RULE 47 Section 2
G.R. No. 128412 March 15, 2002
REXLON REALTY GROUP, INC., petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO T. DE
GUIA, RTC JUDGE (Cavite City), BRANCH 16, ALEX L.
DAVID, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE
OF CAVITE AND PARAMOUNT DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES ponente: DE
LEON, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. (Rexlon, for brevity)
entered into an agreement with Alex L. David for the purchase
of the two (2) parcels of land as evidenced by a document
denominated as "Absolute Deed of Sale".
David filed with the RTC of Cavite City, Branch 16,
a petition for the issuance of owner’s duplicate copies of TCT
Nos. T-72537 and T-72538 to replace the owner’s duplicate
copies which were allegedly lost. David alleged that he
entrusted his owner’s duplicate copies to a friend and member
of his staff for the purpose of showing them to a prospective
developer but were misplaced and that said owner’s duplicate
copies have not been delivered to any person or entity to
secure payment or performance of any obligation.
An initial hearing proceeded ex-parte inasmuch as
nobody appeared to oppose the same and the RTC directed
the Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, upon
payment of the corresponding fees, to issue another duplicate
copies of TCTs.
Rexlon then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for annulment of the said Decision of the trial court on the
ground that David allegedly employed fraud and deception in
securing the replacement owner’s duplicate copies of the
subject TCTs; that there was absence of due process; and,
that the decision of the trial court was tainted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The petition was later amended, with leave of court, to
include as respondent Paramount Development Corporation of
the Philippines (Paramount, for brevity) upon discovering that
David had executed on September 20, 1994, a deed of sale of
the subject parcels of land in favor of Paramount. and as a
result of that sale, new certificates of title designated as TCT
Nos. T-525664 and T-525665 were issued in the name of
Paramount in lieu of TCTs in the name of Alex L. David.
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition of Rexlon,
for lack of merit. CA held as insignificant the contention of
petitioner Rexlon that David had misled the trial court in
alleging that his owner’s duplicate copies were lost as the
decision sought to be annulled concerns the issuance of
owner’s duplicate copies of TCT Nos. T-75237 and T-75238 of
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite and did not
dwell on the issue of whether or not the alleged deed of sale in
favor of petitioner executed by private respondent has any
force and effect. Hence, this Court may not determine the
rights of any of the parties in this case to the said properties.
Furthermore, Alex David appeared to be the registered owner
of TCT Nos. T-75237 and T-75238 when said petition was
filed.
Besides, CA held a judgment can be annulled only on
two (2) grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for want of
jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law; or (b) that it has
been obtained by fraud and for fraud to serve as a basis for the
annulment of a judgment, it must be extrinsic or collateral in
character, otherwise, there would be no end to litigations and
these grounds do not obtain in the instant case.
Then, Rexlon filed a petition for review of the decision
of the CA dismissing the petition for annulment of the decision
of the RTC.
ISSUE: whether such misrepresentation or fraud of David can
be characterized as extrinsic fraud so as to merit the
annulment of the trial court’s decision granting respondent
David’s petition for the issuance of new owner’s duplicate
certificates of title of TCT Nos. T-52537 and T-52538.
RULING:
SC ruled in favor of the petitioner. The petition for
review was GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment
was REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the new owner’s
duplicate copies of TCTs in the name of Alex L. David issued
by virtue of the said Decision of the Regional Trial Court as
well as the replacement thereof, namely, in the name of
Paramount Development Corporation of the Philippines, are
declared VOID.
Pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, the grounds to annul a judgment of a
lower court are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
SC found that the issuance of new owner’s duplicate
certificates of title by the trial court in favor of respondent David
is indeed tainted with extrinsic fraud. David in his petition
before the RTC alleged that the Owner’s Duplicate of the
aforementioned Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-75237 and
No. T-75238 were lost and such have not been delivered to
any person or entity to secure the payment or performance of
any obligation whatsoever or used for any illegal or fraudulent
transaction. However, the document denominated as "Absolute
Deed of Sale" where the signature of respondent David as
seller has not been controverted, states that the latter has fully
received payment for the said sale and has bound himself to
cede and deliver to Rexlon, as vendee
David was therefore well aware that there was no
truth in his allegation in his petition for issuance of new owner’s
duplicate copies of said certificates of title on the false and
fraudulent ground that his owner’s duplicate copies of TCT
Nos. T-52537 and T-52538 were lost and that they were not
delivered to any person to secure the performance of any
obligation.
