, David. In Command of History. Random House, 2005.

Tarling, Nicholas. A Sudden Rampage , University of Hawaii Press, 2001.

Trewhitt, Philip. Armored Fighting Vehicles . Barnes and Noble, 1999.

Ward, Ian. The Killer They Called a God , Media Masters 1992.

Zich, Arthur. The Rising Sun , Time-Life, 1997.

And a few excellent websites

http://www.microworks.net/pacific/personal/pow_repulse.htm

http://www.ww2australia.gov.au/index.html

http://www.warbirdforum.com/buff.htm

http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/ww2/A1122391

http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/fall_of_singapore.htm