Extrinsic fraud contemplates a situation where a
litigant commits acts outside of the trial of the case, "the effect
of which prevents a party from having a trial, a real contest, or
from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates
upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the
manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair
submission of the controversy."11 The overriding consideration
is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court. Hence, the
Court has held that extrinsic fraud is present in cases where a
party (1) is deprived of his interest in land, because of a
deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested
when in fact they are; (2) applies for and obtains adjudication
and registration in the name of a co-owner of land which he
knows has not been allotted to him in the partition; (3)
intentionally conceals facts and connives with the land
inspector, so that the latter would include in the survey plan the
bed of a navigable stream; (4) deliberately makes a false
statement that there are no other claims; (5) induces another
not to oppose an application; (6) deliberately fails to notify the
party entitled to notice; or (7) misrepresents the identity of the
lot to the true owner, causing the latter to withdraw his
opposition. Fraud, in these cases, goes into and affects the
jurisdiction of the court; thus, a decision rendered on the basis
of such fraud becomes subject to annulment.
SC ruled case of Strait Times, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, as it
ruled in the case at bar, that extrinsic fraud did not attend the
proceedings before the trial court for the reason that:
 xxx It is well-settled that the use of forged instruments
or perjured testimonies during trial is not an extrinsic fraud,
because such evidence does not preclude the participation of
any party in the proceedings. While a perjured testimony may
prevent a fair and just determination of a case, it does not bar
the adverse party from rebutting or opposing the use of such
evidence. Furthermore, it should be stressed that extrinsic
fraud pertains to an act committed outside of the trial. The
alleged fraud in this case was perpetrated during the trial.
However, in consonance with the Straight Times
case, respondent David’s act of misrepresentation, though
not constituting extrinsic fraud, is still an evidence of
absence of jurisdiction.
In this case, the authenticity and genuineness of the
owner’s duplicate of TCT Nos. T-52537 and T-52538 in the
possession of petitioner Rexlon and the Absolute Deed of Sale
in its favor have not been disputed. As there is no proof to
support actual loss of the said owner’s duplicate copies of said
certificates of title, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction and
the new titles issued in replacement thereof are void.
In this case, SC simply annulled the decision of the
RTC, acting as a land registration court, to issue new owner’s
duplicate copies of TCT Nos. T-52537 and T-52538, for lack of
jurisdiction. The dispute between petitioner Rexlon and
respondent David regarding ownership over the parcels of
land will have to be threshed out or determined in a more
appropriate proceeding. In a petition for the issuance of a
new owner’s duplicate copy of a certificate of title in lieu of one
allegedly lost, the RTC, acting only as a land registration court,
has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question of actual
ownership of the land covered by the lost owner’s duplicate
copy of the certificate of title. Possession of a lost owner’s
duplicate copy of a certificate of title is not necessarily
equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it. The
certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely
an evidence of title over a particular property.

On whether this Court can rule on the validity or nullity of

the titles issued in the name of respondent Paramount in
the light of the facts of this case, SC ruled in the
affirmative.
Firstly, it must be remembered that, in the amended
petition of Rexlon for annulment of judgment, respondent
Paramount was impleaded for the reason that the prayer
therein sought the nullification of the new titles issued in the
name of respondent Paramount. Inasmuch as a petition for
annulment of judgment is classified as an original action
that can be filed before the Court of Appeals, the said
court can admit, by way of an amendment to the petition,
new causes of action intimately related to the resolution of
the original petition. Hence, respondent Paramount
became a necessary party in the petitioner’s original
cause of action seeking a declaration of the existence and
validity of the owner’s duplicate copy of the subject
certificate of title in the possession of the latter, and an
indispensable party in the action for the declaration of
nullity of the titles in the name of respondent Paramount.
Indeed, there can be no complete relief that can be accorded
as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the action,if we do not touch
upon the necessary consequence of the nullity of the new
duplicate copy of the subject certificate of title. The Rules of
Court compels the inclusion of necessary parties when
jurisdiction over the person of the said necessary party can be
obtained. Non-inclusion of a necessary party when there is an
opportunity to include him would mean waiver of the claim
against such party.
Secondly, Paramount has duly consented to put in
issue the validity of its titles by invoking in this appeal the
reasons espoused by the appellate court and respondent
David for the dismissal of the petition to annul the decision of
the trial court. Based on the principle of estoppel, respondent
Paramount is barred from raising any objection over the power
of this Court to nullify its titles.
Thirdly, in order for a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of the case, we must decide on the effect of void
duplicate copies of a certificate of title that served as a basis
for the sale of the property it represents and the eventual
issuance of titles in the name of respondent Paramount. To
require another proceeding only for the purpose of annulling
the said new titles when the same could be decided in this very
petition would promote judicial bureaucracy, a practice
abhorred by our legal system.
RULE 45
[G.R. No. 144225. June 17, 2003]
SPOUSES GODOFREDO ALFREDO and CARMEN LIMON
ALFREDO, SPOUSES ARNULFO SAVELLANO and EDITHA
B. SAVELLANO, DANTON D. MATAWARAN, SPOUSES
DELFIN F. ESPIRITU, JR. and ESTELA S. ESPIRITU and
ELIZABETH TUAZON, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ARMANDO
BORRAS and ADELIA LOBATON BORRAS ponente:
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Armando Borras (“Armando”) and Adelia
Lobaton Borras (“Adelia”), filed a complaint for specific
performance against Godofredo and Carmen before the
Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 4.
Armando and Adelia alleged in their complaint that Godofredo
and Carmen mortgaged the Subject Land for P7,000.00 with
the Development Bank of the Philippines (“DBP”). The Subject
Land is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 284 (“OCT
No. 284”) issued to Godofredo Alfredo (“Godofredo”) and
Carmen Limon Alfredo (“Carmen”under Homestead Patent No.
V-69196.
To pay the debt, Carmen and Godofredo sold the
Subject Land to Armando and Adelia for P15,000.00, the
buyers to pay the DBP loan and its accumulated interest, and
the balance to be paid in cash to the sellers.
Armando and Adelia subsequently paid the balance of
the purchase price of the land and Godofredo and Carmen
then delivered to Adelia the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No.
284, with the document of cancellation of mortgage, official
receipts of realty tax payments, and tax declaration in the
name of Godofredo.
Godofredo and Carmen introduced Armando and
Adelia, as the new owners of the Subject Land, to the
Natanawans, the old tenants of the Subject Land. Armando
and Adelia then took possession of the Subject Land.
Subsequently, Armando and Adelia discovered that
Godofredo and Carmen had re-sold portions of the Subject
Land to several persons.
Armando and Adelia filed an adverse claim with the
Register of Deeds of Bataan. They discovered that
Godofredo and Carmen had secured an owner’s duplicate
copy of OCT No. 284 after filing a petition in court for the
issuance of a new copy ,claiming in their petition that they lost
their owner’s duplicate copy.
Then Armando and Adelia amended their
complaint to include the following persons as additional
defendants: the spouses Arnulfo Savellano and Editha B.
Savellano, Danton D. Matawaran, the spouses Delfin F.
Espiritu, Jr. and Estela S. Espiritu, and Elizabeth Tuazon
(“Subsequent Buyers”) who purchased from Godofredo and
Carmen the subdivided portions of the Subject Land and to
whom the Register of Deeds of Bataan issued transfer
certificates of title to the lots they purchased.
In their answer, Godofredo and Carmen and the
Subsequent Buyers (collectively “petitioners”) argued that the
action is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds as there is
no written instrument evidencing the alleged contract of sale
over the Subject Land in favor of Armando and Adelia.
As counterclaim, petitioners sought payment of
attorney’s fees and incidental expenses.
Trial then followed. The trial court rendered its decision in
favor of Armando and Adelia.
RULING OF THE RTC: The trial court ruled that there
was a perfected contract of sale between the spouses
Godofredo and Carmen and the spouses Armando and Adelia.
The trial court found that all the elements of a contract of sale
were present in this case. The trial court ruled that the Statute
of Frauds is not applicable because in this case the sale was
perfected. The trial court concluded that the Subsequent
Buyers were not innocent purchasers. Not one of the
Subsequent Buyers testified in court on how they purchased
their respective lots. The Subsequent Buyers totally depended
on the testimony of Constancia Calonso (“Calonso”) to explain
the subsequent sale. Calonso, a broker, negotiated with
Godofredo and Carmen the sale of the Subject Land which
Godofredo and Carmen subdivided so they could sell anew
portions to the Subsequent Buyers. Calonso admitted that the
Subject Land was adjacent to her own lot. The trial court
pointed out that Calonso did not inquire on the nature of the
tenancy of the Natanawans and on who owned the Subject
Land. Instead, she bought out the tenants for P150,000.00.
Another indication of Calonso’s bad faith was her own
admission that she saw an adverse claim on the title of the
Subject Land when she registered the deeds of sale in the
names of the Subsequent Buyers. Calonso ignored the
adverse claim and proceeded with the registration of the deeds
of sale.
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals found the factual findings of the
trial court well supported by the evidence. Based on these
findings, the Court of Appeals also concluded that there was a
perfected contract of sale and the Subsequent Buyers were not
innocent purchasers. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
handwritten receipt dated 11 March 1970 is sufficient proof that
Godofredo and Carmen sold the Subject Land to Armando and
Adelia upon payment of the balance of the purchase price.
The Court of Appeals found the recitals in the receipt as
“sufficient to serve as the memorandum or note as a writing
under the Statute of Frauds.” The Court of Appeals held that
the contract of sale is not void even if only Carmen signed the
receipt dated 11 March 1970. Citing Felipe v. Heirs of Maximo
Aldon, the appellate court ruled that a contract of sale made by
the wife without the husband’s consent is not void but merely
voidable. The Court of Appeals further declared that the sale
in this case binds the conjugal partnership even if only the wife
signed the receipt because the proceeds of the sale were used
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The appellate court
based this conclusion on Article 161[7] of the Civil Code.
The Subsequent Buyers of the Subject Land cannot
claim that they are buyers in good faith because they had
constructive notice of the adverse claim of Armando and
Adelia.
Finally, the Court of Appeals noted that the issue of
prescription was not raised in the Answer. Nonetheless, the
appellate court explained that since this action is actually
based on fraud, the prescriptive period is four years, with the
period starting to run only from the date of the discovery of the
fraud. Armando and Adelia discovered the fraudulent sale of
the Subject Land only in January 1994. Armando and Adelia
lost no time in writing a letter to Godofredo and Carmen on 2
February 1994 and filed this case on 7 March 1994. Plainly,
Armando and Adelia did not sleep on their rights or lose their
rights by prescription.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether the action to enforce the alleged oral contract of sale
brought after 24 years from its alleged perfection had been
barred by prescription and by laches.
RULING:
SC ruled that the petition is without merit.
In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, this Court
reviews only errors of law and not errors of facts. The factual
findings of the appellate court are generally binding on this
Court. This applies with greater force when both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals are in complete agreement on their
factual findings. In this case, there is no reason to deviate from
the findings of the lower courts. The facts relied upon by the
trial and appellate courts are borne out by the record. We
agree with the conclusions drawn by the lower courts from
these facts.
Validity and Enforceability of the Sale
The contract of sale between the spouses Godofredo
and Carmen and the spouses Armando and Adelia was a
perfected contract. A contract is perfected once there is
consent of the contracting parties on the object certain and on
the cause of the obligation. In the instant case, the object of
the sale is the Subject Land, and the price certain is
P15,000.00. The trial and appellate courts found that there
was a meeting of the minds on the sale of the Subject Land
and on the purchase price of P15,000.00. This is a finding of
fact that is binding on this Court. We find no reason to disturb
this finding since it is supported by substantial evidence.
The contract of sale of the Subject Land has also
been consummated because the sellers and buyers have
performed their respective obligations under the contract. In
the instant case, Godofredo and Carmen delivered the Subject
Land to Armando and Adelia, placing the latter in actual
physical possession of the Subject Land. Godofredo and
Carmen also turned over to Armando and Adelia the
documents of ownership to the Subject Land, namely the
owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 284, the tax declaration
and the receipts of realty tax payments. On the other hand,
Armando and Adelia paid the full purchase price as evidenced
by the receipt dated 11 March 1970 issued by Carmen.
The trial and appellate courts correctly refused to apply
the Statute of Frauds to this case. The Statute of
Frauds[provides that a contract for the sale of real property
shall be unenforceable unless the contract or some note or
memorandum of the sale is in writing and subscribed by the
party charged or his agent. The existence of the receipt dated
11 March 1970, which is a memorandum of the sale, removes
the transaction from the provisions of the Statute of Frauds.
The Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts and
not to contracts either partially or totally performed.[ Thus,
where one party has performed one’s obligation, oral evidence
will be admitted to prove the agreement.In the instant case, the
parties have consummated the sale of the Subject Land, with
both sellers and buyers performing their respective obligations
under the contract of sale.
ON THE ISSUE THAT THE SALE IS VOID SINCE IT LACKS
MARITAL CONSENT:
The Family Code, which took effect on 3 August 1988,
provides that any alienation or encumbrance made by the
husband of the conjugal partnership property without the
consent of the wife is void. However, when the sale is made
before the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is
the Civil Code. Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the
disposition of conjugal property without the wife’s consent is
not void but merely voidable. Following petitioners’ argument
that Carmen sold the land to Armando and Adelia without the
consent of Carmen’s husband, the sale would only be voidable
and not void.
However, Godofredo can no longer question the sale.
Voidable contracts are susceptible of ratification. Godofredo
ratified the sale when he introduced Armando and Adelia to his
tenants as the new owners of the Subject Land. The trial court
noted that Godofredo failed to deny categorically on the
witness stand the claim of the complainants’ witnesses that
Godofredo introduced Armando and Adelia as the new
landlords of the tenants. That Godofredo and Carmen allowed
Armando and Adelia to enjoy possession of the Subject Land
for 24 years is formidable proof of Godofredo’s acquiescence
to the sale.
Moreover, Godofredo and Carmen used most of the
proceeds of the sale to pay their debt with the DBP. We agree
with the Court of Appeals that the sale redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. Article 161 of the Civil
Code provides that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for
debts and obligations contracted by the wife for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership. Hence, even if Carmen sold the land
without the consent of her husband, the sale still binds the
conjugal partnership.
Petitioners contend that Godofredo and Carmen did not
deliver the title of the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia
as shown by this portion of Adelia’s testimony on cross-
examination:
Q -- No title was delivered to you by Godofredo Alfredo?
A -- I got the title from Julie Limon because my sister told
me.[26]
Petitioners raise this factual issue for the first time. The
Court of Appeals could have passed upon this issue had
petitioners raised this earlier. At any rate, the cited
testimony of Adelia does not convincingly prove that
Godofredo and Carmen did not deliver the Subject Land to
Armando and Adelia. Adelia’s cited testimony must be
examined in context not only with her entire testimony but
also with the other circumstances.
Petitioners invoke the absence of approval of the sale by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to
nullify the sale. Petitioners never raised this issue before
the trial court or the Court of Appeals. Litigants cannot
raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would
contravene the basic rules of fair play, justice and due
process.[However, we will address this new issue to finally put
an end to this case.
The sale of the Subject Land cannot be annulled on the ground
that the Secretary did not approve the sale, which was made
within 25 years from the issuance of the homestead title. The
failure to secure the approval of the Secretary does not ipso
facto make a sale void. The absence of approval by the
Secretary does not nullify a sale made after the expiration of
the 5-year period, for in such event the requirement of Section
118 of the Public Land Act becomes merely directory or a
formality. The approval may be secured later, producing the
effect of ratifying and adopting the transaction as if the sale
had been previously authorized.
Action Not Barred by Prescription and Laches
Petitioners insist that prescription and laches have set in. SC
disagreed
The Amended Complaint filed by Armando and Adelia
with the trial court is captioned as one for Specific
Performance. In reality, the ultimate relief sought by Armando
and Adelia is the reconveyance to them of the Subject Land.
An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer
property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and
legal owner. The body of the pleading or complaint determines
the nature of an action, not its title or heading. Thus, the
present action should be treated as one for reconveyance.
To determine when the prescriptive period
commenced in an action for reconveyance, plaintiff’s
possession of the disputed property is material. An action for February 1994. Armando and Adelia filed the Complaint on 7
reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten March 1994. Clearly, prescription could not have set in since
years.The ten-year prescriptive period applies only if there is the case was filed at the early stage of the ten-year
an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is prescriptive period.
not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as Neither is the action barred by laches. We have
the real owner of the property also remains in possession of defined laches as the failure or neglect, for an
the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and unreasonable time, to do that which, by the exercise of
possession of the property does not run against him. In such a due diligence, could or should have been done earlier.[52]
case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
imprescriptible. entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.[53] Armando and Adelia discovered in January
In this case, the appellate court resolved the issue of 1994 the subsequent sale of the Subject Land and they
prescription by ruling that the action should prescribe four filed this case on 7 March 1994. Plainly, Armando and
years from discovery of the fraud. We must correct this Adelia did not sleep on their rights.
erroneous application of the four-year prescriptive period.
Validity of Subsequent Sale of Portions of the Subject
xxx It must be remembered that before August 30, 1950, the Land
date of the effectivity of the new Civil Code, the old Code of
Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) governed prescription. It Petitioners maintain that the subsequent sale must be upheld
provided: because the Subsequent Buyers, the co-petitioners of
SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited.- Civil Godofredo and Carmen, purchased and registered the Subject
actions other than for the recovery of real property can only be Land in good faith. Petitioners argue that the testimony of
brought within the following periods after the right of action Calonso, the person who brokered the second sale, should not
accrues: prejudice the Subsequent Buyers. There is no evidence that
3. Within four years: xxx An action for relief on the ground of Calonso was the agent of the Subsequent Buyers and that she
fraud, but the right of action in such case shall not be deemed communicated to them what she knew about the adverse claim
to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud; and the prior sale. Petitioners assert that the adverse claim
In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that registered by Armando and Adelia has no legal basis to render
just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of the law defective the transfer of title to the Subsequent Buyers.
(Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation to
reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true We are not persuaded. Godofredo and Carmen had already
owner. sold the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia. The settled rule
The law thereby creates the obligation of the is when ownership or title passes to the buyer, the seller
trustee to reconvey the property and the title thereto in ceases to have any title to transfer to any third person. If the
favor of the true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph seller sells the same land to another, the second buyer who
3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the has actual or constructive knowledge of the prior sale cannot
Civil Code with Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code, supra, the be a registrant in good faith.Such second buyer cannot defeat
prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently the first buyer’s title.In case a title is issued to the second
registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from buyer, the first buyer may seek reconveyance of the property
the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. subject of the sale.
Following Caro, we have consistently held that an
action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes
in ten years. We went further by specifying the reference point
of the ten-year prescriptive period as the date of the
registration of the deed or the issuance of the title.
Had Armando and Adelia remained in possession of
the Subject Land, their action for reconveyance, in effect an
action to quiet title to property, would not be subject to
prescription. Prescription does not run against the plaintiff in
actual possession of the disputed land because such plaintiff
has a right to wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his right. His
undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek
the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the
adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title.
Armando and Adelia lost possession of the Subject
Land when the Subsequent Buyers forcibly drove away from
the Subject Land the Natanawans, the tenants of Armando and
Adelia.[51] This created an actual need for Armando and
Adelia to seek reconveyance of the Subject Land. The statute
of limitation becomes relevant in this case. The ten-year
prescriptive period started to run from the date the Subsequent
Buyers registered their deeds of sale with the Register of
Deeds.
The Subsequent Buyers bought the subdivided
portions of the Subject Land on 22 February 1994, the date of
execution of their deeds of sale. The Register of Deeds issued
the transfer certificates of title to the Subsequent Buyers on 24
RULE 41
G.R. No. 131794 : December 10, 2003
RUBEN AUGUSTO and ATTY. NOEL D. ARCHIVAL,
petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE TEODORO K. RISOS, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Lapu-Lapu City,
CLEOFE OMOLON, respondents.
ponente: CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Court, as amended, filed by Ruben Augusto and Atty. Noel
D. Archival, for the nullification of the December 5, 1997
Order[1 of the Regional Trial Court Branch 7, Lapu-Lapu City.
FACTS:
Felisa Augusto and her siblings, Jose Augusto,
Magdalena Augusto and Alfonso Augusto, all married, were
the co-owners of a parcel of land, identified as Cadastral Lot
No. 4429 located in Barrio Mactan, Opon, Cebu.
The then Justice of the Peace and Ex-Officio Notary
Public notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale where the mentioned
co-owners sold the property to Guillermo Omolon for P200.00.
Omolon and his wife, Cleofe Omolon, caused the aforesaid
document to be registered in the Office of the City Assessor of
Lapu-Lapu City and then the vendors took possession of the
property.
In the meantime, the property was registered in the
names of Monico, Felisa, Jose, Filomeno, Teofilo and Sinfroso,
all surnamed Augusto, under Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. RO-3560. Guillermo Omolon died intestate and was
survived by Cleofe Omolon.
Sometime in July 1995, Cleofe Omolon filed a petition
for the reconstitution of the OCT covering Lot No. 4429, before
the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City, Branch 54, docketed as LRC Case
No. 21.
On January 10, 1997, the RTC granted the petition
and thus directed the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to
reconstitute the Original Certificate of Title for Lot No. 4429 of
the Cadastral Survey of Opon strictly in accordance with the
technical description of said lot.
However, upon presentation of the aforesaid order to
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, Cleofe
was informed that the owners copy had already been issued to
Ruben Augusto, pursuant to an Order issued by the court
dated August 23, 1996, and that based on the record, the
same was in the possession of Atty. Noel Archival.
Hence, on May 14, 1997, Cleofe filed a petition
before the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City, where she prayed that
after due proceedings, the Ruben Augusto and Atty. Noel
Archival be ordered to surrender the owners copy of the said
title:
On October 22, 1997, the RTC issued an order
directing Atty. Noel Archival to produce the owners copy of
OCT No. 3560 to allow the annotation of Cleofes interest, upon
which the owners duplicate copy of the title may thereafter be
returned.
The trial court declared that, based on the pleadings
of the parties, the issue of ownership over the property had
been raised, a matter which the court, sitting as a cadastral
court, could not pass upon. The trial court further ruled that
pending resolution of the issue of ownership over the property
in an appropriate proceedings therefor, there was a need for
the annotation of the petitioners interest over the property.
Ruben Augusto and Atty. Noel Archival therein
filed a Motion for a Partial Reconsideration of the Order
alleging that Cleofes interest over the property had been
sufficiently protected by the annotation of her adverse
claim.
However, on November 14, 1997, the court issued
an Order denying the motion of the Augusto and Archival
therein.
On November 26, 1997, Augusto and Archival filed
a notice of appeal from the said order to the Court of
Appeals.
On December 5, 1997, the RTC issued an order
denying due course therefor, on its perception that the
orders subject thereof were interlocutory; hence, not
appealable.
Augusto and Archival filed the instant petition
alleging that the HON. JUDGE TEODORO K. RISOS,
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed orders, and that
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law available to them.
The petitioners argue that contrary to the ruling of
the public respondent, its October 22, 1997 Order was final
and appealable, as the same disposed of the case. In her
comment on the petition, the private respondent averred that
the October 22, 1997 Order of the public respondent was
merely interlocutory as it did not fully dispose of the case and
had reserved the further determination of other questions. By
its order, the RTC merely required the petitioners to
present the owners copy of OCT No. 3560 in the Office of
the Register of Deeds for the annotation of her proprietary
interest over the property and ordered the return of the
said owners duplicate to the respondents after such
annotation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ruling of the public respondent, its
October 22, 1997 Order was final and appealable, as the
same disposed of the case
RULING:
In this case, the order of the public respondent
directing the petitioners to produce the owners copy of OCT
No. 3560 in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the
annotation of the private respondents interest over the property
is merely interlocutory and not final; hence, not
appealable by means of a writ of error. The public
respondent had not fully disposed of the case as it had
not yet ruled on whether to grant the private respondents
prayer for the surrender of the owners copy of OCT No.
3560.
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides
that an appeal may be taken only from a final order, and not
from an interlocutory one. A final order is one which
disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be
done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined. An order or judgment is deemed final if it
finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights,
or some right or rights of the parties, either on the entire
controversy or on some definite and separate branch
thereof, and concludes them until it is reversed or set
aside. Where no issue is left for future consideration, except
the fact of compliance with the terms of the order, such order is
final and appealable. In contrast, an order is interlocutory if it
does not finally dispose of the case.
As gleaned from the order of the respondent judge,
he believed that he had no jurisdiction to delve into and resolve
the issue of ownership over the property and was disposed to
dismiss the petition. Before so doing, he believed it was
necessary that the petitioners claim over the property be
annotated at the dorsal portion of the title before the institution
of an ordinary motion for the resolution of the conflicting claims
of ownership over the property:
Going over the pleadings of the parties, the court
gathers that ownership over the land in question is disputed by
the parties, which this court, sitting as a cadastral court, cannot
pass upon. However, since the petitioner has also shown
enough basis for claiming possession of the owners copy of
OCT No. 3560, by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex
A), and in view of the willingness of Atty. Archival to have
petitioners interest annotated at the back of the title, the court
feels that for the protection of both parties, the owners copy of
OCT No. 3560 in the possession of Atty. Noel Archival must be
produced, in order that petitioners interest may be annotated
therein pending resolution of the issue on ownership in the
proper proceedings.
SC directed Archival to produce the owners copy of
OCT No. 3560, before the Office of the Clerk of Court within
ten (10) days from receipt of this order to allow the annotation
of petitioners interest, after which the title may be returned to
the respondent.
In fine, the assailed order of the respondent judge partook
of the nature of an ad cautelam order. This is not to say that
the respondent court sitting as a cadastral court had no
jurisdiction to delve into and resolve the issue of ownership
over the property.
SC noted that earlier, it ruled in Averia, Jr. v. Caguioa,
[12] thus:
The Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree has
eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction
vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a
cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the
change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring
upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not only on
applications for original registration but also over all petitions
filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions.
Consequently, and specifically with reference to
Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (now Section 108 of
P.D. No. 1529), the court is no longer fettered by its former
limited jurisdiction which enabled it to grant relief only in cases
where there was unanimity among the parties or none of them
raised any adverse claim o serious objection. Under the
amended law, the court is now authorized to hear and decide
not only such non-controversial cases but even the contentious
and substantial issues, such as the question at bar, which were
beyond its competence before.[13
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DISMISSED. The December 5, 1997 Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 7, Lapu-Lapu City, is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 150276 February 12, 2008
CECILIA B. ESTINOZO, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS,
FORMER SIXTEENTH DIVISION, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. ponente:NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
Sometime in February and March 1986, Cecilia
Estinozo, while in Sogod, Southern Leyte, represented to
private complainants Gaudencio Ang, Rogelio Ceniza, Nilo
Cabardo, Salvacion Nueve, Virgilio Maunes, Apolinaria
Olayvar, and Mariza Florendo that she was one of the owners
of Golden Overseas Employment and that she was recruiting
workers to be sent abroad.
Private complainants paid the placement and
processing fees totaling P15,000.00 and went with Cecilia
Estinozo to Manila, relying on her promise that they would be
deployed by July 1986.
On the promised date of their departure, however,
private complainants never left the country and were then
informed by that there were no available plane tickets and that
they would leave by September of that year.
When in November 1986, they were not deployed,
private complainants suspected that something was amiss,
and they demanded the return of their money and was assured
a refund of the fees and even executed promissory notes.
Estinozo’s assurances were mere pretenses so in the early
months of 1987, complainants then initiated formal charges for
estafa against Estinozo.
After preliminary investigation, the Provincial
Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin,
Southern Leyte seven (7) separate Informations for Estafa,
defined and penalized under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). On request of Estinozo, the cases
were consolidated and jointly heard by the trial court.
During the trial, in her defense, petitioner testified,
among others, that she was an employee of the Commission
on Audit who worked as a part-time secretary at FCR
Recruitment Agency owned by Fe Corazon Ramirez; that she
received the amounts claimed by the complainants and
remitted the same to Ramirez; that complainants actually
transacted with Ramirez and not with her; and that she
was only forced to execute the promissory notes.
On November 9, 1994, the RTC found petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges of the
seven (7) counts of Estafa in the criminal cases
aforementioned
Aggrieved, Estinozo appealed the case to the CA
which affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The CA ruled
that the complainants positively identified petitioner, their
townmate, as the one who falsely presented herself as
possessing a license to recruit persons for overseas
employment.
On May 30, 2001, within the 15-day reglementary
period to file a motion for reconsideration or a petition for
review, Estinozo filed with the appellate court a Motion for
Extension of Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration which
CA denied pursuant to Rule 52, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
and Rule 9, Section 2 of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals (RIRCA).
Estinozo then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the June 28, 2001 Resolution of the CA which was also
denied.
Hence, petitioner instituted the instant Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65, arguing, among others, that: (1) her
previous counsel, by filing a prohibited pleading,
foreclosed her right to file a motion for reconsideration of
the CA’s decision, and consequently an appeal therefrom;
(2) she should not be bound by the mistake of her
previous counsel especially when the latter’s negligence
and mistake would prejudice her substantial rights and
would affect her life and liberty; (3) the appellate court
gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed petitioner’s
conviction for the other four (4) criminal cases—absent any
direct testimony from the complainants in those cases; (4) she
was deprived of her constitutional right to cross-examine the
complainants in the aforementioned 4 cases; and (5) she
presented sufficient evidence to cast reasonable doubt as to
her guilt in all the seven (7) criminal cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s erroneous filing of a motion for
extension of time and with her non-filing of a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review from the CA’s decision,
the challenged decision has already attained finality and may
no longer be reviewed by this Court
RULING:
Yes, SC ruled to dismiss the petition.
Immediately apparent is that the petition is the wrong
remedy to question the appellate court’s issuances. Section 1
of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a party
desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the CA may file a verified petition for review on
certiorari. Considering that, in this case, appeal by
certiorari was available to petitioner, she effectively
foreclosed her right to resort to a special civil action for
certiorari, a limited form of review and a remedy of last
recourse, which lies only where there is no appeal or
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually
exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an
appeal or any other adequate remedy. The nature of the
questions of law intended to be raised on appeal is of no
consequence. It may well be that those questions of law
will treat exclusively of whether or not the judgment or
final order was rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. This is
immaterial. The remedy is appeal, not certiorari as a
special civil action.
Even granting arguendo that the instant certiorari
petition is an appropriate remedy, still this Court cannot grant
the writ prayed for because we find no grave abuse of
discretion committed by the CA in the challenged issuances.
The rule, as it stands now without exception, is that the 15-day
reglementary period for appealing or filing a motion for
reconsideration or new trial cannot be extended, except in
cases before this Court, as one of last resort, which may, in its
sound discretion grant the extension requested.39 This rule
also applies even if the motion is filed before the expiration of
the period sought to be extended.40 Thus, the appellate court
correctly denied petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time to
File a Motion for Reconsideration.
It is well to point out that with petitioner’s erroneous
filing of a motion for extension of time and with her non-filing of
a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review from the
CA’s decision, the challenged decision has already attained
finality and may no longer be reviewed by this Court. The
instant Rule 65 petition cannot even substitute for the lost
appeal—certiorari is not a procedural device to deprive the
winning party of the fruits of the judgment in his or her favor.
When a decision becomes final and executory, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court will
have the power to review the said judgment. Otherwise, there
will be no end to litigation and this will set to naught the main
role of courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule
of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling
justiciable controversies with finality.

SC reiterated what it stated in Amatorio v. People:

that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be
relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the
remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or to a mistaken
mode of procedure. As a final note, we remind party-litigants
and their lawyers to refrain from filing frivolous petitions for
certiorari. The 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of Section 8 of Rule 65,
as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, now provide that:
However, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds the same
patently without merit or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or if
the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration. In such event, the court may award in favor of
the respondent treble costs solidarily against the petitioner and
counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to administrative
sanctions under Rules 139 and 139-B of the Rules of Court.
The Court may impose motu propio, based on res ipsa loquitor,
other disciplinary sanctions or measures on erring lawyers for
patently dilatory and unmeritorious petitions for certiorari.

As amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, Section 1 of Rule 45

now states:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.—A party
desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts,
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court
a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may
include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or
other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of
law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek
the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the
same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.